The reprioritized roles and missions to be performed by the Navy and by the Submarine Force,
as outlined in the Secretary of the Navy’s white papers “From the Sea” and “Forward From The
Sea,” require greater information throughput than is presently available within existing
submarine communication shore and shipboard systems. The new communication suites must
support strategic communications including multiple pathways capable of performing command
and control (C 2 ) functional requirements throughout a nuclear conflict. They must also permit
seamless interoperability and access to the common tactical picture found within the Battle
Group Joint Maritime Command Information System (JMCIS), reception of large data file
transfers for Tomahawk strike planning, and reception and transmission of video, voice,
facsimile, and imagery while operating with combined and joint forces in the littoral regions.
Submarine and Navy Command, Control, Communications, Computers and Intelligence (C 4 I)
must be interoperable with the Global Command and Control System (GCCS) being deployed by
the Department of Defense (DOD) and the DISA. JMCIS will be the Navy’s implementation of
GCCS and is required on-board all submarines.
The SCMP provides a coordinated basis for planning, programming, and budgeting. The SCMP
is the primary and authoritative document for planning, organizing and controlling the end
products of the Navy’s submarine-related communication programs. This summary is intended
to consolidate planning and improve total communications performance for all classes of attack
(SSN) and ballistic missile (SSBN) submarines by organizing and controlling program objectives
across the various lines of authority and responsibility. The SCMP is also intended to act as the
focal point through which advances in communication systems and combat control systems are
coordinated. This SCMP is an update of the plan approved in May 1994 to reflect programmatic
changes and to coordinate improvements in the submarine communications suite with ongoing
improvements in the submarine combat control systems (CCS).
1.3 ACQUISITION STRATEGY SUMMARY
To achieve the objective of affordable interoperability, sound acquisition strategies and a
common radio room plan must be used. The overall strategy for installing a common radio room
throughout the submarine fleet will be accomplished by soliciting early participation from
industry and by performing class–specific installations. Technical concepts will be demonstrated
and evaluated through a series of prototype SCSS installations prior to selection of a specific
implementation for full production and introduction into the fleet. Installations supporting these
evaluations will be coordinated with the Type Commanders (TYCOMs) such that the submarine
evaluating prototype equipment will receive a comprehensive package of all upgrades. This
coordination of prototype installations will allow a synergistic evaluation of the prototype
systems operating together on a dedicated submarine, and will also reduce test and evaluation
Starting with LOS ANGELES class submarines, a hybrid-design SCSS will be provided in which
new communication systems such as Extremely High Frequency (EHF), Miniaturized Demand
Assigned Multiple Access (Mini-DAMA), and a Baseband System (BBS) will be installed to
complement existing communication systems. This hybrid SCSS will be developed in phases:
(1) Submarine Message Buffer (SMB) Phase (FY94 – FY96); (2) BBS Phase (FY97 – FY98);
and (3) Submarine Automated Radio Room (SARR) Phase (FY99+). These phases are
described in greater detail in Section 3. Installations will be coordinated through the TYCOMs,
scheduling major ship and operational alterations (SHIPALTs and OPALTs) (e.g., EHF, BBS or
Mini-DAMA) concurrently to minimize cost and the need to repeatedly disrupt the radio room
and operating schedule of the submarine.
Due to the high cost of integrating new systems into the existing TRIDENT radio room, the plan
will “freeze” the radio room at revision 5.3.1 until FY01, with the exception of EHF installations
and the requirement for multiple high data rate (HIDAR) receivers to be installed prior to
January 2000. The potential for installation of DAMA capability prior to the planned FY01
SCSS block upgrade for TRIDENT is being assessed. After FY01, newer communication
systems will be “packaged” so that a group of communication equipment such as EHF, Mini-DAMA,
Submarine Low Frequency/Very Low Frequency (LF/VLF) VMEbus Receiver (SLVR),
Antenna Distribution System (ADS), and BBS can be installed during one installation period.
For the SEAWOLF class, modernized communication equipment and capabilities will be
installed following Post-Shakedown Availability (PSA) periods. Finally, the New Attack
Submarine (NSSN) class will receive its variant of the SCSS/Exterior Communications System
(ECS) during the new construction period via a “turn-key” installation strategy. The SCSS ECS
implementation strategy for each submarine class is described in Section 5 (Sections 5.2 - 5.4).
