Index JOINT STRATEGIC CAPABILITIES PLAN
PRAIRIE WARRIOR 2000 - FOR INSTRUCTIONAL USE ONLY


ENCLOSURE D (3110.01)

FORCES

1. Enclosure Description. Enclosure D contains planning information for the apportionment of US forces. It identifies and describes the force apportionment tables found throughout the Instructional JSCP. It also identifies force and Service planning considerations, contains information on regional force apportionment concepts, and identifies Service force apportionment databases.

2. Enclosure Outline

a. Part 1, "General Apportionment Information"

b. Part 2, "Regional Planning Factors"

c. Part 3, "Force Apportionment Summary"

PART 1

General Apportionment Information

1. Introduction. Force apportionment identifies major combat forces and selected support forces to be available for planning 19 October 19__. The apportioned forces reflect the strategy in enclosure B (Strategic Setting), planning guidance in enclosure C, and task assignments and assumptions for each CINC as described in enclosure E. The availability and apportionment of forces is for deliberate planning. Force assignment, reassignment, or allocation for crisis or contingency operations will be as authorized by the NCA through the Chairman of the Joints Chief of Staff to the respective CINCs at the time of execution. Refer to the annual Secretary of Defense memorandum, "Forces for Unified and Specified Commands," for the current peacetime assignment of forces.

2. Force Tables

a. Table Location. Force apportionment tables for regional planning are contained in enclosure E following each CINC's table of tasks.

b. Database. The Services' databases for apportionment of active and reserve forces are contained in Part 3.

3. Force Planning Considerations

a. Mobility Assets. Availability of mobilization assets in OPLANs will not exceed those apportioned in Supplemental Instructions 3110.03 (Logistics) and 3110.11 (Logistics). Specific assumptions based on the strategic mobility assets should be included in the CINC's Strategic Concept.

b. Strategic Offensive Forces. Strategic offensive forces will not be made available for conventional planning.

c. Strategic Bomber Forces. B-52, B-1, B-1B, and B-2 squadrons are apportioned for use in planning conventional operations.

d. Strategic Reconnaissance Forces. Strategic reconnaissance forces are available for planning conventional employment and other contingency operations as directed by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

e. Aerial Tanker and Cargo Support Forces. KC-135 and KC-10 aircraft are available in any scenario to support air refueling requirements. CINCTRANS will determine the best use of KC-135 and KC-10 assets.

f. Strategic Air Defense Forces. Strategic air defense forces will not be made available to CINCs to augment operation plans.

g. Theater Defense Forces. Forces assigned specific defensive missions will not be made available for contingency planning.

h. Maritime Pre-positioned Ships (MPS). The MPS program is designed to support USMC worldwide response. It consists of multiple combination container-RO/RO ships that contain equipment and supplies to support a brigade sized MAGTF. The ships can offload pier-side or at anchor (in-stream) and require a secure environment for arrival, assembly operations, and marriage with airlifted forces.

i. Hospital Ships. Two T-AHs (1,000-bed afloat hospitals each) furnish afloat health care facilities in support of amphibious task forces, Marine Corps, Army, and Air Force elements, and forward-deployed Navy elements of the fleet and fleet activities. T-AH operations are critical during combat when hospital facilities have not been established ashore.

j. Special Operations Forces. Special operations combat and aviation forces are described in detail in Chapter V and the appropriate supplemental instructions.

k. Support Forces. The JSCP apportionment is limited to combatant ("above the line") forces and gives only general guidance on the apportionment of support forces. Requirements for additional combat, combat support (CS) and combat service support (CSS) forces required to satisfy Service doctrine are based on the supported commander's concept of operations and reflect the expected duration and intensity of conflict and forces to be employed. Ultimately, Sourcing of these additional forces is a Service function. Where support levels are insufficient, the CINC may be forced to alter the concept of operations to account for support shortfalls. Support requirements should be time-phased into the operation. There are six sources of CS and CSS forces or equivalent services. These sources are as follows:

(1) Supported commander CS and CSS forces

(2) Host-nation support (HNS)

(3) Equivalent support services from in-theater contractor with existing contract

(4) CONUS CS and CSS forces

(5) Equivalent support services from CONUS contractor

(6) Supporting commander CS and CSS forces

This priority sequence may be altered to prevent temporary shortfalls in CS/CSS support of OPLANs.

