CHAPTER I - INTRODUCTION
CHAPTER II - NSFS SYSTEM DESCRIPTON
CHAPTER III - Fire Support C2 Agencies
CHAPTER IV - FIRE SUPPORT
CHAPTER V - ERGM EMPLOYMENT CONSIDERATONS
CHAPTER VI - AREAS FOR CONTINUED INVESTIGATION OR RESOLUTION
APPENDIX A - REFERENCES
APPENDIX B - CONCEPT OF EMPLOYMENT WORKING GROUP PARTICIPANTS
APPENDIX C - ACRONYNS/GLOSSARY
Figure II-1. Mk 45 upgrade
Figure II-2. ERGM round
Figure II-3. Profile 1
Figure II-4. Profile 2
Figure II-5. Profile 3
Figure IV-1. FSC measures
Figure V-1. ERGM flight profiles
As the United States approaches the 21st century, changing political and international relationships have altered our national and military strategies. The Naval services are committed to a warfare doctrine that incorporates joint expeditionary warfare to preserve and enhance the ability of U.S. forces to project unhindered power into the littoral. The Naval services defined their vision for the future in . . .From the Sea and Forward . . .From the Sea. The Marine Corps, in a related concept paper, Operational Maneuver From the Sea (OMFTS), seized upon the significant enhancements in information management, battlefield mobility, and the lethality of conventional weapons to fully realize the potential of maneuver warfare. OMFTS envisions extensive use of the sea as a means of gaining advantage over an adversary.
In implementing one of the key concepts of OMFTS, the Marine Corps paper, A Concept for Ship-to-Objective Maneuver (STOM), details a new tactical concept for conducting amphibious forcible entry. Techniques such as sea-based logistics, sea-based fire support, and using the sea as a medium for tactical and operational movement will enable assault forces to move directly from their ships to their objectives without the traditional preliminary buildup phase ashore. Subsequently, these forces, still supported from the sea, would be able to maintain a tempo of operations that would keep enemy forces off balance, always reacting and unable to assume the initiative. Long-range accurate fires from the sea are an essential prerequisite for fully capitalizing on this STOM concept.
Future warfare will require lethal and protected forces to operate over a larger and deeper battlefield. Applying the operational concepts outlined in Joint Vision 2010—dominant maneuver, precision engagement, full dimensional protection, and focused logistics—these maneuver forces must be supported by direct and indirect fires with extended range, greater accuracy, and greater lethality. Deep operations and simultaneous attack will allow the commander to stun and quickly defeat the enemy throughout the battlespace. To support this increase in tempo and intensity, tactical digital data connectivity is essential.
In May 1992, a mission need statement (MNS) was signed for an improved Naval Surface Fire Support (NSFS) capability. The MNS acknowledged that a "system of systems" was needed to provide the broad range of performance required to completely satisfy the mission. Deficiencies were a result of increased performance by the land-based threats as well as a need for a more robust capability to support the dynamic nature of the then-emerging OMFTS concept. The MNS led to a December 1992 Milestone Zero Review and initiated the NSFS program. The Center for Naval Analyses was subsequently tasked with conducting a cost and operational effectiveness analysis (COEA). As a program was developed to implement the conclusions of the COEA, it became apparent that fiscal constraints would dictate an incremental approach to introducing NSFS improvements. The validated requirements and a corresponding NSFS strategy to meet them was presented to a Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) Executive Board and approved by CNO in December 1994. The near-term program encompasses modifying the Mk 45 5-inch gun to increase performance and allow employment of a new-development 5-inch guided projectile. The necessary fire control and command and control (C2) system software modifications will be integrated with the weapons developments and fielded in 2001 to match Army and Marine Corps improvements in C2 systems and target location sensors. In the outyears, a more robust NSFS capability will be fielded to include an NSFS missile, integrated mission planning and targeting, and a new naval gun for use in the next surface combatant.
With the introduction of new systems to bring these new capabilities to the battlefield, there will be revolutionary changes in capability:
These radical changes in capability must be tempered with evolutionary
changes to tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) for the operating
forces to effectively incorporate and develop them into the next generation
of warfighting. This document describes a preliminary concept of employment
for the developing NSFS capability, which will achieve an initial operational
capability (IOC) by fiscal year 2001 (FY01). It is intended to help focus
the NSFS systems engineering
effort by setting forth the manner in which the primary customer—supported ground forces—envisions employing a capability that has no precedent in the history of naval fires. It also is expected to accelerate the discussions necessary for the future development of TTP to govern the use of the capability once its introduction to the fleet is imminent. This document, summarizing the collective thinking from a series of workshops (see paragraph 4, "Approach"), provides an initial baseline for both the providers of the new NSFS system and its customers until actual experience with the system and empirical data from tests and exercises become available.
This concept of employment suggests changes to tactics, techniques, procedures, or doctrine. The appropriate Service doctrine and training organizations are responsible for actual changes. This document should serve as a primary reference for those organizations.
The NSFS system can be considered a system of systems. The system embodies
three components—target acquisition systems, weapons systems, and C2
systems. Accordingly, this concept of employment addresses the complementary
nature of the Target Location Designation and Handoff System (TLDHS) and
other near-term targeting improvements; the near-term NSFS weapons, principally
the new EX171 Extended Range Guided Munition (ERGM), the Mk 45
Mod 4 5-inch 62 caliber Gun Mount, and the Mk 160 Mod 8 Gun Computer System (GCS); and operations conducted with automated systems such as the Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System (AFATDS) and the NSFS Warfare Control System (NWCS).
It is assumed that the TTPs associated with conventional ballistic munitions will remain valid and will mature as the Services gain field experience with the new automated C2 systems. Extended range (up to 63 nautical miles (nm)), increased accuracy (20-meter circular error probable (CEP)), and increased responsiveness through digital connectivity of the near-term NSFS capability motivate a thorough examination of how this system differs from traditional naval gunfire. The main focus of this concept is fires to support the ground component commander. However, these vastly enhanced capabilities suggest the potential use of NSFS target acquisition, weapon, and C2 system components, either individually or as a system, to support the Joint Force Commander (JFC) or maritime component commander for land attack, special forces operations, or advanced force operations. In this context, new capabilities such as the ability to conduct fire planning onboard NSFS ships, are addressed in this document.
The need for better understanding of the envisioned tactical employment of the NSFS system was originally identified by the NSFS Program Systems Engineering Integrated Product Team. Subsequently, The NSFS program manager assigned an action item to develop a concept of employment document to make certain that the evolving system design would support the customer, primarily ground combat forces.
An initial working group was convened in December 1996 to discuss the approach and the desired products of this task. They decided to conduct a series of workshops that would be attended by Government engineers, contractors, program office representatives, Army and Marine Corps artillery officers, and other subject matter experts. The working group decided that the final product of this effort should be a 20–25-page document that would set forth a concept of employment based upon the workshops’ findings.
The first of these workshops convened in February 1997 and examined two scenarios: one involved infantry units and one involved mechanized infantry and armor units. Volume II contains an account of these scenarios and some observations.
In April, a second workshop examined a Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF)-sized amphibious assault concentrating on two areas: helicopter-borne assault forces, and surface assault forces. This scenario highlighted broader NSFS employment options than were apparent at the smaller unit levels studied at the first workshop. The operations orders developed for the second workshop are also included in volume II.
The third workshop, held in June, focused on developing a deeper understanding of five key NSFS issues identified in the previous workshops: (1) the initial call for fire mission report and subsequent adjustments; (2) fire support coordination measures; (3) TTPs for use of the enhanced ERGM capability; (4) minimum requirements and functionality for mission planning and targeting; and (5) requirements for communication connectivity from sensor to shooter.
These three workshops provided the basic information and sense of topic perspective and priority for this version of a concept of employment. Chapter 6 discusses a series of topics that have yet to be addressed, but will be added to future versions of this document.
This process is envisioned to be a continuous effort. Numerous ongoing user-supported initiatives at the Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory (MCWL), Fleet Battle Experiments, and Joint Warfighting Interoperability Demonstrations (JWIDs) have the potential to cause changes to doctrine and procedures. As these changes are accepted, they will be added to this document.
The NSFS system can be considered a system of systems consisting of target acquisition, weapon, and C2 systems. This chapter provides a synopsis of system characteristics and their interrelationships.
The total NSFS capability will be realized via the integration of a number of related systems both shipboard on the supporting Navy units and ashore with the supported Marine Corps or Army units. This total NSFS "system" is made up of target acquisition, weapon, and C2 systems. This document addresses the near-term NSFS capabilities of systems that will achieve IOC by FY01. This includes improvements to existing systems and newly developed systems.
Target Acquisition Systems
Target acquisition systems are made up of the equipment, computer resources, interfaces and personnel to detect, locate, and provide targeting and battle damage assessment (BDA) data necessary to the fire support mission. These capabilities range from the use of national assets and intelligence to identify preplanned targets, to the use of data from forward observers deployed with combat units. All combat units can be important sources of target acquisition intelligence. Individual units, reconnaissance patrols, scouts, observation posts, surveillance radars, and Special Operations Forces (SOF) can provide time-sensitive information about enemy troops and equipment and confirm or deny the accuracy of previous information. The following systems are representative of the target acquisition systems that are available for NSFS.
Lightweight Laser Designator Rangefinder (LLDR)
LLDR is a man-portable system that will support dismounted and mounted operations with 24-hour precision target location and designation. LLDR is a joint Army/Marine Corps program that will serve as the laser rangefinder/designator system for both services. LLDR’s built-in modularity allows different configurations to meet specific mission requirements. The target location module (TLM) of LLDR is tripod-mounted. It includes day optics, thermal imager, laser rangefinder, digital electronic compass and vertical angle measurement, an internal global positioning system (GPS) receiver for self-location and electronic interfaces to the precision lightweight GPS receiver (PLGR), battery, microprocessor, operator interface/display, and data/image export capability. For target designation missions, a target designation module (TDM) will be interfaced to TLM to provide laser designation of the target for precision-guided munitions (PGMs
TLDHS is a Marine Corps man-portable automated equipment suite that will give forward observers (FOs), forward air controllers, naval gunfire spot teams, and reconnaissance teams the ability to quickly acquire, locate, laser-designate, and digitally transmit (handoff) target data to fire support coordination and direction agencies or weapon delivery platforms. The baseline system consists of two major components: an LLDR for target locating interfacing with a data automated communications terminal (DACT). The Marine Corps will employ DACT as the rugged handheld tactical computer component of TLDHS that interfaces with LLDR. DACT is a tactical input/output battlefield situational awareness system and communications terminal. It provides digital command, control, communications, and intelligence (C4I) capability down to the level of platoon commander, reconnaissance team, Air and Naval Gunfire Liaison Company (ANGLICO) or naval gunfire spot team. DACT, which is man-portable or vehicle-mounted, includes embedded precise positioning service (PPS) GPS receiver, graphical user interface (GUI), digital map display, and dual modem interface to tactical communications equipment. DACT will receive, store, create, modify, transmit, and display map overlays, operational messages and reports, and position information via tactical radios, networks, and wire lines. DACT will serve as the Marine Corps primary data entry system into AFATDS.
AN/TPQ-36 FIREFINDER Radar
FIREFINDER V(8) is a counterfire detection radar system that will be deployable worldwide on high mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicles (HMMWVs), operate in all climatic conditions, have increased range capabilities and significantly reduced false targeting problems, and provide improved discrimination capabilities to identify type and caliber of incoming projectiles. Counterfire is intended to destroy or neutralize enemy weapons. The radar system forwards counterfire information to the fire direction center of the unit designated to coordinate counterfire activities where the information is processed, evaluated, and verified. AN/TPQ-36 radar will be interoperable with AFATDS. When emplaced, the radar will be capable of continuously searching a 90-degree horizontal sector with an objective of detecting all cannon and finned mortar projectiles (81 mm and larger) to ranges of 18,000 meters. The radar is required to provide the location of the firing weapon with an accuracy of 40 to 100 meters, depending on the range and type of hostile weapon.
