[Mission Area Plans]

Air Force Modernization Planning

Contingency Base Operations

Mission Area Plan

FY1996

 

 

 

JOSEPH W. RALSTON

 

15 November 1995

OPR: HQ ACC/DRS

Phone: DSN 574-5892

Comm: (804) 764-5892

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Air Force Modernization Planning

 

 

FY96

Contingency Base Operations (CBO)

Mission Area Plan (MAP)

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Table of Contents

Section Page

Executive Summary .......................................................................................ii

1 Introduction ...................................................................................... 1

1.1 Contingency Base Operations......................................... 1

1.2 Process Overview ................................................... 2

2 Mission Area Assessment .............................................................. 3

2.1 Strategy-to-Task ................................................... 3

2.2 The Threat ............................................................... 5

2.3 Concept of Operations ................................................... 6

2.4 Operational Concept ................................................... 8

3 Mission Needs Analysis .......................................................................... 10

3.1 Task-to-Need ............................................................... 10

3.2 Current Assessment .................................................... 10

3.3 Civil Engineer Deficiencies.............................................. 11

3.4 Security Police Deficiencies ............................................ 15

3.5 Services Deficiencies ................................................... 18

3.6 Medical Deficiencies ................................................... 19

3.7 Communications Deficiencies ....................................... 22

3.8 Functional Area Points of Contact ........................... 24

4 Mission Area Plan ......................................................................... 25

4.1 Proposed Solution Concepts ....................................... 25

4.2 Solutions ............................................................... 26

4.3 Emerging Technologies ....................................... 49

5 Post Investment Assessment .................................................................... 64

6 Summary ................................................................................................... 66

Glossary ........................................................................................................ 68

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

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Executive Summary

for the

Contingency Base Operations

Mission Area Plan

 

In March 1995, the Air Combat Command (ACC) Commander approved the creation of a new mission area called Contingency Base Operations (CBO). This CBO Mission Area Plan (MAP) replaces the old Air Base Operability (ABO) document.

The change took place to focus force modernization efforts on supporting the strategy of power projection. The ABO MAP was based on the old Warsaw Pact threat resulting in diminished support for projects that countered large ground and air forces attacking fixed locations. Instead, emphasis switched to Bare Base programs which produce rapidly deployable equipment necessary to establish and sustain contingency air bases. Planners recognized the need to combine the ABO and Bare Base programs into a multi-functional, cradle-to-grave effort. CBO now emphasizes projects which produce rapidly deployable equipment necessary to provide, defend, and recover contingency operating locations anywhere in the world, supporting any employment scenario, from humanitarian assistance to theater nuclear war.

The CBO community is comprised of five functional areas: Civil Engineering (CE), Communications (SC), Medical (SG), Security Police (SP), and Services (SV). Each is charged with a part of the responsibility to provide defend, and recover contingency air bases. The basic CBO concept of operations is to "Fight the Base as a Weapon System." Just as an aircraft is a collection of components such as engines, fuselage, avionics, and weapons; so too is the contingency air base. We take a systems approach to understand and plan how each functional area fits together. As an example of primary functional area responsibilities, the Civil Engineer provides base infrastructure and utilities, fire/crash rescue support, Explosive Ordinance Disposal (EOD),rapid Runway Repair (RRR), Camouflage/Concealment/Deception (CCD) measures, and facility repair. Security Police defend contingency locations against ground threats and provide day-to-day resource protection. Services organizations support air bases with food service, billeting, laundry, fitness/recreation, and field exchange operations. The medical community helps establish and sustain air bases through prevention of non-battle diseases and treatment of. non-battle injuries. They defend air bases by immunizing and vaccinating personnel against chemical/biological agents and by treating or evacuating battle related casualties. Finally, communications units are tasked with establishing the Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and Intelligence (C4I) infrastructure necessary to provide local area networks, joint service interfaces, and major facilities such as antenna towers.

The MAP process involves a strategy-to-task and task-to-need analyses to establish linkages between national military strategy, operational tasks, and individual functional area deficiencies. The CBO Mission Area Team (MAT), comprised of representatives from the five functional areas, identified three operational tasks necessary to accomplish the responsibilities detailed above. The tasks are: 1) provide, 2) defend, and 3) recover contingency air bases. Provide includes all infrastructure and equipment necessary to establish and sustain air bases, independent of an enemy threat. Defend includes all infrastructure and equipment necessary to defend contingency air bases from enemy attack. Recover includes all infrastructure and equipment necessary to recover air base damage due to enemy attack.

Once the tasks were identified, the CBO MAT considered the threat to contingency air bases in all scenarios, force structure, and other criterion to identify functional area deficiencies. Key functional area deficiencies include:

CE

- Inadequate chemical/biological defense equipment

- Inadequate bare base equipment

SP

- Limited ability to defend/defeat ground based threats

- Limited ability to transport and protect ground defense personnel

SV

- Limited ability to provide field kitchen facilities

- Limited ability to provide field laundry facilities

SG

- Limited ability to provide vaccines against chemical/biological agents

- Limited ability to mitigate environmental damage

SC

- Data networks are vulnerable to intrusion/exploitation

- Limited ability to provide public address systems

Once identified, the CBO MAT forward the deficiencies to the Air Base Systems (ABS) Technology Planning Integrated Product Team (TPIPT) for solution identification. For each deficiency, the ABS TPIPT provided a potential solutions or emerging technologies that could solve the deficiency now or in the future. Examples of key functional area solutions include:

CE

- Aircrew eye respiratory protection system

- New family of deployable shelters

- New family of power generation/distribution systems

- Groundcrew chemical protection outer garment

 

 

SP

- Up-Armored (UA) Heavy Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV) to transport personnel

- Tactical Automated Security System

- Individual weapons upgrades

SV

- Initial deployment kitchen

- Deployable laundry system

SG

- Field incinerator

- Chemically hardened air transportable hospital

SC

- Scope Shield II radios

- Deployable data communications system

 

Each functional area will determine which solutions solve the most critical deficiencies and either adapt a non-material solution, porcure off-the-shelf, or invest in a new developmental item. If non-material solutions, are not available, Air Force/Joint service laboratories will continue to research emerging technologies that address the warfighters’ needs and develop product for the field. The ABS TPIPT supports this process by submitting critical technology needs to AFMC/ST so that they, along with AF/AQP can earmark sufficient laboratory funding to start or continue research effort on needed technologies. As lead MAJCOM for CBO, ACC will submit the POM inputs necessary to secure adequate funding for the solutions each functional area decides to pursue.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

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Mission Area Plan

for

Contingency Base Operations

1. Introduction.

1.1. Contingency Base Operations. In March 1995, the Air Combat Command (ACC) Commander approved the creation of a new mission area called Contingency Base Operations (CBO). CBO replaces the old Air Base Operability (ABO) mission area.

1.1.1. Reasons for Change: Shortly after the publication of the 1995 ABO Mission Area Plan (MAP), several key players in the MAP process determined that the time had come to update the old ABO MAP. First, the ABO MAP was based on the old Warsaw Pact threat. With the new strategy of Power Projection, support diminished for projects designed to counter large ground and air force attacks against fixed locations. Instead, emphasis switched to the Bare Base program which produced rapidly deployable equipment necessary to provide, defend, and recover contingency operating locations anywhere in the world. Second, the planners saw the need to combine the ABO and Bare Base programs, involve all necessary functional areas, and effectively manage this effort with a cradle-to-grave systems approach. Finally, ABO was not listed as an official mission area within AFM 1-1. A suggested revision to the new AFDD-1 document which replaces AFM 1-1 recommends establishing the Contingency Base Operations mission area.

1.1.2. CBO Community. The CBO community is comprised of five functional areas: Civil Engineer (CE), Communications (SC), Medical (SG), Security Police (SP), and Services (SV). Each is charged with a part of the responsibility to provide, defend, and if necessary, recover contingency air bases, anywhere in the world, under any deployment scenario from humanitarian assistance to theater nuclear war.

1.1.3. MAP Purpose. MAPs provide long range strategy and guidance on how ACC plans to address CBO needs and deficiencies over the next 25 years. This document informs the Air Force, Congress, industry, and other services how the Air Force plans to modernize CBO assets to ensure continuous improvement in our ability to meet national military strategy objectives. The details in this MAP establish a starting point and focus efforts to conduct laboratory research, product development, and budgeting actions. Finally, MAPs establish a series of linkages between National Military Strategy, RD&A programs the CBO community requires, and the Planning Programming, Budgeting System (PPBS).

1.1.4. Other MAPs. Other mission areas which directly affect the CBO mission area are discussed in separate MAPs and Functional Area Plans (FAPs). These areas include Combat Delivery MAP, Theater Battle Management MAP, Theater Missile Defense MAP, Civil Engineer FAP,Surgeon General FAP, Security Police FAP, and the Logistics FAP.

