Joint Staff Officers Guide AFSC Pub 1 -- 1997

The Joint Staff Officer Chapter 1

The Joint Staff Officer

 

100. PURPOSE AND PERSPECTIVE

a. The purpose of The Joint Staff Officer’s Guide, AFSC Pub 1, is to be a single, useful volume to help you understand joint operation planning. It does not stand alone; it is a textbook to supplement the instruction of the Joint and Combined Staff Officer School at the Armed Forces Staff College. It is a textbook and not official doctrine for operations. Joint and Service Doctrine should be referred to for official guidance. While no single volume can fully cover the entire subject, our purpose here is to give you many of the fundamental principles of the joint planning system. Pub 1 is also a compendium of the many references used by the staff officer. References listed in each chapter should be consulted for the most current and accurate procedures and policies. Its organization and content were selected to offer

b. We have found that our readers’ perspectives vary widely. Professionally, the readers may be staff officers well versed in military planning, or they may be new to this complex and challenging work. Operationally, their organization may be employment oriented, or they may work at a level concerned with strategic matters. Each point along the spectrum has different expectations and places different demands on the joint planning process.

c. Pub 1 offers a view of all the players in the planning community that helps you to better understand the entire process and, thus, your role in it. We will outline the processes and cite references so that the serious student can go to the source for an indepth discussion of an issue. To assist you in developing skill in military planning, we will place Service planning procedures in the context of the overall concept of the joint planning process.

d. Your view of the overall process may also improve if you study military history, strategy, tactics, logistics, and the principles of war. Joint Publication 5-0 and the 5-series joint pubs should also be studied. That helps to compensate for a lack of previous work in the field of planning and gives you a broad perspective not limited to your work experience. Such study will give you a broader and deeper understanding of the factors that influence military operations and will also illuminate past mistakes.

 

101. THE PRINCIPLES OF WAR

a. As you develop your professional base of experience in joint planning, you will have to filter from the ocean of information some key lessons learned or certain guiding principles that have universal application. In our profession, the principles of war represent some of those fundamental truths that have stood the test of time. Students who have reviewed and researched warfare over the years still have not reached consensus on a single list of principles of war; but they all will attest that such principles are a good starting point for evaluating military strategy and tactics, and form the foundation for operation planning.

b. Indepth discussions of our current principles of war can be found in joint and Service publications. Joint Pub 1, Joint Warfare of the U.S. Armed Forces, discusses the principles of war and their application in joint warfare. Army Field Manual No. 100-1, The Army, Naval Doctrine Publication 1, Naval Warfare, Air Force Manual 1-1, Basic Doctrine of the U.S. Air Force, and Fleet Marine Force Manual FMFM 6-4, Marine Rifle Company/Platoon, all contain extensive discussions of the principles of war. Excellent articles about the principles of war can be found in Military Review (May 1955 and September 1981) and U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings (November 1986). Figure 1-1 summarizes these joint and Service publications and references. As you can see, the principles of war differ from country to country.

 

102. PROFESSIONAL READING LIST. As a framework for expanding your professional knowledge in this area, the following professional reading list on classic military thought is recommended. For a more complete list, see the bibliographies listed in many of the following publications and in professional military journals. For a list of professional readings recommended by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, see Joint Pub 1, Joint Warfare of the U.S. Armed Forces. For the study of military classic literature, see the historical bibliography #8 compiled by Dr. Robert H. Berlin of the Combat Studies Institute, Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas 66027-6800. For the study of the "Great Captains," see special bibliography #279 compiled by Air University Bibliography Branch, Maxwell AFB, Alabama.

 

PRINCIPLES OF WAR

UNITED STATES

GREAT BRITAIN

AUSTRALIA

FORMER SOVIET UNION "Principles of Military Art"

FRANCE

PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA

Objective

Selection & Maintenance of Aim

   

Selection & Maintenance of Aim

Offensive

Offensive Action

   

Offensive Action

Mass

Concentration of Force

Massing & Correlation of Forces

Concentration of Effort

Concentration of Force

Economy of Force

Economy of Force

Economy, Sufficiency of Force

   

Maneuver

Flexibility

Initiative

 

Initiative & Flexibility

Unity of Command

Cooperation

   

Coordination

Security

Security

   

Security

Surprise

Surprise

Surprise

Surprise

Surprise

Simplicity

       
 

Maintenance of Morale

Mobility & Tempo,

Simultaneous

Attack on All Levels,

Preservation of

Combat

Effectiveness,

Interworking &

Coordination

Liberty of Action

Morale,

Mobility,

Political Mobilization,

Freedom of

Action

Adapted from JT Pub 1, FM 100-1, AFM 1-1, and FMFM 6-4 Figure 1-1

Military Review, May 1955, and Soviet Battlefield Development Plan

 

 

Allard, C. Kenneth. Command, Control, and the Common Defense. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1990.

Andrieu d’Albas, Emmanuel. Death of a Navy: Japanese Naval Action in World War II. New York: Devin-Adair Company, 1954.

Anno, Stephen E., and William E. Einspahr. Command and Control and Communications Lessons Learned: Iranian Rescue, Falklands Conflict, Grenada Invasion, Libya Raid. Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air University, 1988.

Blechman, Barr M., and Stephen S. Kaplan. Force Without War: U.S. Armed Forces as a Political Instrument. Washington, DC: Brookings, 1978.

Bolger, Daniel P. Americans at War: 1975-1986, an Era of Violent Peace. Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1988.