Counterfire missions against enemy indirect fire are a primary demand upon landing force indirect fire units. Having a detection and location radar system afloat may reduce or delay the requirement to move artillery and ground-based counterfire detection radar ashore. If these assets are already ashore, the sea-based counterfire system may reduce the ground-based counterfire ammunition requirements, thereby making more ammunition available for other missions supporting maneuver forces (e.g., suppression or neutralization). The sea-based counterfire capability will be especially valuable when employing the STOM concept, which often constrains the number and type of land-based indirect fire systems that can be moved ashore during the assault.
Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS
JSTARS is a joint surveillance, targeting, and battle management C2 system designed to provide near-real-time wide area surveillance and targeting information on moving and stationary ground targets. It provides commanders with surveillance, target detection, and tracking information to better understand activity within their areas of responsibility. The system has both airborne and ground-based segments. The ground-based segment consists of common ground stations that receive data from the airborne segment and other intelligence sensors. The airborne segment consists of an E-8C aircraft equipped with a phased-array ground surveillance radar, an operations and control subsystem, and a communications subsystem. Ground crews analyze and disseminate JSTARS data to commanders. JSTARS can detect, locate, and track moving ground targets. This dynamic targeting information can be passed to the appropriate fire control agency for assignment to the most suitable and available fire support asset. Via its ground station module (GSM), JSTARS will interface with AFATDS, which could select NSFS as its response choice for a given fire support mission.
Airborne Reconnaissance Low-Multifunction (ARL-M
ARL-M is a multifunction, day/night aerial system that provides dedicated intelligence target acquisition support, typically to the ground component commander. The system provides radar surveillance and target acquisition with moving target indicator and synthetic aperture radar. It has the additional benefit of having a communications intelligence capability onboard with automatic cross-cueing between the radar and communications intelligence suite. The targeting information derived from ARL-M can be passed to the appropriate fire control agency for assignment to the most suitable and available fire support asset. ARL-M can complement JSTARS in target acquisition when employed in the same area.
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs
Tactical UAVs can be effectively operated above the battlefield to provide real-time and accurate target acquisition intelligence. Operation DESERT STORM proved the utility of UAVs for target identification, gunfire spotting, and BDA. Current UAV programs will field vehicles that provide precise target location using GPS/Inertial Navigation System (INS) and imagery using television and forward-looking infrared. There must be adequate communication links between these UAVs, intelligence systems, land- and sea-based fire control agencies, and NSFS ships so that responsiveness is enhanced. With UAVs linked to sea-based fire control nodes, NSFS ships could also engage suitable targets, independently acquired, using a UAV as a spotter. Techniques and procedures for target validation and clearance of fires still need to be fully defined.
The near-term NSFS weapon system is the Mk 34 Gun Weapon System (GWS) installed aboard DDG51 class AEGIS destroyers. Mk 34 GWS consists of the Mk 160 GCS, the Mk 46 Optical Sighting System, the Mk 45 lightweight gun mount, and the associated family of 5-inch naval gun ammunition. GWS is being upgraded in several areas to provide improved NSFS capabilities. The gun mount is being upgraded to provide significantly greater muzzle energy; a new ERGM is being developed; and Mk 160 GCS is being upgraded to provide ERGM initialization and gun orders and to receive fire support target assignments and engagement orders from the new NWCS.
Mk 45 Mod 4 5-inch/62 Caliber Gun Mount
Mk 45 Mod 4 gun mount is a modification of the existing Mk 45 Mod 2 medium caliber 5-inch/54 naval gun (figure II-1). Stabilizing, aiming, and controlling the gun mount are via digital order signals from the Mk 160 Mod 8 GCS. Mk 45 is a fully automatic single-barrel gun mount that stows, handles, and fires conventional ballistic and guided 5-inch projectiles. The gun mount loader drum contains ready-service autoloader capacity for up to 20 conventional ballistic rounds or 10 ERGM rounds or a mix of ballistic and ERGM rounds. Additionally, the gun mount is provided with deep magazine stowage of up to 600 rounds of conventional ballistic ammunition or about 300 ERGM rounds or a mix. For NSFS missions, the anticipated magazine loadout of a mix of approximately 200 ERGM and 200 ballistic rounds will allow the ship to respond to a variety of threats.
Figure II-1. Mk 45 upgrade
From the ready-service loader drum, the gun can fire single rounds
or salvos at a continuous rate of up to 20 rounds per minute for conventional
length projectiles. The longer ERGM-guided rounds require a double ram
cycle, and therefore have a firing rate that is limited to about 10 rounds
per minute. As the loader drum is emptied, rounds must be resupplied via
the lower hoist from the magazine. Ammunition from magazine stowage racks
is manually transferred to the lower hoist. Therefore, the sustained firing
rate of the gun mount is limited by the rate that ammunition can be manually
handled in the magazine. The sustained rate of fire is about 10 to 12 rounds
per minute for conventional ballistic ammunition, depending on the ability
of the magazine crew. For ERGM, the
magazine will have a handling assist system that will allow loading ERGM rounds at a sustained rate of about two to four rounds per minute.
NSFS modifications to the Mk 45 gun system include structural enhancements to increase the allowable muzzle energy from 10 megajoules to about 18 megajoules, integration of the EX-171 ERGM round into the system, replacement of the 54-caliber barrel with a 62-caliber barrel, and the development of an adaptable digital control system that supports the new GCS and ERGM interface requirements. These modifications will allow the gun system to support engagement ranges from 13 to 63 nm for ERGM rounds and up to 21 nm with future ballistic projectiles.
Mk 160 Mod 8 GCS
Mk 160 Mod 8 GCS is a modification of the existing Mk 160 Mod 4/6 systems deployed aboard DDG-51 class ships. Mk 160 Mod 8 is the fully compliant fire control system for the NSFS capability and supports the introduction of ERGM, the updated Mk 45 Mod 4 NSFS gun mount, and the interfaces with the new NWCS. Additionally, Mod 8 GCS provides enhanced human interface via the AN/UYQ-70 display console in CIC and utilizes Ada-based software architecture. GCS provides operational controls, track filtering, ballistic computations, gun pointing and stabilization, and ammunition selection and firing orders for conventional ballistic munitions and ERGM. The Mk 160 system operates under the control of the AEGIS combat system in antiair warfare (AAW), surface direct (ASuW) and NSFS (NGFS) tactical modes. When in NSFS mode, the Mk 160 responds to the direction of NWCS and can accept and process up to 20 fire support targets at a time. GCS also receives engagement scheduling and engage orders for the assigned targets from NWCS.
NSFS enhancements to the fire control system include improvements to the process of engaging shore targets out to the ranges associated with the new munitions. These consist of using GPS inputs for maintaining own ship location and for identifying target locations, processing coordinates referenced to the World Geodetic System 1984 (WGS 84) datum for earth shape and orientation parameters, handling and converting from/to universal transverse mecator (UTM) and/or Military Grid Reference System (MGRS) coordinates as necessary, and providing the capability to compute the necessary gun orders and initialization parameters for the ERGM round
EX-171 ERGM and EX-167 Propelling Charge
The existing family of 5-inch naval ammunition will be expanded with
the addition of EX-171 ERGM and its EX-167 propelling charge. Existing
conventional 5-inch ammunition consists of a family of spin-stabilized
ballistic projectiles with a variety of fuzes (timed, point detonating,
IR proximity, and RF proximity) and a variety of functional warhead loads
(high explosive, illumination, incendiary, etc.) required to perform various
missions. Existing projectiles weigh about
70 pounds and can be fired using a standard Mk 67 (full service) charge to ranges of about
13 nm or Mk 68 reduced charges to shorter ranges, depending on the initial velocity and ballistic trajectory required for the engagement.
ERGM and its associated propelling charge are newly developed to meet the extended range and accuracy demands of the NSFS mission. ERGM is a rocket-assisted, glide trajectory, gun-launched projectile that weighs about 110 pounds (see figure II-2). With the EX-167 propelling charge that provides approximately 18 megajoules launch energy, ERGM can achieve ranges of up to 63 nm. ERGM uses GPS and an INS to precisely control its flight to the stipulated target location. The ERGM lethal mechanism consists of 72 EX-1 submunitions. (The EX-1, when qualified, will become the MK-1. The EX-1 is a Navy variant of the Army XM-80.) that are dispensed over the target and are designed for effectiveness against soft or lightly armored targets. The 72 submunitions can be dispensed in uniformly dense, circular 40, 60, 80, or 100 meter selectable diameter patterns. The uniformity of the dispense pattern is enhanced by the near-vertical attack angle of the ERGM round in final flight stages. Before firing, ERGM will be initialized with target location data provided via the Mk 45 gun mount and will fly an optimal trajectory to the target.
Figure II-2. ERGM round
The C2 systems pertinent to the NSFS capabilities include those land-based and shipboard systems that gather, process, plan, communicate, and control execution of the NSFS missions. For the near-term NSFS system, this can include the force fires coordination center (FFCC), fire support coordination centers (FSCC), and fire support elements (FSE) ashore; the supporting arms coordination center (SACC) afloat; NWCS on the fire support ship(s); and the various military communications systems that provide connectivity between units ashore and afloat. A family of encrypted digital communications links will provide the majority of fire support coordination activities. Operational and geographical considerations will continue to influence the specific means (HF, VHF, UHF, EHF, single/ multi-channel, satellite, cable, etc.) and quantities of links used to exchange information. The increasing requirements for over-the-horizon (OTH) communications will cause various solutions to be employed, including satellites and relays. The principal information exchange format for fire support will be the joint variable message format (VMF).
However, there is still a requirement for accepting voice message formats to support those elements without digital entry devices.
Several systems are expected to be available to provide key C2 capabilities for the near-term NSFS system.
NWCS consists of the interfaces, computer resources, software, human-computer interface, and personnel required to conduct NSFS operations aboard equipped DDG-51 class destroyers. NWCS provides the connection between onboard weapon system assets (e.g., Mk 34 GWS) and other C2 system assets (e.g., Joint Maritime Command Information System ( JMCIS), AFATDS, etc.). NWCS mission tasking may be received via offboard interfaces (e.g., SACC, FSCC/FSE, FO, etc.). The major functions of the NWCS that support this tasking are:
AFATDS is a multiservice, Army/Ma-rine Corps automated fire support C2 system. It is a system of mobile, dispersed, multifunctional nodes that are connected by tactical radio communications systems. AFATDS automates the functions and tasks performed by agencies involved in fire support. It receives and processes requests for fire support from sensors and prioritizes target engagements based on many factors, including the supported maneuver unit commander’s guidance for fire support, target characteristics, weapon systems availability, weapon system capabilities, and Joint Munitions Effectiveness Manual (JMEM) data. AFATDS will select and generate an engage/fire order to the optimum weapon system available to engage a target. It will be capable of managing field artillery, air fire support, naval fire support, and mortar attack systems at all echelons from corps to platoon level. AFATDS prioritizes fire support requests and determines the most appropriate weapon system response. AFATDS significantly increases the efficiency of the fire support available to the maneuver forces.
Due to the greatly expanded employment concept for naval forces, ship-to-shore communications for fire support will be satisfied by several systems. Short-range communications will be supported by Single Channel Ground and Airborne Radio System (SINCGARS) radios for forward units. Company and battalion fire support coordination centers will rely on a data network supported by Enhanced Position Location Reporting System (EPLRS) radios. Depending on the distance from the amphibious ships, either the SINCGARS or EPLRS data network can be extended seaward through the use of the ASC-26 airborne radio relays to reach EPLRS- and SINCGARS-equipped ships at sea. In other instances, UHF SATCOM (PSC-5) radios can be employed for connectivity to shipboard WSC-3 satellite configured radios. In later stages of a conflict, SHF SATCOM (TSC-85/93) terminals ashore could provide connectivity to SHF-equipped naval vessels. While not particularly efficient for transmitting digital data, HF radios could be used for voice message transmission.