1.2. Process Overview. The Operational Requirements Planning Process is described in AFI 10-1401, Modernization Planning Documentation, and AFI 10-601, Air Force Mission Needs and Operational Requirements. The CBO MAP process employs a Mission Area Assessment (MAA) and Mission Needs Analysis (MNA) to establish direct linkages between National Military Strategy and individual force modernization efforts. Specifically, the MAA and MNA provide the means to analyze the effects of force structure, the environment, threats, and tactics on the CBO community’s ability to accomplish assigned taskings. Detailed justification for proposed solutions to CBO deficiencies comes from this analysis. Each functional area uses the MAA/MNA process to generate their portion of the CBO MAP. HQ ACC, Directorate of Requirements compiles functional area information to develop this MAP. See figure 1-1.

Figure 1-1. Mission Area Plan Process

 

1.2.1. Mission Area Team (MAT). The MAT is the organizational body established to create the MAP. The core MAT includes representatives from the five CBO functional areas, or users. Other MAT members include representatives from the Air Base Systems Technical Planning Integrated Product Team (ABS TPIPT), Air Staff, laboratories, System Program Offices (SPO), SAF/AQPT, support agencies, industry, and other concerned parties. Through a series of ACC/DRSO-hosted meetings, the core MAT provided the functional area related data.

1.2.2. Mission Area Assessment. The purpose of the MAA is to identify the operational tasks for which a mission area has responsibility. The process for conducting the MAA is call Strategy-to-Task (STT). Using the STT process, each CBO functional area researches national military strategies, theater CINC and MAJCOM guidance, and other detailed information to identify mission taskings, both current and for the 25 year period this MAP covers. A full understanding of the capabilities required to accomplish each task is essential before moving to the next phase. This MAA/ strategy-to-task evaluation is specifically designed to link mission tasks to military strategy provided by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

1.2.3. Mission Needs Analysis. The purpose of the MNA is to identify the deficiencies which prevent task accomplishment. Once a task is identified, the functional areas use a Task-To-Need process to assess the factors which impact their current and future capability to accomplish their tasks. The task-to-need process evaluates CONOPS, force structure, and threat assessments to identify shortfalls or deficiencies.

1.2.4. TPIPT Development Plan (DP) Once deficiencies are identified by the CBO MAT, the ABS TPIPT is tasked with providing a Development Plan that identifies potential material and non-material solution concepts to solve deficiencies. The TPIPT may recommend to the MAT that they examine doctrine, training, and tactics (non-material solutions) to determine if changes in these areas can solve the deficiency. If a non-material solution is available, the TPIPT will look to military and commercial sources for existing off-the-shelf (OTS) solutions. Finally if modifications to existing systems or new systems are required to solve deficiencies, the TPIPT will explore Air Force, other Services, and industry RD&A programs to identify potential solutions. The ABS TPIPT provides the MAT with detailed descriptions, associated risks, deficiency linkages and status for each potential solution.

1.2.5. Mission Area Plan This MAP summarizes and uses the products of the MAA and MNA processes and the TPIPT Development Plan to highlight non-materiel and material solutions, system modernization efforts, and key technologies required to correct deficiencies. Key MAP products are modernization roadmaps and the identification of technologies selected that will guide current and future acquisition and modifications.

2. Contingency Base Operations Mission Area Assessment (MAA).

2.1. Strategy-To-Task (STT). The CBO MAA establishes the linkage between National Military Strategy and the CBO mission area tasks. Specifically, the STT process is used to derive Campaign Objectives, Operational Objectives, and Operational Tasks for each mission area. A Combat Air Forces (CAF) Integrated Product Team (IPT) was formed to create a standard MAA which all MATs then used as a starting point. Once the CAF IPT established the Campaign and Operational Objectives, individual MATs identified their own unique Operational Tasks. An overview of this linkage is shown in figure 2-1.

Figure 2-1. CBO Strategy-to-Task

 

2.1.1. The national military strategy dictates projection and sustainment of US power to credibly deter and, if required, decisively defeat aggression. Some US forces must be stationed in key overseas regions to deter aggression, underwrite regional stability, promote joint and combined training, and provide an initial response to crisis. Basic military strategy for a campaign to stop aggression in a major regional conflict (MRC) includes: (1) halt the invasion by neutralizing the enemy’s offensive capabilities, (2) build-up US and allied combat power in the theater while reducing the enemy’s, (3) decisively defeat the enemy, and (4) provide for post-war stability. Inherent to the national military strategy is the need to minimize friendly casualties and obtain/maintain political support of the US and allied effort.

2.1.2. Campaign Objective. The CAF MAA Integrated Product Team (IPT) identified seven campaign objectives which directly support the national military strategy. The CBO mission area establishes its link to national military strategy through the "Support Employment and Sustainment of Forces" campaign objective. This objective is defined as "All support activity to employ and sustain the force in the execution of theater strategy, campaigns, and unified operations."

2.1.3. Operational Objectives. The CAF MAA IPT identified 19 operational objectives that support the campaign objectives. The operational objective to "Establish/Sustain Contingency Operating Locations" provides the CBO mission area with the link back to national military strategy. This operational objective is defined as "Those tasks necessary to provide the infrastructure to sustain an operating force in an area of operations. These include health services, air base defense, construction of base facilities and infrastructure, facilities engineering, topographic and geodetic engineering functions, food services, graves, registration, laundry, dry cleaning, property disposal, communications and other logistics services."

2.1.4. Operational Tasks. Once the CAF MAA IPT identified campaign and operational objectives, each MAT identified their specific tasks in support of their specific objectives. The CBO MAT identified three tasks which each CBO functional must accomplish to ultimately support the national military strategy. These tasks are to: (1) provide, (2) defend, and (3) recover contingency operating locations. These tasks were identified as those fundamental to supporting contingency operating locations across the entire spectrum of Air Force operations.

2.1.4.1. Provide. The CBO MAT defines "Provide" as: "All infrastructure and major equipment items necessary to establish and sustain contingency operating locations, independent of an enemy threat." This equipment (such as shelters and utilities) does nothing to defend or recover the air base from enemy attack. The intent is to modernize major bare base systems within the Harvest Falcon and Eagle packages, and any functional area unique systems needed to operate a contingency. This equipment does include infrastructure and equipment the Security Police require to conduct daily base defense and security.

2.1.4.2. Defend. The CBO MAT defines "Defend" as: "All infrastructure and major equipment items necessary to defend contingency operating locations from enemy attack." Enemy attack is defined as any aggressor intending to disrupt, damage, or destroy contingency base assets. Defend includes subtasks such as threat identification, warning, physical damage prevention and protection, and active defense measures.

2.1.4.3. Recover. The CBO MAT defines "Recover" as _All infrastructure and major equipment items necessary to recover contingency operating locations from damage due to enemy attack"_. Recover subtasks include damage assessment; repair of pavement, facility, utility, and communication damage; explosive ordnance disposal (EOD); fire suppression; casualty collection/treatment; and mortuary affairs.

2.2. The Threat. The CBO functional areas must be to ready to establish and sustain air bases anywhere in the world in any employment scenario. With air power most vulnerable at concentrated locations on the ground, the CBO community must be ready to defend against the full spectrum of enemy threats, and recover if necessary, from any damage. These threats are divided into three categories: threats expected during Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW), theater conventional war, and from weapons of mass destruction (WMD). This MAP addresses CBO threat at an unclassified level. The CBO community relies on three documents to provide detailed and classified threat information: (1) Threat Compendium: Worldwide Threat to Air Bases: 1995-2005, (2) Air Base Systems Threat Environment Description, (3) Worldwide Chemical-Biological Threat to USAF Air Bases: 1993-2003.

2.2.1. MOOTW Threats: Threats expected during MOOTW include information warfare, vandalism, terrorism, small group armed intrusions and small group stand-off attacks. With the high probability of US Forces engaging in some form of MOOTW, deployed commanders must be ready to protect contingency locations against these low end threats.

2.2.2. Theater Conventional Warfare Threats: An increasing number of nations possess sophisticated armed forces. Air bases could suffer attacks from hostile ground forces, air-to-ground munitions, cruise missiles, unmanned vehicles, theater ballistic missiles (TBM), and space based weapons. USAF forces are especially vulnerable during the early stages of a conflict, before all defensive units arrive in theater.

2.2.3. WMD Threats: Contingency air bases face a significant and increasingly dangerous threat from chemical and biological (chem/bio) weapons. Many countries currently possess or are engaged in extensive programs to acquire chem/bio weapons. These countries are moving towards acquiring these weapons due to their low cost, ease of manufacture, simple technology, and difficulty in detection and identification.

2.2.4. Future Threats. All indications show the level of sophistication in enemy arsenals will increase dramatically in the coming years. While US Forces possess tremendous defensive capabilities, the range of enemy threats and scenarios is so great that the possibility a contingency air base will sustain some level of enemy attack is very high. Contingency bases are most vulnerable to enemy attack during the build-up phase, before all US Forces arrive in a theater. The CBO community must continue to assess and identify resources necessary to counter any current and future threats.

