Medium Armored Vehicle

 

Draft

OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS DOCUMENT

FOR A

FAMILY OF MEDIUM ARMORED VEHICLES (MAV)

ACAT I

Prepared for Milestone I Decision

30 Jan 00

 

1. General Description of Operational Capability.

a. Mission Area. An immediate and urgent need exists for an air transportable Interim Brigade Combat Team (IBCT), capable of deployment to anywhere on the globe in a combat ready configuration. The range of tasks to be accomplished by the IBCT requires a family of vehicles that are air transportable, capable of immediate employment upon arrival in the area of operations, and have the greatest degree of commonality possible. Force effectiveness is achieved by an organization built around mounted and dismounted infantry enabled by a family of internetted platforms and situational understanding. The family of vehicles is centered on the Infantry Carrier Vehicle (ICV). The range of specific platform requirements will be met to the extent possible by applying Non Developmental Items (NDI) to the ICV. When specific platform requirements cannot be met to an acceptable level by applying NDI to the ICV, a variant may be used. Commonality with the ICV has priority over individual system performance. The two most likely platform variants are the Mobile Gun System (MGS) and the 155mm Self Propelled Howitzer. This base ORD describes common requirements applicable to all MAVs. Annexes A, B, and C describe the capabilities required for the MAV variants. The appendices to Annex A describe the configurations that will use the ICV as the base vehicle. In keeping faith with the concept of off the shelf, this ORD describes threshold requirements. Desired growth potential through technical insertions, normally considered objective requirements, are listed as Preplanned Product Improvements (P3I) in Annex D. Annex E contains classified requirements.

Infantry Carrier Vehicle (ICV) Annex A

Mobile Gun System (MGS) Annex B

155mm Self Propelled Howitzer Annex C

Preplanned Product Improvements Annex D

Classified Requirements Annex E

b. Operational and Organizational Concept.

(1) The Army is the centerpiece of the nation's conventional capability for land warfare and conventional deterrence. The Army provides a unique contribution to the National Command Authority by providing land forces which are capable of decisively fighting and winning the nation's wars, engaging the process to promote peace and stability by being a rapidly deployable and credible land force, and by providing crisis response.

(2) QThe Army's responsibility to satisfy 21st Century requirements for effective full spectrum strategic responsiveness demands an improved capability for the rapid deployment of highly-integrated, combined arms forces possessing overmatching capabilities, exploiting the power of information and human potential, and combining the advantages of both light and mechanized forces, across the full range of military operations. Meeting this requirement and providing warfighting CINCs with an important new option for decisive contingency response is the central near-term objective of the Army's decision to develop full spectrum brigades, known as IBCT. The IBCTs will provide an immediate improvement in national conventional deterrence by establishing the capability to place a credible combat force on the ground anywhere in the world in 96 hours from liftoff.

(3) The IBCT is a full spectrum, combat force. It has utility, confirmed through extensive analysis, in all operational environments against all projected future threats, but it is designed and optimized primarily for employment in small scale contingency (SSC) operations in complex and urban terrain, confronting low-end and mid-range threats that may employ both conventional and asymmetric capabilities. The IBCT deploys very rapidly, executes early entry, and conducts effective combat operations immediately on arrival to prevent, contain, stabilize, or resolve a conflict through shaping and decisive operations. The IBCT participates in major theater war (MTW), with augmentation, as a subordinate maneuver component within a division or corps, in a variety of possible roles. The IBCT also participates with appropriate augmentation in stability and support operations (SASO) as an initial entry force and/or as a guarantor to provide security for stability forces by means of its extensive combat capabilities.

(4) As a full spectrum combat force, the IBCT is capable of conducting all major doctrinal operations including offensive, defensive, stability, and support actions. Its core operational capabilities rest upon excellent operational and tactical mobility, enhanced situational understanding, combined arms integration down to company level, and high dismount strengths for close combat in urban and complex terrain. Properly integrated through a mobile robust C4ISR network, these core capabilities compensate for platform limitations that may exist in the close fight, leading to enhanced force effectiveness. When employed in the operational environment for which it is optimized, the IBCT has the capability to achieve decision as a result of its early entry, shaping, and decisive actions.

(5) The Given its likely operational environment, the IBCT achieves decisive action by means of combined arms dismounted assault at the company level, supported by direct fires from organic weapon systems (ICV crew served weapons, MGS, anti-tank systems, and snipers) integrated with indirect fires from artillery, mortars, and joint fires/effects. Although dismounted actions will be the primary means of achieving decision, the high mobility of the IBCTs and its network based integrated capabilities also allow some immediate actions to be taken without dismounting, enhancing survivability and force effectiveness.

(6) Situational understanding is the fundamental force enabler across all IBCT battlefield operating systems and the foundation for risk mitigation with respect to IBCT vulnerabilities. The IBCT will have the capability to achieve information superiority and deny the adversary the capability to achieve surprise or to template the force and engage it effectively. The IBCT employs a multi-level, integrated suite of intelligence, reconnaissance, and surveillance (ISR) capabilities to develop and disseminate a common operational picture throughout the force. This capability is manifested not only in the RSTA Squadron, but also in the integrated and internetted company combined arms teams, the dismounted soldier systems, and the platform capabilities populated throughout the IBCT AOR.

(7) The IBCT will offset the lethality and survivability limitations of its platforms through the holistic integration of all other force capabilities, particularly the internetted actions of the combined arms company teams. Force effectiveness exploits the teaming of the soldier system, the platform, and the organization. Netted with his mounted platform, the dismounted soldier provides an umbrella of awareness and close in protection, thereby increasing the force effectiveness of the combined arms team. The mounted systems equipped with FBCB2 and other enhancements provide the IBCT a larger internetted web of situational awareness extending throughout the IBCT area of operations. The synergistic effects achieved by internetting highly trained soldiers and leaders with platforms and organizational design enable the force to avoid surprise, develop rapid decisions, control the time and place to engage in combat, conduct precision maneuver, shape the battlespace with precision fires and effects, and achieve decisive outcomes. Once in the assault, the ability to direct maneuver and apply lethal and precise suppressive fires in support of the assaulting force against a wide array of targets greatly enhances the level of organizational effectiveness. This internetted web of information and situational awareness that permeates the IBCT area of operations provides a quality of security and survivability in and of itself. The MGS and ICV with scalable armor protection and overmatching fires protect soldiers as the company maneuvers for the assault. Future P3I technical insertions, where appropriate, will increase lethality and survivability to further reduce potential operational risk.

(8) The initial IBCTs will be populated with systems consisting of integrated off the shelf capabilities. Combined with these off the shelf systems, innovative applications will enable full operational capabilities for the interim force. Preplanned Product Improvements (P3I), as described in Annex D, will provide the full spectrum capabilities for the interim force while we pursue science and technology for the Future Combat System (FCS), the family of systems required for the objective force.

