Joint Staff Officers Guide AFSC Pub 1 -- 1997

• Introduction 6-3
• The Process of Joint Operation Planning 6-4
• Deliberate Planning 6-9
• Summary of the Planning Cycle 6-9
• Basis for Military Planning 6-11
• Phases of Deliberate Planning 6-20
• Initiation Phase of Deliberate Planning 6-23

a. Joint Pub 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms), defines the joint operation planning process as follows:

"A coordinated joint staff procedure used by a commander to determine the best method of accomplishing assigned tasks and to direct the action necessary to accomplish the mission."

The particular procedures we use in joint planning depend on the time available to accomplish them. When time is not a critical factor, we use a process called peacetime or deliberate planning. When the time available for planning is short and the near-term result is expected to be an actual deployment and/or employment of military forces, the planner uses crisis action planning (CAP) procedures. The overall procedures are the same for both deliberate and crisis action planning:

• receive and analyze the task to be accomplished
• review the enemy situation and begin to collect necessary intelligence
• develop and compare alternative courses of action
• select the best alternative
• develop and get approval for its concept
• prepare a plan, and
• document the plan

b. The next section of this chapter introduces the entire process of joint operation planning to give perspective to the planning problem. The remaining sections describe deliberate planning procedures. Deliberate planning is discussed from the receipt of the assigned task to the development of a detailed transportation schedule of personnel, materiel, and resupply into the theater of military operations. The chapter also describes the procedures for maintaining the accuracy of plan data. We present the phases and steps of the planning process as sequential and orderly, though in actual practice procedures may vary considerably. Some of the steps may overlap, some may be undertaken simultaneously, and some are iterative.

a. The staff of a combatant command must consider many factors in its planning in order to select the best means of performing a military mission. Understandably, this means that the planning process will be complex; out of necessity the process must be orderly and thorough. The joint operation planning process must be flexible, as well. In peacetime, it may require 12 months or more to completely prepare and fully coordinate a plan; on the other hand, a crisis may demand a product in just a few hours or days.

b. The amount of time available significantly influences the planning process. Two different methods of planning are described in the JCS-published Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES), depicted graphically in Figure 6-1.

(1) DELIBERATE or PEACETIME PLANNING is the process used when time permits the total participation of the commanders and staffs of the Joint Planning and Execution Community (JPEC). Development of the plan, coordination among supporting commanders and agencies and the Services, reviews by the Joint Staff, and conferences of JPEC members can take many months, possibly the entire two-year planning cycle, to develop a large plan, though continued JOPES Automated Data Processing (ADP) improvements should reduce the time required.

(2) TIME-SENSITIVE or CRISIS ACTION PLANNING (CAP) is conducted in response to crises where U.S. interests are threatened and a military response is being considered. While deliberate planning is conducted in anticipation of future hypothetical contingencies where prudence drives a planning requirement, CAP is carried out in response to specific situations as they occur and that often develop very rapidly. Thus, in CAP, the time available for planning is reduced to as little as a few days. The overall process of CAP parallels that of deliberate planning, but is much more flexible to accommodate requirements to respond to changing events and NCA requirements. CAP procedures promote the logical, rapid flow of information, timely preparation of executable courses of action (COAs), and communication of reports and recommendations

from combatant commanders up to the National Command Authorities (NCA) and decisions from the NCA down to combatant commanders.

(3) Both deliberate and crisis action planning are conducted within JOPES. Procedures for both are described in Joint Pub 5-03.1, to be republished as CJCSM 3122.01 (JOPES Volume I) and CJCSI 3122.02. CJCSM 3122.03 JOPES Volume II, and CJCSM 3122.04 describe detailed administrative and format requirements for documenting the annexes, appendixes, etc. of OPLANs, CONPLANs, and functional plans, the products of deliberate planning. The purpose of JOPES is to bring both deliberate and crisis action planning into a single system architecture to reduce the time required to do either, make the refined results of deliberate planning more readily accessible to planners in CAP, and more effectively manage any plan during execution.

c. The view of resources is another method of describing joint operation planning.

(1) Requirements planning focuses on the combatant commander’s analysis of the enemy threat and assigned task. The planned response determines the level of forces and the support needed to overcome that threat. These required forces and supplies may be more than the level of available resources.

(2) On the other hand, capabilities planning attempts to meet the threat based on the forces and support that have been funded by Congress in the current budget cycle. This level of forces, equipment, and supplies is available now or expected to be available in the planning cycle.

(3) Military solutions may be constrained; a course of action may be limited by available resources or political and diplomatic considerations. Continuing an established trend, the JPEC is moving ever more toward capabilities planning in the post-cold-war era of less explicitly defined and more diverse threats. A regional rather than global focus for deliberate planning allows increased flexibility in apportionment of available combat forces. Anticipation of multiple regional contingencies within the framework of adaptive planning allows effective apportionment of some combat forces to more than one CINC for contingency planning, depending on national priorities and the sequence in which regional contingencies develop. Apportioning supplies is more difficult, but progress continues toward developing capabilities in JOPES to create contingency plans that account for anticipated sustainment availability.

d. Still another way to define planning focuses on command perspective.

(1) Strategic, global planning is done primarily at the JCS/NCA level. Decision-makers look at the entire world situation as it affects, or is affected by, the use of U.S. military forces.

(2) In regional planning, combatant commanders focus on their specific geographic regions as defined in the Unified Command Plan.

(3) Functional planning is conducted by combatant commanders with functional responsibilities, i.e., USSPACECOM, USSTRATCOM, USSOCOM, and USTRANS-COM, and their component commanders. They view their planning problem as not being limited by geography.

(4) The perspective of the command greatly influences both the choice of course of action and the resources made available for planning. Strategic planning for possible sequential or concurrent execution of more than one operation outweighs the regional perspective of any single commander. Likewise, functional planning is subordinate to each supported CINC’s concept for the particular theater of operations in order to support that concept.

e. Finally, joint operation planning can be described in terms of its contribution to a larger purpose.

(1) Campaign planning takes a comprehensive view of the combatant commander’s theater of operations and defines the framework in which an OPLAN fits. Campaign planning offers purpose and a common objective to a series of OPLANS.

• Designing campaigns represents the art of linking major operations, battles, and engagements in an operational design to accomplish theater strategic objectives. Theater campaigns are conducted in theaters of war and subordinate campaigns in theaters of operations; they are based on the Commander’s Estimate and theater strategic estimate and resulting theater strategies. "Campaigns of the US Armed Forces are joint; they serve as the unifying focus for our conduct of warfare. Modern warfighting requires a common frame of reference within which operations on land and sea, undersea, and in the air and space are integrated and harmonized; that frame of reference is the joint campaign. As such, the joint campaign is a powerful concept that requires the fullest understanding by leaders of the US Armed Forces." (Joint Pub 1, "Joint Warfare of the US Armed Forces")

• Combatant commanders translate national and theater strategy into strategic and operational concept through the development of theater campaign plans. The campaign plan embodies the combatant commander’s strategic vision of the arrangement of related operations necessary to attain theater strategic objectives. Campaign planning encompasses both the deliberate and crisis action planning processes (see Figure 6-2). If the scope of contemplated operations requires it, campaign planning begins with or during deliberate planning. It continues through crisis action planning, thus unifying both planning processes. Campaign planning is done in crisis or conflict, but the basis and framework for successful campaigns is laid by peacetime analysis, planning, and exercises (Joint Pub 5-0). To the extent possible, plans should incorporate the following concepts of joint operation (campaign) planning doctrine:

(2) A successful contingency plan involves a wide spectrum of operation. Each element within the spectrum requires special consideration:

• Mobilization planning details the activation of Reserve forces as well as assembling and organizing personnel, supplies, and materiel to bring all or part of the Armed Forces to a state of readiness for war or other national emergency;

• deployment planning encompasses all activities involved in moving forces and materiel from origin or home station to destination, including intra-CONUS, intertheater, and intratheater movement legs, and movement through staging areas and holding areas;

• employment planning describes the theater use of combat forces; and

• sustainment planning involves the logistics support of combat forces.

(3) This guide outlines the entire environment of joint operations and focuses on deployment, with emphasis on the strategic mobility problem. Deployment planning has been the focus of real-world planning efforts in the past and remains so. As JOPES evolves, new ADP applications will be integrated to make possible much more refined mobilization, employment, and sustainment planning.

a. To draw from the many categories we have identified, this chapter describes the planning procedures for

• developing a plan of military action in a hostile environment

• prepared by a CINC with a regional perspective

• by a staff in peacetime conditions when combat action is not imminent

• using currently available U.S. capabilities measured in armed forces, transportation, and supplies and

• emphasizing the strategic deployment of those forces, equipment, and supplies based on the CINC’s concept of operations.

b. This chapter discusses the deliberate planning procedures to build a contingency plan for military action. The plan is based on predicted conditions that will be countered with resources available during the planning cycle. The product is called an operation plan that can be either an OPLAN, CONPLAN, or Functional Plan, depending on the level of detail that is included.

c. Automated Data Processing (ADP) support is essential to the process of creating and maintaining a database of the many available types of combat and support units, describing the units in terms of numbers of passengers and weight and volume of cargo, calculating the vast quantities of specific sustaining supplies needed in each of the various phases of an operation, and simulating the movement of troops and support from their starting location to the point of employment in the theater of military operations.

a. The process of joint deliberate planning is cyclic and continuous. It begins when a task is assigned and is almost identical whether the resulting operation plan is a fully developed OPLAN, CONPLAN, or Functional Plan. Operation plans remain in effect until canceled or superseded by another approved plan. While in effect they are continuously maintained and updated.