2.3. CBO Concept of Operations (CONOPS). The basic CBO CONOPS is to "Fight the Base as a Weapon System", see figure 2-2. Just as an F-15 is a collection of components such as engines, fuselage, avionics, and weapons, so too is the contingency air base. We take a systems approach to understanding and planning how each functional area fits together to provide, defend and recover the air base, across the entire force employment spectrum. See figure 2-3.

2.3.1. Civil Engineer (CE). The deployed civil engineer is responsible for force beddown; maintenance and repair of pavements, facilities, and utilities; and plant operations. CE erects, repairs and sustains Harvest Falcon and Eagle infrastructure and upgrades/expands aircraft operating surfaces as required. CE is also a major player in defending and recovering air bases. To support air base defense, CE trains the base population on camouflage, concealment and deception (CCD) measures, and on procedures to operate in a chem/bio contaminated environment. Also, CE constructs aircraft revetments and hardens critical facilities/utilities. Another major CE responsibility is base recovery: conducting damage assessment; rapid pavement, facility/utility repair; fire fighting/crash/rescue; Unexploded Ordnance (UXO) reconnaissance/ EOD; and chem/bio agent detection/identification.

Figure 2-2. CBO CONOPS

Figure 2-3. CBO Functional Areas

 

2.3.2. Security Police (SP): Defense of contingency air bases against ground attack is a prerequisite for airpower operations. Ensuring that the COB is secure from attack is asecurity police top priority. While SP is most involved in defending air bases, they do help establish/sustain operations through their security and protection activities. On a daily basis, regardless of the threat environment, SP provides flightline, perimeter, and facility protection activities. In threat environments, Security police provide air base ground defense (ABGD) operations against the full range of enemy ground threats, with armed support from the other functional areas. SP is also tasked to provide a point air defense capability.

2.3.3. Services (SV). Services organizations are almost entirely concerned with activities supporting the establishment and sustainment of contingency locations. SV provides food service, billeting, laundry, fitness/recreation, and field exchange operations. Services organizations do get involved in base recovery operations by providing mortuary affairs support. Services personnel are provided firearms and participate in active defense countermeasures to protect base resources from attack.

2.3.4. Surgeon General (SG). The medical community is involved with all CBO operational tasks. In establishing/sustaining contingency operating locations, the medics prevent non-battle diseases and treat non-battle injuries. In defending, SG provides immunization and vaccines to prevent casualties from chem/bio attacks. If necessary, SG conducts recovery operations by treating and air evacuating battle casualties.

2.3.5. Communications (SC). The communications community is primarily concerned with the task of establishing and sustaining air bases. Communications units are tasked with establishing the C4I infrastructure necessary to provide local area networks, joint service interfaces, and major communications facilities such as antenna towers. SC also plays a role in defending air bases by protecting against information warfare and electromagnetic threats, and by providing public address systems to warn of enemy action.

2.4. Operational Concept (OPCON). (Figure 2-4.)

Operational Concept

Figure 2-4. Operational Concept

 

2.4.1. Air Combat Command (ACC) has been designated lead command for the Combat Air Forces (CAF) and provides forces to the warfighting theater CINC. The ACC CBO Integrated Product Team (IPT) is the Air Force focal point for CBO issues. As such, the CBO IPT coordinates CBO activities, to include assisting functional areas in the development of the Operational Concept of readiness, deployment, employment, sustainment, and reconstitution of the CBO assets.

2.4.2. Assumptions: The CBO community must provide and equip sufficient forces to cover a worst case scenario of two nearly simultaneous MRCs. MOOTW also place significant taskings on CBO forces. Since OPERATION DESERT STORM, deployed forces have been constantly engaged in humanitarian relief, peacekeeping, and counter-drug operations throughout the world.

2.4.3. Readiness: Operational CBO functional areas units maintain a high state of readiness through realistic training and exercise participation; and through ongoing MOOTW missions. Training and exercises are conducted day and night and in all environmental conditions. CBO functional area units participate in Red Flag, Green Flag, Silver Flag and various JCS exercises each year. CBO units also participate in MAJCOM/Wing/Squadron specific exercises. The CBO IPT ensures CBO forces have the best infrastructure and equipment possible through the ACC force modernization/budgeting process, such as this MAP.

2.4.4. Deployment: Force beddown infrastructure and equipment must be in place before any sustained aircraft sorties or other operations can take place. Therefore, CBO functional areas are among the first to arrive in any scenario. Unfortunately, Harvest Falcon and Eagle equipment, communications infrastructure, and some unit mobility items are extremely airlift intensive and require significant set up time. To hasten the establishment of contingency operating locations anywhere in the world, the CBO community relies heavily on propositioning (PREPO) equipment and materials. PREPO sites are located within the two potential MRC theaters.

2.4.4.1. Since contingencies can occur anywhere in the world, the "sophistication" of potential deployed locations varies greatly. CBO functional areas could deploy to an established USAF main operating base (MOB) with a robust infrastructure, a host nation collocated operating base (COB), a forward operating location (FOL), or an austere bare base location. Each location type requires a tailored deployment package and varied levels of host nation support.

2.4.5. Employment. The CBO community employs a systems approach to "Fight the Base as a Weapon System". Each CBO functional area plays a role in providing, defending and recovering contingency air bases. Without one of the pieces, the whole system fails.

2.4.5.1. CBO functional areas stand ready to support any contingency where US Air Forces will operate. These scenarios range from providing infrastructure for hurricane and counter-drug operations to establishing and defending a forward, bare base location such as Al Karj during Desert Storm.

2.4.5.2. To the greatest extent possible, the operational CBO functional areas units will deploy together in contingency situations. This concept maximizes familiarity with other units, reduces mobilization time, and ensures rapid base establishment. Once employed, each CBO functional area conducts assigned duties as described in Section 2.3, Concept of Operations.

2.4.6. Sustainment: Each CBO functional area unit deploys with mobility kits. These kits provide an initial capability to accomplish their mission until long term supply channels are established. While CBO units contribute directly to base sustainment, they rely on Air Force supply channels and host nation support for long term operations.

2.4.7. Reconstitution: CBO units are among the last to leave a deployed location. After decisive victory is obtained, CBO forces continue to sustain and defend contingency air bases while the US maintains a presence to establish lasting peace. During this time, repair and reconstitution of infrastructure and equipment takes place. Typically this is accomplished with host nation contractor support. Equipment also is readied for re-deployment to PREPO sites or stateside storage locations. Upon return to peacetime basing, unit mobility kits are replenished and deferred maintenance is accomplished. "Lessons learned" and tactics developed during the deployment are incorporated into a new concept of operations as required.

3. Contingency Base Operation Mission Needs Analysis (MNA).

The following paragraphs describe the process for identifying CBO deficiencies, provides a current assessment of CBO capability and details functional areas deficiencies.

3.1. Task-To-Need (TTN). The CBO MNA provides the linkage between operational tasks and deficiencies (needs). Specifically, the TTN process analyzes force structure, threats, and other factors to assesses the CBO community’s ability to accomplish the tasks identified during the Mission Area Assessment (MAA). The CBO MAT met on several occasions to identify and prioritize deficiencies. Based on their concept of operations for the operational tasks of providing, defending, and recovering contingency air bases, each functional area conducted an internal analysis and brought their identified deficiencies to the meeting. An attempt was made to apply the Quality Force Deployment (QFD) process to prioritize all CBO deficiencies into a master list. The team decided to prioritize deficiencies by individual functional area for this year’s MAP. As the MAT learns to apply QFD and develops more experience on how to "Fight the Base as a Weapon System", the team will use QFD to create a consolidated deficiency list for the next MAP.

3.2. Current Assessment. While the CBO MAT elected to prioritize deficiencies functionally, the team agreed that the operational tasks of provide, defend and recover apply to all CBO functional areas. The CBO community’s current capability is assessed using these tasks. See Figure 3-1. The current assessment time period is the FYDP from FY96 through FY01.

 

Figure 3-1. CBO Current Assessment

 

3.2.1. Provide:

Yellow: Due to quantity deficiencies in Bare Base assets, CBO will have difficulty providing a 100% capability to a two MRC scenario. Existing inventories contain obsolete, 1960’s technology equipment that is airlift intensive and difficult to erect and sustain. Inadequate funding for force modernization prevents a higher rating for all of the functional areas.

3.2.2. Defend:

Yellow: Absence of technologies to provide a real-time chem/bio detection capability, counter all ground/air threats (Point Air Defense - PAD), and provide vaccines against current chem/bio agents prevents a higher assessment. Again, reduced funding prevents full force modernization for CBO functional areas that are now relying on obsolete equipment to defend contingency air bases.

3.2.3. Recover:

Yellow: Deficiencies in the ability to safely dispose of unexploded ordnance (UXO, and provide state of the art casualty treatment facilities prevent a higher assessment. Current technology does not allow a desired method of chem/bio decontamination. Again, reliance on obsolete equipment and inadequate funding reduces overall CBO capability.

