

APPENDIX E

HOW TO ATTACK THE IRAQI ARMY

Neutralize/Destroy SCUD Launchers. This is the first priority strategic task because of the threat to Riyadh and Tel Aviv. Iraq has a limited number of mobile launchers and fixed sites. These systems must be taken out to preclude Riyadh and Tel Aviv being held hostage to offensive action. The danger to "allied" forces is limited by the inherent inaccuracy of Iraqi weapons.

Gain Air Superiority/Supremacy. This is the first priority operational task. The Iraqi Air Force is untested in air-to-air combat. It has sophisticated French air-to-air weapons and we should expect French trained MIRAGE pilots to be the best and most dangerous. The Iraqis have never been confronted with an efficient air power which, in conjunction with other systems, offers the opportunity to checkmate any Iraqi offensive action. It also reduces the chemical and fuel air threats to "allied" ground forces.

Iraqi air defenses are essentially untested. Most missile systems are of older Soviet design, but newer more effective ones are present as are French ROLAND and CROATALE. The integration of the air defense system appears to be complete with Baghdad controlling the outlying region. The system is apparently connected by land-line, but the acquisition and guidance radars could be attacked by TACIT RAINBOW.

Aircraft on the ground will be protected to some degree by an unknown number of hardened shelters, thus they must be drawn out which may not occur after the first days of aerial combat.

Iraqi AWACS capability is limited, but they do have at least two airborne early warning aircraft.

Launch an Antiartillery Campaign. The first priority tactical task is to eliminate Iraqi fire support. While this task serves to negate the effect of the massive Iraqi artillery establishment, it simultaneously eliminates the bulk of the chemical threat to "allied" forces.

Destruction of Iraqi fire support, which is massive and long ranged, is vital to both defensive and offensive operations. Most Iraqi field artillery is towed. The Iraqis follow Soviet practice with their artillery and use it liberally, but it is vulnerable to attack by MLRS, helicopters, and A-10s, in particular. The artillery will be dug in behind revetments as a general rule, but will be dispersed throughout the depth of the battle area. Table 2 displays the relative ranges of artillery weapons under discussion.

Ground Operations.

- Search for a corps boundary—the Iraqis did not coordinate well across boundaries in general and corps boundaries in particular. The Iranians easily located and attacked along these boundaries with regular initial success.
- Beware of fire traps and prepared killing zones, as the Iraqis are proficient in their creation and use. One tip-off will be the location of armored/mechanized concentrations placed to attack the flanks of the "penetration."
- Find and fix the Republican Guard units whose primary role is the counterattack. They usually operate in close coordination with regular army armored and mechanized divisions. The Guards generally lead the attack.
- Present Iraqis with a rapidly shifting, or multidirectional attack while toying with or breaking their command and control. They do not react well to rapid changes and like reassurance from above. While this will be difficult,

UNITED STATES	10km	20km	30km	40km
M-102 (105)	(11.5)			
M-119 (105)		(14)		
M-198 (155)			(24)	
M-109 (155)				(30-RAP)
M-110 (203)			(24)	
MLRS (227)				(30)
(ATACMS)				(100+)
IRAQ				
D-74 (122)				(21)
D-30 (122)		(18.5)		
M-193B (122)		(15.3)		(21.9-RAP)
M-46 (130)				(27.9)
Type 59-1 (130)				(27.9)
M-1937 (152)				(20.8)
M-1943 (152)		(12.4)		
G-5 (155)				(39)
GHM-45 (155)				(39.6)
GCT (155)				(23.5)
2S1 (122)		(18.5)		
2S3 (152)				(20.8)
BM-13/16 (132)				(9)
BM-21 (122)				(20.5)
ASTROS II (127)				(30)
ASTROS SS 40 (180)				(35)
ASTROS SS 60 (300)				(60)
FROG-7				(60)

Table 2.
~~Figure 2~~ Comparative Artillery Ranges

we suggest that the Iraqi command and control structure is probably the tactical and perhaps the operational center of gravity.

- Expect to find the Iraqis well-dug-in with plentiful protective fire plans, mines and other field expedient defenses. If flanked or turned they *may* withdraw quickly—this is more a function of specific leadership than any generalization.
- Find and attack the Popular Army, which has demonstrated a pronounced tendency to panic in the face of a serious assault—but we should not be led into a fire trap by their hasty withdrawal. These forces were often placed forward as a screen.
- Be aware that lines of communication are few and vulnerable but the Iraqis have excellent engineering capabilities to maintain them. They have extensive truck resources and can move massive amounts of supplies quickly.

We offer one final note of caution. Although we have thrice mentioned specific tasks for air power, we do not believe that air power alone will suffice to bring a war with Iraq to an early or decisive conclusion. In the final analysis, ground forces will be required to confront the Iraqi Army and drive it out of Kuwait. The priorities indicated above all have the ultimate purpose of making the land campaign a viable option with minimum allied casualties.