The overall integrated plan for the acquisition, installation, and maintenance of a common radio
room on-board all classes of submarines requires a cooperative, coordinated effort among many
organizations. Specifically, United States Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM),
Commander-in-Chief Special Operations Command (CINCSOC), the Submarine TYCOMs, the
Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) Staff (N6, N8), the Naval Systems Commands (SPAWAR,
NAVSEA), and Naval Laboratories (NCCOSC, NUWC) must work closely together to clearly
articulate the requirements, solutions, and implementation of the plan. The Submarine
Communications Systems Program Manager, SPAWAR PMW 173, is designated as the overall
coordinator of all aspects of submarine communications.
PMW 173 has designated the Navy Command, Control, and Ocean Surveillance Center
(NCCOSC), Research, Development, Test and Evaluation Division (NRaD) as lead laboratory
for submarine communication design architecture since they are the lead activity for all Navy
communication architectural and system engineering designs. The Naval Undersea Warfare
Center (NUWC), Newport Division has been designated lead laboratory for submarine platform
integration. NCCOSC In-Service Engineering Division, East (NISE East) has been designated
the lead organization for coordinating submarine communications system in-service engineering
management, including installations and life cycle support. Submarine communications
installations, currently managed by multiple organizations, will transition to a single, integrated
management in 1996.
Submarine Development Squadron Twelve will continue to develop communication operational
concepts and submarine communication procedures. As submarine missions evolve, the SCSS
and supporting communications concepts must also evolve. The mix of missions carried out by
both attack and ballistic missile submarines (and potentially Guided Missile Submarines
(SSGNs)) has changed significantly since the end of the cold war. This change in mission
emphasis is driving the revolution in submarine communications.
1.5 SUBMARINE MISSIONS
The demise of the Soviet Union has altered the roles and missions of both the U.S. Navy and its
Submarine Force. The submarine communications system (ashore and afloat) must support
mission requirements for both SSNs and SSBNs. The finite assets and capabilities of the
submarine communications system had previously been optimized to support cold war missions.
These tradeoffs must now be reviewed as the submarine communication systems and its
supporting acquisition programs are “re-optimized” to reflect the Navy’s and submarine force’s
reprioritized mission emphasis.
1.5.1 Joint Services and Navy-wide
The Naval services are in an unprecedented period of change. This change provides a unique
opportunity to redirect the Naval forces to best support their future employment. The Secretary
of the Navy (SECNAV) White Papers, “...From The Sea,” and “Forward From the Sea”, define
this new direction as “...to provide the Nation with Naval Expeditionary Forces which are:
The new direction set forth by these white papers shifts the emphasis of naval operations from
preparing for and executing open-ocean warfare against the Soviet Union to preparing for and
executing Joint operations, conducted from the sea, in littoral regions. The four key operational
capabilities required to execute this new direction as stated in “...From the Sea” are:
- Tailored for National Needs
- Shaped for Joint Operations
- Operating ‘Forward From the Sea’”
(1) Command, Control, and Surveillance;
To ensure that Navy acquisition programs support this new direction, the
CNO initiated an assessment process based on seven Joint Mission Areas (JMAs) and two
Support Areas. These JMAs (Joint Strike; Joint Littoral Warfare; Joint Surveillance; Joint Space
and Electronic Warfare/Intelligence; Strategic Deterrence; Strategic Sealift/Protection; Forward
Presence) and Support Areas (Readiness Support and Infrastructure; Manpower, Personnel, and
Shore Training) are employed to assess an acquisition program’s contributions to the key
capabilities. In addition to their traditional roles, such as Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW),
submarines can and will conduct warfare tasks in support of all seven JMAs. The SCSS and its
associated acquisition programs must be able to support these JMAs with interoperable
communications that provide effective C 2 links, as well as support C 4 I requirements.
The submarine communication systems must also provide the communication support necessary
for the SSBN force to ensure continued deterrence of nuclear aggression. “From the Sea” states
“As long as the United States maintains a policy of nuclear deterrence, our highly survivable
nuclear powered ballistic missile submarines will remain critical to national security”. Although
the current radio room adequately supports the strategic communications requirements, these
vital links must not be degraded as tactical connectivity is improved by reprioritizing assets or
communications-related acquisition programs.
(2) Battlespace Dominance;
(3) Power Projection; and
(4) Force Sustainment.