3.3. Functional Area Deficiencies.

3.3.1. Civil Engineer Deficiencies. The CE deficiencies are listed below in priority order. Figure 3-3a.

Figure 3-3a. Civil Engineer Deficiencies

 

3.3.1.1. Deficiency Definitions. A brief description of each deficiency follows, as well as the task linkage. For more detailed information on a particular deficiency, please contact the functional area POC listed in section 3.8.

CE1: Inadequate Aircrew Individual Protective Equipment (IPE).

Task: Defend

Existing aircrew IPE is inadequate to support sustained air operations in a chem/bio warfare environment. The most serious deficiency is that the current overgarment presents an unacceptable heat load to those wearing the suit for extended periods of time. Garment components are also bulky, limit dexterity, and cannot be decontaminated easily.

CE2: Inadequate Groundcrew Individual Protective Equipment (IPE).

Task: Defend

Existing groundcrew IPE is inadequate to support sustained ground operations in a chem/bio warfare environment. The most serious deficiency is that the current overgarment presents an unacceptable heat load to those wearing the suit for extended periods of time. Garment components are also bulky, limit dexterity, and cannot be decontaminated easily.

CE3: Inadequate Deployable Shelters/Environmental Control Units (ECU).

Task: Provide

Existing shelters and ECUs, critical components of Harvest Falcon/Eagle program, are too airlift intensive to rapidly support future force projection operations. They are also bulky, difficult to erect and maintain, and cannot adequately support long term deployments. Existing ECUs are too large and inefficient, and use environmentally hazardous refrigerants. Many of these commodities are no longer manufactured and spare parts are difficult to obtain. Today’s inventory will exceed life expectancy by the year 2000-10.

CE4: Inadequate Biological Agent Detection Capability.

Task: Defend/Recover

No operational capability exists to provide real-time point or stand-off detection, identification, or warning of biological agents.

CE5: Inadequate Chemical Agent Detection Capability.

Task: Defend/Recover

No one system provides a reliable capability to detect, identify and warn of multiple chemical agents. Current equipment either detects only one type of agent or is severely unreliable.

CE6: Inadequate Portable Generators and Electric Distribution Systems

Task: Provide

Current Harvest Falcon/Eagle generators are based on 1960’s design and technology. A C-130 can carry only one 750kw generator. Current power distribution systems in the inventory are also very airlift intensive, difficult to install and maintain, and pose reliability problems.

CE7: Inadequate Ability to Safely Locate and Neutralize Unexploded Ordnance (UXO).

Task: Recover

Procedures to neutralize and remove UXOs have not changed since World War II. They are extremely hazardous to personnel and very time consuming. Current procedures involve EOD personnel approaching and physically placing explosive charges on individual UXOs. This manpower intensive operation places personnel in direct contact with unstable munitions resulting in numerous deaths and serious injuries.

CE8: Inadequate Methods for Assessing Force Beddown and Survivability Requirements.

Task: Provide/Defend/Recover

No automated capability exists to support deployed the civil engineer in rapidly establishing and managing contingency locations. Requirements include developing force beddown/site development/aircraft parking plans, critical facility/utility hardening requirements, and CCD plans. We also lack the capability to employ advanced modeling and simulation techniques; or systems to assess and validate MAP deficiencies, solutions and equipment development.

CE9: Inadequate Deployable Communication and Data Automation Systems

Task: Provide/Defend/Recover

Deployed CE squadrons have a very limited capability to communicate between work parties and damage control centers. Current radios are subject to self-jamming and have limited range. There is no capability to automate Survival Recovery Center/Damage Control Center operations nor to provide automated base status inputs to the Wing Command and Control System.

CE10: Inadequate Pavement Evaluation, Repair, and Expansion Capability

Task: Provide/Recover

There is no rapidly deployable capability to conduct non-destructive evaluation of pavements at forward operating locations. Significant shortfalls exist in the capability to rapidly repair spall damage, and no deployable capability is fielded to employ advanced, quick-setting pavement repair materials.

CE11: Inadequate Water Purification, Storage, and Distribution System

Task: Provide

Existing Harvest Falcon/Eagle water systems are extremely airlift intensive.

CE12: Inadequate Camouflage, Concealment, and Deception Capabilities

Task: Defend

Current CCD capability is limited to nets and smoke. There are no adequate aircraft/support equipment decoys or the ability to defeat enemy precision-guided weapons.

CE13: Inadequate Contingency Airfield Support Systems

Task: Provide/Defend/Recover

Recent upgrades have extended the useful life of deployable airfield support systems in the near term. However, Harvest Falcon/Eagle airfield lighting systems, mobile aircraft arresting systems, and navigational aid equipment will exceed life expectancy during the next 25 years.

CE14: Inadequate Ability to Conduct Damage Assessment and UXO Reconnaissance.

Task: Recover

Existing CE/EOD armored vehicles (M-113s) are limited in number, logistically unsupportable, and offer limited protection against UXOs.

CE15: Inadequate Deployable Waste Management Systems

Task: Provide

There is no deployable, environmentally-acceptable capability to dispose of solid and liquid wastes generated at deployed locations.

CE16: Inadequate Chem/Bio Agent Decontamination Capability

Task: Recover

Existing capability to decontaminate personnel and equipment is inadequate to support large scale, continued operations in a chem/bio environment. Existing methods are destructive, labor intensive, and inherently hazardous to personnel.

CE17: Inadequate Radiation Detection Capability

Task: Defend/Recover

Current radiation detection capability is adequate for the near term. However, emerging technologies will offer significant capability increases in the mid to long term.

CE18: Inadequate Capability to Rapidly Harden Facilities, Aircraft Parking, and Utility Systems

Task: Defend/Recover

Existing A-1 and B-1 revetment kits require significant manpower, equipment, and time to erect. They are also airlift intensive. Technologies are developing that can provide procedures and equipment to employ indigenous materials for this purpose.

CE19: Inadequate Chem/Bio Collective Protection Systems

Task: Defend

There is no deployable collective protection capability currently fielded. While the SG community is fielding a limited capability to support their air transportable hospitals, the base population at-large remains unprotected. Technology has provided several candidate solutions, however, a lack of funding has negated efforts to evaluate/field these systems.

3.4. Security Police Deficiencies. The SP MAP deficiencies are listed below in priority order. See Figure 3-3b.

Figure 3-3b. Security Police Deficiencies

 

3.4.1. Deficiency Definitions. A brief description of each deficiency follows, as well as the task linkage. For more detailed information on a particular deficiency, please contact the functional area POC listed in section 3.8.

SP1: Inability to Safely Transport Personnel in Response to Ground Threats

Task: Provide/Defend/Recover

Replacement capability is required for the current Peacekeeper vehicles. Capability will be used to provide an increased level of protection for personnel executing duties as convoy escort, nuclear security, ABGD reaction force roles, and anti-terrorist operations.

SP2: Limited Capability to Defend Against New/Emerging Ground-based Threats

Task: Defend

Inadequate technologies exist to allow security personnel to defend against new and emerging ground based threats.

SP3: Limited Capability to Defeat New/Emerging Ground-based Threats

Task: Defend

- Inadequate analytical tools are available to model various attack scenarios against different defensive arrangements. Tools will enable selection of optimum security systems, force structure, and manpower requirements.

- Defensive forces do not have the capability to accurately sight defensive fighting positions, plot target reference points for heavy weapons fire, land navigation, and sensor employment.

- Inadequate capability to mask security/base defense positions and personnel from intruders using thermal imagers.

- Security forces require advanced small arms weapons and equipment capability, i.e., incapacitates, lasers, and optics to meet future threats.

- Inadequate automated systems and non-lethal technologies exist to delay and deny intruders attempting unauthorized access to nuclear weapons, flight lines, or employment for protection of personnel in contingency operations.

- Inadequate capability to counter incoming RF-fused rocket, artillery, mortar (RAM) ordnance.

SP4: Limited Ability to Detect enemy Forces

Task: Provide/Defend

- Inadequate tactical early warning systems exist to integrate with Point Air Defense systems.

- Inadequate automated, entry control systems exist that employ various levels of entry requirements.

- Inadequate capability exists to allow remote surveillance of an area without going into harms way. Proposed for use with convoy operations, tactical field applications, and static use within a confined area (i.e. weapons storage area/flightline).

- Inadequate capability exists to detect and assess intrusions into large, loosely defined security areas or near flightline areas.

SP5: Inadequate Body Armor

Task: Defend

Defense forces lack appropriate body armor to survive higher ballistic weapons rounds. No protection exists from the munitions SP forces would face at even the lower end of the spectrum of conflict. Currnet body armor is bulky and cumbersome to wear.

SP6: Limited Joint Tactical Communications Interoperability

Task: Provide/Defend

Current tactical communications equipment is not interoperable with other services and host nation security forces communication equipment, and does not have insufficient range to support ABGD or contingency operations.