2. Threat.

a. Threat to be countered. MAV targets include mounted and dismounted infantry, artillery, air defense, C4ISR facilities/ platforms, bunkers, concrete buildings/revetments, dug-in and concealed weapon platforms, and light/medium armored vehicles. Reference DIA validated series of Land Threat Environment projections, NGIC-1100-600 Series, volumes 1-6 for details. Details of the threat to be countered can be found in the MAV System Threat Assessment Report (STAR).

b. Projected threat environment. Asymmetric warfare focuses whatever may be one side’s comparative advantages against an enemy’s relative weakness. A defining and distinguishing aim of asymmetric warfare is the creation of conditions where an enemy’s relative advantage cannot be applied is degraded or neutralized. The IBCT will be employed worldwide, wherever U.S. interests are threatened. To this end, potential threat forces will be armed with various mixes of increasingly sophisticated weaponry. They will include small arms and automatic individual/crew served weapons, antitank (AT) weapons to include antitank guided missiles (ATGM), medium caliber cannon (20-75mm), hand held high explosive antitank (HEAT), shoulder fired Surface to Air Missiles (SAM), and land mines. Regardless of its location on the battlefield, MAV equipped forces will be threatened by indirect fire. As part of a digitized force the MAV will be subject to electronic warfare, threat information operations and directed energy. The IBCT will potentially operate in a nuclear, biological and chemical (NBC) environment, which could include weaponized agents, toxic industrial hazards and battlefield residues.

c. Many future regional conflicts will include low to medium range military operations, or small-scale contingencies (SSC). Many of the world’s major military powers, as well as third world nations, are moving toward smaller, better-trained and equipped forces. Less developed nations have increased their warfighting capabilities through greater access to military technologies and increased availability of a wide range of advanced military equipment on the international market. Even relatively underdeveloped countries may acquire a minimum number of advanced systems to fill a specific technology void and/or increase their leverage in terms of another regional power. These forces will attempt to undermine U.S. technical superiority by making maximum use of asymmetric techniques that may impact on our capability to maintain total situational understanding and/or employ long-range fires or precision munitions. Threat forces are capable of employing NBC weapons and directed energy, electronic attacks on communications, camouflage dispersion, the potential use of human shields, deception, and PSYOPS.

3. Shortcomings of Existing Systems.

a. Although the Army is full spectrum capable, it’s organizations and equipment platforms are not optimized for strategic responsiveness to preclude expansion of a crisis or to begin stabilizing a conflict. Our light forces provide responsiveness but have limitations in lethality, survivability, and tactical mobility. The initial IBCT is organized and equipped to complement light forces for small scale contingencies and crisis response for stability and support operations. Our mechanized and light forces remain our force mix for decisive operations in land warfare for major regional contingencies. The initial IBCT will improve not only our responsiveness in contingencies but represents complementary force design options for mechanized and light forces in a major regional contingency. The initial IBCT is organized, trained, manned, and equipped, to operate as an integral part of light or mechanized division response forces for full spectrum operations.

b. The capabilities of the IBCT provide options to meet an urgent need that are not currently available. The operational capabilities envisioned to meet these requirements are not provided in any existing organizational design or emerging ground combat system. The development of the Medium Armored Vehicle (MAV) family of systems for the IBCTs will provide near and mid-term capability improvements for the interim force while we pursue science and technology for the Future Combat System (FCS), the family of systems required for an objective force which is general purpose in design, strategically responsive, and full spectrum capable.

4. Capabilities Required. Requirements in this paragraph represent the threshold capabilities required for all MAVs. Annexes A, B, and C describe the threshold capabilities required for the distinct MAV variants (ICV, MGS, and 155mm Self Propelled Howitzer, respectively). The appendices at Annex A describe the threshold requirements for the configurations that will use the ICV as the base vehicle. P3I capabilities are those growth potential technical insertions that should be incorporated into MAVs and are described in Annex D. Annex E contains classified requirements.

a. System Performance. Key Performance Parameters (KPPs); Asterisk (*) indicates a KPP.

*(1) Interoperability. MAV must be capable of hosting and effectively integrating existing and planned Army Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) systems (e.g., EPLRS, FBCB2, ABCS, WIN-T Subscriber Node). Specific C4ISR systems configurations will be integrated into MAV platforms in accordance with approved systems architecture.

Rationale: This internetted interoperable capability is based on MAV hosting C4ISR systems which enable a common relevant picture, scaled to specific level of interest. The common picture allows Army forces to operate as an integral part of a joint force and be capable of operational and tactical command of Army forces across the full spectrum of operations.

*(2) MAV must be transportable in a C-130 aircraft.

Rationale: This mobility capability is critical to enable strategic maneuver of the IBCT through enabled operational and tactical intra-theater C-130 transport. To be C-130 transportable, MAV must enter and exit the aircraft capable of immediate combat operations (does not require a full basic load) and not exceed 13,000 pounds maximum axle weight on the treadways of C130 aircraft, and its combat capable deployment weight must not exceed 38,000 pounds GVW (19 stons) to allow C-130 transport of 1,000 nautical miles without requiring a USAF waiver for maximum aircraft weight on fixed runway. C-130 with MAV must be capable of assault strip landing with a waiver for maximum aircraft weight.

(3) MAV must have the ability to operate effectively, employ weapon systems, and rapidly maneuver 24 hours per day including night, inclement weather and other periods of limited visibility. Individual configurations will be capable of hosting appropriate government furnished weapons sight and driver enhancing night vision capabilities.

(4) MAV must host the capability for dismounted soldiers to communicate directly with vehicle crews and mounted elements using radio, phone, wire, or visual signals.

Rationale: These requirements provide soldiers and platforms a networked capability and enable them to gain full situational understanding, generate and direct fires, and direct maneuver. Soldiers and platforms will be provided shared friendly identification, target acquisition, designation, and engagement, thus providing the organization as a whole greater protection and lethality. This enables the ability to use a designator/ sensor to direct maneuver, precision fires, and direct fires as well as to pass target designation information into FBCB2. It also provides the soldiers and platforms the ability to identify friends and foes. Finally, the information provided by dismounted soldiers allows the platforms to achieve standoff and to avoid engagement by man-portable AT fires.

(5) Commonality will be maximized between the ICV and all other MAV platform variants and configurations.

Rationale: The IBCT will be optimized for platform enabled dismounted infantry operations. To reduce the logistics footprint and sustainability of the force as a whole, commonality must be achieved to the greatest extent possible. Ideally, common chassis, components, and subcomponents will be achieved, thus reducing the need for differing maintenance

personnel, spare parts, and tools. The result will be demand reduction and sustainment efficiency measures which will contribute to the IBCT’s ability to operate with a reduced logistics footprint. Commonality will also increase the combat effectiveness of the force by allowing crewmembers to switch from one function to the next without loss in efficiency (interchangeability) and by supporting and enabling dismounted assault operations with a family of MAVs. Commonality also reduces training load both on the IBCT and institution.

(6) MAV must be operable in climatic design types hot, temperate, and cold.

Rationale: The MAV will be deployed worldwide to any operational area, it must have the capability to be fully functional in all anticipated climatic conditions.