4. Service Planning Considerations

a. Army. Reserve forces are an integral part of the Army organization. It would be difficult to conduct large-scale operations using only the active component of the US Army.

b. Navy. Navy forces kept in the reserves will not be apportioned in the JSCP. Sufficient combatants are in the active component to prevent reserve vessels from being required for the contingencies anticipated here. Mobilization times for ships in the Inactive Ship facilities and the National Defense Reserve Fleet are sufficiently long that they would be available only in a crisis that has a sufficiently long lead time. USCG forces will not be made available to the CINCs for contingency planning.

c. Marine Corps

(1) Marine forces are deployed as fully integrated MAGTFs, task-organized, combined arms forces consisting of air, ground, and combat service support units. MAGTFs include a command element (CE), a ground combat element (GCE), an aviation combat element (ACE), and a CSS element (CSSE). These elements are organized into three basic sizes of MAGTFs: Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF), Marine Expeditionary Force (FWD) (MEF), Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU), and Special Purpose MAGTF (SPMAGTF). The MEF normally has a Marine division as its GCE and a Marine aircraft wing as its ACE. The MEF(FWD) is normally organized with a regimental landing team as its GCE and an air group as its ACE. The MEU normally has a battalion landing team as the GCE and a composite squadron as its ACE. The SPMAGTF is organized to accomplish specific tasks ranging from warfighting to humanitarian assistance.

(2) Each MEF normally deploys a MEF(FWD), either on amphibious shipping or by air in conjunction with an MPS squadron, as its lead element. The rest of the MEF then deploys by a combination of sea and air to reinforce the lead element and gives the CINC a division/wing/FSSG force complete with 60 days of sustainment. MEF(FWD)s, normally deployed as the lead element of the MEF, can also operate as independent organizations to accomplish specific tasks. Each MEF(FWD) is capable of limited independent combat operations and can sustain itself for 30 days. The MEU is normally forward-deployed aboard amphibious shipping as part of the fleet and normally carries sustainment for 15 days. However, a MEU can be formed on short notice and deployed by air. The SPF deploys by air or sea depending on the mission, the wishes of the CINC, and the size of the MAGTF.

If the MEF(FWD) is to be a stand-alone MAGTF and the concept of operations does not envision the deployment of the MEF, then we will designate the MAGTF as a MEB, for example, 1st MEB. If the concept of operations later changes to require the MEF, the MEB concept of operations, the MEB will be redesignated the MEF (Fwd) in preparation for the arrival of follow-on forces. For example, 1st MEB would be redesignated as I MEF (Fwd).

(3) Selected Marine Corps Reserve (SMCR) forces selectively augment and reinforce the active forces. However, their activation time precludes their being apportioned to the CINCs for contingency planning.

d. Air Force. Each unit in the active forces and the Selected Reserve is programmed, budgeted, and trained to be ready to deploy within 72 hours after notification. Some units can deploy earlier.

5. Additional Planning Information. The force apportionment tables deal primarily with major combat forces. The JSCP supplemental instructions contain additional planning guidance. In addition, the following publications are available as planning aids:

a. AMOPS, Volume II

b. NCMP

c. USAF WMP Volume 3, Combat and Support Forces

d. Marine Corps Capabilities Plan, Volumes I & II and MPLAN

e. CGAPLAN and CGLSMP

f. Joint Pub 4-05, "Joint Doctrine for Mobilization Planning"

6. Planning Constraints

a. Forces. Constraints may affect the combat capability of forces listed in the force tables. These constraints are identified in the supplemental instructions.

b. Logistics. CINCs will notify CJCS of any anticipated shortfalls of materiel, support forces, or other deficiencies that will adversely affect the concept of operations.

c. Host-Nation Support. Footnotes to the tables in each CINC's section frequently reflect forces apportioned for planned deployments to specific locations. This should not be construed to mean that host-nation support agreements exist to support such deployments.

d. Force Availability. Operation plans will include only those forces apportioned. Each CINC will determine the risks associated with meeting assigned tasks with the forces apportioned.