SP7: Inadequate Night Vision Equipment (NVE)/Imagery Systems

Task: Provide/Defend

Current night vision/imagery systems are ineffective during inclement weather, difficult to maintain, and costly.

SP8: Current Tactical Communications inefficient to operate

Task: Provide/Defend

Current systems hamper the defender as well as distract from a defender’s ability to put "iron" on the target. Low battery life places SP forces at risk during prolongedengagements.

SP9: Inability to Rapidly Erect Defensive Fighting Positions

Task: Defend

Currently the time needed to erect defensive fighting positions (DFPs) and the establishment of checkpoints is time consuming and difficult, bulky, and does not offer ballistic protection.

SP10: Inadequate Point Air Defense (PAD) Capability

Task: Defend

No capability exists for highly lethal point air defense. Capability will provide USAF forces operating from forward airfields with an organic PAD capability to defend against fixed and rotary wing aircraft, particularly before USA air defense assets can be deployed.

SP11: Limited Ability to Track Friendly Forces

Task: Provide/Defend

Inadequate capability to allow control centers to know the location of their personnel and/or vehicles.

SP12: Inadequate Training for Base Personnel in Air Base Defense (ABD)

Task: Provide/Defend

Current educational systems for base security are not "interactive" and lack the sophistication needed to provide the best education. With the capability to attend exercises dwindling; and formal school slots even harder to get, we need a capability to realistically simulate threats and provide a better training mechanism.

3.5. Services Deficiencies The Services MAPdeficiencies are listed below in priority order. See Figure 3-3c.

Figure 3-3c. Services Deficiencies

 

3.5.1. Deficiency Definitions. A brief description of each deficiency follows, as well as the task linkage. For more detailed information on a particular deficiency, please contact the functional area POC listed in section 3.8.

SV1: Field Kitchen Equipment Labor Intensive/Inefficient/Hazardous to Operate

Task: Provide

- Existing deployable kitchens are airlift intensive, labor intensive and use highly flammable gasoline as the fuel for food preparation equipment. Present gas fired cooking equipment will not maintain cooking temperatures and require constant refueling thus causing extended food preparation periods. Fuel leaks and overpressurization have resulted in personal injury and property loss.

SV2: Field Kitchen Facilities Labor Intensive/Inefficient to Set Up/Maintain

Task: Provide

- Existing deployable kitchens are airlift intensive and difficult to erect/maintain.

- Layout is ergonomically inefficient requiring separate areas to accommodate fuel storage, lighting, and cool down for gasoline fired cooking and heating equipment

- Requires large separate areas for dining, serving, ware washing, food storage, and refuse disposal

- Difficult to impossible to properly sanitize.

SV3: Inadequate Capability to Provide Personal/Organizational Laundry Services

Task: Provide

Current tactical field laundry unit is airlift intensive, labor intensive, unreliable, and difficult to maintain.

SV4: Inadequate Capability to Process/Store Remains

Task: Recover

No deployable facility is available for mortuary processing that provides a water source, easily sanitized work surfaces, walls and floors. Existing 150 cu. ft. refrigerators have inadequate space and shelving for storage of multiple bodies

SV5: No Capability to Ship Refrigerated and Frozen Materials Aboard Aircraft

Task: Provide

Services does not have a deployable container for transporting refrigerated/frozen supplies for forward operating locations. Existing means of transporting are large cardboard boxes and dry ice.

SV6: Inadequate Capability to Provide Exchange Services

Task: Provide

There is no dedicated securable facility with shelving, storage space, cash registers, etc. to support resale operations

SV7: Inadequate Capability to Provide Flight/Flightline Meals

Task: Provide

No self-contained, mobile, deployable facility available for production of flight meals and hot ground support meals near the flightline

SV8: Limited Ability to Provide Fitness/Recreation Facilities

Task: Provide

No self-contained, deployable facility to conduct fitness activities.

3.6. Surgeon General (Medical) Deficiencies The SG MAP deficiencies are listed below in priority order. See Figure 3-3d.

Figure 3-1d. Surgeon General Deficiencies

 

3.6.1. Deficiency Definitions. A brief description of each deficiency follows, as well as the task linkage. For more detailed information on a particular deficiency, please contact the functional area POC as listed in section 3.8.

SG1: Inability to protect against/treat all known chem/bio agents.

Task: Defend

No systems currently available that accurately and rapidly detect, identify, and assess immediate chem/bio threats in a field setting. Require effective vaccines, antidotes, procedures, and training for treating biological warfare casualties.

SG2: Inability to detect/identify/warn of NBC attack.

Task: Defend/Recover

Lack of rapid access to data sources on health threats, monitoring procedures, and antidotes for contingencies are limited and in some cases non-existent.

SG3: Preventative care overwhelmed by Third World health conditions.

Task: Provide

Air Force personnel must be ready to deploy anywhere in the world. Third world countries pose a wide range of health problems to include unusual flora and fauna, unsanitary conditions, and disease transmission modes. Require a means to protect personnel from these dangers. Severe pollution of local water, foods, and population health risks can overwhelm attempts to prevent contamination of base systems.

SG4: Deployable medical facilities are airlift/labor intensive.

Task: Provide

Current equipment is obsolete, heavy, inefficient, and lacks flexibility to reconfigure and respond to contingencies.

SG5: Current medical facilities are vulnerable to chem/bio contamination.

Task: Defend

Current MTF facilities have limited collective protection capability. Without protected operating areas, emergency medical care cannot occur at locations contaminated with chem/bio agents. Patients must be transported to clean areas resulting in hazardous travel for patients as well as delayed treatment.

SG6: Limited diagnostic equipment capability.

Task: Provide/Recover

Require improved capability and more deployable equipment that rapidly diagnoses casualties and provides x-rays both for contingency locations on the ground and in-flight medical evacuations. Equipment lacks full second and third echelon diagnostic capability for on-ground or in-flight casualty care. Need greater diagnostic capabilities, i.e. therapeutic levels. Absence of critical disease identification information necessitates the blind "shot gun" approach for therapeutic agents.

SG7: Limited capability to project specialty medical expertise forward.

Task: Provide/Recover

Require video telecommunications equipment that allows medical specialists in rear areas to project, in real time, their knowledge to physicians who are treating casualties at forward locations.

SG8: Current anesthesia, and x-ray equipment inadequate for ATH’s. Task: Provide/Recover

Air Transportable Hospital (ATH) equipment items are bulky, heavy, lack flexibility, and capability. Hazardous chemicals used for processing, vented waste gases, etc. require replacement. ATHs lack field oxygen systems; anesthesia ventilators, and field sterilization units.

SG9: Limited ability to prevent/mitigate environmental damage .

Task: Provide

Require means to safely dispose of human, medical, industrial and other dangerous waste from contingency operating bases. Significantly impacts the environment. Current systems are unable to prevent pollution caused by medical waste produced at deployed sites.

SG10: Inadequate medical threat assessment.

Task: Defend

MTFs lack rapid access to data sources on health threats, monitoring procedures, and hazards associated with deployment locations. Lack access to timely prioritized medical intelligence at point of decision/point of care.

SG11: Limited clinical automation support.

Task: Provide/Recover

Deployable hospitals lack the sophisticated information control systems to deal with the rapidly changing medical environment at contingency locations. State of the art video telecommunications equipment and computer systems are required. Lack of information at the site, impacts on casualty care, impedes clinical treatment, and causes inaccurate and untimely reporting.

SG12: Inadequate patient tracking/reporting capability.

Task: Recover

Currently, patient tracking systems require manual inputs using either paper or computer logs. Require a system that automatically updates patient status and location throughout the treatment process.

SG13: Undefined contingency industrial surveillance requirements.

Task: Provide

Standards for establishing acceptable industrial pollution surveillance and toxicity levels are undefined for contingency operating locations. Greatly impacts on the medical treatment facility’s (MTF) ability to prevent/mitigate environmental damage.

 

3.7. Communications Deficiencies The SC MAP deficiencies are listed below in priority order. See Figure 3-3e.

Figure 3-3e. Communications Deficiencies

 

3.7.1. Deficiency Definitions. A brief description of each deficiency follows, as well as the task linkage. For more detailed information on a particular deficiency, please contact the functional area POC as listed in section 3.8.

SC1: Data networks vulnerable to intrusion/exploitation/disruption.

Task: Defend

USAF data systems are vulnerable to technical attack by organized and unorganized hostile forces. Such attacks are frequently undetected until critical data is missing or corrupted. While secure command and control systems appear to be less vulnerable, unclassified networks have spotty control mechanisms of varying effectiveness. Failure to eliminate or control these attacks will significantly degrade contingency base operations.

SC2: Inadequate ability to support secure voice requirements.

Task: Defend

Secure voice service is required to deny hostile agency access to critical information. Current systems have very limited capability to support STU-III’s, and therefore rely heavily on specialized tactical instruments. USAF communications units do not have enough tactical secure telephones to support contingency base operations for two major regional conflicts. Failure to correct this deficiency will limit combat operations and possibly compromise classified information to hostile forces.