Mobility:

(7) MAV must be capable of sustained hard surface speeds of 40 MPH.

Rationale: One of the core capabilities of the MAV equipped IBCT is the ability to move rapidly about the battlefield. A sustained speed of 40 MPH gives the IBCT the ability to conduct road marches at 30-35 MPH, and gives individual platforms the ability to have catch up speed to maintain momentum. MAV must be capable of rapid deployment/displacement to critical areas immediately upon landing/insertion and have the ability to rapidly relocate to meet emerging threats and to shape the battlefield. This speed allows the commander to rapidly move and commit his MAV equipped force.

(8) MAV must be able to climb vertical 18-inch obstacles in forward and reverse.

Rationale: The IBCT O&O requires rapid repositioning in urban and complex terrain. This capability is essential to quickly negotiate hasty obstacles, man-made and natural, such as downed trees, building rubble (medium sized pillars, 14-18 inches), agricultural enclosures, retaining walls, barbed wire or dikes that may seriously impede maneuver. In those cases where MAV equipped forces will conduct an engagement without dismounting, this capability is essential to maintaining momentum.

(9) MAV must provide a cruising range of a minimum of 300 miles without refueling.

Rationale: Provides ability to move over extended ranges without refueling, thus increasing operational flexibility and reducing the load on CSS assets. When task organized within a Force XXI or AOE division, the brigade requires the ability to keep pace with the mechanized formation. The cruising range for both the Bradley and Abrams is 300 miles.

(10) MAV must be capable of fording a water obstacle while maintaining wheel/track contact with the ground. Must be capable of fording, without preparation, at a depth of one meter forward and reverse.

Rationale: Provides operational flexibility to maneuver over a wide variety of terrain and natural water obstacles. Reduces the need for integral or augmented engineer mobility assets. Maintains the momentum of the force during maneuver by limiting the terrain features that require augmented support to negotiate.

(11) MAV must be able to climb and descend hard surface 60 percent frontal slope with no degradation in steering.

Rationale: This allows the MAV to negotiate steep hills, valleys, and man-made objects that are typical in cross-country and urban terrain. It allows the commander needed operational flexibility in selecting maneuver options. Ensures the vehicle can quickly and safely climb over and out of steep terrain.

(12) MAV must be capable of crossing gaps (approximately ¼ vehicle length).

Rationale: Required for negotiating ditches/obstacles encountered in close terrain in order to maintain the desired optempo described in the O&O concept. Capability to maintain momentum in complex and urban terrain

Survivability:

(13) MAV must be able to move 50 meters from a standing start in less than 8 seconds (hard surface).

Rationale: The MAV is required to operate in complex and urban terrain and must be able to quickly move in both directions to avoid target acquisition. This facilitates the ability to dash to safety, particularly in urban areas. In addition to increased mobility, this capability is essential to survivability for medium armor protected vehicles. This acceleration provides the minimum dash-to-cover capability. Provides the ability to immediately seek cover from direct and indirect fire.

(14) MAV must provide integral frontal, side and rear protection from 7.62mm AP at (Classified) meters.

(15) MAV must be able to accept scaleable add-on armor (active or passive) capable of defeating 14.5mm AP at (Classified) meters and hand-held HEAT up to and including

RPG 7. During the process of protecting the vehicle, the scalable armor must not endanger personnel or equipment in close proximity to the vehicle. Minimum safe zone must be (Classified) meters away from the vehicle. Armor must be capable of mounting by the crew, without special tools, within two hours.

(16) MAV must provide overhead crew protection against 152mm HE airburst at (Classified) meters.

Rationale: Armed with its networked information capability, the IBCT selects when and where to go on the battlefield, providing advanced warning and standoff from the threat. These capabilities provide the protection levels required for each system when the decision is made to engage in the close fight. Because of the proximity of small arms engagements, (Classified) meters is needed for all around small arms protection. RPGs and 14.5mm heavy machine guns are proliferated throughout the world and are expected to be among the "weapons of choice" for opposing forces. In close-in terrain, during the assault, dismounted infantry and situational understanding will provide standoff. The IBCTs scale able protection requirement provides the platforms the ability to support add-on armor packages capable of defeating hand-held weapons and eliminating "cheap kills." Vulnerability to enemy artillery fire has been convincingly demonstrated in simulation-based wargaming. To provide overhead protection during movement and while supporting dismounted assaults, (Classified) meters of overhead standoff is necessary.

(17) MAV must provide all around crew protection against the blast and overpressure effects of AP mines. This does not include shaped-charges or an explosively formed penetrator exploding under the entire length of a vehicle with mine protection.

Rationale: Worldwide proliferation of mines is a major threat to movement of maneuver forces. This level of protection is an essential capability for medium or high tempo operations described in the O&O concept.

(18) All MAV configurations (less medical) not already mounting a self defense weapon will be equipped with a universal gun mount capable of elevating to at least 60 degrees and traversing 360 degrees.

Rationale: Provides supplemental fire support at critical points. Weapon required for engaging enemy soldiers on rooftops in urban settings and providing limited air defense self-protection. Minimum requirement for platform self-protection anywhere on the battlefield.

(19) MAV must be capable of rapid self-obscuration activated from inside the vehicle.

Rationale: Significantly improves vehicle survivability by degrading threat system capability to acquire friendly vehicles. Essential element to deter enemy direct fire weapons/munitions detection, acquisition, and engagement capability. Allows time for the vehicle to move and maneuver against the identified threat.

(1620) The MGS MAV crew compartment must be provided with a spall lining to contain/limit penetration fragmentation from injuring crew members.

Rationale: Spall lining will increase crew protection and survivability by deflecting and containing fragmentation caused by munitions and indirect fire.

Sustainability:

(21) MAV must be capable of towing and being towed by another MAV and be equipped with a self–recovery capability.

Rationale: Ability to be towed and for self-recovery contributes to deployability by minimizing the need for a specialized recovery vehicle and allows the force to maintain momentum.

(22) MAV must possess a NATO slave receptacle and slave start capability.

Rationale: Ability to be slave started by the crew ILO maintenance personnel, and assist other MAVs with slave starting, enhances operational availability. The receptacle is useful in supporting standard tools and diagnostic equipment, when needed, and contributes to interoperability.

(23) MAV must be capable of rapid refueling (no less than 50 gallons per minute) in four minutes or less and rapid fuel transfer using only one fuel tank filler pipe.

Rationale: Rapid refueling is necessary to minimize the time spent conducting replenishment operations and to expedite turnaround of combat service support assets. This is particularly important during the extended range operations envisioned in the IBCT O&O. This rate is compatible with current support capability. Improves safety of crew and support personnel and significantly impacts survivability by minimizing time spent in a static position

(24) MAV must provide an auxiliary power source capable of powering critical systems for a minimum of 12 hours. MAV must also provide a battery charging and power management capabilities.

Rationale: Auxiliary power is necessary for signature management and to reduce wear and tear on the vehicle’s engine. It also allows silent watch. Battery charging is necessary to support the rechargeable battery requirements of crewmembers and dismounted elements. Uninterrupted, stable power will assist in maintaining the readiness of digital communications equipment and computers on board the MAV.

