PPT Slide
and infantry) support fires instead of vice versa.
This concept has great impact on the artillery. The ascendancy of fires will demand highly accurate and timely knowledge of enemy locations through reconnaissance, surveillance and target acquisition and the ability to bring devastating fires to bear day, night or in bad weather or obscurations.
Let me give you an example of the impact of the change on the artillery at the micro-level. For years, the artillery has emphasized the capabilities of the forward observer to bring fires to bear for the frontline troops - and rightfully so. With the ascendance of fires, if the artillery must emphasize the capabilities of the FO, then we've failed to destroy or neutralize the enemy before our ground maneuver forces make contact with him.
The long-range fires used to destroy or neutralize the enemy will come from multiple means: surface-to-surface assets, such as tube and rocket artillery; aircraft, both fixed wing and attack helicopters; UAVs (unmanned aerial vehicles) and other sources. The devastating effects of our precision-guided munitions with sub-munitions (vehicle and anti-personnel) and mines will keep the enemy from moving.
Under those conditions, an enemy commander will find his options are few. No matter what he does, his forces will be subjected to heavy fires. Then our ground maneuver forces - tanks and infantry and, by the way, artillery and helicopters - can move in and complete the devastation, forcing the enemy to quit. The main objective in battle and the campaign is to make the enemy quit. It doesn’t matter if he quits by surrendering, withdrawing or your killing him - just that he quits.
Now, I’m not saying we need to do away with tanks and infantry - far from it. But I am saying the focus of the combined arms team is evolving into another stage of development as it did in World War II.
With our knowledge base increasing, with artillery ascendancy in firepower and precision and with attack helicopter mobility - a third dimension - and great accuracy, we have a new era.
Now that’s a quick explanation of what I believe to be the ascendancy of fires on the combined arms team. And the Field Artillery sits right in the middle of it for the next two or three decades.
What impact do you see this ascendancy of fires having on the organization and employment of Field Artillery?
Organizationally, we’ll see more artillery per unit of force than we’ve had in the past. Such recommendations have already started. In the recent past, we’ve had three direct support battalions in an Army division. Then we’ve had a corps artillery of so many artillery groups or brigades and so on. In the future, we’ll see more artillery in the force at all levels. And we might consider artillery divisions - I suggested that in 1986.
Why have an artillery division? As I see it, we fight artillery and other weapons, essentially, by battalions because the battalion is the largest organization that has a single weapon system. So the question is, if the evolving concept requires more artillery battalions, how do you command and control those battalions? If the increase in artillery turns out to be several brigades that can fall under a corps artillery, then fine. If the increase is considerably more and we need an artillery division for command and control, then we ought to have one. The idea is to create the command and control organization for the number of battalions we need. So we create an artillery division if the size of the artillery force calls for it.
We’ll employ Field Artillery differently in the primacy of fires concept. The fundamental tenet of the construct is that we not expose our forces to enemy fires any more than we have to. The construct says, “I’m going to fight the enemy by fire first and then by movement and fire.” So our firers must get within
range to hit the enemy’s range. The logical conclusion is that artillery will move to where it can bring fires to bear on enemy targets.
You’ll notice that when I talk about moving the artillery to range targets, I don’t talk about crossing the “FLOT” [forward line of own troops] - nor will I because there won’t be a FLOT in Force XXI. The language of FLOT envisions lines. TRADOC [Training and Doctrine Command] Pam 525-5 Force XXI Operations says there aren’t going to be lines. I agree with that.