Bond, Brian, ed. Fallen Stars: Eleven Studies of Twentieth Century Military Disasters. London: Brassey’s (UK), 1991.

Bond, Brian. Liddell-Hart: A Study of his Military Thought. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1976.

Brecher, Michael, and Jonathan Wilkenfeld. Crisis, Conflict, and Instability. New York, NY: Pergamon Press, 1989.

Brodie, Bernard. Strategy in the Missile Age. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1959.

Builder, Carl H. The Masks of War: American Military Styles in Strategy and Analysis. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1989.

Chandler, David. Waterloo: The Hundred Days. New York: MacMillan Publishing Company, Inc., 1980.

Clausewitz, Karl von. On War. Ed. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret.

Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976.

Coakley, Thomas P. Command and Control for War and Peace. Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1991.

Cohen, Eliot A., and John Gooch. Military Misfortunes: The Anatomy of Failure in War. New York: Free Press, 1990.

Corbett, Sir Julian Stafford. Some Principles of Maritime Strategy. London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1911.

Craig, Gordon A., and Alexander L. George. Force and Statecraft: Diplomatic Problems of Our Time. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1983.

Cushman, John H. "Joint, Jointer, Jointest." United States Naval Institute Proceedings, May 1992, pp. 78-85.

Depuy, William E. "For the Joint Specialist: Five Steep Hills to Climb." Parameters, Sept., 1989, pp. 2-12.

Dougherty, James E., and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr. Contending Theories of International Relations: A Comprehensive Survey. New York, NY: Harper & Row, 1996.

Douhet, Giulio. The Command of the Air. New York: Coward-McCann, 1942.

Eccles, Henry Effingham. Logistics in the National Defense. Harrisburg, PA: Stackpole Co., 1959.

Eisenhower, Dwight D. Crusade in Europe. Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1948.

Fehrenbach, T.R. This Kind of War. New York: MacMillan Co., 1963.

Feifer, George. Tennozan. New York: Ticknor and Fields, 1992.

Foch, Marshal Ferdinand. The Principles of War. London: Chapman and Hall, 1918.

Frank, Richard B. Guadalcanal. New York: Random House, 1990.

Freeman, Waldo D., Randall J. Hess, and Manuel Faria. "The Challenges of Combined Operations." Military Review, Nov. 1992, pp. 2-11.

Gelb, Norman. Desperate Venture: The Story of Operation Torch, the Allied Invasion of North Africa. New York: William Morrow and Company, Inc., 1992.

George, Alexander L., and Richard Smoke. Deterrence in American Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice. New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1974.

______. Avoiding War: Problems of Crisis Management. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1991.

Gibson, Andrew E., and Jacob L. Shuford. "Desert Shield and Strategic Sealift." Naval War College Review, 44 (2), Spring 1991, pp. 6-19.

Gray, Colin S. The Leverage of Sea Power: The Strategic Advantage of Navies in War. New York: Free Press, 1992.

Guderian, Heinz Wilhelm. Panzer Leader. Trans. Constantine Fitzgibbon. New York: Dutton, 1952.

Hammel, Eric. The Root: The Marines in Beirut, August 1982-February 1984. San

Diego: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1985.

Holsti, Ole R. Crisis, Escalation, War. Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1973.

Howard, Michael. The Lessons of History. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1991.

Jessup, J.E., and R.W. Coakley, eds. A Guide to the Study and Use of Military History. Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1979.

Joint Electronic Library (JEL)

Jomini, Henri. Jomini and His Summary of the Art of War. A condensed version, edited and with an introduction by Lt Col J. D. Little. Harrisburg, PA: Military Service Publishing Co., 1947.

Keegan, John. Six Armies in Normandy: From D-Day to the Liberation of Paris. New York: Penguin Books, 1982.

Kenney, George C. General Kenney Reports. New York: Duel, Sloan and Pearce, 1949.

Lebow, Richard Ned. Between Peace and War: The Nature of International Crisis. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins Press, 1981.

Lehman, John F. Making War: The 200-year-old Battle between the President and Congress over How America Goes to War. New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1992.

Liddell-Hart, Basil Henry. Strategy: The Indirect Approach. New and enlarged edition. London: Faber and Faber, 1967.

Machiavelli, Niccolo. The Art of War. Albany, NY: H.C. Southwick, 1815.

Magruder, Carter B. Recurring Logistic Problems as I Have Observed Them. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1991.

Mahan, Alfred Thayer. Mahan on Naval Warfare. Ed. Allan Westcott. Boston: Little, Brown, 1943.

Manchester, William. American Caesar. Boston: Little, Brown, and Co., 1978.

______. Goodbye, Darkness: A Memoir of the Pacific War. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1979.

Mangum, Ronald Scott. "The Vicksburg Campaign: A Study in Joint Operations."

Parameters, Autumn, 1991, pp. 74-86.

Mason, R. A. "The Air War in the Gulf." Survival, 33 (3), May-June 1991, pp. 211-229.

McCarthy James P. "Commanding Joint and Coalition Operations." Naval War College Review, 46 (1), Winter 1993, pp. 9-21.

McCullough, David G. Truman. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1992.

Means, Howard B. Colin Powell: Soldier/Statesman--Statesman/Soldier. New York: Donald I. Fine, 1992.

Miller, Paul David. Both Swords and Plowshares. Cambridge, MA: Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, National Security Paper, November 19, 1992.

______. Leadership in a Transnational World: The Challenge of Keeping the Peace. Cambridge, MA: Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, National Security Paper, November 12, 1993.

