Index JOINT STRATEGIC CAPABILITIES PLAN
PRAIRIE WARRIOR 2000 - FOR INSTRUCTIONAL USE ONLY


ENCLOSURE C (3110.01)

PLANNING GUIDANCE

1. General. With the end of the Cold War and resulting changes in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, many of the traditional planning concepts of previous JSCPs are ill-suited for contemporary contingency planning. It has become clear from an assessment of these changes and from the lessons of operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM that fixed values assigned to planning assumptions for warning and informational decisions regarding force movements, reserve callup, mobilization, and other executive emergency measures, while necessary to develop operational plans, may and most likely will change at execution. What is also fairly clear, and critically important to recognize and plan for, is that crisis response always entails an element of risk, encompassing diplomatic, informational, economic, and military considerations. Because of this, warning time or, more correctly stated, available response time is far more likely to be well used by key decisionmakers if they have a menu of discriminate preplanned response options from which to choose, gauged to a range of crises.

2. Adaptive Planning Guidance. In consideration of the above, this JSCP introduces the concept of adaptive planning. Its premise is that a crisis can arise under a variety of circumstances that will, in turn, elicit a variety of likely or possible responses. Accordingly, the JSCP assigns planners the task of developing several response options keyed to a specific set of conditions at the onset of a crisis. These response options and three types of crises are portrayed in Figure C-1. Although CINCs are directed in enclosure E to apply these concepts to specific tasks and develop options considering specific threats, the intent is to produce plans varied and flexible enough so they can be applied and, with some modification, adapted to unforeseen regional threats or unexpected contingencies as well.

a. Flexible Deterrent Options. Adaptive planning underscores the importance of early response to an emerging crisis. It facilitates early decisionmaking by laying out a wide range of interrelated response paths that begin with multiple deterrent-oriented options carefully tailored to avoid the classic response dilemma of too much too soon or too little too late. These deterrent-oriented early response options are called Flexible Deterrent Options (FDOs).

(1) FDOs using military forces and resources should be combined with diplomatic, informational, and economic actions by non-DOD agencies to demonstrate to a potential adversary a clear signal of US resolve. Therefore, during the planning process, CINCs will plan requests for appropriate diplomatic, informational, and economic options as well as military options. The intent is to give the NCA a wide range of options, encompassing all the elements of national power (diplomatic, informational, economic, and military). Examples of diplomatic, informational, economic, and military options are shown in Figures C-2 through C-5.

(2) All regional operation plans will have FDOs. It is expected that FDOs will have a regional flavor, uniqueness, or variation. It is also expected that certain FDOs will be linked to actions not under the direct purview of the supported CINC, such as lift staging and readiness upgrades in CONUS. For the most part, as initial military responses, plans for flexible deterrent options should use active, in-place forces and theater lift assets (Case 1 forces). Some portions of the augmentation forces listed in the Case 2 force list (early deployers for Deploy-to-Fight Option) may be used It is envisioned that a single FDO should be approximately brigade, squadron, or battle group size. Combat support and combat service support should be furnished primarily by active-duty support forces.

(3) In planning FDOs, CINCs should avoid placing forces in a position where they may be sacrificed if a potential adversary is not deterred. In addition, FDOs should facilitate escalating to the deploy-decisive force response should it appear that signaling of resolve has not been effective. Finally, FDOs should also be capable of rapid de-escalation should the crisis appear defused.

(4) To facilitate the review of these FDOs, CINCs will include them as part of their CINC's Strategic Concept for each operation plan during concept review per the appropriate JOPES Volume II (CJCSM 3122.03) format. The description of these options will include anticipated mobilization and transportation enhancements, if required.

b. Deploy-Decisive Force. Planners must prudently plan for later actions (less timely from a deterrent perspective) resulting from the receipt of unambiguous warning in the event decisionmakers elect not to make a response or an adversary is not be deterred by FDOs. These actions must include the rapid deployment to the crisis region initially of a sufficient and supportable warfighting force to defend US interests, followed by decisive force to end the conflict quickly.

c. Counterattack. There is also the distinct possibility that a crisis would begin with an attack against US forces or vital interests without prior warning or deterrent moves. US force deployments would, therefore, not occur until after conflict had been initiated. The CINC may consider using an existing plan as a common reference for a point of departure, saving valuable time and permitting execution to begin almost immediately. Thus, such a concept for the deployment and employment of assigned and apportioned forces will be included in the MRC plans directed in enclosure E.

d. Specific Guidance for Adaptive Planning and TPFDDs. In general, adaptive planning OPLANs required in enclosure E will have a Deploy-Decisive Force TPFDD that includes the Presidential Selected Reserve callup and partial mobilization. For TPFDD development, the ordering of cases within the force tables (Cases 1 to 4) does not preclude the CINC from sequencing forces as required to meet his concept of operations with decisive force. The intent of sequencing force apportionment in these cases is to furnish a regional focus to forces, minimize multiapportionment of early deployers, and offer the flexibility of having plans to respond to other contingencies.

3. Deliberate Planning for Two Concurrent Major Theater Wars (MTWs) that Develop Sequentially. Major regional threats to US interests could occur in a number of different places. Because potential foes could consider US involvement in one crisis as affecting our ability to protect interests elsewhere, plans should support the possibility of two concurrent regional contingencies. Planning for two concurrent contingencies does not mean that our military strategy is designed to fight multiple wars. It simply enables us to deter an adversary or defend vital national interests in a theater while our attention is focused elsewhere. The NCA will establish priorities and decide on deployment or redeployment of forces based on global strategic requirements at the time of execution. Under these circumstances a CINC will prepare a CONCEPT SUMMARY dealing with the consequences, requirements, constraints, and shortfalls of executing the second of two concurrent MTWs.