 

Lethality: See Configuration Annexes and Appendices.

b. Information Exchange Requirements (IERs). IERs will be defined by the requirements documentation of the C4 systems in the ABCS Capstone Requirements Document (CRD) and the C4RDP. The MAV will host one or more of these systems depending on mission and configuration.

c. Logistics and Readiness.

(1) MAV must provide easy access to prime power train components. Power pack and primary components should be capable of replacement by organizational maintenance with crew assistance using organic tools and equipment.

Rationale: Contributes to ability to maintain the force in the field and maintain maximum force/momentum without the need for spares. Minimizes downtime for the entire fleet. The result is improved readiness and a smaller logistics footprint (fewer maintainers, supply personnel and Class IX stockage).

(2) MAV must be equipped with standard tie-down and lifting provisions for air, rail and sea movement without using shackles.

Rationale: Although air transport is the primary means of strategic and tactical deployment, conditions may require transport by highway, rail or sealift.

(3) Reliability goal should be 1000 miles between combat mission failure.

Rationale: Superior reliability is essential due to the austere nature of organic maintenance and logistics support. Reliability and maintainability standards/goals will be established during the acquisition process to ensure that the system conforms to military/commercial standards. The established reliability goal is based on the ability to accomplish a given mission within the 1000 miles maximum range threshold and demonstrated field reliability of comparable systems. High reliability will ensure unit effectiveness over time. It will result in improved readiness and a reduced logistics footprint and reduces the "ripple effect" on support requirements.

(4) MAV must be equipped with built-in test (BIT) or built-in test equipment (BITE). Embedded diagnostics at the system level for electronics is necessary to fault isolate to a single line replacement unit (LRU) or removable assembly at the unit level and single shop replacement unit (SRU). Diagnostic capability must be compatible with the Army Diagnostic Improvement Program.

Rationale: On board diagnostics with BIT/BITE dramatically improves system readiness by reducing repair cycle times. Subsequent benefits are reduced Class IX requirements and fewer maintainers required to support the unit.

(5) If a wheeled variant, MAV must be equipped with central tire inflation and run-flat tires. If a tracked variant, MAV must have the capacity to run short track with a minimum of one road wheel arm incapacitated on either side.

Rationale: The requirement for MAV may be met by a wheel or track solution. Regardless, any variant or configuration must be able to keep pace with the rest of the force. Mine damage in complex terrain where rubble and hard rock surfaces are prevalent and are likely to cause broken track and flat tires. Short track capability allows the ability to rapidly repair the broken track and continue the mission. Run-flat tire capability allows systems to continue missions (limp home or get-away capability) for short durations after combat or terrain induced tire failures thus improving survivability for the system and the crew. Limp home capability reduces maintenance recovery workload. Central Tire Inflation (CTI) provides the capability to vary tire pressures and vehicle mobility to match terrain, road, and weather conditions -- lower pressures for off road in soft soils, sand, mud and snow and higher pressures for use on-road where higher speeds are required. CTI improves vehicle ride quality over rough terrain, reducing driver fatigue and reducing terrain induced reliability failures.

(6) MAV configurations must be equipped with interactive electronic technical manuals.

Rationale: The Army requires that all technical manuals be produced in the digital format. This will eliminate the space requirement for all of the paper technical manuals.

(7) MAV maintenance must use common tools and must not require the use of any special tools not currently available.

Rationale: Reduces the logistics footprint and improves repair cycle time. Reduces the number of special tools required for deployment, transport, maintenance and training.

(8) MAVs must be equipped with lifetime oil filters, on-board oil changers, and equipped with AC/DC power generation. Must be capable of supporting integrated and associated equipment with 110/220 volts AC 60 Hz and 28 volts DC with the vehicle engine operating or through embedded auxiliary power and mounting brackets. Routine scheduled services should not be required more frequently than annually for the engine, drive train, wheel, hull, and turret systems.

Rationale: Reduces logistics footprint, compensates for extended maintenance service intervals and reduces maintenance requirements. Power generation reduces the dependence on generators, provides additional power to meet emergency requirements, and gives the combat commander more flexibility to meet mission requirements. In austere environments, power generation capability is the backup power source for any deadlined generator. These power requirements allow the use of NDI mission equipment packages.

(9) MAV must utilize standard fuel (JP8) and standard lubricants for primary operations. The MAV must also be able to use alternate fuels and lubricants for special operations, e.g., cold climates.

Rationale: DOD’s standard fuel is JP8 per Dir 4140.43, Mar 11, 1988. The use of standard fuels and lubricants minimizes the impact on IBCT logistics distribution and support. JP8 has a higher flash point than gasoline, so is a safer fuel.

(10) The MAV will be equipped with outside cargo straps and hooks.

Rationale: Due to weight restrictions of the MAV, it will be necessary to store individual equipment on the outside of the vehicle to allow adequate space inside the vehicle for the squad.

d. Other System Characteristics.

(1) MAV must be able to accomplish OMS/MP critical functions while in NBC contaminated environments and within 15 minutes following High-altitude Electromagnetic Pulse Environments (HEMP). MAV must also survive the initial nuclear weapons effects (INWE) of blast, thermal radiation, and initial nuclear radiation (INR) to the extent that a unit maintains its combat effectiveness.

(a) MAV must carry on-board, items necessary to conduct immediate and operational decontamination procedures as developed and defined in appropriate MAV operational and technical manuals and conducted by crew within 15 minutes. MAV must be operationally decontaminable to a level to prevent spread of contaminates to the operators, passengers, terrain, and other equipment during OMS/MP critical functions; and to reduce personnel MOPP levels for personnel performing these OMS/MP critical functions. If some variants incorporate unique key components, which proponent deems necessary to be decontaminable to a negligible risk level, decontamination must be accomplished by the crew utilizing on-board equipment. MAV must provide crew and passengers additional NBC protection through ventilated face pieces.

(b) MAV is not required to operate through a HEMP burst, but equipment must be able to be rebooted and vehicle restarted and returned to full operational capability within 15 minutes.

Rationale: MAV will be utilized as mission critical/essential equipment where the loss of MAV theater-wide due to HEMP or localized due to NBC will have an effect on its mission. For the protection of the crew and passengers, MAV needs to be operable in these threat environments. The Army’s "front-line-shooters" must be survivable to initial nuclear weapons effects. Soldiers who survive the initial NBC environment can continue the fight, assuming an offensive and self-preservation function exists. According to the O&O concept, MAV forces are intended to be an initial entry force and therefore will be a primary target for nuclear weapons. Current threat projections and intelligence confirm that nuclear weapons are proliferating and are still a viable threat against our tactical forces.

(2) The MAV must be able to host existing and future GPS capabilities into an integrated, self-contained, externally referenced positioning/navigation system. The accuracy of this system shall be sufficient to provide navigation position, velocity, heading, attitude, and time data for map displays, automatic position reporting, target location determination and communications reporting.