1.5.2 Tailored Expeditionary Forces
“...From The Sea” also presented the concept of tailorable expeditionary forces. To support this
concept, the Navy and Marine Corps must be restructured around flexible, forward-deployed
Naval Expeditionary Forces which expand on and capitalize upon the Naval Services’ traditional
expeditionary roles. “From the Sea” states “Naval Expeditionary Forces provide unobtrusive
forward presence which may be intensified or withdrawn as required on short notice”. The
Naval Service will provide the Unified Commanders in Chief (CINCs) an Expeditionary Force
Package, flexibly and dynamically configured from the available Naval Forces, which ranges
from an Aircraft Carrier Battle Group (CVBG) and its assigned aircraft, submarines, and surface
ships, to Special Operations Forces (SOF) teams. The Submarine Force and its communications
systems must be capable of supporting this flexible Expeditionary Force during operations with
joint and combined task forces.
1.5.3 Submarine Force
Mirroring the changes in Navy-wide mission priorities, the Submarine Force has shifted its
mission emphasis from global sea control to the support of regional conflict ashore . The
Submarine Force Strategic Plan provides a Submarine Force Vision and Mission Statement. The
Vision statement states:
“The U.S. Submarine Force will remain the world’s preeminent submarine force.
We will aggressively incorporate new and innovative technologies to maintain
dominance throughout the maritime battlespace. We will promote the multiple
capabilities of the submarines and develop tactics to support national objectives
through battlespace preparation, sea control, supporting the land battle and
strategic deterrence. We will fill the role as the Navy’s stealthy, general purpose
The Submarine Force Mission statement states:
“The Submarine Force will provide the National Command Authority, Theater
Commanders and Joint Task Force Commanders with:
- A survivable force capable of deterring regional aggression or global strategic
- Early, accurate and sufficient knowledge of pre-crisis situations at sea and on
land, as well as the battlefield on which power may be projected from the sea.
- Clandestine and timely striking power against critical targets at sea and ashore.
- Capabilities to prepare the battlespace and enable the establishment and
support of an expeditionary force on land.
- The naval superiority to defeat enemy forces, control sea lines of
communication and dominate the maritime battlespace.”
1.6 Copernicus Concept
The original Copernicus pillars have evolved to support the shift to “Forward...From the Sea”
and “Operational Maneuver From The Sea.” In “Forward...From the Sea,” it was recognized
that the most important role for Naval forces, short of war, is to be engaged in forward areas,
preventing conflicts and controlling crisis. The Copernicus evolution reflects the need for the
C 4 I infrastructure to support the architecture, down to the shooter and the weapon. Deployed
forward, Naval C 4 I gives the joint commander C 2 on arrival.
Copernicus supports worldwide C 4 I coverage to the shooter. Fixed and mobile elements now
provide the shooter the same information previously available only to decision makers in
command centers. Conceptually, platforms are linked by moving information around the
information spectrum. The information spectrum consists of three integrated grids (Figure 1-1).
Surveillance Grid: A capabilities grid blanketing the battle space instead of a series of single
sensors. This grid consists of national, theater, and platform sensors that the warfighter can
access directly through Global Information Exchange System (GLOBIXS) and Tactical Data
Information Exchange Subsystem (TADIXS).
Communications Grid: An overlaying wide area network (WAN) of pathways that uses
multiplexing and digital technology to move data and information into and around the
battlespace. Copernican connectivity facilitates the movement of information among operators
Tactical Grid: A tactical network of communications links that ties together all units of a force
regardless of the platform or component. This grid connects the units Combat Control Systems
(CCSs) to provide fire-control grade information across the battle cube to the shooters. The
Battle Cube Information Exchange System (BCIXS) can “plug” and “play” to access C 4 I
information directly by using Tactical Digital Information Links (TADILs) tied to higher echelon Tactical Command Centers (TCCs) and the tactical grid itself.
1.6.1 Information Warfare
Information Warfare (IW)/Command and Control Warfare (C 2 W) is any action to exploit,
manipulate or destroy an adversary’s information and/or information systems while leveraging
and defending friendly information and information systems to achieve information dominance.
IW can be employed before and during hostilities and is fought in the information battle space.