______. The Interagency Process: Engaging America’s Full National Security Capabilities. Cambridge, MA: Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, National Security Paper, November 11, 1993.

Millet, Allan R., and Peter Maslowski. For the Common Defense: A Military History of the USA. New York: The Free Press, 1984.

Morrison, Wilbur H. Fortress Without a Roof: The Allied Bombing of the Third Reich. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1982.

Nye, Joseph S., Jr., and Roger K. Smith, eds. After the Storm: Lessons from the Gulf War. Lanham, MD: Madison Books, 1992.

Pagonis, William G. Moving Mountains: Lessons in Leadership and Logistics from the Gulf War. Boston, MA: Harvard Business School Press, 1992.

Paik Sun Yup. From Pusan to Panmunjon. Washington, DC: Brassey’s (U.S.), 1992.

Pfaltzgraff, Robert L., Jr., and Jacquelyn K. Davis, eds. National Security Decisions: The Participants Speak. Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1990.

Quinn, Dennis J., ed. Peace Support Operations and the U.S. Military. Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1994.

Raizo Tanaka. "Japan’s Losing Struggle for Guadalcanal." United States Naval Institute Proceedings, July, 1956, pp. 687-699; Aug., 1956, pp. 815-831.

Roberts, Jonathan M. Decision-Making During International Crisis. New York, NY: St. Martin’s Press, 1988.

Ryan, Paul B. The Iranian Rescue Mission: Why It Failed. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1985.

Schemmer, Benjamin F. The Raid. New York: Harper & Row, 1976.

Schwarzkopf, H. Norman. General H. Norman Schwarzkopf: The Autobiography: It Doesn’t Take a Hero. New York: Bantam Books, 1992.

Sheehan, Neil. A Bright Shining Lie: John Paul Vann and America in Vietnam. New York: Random House, 1988.

Slim, Sir William. Defeat into Victory. New York: David McKay Company, 1961.

Smith, W. Y. "Principles of U.S. Grand Strategy: Past and Future." Washington Quarterly, Spring 1991, pp. 67-78.

Snyder, Glenn H. and Paul Diesing. Conflict Among Nations: Bargaining, Decision-Making, and System Structure in International Crisis. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1977.

Spector, Ronald H. Eagle Against the Sun. New York: Free Press, 1985.

Spiller, Roger J. Not War but Like War: The American Intervention in Lebanon. Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1981.

Stockdale, James B. A Vietnam Experience. Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution, Stanford University, 1984.

Summers, Harry Glenn. On Strategy: The Vietnam War In Context. Carlisle Barracks, PA: Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 1981.

______. On Strategy II: A Critical Analysis of The Gulf War. New York: Dell Publishing, a division of Bantam Doubleday Dell Publishing Group, Inc., 1992.

Sun-Tzu. The Art of War. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1963.

Taylor, William J., Jr., and James Blackwell. "The Ground War in the Gulf." Survival, 33 (3), May-June 1991, pp. 230-245.

Thompson, Julian. The Lifeblood of War: Logistics in Armed Conflict. McLean, VA: Brassey’s (US), 1991.

Tilford, Earl H. Setup: What the Air Force Did in Vietnam and Why. Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air University Press, 1991.

Toffler, Alvin and Heidi. War and Anti-War: Survival at the Dawn of the 21st Century. Boston, MA: Little, Brown, 1993.

Toshikazu Ohmae. "The Battle of Savo Island." United States Naval Institute Proceedings, Dec. 1957, pp. 1263-1278.

Tuchman, Barbara. Stilwell and the American Experience in China, 1911-45. New York: MacMillan Company, 1970.

United States. Joint Chiefs of Staff. Special Rescue Mission Report. Washington, 1980.

United States Specified Command, Middle East. Operation "Blue Bat." CINCSPECOMME Command Report, 15 July-25 October 1958. 1958.

Van Creveld, Martin L. Supplying War: Logistics from Wallenstein to Patton. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1977.

van der Vat, Dan. The Atlantic Campaign: World War II’s Great Struggle at Sea. New York: Harper and Row, 1988.

______. The Pacific Campaign: World War II, the U.S.-Japanese Naval War, 1941-1945. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1991.

Vegetius Renatus, Flavius. The Military Institutions of the Romans. Harrisburg, PA: Military Service Publishing Co, 1944.

Watson, Bruce W., and Peter G. Tsouras, eds. Operation Just Cause: The U.S. Intervention in Panama. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1991.

Winham, Gilbert R. New Issues in International Crisis Management. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1988.

Winnefeld, James A., and Dana J. Johnson. Command and Control of Joint Air Operations: Some Lessons Learned from Four Case Studies of an Enduring Issue. Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 1991.

Woodward, Bob. The Commanders. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1991.