b. Task assignment. The CJCS is responsible for preparing strategic plans and providing for the preparation of joint contingency plans. Strategic planning was discussed in Chapter 5; the contingency planning responsibility of the CJCS is performed through the commanders in chief of combatant commands (CINCs). The task-assigning directive performs several functions: it apportions major combat forces available for planning, and specifies the product document, i.e., an OPLAN, CONPLAN, or Functional Plan, and the review and approval authority for the plan. With this the CINC has the scope of the plan, its format, and the amount of detail that must go into its preparation.

c. Developing the concept. In response to the task assignment, the supported CINC first determines a mission statement and then develops a fully staffed concept of envisioned operations documented in the CINC’s Strategic Concept. The CINC’s Strategic Concept is submitted to the CJCS for review and, when approved, becomes the concept of operations on which further plan development is based. The concept is also sent to subordinate and supporting commanders, who can then begin the detailed planning associated with plan development.

d. Developing the detailed plan. Subordinate commanders use the CINC’s concept and the apportioned major combat forces as the basis to determine the necessary support, including forces and sustaining supplies for the operation. The CINC consolidates the subordinates’ recommended phasing of forces and support and performs a transportation analysis of their movement to destination to ensure that the entire plan can feasibly be executed as envisioned. Next, the Services identify real-world units to take part in the plan, and the sustainment to meet requirements is identified as much as possible. USTRANSCOM, a supporting command, analyzes strategic sea and air transportation. Figure 6-3 illustrates the overall process of this phase: determine the forces and cargo required; describe them in logistic terms of numbers of personnel, volume, and weight; simulate the move using the capabilities of apportioned lift resources; and, finally, confirm that the OPLAN is transportation feasible with the available resources and transportation schedules. This planning phase is over when documentation is prepared for final review.

e. Review of the plan. The review process is more than a single phase in deliberate planning. The Joint Staff has reviewed and approved the CINC’s concept before detailed plan development. Now the completed plan goes to the CJCS for review and approval. If all is in order, the plan will be approved (effective for execution, when directed).

f. Preparation of the supporting plans. The emphasis here shifts to the subordinate and supporting commanders, who respond to the tasks identified in the approved operation plan by preparing supporting plans that outline the actions of assigned and augmenting forces.

a. The process of planning a joint operation produces a contingency plan for military action. It begins with a national strategy stated by the President, supported with the funding of resources by Congress, and is defined by the task assignments published by the CJCS. The systems that support the translation of national interests into contingency plans are discussed in detail in Chapter 5.

b. Players in the planning process are illustrated in Figure 6-4. They include the NCA, their advisers, supporting executive-level agencies, and a group collectively called the Joint Planning and Execution Community (JPEC). The JPEC is defined in Joint Pub 1-02 as the commands and agencies involved in the training, preparation, movement, employment, support, and sustainment of forces in a theater of operations. Examples of those organizations are listed in the definition and include those shown on the lower part of Figure 6-4, i.e., CJCS, supported commanders, etc.

(1) Civilian leadership tops the pyramid in Figure 6-4. The ultimate decision on national policy, detailed development of resource levels, and overall strategic direction of the U.S. Armed Forces is given by the President and Secretary of Defense, referred to as the National Command Authorities (NCA). The NCA are supported by the executive departments, e.g., Departments of Defense and State, and organizations within the Office

of the President, such as the National Security Council. The illustration also includes combat support agencies, e.g., Defense Intelligence Agency, National Imagery and Mapping Agency, and Defense Logistics Agency. All these executive-level organizations have a role to play in the preliminary direction of contingency operations and approval of the final plans.

(2) The CJCS and the Joint Staff, who publish the task-assigning documents, review the products and approve the final version of peacetime plans. The supported command, i.e., the combatant command, and its subordinates are the commands principally responsible for developing the deliberate plan and, ultimately, executing it. The Services and their logistics agencies play key support roles within the community. By law, it is the responsibility of the Services to recruit, organize, supply, equip, train, and maintain forces for the combatant commands. The U.S. Transportation Command is shown separately as a supporting player in the JPEC because of its strategic mobility responsibilities and its critical role in assisting the CINCs to develop transportationally feasible plans. The last entry on the figure is titled "Supporting Commands"; it represents all the commands and agencies that supply resources to the supported command.

c. The Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) details an established, orderly way of translating the contingency planning task assignments into an operation plan or Functional Plan in deliberate planning, or an operation order in crisis action planning. JOPES is directed by DOD to be used as the process for joint planning. JOPES is comprehensive enough to thoroughly prepare a concept of military operations and automated enough to handle the enormous quantities of data involved in military operation planning. The modern computer tools it employs afford reasonable assurance that the plan will work as expected on execution or can be modified during execution to adapt to changing circumstances. The overall system is complex and is best understood through examination of both the process and procedures that make it up.

(1) The process is a particular method of planning for joint operations that involves a number of steps or operations. It is the planning activity from receipt of the task to the preparation of supporting plans by subordinate and supporting commanders. The joint planning process for both deliberate and crisis action planning is described in the references identified at the beginning of this chapter and paragraph 601.a(3).

(2) The procedures are the individual, often interrelated, steps, actions, or methods performed to produce the plan. Each level of command responsible for writing plans may have developed its own procedures to expand or augment JOPES direction. These procedures may vary in certain respects from command to command, so newly assigned staff officers need to adjust to the specifics of their own organizations.

(3) Staff officers should keep the difference between process--the method of planning--and procedures--the steps required to use the process--clearly in mind as they become immersed in joint planning. An abundance of detailed procedures accompanies the actual planning process, yet most of the published guidance seems very general in nature. This publication tries to amplify JOPES guidance.

d. Service Planning Systems

(1) The secretaries of the military departments are responsible for the efficiency of the Services and their preparedness for military operations. Given strategic guidance in CJCS documents and program and budget guidance sent through department channels, the military Service chiefs have developed a series of documents that support, direct, and guide component commanders.

(2) The following documents describe the Service-unique planning systems and have specific application in the development of joint OPLANs:

U.S. Army Publications

FM 34-1, Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Operations

FM 100-5, Operations

FM 101-5, Staff Organization and Operations

U.S. Navy Publications

NWP 11, Naval Operational Planning

Navy Capabilities and Mobilization Plan (NCMP)

U.S. Air Force Publications

AF Manual 10-401 Operation Planning and Concept Development

USAF War and Mobilization Plan (WMP)

U.S. Marine Corps Publications

FMFM 2-1, Intelligence

FMFM 3-1, Command and Staff Action

Marine Corps Capabilities Plan (MCP)

Marine Corps Mobilization Management Plan (MPLAN)

U.S. Coast Guard Publications

USCG Capabilities Manual (CG CAPMAN)

USCG Logistic Support and Mobilization Plan (CGLSMP)

(3) The component commanders receive direction and guidance from both the operational chain of command and a Service or functional support chain of command; they are the common link between the two chains. The component commanders support the operational needs of the CINCs to the extent that they are supported through their Service and functional chains of command. The components negotiate the proper balance between requirements planning and capabilities planning.

e. Adaptive Planning. Adaptive planning is a concept for joint operation planning in the context of the post-cold-war world. It is the framework within which the deliberate planning process produces operation plans useful to high-level decision-makers if crises develop. It recognizes that with the more diversified threats to U.S. interests since the breakup of the former Soviet Union, fixed assumptions for warning times and political decisions (force movements, reserve callup, mobilization, etc.) used in deliberate planning will likely be less accurate if the contingency that planners anticipate actually occurs. In short, without a single, well-understood, primary foe with global aspirations and capabilities to plan against, the world is a less predictable place. Adaptive planning also recognizes that key decision-makers are more likely to exploit available response time to deter further crisis development if a menu of response options, gauged to a range of crisis conditions, is available for them to implement rather than an all-or-nothing choice. The "all" would likely be too much and the "nothing" not enough to deter escalation of a crisis early in its development. The Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) requires the CINCs to use adaptive planning principles to develop a menu of options along the spectrum from "all" to "nothing" in their operation plans for regional contingencies, including flexible deterrent options, deploy-decisive-force options, and counterattack options. JSCP force apportionment facilitates development of this range of options by apportioning some forces to more than one CINC for deliberate planning. This policy is often referred to as "multi-apportionment." In anticipation of the need to respond to multiple, sequentially developing regional contingencies, the JSCP also furnishes planning guidance that prioritizes and deconflicts planned employment of forces that are apportioned to more than one CINC.

(1) Regional focus. Regional contingencies are the focus of U.S. conventional planning. Anticipated regional contingencies for which deliberate planning is conducted are classified as either Major Regional Contingencies (MRCs) or Lesser Regional Contingencies (LRCs). An MRC is a regionally centered crisis based on a significant threat to U.S. vital interests in a region that warrants the deployment of significant forces (i.e., greater than division-wing combinations). An LRC is a regionally centered crisis based on a less compelling threat than in an MRC. LRC missions range from conflict to the lower end of the combat spectrum. Through the JSCP, combatant commanders are assigned tasks of developing operation plans or Functional Plans for specific MRCs and LRCs anticipated as future possibilities in their geographic areas of responsibility (AORs).

(2) Range of options. The adaptive planning concept calls for development of a range of options during deliberate planning that can be adapted to a crisis as it develops. Where the crisis builds slowly enough to allow it, appropriate responses made in a timely fashion can deter further escalation or even defuse the situation to avoid or limit conflict. Where such options fail to deter or there is not time enough to execute them, a stronger response may be required to protect vital U.S. interests. The eventuality of attack without prior warning must also be considered. Figure 6-5 amplifies the options discussed.

(a) Flexible Deterrent Options (FDOs). FDOs underscore the importance of early response to a crisis. They are deterrence-oriented and carefully tailored to avoid the response dilemma of too much too soon or too little too late. Military FDOs are intended to be used in concert with diplomatic, economic, and informational options to give the NCA a wide array of deterrent options integrating all elements of national power. All regional operation plans have FDOs, and CINCs plan requests for appropriate diplomatic, economic, and informational options as they develop their plans. Examples of FDOs from all four elements of national power are listed in Figures 6-6 through 6-9. In general, plans for FDOs use Active Component, in-place forces of approximately brigade,

squadron, or battle group size, intratheater lift assets, and predominantly Active Component support forces.