Digital Message System (DMS)
The DMS, AN/PSC-2A, is a lightweight, handheld communications message processor. It is operator-interactive (touchscreen interface) with a light emitting diode display and key entry for composition and readout of messages. The expanded memory digital communications terminal variant provides the user with point-to-point and netted communications over a variety of military radios and secure equipment. The message processor performs all tasks of format composition, address coding, error control, error checking, and net protocol.
Handheld Terminal Unit (HTU
HTU is a small, lightweight system with various tactical software applications that will allow users to compose, edit, store, and display images and messages that are received or transmitted via several types of tactical communication devices. It is both hand-portable and vehicle-mountable. HTU has an internal hard disk that can run several commercial operating systems. It also has a dual-channel modem port and field communications wire binding posts. Army FOs, fire support teams, and combat observation and lasing teams will use HTU to pass fire control and support data and information, such as that identified by LLDR to request a fire mission. LLDR will feed its data into the HTU running Forward Observer System software. HTU, sometimes called the lightweight forward entry device, will allow a FO to communicate with AFATDS. HTU has several expansion options, including voice activation, memory and data processing in creases, and a headmounted display and camera. The voice activation feature allows the observer to call for fires, if desired, rather than "punching in" data.
The NSFS system of systems involves coordinated use of all available assets from the target acquisition sensors to the selected weapon for engagements. Three potential operational profiles have been envisioned for employment of the NSFS system.
Figure II-3. Profile 1
Figure II-4. Profile 2
Figure II-5. Profile 3
For NSFS to operate effectively in these varying profiles, joint interoperability and connectivity of the involved systems must be achieved.
As a system of systems, the NSFS system may be exposed to numerous hostile threats. These threats range from information warfare (IW) directed at the C2 systems, to communications jamming against the digital data and voice communications, to airborne and land-based weapon systems employed by an adversary. Due to the pervasive use of GPS for target location, shooter location, and weapon delivery guidance, the following discussions focus on the threat to GPS.
Target Acquisition Vulnerability
The use of GPS for target location is a very accurate way to identify the target’s location. Inherent in this precision, however, is the risk that GPS will not be available either due to local jamming or to an enemy conducting space warfare against the satellites themselves. Other systems such as EPLRS, an advanced radio set with some built-in navigation capabilities, have proved to be effective backups in case of electronic warfare (EW), such as jamming against GPS. An observer providing target location must be aware of the validity of the position location being provided and so inform the fire support units being directed
ERGM Delivery Vulnerability
ERGM utilizes a GPS/INS guidance system to achieve its specified delivery accuracy of 20 meters CEP. ERGM must always acquire the GPS early in its flight in order to update INS. However, maximum precision of ERGM is attained when GPS signals are available throughout the entire flight to the target. The most likely threat to ERGM is the use of commercially available equipment to jam GPS downlink signals. Wideband barrage noise jamming against GPS user equipment is readily available, and the potential for its use by an adversary in wartime is assessed to be high. ERGM has state-of-the-art antijam technology to protect it from small, inexpensive jammers. When GPS signals are jammed in the vicinity of a target, the ERGM round can navigate using inertial data only. Depending on the location and levels of jamming, the terminal delivery accuracy of ERGM can be somewhat degraded. Therefore, in a substantial jamming environment, it can be expected that more ERGM rounds may be required to defeat a target than in a clear environment. Additionally, the ERGM round has a home-on-jam submode that can be activated to specifically engage battlefield jammers collocated with a target. The home-on-jam capability will be employed when authorized by the appropriate authority. Detailed information on EW threats applicable to ERGM is available in The EW Threat to Navy Munitions and Aircraft GPS Receivers (ONI-1732S-001-94.
This chapter is a brief description of the relationships between
the organizations involved
with the execution of NSFS. Within this context, following chapters will discuss operational
Fire support is the assistance to ground, amphibious, maritime, and SOF rendered by firing units to engage the enemy to delay, disrupt, neutralize, or destroy enemy forces, combat formations, and facilities. It includes artillery, mortars, NSFS, and close air support (CAS). Fire support entails the collective and coordinated use of weapons for optimum effectiveness, while protecting friendly forces and installations
Fire support is composed of three parts: coordination, planning, and delivery. Fire support coordination is planning and executing fire so that targets are adequately covered by a suitable weapon or group of weapons. Supporting arms agencies conduct fire planning for the employment of their weapons so that fires will be coordinated for the maneuver commander’s concept of operations. Likewise, fire support planning must be integrated with the commander’s scheme of maneuver. Delivery of fire is the execution of fire plans and necessary coordination of operations.
The proper application of these parts is the responsibility of different individuals, agencies, and elements such as commanders, gunfire support officers, joint and component unit staffs, coordination agencies, gun and aircraft crews, etc. These entities communicate, coordinate, and integrate with one another, with other assets such as EW, and with maneuver units to produce combat power.
C2 involves those facilities, equipment, communications, procedures, and personnel essential to a commander for planning, directing, and controlling operations of forces assigned to the particular mission. Successful C2 of fire support operations involves fire support planning and coordination, tactical fire direction procedures and air operations, and technical fire direction procedures to achieve a commander’s desired effects. C2 agencies assist a commander in organizing, planning, directing, coordinating, and controlling fire support
Upon the initiation of planning for an amphibious operation, the Commander, Amphibious Task Force (CATF) establishes a SACC. Through this agency, CATF exercises overall coordination of all supporting fires during the amphibious assault. SACC is staffed by personnel from ATF and assigned landing force (LF) representatives.
CATF is responsible for the overall plan for an amphibious operation. Although CATF coordinates planning, CATF and Commander, Landing Force (CLF) are equal in planning matters and decisions. They refer differences to their common superior in the operational chain of command. Once LF is embarked aboard amphibious shipping, CATF assumes full responsibility for ATF and for the operation. If the mission changes after the operation begins, an equal planning relationship will again apply
SACC is located aboard an amphibious ship configured with the communications
facilities required to coordinate the employment of mortars, artillery,
air, and naval surface fires. It functions under the supervision of the
supporting arms coordinator (SAC). SAC, with the advice of the LF fire
support coordinator (FSC), integrates the fire plans of the supporting
arms to ensure their most effective use in furthering CLF’s concept of
operations and supporting the LF scheme of maneuver. During an amphibious
operation, SACC is the primary agency that coordinates and controls all
supporting fires for CATF in order to
establish the LF ashore.
The naval gunfire control officer is a member of CATF’s staff who supervises the execution of the NSFS plan.
The gunfire support officer is a member of CATF’s staff, which assists the SAC in planning and coordinating NSFS.
LF FSC advises SAC of fire support requirements and coordination and the tactical situation of the LF.
The LF naval gunfire officer assists the LF FSC in SACC.
When CLF is ashore and his control and coordinating agencies are operating effectively, CATF normally passes responsibility for control and coordination of supporting arms to CLF upon CLF’s request. Thereafter, CLF coordinates the fires of supporting arms through FFCC and subordinate FSCCs (Marine Corps) or FSE (Army). CLF is then authorized to assign NSFS missions directly to NSFS ships and to supervise execution of these missions. The change in responsibility for fire support coordination is based on established criteria, including the capability to coordinate all ground and air fires, and is contingent on CATF’s decision. After passage of control and coordination responsibilities ashore, SACC assumes a monitoring status, prepared to resume control and coordination functions if required.
It is not unusual, however, for control and coordination of supporting arms to be passed ashore incrementally. For example, CATF may retain responsibility for NSFS operations beyond the range of the LF being supported, but within range of fire support ships. The extended range of ERGM has increased the likelihood of this situation.
When NSFS continues to support land operations after conclusion of an amphibious operation and SACC has been disestablished, the senior fire support C2 agency ashore, i.e., FFCC, FSCC, and FSE, will plan and coordinate the assignment and execution of all supporting arms including NSFS. NWCS aboard the fire support ship(s) will be capable of receiving taskings either from the fire support C2 agency ashore or directly from a spotter (in the case of decentralized control or autonomous mode). Thus, it is important that there are reliable digital and voice communication links between the fire support C2 agency, the spot teams ashore, and the surface combatants firing in support.
FFCC and FSCC
Various agencies and elements are established within the Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF) to assist commanders in the execution of their fire support responsibilities. These agencies may be used for either amphibious (LF) or sustained land operations.
The MAGTF command element (CE) organizes an FFCC that is responsible for overall fire support coordination. FFCC complements and extends the fire support coordination efforts of other MAGTF elements. At each level (division, regiment, and battalion) below the MAGTF CE, an FSCC is established as an advisory and coordination agency within the ground combat element (GCE). FFCC and each FSCCs centralize personnel, equipment, and communications facilities for the coordination of all supporting arms required at each level as appropriate to the fire support functions to be performed. The FFCC and each FSCC are staffed with representatives of the various Marine Corps and Navy supporting arms whose roles differ at the various levels. Typically, during the initial phase of an amphibious operation while control and coordination responsibility of supporting arms is still afloat, FFCC provides LF representatives to the SACC. Through the FFCC and FSCCs, CLF (in the case of an amphibious operation) and subordinate commanders, respectively, plan, control, and coordinate the fires of supporting arms with the scheme of maneuver.
FFCC handles fire support matters beyond the capability of the FSCCs such as resolving fire support issues that affect the MAGTF as a whole and interfacing with appropriate staff agencies of higher, adjacent, and external commands.
FFCC and FSCCs are organized and supervised by FSCs. FSCs are responsible for the functioning of their respective FFCC or FSCC, and implementing the fire support coordination policies of their commanders. They directly represent their commanders in matters involving fire support coordination. FSCs are normally supervised by their organization’s operations officer.
The naval gunfire officer, a member of the CLF’s staff, provides expertise and advice on NSFS to CLF and FFCC. He reviews NSFS requirements from subordinate echelons of the LF and oversees the consolidation of these and other LF requirements into a recommended naval gunfire plan for the entire LF.
Each GCE FSCC—division, regiment, and battalion—includes a permanent NSFS section (division level) or a liaison team from the headquarters battery of the supporting artillery battalion (regimental and battalion levels) that coordinates and performs liaison between supported units and appropriate control agencies, advises the ground commander on NSFS employment, and requests and controls NSFS. A naval gunfire officer controls the division NSFS section. A naval gunfire liaison officer (NGLO) heads the regimental and battalion teams.
During sustained land operations, either subsequent to an amphibious operation when the CLF has moved ashore or during a non-amphibious operation, the FFCC and each FSCC continue as the primary agencies for planning and coordinating fires in support of the MAGTF Commander’s concept of operations and the scheme of maneuver, within their respective zones of action. FFCC maintains close coordination with GCEs’ FSCCs in order to effect the integration of plans for close supporting fires and deep supporting fires. (The extended range of the ERGM enables NSFS to engage enemy targets well beyond littoral penetration points and surrounding areas, hence giving NSFS a more substantial role in providing deep supporting fires.)Error! Reference source not found.
During sustained operations ashore, subsequent to an amphibious assault when MAGTF is firmly established ashore, CLF may choose to exercise C2 while remaining afloat (sea-based). This decision may be based, for example, on the scheme of maneuver and extended battlespace or the desire to minimize the buildup of forces ashore. By remaining sea-based, CLF and his staff do not consume scarce LF combat and logistic resources nor do they create a lucrative target ashore. Still, CLF must effect positive control over LF fire support, to include NSFS, just as if he had established command ashore. In this case, CATF would pass responsibility for fire support coordination to CLF, with FFCC remaining afloat. FFCC would occupy existing SACC spaces. SACC representatives would continue to monitor activities and support FFCC representatives as needed. Procedures and doctrine need to evolve to support this concept and permit more robust sea-based operations, and should be considered for examination in future warfighting experiments.