 

103. ORIGINS OF AMERICAN MILITARY STAFF PRACTICE

a. European origin. The staff practice and philosophy of the Armed Forces of the United States are almost completely of European origin. The modern general staff was developed in Prussia during the nineteenth century. Distinctive features of this staff system included

The general staff improved commanders’ ability to control the field operations of mass armies. These advantages eventually brought about the adoption of a staff system by all major Western powers.

b. The United States and the general staff concept. Major General Friedrich von Steuben, the first Inspector General of the Continental Army of the United States, introduced the staff practices of Frederick the Great into Washington’s army during the American Revolution. His well-drawn estimates of the military situation were of significant value to the American cause. Although American military leaders failed to develop the staff concept further during the years following the Revolution, the military staff saw rapid development in Europe during the first half of the nineteenth century.

c. The American Civil War exposed many of the conceptual weaknesses of our military staff. Why General George G. Meade failed to follow up his advantage at Gettysburg and pursue Lee in his retreat has been the subject of endless debate. Only a few historians have noted that Meade really lacked a staff with the training and resources to prepare and disseminate plans and orders quickly for such a complex operation. On the evening of 3 July 1863, a well-trained staff with adequate resources might have changed the course of history had it presented Meade with a well-conceived and ready-to-execute plan for pursuing Lee. The brilliant campaigning of Lee and Jackson was performed without detailed, exhaustive formal planning. It was more in keeping with the American style of the time, and it caught the imagination of militaries around the world. War, however, was becoming too complex, too industrialized to be fought without extensive use of the staff system. Isolated from Europe and concerned mainly with internal affairs during the nineteenth century, the United States did not adopt the military staff system for the Armed Forces until the beginning of the twentieth century.

104. STAFF DEVELOPMENT IN THE INDIVIDUAL MILITARY SERVICES. Today, a number of functions common to all the Services have developed from the National Security Act of 1947 and its amendments, and most recently from the Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986. Figure 1-2 describes these common functions. The following pages discuss the evolution of military staffs within each of the Services and the specifics related to their current functions. These functions are, by law, subject to the authority, direction, and control of the Secretary of Defense and the authority of the combatant commander as specified in Chapter 6, Title 10, U.S. Code. The accompanying illustrations describe some of the major functions of the individual Services as discussed in DOD Directive 5100.1. Additional information is in CM-44-89 "Report on Roles and Functions of the Armed Forces," and CM 1584-93 "Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Report on the Roles, Missions, and Functions of the Armed Forces of the United States," 10 February 1993.

COMMON FUNCTIONS OF THE

MILITARY DEPARTMENTS

THE MAJOR FUNCTIONS OF THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS, UNDER THEIR RESPECTIVE SECRETARIES, ARE TO

  • prepare forces and establish reserves of manpower, equipment, and supplies for the effective prosecution of war and military operations short of war and plan for the expansion of peacetime components to meet the needs of war;
  • maintain in readiness mobile reserve forces, properly organized, trained, and equipped for employment in emergency;
  • recruit, organize, train, and equip interoperable forces for assignment to unified and specified combatant commands;
  • prepare and submit budgets for their respective departments;
  • develop, garrison, supply, equip, and maintain bases and other installations and administrative and logistic support for all forces and bases; and
  • assist each other in the accomplishment of their respective functions.

Adapted from DOD Directive 5100.1 Figure 1-2

a. The U.S. Army

(1) Origin. From its birth in 1775 until the early 1800s, young America’s army staff patterned itself after the British system: control of the small Regular Army was split between the Commanding General, who was responsible for military discipline and control of field forces, and the Secretary of War, who guided administration and support with a staff bureau system. This bureau system divided authority between the Secretary of War and the Commanding General of the Army and lacked the mechanism to develop coordinated, long-range plans. Though suited to the efficient administration of a small peacetime force, the bureau system was incapable of coping with the demands placed on the twentieth-century Army, a situation that became clear in the Spanish-American War (1898).

(2) Development in the twentieth century

(a) In 1899, a civilian lawyer, Elihu Root, was appointed Secretary of War. At the time, he expanded the Army’s missions to include pacification and administration of the island territories recently acquired from Spain; in addition, he responded to public criticism of the logistical and operational confusion that had plagued Army performance in the Spanish-American War. He undertook reform of the Army command and staff system patterned on the British system. In 1903 Congress passed legislation creating a modern U.S. Army General Staff. The War Department General Staff corps of 44 officers, who were relieved of all other duties, was functionally organized to prepare plans for the national defense and mobilization of troops. The legislation also replaced the ranking military position, Commanding General of the Army, with a War Department Chief of Staff. The Chief of Staff (COS) supervised all Army forces and the staff departments that had been responsible to the Secretary of War. It was not until 1918, though, that it was clearly resolved that the Chief of Staff was the ranking member of the Army when General Pershing, then Commander of the American Expeditionary Force, was made subordinate to the COS. The Root reforms were the beginning that gave the Army the basis for a unified command and staff system.

(b) Today the Army Staff is an executive component of the Department of the Army. It exists to assist the Secretary of the Army in his/her responsibilities, and includes the following:

Chief of Staff

Vice Chief of Staff

Deputy Chiefs of Staff for Personnel, Intelligence, Operations and Plans, and Logistics

Assistant Chiefs of Staff (positions authorized by law, but not used) Special Staff: Chief of Engineers; Surgeon General; Judge Advocate General; Chief of Chaplains; Chief of National Guard Bureau; and Chief of Army Reserves

Adapted from DOD Directive 5100.1 Figure 1-3

b. The U.S. Navy

(1) Origin. The Department of the Navy was established in 1798. The early department was entirely in the hands of civilian appointees, while naval officers served at sea. Growth in size and complexity of Navy business in the first quarter of the 1800s led to creation of a Board of Naval Commissioners to give professional advice to the civilian appointees on constructing, repairing, and equipping ships and superintending shipyards. It was a bilinear arrangement, since employment of forces and discipline of troops was retained by the Secretary of the Navy. By 1842 the Navy Department had shifted from a predominantly personnel service, like its Army counterpart, to a predominantly materiel service deeply involved in complex and expanding technical problems. Five individual bureaus under the Secretary of the Navy were created for yards and docks; construction, equipment, and repairs; provisions and clothing; ordnance and hydrography; and medicine and surgery. The creation of additional bureaus specifically for navigation and equipment and for recruiting (enlisted personnel matters) was the response to weaknesses of the bureau system that were discovered during the Civil War. When necessary, special boards were formed to consider specific technical problems, such as strategy, inventions, and new vessels. By the close of the nineteenth century, the size and complexity of the Service, as well as the pressing need to ensure adequate preparation for war, became too much for control by a single manager. This, compounded by the intra-Service as well as the inter-Service experiences in the Spanish-American War, furnished motivation for Congressional and administrative change in the early 1900s.