(b) Deploy decisive force. If decision-makers elect not to make a response to crisis indications, or an adversary is not deterred by FDOs that are executed, CINCs must plan for later actions (less timely from a deterrence perspective) to respond to unambiguous warning. Unambiguous warning occurs when the President decides, based on intelligence he receives, that a hostile government has decided to initiate hostilities. Deploy-decisive-force options involve early deployment of sufficient supportable combat forces, possibly including some Reserve forces, to the crisis region to defend U.S. interests, followed by decisive force to quickly end the conflict on terms favorable to the United States. Deploy-decisive-force options are the focus of deliberate planning. They are the options for which detailed force and resource planning is conducted and for which transportation-feasible TPFDDs are developed for OPLANS. Though crises for which deploy-decisive-force options are appropriate may still be deterrable, planners assume that deterrence will fail and that conflict will erupt.

(c) Counterattack. There exists the possibility that crises could begin with no-warning attacks against U.S. forces or vital interests, or without prior deterrent moves having been made. U.S. force deployments would not begin until after conflict

had been initiated. CINCs include concepts for a counterattack option in MRC operation plans for deployment and employment of assigned and apportioned forces to achieve U.S. objectives.

(3) Force apportionment and multiple contingencies. Adaptive planning, centered on regional contingencies, is a framework for deliberate planning using force levels reduced from those needed to meet a global threat. Apportionment of some forces from these reduced force levels to more than one CINC for planning is required to generate decisive force in some regional contingencies. In addition, U.S. military strategy requires maintaining the capability to respond to two concurrent, sequentially developing regional contingencies. The purpose of this requirement is to deter potential adversaries from deciding that U.S. commitment of decisive force to one contingency might present a window of opportunity to successfully attack U.S. interests elsewhere. Adaptive planning minimizes conflict between the need to apportion some forces to more than one CINC for deliberate planning, and the need to plan responses to concurrent contingencies. While employment of some of the same forces may be planned by different CINCs for

each of two concurrent contingencies, those forces cannot be simultaneously employed in both. The JSCP gives planning guidance that prioritizes apportioned forces into four cases for all MRCS. MRCs are the most demanding operation planning scenarios, and the OPLANs developed to respond to them will therefore be most dependent on those forces apportioned to more than one CINC. Even though the forces in all four cases are available to the CINCs for development of OPLANs, forces in some of the cases may not be available at execution of a response to one of two sequential, concurrent contingencies. The four cases are related to the range of options previously discussed.

(a) Case 1 Forces (FDOs). Case 1 forces are primarily in-place and augmentation forces from the Active Component appropriate for an array of FDOs the CINC might develop for use during a period of ambiguous warning. Augmentation forces are rapidly deployable and relatively small, as previously described. The augmentation force may contain subunits of a larger force from Case 2.

(b) Case 2 Forces (Early Deployers for Deploy-Decisive-Force). Built on Case 1 forces, the Case 2 forces include Active and that portion of the Reserve forces needed to move and sustain a major force deployment from CONUS. They give the CINC a significant level of force that would be used in the early stages of a Deploy-Decisive-Force option.

(c) Case 3 Forces (Deploy-Decisive-Force). Built on Case 1 and Case 2 forces, the Case 3 forces are apportioned based on unambiguous warning in which the enemy initially may not have completed preparation for war. They include Presidential Selected Reserve Callup (PSRC) and partial mobilization reinforcements, and are the forces available to the CINC during OPLAN development.

(d) Case 4 Forces (Counterattack/Decisive Force). The Case 4 forces build on Case 1, 2, and 3 forces and comprise additional Active units and Reserve forces required and made available under partial mobilization. Case 4 forces are phased into the OPLAN to support the concept with the decisive force needed to quickly end a regional conflict on terms favorable to the United States.

(e) Concurrent Contingencies. The purpose of dividing MRC force apportionment into the four cases is to deconflict planned employment of forces apportioned to more than one CINC for planning in anticipation of concurrent contingencies. If an MRC is the first of two sequentially developing contingencies, not all of its Case 4 forces, even though phased into the OPLAN, may be available at execution, as those units could be allocated to a second contingency. In the case of the second of two sequentially developing contingencies where significant forces have been committed to the first, in-place Case 1 forces may be the only forces available for planning an initial response. Other later deploying (Case 4) forces are apportioned for the purpose of counteroffensive operations should deterrence fail. CINCs receive tasks in the JSCP to produce plans that outline how they will deal with such eventualities. It must be remembered that these force apportionment parameters are set forth in the JSCP to furnish the guidance necessary to conduct coordinated contingency planning. The NCA will determine priorities between actual concurrent contingencies and the actual major forces deployed to respond to them at execution.

605. PHASES OF DELIBERATE PLANNING. The five formal phases of the deliberate planning process begin when a commander receives a task assignment and end when supporting plans have been approved by the supported commander. However, from the supported commander’s perspective, deliberate planning never stops. Regular updating of plan information is required to ensure that plans are as accurate as possible. Maintenance of large plans may require planners to continually update elements of information. The products of deliberate planning are operation plans and Functional Plans. Operation plans are either OPLANs or CONPLANs. The process is the same for development of both, but CONPLANs are less fully developed (only require, as a minimum, annexes A through D, J, and K), especially in the area of detailed resource planning, and generally will not contain a TPFDD. Functional Plans, like CONPLANs, require annexes A through D, J, and K. Operation plans are developed using all phases of the deliberate planning process. Approved plans remain in effect and must be maintained until canceled

or superseded by another plan. Figure 6-10 shows the five formal phases of the deliberate planning process.

a. In the initiation phase planning tasks are assigned, major combat forces and strategic transportation assets are apportioned for planning, and the groundwork is laid for planning to begin.

b. Several things happen during the concept development phase. The combatant commander derives the mission from the assigned task, issues planning guidance to his staff and subordinate commands, and collects and analyzes information on the enemy. From this, the staff proposes and analyzes tentative courses of action (COAs), the combatant commander selects the best COA, and the staff develops that COA into a complete concept of operations. The concept of operations, documented as the CINC’s Strategic Concept, is forwarded to the CJCS for review. By authority of the CJCS, the Joint Staff reviews the CINC’s Strategic Concept and, when approved, it becomes the concept of operations for the plan.

c. In the plan development phase the combatant commander’s staff, the staffs of subordinate and supporting commands, and other members of the JPEC develop the operation plan to the level of detail and in the format required by CJCSM 3122.03 (JOPES Volume II). If the CINC considers it necessary, a CONPLAN or Functional Plan can be developed in more detail than JOPES requires. For all OPLANs and some designated CONPLANs, a detailed transportation-feasible flow of resources into the theater is developed to support the concept of operations. Forces are selected and time-phased, support requirements are determined and time-phased, and the strategic transportation flow is computer simulated. The information required for the plan, i.e., the combat and support units along with the equipment and supply support, is collected in the Time-Phased Force and Deployment Data (TPFDD) file using JOPES ADP. This phase ends when the fully documented plan, including TPFDD when required, is forwarded to the CJCS for final review and approval.

d. The plan review phase is a formal element of the deliberate planning process. The CINC submits all elements of the now fully developed plan to the JPEC for review and CJCS approval.

e. In the supporting plans phase, each subordinate and supporting commander who is assigned a task in the CINC’s plan prepares a supporting plan. The subordinate and supporting commanders submit these plans to the supported commander for review and approval. The planning process continues through development of supporting employment and deployment plans that further ready the CINC’s plan for implementation.

f. The planning cycle for the deliberate planning process is defined by the principal task-assigning document, the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP). The approved operation plans prepared as directed by the JSCP are considered effective until superseded. The CJCS publishes the schedule for document submission dates, dates for the TPFDD refinement conferences held late in the plan development phase, and dates for the TPFDD maintenance conferences. The CINCs play a key role in establishing the administrative schedules as well as recommending to the CJCS whether current operation plans remain valid, need updating, or should be canceled.

a. Background

(1) Military action is not the only possible response to situations that threaten U.S. national interests. All elements of national power--the military, diplomatic, economic, and informational elements--are considered in the formulation of national policy. Military plans developed through the deliberate planning process also consider diplomatic, economic, and informational options. In fact, CINCs must explicitly relate military Flexible Deterrent Options (FDOs) to FDOs under the other elements of national power as they develop their operation plans according to adaptive planning principles. Several examples of deterrent options are listed in Figures 6-5 through 6-8.

(2) The nation’s strategic direction is developed by the President and his advisers. The National Security Council (NSC) staffs and prepares the national strategy. One administration published this strategy as a National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) signed by the President; the exact title of the President’s decision document may vary from one administration to another. After the national strategy is published, the CJCS translates the worldwide military strategy into specific planning requirements.

b. Task-assigning documents

(1) The CJCS outlines the nation’s military strategy in the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP), which assigns preparation of specific contingency plans to the combatant commanders.

(a) The JSCP assigns the CINCs the tasks of preparing operation plans in complete format (OPLANs), in concept, or abbreviated, format (CONPLANs), or as Functional Plans. Formats for OPLANs, CONPLANs, and Functional Plans are described in detail in CJCSI 3122.03 (JOPES Volume II). Briefly, the CONPLAN does not require the detailed identification of units and preparation of movement schedules found in the OPLAN and its accompanying TPFDD file. Presently, CONPLANs are required to have at least annexes A through D, J, and K. The Functional Plan summarizes the CINC’s concept in even broader terms than the CONPLAN, is normally associated with peacetime operations, and, like the CONPLAN, is required to have at least annexes A through D, J, and K (Figure 6-22).