Rationale: Provides the ability for soldiers to accurately determine their location and direction in accomplishing their mission. Accurate location on the battlefield is paramount in accomplishing their mission and providing situational understanding (situational awareness) to the commander. Situational understanding is also essential for soldiers to accomplish requirements stated in the IBCT O&O. Accurate friendly position location helps avoid fratricide.

(3) The MAV must have a fire detection and suppression system.

Rationale: Fire suppression will minimize materiel effects and damage and crew casualties should the vehicle be penetrated.

(4) MAV will be equipped with a water ration heater with the same capacity and capability as those installed in the M2 ODS and M2 A3 Bradley.

Rationale: Water ration heater provides the crew and squad with the capability to heat MREs and water for hot beverages or personal hygiene during field operations. This capability is particularly important for soldiers in the Bde combat team because of their highly mobile operations and limited mess support.

5. Program Support. This program has Joint potential or interest. A supportability strategy and system support packages will be developed and updated throughout the acquisition process.

a. Maintenance Planning. Logistics and maintenance support will be accomplished using a "replace forward, repair rear" concept, representing two levels of maintenance. When feasible, Weapon System Replacement Operations (WSRO) will be utilized to fully replace a system.

b. Support Equipment. New or unique equipment to support MAV will be kept to a minimum.

c. C4I/Standardization, Interoperability, and Commonality.

(1) C4I/Standardization. MAV will have the inherent capability to access information databases, in a "push/pull" mode. Information pulled from database(s) shall assist in planning and supporting military operations. It must support and interface with existing and emerging Army, Joint and Allied/Coalition C4I systems via JVMF. The transfer of battle command information shall be automated over tactical data and voice communications systems.

(a) Electromagnetic Environmental Effects and Spectrum Supportability. All sheltered components of the MAV shall be designed to be mutually compatible with other electric or electronic equipment within the system’s expected operational electromagnetic sheltered environment. All spectrum dependent equipment must have a frequency supportability assessment conducted and conform to the frequency spectrum certified for Army use worldwide.

(b) The MAV component design must include consideration for mitigation of co-site interference with other Army equipment operating in the same frequency range(s) and close proximity.

(c) MAV communications systems will be commercial standards based, modular in design, scalable to user requirements and compliant with JTA standards.

(2) Interoperability. See paragraph 4.a.(1). Based on individual system role/mission as stated in the ORD, functions will be combined/integrated wherever possible. The MAV must be interoperable with Army and Joint systems. The MAV must comply with applicable information technology standards contained in the DOD JTA, to include DII/COE compliance for management systems.

(3) Commonality. See paragraph 4.a.(5). Commonality between platforms and the various configurations will be maximized wherever feasible.

d. Computer Resources. MAV will utilize existing and/or currently planned common computer resources (e.g., ABCS). Computing systems must include GPS/PosNav capability.

e. Human Systems Integration. MANPRINT issues will be addressed in the MAV System MANPRINT Management Plan (SMMP) and tracked in updates thereof, incorporated into Critical Operational Issues and Criteria (COIC) as appropriate, and addressed in the Test & Evaluation Master Plan (TEMP). A MANPRINT Assessment should be completed prior to any production/acquisition decision.

(1) Manpower: No increase in total force structure for operators and maintainers will be required by introduction of the MAV. Appropriate analysis will be conducted to identify force structure impacts, if any. Results of this analysis will be incorporated into a Manpower, Personnel, & Training Assessment (MPTA) to be submitted at each Milestone Decision Review (MDR) as part of the MANPRINT Integration Report (MIR) and considered at program reviews as appropriate.

(2) Personnel: Qualitative and quantitative changes in personnel requirements will be analyzed and documented. Results will be incorporated in the MPTA at appropriate decision points.

(3) System Training Strategy: The MAV equipped force is composed of mission specific variants/configurations (V/C), each of which provide the vehicle operator/crewman with a series of functional capabilities, some of which have previously not been available. These off the shelf, advanced capabilities demand the training of certain individual and collective tasks, skills and knowledge to support effective use of the MAV that require significant initial and frequent reinforcement training. Initial individual training is conducted during new equipment training (NET) in conjunction with introduction of the MAV during unit fielding and in the institution. The institution will train system operation and/or familiarization to initial entry and professional development officer and enlisted personnel course attendees. Collective training on the system will be conducted in the unit. The unit commander is responsible for system proficiency through sustainment and transition training, and ensures training time and assets are available to train required tasks to standard. The MAV System Training Plan (STRAP) details specifics.

(a) It is essential that all requisite training products be developed by materiel developer consistent with the delivery of MAVs. Task analysis and training product development will be performed using the Automated Systems Approach to Training (ASAT) database software, with software and ASAT training provided as Government Furnished Equipment (GFE). Training products will be prepared in accordance with the TRADOC Systems Approach to Training (SAT) and TRADOC Regulation 350-70 by FUE. Each training package will consist of, but not be limited to, a program of instruction, lesson plans, evaluation instruments with multiple variations, test administration guides, training schedules, training and job aids, and individual training support packages (TSP), as applicable. This training package will evolve to and become the new equipment training (NET) package. The PM is responsible for planning, programming, budgeting, and execution the conduct of Instructor and Key Personnel Training, test player training during operational testing, and NET for unit fielding. The NET training products will be used as the basis for institutional training development, unit sustainment training, and rapid train-up of replacement personnel. The final NET package will be used to conduct training at the site of the receiving unit and left, as a stay behind training packet, with the unit to support sustainment training.

(b) Full Embedded Training (ET) desired to meet deployability operator and maintainer training requirements will be addressed concurrently with materiel development. The ET concept must include individual and crew training tasks that can be performed in a deployed theater, in garrison, and in a field environment.

(c) Training Support Packages (TSP). As part of MAV development, the materiel developer will develop a series of task based individual TSPs that will be prioritized to provide vehicle operational capabilities, functionality, operator maintenance, and employment. The end deliverable of each TSP will be Interactive Multi-media Instruction and will be designed to support effective training for operators of the system, and if applicable, the fire controls and weapons systems organic to the MAV V/C. The package will have an interactive, self-tutored text program to support effective and detailed individual operator training in system application. The full range of IMI will be explored to determine the most appropriate medium to support student-centered training (i.e., Computer-based Instruction, Computer-based Training, Interactive Course, Interactive Video Disc, Computer Managed Instruction, and Electronic Performance Support System.

(d) The proponent training developer will review all training products developed by the PM for completeness, content, and applicability to military instruction and training IAW TRADOC Regulation 350-70.

(e) Training Aids, Devices, Simulators, and Simulations (TADSS). The materiel developer will provide representation of all MAV variants and configurations for inclusion in standard Army training models and simulations.