Shore Fire Control Party (SFCP
The battalion SFCP from the headquarters battery of the supporting artillery battalion is headed by an NGLO and includes a battalion NSFS liaison team and an NSFS spot team. The liaison team performs liaison and coordination functions in the battalion FSCC. The spot team is normally employed with a company/team of the battalion. The spot team may be divided into two elements, each capable of independent operations for a limited period. Spot teams call for and adjust NSFS.
An ANGLICO is a Marine Corps organization with Navy officers assigned to it. ANGLICO provides liaison for naval air and surface fire support to Army units, SOF, and allied ground forces.
ANGLICO representatives advise supported commanders on the proper employment of CAS and NSFS. ANGLICO supports U.S. Army and allied divisions, or elements of these organizations, by providing the control and liaison agencies for the employment of NSFS and CAS. An ANGLICO normally accompanies the supported force for a joint or combined operation in which U.S. fleet assets are employed. ANGLICO uses fleet fire assets to augment Army and allied forces or help offset their lack of heavy organic fire support. To support airborne and SOF, ANGLICO personnel maintain an airborne capability. The increased range of ERGM will extend the availability of NSFS as a fire support option to U.S. Army forces operating inland beyond the littoral.
Typically, each ANGLICO consists of a division team and three brigade platoons, but is very flexible and can task-organize to meet the needs of the supported force. The division air and naval gunfire team is comprised of a division tactical air and naval gunfire liaison team that provides personnel and communications for coordinating, controlling, and employing naval air and surface fires at the division level. Each brigade platoon is organized into a brigade team, two supporting arms liaison teams, and four firepower control teams. These provide personnel and communications for coordinating, controlling, and employing naval air and surface fires at the brigade, battalion, and company echelons, respectively.
In the Army, FSEs are normally established from the company to corps level. Supporting field artillery commands provide an FSE to each maneuver command echelon. These elements advise the maneuver commander on capabilities and effective use of fire support assets, and assist with planning and coordinating fire support.
FSEs have an FSC, typically the senior field artillery commander, and a supporting staff. An FSE usually includes representatives from such elements as ANGLICO, Army aviation units, and Air Force tactical air control party.
FSC serves as the maneuver commander’s principal assistant for the integration and application of fire support. FSC ensures that all available means of fire support are fully planned for and integrated and synchronized with the battle plan. He is responsible for implementing the approved fire support plan.
The deep operations coordination center (DOCC) performs FSE functions within echelons above corps units. The primary functions of DOCC are situational awareness, planning and coordinating targeting, and controlling designated fire assets. DOCC ensures effective and efficient employment of critical assets and facilitates synchronization of Joint operations.
FSEs provided at the corps and division levels are similar in structure. Both are located in the main and tactical command posts and in rear tactical operations centers. FSC supervises them. The division coordinates NSFS through the division tactical air and naval gunfire liaison team. The ANGLICO commander serves as the divisional naval gunfire officer. Because of the design of ANGLICO, the division is normally the highest echelon that establishes liaison with NSFS assets.
FSC at the brigade level is typically the commander of the direct support field artillery battalion. He establishes fire support organizations in each maneuver battalion and company. FSC is responsible for the training of all personnel who will perform all missions and tasks associated with providing fire support to the maneuver force. FSEs at brigade and battalion are located in the maneuver tactical operations center. An NGLO from ANGLICO would be assigned to a brigade FSE (FS cell) when operations involve NSFS and naval air supporting the brigade. His duties involve determining requirements, preparing requests, and helping to coordinate NSFS and naval air and integrate them with other supporting arms. Supporting arms liaison teams (SALT) from ANGLICO are attached to maneuver battalions. The SALT officer advises the battalion FSO on NSFS and naval air employment, coordinates the employment of these assets, and supervises firepower control teams (FCT) that are attached to maneuver companies. He can assist company FSOs in coordinating the use of NSFS and naval air to support their company’s scheme of maneuver, and integrating these fires with other fire support assets. The fire support organization at the company level is the fire support team (FIST.
The mission of a FIST is to provide fire support for the maneuver company. FISTs are attached to maneuver elements at the company level and act as observers for mortar and artillery support for the company. FIST is headed by the company FSO. To accomplish this mission, FIST is responsible for planning and coordinating fire support, target location and calls for indirect fire, reporting battlefield information, and emergency control of CAS and NSFS. An FCT from ANGLICO can be attached to the company to provide the expertise to request, observe, adjust, and coordinate NSFS and naval air support.
This chapter discusses the basic conceptual framework of fires and fire support. Through discussions of the processes of fire support planning, coordination, and execution, the chapter highlights the employment of NSFS to support operations ashore.
Fires are defined as the effects of lethal or nonlethal weapons. The JFC and component commanders, with the assistance of their staffs, synchronize fires in time, space, and purpose to increase the total effectiveness of the joint force. Fires can be delivered by air, land, naval, and space assets as well as SOF. Fires include all lethal and nonlethal weapons effects, including those from information operations, NSFS, indirect fire support, CAS, and nuclear weapons.
Interdiction fires are usually characterized by short time requirements (tens of minutes reaction time plus time of flight) because the targets have the potential to threaten friendly forces. They are normally delivered at some distance from friendly forces. Shaping the battlefield, interdiction increases the effectiveness of ground operations by destroying enemy reinforcements or isolating the battlefield from them; ground maneuver increases the effectiveness of interdiction by forcing enemy forces to maneuver, thereby exposing themselves to attack.
Long-range strikes are characterized by long time requirements (hours of reaction time plus time of flight) because the targets are fixed or not in a position to threaten friendly forces. Such targets may be an enemy center of gravity or critical for executing the enemy’s campaign plan. Long-range strikes are delivered at considerable distance from friendly forces, but must be integrated with other fires and consistent with JFC’s intent and campaign objectives.
Fire support is fires that directly support land, maritime, amphibious, and SOF to engage the enemy to delay, disrupt, neutralize, or destroy its forces, combat formations, and facilities in pursuit of tactical and operational objectives. Fire support is the collective and coordinated employment of lethal and nonlethal fires against targets at both the tactical and operational levels of war. The ability to employ all available fires as a synchronized effort integrated with the scheme of maneuver is accomplished through the process of fire support planning, coordination, and execution.
Fire planning consists of those activities necessary for implementing fire support. Targeting, scheduling fires, provisions for attacking targets of opportunity, positioning, communications, combat service support, allocating resources, and computing firing data are some of the aspects of fire planning. Historically, much of this effort has been done manually. Coordinating supporting fires with the movement of forces ashore will become increasingly complex. The introduction of faster, longer ranging maneuver capabilities brought about with the V-22 tilt-rotor assault transport and the advanced amphibious assault vehicle (AAAV), and the increased range of new munitions to support OMFTS will require space coordination/deconfliction across a much larger battlespace area than ever before. With the introduction of the AFATDS and other C2 systems, fire planning can be done more expeditiously and be more responsive to the maneuver commander in the highly fluid battlefield of the future.
Supporting arms agencies conduct fire planning to support the maneuver commander’s concept of operation.
Fire support planning is conducted at all echelons to determine:
At the JFC level, joint fire support planning optimizes employment of fires by integrating and synchronizing them with the commander’s maneuver plan. Decisive operations, freedom of action, massing of effects, and depth and simultaneity are typical considerations. Ground component commanders (or CATF/CLF during amphibious landings) prepare fire support plans and determine the need for air, NSFS, field artillery, and mortars. At the maneuver element commander’s level, fire support planning concentrates on executing promulgated fire plans, identifying on-call targets, and integrating fire plans with the scheme of maneuver. Typical on-call targets are known/suspected enemy positions, avenues of approach, and key terrain.
The ability to conduct fire planning onboard NSFS-capable ships is necessary to support naval advance force operations or low-intensity operations when minimum forces have been allocated to support the operation.
In planning the use of NSFS to support combat operations, planners need consider and plan ammunition resupply of NSFS ships. This is particularly important when the tactical situation may involve sustained operations ashore. The extended range of ERGM increases the likelihood that they will be employed for a longer period during a campaign than previously experienced. Depending upon the amount of organic fire support planned to be brought ashore, the number of calls for NSFS fire may also increase significantly over that previously experienced during a traditional large buildup of combat forces ashore. These factors need to be considered when estimating replenishment needs for NSFS.
When planning fires, the desired effect is a major consideration in selecting the weapon, type and amount of munitions, and required time of delivery. The availability and characteristics of the weapons and munitions, troop dispositions (unit locations), and scheme of maneuver must also be considered in planning fires. This planning ensures that the best available weapon-munition combination is used to achieve the desired effect on approved targets. Using precision weapons such as ERGM can minimize uncontrollable collateral damage and casualties to non-combatants and own troops and avoid consequences with political ramifications that could jeopardize the operation.
Seven mission types are consistent with NSFS capabilities When developing a recommendation for the appropriate weapon system, the nature and importance of the target, the engagement time window, the availability of attack assets, and the results desired should be considered. When recommending NSFS for a specific mission, the following types of fire should be considered.
Destruction fire is delivered for the sole purpose of destroying material objects. To achieve destructive effects on a target, it is not necessary to completely destroy (e.g., demolish) it. A target may be considered destroyed if it cannot perform its primary mission. NSFS, when using GPS for navigation, target location, and weapon guidance and a dual-purpose improved conventional munitions (DPICM) payload, can be accurately delivered and effective against a wide range of targets.
Neutralization fires are intended to render the target temporarily ineffective or unusable or to hamper the movement and/or the firing of the weapon. Like destruction, the effects required to render a target neutralized are situation-dependent. NSFS, with GPS-guided weapons can provide first-round hits or a minimum adjustment phase (depending on targeting accuracy). This capability should be considered in situations where the scheme of maneuver is time-critical.
Harassing fire is designed to disturb enemy troops’ rest, to curtail
movement, and, by threat of losses, to lower morale. These fires are delivered
occasionally, usually at night or during periods of reduced visibility.
Harassing fires can be delivered intermittently to deceive the enemy as
to the actions or intentions of friendly forces. Harassing fires are well-suited
to aircraft, particularly against deep targets; as well as NSFS, artillery
Interdiction fire is placed to prevent the enemy from using a particular area or point. Roads, railways, routes, and other lines of approach or communications may be interdicted to prevent, reduce, or disrupt the enemy forces, supplies, and communications. NSFS with ERGM’s long-range, low dispersion, time-on-target delivery capability make it well-suited for interdiction missions where the targets can be observed.
Illumination fire may be used to observe enemy operations and movements, to adjust observed fire during hours of darkness, and to assist friendly night operations. NSFS can deliver especially effective illumination out to ballistic ammunition ranges. Typically, however, NSFS ships carry a limited quantity of illumination rounds.
Suppressive fires are delivered or about a weapons system to degrade its performance below the necessary level to fulfill its mission objectives, during the conduct of fire missions. The effects are rendered only while the firing is occurring. When the firing stops, the enemy returns to action. To be effective, the supported unit must accomplish something while the suppressive fires are being delivered: bypass, maneuvering to assault the target, or attacking the target with direct- or indirect-fire weapons in order to neutralize or destroy it. NSFS’s long-range, low-dispersion, time-on-target delivery capability make it well-suited for suppression missions.
Screening and Obscuration Fire
These fires use smoke projectiles to obscure the enemy’s observation of friendly forces and their movement. Screening fires can be delivered by artillery, mortars, and to a limited extent, NSFS with ballistic high explosive or white phosphorous rounds.
Targeting and Target Types
Targeting is the process of selecting targets and matching the appropriate response to them, considering operational requirements and capabilities. The purpose of targeting is to select for attack those enemy installations, units, or equipment that are most vulnerable and the attack of which best supports the mission. Enemy targets must be detected, accurately located, identified, and prioritized for effective attack. Targeting is an integral part of the planning process, which begins when the mission is received and continues through the development and execution of the plan. It is based on the friendly scheme of maneuver and/or tactical plan. It includes an assessment of the weather, terrain, and the enemy situation. This assessment identifies those enemy units, equipment, facilities, and terrain that must be attacked or influenced to ensure success.