4. Deliberate Planning for Smaller Scale Contingencies (SSCs). SSC plans are for operations against a less compelling threat than those involved in a major theater war. Thus, an SSC is limited in scale and duration and involves primarily active forces mainly for crises and conflicts like URGENT FURY and JUST CAUSE. Nevertheless, where appropriate, plans for SSCs will adopt the adaptive planning structures described in this enclosure. CINCs planning for SSCs can plan to use some reserve forces where and when they consider it appropriate and necessary to move a force. CINCs must clearly identify the circumstances where use of reserve forces will be required in their SSC plans. Table E-1 of enclosure E provides a list of approved regional assumptions for use in planning both major and lesser regional contingencies.

5. Planning for Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Warfare. All plans developed at CGSC will be based on the assumption that opponents may possess NBC weapons or can obtain them for the duration of the planning period.

6. Plans for Forward Presence Operations. For this planning period, specific areas of interest are operational training and deployments, security assistance, protection of US citizens abroad (noncombatant evacuation operations and combating terrorism), combating drugs, and humanitarian assistance. Supplemental Instruction 3110.14, "Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW)," contains general guidance and considerations for planning in these areas.

7. Access and Host-Nation Support. Any US operation may require access by US forces to lines of communication and facilities not in US territory, air space, or territorial waters. Plan for allied contributions to logistics, lift, administration, rear area security, medical, and C3I support, and allied combat forces, whenever feasible. Specific assumptions for regional planning are found in table E-1 of enclosure E.

8. Logistics

a. General. Guidance and planning factors for support, materiel sustainment, and strategic mobility are found in enclosure D and E and Supplemental Instructions 3110.03, 3110.11, and 3110.13.

b. Threat Distribution. As a result of lessons learned from Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM, plans will include, as much as practicable, guidance distributing the threat among Service components and identifying the expected duration of each phase of the operation. Deliberate threat distribution in joint operations is to ensure that resources support the CINC's Strategic Concept as it applies to the joint force as a whole. Independent resourcing by Service component commands that does not take into account the operational contributions of all Service component commands, collectively, or the expected duration of specific phases of the operation may place unacceptable strains on critical strategic lift assets and can impede the closure of forces.

 

Figure C-1

 

 

 

DIPLOMATIC FDOs

 

  • Reduce international diplomatic ties
  • Increase cultural group pressure
  • Alter existing meetings, programs, or schedules
  • Prepare to withdraw US embassy personnel
  • Pursue measures to increase regional support
  • Identify the national leader who may be able to

solve the problem

  • Develop or work within existing coalition (avoid unilateral actions when possible)
  • Show international resolve
  • Alert and introduce special teams

- Public diplomacy

- MTT

- Communications

  • Initiate noncombatant evacuation procedures
  • Use the UN or other international institutions
  • Identify clearly the steps to peaceful resolution
  • Restrict activities of diplomats
  • Reduce national embassy personnel
  • Take actions to win support of allies and friends
  • Coordinate efforts to strengthen international support
  • Promote democratic elections
  • Heighten informational efforts directed at:

- International community

- People within the national

- Coalition formed to overcome the situation

 

 

 

 

 

INFORMATIONAL FDOs

 

 

  • Impose sanctions on C4I technology transfer
  • Maintain an open dialog with the press
  • Protect friendly C4I assets
  • Heighten public awareness of the program and potential for conflict
  • Interrupt Satellite downlink transmissions

 

 

 

 

 

 

  • Promote US policy objectives through public policy statements
  • Keep selected issues as lead stories
  • Take measures to increase public support
  • Increase C4I processing and transmission capability

 

 

 

 

 

 

ECONOMIC FDOs

 

 

  • Seize real property in the US
  • Embargo goods and services
  • Cancel US-funded programs
  • Heighten informational efforts directed at:

- Financial institutions

- Reduce or eliminate corporate transactions

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

  • Freeze monetary assets in the US
  • Freeze international assets
  • Enact trade sanctions
  • Encourage corporations to restrict transactions
  • Reduce security assistance programs

 

 

 

MILITARY FDOs

  • Employ reconnaissance assets to the area
  • Increase military exchanges and staff visits to the area
  • Conduct aircraft fly-overs
  • Prestage sealift and airlift reception assets to air and sea ports of embarkation
  • Deploy fighter squadrons
  • Deploy the forward deployed ARG/MEO (SOC) to the region
  • Deploy AWACS to region
  • Open pre-positioned stockage facilities
  • Open and secure sea and air LOCs
  • Deploy CVBG to region
  • Activate reserve call-up
  • Initiate or increase show of force actions
  • Begin moving forces to air and sea ports of embarkation
  • Prestage or deploy contingency ready brigades
  • Establish curfews and impose restrictions on leaves, separations, and retirements
  • Implement meaconing, interference, jamming, and intrusion of enemy information assets

 

  • Deploy naval Surface Action Group to the region
  • Move MPS to region
  • Move Marine Expeditionary Force (FWD) to region
  • Upgrade alert status
  • Increase exercise activities, schedules, and scope
  • Increase strategic reconnaissance
  • Increase naval port calls or air squadron visits to the area
  • Increase mobile training teams
  • Use naval or air capability to enforce sanctions
  • Move prepo ships into the region
  • Deploy intelligence collection and analysis to area
  • Exercise WMD passive defense
  • Prestage airlift and airlift support assets
  • Deploy JSTARS to area
  • Replace logistic infrastructure where possible
  • Increase informational efforts

- PSYOP

- Measures directed at the opponent's military forces