(1) The materiel developer is responsible for the planning, programming, and budgeting for TADSS in coordination with the training developer and proponent. Full ET is the preferred approach to TADSS development. However, if this is technically infeasible, impractical, or cost prohibitive, appended and umbilical ET, and stand-alone TADSS must be considered. TADSS for the MAV will leverage already developed appended and stand-alone systems and technology to the greatest extent, with the intent of maximizing standardized training and systems commonality with the potential of significant cost savings. Due to the low numbers of actual vehicles made available for institutional training, selected stand-alone TADSS will be required. It is a goal that TADSS be produced as multi-use devices, such as those that train gunnery and maneuver simultaneously also be developed and employed to support task based individual and collective training on the system.

(2) The MAV materiel developer, in conjunction with the proponent, will and the TADSS materiel developer must consider the necessity of incorporateing variant and configuration functionality or capabilities representedion into selected existing training systems. Proponents will develop specific TADSS requirements. MAV training in units and the institution will be supported by training devices for gunnery and collective, tactical, and maintenance training. These devices will interface with current and future ranges, targetry, and tactical engagement simulation. All TADSS should be transportable/mobile by C-130, so that training can occur immediately upon arrival in the theater of operations. Because the software of the MAV system will change periodically, provisions must be made to insert new software into TADSS to ensure they are current with the operational system.

(f) Logistical Support. Embedded MAV training systems, if applicable, will be logistically supported as part of the organic operational system. MAV functionality incorporated into other TADSS will be supported by the TADSS Program Manager organic logistic support system.

(4) Human Engineering. The MAV shall be designed for use and maintenance by the 5th to 95th percentile environmentally clothed target audience soldier. The MAV equipment must promote ease of operation and utilize controls and displays that are easy to understand and readily accessible. Sound Human Engineering principles will be used in system design to ensure that target audience soldiers wearing and using standard Army clothing and equipment (operators and maintainers) are capable of performing required tasks with 95 percent reliability and accuracy.

(5) System Safety. All safety hazards will be eliminated or reduced to an acceptable level of risk. The MAV must not have any uncontrolled safety or health hazards that may adversely impact upon the health or safety of the operator, maintainer, trainer, or handler. A System Safety Assessment (SSA) will be completed as part of the design process to ensure the MAV is free from conditions which can cause death, injury, or illness to the target audience soldier. The SSA will be updated prior to each MDR and results will be incorporated into the MIR.

(6) Health Hazards. The MAV shall be designed to eliminate or control all potential health hazards to include steady state noise, excessive heat, and toxic fumes. A Health Hazard Assessment (HHA) will be completed as early as practical in the program to identify potential health hazards. Results of the HHA will be incorporated into each MIR.

(7) Soldier Survivability. MAV operation, maintenance, and repair requirements or characteristics should not increase personnel detection. A Soldier Survivability Assessment will be conducted prior to every MDR and will provide input to the MIR.

f. Other Logistics and Facilities Considerations. Systems and components will meet OMS/MP requirements. Appropriate models and simulation facilities will be updated to support this program. MAV variants and configurations should be able to be accommodated by existing facility standard designs. MAV should not rely on products or components that cause environmental liability.

g. Transportation and Basing. System will be moved into theater primarily via C-5 and C-17. Intra-theater deployability is by air (C-130 aircraft), the vehicle itself, rail, sea and other ground transportation vehicles.

h. Geospatial Information and Services. No special requirements.

i. Natural Environmental Support. No unique weather, oceanographic or astro geophysical support is required.

6. Force Structure. Projected Army initial requirement is 1740 systems. This will equip 5 brigade-size units of 348 systems each. Additional platforms will be required for the training base, institutional training, maintenance floats, and spares. Actual numbers and locations of these vehicles will be specified prior to IOC.

7. Schedule. IOC is the fielding of the first brigade set and is projected for 1QFY02.

8. Program Affordability. Program cost for 1740 systems is $XXXM in constant FY00 dollars. Approximately $XXXK average unit production cost per vehicle.

Appendices:

A: References

B: Distribution List

C: List of ORD supporting analysis

Glossary:

Part I: Abbreviations and Acronyms

Part II: Terms and Definitions

Tables:

A: ORD KPP Summary

B: Information Exchange Requirements Matrix

Annexes:

A: Infantry Carrier Vehicle (ICV)

B: Mobile Gun System (MGS)

C: MAV Howitzer

D: Preplanned Product Improvements (P3I)

E: Classified

APPENDIX A

REFERENCES

 

DOD Reg 5000.2R, Mandatory Procedures for MDAPs, 15 Mar 96

CJCSI 3170.01A, Requirements Generation System, 10 Aug 99

AR 71-9, Materiel Requirements, 30 Apr 97

TRADOC Pam 71-9, Requirements Determination, 5 Nov 99

 

APPENDIX B

DISTRIBUTION LIST

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE ARMY (RESEARCH LOGISTICS TECHNOLOGY), ATTN: ASAALT-ZA/ZS/DO, 103 ARMY PENTAGON, WASHINGTON, D.C., 20310-0103

DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF FOR INTELLIGENCE, ATTN: DAMI-ZA, 1000 ARMY PENTAGON, WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310-1000

DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF FOR OPERATIONS AND PLANS, ATTN: DAMO-TR/ZD/ZX/ZS/FD/FDB/FDD/FDE/FDF/FDG/FDJ/FDL/FDR/FDV, 400 ARMY PENTAGON, WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310-0400

DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF FOR LOGISTICS, ATTN: DALO-ZA/ZB/PLZ-A, 500 ARMY PENTAGON, WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310-0500

ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF FOR INSTALLATION MANAGEMENT, ATTN: DAIM-ED/FDP, 600 ARMY PENTAGON, WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310-0600

DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF PERSONNEL, ATTN: DAPE-ZX, 200 ARMY PENTAGON, WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310-0300

DIRECTOR OF INFORMATION SYSTEMS C4, ATTN: SAIS-PPP, 107 ARMY PENTAGON, WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310-0107

THE SURGEON GENERAL, ATTN: DASG-HCO, 5109 LEESBURG PIKE, STE 600, FALLS CHURCH, VA 22041-3258

COMMANDER IN CHIEF

U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND, ATTN: CENTCOM-J3, MACDILL AIR FORCE BASE, FLORIDA 33608-7001

U.S. ARMY EUROPE AND SEVENTH ARMY, ATTN: AEAGC-FMD, APO AE 09014-0100

U.S. ARMY FORCES ATLANTIC, ATTN: USACOM-J35, FORT MCPHERSON, GEORGIA 30330-6000

U.S. PACIFIC COMMAND, ATTN: J52, P.O. BOX 4015, CAMP SMITH, HAWAII 96861-4015

U.S. SPACE COMMAND, ATTN: SPJ-5R, 250 S PETERSON BOULEVARD, SUITE 116, PETERSON AIR FORCE BASE, COLORADO 80914-3010

U.S. SOUTHERN COMMAND, ATTN: SCJ3-FD, 3511 NW 91ST AVE, MIAMI, FLORIDA 33172-1217

U.S. TRANSPORTATION COMMAND, ATTN: TRANSCOM-J3, SCOTT AIR FORCE BASE, ILLINOIS 62225-7001

COMMANDER

HEADQUARTERS, AIR COMBAT COMMAND, ATTN: DRPM, 205 DODD BOULEVARD, LANGLEY AIR FORCE BASE, VIRGINIA 23665-2788

APPENDIX B (CON'T)