The target location error (TLE) of sensors will drive mission accuracy. Error is inherent with every type sensor; it needs to be known and factored during mission planning. A descriptor such as TLDHS or manual spot that would be included in the call for fire mission report, could describe the accuracy of the observer’s information in order to determine TLE.
Fire missions are assigned to or requested from the agency that can deliver the most effective fire. The most effective means varies with the nature and importance of the target, the likelihood of the target staying in its current location, the availability of observers and attack means, and the results desired. Procedures to determine the appropriate weapon-to-target pairing are being fielded as a capability of AFATDS and NWCS.
Targets encountered on the battlefield vary in composition, size, shape, vulnerability, mobility, and recoverability.
A point target has a specific set of coordinates that identify its location so that ordnance can be placed accurately to neutralize or destroy it. Examples of point targets are mobile air defense guns/missile launchers, armored personnel carriers, and bunkers.
An area target consists of a very large object or a set of target elements distributed over an area rather than a single point. Area targets include personnel (platoon-sized or larger) or materiel targets such as armored formations, truck parks, ammunition dumps, petroleum/oil/lubricant (POL) dumps, and communication centers. Utilizing predetermined fire patterns or special sheafs will allow NSFS to uniformly cover larger area targets.
For indirect, non-terminally guided fires to seriously damage a target, the target should remain stationary or move very little while fires are arriving at the target. For an area target such as an armored or infantry battalion, individuals and pieces of equipment may move, but the unit essentially stays still if a portion of the unit remains in the pattern of incoming rounds. Effectiveness requires accurately predicting the target’s time of arrival at a predetermined location. NSFS can be effective against moving targets if the overall movement of the target during time of flight can be reasonably predicted (movement restricted to a road or transit of a known choke point) or if the target’s movement can be stalled temporarily (such as fixing a target with mortars while NSFS is called in).
In artillery and naval gunfire support, a planned target is a target on which fire is prearranged. Targets are planned at all echelons. Targets may be planned by higher echelons and disseminated to subordinates along with tasking for the attack of critical targets. Lower echelons plan targets concurrently to meet their commander’s requirements and submit these targets as refinements to the targets planned by the higher echelon. Battalion FSCCs are responsible for coordinating the majority of fires that support tactical operations. Since most of DS fires are delivered in the battalion and regimental zones by the fire support means available to those units, most of the coordination is accomplished without referring to higher echelons. Fires that endanger friendly troops or interfere with operations of adjacent or higher units must be coordinated with the headquarters concerned prior to execution.
Schedule of fires, target lists, target bulletins, and other fire planning will be done with automated systems such as AFATDS. The shipboard NWCS will have the ability to process this information for tasking from SACC or FFCC/FSCC.
Fire Support Allocation
Higher command echelons apportion fire support resources, including NSFS, for a specific use or among subordinate components or commands. The commander receiving these apportioned assets then allocates them for employment by assigning tactical missions, (i.e., DS or GS). Commanders may further allocate fire support resources by assigning priority of fires. Priority of fire is guidance to a fire support planner to organize and employ fire support assets in accordance with the relative importance of a unit’s mission. Priority of fires is often assigned to the main effort, but not always. For example, if a surface assault during an amphibious operation is the main effort and a helicopter-borne assault is the supporting effort, the surface assault battalion may have priority of fires for CAS while the helicopter-borne assault battalion has priority of fires for NSFS.
Counter GPS Countermeasures
ERGM will have the ability to home on GPS jammers. If GPS jammers are detected during intelligence preparation of the battlefield, they should be assigned as priority targets. Close coordination with EW units, particularly airborne units, will be needed to allow targeting and identification when the jammers are radiating.
Fire Support Area Stationing
Fire support areas are maneuver areas assigned to fire support ships that will deliver support. They are located for minimum interference with any waterborne and airborne ship-to-shore movement. Their size and shape are dependent on such factors as ship maneuver room, hydrographic conditions, obstacles, antiaircraft and antisubmarine dispositions, and the best position in respect to range (time of flight), gun-target line (GTL), and observation for potential employment targets. Fire support stations are exact locations within a fire support area. They can be used when ships are stationed within boat lanes or whenever maneuvering room is sufficiently restricted by other considerations.
With the added range of ERGM, the positioning of the fire support ship will no longer be limited to the management of the GTL. Ship position will become critical for firing across boundaries and deconfliction. Proper positioning can reduce the challenge to fire support coordination by limiting the volume of airspace requiring deconfliction. Communications connectivity should also be considered when positioning NSFS ships. Depending on the communications frequency and satellite footprints, ship locations may need to change to support the changing tactical picture.
Fire support coordination is the planning and execution of fires to efficiently and effectively support the maneuver unit’s accomplishment of its mission. Table IV-1 lists representative fire support coordination tasks. Several of the references in appendix A provide detailed accounts of the techniques and procedures for carrying out these and other fire support coordination tasks. These tasks and the basic procedures for carrying them out remain valid and applicable for the enhanced NSFS system. Some changes, however, in applying fire support coordinating measures (FSCMs) are indicated by the new NSFS capabilities. (FSCMs enhance the expeditious attack of targets; protect forces, populations, critical infrastructure, and sites of religious or cultural significance; and set the stage for future operations.) Chapter V discusses special considerations for applying FSCMs when employing ERGM.
Table IV-1. Typical fire support coordination tasks
The type and number of FSCMs employed depends on the tactical situation. At each echelon of the ground forces, FSCs plan FSCMs consistent with the scheme of maneuver and maneuver control measures such as phase lines and boundaries. When used properly, FSCMs enable the commander to open up areas of the battlefield to rapidly engage targets or to restrict and control fires. With the exception of boundaries, FSCMs are either permissive or restrictive. (Appendix C includes official definitions of all FSCMs described later. Joint Pub 3-09 contains detailed explanations of the purpose, establishment, graphic portrayal, and employment of each FSCM. Also see figure IV-1.)
Figure IV-1. FSC measures
By establishing a permissive measure, no further coordination is required for engaging targets affected by the measure. In essence, the primary purpose of the permissive measure is to facilitate the attack of targets. A coordinated fire line (CFL) is a line beyond which conventional surface fire support may fire at any time within the boundaries of the establishing headquarters without additional coordination. A fire support coordination line (FSCL) is established by the appropriate land or amphibious force commander, in consultation with superior, subordinate, supporting, and affected commanders, to ensure coordination of fire not under his control but which may affect his current operations. Supporting elements may attack targets forward of the FSCL, without previously coordinating with the land or amphibious force commander, provided the attack will not produce adverse surface effects on or to the rear of the line. Attacks against surface targets behind this line must be coordinated with the appropriate land or amphibious force commander. The free fire area (FFA) is a specific, designated area into which any weapon system may fire without additional coordination with the establishing headquarters.
A restrictive measure imposes certain requirements for specific coordination before engaging those targets affected by the measure. Therefore, the primary purpose of restrictive measures is to provide safeguards for friendly forces. A restrictive fire line (RFL) is established between converging friendly forces (one or both may be moving) to prohibit fires or effects from the fires across the line without coordination with the affected force. The purpose of the line is prevent fratricide and duplicated attacks by converging forces. The restrictive fire area (RFA) is an area in which specific firing restrictions are imposed. Fires that exceed those restrictions will not be delivered into an RFA without coordinating with the establishing headquarters. The purpose of an RFA is to regulate fires into an area according to the stated restrictions. The purpose of a no-fire area (NFA) is to prohibit fires or their effects into an area. An airspace coordination area (ACA) is the primary FSCM that reflects the coordination of airspace for use by air support and indirect fires. ACAs are used to ensure aircrew safety and the effective use of indirect supporting surface fires by deconfliction through time and space. An ACA is a block or corridor of airspace in which friendly aircraft are reasonably safe from friendly surface fires. It acts as a safety measure for friendly aircraft while allowing other supporting arms to continue fires in support of the maneuver force.
Boundaries are used by the maneuver commander in various operations to indicate the geographical area for which a particular unit is responsible. They describe a zone of action or sector of responsibility for a maneuver unit and are normally designated along terrain features easily recognizable on the ground. Boundaries are the basic FSCM. As, such they are both permissive and restrictive.
They are restrictive in that no fire support may deliver fires across a boundary unless the fires are coordinated with the force having responsibility within the boundary, or unless a permissive FSCM is in effect that would allow firing without further coordination.
They are permissive in that a maneuver commander, unless otherwise restricted, enjoys complete freedom of fire and maneuver within his own boundaries.
Boundaries designate the geographic limits of a unit’s zone of action. Unless otherwise restricted, a unit commander enjoys complete freedom of fire and maneuver within his own boundaries. No unit may fire across boundaries unless such fires are coordinated with the unit to whom the area is assigned, or unless such fires are beyond the CFL or appropriate coordination measure of the affected unit. In combined arms, boundaries aid the commander and his subordinates in structuring the battlefield to facilitate rapid, flexible, and opportunistic maneuver (movement in combination with fire). To achieve this, the establishing commander must give deliberate, continuous attention to establishing and subsequently adjusting the boundaries.
ERGM Employment Considerations
Previous chapters discussed general NSFS topics. This chapter is specific to ERGM-related employment considerations.
The employment of naval surface gunfire to support ground combat operations has taken a significant step forward with the introduction of the NSFS near-term program with its enhanced capabilities of greater accuracy, greater coverage, and better control. The dramatically improved accuracy of the GPS/INS precision-guided ERGM provides the ability to support rapidly moving maneuvering forces with continuous fire support. Naval gunfire is no longer constrained by flat trajectories and steep terrain features that, when combined, mask targets. ERGM can decisively engage targets in defilade that previously would have been "safe" behind such terrain. The trajectory and dispersion pattern of ERGM, even at long ranges, also result in the absence of a strict GTL and the attendant need for positioning the NSFS ship so that the GTL is parallel to the front line trace of friendly forces, in close proximity to the target, before firing. Ships will be able to fire ERGMs while underway, without being restricted by a changing GTL relative to friendly positions and the inherent danger to friendly forces from the elliptical dispersion pattern of conventional ballistic rounds.
The increased range and accuracy of ERGM allows NSFS to be effectively employed well beyond a landing beach or littoral penetration point and adjacent inland area during a ship-to-shore movement, even when attacking small targets. Increased range and accuracy also enable NSFS to provide effective complementary fires to support prolonged joint combat operations. These capabilities offer a commander the option of providing long-range, accurate fire support for troops ashore with sea-based as well as organic fires, thereby enhancing ground forces’ mobility while maintaining their operational effectiveness. OMFTS, which emphasizes rapid uninterrupted thrust of combat power ashore at decisive points while minimizing buildup of support and materials ashore, will place great reliance on sea-based fire support.
The value of fires, including NSFS, is determined by how well they contribute to the supported activity. While fires can kill or wound individuals and destroy equipment or structures, fires rarely, if ever, destroy entire forces. Rather, fires disrupt, delay, or damage forces, which is valuable only if they facilitate some other actions by friendly forces. NSFS contributes to combat power in a variety of ways by providing a range of close, deep, interdiction, and counterbattery fires. The objective of NSFS is to project power ashore to support the land battle. With its increased range, NSFS becomes a more potent supporting arms option. It will reach well beyond a beachhead from distances off shore that will decrease the vulnerability of fire support ships to antiship land-based munitions.
Fire Support to Complement or Supplement a Supported Activity
Fire support can be integrated with a supported activity to create combat power. Fires may be delivered before, after, or simultaneously with a supported activity. They can be used to soften the enemy, create gaps, provide screens, shape the battlefield, obscure the enemy observers, or afford protection. Fires may be delivered to complement the activities of the force. For example, NSFS counterbattery fires may be delivered to suppress the enemy artillery while the infantry attacks or defends against an attack by the enemy (DPICM are well-suited for use against counterbattery targets). The improved accuracy of NSFS makes it more effective against suspected enemy counterattack positions close to friendly positions. Fires may also be used to suppress one fortified enemy position while the infantry attacks another. The improved accuracy of ERGM enables NSFS to provide more effective suppressive fire than it could previously.