(2) Development in the twentieth century

(a) In 1909 a General Board of the Navy was established to serve as an advisory body to the Secretary on matters of personnel, operations, materiel, and inspections. Legislation in 1915 created the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) that was charged with the operation of the fleet and preparation and readiness of war plans. In the 1920s the responsibilities for operation of the fleet were assigned to the newly created position of Commander in Chief of the U.S. Fleet. In March 1942 the positions of Commander in Chief of the U.S. Fleet and CNO were consolidated; once again the total direction and support of the U.S. Navy operating forces were under a single person. By the 1960s the CNO as military chief had complete responsibility for operations as well as supporting logistics and administration.

(b) Today the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations within the Department of the Navy assists the Secretary of the Navy in executing his or her responsibilities. This office includes the following:

 

Adapted from DOD Directive 5100.1 Figure 1-4

Chief of Naval Operations

Vice Chief of Naval Operations

Assistant Vice Chief of Naval Operations

Deputy Chiefs of Naval Operations for Manpower and Personnel (N1); Policy, Strategy, and Plans (N3/5); Logistics (N4); and Resources, Warfare Requirements and Assessments (N8)

Directors: Director of Naval Intelligence (N2); Director, Space and Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and Intelligence (C4I) Requirements (N6); Director, Training and Doctrine (N7); Chief of Naval Reserve; Surgeon General; Chief of Chaplains; and Oceanographer of the Navy

c. The U.S. Marine Corps

(1) Origin. The Marine Corps staff had its origin in 1798 in the Act for the Establishment and Organization of the Marine Corps. For a time the Commandant was a one-man staff; his chief duty was recruiting Marines for service with the fleet. As the number of recruits began to increase, however, the Commandant expanded the staff to include an adjutant to assist with musters and training, a quartermaster to procure supplies, and a paymaster to pay the troops. An administrative staff of three to five officers carried the Marine Corps through the nineteenth century.

(2) Staff growth in the twentieth century. The emergence of the United States as a world power after the Spanish-American War greatly expanded Marine Corps employment. As additional staff officers were assigned to aid the adjutant, quartermaster, and paymaster, their offices became known as departments. Change first occurred outside the staff departments in what came to be called the "Immediate Office of the Commandant." The initial step was taken in 1902, when an officer was assigned to headquarters as aide-de-camp to the Commandant. He formed the nucleus for staff expansion in the Office of the Commandant. The position of Chief of Staff was added in 1911 to assist the Commandant with matters of training, education, equipping the troops, and organization, distribution, and assembly at embarkation for expeditionary duty.

(3) Between World War I and the 1970s, the Marine Corps headquarters staff evolved into the staff that is seen today. In the early years of the twentieth century, there was the strong influence of the American Expeditionary Force and the development of the Army staff. Through World War II, the headquarters staff retained a line planning staff and functionally organized staff divisions for administrative, technical, supply, and operations functions. In the 1950s the staff was reorganized along general staff divisions, G-1 through G-4, and several technical staff divisions. The position of Chief of Staff was redefined in 1957 to assist the Commandant in his responsibilities to supervise and coordinate the headquarters staff. Even through the early 1970s, there was a composite staff

Adapted from DOD Directive 5100.1 Figure 1-5

arrangement with a distinction in line and staff functions. In 1973 headquarters was reorganized along functional lines with four Deputy Chiefs of Staff: Manpower, Installations and Logistics, Requirements and Programs, and Plans and Operations. These new directorates replaced the general staff sections. Marine Corps field units continued to use a combination of a functionally organized general and executive staff and a staff of technical experts.

(4) The Headquarters, Marine Corps, is in the executive part of the Department of the Navy. Its functions are to furnish professional assistance to the Secretary of the Navy, accomplish all military department support duties that deal with the Marine Corps, coordinate the action of Marine Corps organizations, prepare instructions for the execution of approved plans, and investigate and report efficiency of the Marine Corps in support of combatant commands. Its current organization includes the following:

Commandant of the Marine Corps

Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps

Chief of Staff of the Marine Corps

Deputy Chiefs of Staff for Aviation; Installation and Logistics; Manpower and Reserve Affairs; Plans, Policies and Operations; and Requirements and Programs

Assistant Chief of Staff for Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and Intelligence (C4I)

d. The U.S. Air Force

(1) Origin. The earliest staff organization in the Air Force reflected the general staff organization in the Army in the years before World War II. Before 1935 the War Department General Staff was responsible for planning, coordinating, and controlling the Air Corps. In 1935 the General Headquarters Air Force was formed and operated under the Army Chief of Staff and the War Department. By June 1941 the Army Air Forces had a recognized Office of the Chief of the Air Force. Reorganization throughout the war years resulted in experiments with a variety of staff organizational arrangements: the Army-style general staff organization; a double-deputy staff that produced a two-prong functional general staff identified as operations and administration; and a tridirectorate staff that recognized personnel and administration, materiel and logistics, and plans and operations.