(b) The JSCP identifies major combat forces and strategic transportation for the CINC to use to develop each operation plan. These are called apportioned resources, and may include any limited, critical asset, such as combat forces, support forces, supplies, or strategic and theater transportation units. The JSCP generally apportions "major combat forces," a term that covers combat, not support, units and, generally, units the size of Army brigades or larger, Air Force squadrons, Navy carrier battle groups and surface action groups, and Marine Corps MAGTFs. It is important to recognize that these apportioned resources may differ from the numbers that may ultimately be furnished, or allocated, when an operation is actually executed.

(c) The JSCP establishes priorities for OPLANs that compete for limited resources.

(2) The Unified Command Plan (UCP) gives basic guidance to the combatant commander on general responsibilities and identifies geographic and functional areas of responsibility (AORs) and functional responsibilities.

(a) The Joint Chiefs of Staff issue the classified UCP as required and update it periodically. It is a task-assigning document and, therefore, specifically cites the authority the Secretary of Defense grants through memorandum or DOD directive. The President approves the UCP.

(b) In broad terms, the UCP directs the combatant commanders to be prepared to

• evacuate noncombatants,
• execute disaster recovery operations, and
• conduct "normal operations" within the assigned geographic or functional AOR.

The broad category "Normal Operations" includes responsibilities for planning and executing operations in contingencies, limited war, and general war; planning and conducting operations other than contingencies; planning and administering the security assistance program; and maintaining the relationship and exercising authority prescribed in Joint Pub 0-2 (UNAAF) and Joint Administrative Publication 1.1, Organization and Functions of the Joint Staff.

(c) The UCP, then, is a general task-assigning document that covers many contingencies for which the CINC has to prepare.

(3) Joint Pub 0-2, Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF), is also a task-assigning document. The unclassified CJCS guidance in UNAAF defines the exercise of authority by the combatant commander.

(a) UNAAF discusses the principles and doctrines governing joint activities of the Armed Forces:

• restatement of the statutory guidelines and departmental directives that govern the functions of the entire Department of Defense
• functions of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the military departments
• principles governing the unified direction and the joint activities of the Armed Forces
• responsibility and authority of the combatant commander
• functions and responsibilities of joint staff divisions
• the command authority over forces and implications for transfer of authority

(b) By broad definition, UNAAF initiates deliberate planning by assigning the combatant commander the task of "planning and conducting military operations in response to crises, to include the security of the command and protection of the United States, its possessions and bases against attack or hostile incursion." Continuing operation of the command and basic self-defense of the command are missions developed from that broad task assignment.

(4) On occasion, the CJCS may direct preparation of additional plans not included in the current JSCP. This task assignment may come in the form of a message or other directive. The new task will normally be incorporated into the next edition of the JSCP.

(5) The CINC’s planning tasks are not limited to those specified by higher authority. The CINC may prepare plans considered necessary to discharge command responsibilities described in the UCP and UNAAF, but not specifically assigned. The CINC may also determine that a need exists to prepare plans to cover contingencies not assigned by the JSCP. If the CINC expects to assign tasks to forces not currently under his combatant command, the CJCS must approve.

(6) The number of operation plans prepared by a CINC using deliberate planning procedures varies with each command.

c. Products. In the deliberate planning process, the CINC is directed in the initiation phase to produce operation plans in either complete (OPLAN) format or abbreviated concept (CONPLAN) format, or to produce a Functional Plan.

(1) An OPLAN is a complete description of the CINC’s concept of operations and demands much time and effort to produce. It identifies the forces and supplies required to execute the plan and includes a movement schedule of the resources into the theater of operations. The documentation includes annexes that describe the concept and explain the theater-wide support required in the subordinate commander’s supporting plan. OPLANs describe deployment and employment of forces and resources and include a TPFDD. The detailed planning essential in OPLAN development is normally required when the military response to a hostile situation

• is sufficiently critical to U.S. national security to justify the detail involved,
• contributes to deterring enemy aggression by showing U.S. readiness through planning, or
• would tax total U.S. capability in forces, supplies, or transportation.

(2) In most situations the task does not require preparation of a detailed flow of resources. Though the same process is followed for producing CONPLANs as is used for OPLANs, the level of detail produced in the plan development phase of CONPLANs is abbreviated. Detailed support requirements generally need not be calculated, nor do strategic movements need to be simulated. CONPLANs do not generally include the detail typically found in OPLAN annexes, but require annexes A through D, J, and K or a TPFDD if the CJCS or CINC so directs. CONPLANs are normally prepared when

• the contingency is not sufficiently critical to national security to require detailed prior planning,
• the situation would not place unacceptable demands on U.S. resources,
• the probability of occurrence during the JSCP planning cycle is low, or
• planning flexibility is desired.

(3) A Functional Plan is used to respond to the requirements of the JSCP, at the initiative of the CINC, or as tasked by the supported commander, Joint Staff, Service, or Combat Support Agencies. Development of Functional Plans follows the same process used for OPLANs and CONPLANs throughout the concept development phase of deliberate planning. They normally are plans involving the conduct of military operations in a peacetime or permissive environment developed by combatant commanders to address requirements, such as

• disaster relief,
• nation assistance,
• logistics,
• communications,
• surveillance,
• protection of U.S. citizens,
• nuclear weapon recovery and evacuation, and
• continuity of operations, or similar discrete tasks.

d. JPEC coordination. The Services also have an input during the initiation of planning. Since the CJCS apportions only major combat forces, the Services must give the CINC information about other combat, combat support, and combat service support forces that are available for planning. They also inform the combatant commander on Service doctrine, guidance, and priorities.

e. Review of previous operations. Planners should access the Joint Center for Lessons Learned (JCLL) and the Joint Universal Lessons Learned Systems (JULLS) database early in the planning process and periodically thereafter to obtain specific practical lessons in all areas of planning and execution gained from actual operation and exercise experiences. A regular review of such information during the planning process can alert planners to known pitfalls and successful, innovative ideas.

a. After the CINC has received the task assignment, the staff analyzes the mission and develops tentative courses of action (COAs) to accomplish the mission. The concept development phase can be seen as an orderly series of six steps. The first five take the joint staff through a problem-solving process to develop the CINC’s Strategic Concept. In the sixth step the CJCS reviews the CINC’s Strategic Concept. With CJCS approval, the CINC’s Strategic Concept becomes the concept of operations for the plan. Although the steps, illustrated in Figure 6-11, are diagrammed and discussed individually, in actual practice they may not be conducted separately or in the simple sequence listed. The dividing line between steps is sometimes hard to see, since steps are often repeated, combined, or done concurrently. Staff work done in one step affects work being done in others.

b. Once it has developed the CINC’s Strategic Concept, the staff forwards it to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for concept review. When approved, the CINC’s Strategic Concept becomes the concept of operations for the plan, and the plan is approved for further development. This review process is the same for all operation plans (OPLANs and CONPLANs).

a. To begin developing the concept of operations, the combatant commander determines the objective, reviews what resources are available for use in developing the plan, analyzes the enemy and the physical conditions that affect the task, and reviews the guidelines that have been given by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The first step in the development of a military concept of operations begins with a careful analysis of the task assignment. In the language of deliberate planning, the CINC and joint staff view the overall operation to

• determine assigned, implied, and subsidiary tasks in order to develop a concise mission statement;
• consider the forces that have been apportioned for planning, the capabilities of the enemy, the terrain, geographic features that support friendly and enemy forces, and weather; and
• incorporate controlling factors levied by others that will influence the military operation, such as diplomatic understandings, economic conditions, host-nation issues, etc.

b. Until now, we have considered the task that has been assigned to the CINC by the JSCP or other directive. A transition from the assigned task to the CINC’s mission statement must be made.

(1) Both Joint Pub 1-02, DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, and Joint Pub 0-2, UNAAF, define a mission as "the task, together with the purpose, that clearly indicates the action to be taken and the reason for the action." Neither the DOD Dictionary nor UNAAF defines "task."

(2) Tasks are defined in Service documents. AR 310-25, the Dictionary of United States Army Terms, defines tasks as "the specific Army, Navy, and Air tasks which have to be done to implement successfully the phased concept of operations stemming from . . . the overall strategic concept."

c. For the purposes of deliberate planning, a clear distinction must be made between a task and a mission.

(1) AFSC defines a task as a job or function assigned to a subordinate unit or command by higher authority.

(2) Using the Joint Pub 1-02 definition, then, the subordinate’s mission is derived from the task assigned by a higher authority and includes the reason for that task.

(3) This distinction between mission and task is consistent with joint planning documents. The task assigned by higher authority and its contribution to the mission of that higher-echelon commander serve as the basis for developing the subordinate’s mission.

d. The product of Step 1 is the mission statement. The mission statement carries through the planning process and is included in the planning guidance, the planning directive, staff estimates, the Commander’s Estimate, the CINC’s Strategic Concept, the concept of operations, and the completed operation plan.

(1) The mission statement is a clear, concise statement of the objective to be accomplished by the command (what) and the purpose to be achieved (why). Multiple tasks are normally described in the sequence in which they are to be done. Routine tasks or inherent responsibilities of the commander are not usually included in the mission statement.

(2) The mission statement developed during the mission analysis step is the basis for COA development, staff estimates, and the Commander’s Estimate. It is stated in the planning guidance the CINC issues to coordinate the planning effort, and, after further refinement, it will also be included in the final OPLAN, CONPLAN, or Functional Plan. The elements of the mission statement are who, what, when, where, why, and, possibly, how. Normally, how the operation will be conducted is described in the concept of the operation or execution paragraph developed later in the planning process as greater detail is added.

(3) An example of a mission statement is found in the operation plan for the Philippine Campaign in World War II leading to Okinawa: CANF SWPA No. 16-44 of 18 November 1944:

a. This step has two objectives: first, to give enough initial planning guidance to the supported CINC’s staff for work to begin on COAs and, second, to communicate planning guidance to the subordinate commanders through a written planning directive or a planning conference.

b. Initial guidance. The following paragraphs describe the information that a supported commander may give a staff to understand the assigned task, derived mission statement, and restrictions or other considerations that will affect their planning.