IW permeates strategic, operational and tactical levels; encompasses political, economic,
physical and military infrastructures; expands the spectrum of warfare from competition to
conflict; redefines traditional military and national security concepts; and spans the spectrum
from peace through warfighting. C 2 W, the military and submarine force implementation of IW,
is the integrated use of operations security, military deception, psychological operations,
electronic warfare and physical destruction to deny information to, influence, degrade or destroy
an adversary’s C 2 capabilities, while protecting friendly C 2 capabilities against such actions.
1.6.2 Connectivity and Battle Cube Information Exchange System
Connectivity links nodes throughout Copernicus to implement the sensor-to-shooter construct.
Rapid and reliable connectivity is the cornerstone of all C 4 I provided by GLOBIXS, TADIXS
and BCIXS. Connectivity is critical to the Common Tactical Picture (CTP) because it provides
the managed bandwidth for timely transmission of imagery, video, voice, and data. Connectivity
is critical to the Defense Information Infrastructure (DII) users in peace, crisis, conflict,
humanitarian support, and war. It is the widely-distributed, user-driven infrastructure composed
of the information assets owned by all the military Services into which the warfighter can gain
access from any location, for all required information.
Initially, there were four pillars of the Copernicus architecture: the GLOBIXS, the CINC
Command Complex (CCC), the TADIXS, and the TCCs. As the Copernicus architecture
evolved, a new pillar emerged — BCIXS (Figure 1-2). The initial pillars flowed and filtered
information to and from the TCC for use in the battle space. The Copernicus battle space is
defined as the entire military and political infrastructure that spans the range of the pillars to the
TCC. The BCIXS extends the architecture to include the battle cube — the area in which
shooters and weapons reside. The battle cube is a conceptual, multi-dimensional area that
includes subsurface, surface, air and space as the environment for conducting warfare. BCIXS
represents the battle cube in which tactical forces operate. The boundaries of the BCIXS are
fluid and defined by the dynamics of the battle. Shooters operating in the battle cube form the
operational nodes in the BCIXS. Shooters are equipped with C 4 I tools that allow them to receive
and process information from the Copernicus architecture.
1.6.3 Copernicus Sensor-to-Shooter Concept
The Sensor-to-Shooter Concept within the Copernicus architecture focuses on the process of
putting a weapon on target. This includes surveillance and reconnaissance, acquisition and
localization, combat identification, targeting, engagement and guidance, and battle damage
assessment. Historically, systems were developed to engage a specific threat with little regard
for the interrelationship with other systems or supporting infrastructure. Stovepipe systems
made it difficult for platforms to share information in a timely manner causing inefficiencies,
especially in joint and allied operations. The sensor-to-shooter construct integrates all systems in
the weapon procurement and employment process.
1.6.4 Common Tactical Picture: Command, Control, Communications, Computers and
Intelligence/Communications Support System Integration
Within the Copernicus architecture, the CTP refers to all information spanning the spectrum
from the sensor to the shooter that allows tactical commanders to understand the battle space.
CTP consists of surveillance, intelligence, identification, environmental and positioning inputs
and tactical decision aids. Key factors in the CTP include timeliness, coverage, sensor revisit
rates, accuracy and completeness. All users then share the same scalable picture and can extract
the pieces relevant to their specific needs and tactical situation. Reducing fratricide during
hostilities is an objective of national policy. This depends on a near-perfect tactical picture with
common grid (location) references on all platforms.
Reduced reaction times, combined with increasingly capable threat weapons, makes full
C 4 I/CCS integration a critical objective of Copernicus. Fewer nodes and integration of C 4 I/CCS
accelerates the decision making process and assists the joint warfighter in achieving information
dominance over the enemy. Copernicus is accomplishing this integration by prescribing the
interfaces between C 4 I systems and CCS, empowering platforms to react immediately to threats.
These interfaces depend on common standards and protocols so that systems in the architecture
can transfer data. The first major step in fielding Copernicus was implementing JMCIS. The
JMCIS architecture links C 2 systems into functional categories and creates an environment for
Services to field interoperable systems with common user interfaces. JMCIS has already
migrated several stovepipe systems into one workstation to produce a CTP. More Navy and
Marine Corps C 4 I systems will continue to migrate into the JMCIS architecture as Copernicus
evolves. JMCIS is the maritime implementation of the GCCS. GCCS supports an open system
environment for automated information processing at all warfighting levels of the DOD.