NSFS augments the organic fire support capability of the landing force, particularly during the early phase of an amphibious operation if forcible entry is required and when organic artillery is typically still afloat. ERGM could be effectively used for destructive fire against exposed forces and unarmored and lightly armored vehicles, suppression fire on enemy troops or weapon systems, or interdiction fire placed on a line of communication or avenue of approach. When assault forces move directly from the sea inland to seize and secure objectives, NSFS can be employed against targets such as air defense systems in the vicinity of insert/egress routes, artillery sites that can range helicopter landing zones and beaches/littoral penetration points, and enemy troop concentrations, as well as close supporting fires delivered immediately in direct support of maneuvering ground forces. When a landing force is established ashore to conduct sustained or subsequent operations, more organic fire support will be transferred ashore. NSFS will continue, however, to provide augmenting, general support fires such as deep fires and counterfire.
Fires may be delivered on the same target which the supported unit is attacking. For example, a fortified position may be attacked by supporting fires while the infantry attacks it. The improved delivery accuracy of ERGM allows infantry and mobile units to move closer to a target before lifting or shifting NSFS fires and beginning the final assault. An observer engaging a target with ERGM in close proximity to friendly forces can control the dispense diameter of the EX-1 submunitions.
An issue must be considered, however, when moving forces into an area immediately after lifting NSFS fires. The EX-1 self-destruct mechanism has a delay that might not ensure that all non-exploding DPICMs have been disabled before troops move through the impact area.
Fires can also be used to lead supported units onto an objective. For example, taking advantage of its improved accuracy, naval fires can be delivered onto and beyond the objective, then shifted beyond the objective as infantry and mobile units close to within a relatively short distance of the objective. Other indirect fire weapons and CAS can simultaneously be fired on the objective as troops advance, and then shifted.
Direct fire weapons, e.g., heavy machine guns on infantry fighting vehicles or tanks, can continue to fire even as troops close on the objective. Thus, the assault force advances under a canopy of fire. This also demonstrates the synergism of supporting arms and the ability of NSFS to be coordinated with other weapons in support of a direct assault.
ERGM is more suited for employment against targets whose location has been well defined (we know where the target is, although it may move) because time of flight and the absence of a terminally guided munition capability makes the engagement of moving targets less effective. Controlling the delivery of naval fires, that is, when ERGM is fired ("at my command") to attain a specific time of impact on target (time on target), does, however, enable moving targets to be more effectively engaged, and enhances surprise and shock.
Similar to the effects of an artillery sheaf on a point or area target, a desired pattern of bursts from multiple ERGM rounds fired simultaneously from several NSFS combatant ships can be achieved by the spotter identifying either a specific location for a point target or points within an area target and the need for simultaneous impact. This will allow the supported force to surprise the enemy with first round fires while simultaneously providing fires that are dispersed over an entire target area or converged on a specific point.
Fire Support to Reinforce the Effects of Another Activity
Naval fires can be employed to magnify the effects of another combined arms activity. This multiplicity adds to the total combat power, produces another dimension with which the enemy must contend, and affords backup during potential breakdowns that are certain to occur on the battlefield. For example, naval fires can cover a hasty minefield. The minefield itself will slow the enemy, but as the enemy moves to overcome the effects of the minefield, he is hammered by precision DPICM fires that are devastating to personnel, trucks, or other lightly armored vehicles. Similarly, DPICM fires have a low probability of destroying tanks, but suppression fires on the tanks from DPICMs will allow direct fire weapons to more effectively engage the tanks.
Fire Support to Create Opportunity
Fire support can be used to allow another activity to occur. For example, an operation’s success may be contingent on the availability of CAS. This prerequisite may necessitate creating an environment in which CAS can be used. The planning and execution of SEAD creates an opportunity for air operations to support the maneuver force. NSFS precision and optimally dispersed submunitions are ideally suited to defeat crew-served and shoulder-fired air defense weapons.
Fire Support as an Extension of Maneuver
Maneuver warfare is characterized by flexibility, mobility, and agility. Fire support is an essential element of maneuver warfare. Maneuver and fires are almost inseparable at the tactical level. In order to support the high operational tempo inherent in maneuver warfare, fire support, including NSFS, is evolving from a traditional methodology of coordinated, sequenced fires followed by maneuver to better integrated, simultaneous fires and maneuver. With the increasing lethality, range, responsiveness, and accuracy of fire support assets, maneuver to exploit fires may be considered, in a given set of circumstances, as viable a tactical scheme as using fires to exploit maneuver.
Fire support may be exploited by attacking enemy positions, units, or installations not accessible by maneuver forces; furthering an attack initiated by maneuver forces; or concentrating fires on enemy forces, at a decisive point, positioned by maneuvering forces. Examples include attacking enemy reserve forces to prevent them from reinforcing forward units engaged with friendly forces; attacking fleeting targets during exploitation and pursuit, and isolating or fixing enemy forces for defeat in detail with accurate, responsive, and long-range fires. Fire support can also be used to establish and maintain battle momentum. NSFS, with greater accuracy, increased coverage, and better control, enhances the commander’s tool kit of fire support assets to integrate with his maneuver scheme.
Fire Support to Cause Enemy Reactions
The effects of fires can cause the enemy to do something such as slow down, displace, deploy, change direction, communicate, or fire. This often makes him vulnerable to the force of another supporting arm. For example, reconnaissance fires delivered on a suspected enemy position by NSFS may cause the enemy to disclose his presence by movement, making him vulnerable to further fires such as ERGM or air attack. In another example, NSFS could be used to deceive the enemy, leading him to think the focus of effort is other than where it really is and making him react to these fires.
Fires to Support the Offense
In the offense, fires may be delivered during preparation for an offensive action. Such fires may be delivered before the leading elements of the attacking force cross the line of departure or when ground contact is made with the enemy, whichever comes first. These fires may be delivered prior to or as part of preparation fires.
In contrast to the flat trajectory of traditional naval gunfire, ERGM has a higher trajectory and near-vertical attack angle. This makes it well-suited for attacking objectives protected from fire by natural terrain features or which are in defilade.
Fires are delivered during an attack. They are delivered from the time the leading elements cross the line of departure until after the assault on the enemy and consolidation by friendly forces. Weapons positioning, range, and GTL orientation, particularly when employing conventional ballistic munitions as part of naval surface fires in relation to leading assault units, should provide the most accurate fires so that assault troops can better exploit supporting fires. The increased accuracy of ERGM allows NSFS to be used against targets in closer proximity to attacking forces than previously possible using naval gunfire. It also allows commanders to wait longer before lifting or shifting fires on an objective so that their forces can conclude the final assault. A counterfire plan would be part of an assault and NSFS would be an effective part of these fires against enemy indirect fire weapons.
"Danger close" is a term used when fires are close to friendly forces. It is a caution, not a restrictive measure. Danger close for current 5-inch conventional ballistic ammunition is stipulated as 750 meters. The CEP of the GPS-guided ERGM enables NSFS to be employed against targets that are closer than 750 meters to friendly forces. This increased accuracy may allow the danger close criteria of 750 meters to be reduced. Despite the increased accuracy of ERGM, however, DPICMs are inherently more dangerous than unitary high-explosive munitions in a danger close role, because of their dispersion patterns. Supporting fires must still be closely coordinated when friendly fires are to be called in on a target within these ranges.
Fires are delivered during exploitation following an assault on the enemy force. They involve supporting operations to exploit the success of initial gains. These fires continue into the pursuit. The extended range and increased accuracy of ERGM enables NSFS to be employed in response to the need for exploitation fires following an assault at much greater distances inland than currently possible using conventional munitions and naval gunfire.
Planned improvements to troop transport capabilities combined with evolving maneuver concepts such as STOM will result in initial objectives being selected at distances inland beyond the range of conventional munitions and naval gunfire. Thus, ERGM becomes a key element of the STOM concept.
Fires to Support the Defense
Fires to support a specific defensive operation or phase of an operation are generally characterized by intense, on-call operations.
Fires are delivered to place the enemy under increasingly heavy attack as he approaches a defensive position. Long-range fires are delivered by aircraft and long-range indirect fire weapons such as ERGM. Fires are planned along expected enemy routes and likely avenues of approach. Kill zones are planned around obstacles and barriers or natural terrain where the enemy may be delayed or canalized, or seek cover and concealment. The precision delivery and near-vertical descent of ERGM makes it well-suited for this mission.
Fires are delivered within the battle area. Such fires may include fires that support a counterattack and barrage fire. Barrage fires are designed to fill a volume of space or area rather than aim specifically at a given target. They are prearranged barriers of fire designed to protect friendly troops and installations by impeding enemy movements across defensive lines or areas.
As the enemy approaches the defensive position, indirect and direct fire weapons, crew-served weapons, close-in fire support, CAS, and small arms are integrated into close defensive fires. Final protective fires (FPFs) are immediately available to provide a barrier of fire designed to impede enemy movement. Although naval gunfire has not typically been assigned FPFs because of the dispersion pattern of conventional ballistic rounds and response time, the increased accuracy of ERGM and area coverage of DPICMs enables NSFS to be considered for inclusion in an FPF barrage. The immediate response typically required for FPF may preclude NSFS as a primary choice because of time of flight considerations. However, NSFS can be used to sustain an FPF, with other organic weapons and supporting arms bringing more immediate fires against the attacking force. It should be noted that given certain tactical considerations, i.e., the absence of enemy coastal artillery or a limited range capability of these assets, NSFS ships can close the beach as appropriate to reduce ERGM time of flight.
OMFTS is the application of the principals of maneuver warfare to a maritime campaign. As such, it takes full advantage of the modern warfare capabilities of naval forces to achieve strategic objectives. Naval Expeditionary Forces (NEFs) achieve their objectives either completely from a sea base or by establishing LF ashore. OMFTS capitalizes on the flexibility of sea-based forces to create events that can paralyze an adversary through deception, surprise, and the decisive application of power.
The goal of OMFTS is to project combat power ashore seamlessly and continuously, ensuring the rapid attainment of campaign objectives. Operations are designed to break the cohesion and integration of enemy defenses while avoiding attrition-style, head-on attacks. Emphasis is placed on deception, surprise, speed, and battlefield preparation to create delay, uncertainty, and ineffectiveness in enemy actions. The mobility of naval forces at sea; the rapid buildup and maneuver of combat power ashore, without establishing a vulnerable beachhead; and the early accomplishment of critical objectives are key elements of OMFTS.
What distinguishes OMFTS from other types of operational maneuver is the extensive use of the sea as a means of gaining advantage, an avenue for friendly movement that is simultaneously a barrier to the enemy, and a means of avoiding disadvantageous engagements. OMFTS treats the sea as an avenue of approach. For the force that controls it, the sea is a highway of unparalleled mobility.
OMFTS is both battlespace dominance and power projection. The first tasks of the NEFs are to isolate the objective area, protect friendly forces, and limit and shape enemy actions by projecting power to establish air and sea dominance. Ground forces, including elements of the Marine Corps and Army, then establish land battlespace dominance and project their power against objectives ashore.
OMFTS relies on overwhelming tempo. It demands the ability to apply sustainable force to a critical vulnerability faster than the enemy can effectively counter. This requires seizing and maintaining the initiative, and operating at a pace that allows NEFs to continually dictate the terms of the conflict. If the enemy chooses to withhold a strong mobile reserve, he can be attacked with long-range fires such as NSFS.
OMFTS depends on momentum. Coordinated actions and transitional phases should be seamless. Rapid and uninterrupted buildup and concentration of combat power at decisive points ashore must be supported by complementary actions that fix, confuse, or neutralize the enemy. Maneuver and fires must be closely integrated, swift, and violent. The enemy must continually face dilemmas and a tempo of operations that deny him control of the battle. Actions must remain focused and proactive, keeping the enemy reactive and ineffective.