PART 2

REGIONAL PLANNING FACTORS

1. Concepts. Regional contingencies are divided into two categories: Major Theater Wars (MTWs) and Smaller Scale Contingencies (SSCs). All major US combat forces are apportioned to the commands that are identified within the contingency categories. The two regional categories are used as a means of identifying commands assigned to develop MTW plans and for deconflicting multiapportioned forces among the commands. Further procedures are established to enable deconfliction within MTWs and SSC categories and between MTWs and SSC categories.

2. Force Table Categories and Commands

a. Categories. Apportioned forces for regional contingencies are listed in one of three table categories: MTW, SSC, or support.

b. Commands. USCINCPAC task assignments can be found in the LRC table.

3. Table Description. Each table is titled to give general criteria for which the listed forces are apportioned. Within each table, forces are further divided into cases (MTW only), column subsets (Service, Availability, Location, and Sources), and row subsets (In-place, Augmentation, or Reinforcements).

a. Table Cases (MTW only). Establishes separate tables for each case for MTWs

b. Table Columns

(1) Service. Forces are listed by Service starting with the highest levels of command.

(2) Availability. Availability times are based on a unit's capability to start and sustain movement from its normal geographic location. Forward-deployed forces are assumed to be available immediately for employment or repositioning.

(3) Location. Indicates relative location of a unit in either a specific AOR or the United States. CONUS-based units may be specified by coastal area. Some AOR locations are subdivided and easily identifiable.

(4) Source. The CINC having COCOM of a unit or the agency performing peacetime administration and routine management

(5) Supported Command (USSOCOM only). Identifies commands supported by SOF forces sourced by USSOCOM

c. Table Rows

(1) In-place. Active-duty forces remaining in a CINC's AOR after any planned redeployment to support another CINC. It also includes lead elements of follow-on combat forces.

(2) Augmentation. Active-duty forces that come from CONUS or another CINC

PART 3

FORCE APPORTIONMENT SUMMARY

1. Force Tables. Force tables in part 3 indicates the apportionment of generic Service forces (Army, Navy, Marine, Air Force). The generic quality of this table indicates the probability that specific Army Divisions, CVBGs, MEFs, and Air Force squadrons may not be available at the time of execution. However, in order to facilitate detailed planning and provide a basis for prioitizing training, the table part 3 is followed immediately by a listing of those forces identified for planning against the generic apportionment.

 

 

 

 

TABLE D-1

USPACOM FORCE APPORTIONED FOR REGIONAL APPORTIONMENT


IN-PLACE/FDO       MAJOR FDO          DECISIVE FORCE          OVERWHELMING FORCE

FLD ARMY HQ
CORPS HQ/SPT	                                            CORPS HQ/SPT
DFE(H)(-)          DFE(H)             DFE(H)                   DFE(H)
DFE(L)(-)  	                                             DFE(L)
2 APS                                 2 ER BDES (L)            BDE(H)
BDE(H)                                BDE(L)                   2 ER BDE(H)
BDE(L)             ACR                                         ACR
SF BN              SFG(-)             RGR BN                   SFG(NG)
                   AVN BDE            SOAR                     AVN BDE
                                                               2 ADA BN

4 VP                                  VP                       VP           
2CVBG              CVBG               CVBG                     2  CVBG
SAG                MCM                MCM                      SAG
MEU(SOC)                                                                                                 MEU(SOC)
MPS/MEF FWD        MPS/MEF FWD                                 MPS/MEF FWD
AMP/MEF FWD        or  AMP/MEF FWD                             and AMP/MEF FWD

13 FS              CW                 8 BS                     5 BS
SOG/3SQDN                             6 FS                     3 BS(F-117)
SOW/1SQDN                                                                                            12 FS
11 E-3                                12 E-3                   SOG/3SQDN
2 E-8                                 4 E-8



Note:

1. Army Corps HQ will be stationed in Pacifica if forward-deployed.

2. Refer to Table E-3B for regional forces apportioned for planning

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

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