(1) Mission. The mission statement was developed in Step 1 from the CINC’s analysis of the task.

(2) Assumptions

(a) The DOD Dictionary defines an assumption as

"A supposition on the current situation or a presupposition on the future course of events, either or both assumed to be true in the absence of positive proof, necessary to enable the commander in the process of planning to complete an estimate of the situation and make a decision on the course of action."

(b) An assumption normally covers the issues over which the commander has no control and is used to fill a gap in knowledge so planning can continue. It is stated as if it were a fact. Subordinate commanders and supporting commanders treat the assumptions of the higher-echelon commander as facts and often do not plan for the possibility that they are not. Therefore, the statement of assumptions is a critical element in the development of the concept.

(c) Assumptions have a significant impact on the planning process. When dealing with an assumption, a "branch" to the plan would be developed should the assumption prove to be incorrect. Because of their influence on planning, the fewest possible assumptions are included in an operation plan. A valid assumption has three characteristics: it is logical, realistic, and essential for the planning to continue.

(d) Assumptions are made for both friendly and enemy situations. For example, planners can assume the success of friendly supporting operations that are essential to the success of their own plan, but cannot assume the success of their own operation. For instance, COM5THFLEET included this assumption in his OPLAN for the capture of Okinawa in 1945, ". . . that the assault shipping, supporting naval forces, and army troops to be used in the operation are released promptly from Philippine operations."

(e) Planners should use a worst-case scenario. The planner should plan that the enemy will use every capability at its disposal and operate in the most efficient manner possible. To dismiss these enemy possibilities could dangerously limit the depth of planning. Planners should never assume away an enemy capability.

(f) Planners cannot assume a condition simply because of a lack of accurate knowledge of friendly forces or a lack of intelligence about the enemy.

(g) As planning proceeds, additional assumptions may be needed, some early assumptions may prove to be faulty, and still others may be replaced with facts or new information gained during the planning process. The use of assumptions is more prevalent for operations planned far into the future; the situation is less certain and assumptions must be made to complete the planning.

(3) Nuclear and chemical warfare. Planning for nuclear and chemical warfare is especially sensitive. The commander issues guidance as early in the planning process as possible. A highly specialized staff does the planning for these capabilities.

(4) Political considerations

(a) Planning for the use of military forces includes a discussion of the political implications of their transportation, staging, and employment. Political factors can have a significant effect on the prosecution of a military operation. Unfortunately, in peacetime planning they are extremely difficult to predict. Political considerations may have to be treated as assumptions.

(b) Most unified combatant commanders with a geographic area of responsibility have a Political Adviser (POLAD) as a member of their personal staffs. The POLAD is a representative from the Department of State experienced in the political and diplomatic situation in the theater. The POLAD is helpful in advising the CINC and staff on political or diplomatic issues crucial to the planning process, such as overflight and transit rights for deploying forces, basing and servicing agreements, etc.

(5) Tentative courses of action

(a) The CINC gives the staff his preliminary thinking on possible military actions early in the planning process to focus their actions. These preliminary or tentative COAs are activities initially seen to be open to the military commander that will lead to successful accomplishment of the mission. Normally, these tentative COAs are not fully analyzed for feasibility and seldom contain all elements of a refined COA.

(b) Tentative COAs may include only what military action is to be accom-plished, that is, amphibious or airborne assault, naval blockade, etc., and where the military action could take place. The refined COA contains who, what, when, where, and how.

(6) Planning schedule

(a) The commander usually issues a planning schedule with his initial guidance, although practice varies from command to command.

(b) Normally drawn up by the chief of staff, the planning schedule sets milestones or deadline dates for completing staff estimates, submitting data from subordinate and supporting commands, and completing and distributing various elements of the plan.

(7) Initial staff briefings

(a) Initial briefings on such subjects as terrain and hydrography of the area of operations, enemy capabilities, forces available, logistics support, and others are vital to the staff early in the planning process. They help the J-5 staff formulate additional tentative COAs and focus the joint staff divisions as they analyze tentative COAs and develop recommendations for the CINC.

(b) In most cases, the appropriate staff directorates prepare and present these initial briefings.

c. Commander’s intent. The commanders’ intent describes the desired end state. It is a concise expression of the purpose of the operation, not a summary of the concept of the operation. It may include how the posture of units at end state facilitates transition to future operations. It may also include the commander’s assessment of the enemy commander’s intent. The commander’s intent is the initial impetus for the entire planning process. The commander refines his intent as he considers staff estimates and the Commander’s Estimate. The intent statement may also contain an assessment of where the commander will accept risk during the operation. The commander’s intent helps subordinates pursue the desired end state without further orders. Thus, the commander’s intent provides focus for all subordinate elements.

d. Planning directive. The CINC normally communicates initial guidance to the staff, subordinate commanders, and supporting commanders by publishing a planning directive to ensure that everyone understands the commander’s intent and is "reading from the same sheet of music."

(1) Generally, the head of the plans and policy directorate, J-5, coordinates staff action for deliberate planning. The J-5 staff receives the CINC’s initial guidance and combines it with the information gained from the initial staff briefings; this information becomes the written planning directive issued by the CINC. The contents of a planning directive are not officially prescribed in deliberate planning procedures, but generally include the information discussed in paragraph b. preceding. A suggested format appears in Appendix A of this publication, adapted from Appendix 1 to Annex P of Joint Pub 5-03.1 (JOPES Volume I) to be republished as CJCSI 3122.01.

(2) The CINC, through the J-5, may convene a preliminary planning conference for members of the JPEC who will be involved with the plan. This is the opportunity for representatives to meet face-to-face. At the conference, the CINC and selected members of the staff brief the attendees on important aspects of the plan and may solicit their initial reactions. Many potential conflicts can be avoided by this early exchange of information. The supported commander’s staff normally prepares and distributes minutes of the conference. The record of these proceedings can also serve as the basis for a planning directive.

(3) It is absolutely vital to the success of the planning process that all members of the JPEC be kept informed. The ultimate success of the supported commander’s mission will depend on the support and cooperation of each subordinate and supporting commander. A large measure of that success results from a clear understanding of the commander’s intent. Of course, each new plan spawns supporting plans; early CINC guidance allows supporting commanders to begin concurrent planning to develop those supporting plans.

a. Introduction. Staff estimates are the foundation for the CINC’s selection of a course of action. In this step, the staff divisions analyze and refine each COA to determine its supportability. The thoroughness of these staff estimates may determine the success of the military operation.

(1) Not every situation needs an extensive and lengthy planning effort. It is conceivable that a commander could review the assigned task, receive oral briefings, make a quick decision, and direct the writing of a plan. This would complete the process and might be suitable if the task were simple and straightforward.

(2) Most combatant commanders, however, demand the thorough, well-coordinated plan that necessitates a complex staff estimate step. Although written staff estimates are not mandatory, most will be carefully prepared and coordinated and fully documented.

b. The CINC’s entire staff is deeply involved in the deliberate planning effort. The J-5 normally coordinates the overall process of long-range planning, prepares the initial planning guidance, and coordinates the staff estimates. As illustrated in Figure 6-12, most major joint staff divisions, J-1, J-2, J-4, and J-6, prepare staff estimates; in addition, input may be solicited from the CINC’s special staff on specialized or technical matters. The J-5 gathers information and, with the J-3, proposes and revises tentative COAs. The J-3 might also complete a staff estimate to compare COAs for supportability and recommend a preferred COA to the J-5. In the later stages of staff analysis, the J-5 begins to focus on selecting information from the staff estimates to assist the CINC in preparing the Commander’s Estimate.

c. The purpose of staff estimates is to determine whether the mission can be accomplished and to determine which COA can best be supported. This, together with the supporting discussion, gives the CINC the best possible information to select a COA.

(1) Each joint staff division

• reviews the mission and situation from its own staff functional perspective,
• examines the factors for which it is the responsible staff,
• analyzes each COA from its staff functional perspective,
• compares each COA based on its staff functional analysis, and
• concludes whether the mission can be supported and which COA can best be supported from its particular staff functional perspective.

(2) Because of the unique talents of each joint staff division, involvement of all is vital. Each staff estimate takes on a different focus that identifies certain assumptions, detailed aspects of the COAs, and potential deficiencies that are simply not known at any other level, but nevertheless must be considered. Such a detailed study of the COAs involves the corresponding staffs of subordinate and supporting commands; this coordination is essential, since they bring details of force support and employment not viewed at the theater level.

(3) The form and, possibly, the number of COAs under consideration change during this step. These changes result in refined courses of action.

d. The product of this step is the sum total of the individual efforts of the staff divisions. Complete, fully documented staff estimates are extremely useful to the J-5 staff, which extracts information from them for the Commander’s Estimate. The estimates are also valuable to planners in subordinate and supporting commands as they prepare supporting plans. Although documenting the staff estimates can be delayed until after the preparation of the Commander’s Estimate, they should be sent to subordinate and supporting commanders in time to help them prepare annexes for their supporting plans.

(1) The principal elements of the staff estimate normally include mission, situation and considerations, analysis of friendly COAs, comparison of friendly COAs, and conclusions. The details in each basic category vary with the staff performing the analysis. The principal staff divisions have a similar perspective--they focus on friendly COAs and their supportability. However, the J-2 estimate on intelligence concentrates on the enemy: enemy situation, enemy capabilities and an analysis of those capabilities, and conclusions drawn from that analysis. The analysis of enemy capabilities includes analysis of the various courses of action available to the enemy according to its capabilities, which include attacking, withdrawing, defending, delaying, etc. The J-2’s conclusion will indicate the enemy’s most likely course of action.