(2) Growth since 1947. With the passage of the National Security Act of 1947, the U.S. Air Force was created as a coequal partner in the National Military Establishment. At first, the U.S. Air Force retained the multiple directorate organization used when it was the Army Air Corps. Stuart Symington, the first Secretary of the Air Force, was sworn in on 18 September 1947. The Secretary, along with the first several Chiefs of Staff, developed what was to become the foundation of today’s headquarters staff. The current organization is a multiple directorate staff: the traditional personal and specialist staff subdivisions plus a coordinating staff of personnel, comptroller, operations, and materiel.

(3) Since its inception, the U.S. Air Force has been organized along functional rather than area lines. The Chief of Staff is the military head of the Air Force. The Deputy Chiefs of Staff may speak for the Chief of Staff at any time on any subject within their functional areas, according to the authority delegated by the Chief of Staff. Each deputy in turn presides over a family of directorates, and each directorate is functionally oriented. In the Air Staff, decisions are made at the lowest level that has access to sufficient information and the requisite delegated authority.

Adapted from DOD Directive 5100.1 Figure 1-6

(4) The Air Staff is an executive part of the Department of the Air Force. It serves to assist the Secretary of the Air Force in carrying out his responsibilities and is organized as follows:

Chief of Staff of the Air Force

Vice Chief of Staff

Deputy Chiefs of Staff for Personnel, Logistics, Plans and Operations, and Command, Control, Communications, and Computers

Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence

Special Staff: Surgeon General; Judge Advocate General; Chief of Chaplains; Chief of National Guard Bureau; Chief of Safety; Director of Manpower and Organization; Chief, Security Police; Director of Programs and Evaluation; Director of Test and Evaluation; Civil Engineer; Chief of Air Force Reserve; Director of Morale, Welfare, Recreation and Services; Air Force Historian

e. The U.S. Coast Guard

(1) Origin. The Coast Guard, the nation’s oldest continuing seagoing Service, was established in 1790 as "a system of cutters" in the Treasury Department. First called the Revenue Marine and later the Revenue Cutter Service, the Coast Guard was primarily a law enforcement agency responsible for collecting customs duties from ships entering U.S. waters, enforcing embargoes, hunting pirates, and enforcing quarantines. However, by 1797 the strength of the Treasury Department’s cutters had been increased to "defend the sea coast and repel any hostility to vessels and commerce"; Congressional authorization established the role of the Coast Guard in national defense.

(2) Expansion of responsibility. In 1915 the U.S. Lifesaving Service, an organization of local stations scattered along U.S. coasts, merged with the Revenue Cutter Service to form the U.S. Coast Guard, and with that was born its traditional image, the "lifesavers." During World War I responsibilities were added for port safety and security, commercial vessel safety, icebreaking, and marine environment protection. Joined in 1939 by the Lighthouse Service, the Service assumed responsibility for establishing and maintaining aids to navigation. In 1967 the Coast Guard became part of the newly formed Department of Transportation. A comprehensive review of wartime missions was performed in 1981 by the Navy and Coast Guard Board. In a 1984 Memorandum of Understanding between the Secretaries of Navy and Transportation, Coast Guard area commanders were assigned as commanders of the newly formed U.S. Maritime Defense Zones (MDZ). These commanders are responsible to the Atlantic and Pacific Fleet commanders for planning and coordinating U.S. coastal defense, preparing operational plans, conducting exercises, and training reserve forces. MDZs will be activated as a deterrent option to ensure port safety and the initial safety of seaborne deployments.

Adapted from Figure 1-7

Titles 10 and 14 U.S. Code and

Navy and Coast Guard Board, Review of Coast Guard Wartime Taskings, dated 19 March 1981

(3) Organization. The command and control structure of the Coast Guard is based on nine autonomous districts and two Maintenance and Logistics Commands (MLCs) that report to the Atlantic and Pacific area commanders. The Commandant of the Coast Guard reports directly to the Secretary of Transportation in peacetime. On declaration of war, or when directed by the President, the Coast Guard becomes a Service within the Navy with the Commandant reporting to the Secretary of the Navy; he or she reports to the CNO for military functions concerning organization, training, and readiness of operation forces assigned to the Navy.

(4) The Headquarters, U.S. Coast Guard, under the Commandant reports in peacetime to the Secretary of Transportation. The Commandant is assisted in the direction of policy, legislation, and administration by a functional organization headed by Chiefs of Offices:

Chiefs of Offices:

Acquisition; Chief Counsel; Civil Rights; Command, Control, and Communications; Resource Director/Comptroller; Engineering; Health Services; Marine Safety, Security, and Environmental Protection; Navigation; Operations; Personnel; and Readiness and Reserves

 

105. THE JOINT SPECIALTY OFFICER (JSO)

a. The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 requires the Secretary of Defense to establish policies, procedures, and practices for the effective management of officers of the military Services who are particularly educated, trained in, and oriented toward, joint matters. "Joint matters" are defined in the law as "the integrated employment of land, sea, and air forces," and this includes national military strategy, strategic and contingency planning, and command and control of combat operations under unified command. There are no restrictions on the number of officers who may hold the joint specialty; however, sufficient numbers must be designated to meet Joint Duty Assignment (JDA) requirements. Approximately 9,000 billets are currently designated as JDAs.