SC3: Inability to provide public address (PA) services.

Task: Provide/Defend

Current "Giant Voice" equipment consists of small public address systems unsuitable for broadcasting attack warnings over entire contingency base area. USAF communications units do not possess sufficient quantity of these systems to support two MRCs. Failure to correct this deficiency may unnecessarily endanger the lives of contingency base personnel.

SC4: Portable communication infrastructure is large/inflexible/fragile.

Task: Provide

Contingency base portable communications systems are unable to operate over a large area without repeater sites. Current repeater sites are essentially fixed base models that are large, difficult to deploy, frequently break during shipment, and cannot be easily reprogrammed to accept new frequencies in the UHF and VHF bands. Operations may be severely limited in UHF-only theaters.

SC5: Inability to integrate deployed data networks.

Task: Provide

Currently, no method exists to integrate networks deployed by contingency base personnel into a single, multi-level secure, centrally managed network. This deficiency inhibits ability of contingency base personnel to coordinate operations with the base, theater, and CONUS support agencies.

SC6: Current deployable comm systems are airlift intensive.

Task: Provide

Communications systems to support contingency base operations require extensive airlift.

SC7: Current information infrastructure setup is manpower/airlift intensive.

Task: Provide

Cable required to interconnect contingency base agencies requires extensive airlift.

SC8: Limited interoperability with joint/coalition C4I systems.

Task: Provide

Contingency base communications systems were designed to operate within a "closed" environment, with little concern for interoperability with other allied communications systems. These systems are completely incompatible with most US and international commercial communications systems, and have limited compatibility with systems possessed by other US forces.

SC9: Software features inadequate for coalition releasability.

Task: Provide

Data from contingency base C2 systems must be shared with coalition/allied forces to execute air operations. However, current C2 systems have limited ability to sanitize classified data for release to non-US forces. Additionally, "private" cryptographic keys, encrypting secure voice and data networks, are seldom releasable to non-US forces.

SC10: Limited ability to counter EM interference.

Task: Provide

Communications forces supporting contingency base operations have no ability to detect the source of natural, incidental, or hostile electromagnetic interference or direct elimination.

3.8. Functional Area Points of Contact. (Figure 3-4.)

POC

Org

Base/State

DSN

Comm

Alexander, Ed Mr.

WL/FIVC

Tyndall AFB, FL

523-3705

(904)283-3705

Booth, T. LTC

HQ ACC/SVX

Langley AFB, VA

764-2921

(804)574-2921

Carson, Mike Maj

HQ AFCESA/CEXR

Tyndall AFB, FL

523-6306

(904)283-6306

Clausen, Larry LTC

ASC/VXO

Eglin AFB, FL

872-4685 x309

(904)882-4685 x309

Collins, Donald LTC

HQ ACC/SPXS

Langley AFB, VA

574-2958/61

(804)764-2958/61

Dougherty, Paul Mr

HQ ACC/LGXP

Langley AFB, VA

574-5228

(804)764-5228

Fargholi, Ralph Mr.

NAIC/POAD

WPAFB, OH

787-3776

(513)257-3776

Fisher, Joe D. Mr.

HQ ACC/CES-ES

Langley AFB, VA

574-7659

(804)764-7659

Gardner, Steve Maj

ASC/VXO-CCD

Eglin AFB FL

872-4089

(904)882-4089

Goetz, Al Mr

NAIC/POAD

WPAFB, OH

787-3776

(513)257-3776

Hamant, N. Capt

HQ ACC/SCXX

Langley AFB, VA

574-5736

(804)764-5736

Hennessy, Steve, Capt

HQ ACC/SCCD

Langley AFB, VA

574-6166

(804)764-6166

Hill, Rob Capt

HQ USAF/CEOR

Pentagon

225-5490/7744

(703)697-8902

Hoeferkamp, Richard Maj.

HSC/YAC

Brooks AFB, TX

240-5126

(210)536-5126

Holdiness, Chuck LTC

HSC/YAC

Brooks AFB, TX

240-5125

(210)536-5125

Kelley, Sam LTC

WR-ALC/LVF

Robins AFB, GA

468-2062

(912)926-2062

Larson, Bob Mr.

ASC/VXO(BDM)

Eglin AFB, FL

872-5407 x346

(904)882-5407 x346

Leptrone, Jeff LTC

HQ ACC/DRSO

Langley AFB, VA

574-5892

(804)764-5892

Lewis, Frank Maj

HQ ACC/DRSO

Langley AFB, VA

574-5892

(804)764-5892

Loveland, J. L. LTC

HQ ACC/CEXX

Langley AFB, VA

574-5335

(804)764-5335

May, L. LTC

HQ ACC/SGM

Langley AFB, VA

574-2874 ext 2135

(804)764-2874 ext 2135

McCullough, Alana Capt

SAF/AQPT

Pentagon

225-0328

(703)695-0328

Metcalf, R, LTC

HQ ACC/DRSO

Langley AFB, VA

574-5892

(804)764-5892

Nelson, David, Capt

HQ AFMC/STPN

WPAFB, OH

787-8764

(513)257-8764

Rettie, Bob Mr.

ASC/VXO

Eglin AFB, FL

872-4697 X311

(904)882-4697 X311

Reyes, Robert Dr

AL/CFD

Aberdeen Prov Grd, MD

584-3995

(410)671-3995

Sanders, Bill Maj

HQ USAF/CEP

Pentagon

225-7744

(703)697-0720

Shurman, Sandra Capt

HSC/YAC

Brooks AFB, TX

240-4533

(210)536-4533

Spore, Tim Mr.

ASC/VXO

Eglin AFB, FL

872-4695 x320

(904)882-4695 x320

Swygert, A. Capt

HQ ACC/DRSO

Langley AFB, VA

574-5892

(804)764-5892

Thomas, W. Mr

HQ ACC/DRSO

Langley AFB, VA

574-5892

(804)764-5892

Toliver, Renea, Capt

Det 2 AFOTEC

Eglin AFB FL

872-9219

(904)882-9219

Walker, Tim Maj

HQ ACC/SPXS

Langley AFB, VA

574-2958/61

(804)764-2958/61

Warlick, Donald, Maj

ASC/VXO

Eglin AFB FL

872-4695 x329

(904)882-4695 x329

Wilson, Mike LTC

HQ USAF/SPX

Pentagon

225-9691

(703)695-96919710

Figure 3-4. Functional Area Points of Contact

4. Mission Area Plan.

4.1. Proposed Solutions Concepts. This section outlines the measures to correct CBO functional area deficiencies. Once the CBO MAT completed the Task-To-Need (TTN), identified deficiencies are passed to the Air Base Systems (ABS) TPIPT for proposed solution concepts. Originally, the TPIPT planned to provide proposed solutions in a document called the "Development Plan" (DP). Due to an accelerated publication timeline for the CBO MAP, the TPIPT, at MAJCOM request, provided potential solutions directly to the MAT without a DP. The TPIPT made a call for potential solution concepts to applicable commercial enterprises through Industry Day programs and through use of the Commerce Business Daily (CBD), Air Force laboratories, other TPIPTs, functional area support agencies, SPOs, and other Services. Since the ABS TPIPT had considerable experience working CE and SP issues, they provided robust solution concepts for CE and SP. SC, SG, and SV as newcomers to the MAP process received less attention than the TPIPT would have liked to provide. As the TPIPT becomes more familiar with SC/SG/SV functional area deficiencies, a more comprehensive database and solution set will be provided to the MAT.

4.1.1. For this year’s MAP, all proposed solutions concepts are presented in two categories: Solutions or Emerging Technologies. These include material/non-material and development/non-development concepts. Solutions (S) are measures immediately available to solve deficiencies. Emerging Technologies (E) require additional research and development before a measure can correct a deficiency. The following sections identify, describe, and link deficiencies with potential solutions and emerging technologies. Each CBO functional area prioritized only the measures applicable to their area (next year a consolidated CBO list is planned). For functional area deficiencies with numerous potential solutions concepts, only the top twenty were prioritized.

4.1.2. The functional areas will identify those solutions and emerging technologies which they want to pursue. The ABS TPIPT will provide this information to AFMC/ST who, in turn, works with HQ AF/AQP to target technologies and pursue R&D funding for appropriate laboratory research. The functional areas themselves will accomplish Mission Need Statements (MNS) and Operational Requirements Documents (ORD) as well as budgeting actions on the solution concepts each area wants to pursue and fund.

4.2. Solutions This section describes proposed solutions readily available to correct CBO deficiencies. Solutions are listed below the deficiency to be corrected. Status information is provided only for those solutions that have a current Operational Requirements Document (ORD) or funding line.

4.2.1. Civil Engineer. (Figures 4-1a and 4-1b.) Only the top 10 were prioritized, with the understanding that not all solutions can be funded.