(2) Guidance on the format for staff estimates is found in Appendixes 2 through 5 to Annex P of Joint Pub 5-03.1, JOPES Volume 1, to be republished as CJCSI 3122.01. Appendixes B through E of AFSC Pub 1 include staff estimate formats adapted from JOPES Volume 1. Combatant commanders may direct that additional details be included in their particular staff estimates.

e. Often the steps in the concept development phase are not separate and distinct, as the evolution of the refined COA illustrates.

(1) During planning guidance and early in the staff estimates step, the initial COAs may have been developed from initial impressions and based on limited staff support. But as concept development progresses, COAs are refined and evolve to include as many of the following as applicable:

• what military operations are considered, where they will be performed
• who will conduct the operation
• when the operation is planned to occur
• in general terms, how the operation will be conducted

(2) These refined COAs are developed by an iterative process of modifying, adding to, and deleting from the original, tentative list. The staff continually estimates and reestimates the situation as the planning process continues. Early staff estimates are frequently given as oral briefings to the rest of the staff. In the beginning, they emphasize information collection more than analysis. It is only in the later stages of the process that the staff estimates are expected to indicate which COAs can best be supported.

a. Definition. Joint Pub 1-02 defines the Commander’s Estimate (of the Situation) as "a logical process of reasoning by which a commander considers all the circumstances affecting the military situation and arrives at a decision as to a course of action to be taken to accomplish the mission." In deliberate planning, it is the document that clearly states the CINC’s decision and summarizes the CINC’s rationale for that decision. The Commander’s Estimate becomes a tool to communicate valuable guidance from the CINC to the staff and subordinate commanders. As such, it is a valuable planning tool for the staff and subordinate commanders.

b. Generally, after receiving direction from the CINC and drawing from information in the staff estimates, the J-5 assembles the staff estimates and drafts the documentation for the Commander’s Estimate. It is prepared for the CINC to describe the chosen COA. In deliberate planning, the Commander’s Estimate is a planning document used by the command. Appendix 6 to Annex P of Joint Pub 5-03.1 (JOPES Volume 1) to be republished as CJCSI 3122.01 furnishes a format for the Commander’s Estimate; Appendix F of AFSC Pub 1 also includes a format adapted from JOPES Volume 1. Figure 6-13 shows the basic

subdivision of information; the five main paragraph headings outline steps to basic problem solving. A more detailed guide to preparing a Commander’s Estimate is contained in Figure 6-14, "A Primer on the Commander’s Estimate."

a. Introduction. The CINC’s Strategic Concept is the proposed concept of operations for the plan, an expanded version of the COA selected in the Commander’s Estimate prepared in Step 4. It is a narrative statement of how the CINC expects to conduct operations to accomplish the mission. It serves two purposes:

(1) It clarifies the intent of the commander in the deployment, employment, and support of apportioned forces.

(2) It identifies major objectives and target dates for their attainment.

b. Format. The CINC’s Strategic Concept is written in sufficient detail to impart a clear understanding of the CINC’s overall view of how the operation will be conducted, or concept of operations. The particular format for submission of the CINC’s Strategic Concept is prescribed in CJCSI 3122.011 and Appendix G of AFSC Pub 1. The elements of information that clearly convey the CINC’s concept of operations include the following.

TESTS FOR COURSE OF ACTION

(1) Situation

• probable preconditions for implementation of the plan
• deterrent options included in the plan
• enemy forces
• general tasks of friendly forces
• expected operations of other friendly commands that will influence the plan
• assumptions, including level of mobilization
• legal considerations

(2) Mission

(3) Execution

• who will be employed
• where forces will be employed
• when forces are to be phased into theater
• general description of how forces are to be employed
• conventional, nuclear, and other supporting operations
• deception
• necessary deployment of forces
• tasks of each subordinate and supporting command
• required supporting plans

(4) Administration and Logistics

• transportation during deployment and employment
• concept of logistics support
• stockage levels, pre-positioned war reserve stocks consumption levels
• mutual allies’ support requirements and inter-Service support

(5) Command and Control

• command relationships
• command and control requirements
• succession to command

c. Concept Development Conference. The CINC may call a concept development conference involving representatives of subordinate and supporting commands, the Services, Joint Staff, and other interested parties. Such a conference might be convened if additional work is required from subordinate and supporting commanders, which may be the situation either when the original task is to prepare an OPLAN and substantial subordinate commander involvement is required in the next phase (plan development) or when considerable effort will be required to prepare supporting plans. The conference would be convened to ensure that adequate direction is given to subordinates. Subordinate and supporting commanders base further planning on guidelines in the CINC’s Strategic Concept.

d. The transmittal of the concept. The commander must ensure that his concept is accurately described both to members of the planning community, so they can continue planning in support of the operations, and to the CJCS for review and approval.

613. STEP 6? CJCS CONCEPT REVIEW. Once the CINC’s Strategic Concept is prepared, it is forwarded to the CJCS for review and approval. The process is the same for OPLANs, CONPLANs, and Functional Plans, whether they are new plans or existing plans for which the concept has changed. Reviews should be completed within 60 days of referral; however, the Director, Joint Staff, may extend the review period if necessary. With CJCS approval, the CINC’s Strategic Concept becomes the concept of operations for the plan. It will be used in paragraph 3 (Execution) of the Basic Plan and described in detail in Annex C of the OPLAN.

a. Initiation of review. The Joint Staff conducts the review for the CJCS. When the Joint Staff receives the CINC’s Strategic Concept, it determines whether the concept is in the proper format, conforms with JSCP guidance, is consistent with joint doctrine, and is therefore ready for review. If not, the submitting headquarters is notified by memorandum or message.

b. Review responsibilities. The Joint Staff, Services, and designated defense agencies (National Security Agency (NSA), National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA), Defense Logistics Agency (DLA), and Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA)) conduct independent reviews and submit comments within 30 days of referral. Comments by Joint Staff directorates and defense agencies are submitted to the Joint Staff Operational Plans and Interoperability Directorate (J-7), which has primary staff responsibility for conducting reviews. The Services submit comments to the Secretary, Joint Staff.

c. Review criteria. The purpose of the concept review is to

(1) determine whether the scope and concept of operations are sufficient to accomplish the task assigned,

(2) assess the validity of the assumptions,

(3) evaluate compliance with CJCS guidance and joint doctrine, and

(4) evaluate acceptability with regard to expected costs and military and political supportability.

d. Review comments. Comments back to the CINC concerning his concept are classified as execution-critical, substantive, or administrative.

(1) Execution-critical comments describe major deficiencies that negatively affect the capability of the plan to meet the JSCP objective and may prevent execution of the plan as written. Examples of such deficiencies include such things as failure to meet assigned tasks, deviations from joint policy, and major logistics shortfalls.

(2) Substantive comments pertain to less critical deficiencies such as deviations from CJCS guidance or JOPES formatting. These deficiencies would not prevent execution of the plan.

(3) Administrative comments are offered for clarity, accuracy, and consistency. They include such items as outdated references, improper terminology, and minor errors.

e. Review results. Results of the review are forwarded to the supported commander by memorandum or message stating that the concept is either

(1) approved for further plan development or

(2) disapproved and requires significant changes before resubmission.

f. Post-review actions. The supported commander incorporates changes required by the CJCS as follows:

(1) A formal change incorporating all execution-critical comments is submitted to the CJCS within 30 days of receipt of the review results.

(2) Substantive comments must be incorporated when the plan is submitted for review in its entirety in the plan review phase of the deliberate planning process.

a. The deliberate planning process has progressed from receipt of the task assignment to development of the CINC’s concept of how the assigned task will be accomplished. The CINC has documented the plan in sufficient detail for the reviewing authority, the CJCS, to understand fully the overall military concept of operations. Moreover, the transmittal of the concept gives continuing guidance to subordinates as they begin more detailed planning. The procedures in concept development are not rigid. Through each step, the planners identify and analyze factors that could adversely affect the accomplishment of the CINC’s mission. This discovery and problem-solving process continues even while they are preparing the CINC’s Strategic Concept; they may adjust or revise the concept at any time. Shortages in types, quantities, or timing of forces or resources (called shortfalls) are among the most critical factors. The identification and resolution of shortfalls continue throughout the entire planning process.

b. Joint Planning and Execution Community coordination. The planning procedures during the concept development phase are conducted primarily by the CINC and the CINC’s staff. The component commanders, joint task force commanders, and subordinate unified commanders have been involved. Outside the CINC’s theater, supporting commanders, such as USTRANSCOM and other combatant commanders, and defense agencies, have attended coordination meetings, received the supported CINC’s guidance, and given valuable insight during development of the concept.

c. The development of the CINC’s concept of operations has been described as the most difficult phase of deliberate planning, because of the many subjective determinations that must be made. Now begins the detailed development of the flow of resources and the determination of whether that operation is possible with the apportioned forces and transportation. This next phase, plan development, is undoubtedly the most time-consuming phase.

a. Overview. At the close of concept development, the CINC sends his Strategic Concept to the CJCS for review and approval. Once approved, it becomes the concept of operations for plan development and subsequent phases of the deliberate planning process. In the plan development phase, the staff expands and formally documents the concept of operations in the appropriate operation plan format. The process is the same for OPLANs, CONPLANs, and Functional Plans.

b. CONPLANs and Functional Plans are not as fully developed as OPLANs. CONPLANs do not require the level of detailed planning in support, sustainment, or transportation that OPLANs do. Unless the supported commander requires it, annexes and appendixes are not required to be as fully developed as in an OPLAN, and, generally, TPFDD development is not required. Therefore, CONPLANs present a less complicated plan development problem than OPLANs. Because OPLAN development requires all the procedures for the plan development phase to be accomplished and CONPLAN development does not, subsequent discussion of the plan development phase will focus on planning procedures for OPLANs.

c. During the initial steps of this phase, the spotlight moves to the subordinate commanders; generally, in unified combatant commands, these are the component commanders. Planners on the staffs of the component commands begin developing the total package of forces required for the operation. They start with the major combat forces selected from those apportioned for planning in the original task-assigning document and included in the CINC’s concept of operations. Working closely with the staffs of Service headquarters, other supporting commands, and combat support agencies, they identify requirements for support forces and sustainment.