b. The Secretary of Defense designates as JSOs officers who are educated in and experienced in the employment, deployment, and support of unified and combined forces to achieve national security objectives. To qualify as a JSO, an officer must complete an approved program of Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) and a full JDA. JSO designation boards are convened by the secretaries of the military departments to consider officers for recommendation to the Secretary of Defense for designation as JSOs. The Secretary of Defense can waive some of the JSO requirements on a case-by-case basis.

c. Both Service PME and JPME contribute essential qualities to the educational development of a JSO nominee. The military departments are responsible for designating officers as JSO nominees. Officers may be designated as JSO nominees when they have successfully completed a program of Joint Professional Military Education or have a Critical Occupational Specialty. Designation of an officer as a JSO nominee identifies the officer as a potential candidate for JSO, but does not, in itself, constitute recommendation for award of the Joint Specialty.

d. A JDA is a designated position in a multi-Service or multinational command or activity that is involved in the integrated employment or support of the land, sea, and air forces of at least two of the three military departments. Such involvement includes matters relating to national military strategy, joint doctrine and policy, strategic planning, contingency planning, and command and control of combat operations under a unified command. At least 800 1,000JDAs are designated as critical. Current law requires that critical billets be filled with JSOs unless the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff approves an exception.

e. For further information on the JSO program, see JCS Admin Pub 1.2 (Joint Officer Management) and the Officer Professional Military Education Policy (CJCSI 1800.01, 1 March 1996) (CM-344-90, 1 May 1990).

 

106. SERVICE SCHOOLS

a. Major organizational changes in the late 1800s and early 1900s laid the foundation for a modern staff system in the U.S. Armed Forces. The continuing professional education of military officers was an important element and included Service staff and war colleges. European experience had shown that, without a sound and vital school system, the staffs themselves could not function properly. The Naval War College was established in 1884 and the Army War College in 1901. The Air War College was established in 1946.

b. World War I led to the creation of a widespread system of field staffs in the Army and a growth of staff consciousness in the other Services. Soon after the war, the U.S. military Services began to evolve the functional staff patterns that remain in use today. The Service colleges reached officers destined for Service leadership, educating them in the fundamentals of staff practice and enlarging on the body of knowledge that was to become Service doctrine.

c. By the 1920s the U.S. Armed Forces had a distinctively American staff system that had been drawn from elements of Prussian, British, and French military organizations. For example, contrary to some European practices, the United States did not adopt the concept of a permanent staff corps. Rather, officers constituting U.S. staffs are members of their own Service and are assigned to staff duty only periodically throughout their careers.

d. After World War II command and staff education for field-grade officers was further developed. While command and staff courses for company and field-grade officers in the Army (1901), Marine Corps (1920), and Navy (1923) had long been in existence, the schools now emphasized education in staff subjects and field application. Attendance at the Services’ schools rose to a level not possible during the war. The Air Command and Staff College began at Maxwell AFB, Alabama, in 1946.

 

107. JOINT AND COMBINED SCHOOLS. The school system that accompanied the early twentieth-century military reforms was reconstituted and enlarged to meet post-World War II requirements. Shortly after the war, three joint Service colleges were established: the Army Industrial College, redesignated the Industrial College of the Armed Forces (ICAF) in April 1946, and the National War College (NWC) in August 1946, both at Ft. McNair in Washington; and the Armed Forces Staff College (AFSC) in August 1946 in Norfolk, Virginia. All colleges have now been incorporated under the National Defense University (NDU), NWC and ICAF in 1976, and AFSC in August 1981. Today NDU also includes the Information Resources Management College (IRMC), the Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS), and the Institute of Higher Defense Studies (IHDS). NDU is assigned the task of preparing selected military officers and civilian officials for command, management, and staff responsibilities. The senior colleges emphasize national security formulation, military strategy development, mobilization, management of resources for national security, and planning for joint and combined operations. Effective July 1990, the Armed Forces Staff College became the single point for completion of Joint Professional Military Education for prospective Joint Specialty Officer nominees. This was mandated by Congress. The Service intermediate and senior schools teach the first phase of a joint track. The Armed Forces Staff College teaches the follow-on phase at the application level with a curriculum and environment specifically designed to nurture a joint perspective. For further information on JPME, see Appendix VI, Joint Admin Pub 1.2 (Joint Officer Management) and JCS Memo SM-73-89, Implementation of the JCS Program for Joint Professional Military Education (JPME).

 

108. THE AFSC PERSPECTIVE

a. Planning for joint forces is a team effort, and that team must be carefully balanced. The staff comes from the represented Services and brings not only Service doctrine but also the technical expertise from a range of functional areas within the Services.

b. The ultimate purpose of staff officers is to make sound recommendations to a commander and then clearly communicate the commander’s decision to the chain of command. This publication has been developed to help members of a joint staff work more effectively as action officers, understand the joint planning process, and interpret and prepare products of the planning process.

c. AFSC Pub 1 has evolved over the years from many sources. Wherever possible, joint publications have been used. When these do not cover the particular subject, we have adapted material from applicable Service manuals. AFSC Pub 1 traces its roots to the following publications:

(1) Joint Pub 0-2, Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)

(2) Joint Pub 1, Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States

(3) Joint Pub 1-02, DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms

(4) Joint Pub 1-03 Series, Joint Reporting Structure (JRS) General Instructions

(5) Joint Pub 2-0, Doctrine for Intelligence Support to Operations

(6) Joint Pub 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations

(7) Joint Pub 4-0, Doctrine for Logistic Support of Joint Operations

(8) Joint Pub 4-01, Mobility System Policies, Procedures and Considerations

(9) Joint Pub 5-0, Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations

(10) Joint Pub 5-03 Series, Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES)