 

Figure 4-1a. Civil Engineer Deficiencies/Solution Matrix


Figure 4-1b. Civil Engineer Deficiencies/Solutions Matrix (Cont’d)

 

 

4.2.1.1. (CE1) Inadequate aircrew individual protective equipment.

4.2.1.1a. Aircrew Eye/Respiratory Protection.

Description: Replaces the MBU-13P C/B Oxygen Mask. STATUS: No ORD. Program funded for R&D/Procurement.

4.2.1.1b. Aircrew Ensemble.

Description: This effort procures an existing ensemble developed, tested, and fielded during OPERATION DESERT STORM. STATUS: No ORD. Program funded.

4.2.1.2. (CE2) Inadequate groundcrew individual protective equipment.

4.2.1.2a. EOD Ensemble.

Description: Ensemble provides chem/bio protection and reduced heat stress. Program effort is part of Joint Service Integrated Lightweight Suit Technology (JSLIST) program. Joint ORD is awaiting AF approval. STATUS: SON - 19 Sep 86, ORD 3 Apr 94. Program funded for R&D/Procurement.

4.2.1.2b. Firefighter Mask.

Description: This equipment provides an extended duration, self contained breathing apparatus (SCBA). It provides communications and chem/bio warfare capability. This commercial off the shelf (COTS) program will provide significant improvement in fire fighting operations by extending the fire fighter on-scene fire exposure and rescue time, enhance crew communication and protect fire fighters in a Chem/bio environment. STATUS: Program is unfunded.

4.2.1.2c. Micro-Climate Cooling.

Description: Incorporates cooling capability within chem/bio ensemble to allow conduct of strenuous duties while wearing the ensemble. Program monitors Army developments. Refinement of Army design or direct purchase should reduce program risk to the Air Force. STATUS: Program is unfunded.

4.2.1.2d. Voice Emitter for SCBA.

Description: The emitter provides clear voice communications up to 75 meters away. The unit is powered by one nine volt battery and is intrinsically safe. The emitter should enhance voice communications between crew members. STATUS: Program is unfunded.

4.2.1.2e. Groundcrew Eye-Respiratory Protection.

Description: This is a disposable, inexpensive, lightweight emergency mask which provides head/neck protection from liquid, vapor, and aerosol chemical warfare agents. STATUS: Program is unfunded.

4.2.1.3. (CE3) Inadequate deployable shelter systems.

4.2.1.3a. New Family of Portable Shelters, Development.

Description: Defines operational and design concepts for airmobile shelters for bare base and expeditious force application and applies advanced technology to significantly upgrade existing shelter performance. The concepts will be evaluated for survivability, air mobility, and erectability. STATUS: MNS - CAF 316-92 (9 Feb 92), ORD - CAF 316-92-I-B (27 May 94). Program is partially funded.

4.2.1.3b. New Family of Portable Shelters, Medium/Large.

Description: This is a 6.4 program, Non-Developmental Item, procures medium shelters 1500 sq ft and large shelters 4200-9000 sq ft. STATUS: MNS - CAF 316-92 (9 Feb 92), ORD - CAF 316-92-I-B (27 May 94). Program is partially funded.

4.2.1.3c. New Family of Portable Shelters, Small.

Description: This is a 6.4 program, Modified Non-Developmental Item to purchase small shelters and Environmental Control Units (ECUs). It involves modifications for insulation, ducting and packaging. . STATUS: MNS - CAF 316-92 (9 Feb 92), ORD - CAF 316-92-I-B (27 May 94). Program is partially funded.

4.2.1.3d. New Family of Portable Shelters-Field Deployable ECUs (FDECU).

Description: ECU's to support the new family of Air Force portable shelters. Two sizes of ECUs will be developed to support the two classes (personnel and aircraft size) shelters. STATUS: MNS- CAF 316-92, ORD - CAF 316-92-I-C. Program partially funded. A separate effort is an advanced technology ECU (FDECU) to replace the A/E 32 C-39 (the C-100 in the Army). Program is funded.

4.2.1.3e. Bare Base Study.

Description: A study to provide the basis for operational commands to create and support requirements for bare base systems. These studies emphasize determination of optimal technical characteristics for individual bare base capabilities, as part of an overall bare base "weapons systems" concept. An integrated systems approach is employed to identify the best near term and next generation bare base infrastructure for development and acquisition. Identifies opportunities for out-year enhancement/improvement of bare base assets. STATUS: Program funded.

4.2.1.3f. Bare Base Systems Cold Weather Package.

Description: This equipment would be deployed as an add-on capability to Harvest Falcon/Eagle to provide freeze protection for deployed water systems and shelter heating for extremely cold climates (temperatures between +25 and -25 degrees Fahrenheit.) STATUS: Program unfunded.

4.2.1.4. (CE4) Inadequate biological agent detection capability.

4.2.1.4a. Biological Agent Detector.

Description: Automatic air sampling device to provide visual and audible alarm in the presence of biological agents. The Air Force will participate with the other services in using common technology applied to a unique platform for each service. STATUS: SON - 19 Sep 86, ORD - 21 Nov 94. Program is unfunded.

4.2.1.4b. Water Bio Detection.

Description: This effort would provide bio agent detection and warning when agents were present in local water supplies. An automatic monitoring system would allow for continuous monitoring of all water sources and negates the time and manpower required with present water sampling methods. STATUS: SON - 19 Sep 86. Program funded partially for R&D.

4.2.1.5. (CE5) Inadequate chemical agent detection capability.

4.2.1.5a. Equipment Contamination Detection System.

Description: This device will provide rapid indication of agent contamination on equipment and material. Program may use Ion Mobility Spectroscopy technology to develop equipment capable of detecting selected chemical agents. STATUS: SON - 19 Sep 86. Program is unfunded.

4.2.1.5b. Individual Chemical Agent Detector.

Description: Small, lightweight device worn by individuals to warn of chem agents. Detects chem agents and emits audible warning. Program may employ Ion Mobility Spectroscopy or Surface Acoustic Wave (SAW) technology. Other technologies could be devised, such as chemo-optical. STATUS: SON - 19 Sep 86, SORD - 26 Jun 92. Program is unfunded.

4.2.1.5c. Automatic Vapor Agent Detector.

Description: Deficiency exists in detection of mustard agents. Development of this capability will improve upon nerve vapor detection capability of the M8A1 detector, as well as provide the capability to detect mustard agents. Joint program with Army. STATUS: SON - 19 Sep 86, SORD - 26 Jun 92. Program is funded for R&D/Procurement.

4.2.1.5d. Water Chemical Detection.

Description: This effort would provide chemical agent detection and warning when agents were present in local water supplies. Current techniques require extensive manual sampling activities using chemical analysis. An automatic monitoring system would allow for continuous monitoring of all water sources and negate the time and manpower required with present sampling methods. STATUS: SON - 19 Sep 86. Program funded partially for R&D.

4.2.1.5e. Aircraft Interior Detector.

Description: Device which will detect, identify, quantify and provide warning of the presence of nerve agents and vesicants in vapor form. STATUS: SON - 19 Sep 86, SORD - 28 Jun 89, Draft ORD - CAF (USAF 004-85) - I/II-A in progress. Program is partially funded.

4.2.1.6. (CE6) Inadequate portable generators and electric distribution.

4.2.1.6a. Lightweight Deployable Generator/Power Distribution Systems

Description: This project involves secondary distribution center (SDC) replacement, the acquisition of 100KW and 1600KW generators and a power monitoring and control system. STATUS: ORD - CAF 316-92-I-E. Program is partially funded.

4.2.1.6b. Electric Rapid Utility Repair Kit.

Description: Provides a portable air base electric utility system restoration kit to repair and quickly restore electric power to essential functions and facilities.

4.2.1.7. (CE7) Inadequate ability to safely locate and neutralize unexploded ordnance.

4.2.1.7a. MK-1 MOD 3 Rocket Wrench.

Description: The MK-1 MOD 3 Rocket Wrench is a specialized EOD tool set which is used to neutralize a large number of foreign and US air munitions. The tool is explosively operated by two 50 caliber cartridges and remotely removes fuzes from munitions.

4.2.1.7b. MK-26 Ferrous Ordnance Locator.

Description: The MK-26 ferrous ordnance locator is a lightweight, highly accurate and precise metal detector capable of locating deeply buried unexploded bombs and munitions (up to 25 feet).

4.2.1.7c. MK-32 X-ray Machine.

Description: The MK-32 x-ray machine is an EOD diagnostic tool which technicians use to determine neutralization procedures for terrorist explosive devices and previously unknown foreign munitions. The system consists of a ac/dc operated x-ray device and a film processor to develop the illuminated film.

4.2.1.7d. MX-22 Remote Controlled Firing Device (RCFD).

Description: The MX -22 RCFD provides EOD personnel with a capability to safely and remotely initiate explosive charges up to four kilometers away. The system consists of a non expendable transmitter with a preset transmission frequency and multiple expendable receivers which have been preset at the same frequency.