d. The supported commander consolidates each component’s forces and supplies, and phases their movement into the theater of operations. The resources are proposed for arrival in-theater and at the final destination using apportioned intertheater transportation, CINC-controlled theater transportation, and transportation organic to the subordinate command. The strategic movement is simulated in a computer model; reasonable assurances can then be given by the CINC that the operation is transportation feasible.

e. The later steps of the phase fill the plan’s hypothetical (notional) units with actual units and those supply entries that can be replaced. In the refinement step, movement of these units is again computer-simulated, and USTRANSCOM develops movement tables. The final documentation for the transportation-feasible OPLAN is prepared. Two phases follow plan development in the deliberate planning process. The first presents the OPLAN package to the CJCS for final review and approval, and the second sees subordinate and supporting commanders developing necessary supporting plans.

f. For clarity, the plan development phase will be described in eight sequential steps shown in Figure 6-16. In reality, these steps may overlap, be accomplished simultaneously, or repeat. The same flexibility displayed in the course of action refinement process of the preceding phase is seen again here, as shortfalls are discovered and eliminated. The sheer magnitude of the problem is enormous; tens of thousands of separate combat and support units and materiel shipments make up large OPLANs. Computer support within JOPES makes the timely development of a realistic flow of manpower and supplies possible.

g. ADP support. The plan development phase produces huge amounts of information about the forces, the equipment and materiel support to those forces, and the time- time-phased movement of personnel and materiel to the area of operations. To manage this mountain of information, planners need ADP support. The Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) provides ADP support to operation plan development. JOPES is accessed by planners and throughout the JPEC through the Global Command and Control System (GCCS). Planners use specialized application programs in JOPES and interface with other application programs through JOPES, to create a Time-Phased Force and Deployment Data (TPFDD) computer file. The TPFDD is created by entering and relating data supplied by sources throughout the JPEC and generated by JOPES and JOPES-related applications. The discussion of plan development in this volume will first cover the eight steps previously mentioned, followed by a section covering the ADP support available in JOPES to help accomplish the steps.

h. TPFDD LOI. The supported commander publishes a letter of instruction (LOI) at the beginning of the plan development phase of deliberate planning. The purpose of the LOI is to give the CINC’s component commanders and supporting commands and agencies specific guidance on how the plan is to be developed. The supported commander’s staff coordinates with affected commands such as USTRANSCOM and its

components before publication to ensure that the guidance given in the LOI is current. The LOI must furnish specific guidance concerning these items:

• priority of air movement for major units
• apportionment of airlift capability between Service components and resupply
• standard time windows for resupply defined by earliest arrival date (EAD) and latest arrival date (LAD)
• resupply and nonunit personnel replacement planning factors
• retrograde, chemical, and nuclear TPFDD procedures
• attrition planning factors
• standard ports of embarkation (POEs) and ports of debarkation (PODs) for forces, and channels for resupply
• administrative management of identifiers used within JOPES application software to identify, manipulate, and track force, cargo, and personnel requirements (e.g., unit line numbers (ULNs), cargo increment numbers (CINs), personnel increment numbers (PINs), and force record numbers (FRNs))
• the CINC’s required delivery dates (RDDs) and TPFDD points of contact for the supported and supporting CINCs’ staffs

a. Introduction. The purpose of force planning is to identify all forces needed to accomplish the CINC’s concept of operations and phase them into the theater of operations. Force planning is based on CJCS, Service, and USSOCOM (for special operations) guidance and doctrine. It consists of force requirements determination, force list development and refinement in light of force availability, and force shortfall identification and resolution. Force planning is ultimately the responsibility of the supported commander, but the components do most of the work.

(1) The original task-assigning instrument, the JSCP or other such directive, identifies major combat forces. Tasks assigned in the UCP and UNAAF generally use in-place forces already under the combatant command of the CINC. Forces apportioned for use in making operation plans will be those projected to be actually available during the JSCP period at the level of mobilization specified for planning. CJCS approval is required when CINC-initiated OPLANs cannot be supported with apportioned resources. The CINC’s strategic concept clearly identifies the principal combat forces required by the concept of operations.

(2) A total force list includes much more than just major combat troops. Combat support (CS) and combat service support (CSS) forces, as well as smaller units of combat forces, are essential to the success of any military operation. The most up-to-date guidance on combat and support capabilities and methods of employment is available in Service planning documents and directly from Service headquarters commands. Therefore, each component command develops its own total force list composed of combat, combat support, and combat service support forces (C, CS, CSS) using Service planning documents: Army Mobilization Operations Planning and Execution System (AMOPES) in four volumes, Navy capabilities and Mobilization Plan (NCMP) and fleet planning guidance, Marine Corps Capabilities Plan (MCP), and the Air Force War and Mobilization Plan (WMP) in five volumes. Essential combat and support forces that are available for planning may also be listed in the applicable JSCP supplemental instructions.

(3) The apportioned major combat forces may have been described in relatively large fighting units, such as Army division and brigade, Navy carrier battle group and surface action group, Marine expeditionary force and unitbrigade, and Air Force wing and squadron. The final product for each component’s total force list will include detail down to unit level, i.e., battalions, squadrons, detachments, teams, etc. Certain terms describing the movement of forces are essential to understanding this step of the planning problem and later discussions of the JOPES ADP applications that planners access to build the TPFDD.

b. Movement terms. Forces move from their home location to a specified destination in the theater. This movement involves planning by several echelons of command, possibly stops at several intermediate locations en route, and a schedule constrained by a variety of operational requirements. These essential items of information are first considered and identified during the force planning step. Figure 6-17 illustrates the flow of resources.

(1) Key locations routinely used in deliberate planning include the following:

(a) The actual calculation of dates and the determination of locations used in deliberate planning begin with the destination (DEST), the geographic location where the force is to be employed. It is the terminal geographic location for the movement of forces in the TPFDD. To reach the DEST may require strategic and theater transportation controlled by the CINC as well as theater transportation controlled by subordinate and supporting commanders. Arrival at the DEST is not to be equated to coming into direct contact with an opposing force; rather, arrival at the DEST only satisfies the concept of operations envisioned by the CINC and subordinate commander. For example, the DEST for an Army terminal service unit may be a transshipment point many miles from direct contact with the enemy.

(b) The port of debarkation (POD) is the airport (APOD) or seaport (SPOD) within the theater of operations where the strategic transportation requirement for forces is completed, generally a large airport or seaport. It may or may not be the ultimate destination. For example, troops landing at an airfield in country Blue, the POD, may have to be transported many kilometers to their planned defensive position on the country Blue-country Red border (DEST). In some cases, the POD and DEST are the same place, e.g., an airfield in Germany may be the POD and the final destination for an

Air Force squadron. The port of support (POS) is the geographic location within the objective area where strategic transportation ends for air-transported supplies, resupply, and replacement personnel; sealift ammo; sealift POL; and sealift supplies and resupply. This is expected to be a distribution point; intratheater transportation from this geographic point may be required.

(c) The port of embarkation (POE) is the point where strategic air or sea transportation begins. Generally, it is the location in CONUS where strategic shipments begin. For Reserve units, the POE probably will not coincide with the home location (HOME) or mobilization station. The origin (ORIGIN) is the beginning point for a deployment move. For Active forces the ORIGIN and the POE will probably not be the same geographic location. For instance, Fort Bragg is the ORIGIN and Pope AFB is the POE for the 82d Airborne Division. Transportation to the POE is the planning responsibility of the providing commander or Service, with either organic transportation or transportation arranged by a supporting commander, such as USTRANSCOM’s component, the Army Military Traffic Management Command (MTMC).

(d) Several additional locations within the theater may also influence deployment; an intermediate location (ILOC) is a stopping point in the deployment movement that may be used for strategic staging, changing mode of transport, necessary cargo handling, training, or marrying forces and equipment that are being transported by split shipment. The ILOC can occur between ORIGIN and POE, between POE and POD, or between POD and DEST. A marshalling area is the location where troops are matched with pre-positioned war stocks of equipment and supplies, such as the Army War Reserve Pre-positioned Sets (AWRPS) located in Europe, Italy, Norway, Korea, Kuwait, and Qatar. These pre-positioned stocks may also be afloat as part of the Army’s AWR-3 configuration or with one of three U.S. Marine Corps Maritime Pre-positioned Ships (MPS). Another ILOC may be a strategic staging location for holding forces not yet directly committed to the theater’s military operation. Finally, the Tactical Assembly Area (TAA) is the location where units assemble before tactical employment.

(e) These locations all play important roles in the deployment of forces and supplies. Since the arrival at the DEST is the key to successful participation in the CINC’s concept, readying forces and supplies at the ORIGIN or POE, scheduling intermediate stops, and scheduling theater transportation from POD to DEST influence the planning and timing of the movement.

(2) Timing is crucial. Times are important because they offer a method to track the movement of resources and measure attainment of the CINC’s schedule for involvement of the forces and required arrival of supplies. In addition, the assignment of dates allows JOPES application software to compare simulated movement with the CINC’s desired movement schedule to determine whether the concept is transportation-feasible.

(a) The force must arrive and unload at its destination by the required delivery date (RDD) if it is to take a supportive part in the operation and contribute meaningfully to its outcome. It is not enough just to get a unit to its destination; it must arrive on or before the RDD. Arriving too early may create an unnecessary logistics support problem; too late may mean that the forces cannot affect the outcome of the operation. Another date, the CINC’s required date (CRD), has been introduced in response to the administrative shifting of the RDD that sometimes takes place during plan development to resolve simulated shortfalls. It is the original RDD, established by the CINC, and is listed in the TPFDD to give visibility to RDDs that do shift and to show the impact of later arrival. It is intended that CRDs not be changed without CINC approval, as such changes can significantly alter the concept of operations.