(11) Joint Pub 6-0, Doctrine for C4 Systems Support to Joint Operations

(12) CJCS MOP 7, "The Joint Strategic Planning System"

(13) JCS MOP 136, "JCS, CINC, and OJCS Involvement in the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System"

(14) Unified Command Plan (UCP)

(15) Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP)

(16) U.S. Naval Warfare Publication (NWP) 11, Naval Operational Planning

(17) U.S. Marine Corps Manual FMFM 3-1, Command and Staff Action

(18) U.S. Air Force Regulation (AFR) 28-3, USAF Operation Planning Process

(19) JCS Action Officer Orientation

(20) American Forces Information Service, DOD, The Armed Forces Officer

(21) U.S. Army Field Manual 101-5, Staff Organization and Operations

(22) Joint Admin Pub 1.2, Joint Officer Management

(23) Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 1800.01, Officer Professional Military Education Policy

(24) Goldwater-Nichols DOD Reorganization Act of 1986, Title IV, Joint Officer Management

(25) Report of the Panel on Military Education, U.S. House of Representatives Armed Services Committee, 21 April 1989

d. The chart at the end of the chapter illustrates the rank insignia of the military Services, the "joint team."

OFFICERS INSIGNIA OF THE

UNITED STATES ARMED FORCES

O-1

O-2

O-3

O-4

O-5

O-6

O-7

O-8

O-9

O-10

SPECIAL

NAVY

ENSIGN

LIEUTENANT JUNIOR GRADE

LIEUTENANT

LIEUTENANT COMMANDER

COMMANDER

CAPTAIN

COMMODORE ADMIRAL*

REAR ADMIRAL

(O-7 & O-8)

VICE ADMIRAL

ADMIRAL

FLEET ADMIRAL

MARINES

SECOND LIEUTENANT

FIRST LIEUTENANT

CAPTAIN

MAJOR

LIEUTENANT COLONEL

COLONEL

BRIGADIER GENERAL

MAJOR GENERAL

LIEUTENANT GENERAL

GENERAL

 

ARMY

SECOND LIEUTENANT

FIRST LIEUTENANT

CAPTAIN

MAJOR

LIEUTENANT COLONEL

COLONEL

BRIGADIER GENERAL

MAJOR GENERAL

LIEUTENANT GENERAL

GENERAL

GENERAL OF THE ARMY

AIR FORCE

SECOND LIEUTENANT

FIRST LIEUTENANT

CAPTAIN

MAJOR

LIEUTENANT COLONEL

COLONEL

BRIGADIER GENERAL

MAJOR GENERAL

LIEUTENANT GENERAL

GENERAL

 

WARRANT

 

NAVY

MARINES

ARMY

 

COAST GUARD

W-1

WARRANT

OFFICER-1

WARRANT

OFFICER (WO1)

W-2

CHIEF WARRANT

OFFICER

CHIEF WARRANT

OFFICER-2

CHIEF WARRANT

OFFICER (CW2)

W-3

CHIEF WARRANT

OFFICER

CHIEF WARRANT

OFFICER-3

CHIEF WARRANT

OFFICER (CW3)

W-4

CHIEF WARRANT

OFFICER

CHIEF WARRANT

OFFICER-4

CHIEF WARRANT

OFFICER (CW4)

W-5

CHIEF WARRANT

OFFICER-5

CHIEF WARRANT

OFFICER (CW5)

ENLISTED INSIGNIA OF THE

UNITED STATES ARMED FORCES

E-1

E-2

E-3

E-4

E-5

E-6

E-7

E-8

E-9

NAVY

(no insignia)

SEAMAN RECRUIT

SEAMAN APPRENTICE

SEAMAN

PETTY OFFICER THIRD CLASS

PETTY

OFFICER SECOND CLASS

PETTY OFFICER FIRST CLASS

CHIEF PETTY OFFICER

SENIOR CHIEF

PETTY OFFICER

MASTER CHIEF PETTY OFFICER

MASTER CHIEF PETTY OFFICER OF THE NAVY

MARINES

(no insignia)

PRIVATE

PRIVATE FIRST CLASS

LANCE CORPORAL

CORPORAL

SERGEANT

STAFF SERGEANT

GUNNERY SERGEANT

FIRST SERGEANT

MASTER SERGEANT

SERGEANT MAJOR

MASTER GUNNERY SERGEANT

SERGEANT MAJOR OF THE MARINE CORPS

ARMY

(no insignia)

PRIVATE

PRIVATE

PRIVATE FIRST CLASS

CORPORAL

SPECIALIST

SERGEANT

STAFF SERGEANT

SERGEANT FIRST CLASS

FIRST SERGEANT

MASTER SERGEANT

COMMAND SERGEANT MAJOR

SERGEANT MAJOR

SERGEANT MAJOR OF THE ARMY

AIR FORCE

(no insignia)

AIRMAN BASIC

AIRMAN

AIRMAN FIRST CLASS

SENIOR AIRMAN

STAFF SERGEANT

TECHNICAL SERGEANT

MASTER SERGEANT

SENIOR MASTER SERGEANT

CHIEF MASTER SERGEANT

CHIEF MASTER SERGEANT OF THE AIR FORCE

Figure 1-9