The emphasis of OMFTS on initiating operations from greater distances seaward; the early, rapid projection of forces directly to objectives from their sea-base without first establishing a secure lodgment; the exploitation of rapidly developing tactical situations; and the potential breath and depth of the battlespace given emerging mobility assets, all place significant importance on the availability of accurate, responsive, and long-range fire support during the initial stages of an operation conducted from the sea. NSFS, available around the clock in all weather conditions, is capable of providing such fire support.
The improved NSFS capability provides the firepower which, when combined with STOM, creates the principal physical ingredients in OMFTS that will defeat an enemy. OMFTS uses fires to exploit maneuver just as maneuver is used now to exploit the effects of fires.
As shown in figure V-1, out to around 40 nm, ERGM time of flight is anticpated to be nearly linear with range. After 40 nm, ERGM must glide to achieve the extra range, thereby slowing down. Where responsiveness is time-critical, fire support ship stationing should be considered to keep expected engagement ranges under 40 nm.
Figure V-1. ERGM flight profiles
The extended range of NSFS realized by ERGM increases the opportunity for its use, thereby affecting the fire support coordination challenge. Traditionally, naval gunfire has been a tactical-level weapons system. Range and precision improvements allow NSFS to become an important contributor to operational fires.
The ERGM operational requirement document (ORD) specifies the need to respond within 10 minutes to a call for fire (i.e., ordnance must be on the target no later than 10 minutes after the FO initiates the call for fire). At maximum range, ERGM flight can be up to 7 minutes, leaving no more than 3 minutes to prosecute a call for fire. By contrast, the Marine Corps requirement for artillery fires responsiveness is 2 1/2 minutes. For ERGM to approach the responsiveness of artillery for ranges with less than a 2 1/2-minute time of flight (approximately 40 nm), the time to prosecute a call for fire, including all necessary fire support coordination tasks, must be reduced as much as possible. Reducing fire mission prosecution time through automation and improved procedures should be a primary objective of fleet battle experiments and advanced warfighting experiments (AWEs).
No FSCMs in addition to those described in chapter IV are required to employ enhanced NSFS capabilities. Techniques and procedures must be modified, however, to enable rapid establishment, activation, and dissemination of FSCMs, especially informal ACAs that employ lateral, altitude, and time separation plans to deconflict air and surface fires.
ERGM’s range and guided flight allow greater flexibility in establishing fire support areas and fire support stations. Also, the GTL is no longer a factor in determining effect on target. Still, proper NSFS ship positioning can reduce the fire support coordination challenge by limiting the volume of airspace requiring deconfliction.
For example, an ERGM that a ground commander employs within his boundaries may cross several other units’ boundaries en route to its target. Ship positioning could minimize the coordination effort needed to clear the ERGM flight path quickly.
The highest probability of conflict between aircraft and surface-to-surface weapons occurs at relatively low altitudes in the immediate vicinity of firing location and target impact areas. In the case of ERGM, the majority of its trajectory will be above the normal operating altitudes of tactical aircraft except in these areas. Establishing hazard areas around the ERGM launch point (firing ship) and the target, as is done for the Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS), may be indicated. Hence, procedures to define hazard areas around NSFS ships and targets, effectively disseminate them to the Joint Force Air Component Commander (JFACC) and other fire support coordination elements, and activate and deactivate them quickly, should be investigated for feasibility in warfighting experiments.
As part of the concept of operations workshop process, a working group reviewed the current Naval Gunfire Call for Fire Mission Report to consider any implications resulting from the significant enhancements in naval surface gunfire integral to the NSFS near-term program. It was assumed that the NSFS call for fire format would have to support a fire mission using either ballistic munitions or ERGM and either the digital or voice transmission of a fire mission, depending upon the equipment available to the spotter. A summation of that working group’s review follows.
The current Naval Gunfire Call for Fire Mission Report is composed of seven major elements:
A naval gunfire spotter (FO) most effectively performs his primary duty of providing naval surface fire to support a unit, with the least confusion and the greatest speed, by employing a standard call for fire. A call for fire is a concise message sent by a spotter. It contains all the information needed to attack a target.
The working group concluded that the purpose and value of a standard call for fire report are still valid and required. The seven major elements of the Call for Fire Mission Report do not change with the enhancements of the NSFS near term program. The working group also concluded that certain subelements needed to be added to the Call for Fire Mission Report to optimize the effectiveness of new NSFS capabilities. These recommended additional subelements are summarized as follows:
· Target location
· Target description
· Method of engagement
Chapter IV defined the different types of fire categorized by desired effect on target (referred to here as mission type). ERGM’s anticipated applicability for each mission type is described in this section.
Destroying a target with ballistic rounds usually requires a means of observation, many rounds, and much time. ERGM, with its GPS guidance, can engage targets with a high probability of achieving effects on target with the first round. The probability of destroying a target becomes primarily a factor of the ERGM warhead’s capability, not volume of fire as is the case with conventional projectiles. ERGM’s EX-1 DPICM warhead, providing fragmentation over a large area, could be used effectively for destructive fire against exposed personnel, unarmored vehicles, and uncovered or lightly covered supply dumps and communications centers. A broader selection of warheads would increase the types of targets ERGM could engage in destruction fire missions.
ERGM, with a DPICM warhead, could neutralize the same type targets that it could effectively engage for destruction fire, and could do so with fewer rounds. Also, ERGM could neutralize additional targets with somewhat heavier degrees of protection. For example, DPICM’s EX-1 submunitions probably would not destroy an enemy artillery battery. They could, however, cause minor damage to the cannon and inflict enough casualties to the crews to render the battery temporarily ineffective.
Drawbacks to conducting harassing fire missions include limitations on ammunition and the counterfire threat. Limited magazine capacity afloat would impose more stringent supply constraints on ERGM than would usually be the case for land-based artillery which can use cheaper and more plentiful projectiles to harass the enemy. Underway ships are inherently less vulnerable to enemy counterfire than land-based cannon. Furthermore, ERGM’s guided flight path would not yield good counterfire targeting data to enemy ground-based radars. Hence, although ERGMs would be effective for harassing missions and would incur minimal risk of drawing counterfire, they would be used in that role sparingly because of their relative expense and scarcity.
ERGM’s accuracy and high angle of attack would make it effective for interdicting constricted avenues of approach for light enemy forces and for interdicting an enemy’s lines of communication. It could be especially useful in narrow gorges or passes that restrict lateral movement. Preferably, when using ERGM for interdiction, fire should be observed and judiciously timed in order to gain full advantage from each ERGM.
ERGM cannot provide illumination with its current warhead.
Screening and Obscuration Fire
ERGM cannot provide screening or obscuration with its current warhead
ERGM’s accuracy and ability to impact within seconds of a specified time (except for near-maximum range) make it a good suppression weapon. For short-duration suppression, a few ERGMs, well placed and timed, could provide the required effect independent of other fire support systems. Or, for short or longer missions, they could be used in concert with artillery- and air- delivered suppressive fires. EX-1 submunitions, though lacking in raw destructive power, can suppress enemy activity over a large area using their widest dispersion pattern of 100 meters
Chapter IV described three target types: point, area, and moving. This section sets forth specific considerations for using ERGM to attack these target types.Error! Reference source not found.
Because of their inherent accuracy, ERGMs with submunition warheads are especially effective against soft point targets. When a target’s size is less than the area covered by ERGM’s payload pattern (as determined by a function of CEP and TLE), the target should be regarded as a point target and be engaged with one or more ERGMs with the same aim point. The limited effectiveness of EX-1 submunitions against hard targets reduces the set of point targets suited for ERGM engagement. Preplanned product improvements for ERGM warheads—unitary warhead and a terminal seeker—will make ERGM effective against hard and hardened point targets
ERGM’s capability to uniformly distribute submunitions over an area up to 100 meters in diameter makes it an area target weapon by design. Any stationary target whose size exceeds the definition of a point target should be regarded as an area target and engaged with a sheaf of ERGMs. ERGM sheafs should consist of multiple aim points (e.g., predetermined patterns of fire) that will provide the coverage needed to attain desired effects over the area target. (JMEMs or other munitions effects documents would have to be updated to include ERGM data.)
ERGM does not have a warhead with terminal seeking capability, therefore it will have limited effectiveness against moving targets unless the movement of the target during time of flight can be reasonably predicted. For example, an ERGM with a submunition warhead would be effective against extended logistic trains or light mechanized forces moving at steady speed toward or through an area where lateral movement is restricted. Also, if another weapon could temporarily stall a moving target such as the lead vehicle in a column in restricted terrain, then the moving target becomes a stationary target that can be suppressed or destroyed by ERGM submunition warheads.
A number of issues were identified during the working group process that needed further study and were not ready for inclusion in the initial document. This chapter briefly describes those issues.
The DPICM ERGM round is highly effective against soft point and area targets but not very effective against hard targets. Given ERGM’s accuracy and range, it is likely that a wider variety of warheads would substantially increase capability. Examples include terminally guided rounds with penetration warheads to kill tanks, and a blast-fragmentation warhead that would improve lethality in thick canopy forested areas. An analysis of several alternatives would determine the priority of investment in additional warheads.
ERGM’s effectiveness depends upon its inherent CEP, TLE, and its ability to control its time of arrival (TOA) at the target. Meteorological uncertainties en route and at the target will affect the CEP component of ERGM accuracy and the round’s ability to control its time of flight, hence its TOA. Improved meteorological data on conditions between the shooting platform and the target will allow ERGM to compensate and hence control TOA. Meteorological data on conditions at the target can help to improve ERGM’s CEP; however, ERGM does employ an onboard wind-correction algorithm in its guidance system that measures the wind at the dispense altitude and corrects for its predicted effect upon the dispensed submunitions as they fall to the ground. Also, ERGM will be able to guide out errors due to weather and most winds. The effects of high altitude winds on very long range shots and of sharp wind shears at very low altitudes over the target will be the areas where meteorological data will be most valuable. Source, availability, and accuracy of meteorological data remain to be determined.
Enhanced NSFS adds a valuable asset to the universe of fire support options available to commanders. Planning and decision aids would help both in fire support planning and in training ship’s crews and supported units in the effective employment of long-range precision naval fires.
The development community is addressing a number of safety issues and procedures associated with ERGM (e.g., ERGM flight reliability, failure modes, etc.) The results of these analyses will be assembled into a set of weapons planning procedures that will minimize the potential for fratricide.
WGS 84 is the datum of choice for U.S. forces as stated in the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 3900.01, "Position Reference Procedures." Using WGS 84 datum is not always feasible since different datums or more than one datum may exist for certain geographical areas. A precision weapon aimed at coordinates determined from the wrong datum will not hit the intended target. Detailed examination of the datum situations that NSFS providers and users could confront is necessary to develop procedures to handle other than WGS 84 datums.
Although the working groups discussed the requirement for MRSI and its implications at length, the technical challenges to a MRSI capability, and the TTP inherent to a MRSI employment need more exploration
The Mk 34 GWS is the first of several systems being developed or adapted for land attack from naval platforms. As these enhanced naval land attack capabilities are introduced into the fleet, an understanding of how they will be integrated with NSFS and collectively within the joint warfare context should be developed concurrently.