(b) For the strategic move, planners begin with the RDD to determine some important interim dates. Deployment planners are interested in having units arrive at the POD between an earliest arrival date (EAD) and the latest arrival date (LAD). The EAD is the earliest a planner can allow the first element of personnel or equipment to offload from strategic lift at the POD; the LAD is the latest date for the last element to arrive at the POD and complete offloading in time to arrive at the DEST by the RDD. The unloading of the last unit is termed "closing the force." Whatever transportation time may be required to move between the POD and DEST is the difference between LAD and RDD.

(c) At the other end of the route, the mobilization and intra-CONUS planners (the Services, force-providing organizations, and the supporting transportation commands) are primarily concerned with preparing and scheduling the forces at the HOME, mobilization site, and ORIGIN. The ready-to-load date (RLD) is the earliest date a unit is available at the origin for onward transportation to the POE. The available-to-load date (ALD) is the earliest time that the unit can begin loading at the POE. An earliest date of completion (EDC) of loading is the scheduled time that all loading is completed at the POE. The earliest departure date (EDD) is the earliest date after the ALD that the shipment is ready to depart from the POE. Theoretically, these dates would be calculated backward from the RDD after considering marshalling and assembly times, theater and strategic deployment transportation times, etc. In fact, there is seldom any slack early in the planning period; the RLD and ALD are generally the minimum time required to prepare the units and materiel and transport them to the POE. Delays here may adversely affect arrival time at DEST.

(d) In practice, planners calculate the arrival window at the POD by determining the time to complete each link in tactical, intratheater transportation. Beginning with the RDD (or CRD) set by the CINC, deployment planners determine the time it will take to get from the POD to the DEST--time both to match with split-shipped or AWRPS equipment and to perform necessary assembly. Since most units cannot fully arrive on one day, there is an EAD-LAD window from the earliest arrival of the units and/or equipment at the POD and the latest departure from the POD to the DEST that will still satisfy the RDD. In theory, subtracting the time to perform strategic lift between POE and POD from those dates would result in the deadline required to complete assembly at the HOME/ORIGIN/POE for onward shipment. In practice, planners realize that on execution, competing demands will be made to mobilize, prepare for movement, and transport forces, equipment, and supplies. An RLD-ALD window is generally determined for the embarkation end of strategic transportation, and compromises begin to ease the impact on the final delivery date at the DEST. The possible loss of visibility of the original RDD that can result from these compromises led to the introduction of an inviolate CRD.

(3) Planners must have a clear understanding of force planning.

(a) It is easy to visualize a complicated movement of Reserve units. They may require movement from their home location (HOME) to their mobilization site and, possibly, onward to an Active base (ORIGIN) for training and marrying with equipment. Further movement may be required to the POE, where strategic transports will be met. These can become transportation planning problems even before troops and equipment leave CONUS. Such movement requirements are not limited to the Reserve Component. Active-duty units may also require intra-CONUS transportation from ORIGIN to POE. This enormous field of planning is basically the responsibility of the Services and is executed through the USTRANSCOM component, MTMC. This is called mobilization planning. It can significantly affect strategic lift and, ultimately, the arrival of combat units under the CINC’s concept, and is therefore important to supported commanders. ADP applications for mobility planning are envisioned within JOPES to furnish planning tools that facilitate this crucial transportation link.

(b) Strategic deployment planning is the central focus of deliberate planning. It involves the strategic transportation of forces from POE to POD and of supplies and replacement personnel from POE to POS. Planning is done for transportation by sea and air lift assets that are apportioned to the CINC for planning. This lift is furnished by a supporting commander when the OPLAN is implemented.

(c) Within the theater, transportation may be required from a POD to the DEST. Transportation may be done in several ways, but of primary interest to the CINC is the requirement for limited theater airlift, a resource that may also be apportioned in the JSCP or limited by Service capabilities. This onward movement from POD to DEST is termed theater deployment planning and may be significant to the CINC if requirements for use of theater lift assets exceed the CINC’s theater capabilities or if the simulated intratheater movement is not scheduled to meet the RDD. Arrival of the force at the right place and time (factors that are determined by an employment scheme and the concept of operations) is the ultimate objective of the deployment.

(d) Employment planning is another area vital to the successful execution of the CINC’s concept of operations. It involves the actual use of personnel and materiel in the theater of operations. Detailed planning for employment is normally the responsibility of the subordinate commanders, such as component commanders or a joint task force commander.

(e) Overarching the mobilization, deployment, and employment planning processes is the Services’ responsibility to sustain their forces. Though such sustainment planning is not completely supportable within the current capabilities of JOPES, improvements to JOPES ADP will include applications with much more capability to support it. Sustainment involves the resupply of materiel and replacement of personnel lost in the operation.

(f) The traditional focus of deliberate planning has been on strategic deployment. Improvements in ADP hardware, application software, and planning procedures continue to expand the view and control of the CINC in deliberate planning. Requirements for JOPES ADP to deal with the full planning spectrum from initial generation of force lists in mobilization through monitoring of employment and sustainment have been identified. The scope of JOPES is discussed in Chapter 5.

c. Building the force list. Given the mission and the concept of operations to accomplish it, the component planner reviews the forces apportioned for planning and included in the CINC’s concept of operations, confirms the appropriateness of those forces, and determines the applicable CS and CSS forces from Service planning documents. The component force lists are developed with the full involvement of the supported commander. The subordinate commander submits the time-phased force list to the CINC for review and approval. By submitting the component force list, the supporting commander indicates full understanding of the concept of operations and assurance that the forces in the force list will support that concept. The CINC’s staff merges the component force lists and evaluates the resulting consolidated force list. It analyzes the consolidated force list to confirm that it is adequate to perform the mission. When the supported commander concurs with the consolidated force list, the components then add any missing information needed to deploy the forces. Planners may build a force list in different ways.

d. Planners can create a force list unit by unit, starting with the apportioned combat forces and adding all necessary CS and CSS forces identified in doctrinal publications. This is a time-consuming effort, since OPLANs can contain several thousand separately identifiable units, or force requirements, and scores of data elements for each entry are needed to plan the movement adequately. An alternative method uses force modules. These are groupings of C, CS, and CSS forces, as well as a calculated amount of sustainment. Using either method manually would take an extremely long time. Fortunately, JOPES ADP support greatly aids in building the force lists for a plan, and is discussed in greater detail later in this chapter.

(1) Understandably, each Active and Reserve unit in the U.S. Armed Forces today differs from the others. Even seemingly similar units within a Service may have different unit performance characteristics, various physical sizes of personnel and equipment assets, and even different unit readiness and combat capability. It is impossible to distinguish each unit separately at this stage of force planning, and no attempt is made to do so. Instead, a model is substituted, one that generally represents each different category of unit in each Service. Each model is a generic (notional), or type, unit--one that is representative of an operational capability. Nearly 8,500 type units are on file representing units ranging in size from a two-person Air Force personnel team unit to a 6,500-member nuclear-powered aircraft carrier. Type units are used to build a force list line by line.

(a) To build a force list line by line requires the following unit descriptive information about the forces to be listed:

• approximate physical characteristics listed in number of personnel and weight and volume of equipment and accompanying supplies
• approximate movement characteristics in terms of self-deploying aircraft and operators, size of palletable materiel, and its ability to fit on current-inventory tactical and strategic lift platforms
• special characteristics of supplies, such as whether they are hazardous, explosive, etc., so special handling can be arranged
• unique operational characteristics that may aid in shipping less than the entire unit

(b) The unit movement information, such as ORIGIN, POE, ILOC, POD, and DEST, is needed.

(c) In addition, suggested times are introduced for RLD at the ORIGIN, ALD at the POE, and EAD and LAD at the POD. These times are determined from the expected transportation modes using apportioned strategic and tactical lift assets, planners’ professional assessments of necessary loading and unloading times, marshalling and assembly times, final transport time to the DEST, and the RDD set by the CINC.

(d) In fact, when the necessary routing information is included, there are 96 separate identifiers that peacetime planners find useful in describing the movement and physical characteristics of an individual unit. Almost 75 percent of these must be entered individually.

(e) The process is further complicated by mixing the CS and CSS forces identified in Service doctrine with the combat forces. Their movement into the theater is phased to meet operational requirements of the fighting force as well as operational constraints levied by transportation.

(2) A more efficient way to build force lists is through the use of force modules. Force modules are planning and execution tools used within JOPES to link major combat units with supporting units and a minimum of 30 days’ sustaining logistics supplies. Movement for the entire package is phased to support the concept of operations. The force module concept permits rapid construction of a combat force and satisfies the longstanding need to link support and sustainment requirements with each major combat force in both deliberate planning and crisis action planning, and permits the monitoring of execution. Many force and support requirements can be added to a plan’s database with a three-character force module identifier (FMI). There are three types of force modules:

(a) The first type is the Service force module. Service force modules are built by the Service headquarters to represent the generic (notional) structure of major combat units. Each Service force module contains the combat forces, the combat service (CS) and combat service support (CSS) forces required to support the combat forces, and associated sustainment for all of these for at least 30 days. Service force modules are designed to be basic building blocks to aid the planner in quickly creating force lists in both deliberate and crisis action planning. A basic library of Service force modules is maintained by the Services in the JOPES database.

(b) The second type of force module is the OPLAN-dependent force module. Like Service force modules, OPLAN-dependent force modules group combat, CS, CSS, and sustainment elements, but they are developed by the CINC to meet the specific demands of a particular OPLAN. They may begin as Service force modules that are then tailored to fit the requirements of the OPLAN in development, or they may be created by the CINC or components to fulfill a specific planning task. OPLAN-dependent force modules recognize theater-specific conditions: anticipated weather conditions, expected host-nation support contributions, expected intensity and nature of conflict, etc. OPLAN-dependent