 

U.S. FORCES KOREA AND EIGHTH U.S. ARMY, ATTN: EARM-MA-D-E,

UNIT 15237, APO AP 96205-0009

U.S. ARMY FORCES COMMAND, ATTN: AFOP-FIC, FORT MCPHERSON, GEORGIA 30330-6000

U.S. ARMY INFORMATION SYSTEM COMMAND, ATTN: ASOP-MM, FORT HUACHUCA, ARIZONA 85613-5000

U.S. ARMY MATERIEL COMMAND, ATTN: AMCAQ-PM-TILO, 5001 EISENHOWER AVENUE, ALEXANDRIA, VIRGINIA 22333-0001

U.S. ARMY OPERATIONAL TEST AND EVALUATION COMMAND, ATTN: CSTE-OP, PARK CENTER IV, 4501 FORD AVENUE, ALEXANDRIA, VIRGINIA 22302-1458

U.S. ARMY PACIFIC COMMAND, ATTN: APOP-FD, FORT SHAFTER, HAWAII 96858-5100

U.S. ARMY SAFETY CENTER, ATTN: CSSC-IS, FORT RUCKER, ALABAMA 36362-5000

U.S. SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND, ATTN: SOJ5RM, MACDILL AIR FORCE BASE, FLORIDA 33608-7001

U.S. ARMY TEST AND EVALUATION COMMAND, ATTN: AMSTE-TA-OT, ABERDEEN PROVING GROUND, MARYLAND 21005-5055

U.S. ARMY TRAINING AND DOCTRINE COMMAND, ATTN: ATCD-ZA/ZC/B/E/F/G/H/M/S/ATTG-ZA FORT MONROE, VIRGINIA 23651-5000

U.S. ARMY ARMAMENT AND CHEMICAL ACQUISITION AND LOGISTICS ACTIVITY, ATTN: AMSTA-AC-WS, ROCK ISLAND, ILLINOIS 61299-7630

U.S. ARMY ARMOR CENTER AND FORT KNOX, ATTN: ATZK, FORT KNOX, KENTUCKY 40121-5000

U.S. AVIATION CENTER AND FT RUCKER, ATTN: ATZQ-CD, FORT RUCKER, ALABAMA 36362-5000

U.S. ARMY COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONIC COMMAND, ATTN: AMSEL-RD-AS-AR, FORT MONMOUTH, NEW JERSEY 07703-5201

U.S. ARMY INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY COMMAND, ATTN: IAOP-FMI/MA, 8825 BEULAH STREET, FORT BELVOIR, VIRGINIA 22060-5246

U.S. ARMY INTELLIGENCE CENTER, ATTN: ATZS-CG/CD, FORT HUACHUCA, ARIZONA 85613-6000

U.S. ARMY TRAINING SUPPORT CENTER, ATTN: ATIC-DM, FORT EUSTIS, VIRGINIA 23604-5166

U.S. ARMY COMBINED ARMS SUPPORT COMMAND, ATTN: ATCL-CM, FORT LEE, VIRGINIA 23801-6000

U.S. ARMY COMBINED ARMS CENTER, ATTN: ATZL-CG, FORT LEAVENWORTH, KANSAS 66027-2300

U.S. ARMY QUARTERMASTER CENTER AND SCHOOL, ATTN; ATSM-CG, FORT LEE, VIRGINIA 23801-1601

APPENDIX B (CON'T)

 

U.S. ARMY ORDANCE, MISSILE AND MUNITIONS CENTER, ATTN: ATSK-CMT, REDSTONE ARSENAL, ALABAMA

COMMANDANT

U.S. ARMY AIR DEFENSE ARTILLERY SCHOOL, ATTN: ATSA-CDS, FORT BLISS, TEXAS 79916-3802

U.S. ARMY ARMOR SCHOOL, ATTN: ATZK-CG, FORT KNOX, KENTUCKY 40121-5000

U.S. ARMY MANEUVER SUPPORT CENTER, ATTN: ATZT-CD, FORT LEONARD WOOD, MISSOURI 65473-5331

U.S. ARMY ENGINEER SCHOOL, ATTN: ATZT-EN, FORT LEONARD WOOD, MISSOURI 65473

U.S. ARMY CHEMICAL SCHOOL, ATTN: ATZT-CH, FORT LEONARD WOOD, MISSOURI 65473

U.S. ARMY MILITARY POLICE SCHOOL, ATTN: ATZT-MP, FORT LEONARD WOOD, MISSOURI 65473

U.S. ARMY FIELD ARTILLERY SCHOOL, ATTN: ATSF-CG/CN, FORT SILL OKLAHOMA 73503-5600

U.S. ARMY INFANTRY SCHOOL, ATTN: ATZB-CG, FORT BENNING, GEORGIA 31905-5007

U.S. ARMY SIGNAL SCHOOL, ATTN: ATZH-CG, FORT GORDON, GEORGIA 30905-5000

U.S. ARMY TRANSPORTATION SCHOOL, ATTN: ATZF-CG, FORT EUSTIS, VIRGINIA 23604-5000

DIRECTOR

INTERNATIONAL COOPERATIVE PROGRAMS ACTIVITY, ATTN: AMXIP-OI, ABERDEEN PROVING GROUND, MARYLAND 21005-5005

MILITARY TRAFFIC MANAGEMENT COMMAND, TRANSPORTATION ENGINEERING AGENCY, ATTN: MTTE-DP, 720 THIMBLE SHOALS BOULEVARD, SUITE 130, NEWPORT NEWS, VIRGINIA 23606-2574

TRADOC ANALYSIS CENTER, ATTN: ATRC-TD, FORT LEAVENWORTH, KANSAS 66027-5000

U.S. ARMY COST AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS CENTER, ATTN: SFFM-CA, 5611 COLUMBIA PIKE, FALLS CHURCH, VIRGINIA 22401-5050

U.S. ARMY EDGEWOOD RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT AND ENGINEERING CENTER, ATTN: SCBRD-ASP, ABERDEEN PROVING GROUND, MARYLAND 21010-5423

U.S. ARMY MATERIEL SYSTEMS ANALYSIS ACTIVITY, ATTN: AMXSY-SA, AMXSY-L, ABERDEEN PROVING GROUND, MARYLAND 21005-5071

APPENDIX B (CON'T)

 

U.S. ARMY NUCLEAR AND CHEMICAL AGENCY, ATTN: MONA-NU/CM, 7150 HELLER LOOP, SUITE 101, SPRINGFIELD, VIRGINIA 22150-3198

U.S. ARMY TEST, MEASUREMENT, AND DIAGNOSTIC EQUIPMENT ACTIVITY, ATTN: AMXTM-LA, REDSTONE ARSENAL, ALABAMA 35898-5400

PROGRAM EXECUTIVE OFFICER

PROGRAM EXECUTIVE OFFICER, GROUND COMBAT SUPPORT SYSTEM, ATTN: SFAE-CG, WARREN, MICHIGAN

CF:

CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS, ATTN: N81, 2000 NAVY PENTAGON, WASHINGTON, D.C. 20350-2000

COMMANDING GENERAL, U.S. MARINE CORPS COMBAT DEVELOPMENT COMMAND, ATTN: C441, QUANTICO, VIRGINIA 22134-5001

HEADQUARTERS, U.S. AIR FORCE, ATTN: XORD, 1480 AIR FORCE PENTAGON, WASHINGTON, D.C. 20330-1480

MARINE CORPS SYSTEMS COMMAND, ATTN: MARCORSYSCOM(CBGF), 2033 BARNETT AVENUE, SUITE 315, QUANTICO, VA 22134-5010

TABLE 1 – Bibliography of Studies, Reports, Documents and Articles regarding Medium Armored Vehicles

TABLE 2 – Summary of Analytic Efforts Completed in Support of the Development of the Interim Brigade Combat Team Organizational and Operational Concept.