CG, MCCDC, ltr of 3 Dec 1996; Subj: Naval Surface Fire Support for Operational Maneuver From the Sea
CNO, Director, Surface Warfare (N86) and Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Research, Development, and Acquisition (ASN (RD&A), "Report on Naval Surface Fire Support Program Plan," April 1995
CNO, Director, Surface Warfare (N86) and Office of the ASN(RD&A), "Report on Naval Surface Fire Support Program Plan," April 1996
FMFM 2-7, "Fire Support in Marine Air-Ground Task Force Operations"
FMFM 6-18, "Techniques and Procedures for Fire Support Coordination"
FMFM 6-20-10/MCRP 3-1.6.14, "Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for the Targeting Process," 8 May 1996
FM 6-30, "Observed Fire"
Joint Pub 1-02, "DoD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms"
Joint Pub 3-02, "Joint Doctrine for Amphibious Operations," 8 October 1992
Joint Pub 3-02.1, "Joint Doctrine for Landing Force Operations," 1 November 1989
Joint Pub 3-03, "Doctrine for Interdiction Operations," 10 April 1997
Joint Pub 3-09, "Doctrine for Joint Fire Support" (final coordination draft)
Joint Pub 3-09.3, "JTTP for Close Air Support (CAS)"
Naval Doctrine Command, "Naval Fires" (working draft 31 March 1997)
NWP 3-09.11M, "Supporting Arms in Amphibious Operations," March 1995
Operational Maneuver From the Sea, undated, signed by C. C. Krulak, General, USMC, CMCU.S. Marine Corps, "Ship-to-Objective Maneuver," (concept paper, 25 July 1997)
|Chow, Ed; LT USNfirstname.lastname@example.org||EWTGLant|
|Johnson, Bill; LTC USA||405-442-3814||johnsonW@usafas.army.mil||Ft Sill|
|Johnson, Ron; LTC USAemail@example.com||FtSill|
|Joynson, Jack; LCDR USN||703-602-1911
|Linehan, Sean; MAJ USAfirstname.lastname@example.org||Army Staff|
|Luster, Frank; Maj USMCemail@example.com||MCWL|
|McCabe, Bob; CAPT USN||703-697-1174||(transferred)||N864|
|Parker-Haase, Steve; LT USNfirstname.lastname@example.org||EWTGPac|
|Riccio, Marc; Maj USMCemail@example.com||N85|
|Rickenbach, Jeff; LT USNfirstname.lastname@example.org||SWDG|
|Seay, Mike; Maj USMC||703-784-2645
|Seiter, Fred; Maj USMCemail@example.com||MCCDC|
|Snyder, Tim; Maj USMC||703-614-1239||(transferred)||HQMC|
|Soroka, Tom; Maj USMCfirstname.lastname@example.org||NAVDOCCOM|
|AAAV||advanced amphibious assault vehicle|
|ACA||airspace coordination area|
|AFATDS||Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System|
|ANGLICO||Air and Naval Gunfire Liaison Company|
|ARL-M||airborne reconnaissance low multifunction|
|ASN (RD&A)||Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Research, Development, and Acquisition)|
|ATACMS||Army Tactical Missile System|
|AWE||advanced warfighting experiment|
|BDA||battle damage assessment|
|C2||command and control|
|C4I||command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence|
|CAS||close air support|
|CATF||Commander, Amphibious Task Force|
|CEP||circular error probable|
|CFL||coordinated fire line|
|CJCS||Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff|
|CLF||Commander, Landing Force|
|CNO||Chief of Naval Operations|
|COEA||cost and operational effectiveness analysis|
|DACT||Data automated communications terminal|
|DMS||Digital Message System|
|DOCC||deep operations coordination center|
|DPICM||dual-purpose improved conventional munitions|
|EPLRS||Enhanced Position Location Reporting System|
|ERGM||Extended Range Guided Munition|
|FCT||firepower control team|
|FFA||free fire area|
|FFCC||force fires coordination center|
|FIST||fire support team|
|FPF||final protective fire|
|FSCC||fire support coordination center|
|FSCL||fire support coordination line|
|FSCM||fire support coordinating measure|
|FSE||fire support element|
|GCE||ground command element|
|GCS||gun computer system|
|GPS||global positioning system|
|GSM||ground station module|
|GS-R||general support reinforcing|
|GUI||graphical user interface|
|GWS||gun weapon system|
|HMMWV||high mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicle|
|HTU||handheld terminal unit|
|INS||Inertial Navigation System|
|IOC||initial operational capability|
|JFACC||Joint Force Air Component Commander|
|JFC||Joint Force Commander|
|JMCIS||Joint Maritime Command Information System|
|JMEM||Joint Munitions Effectiveness Manual|
|JSEAD||joint suppression of enemy air defenses|
|JSTARS||Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System|
|JWID||Joint Warfighting Interoperability Demonstration|
|LLDR||lightweight laser designator range finder|
|MAGTF||Marine Air-Ground Task Force|
|MCWL||Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory|
|MEF||Marine Expeditionary Force|
|MGRS||Military Grid Reference System|
|MNS||mission need statement|
|MRSI||multiple rounds, simultaneous impact|
|NEF||Naval Expeditionary Force|
|NGLO||naval gunfire liaison officer|
|NSFS||naval surface fire support|
|NWCS||NSFS Warfare Control System|
|OMFTS||Operational Maneuver From the Sea|
|ORD||operational requirement document|
|PLGR||precision lightweight GPS|
|PPS||precise positioning service|
|RFA||restrictive fire area|
|RFL||restrictive fire line|
|SAC||supporting arms coordinator|
|SACC||supporting arms coordination center|
|SALT||supporting arms liaison team|
|SFCP||shore fire control party|
|SINCGARS||Single Channel Ground and Airborne Radio System|
|SOF||special operations forces|
|TDM||target designation module|
|TLDHS||Target Location Designation and Handoff System|
|TLE||target location error|
|TLM||target location module|
|TOA||time of arrival|
|TTP||tactics, techniques, and procedures|
|UAV||unmanned aerial vehicle|
|UTM||Universal Transverse Mercator (coordinate system)|
|VMF||variable message format|
|WGS 84||World Geodetic System 84|
|area target||A target consisting of an area rather than a single point.
(Joint Pub 1-02)
|barrage fire||Fire which is designed to fill a volume of space or area rather than aimed specifically at a given target. (Joint Pub 1-02)|
|boundary||A line that delineates surface areas for the purpose of facilitating coordination and deconfliction of operations between adjacent units, formations, or areas.|
|circular error probable||An indicator of the delivery accuracy of a weapon system, used as a factor in determining probable damage to a target. It is the radius of a circle within which half of a missile’s projectiles are expected to fall. Also called CEP. (Joint Pub 1-02)|
|coordinated fire line||A line beyond which conventional, indirect, surface fire support may
fire at any time within the boundaries of the establishing headquarters
without additional coordination. The purpose of the CFL is to expedite
the surface-to-surface attack of targets beyond the CFL without coordinating
with the ground commander in whose area the targets are located. Also called
CFL. (Revised definition proposed in draft
|direct support||A mission requiring a force to support another specific force and authorizing it to answer directly to the supported force’s request for assistance. Also called DS. (Joint Pub 1-02)|
|final protective fire||An immediately available prearranged barrier of fire designed to impede enemy movement across defensive lines or areas. (Joint Pub 1-02)|
|fire support||Fires that directly support land, maritime, amphibious, and SOF to delay, disrupt, neutralize, or destroy enemy forces, combat formations, and facilities in pursuit of tactical and operational objectives. (New definition proposed in draft JP 3-09)|
|fire support area||An appropriate maneuver area that the naval force commander assigns to fire support ships from which they can deliver gunfire support to amphibious operations. Also called FSA. (Revised definition proposed in draft JP 3-09)|
|fire support coordination||The planning and executing of fire so that targets are adequately covered by a suitable weapon or group of weapons. (JP 1-02)|
|fire support coordination center||A single location in which are centralized communications facilities and personnel incident to the coordination of all forms of fire support. (Joint Pub 1-02)|
|fire support coordination line||A fire support coordination measure that is established and adjusted by appropriate land or amphibious force commanders within their boundaries in consultation with superior, subordinate, supporting, and affected commanders. Fires support coordination lines (FSCLs) facilitate the expeditious attack of surface targets of opportunity beyond the coordinating measure. An FSCL does not divide an area of operations by defining a boundary between close and deep operations or a zone for CAS. The FSCL applies to all fires of air, land, and sea-based weapon systems using any type of ammunition. Forces attacking targets beyond an FSCL must inform all affected commanders in sufficient time to allow necessary reaction time to avoid fratricide. Supporting elements attacking targets beyond the FSCL must ensure that the attack will not produce adverse surface effects on or to the rear of the line. Short of an FSCL, all air-to-ground and surface-to-surface attack operations are controlled by the appropriate land or amphibious force commander. The FSCL should follow well-defined terrain features. Coordination of attacks beyond the FSCL is especially critical to commanders of air, land, and SOF. In exceptional circumstances, the inability to conduct this coordination will not preclude attacking targets beyond the FSCL. However, failure to do so may increase the risk of fratricide and waste limited resources. (Revised definition proposed in draft JP 3-09)|
|fire support station||An exact location at sea within a fire support area from which a fire support ship delivers fire. Also called FSS. (Joint Pub 1-02)|
|fires||The effects of lethal or nonlethal weapons. (Upon approval of draft Joint Pub 3-09, this term and its definition will be included in Joint Pub 1-02.)|
|free fire area||A specific area into which any weapon system may fire without additional coordination with the establishing headquarters. (Upon approval of draft Joint Pub 3-09, this term and its definition will be included in Joint Pub 1-02.)|
|general support||That support which is given to the supported force as a whole and not
to any particular subdivision thereof. Also called GS. (Joint Pub
|gun target line||An imaginary straight line from the gun(s) to the target. (Joint Pub 1-02)|
|joint fire support||Joint fires that assist land, maritime, amphibious, and SOF to move, maneuver, and control territory, populations, and key waters. (Upon approval of draft Joint Pub 3-09, this term and its definition will be included in Joint Pub 1-02.)|
|joint fires||Fires produced during the employment of forces from two or more components in coordinated action toward a common objective. (Upon approval of draft Joint Pub 3-09, this term and its definition will be included in Joint Pub 1-02.)|
|naval fires||(Not in Joint Pub 1-02; discussed in Naval Fires: A Concept for Seabased Warfighting in the 21st Century, Naval Doctrine Command, working draft, 31 Mar 1977)|
|naval operational fires||(Not in Joint Pub 1-02; discussed in Naval Fires: A Concept for Seabased Warfighting in the 21st Century, Naval Doctrine Command, working draft 31 May 1997)|
|naval surface fire support||Fire provided by Navy surface gun, missile, and EW systems to support a unit or units tasked with achieving the commander's objectives. Also called NSFS. (Joint Pub 1-02)|
|naval tactical fires||(Not in Joint Pub 1-02; discussed in Naval Fires: A Concept for Seabased Warfighting in the 21st Century, Naval Doctrine Command, working draft 31 May 1997)|
|neutralization fire||Fire that is delivered to render the target ineffective or unusable. (Joint Pub 1-02)|
|no-fire area||A land area designated by the appropriate commander into which forces or their effects are prohibited. Also called NFA. (Upon approval of draft Joint Pub 3-09, this term and its definition will be included in Joint Pub 1-02).|
|point target||A target of such small dimension that is requires the accurate placement of ordnance in order to neutralize or destroy it. (Joint Pub 1-02)|
|restrictive fire area||An area in which specific restrictions are imposed and into which fires that exceed those restrictions will not be delivered without coordination with the establishing headquarters. Also called RFA. (Upon approval of draft Joint Pub 1-02)|
|restrictive fire line||A line established between converging friendly surface forces that prohibits fires or their effects across that line. Also called RFL. (Upon approval of draft Joint Pub 3-09, this term and its definition will be included in Joint Pub 1-02).|
|suppressive fire||Fires on or about a weapons system to degrade its performance below the level needed to fulfill its mission objectives during the conduct of the fire mission. (Joint Pub 1-02).|
|support arms coordination||A single location on board an amphibious command ship in which all communication facilities incident to the coordination of fire support of the artillery, air, and naval gunfire are centralized. This is the naval counterpart to the fire support coordination center utilized by the landing force. (Joint Pub 1-02)|
|suppression of enemy air defenses (SEAD)||That activity which neutralized, destroys, or temporarily degradess surface-based enemy air defenses by destructive and/or disruptive means. (Joint Pub 1-02)|
|targeting||The process of selecting targets and matching the appropriate response to them taking account of operational requirements and capabilities. (Joint Pub 1-02)|
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