GLOSSARY

PART I - ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

ABCS Army Battle Command System

AIT Automated Information Technology

AOE Army of Excellence

AOR Area of Responsibility

AP Anti-personnel or Armor Piercing

ASAT Automated Systems Approach to Training

ASI Additional Skill Identifier

AT Antitank

ATGM Antitank Guided Missiles

IBCT Brigade Combat Team

BIT Built-In Test

BITE Built-In Test Equipment

CBT ID Combat Identification

C4ISR Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance & Reconnaissance

C4RDP Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Requirements Definitions Program

CINC Commander-In-Chief

COTS Commercial Off-the-Shelf

COIC Critical Operational Issues & Criteria

CRD Capstone Requirements Document

CSS Combat Service Support

CTI Dual-purpose Conventional Improved Munition

EMP Electromagnetic Pulse

EPLRS Enhanced Position Location Reporting System

ET Electronic Training

FBCB2 Future Battle Command Brigade and Below

FCS Future Combat System

FLIR Forward Looking Infra-red

FUE First Unit Equipped

GCSS-A Global Combat Support System-Army

GFE Government Furnished Equipment

GOTS Government off-the-Shelf

GPS Global Positioning System

HE High Explosive

HEAT High Explosive Antitank

HEMP High-altitude Electromagnetic Pulse

HHA Health Hazard Assessment

ICV Infantry Carrier Vehicle

IER Information Exchange Requirements

ILO In Lieu Of

INR Initial Nuclear Radiation

INWE Initial Nuclear Weapons Effects

IR Infrared

ISR Intelligence, Reconnaissance and Surveillance

KM Kilometer

KPP Key Performance Parameter

LRU Line Replacement Unit

M Meters

MAV Medium Armored Vehicle

MDR Milestone Decision Review

MFCS Mortar Fire Control System

MGS Mobile Gun System

MIR MANPRINT Integration Report

MOS Military Occupational Specialty

MOUT Military Operations in Urban Terrain

MPH Miles Per Hour

MPTA Manpower, Personnel & Training Assessment

MRE Meal Ready to Eat

MTW Major Theater of War

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NBC Nuclear, Biological & Chemical

NDI Non Developmental Item

NET New Equipment Training

NL Non-lethal

(O) Objective

OMS/MP Operational Mode Summary/ Mission Profile

O & O Operational and Organizational

Optempo Operational tempo

ORD Operational Requirements Document

P3I Preplanned Product Improvements

PM-MAV Program Manager

PSYOPS Psychological Operations

RPG Rocket Propelled Grenade

RSTA Reconnaissance, Surveillance and Target Acquisition

SA Situational Awareness

SAM Surface to Air Missile

SMMP System MANPRINT Management Plan

SASO Stability and Support Operations

SAT System Approach to Training

SRU Shop Replacement Unit

SSA System Safety Assessment

SSC Small-Scale Contingencies

STAR System Threat Assessment

STRAP System Training Plan

(T) Threshold

TADSS Training Aids, Devices, Simulators and Simulations

TEMP Test & Evaluation Master Plan

TRADOC Training and Doctrine Command

TSP Training Support Package

TTP Tactics, Techniques and Procedures

V/C Variant/Configuration

WIN-T Warfighter Information Network-Tactical

PART II - DEFINITIONS

Deployability. Ability to rapidly airlift the brigade with readily available assets, including C-130 aircraft. Capability is driven by numbers/types of vehicles, sustainability and support requirements and weight/cube of systems to be transported.

Full Spectrum Military Operations. Military missions/ environments ranging from low intensity stability operations to high intensity warfare against a well-armed and determined threat.

Initial Brigade Combat Team (IBCT). First step in the transformation process. Begins with converting two brigades at Fort Lewis, WA. Units initially are partially equipped with loaner MAVs and surrogate equipment for developmental training to refine O&O and TTPs. Unit is not operational/deployable in this phase. At IOC, the initial IBCT will be fully equipped with procurement MAVs at the threshold state and some in-lieu-of equipment.

Interim IBCT. Next step in the transformation process. Units equipped with almost all TOE MAVs and equipment and some in-lieu-of items. The unit also has some P3I technical insertions to provide enhanced capabilities.

Key Performance Parameter. System capability or characteristic considered essential for mission accomplishment.

Variant. A very limited number of vehicle types (ICV, MGS, Howitzer) to enable commonality to the greatest extent possible.

Configuration. Use of one of the variants to perform a specific battlefield function (Mortar, ATGM, Recon). Goal is to develop configurations by integrating existing or planned mission equipment packages (NDI) onto one of the variants.

TABLE A

ORD KPP SUMMARY

System KPP Threshold

MAV Interoperability MAV must be capable of hosting and effectively integrating existing and planned Army Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) systems (e.g., EPLRS, FBCB2, ABCS, WIN-T Subscriber Node). Specific C4ISR systems configurations will be integrated into MAV platforms in accordance with approved systems architecture.

MAV C-130 Deployability MAV must be transportable in a C-130 aircraft.

ICV Load Carrying Capacity MAV ICV, when configured as an infantry carrier of Engineer Squad Vehicle, must carry an Infantry squad with individual equipment.

MGS Bunker Busting The MGS must provide direct, supporting fires to assault infantry in order to destroy hardened enemy bunkers, machine gun, and sniper positions. To accomplish this the MGS primary armament must defeat a standard infantry bunker and create an opening in a double reinforced concrete wall, through which infantry can pass.

Howitzer Rounds, Range, Rate of Fire The SP Howitzer will integrate athe Light Weight 155mm (M777)cannon system with capabilities equal to or greater than the Lightweight 155 (M777) on a common chassis within the IBCT and be capable of firing all currently fielded and developmental US and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Standard 155mm munitions and propellants. In addition the system must be able to achieve a range of 30 kilometers (assisted) and be able toachieve a maximum rate of fire of not fewer than five rounds per minute for three minutes in low angle (less than 800 mils elevation) indirect fire.

 

 

TABLE B

INFORMATION EXCHANGE REQUIREMENTS MATRIX

TBP