4.2.1.7e. Rapid Ordnance Removal System (RORS).

Description: Development of lightweight blade/plow vehicle system for clearance of submunitions from hard and soft surfaces. STATUS: ORD - CAF319-79-I-K in draft. Program is fully funded.

4.2.1.8. (CE8) Inadequate methods of assessing force beddown and survivability requirements for contingency base operations.

4.2.1.8a. Bare Base Study.

Description: See 4.2.1.3e

4.2.1.9. (CE9) Inadequate CE communication and automation systems.

4.2.1.9a. ABO Radios (Scope Shield II).

Description: An OTS system, Scope Shield II radios provide tactical secure interoperable communications, and allow our ABGD forces to communicate with other services and host. Program is partially funded.

4.2.1.9b. Speakeasy/Digital Burst.

Description: Joint Service program integrates small, mobile, physically dispersed devices that provide interoperable covert communications.

4.2.1.10. (CE10) Inadequate contingency evaluation, repair and creation capability.

4.2.1.10a. Deployable Pavement Repair System (DPRS).

Description: A self-contained, C-130 transportable concrete dispensing machine. Develops capability, tests and acquires mixing/dispensing hardware for the rapid repair/upgrade of spalls, small craters, and aircraft parking aprons. Employs advanced cements to provide a USAF pavement upgrade capability without relying on host nation support. STATUS: MNS - CAF 316-92, ORD - CAF 316-92-I-D. Program is partially funded.

4.2.1.10b. Methods of Using In-Theater Materials to Repair Pavements.

Description: This develops new rapid airfield pavement repair capabilities to help meet Global Reach/Global Power mission objectives. This in-house effort will build on the capabilities offered by the deployable pavement repair system (DPRS). It will further develop criteria for repair performance, and investigate the use of indigenous, less-than-ideal materials for repair.

4.2.1.10c. Portable GPR to Evaluate Conditions of Airfields at Deployed Locations.

Description: This project will provide the AF with an enhanced capability to perform rapid, high-confidence-level traffic capacity assessments for existing surfaced and unsurfaced runways and aprons, primarily at remote operating locations.

4.2.1.10d. Repair Quality Criteria.

Description: Establishes pavement repair criteria for various types of aircraft. Performs aircraft validation testing and computer simulations to determine if aircraft can operate safely from contingency base airfield pavements.

4.2.1.11. (CE11) Inadequate water purification, storage and distribution systems.

4.2.1.11a. Water Rapid Utility Repair Kit (RURK).

Description: Provides a deployable air base water utility system restoration kit to repair and quickly restore water service to personnel, fire fighting, and other essential functions and facilities during contingencies.

4.2.1.11b. Bare Base Study.

Description: See 4.2.1.

4.2.1.12. (CE12) Inadequate camouflage, concealment, and deception (CCD) capabilities.

4.2.1.12a. CCD Multispectral Camouflage Nets.

Description: Provide the user with a multispectral camouflage net using coatings and manufacturing techniques which are infrared (IR) absorbent and radar reflective. These nets will be capable of passively affecting the visual, IR and radio frequency (RF) spectrums yet have less bulk than traditional camouflage netting. These lightweight nets will also reduce past foreign object damage (FOD) potential and snagging problems inherent with the old style nets. STATUS: ORD - CAF 305-92-I-D. Program is partially funded.

4.2.1.12b. CCD Multispectral Ground Decoys (MSGD).

Description: The MSGD system is a family of decoys that duplicate the physical properties of real equipment. The project includes the F-15, F-16, and future generation aircraft; the R-12 refueler truck, and a wide variety of ground support equipment. STATUS: ORD - CAF 305-92-I-B. Program is scheduled for termination.

4.2.1.12c. Point Target Smoke Obscurant System (PTOS).

Description: A system of smoke pots dispensing visual and infrared masking smoke for high value point targets. System is remotely activated. STATUS: Program is partially funded.

4.2.1.12d. CCD Manual.

Description: A manual to guide base personnel on the installation and employment of CCD measures.

4.2.1.12e. Global Positioning System Jammer (GPS JAM), Validation.

Description: No operational capability exists to jam or neutralize the hostile use of GPS to guide manned aircraft, unmanned aerial vehicles, cruise missiles (including remotely piloted vehicles, and Tactical Ballistic Missiles (TBM). The precision delivery of these weapons will result in a quantum increase in their effectiveness and GPS will accomplish this goal. These threats also include chemical and biological weapons. The GPS JAM will provide a real-time capability to deny hostile users the ability to utilize GPS for navigation to and targeting of friendly facilities, personnel, and assets. It will be used by fixed locations/installations, bare base configurations, and forward operating locations.

4.2.1.12f. CCD Laser Warning/Defeat System, Development.

Description: The Laser Warning/Defeat (LW/D) system involves a close-in airbase defense system to counter current and future semi-active Laser Guided Weapons (LGWs) directed against high-value airbase assets.

4.2.1.13. (CE13) Inadequate contingency airfield support systems.

4.2.1.13a. Deployable Fire Protection System (DFPS).

Description: The new DFPS will be a trailer mounted system which will automatically detect a fire then discharge aqueous film forming foam (AFFF) agent through an oscillating turret. The system then sends an alarm to the fire station. STATUS: ORD - CAF 311-90-I-A. Program is funded.

4.2.1.13b. Emergency Airfield Lighting System (EALS).

Description: Provides deployable lighting requirements for a Minimum Operating Strips up to 10,000’. Contains edge lights, threshold/end lights, approach lights, approach strobes for both ends, distance-to-go marker lights, taxiway lights, two 30 KW generators, regulator, control panels and cabling.

4.2.1.13c. Mat Anchoring.

Description: Recommends appropriate anchoring system for the folded fiberglass mats on asphalt surfaces.

4.2.1.13d. Next Generation Mobile Aircraft Arresting System (MAAS).

Description: Provides an air transportable capability for arrested landings of large aircraft. The standard MAAS anchoring system provides a limited certified anchoring capability of 40,000 pound aircraft at 150 knots. The upgrade will provide two significant operational enhancements to current capabilities. The first will engage 65,000 pound aircraft at 180 knots, bi-directional landing and aborted take-off, commensurate to an expeditionary BAK-12. The second enhancement will install MAAS trailers at a distance sufficiently setback from the runway edges to provide clearance for wide body aircraft operations.

4.2.1.14. (CE14) Inadequate ability to conduct damage assessment and explosive ordnance reconnaissance (EOR).

4.2.1.14a. MK-26 Ferrous Ordnance Locator.

Description: See 4.2.1.7b

4.2.1.14b. MK-32 X-ray Machine.

Description: See 4.2.1.7

4.2.1.14c. Up-Armored Heavy HMMWV (EOD concept).

Description: Focuses on off-the-shelf technology and replaces the M113 and Peacekeeper AFVC to satisfy EOD, SP and CE requirements. Joint program with USA and USMC. Provides multi-role vehicle for USAF CE, EOD and ABGD Post Attack Reconnaissance and Recovery Operations and SP Convoy Escort, Nuclear Security, and Contingency Operations Roles.

STATUS: Program partially funded.

4.2.1.14d. Vallon ML 1620B Lightweight, Shallow Mine Detector.

Description: The ML 1620B is a lightweight, highly accurate and precise metal detector capable of locating metallic ordnance and plastic end items with minimum metal content at shallow depths (less than 10 feet). The ML 1620B will replace the Korean war vintage existing mine detector, NSN 6665-00-684-2659 that is currently in the field.

4.2.1.14e. Andros MK-VI Reduced Size Remote Controlled Vehicle.

Description: These robots will provide the capability to perform remote EOD neutralization, gather intelligence information on hazardous ordnance, and monitor situations where use of EOD personnel would prove life threatening (i.e., area denial/sensor fuzed ordnance, nuclear and chemical scenarios).

4.2.1.15. (CE15) Inadequate deployable waste management systems.

4.2.1.15a. Bare Base Study.

Description: See 4.2.1.3e

4.2.1.16. (CE16) Inadequate chem/bio agent decontamination ability.

4.2.1.16a. Aircraft Interior Decontamination.

Description: This project will provide a system for decontamination of aircraft interiors. The system developed will not degrade aerospace material and will be able to decon enroute as well as before/after cargo on-load/off load. STATUS: SON - 19 Sep 86, SORD - 28 Jun 89. Program unfunded.

4.2.1.16b. Avionics Decontamination System.

Description: This project will provide a non-aqueous equipment decontamination system (NAEDS) using a closed-loop solvent system. It will decontaminate avionics devices, electronics, communication equipment and optical sights.

4.2.1.17. (CE17) Inadequate radiation detection capability.

4.2.1.17a. Multifunction Radiac Equipment (MFR).

Description: Provides a single lightweight, multi-functional radiation detector to replace the five current types of detectors in AF inventory. This is a procurement of off-the-shelf equipment. The MFR will consist of a hand-held detector with internal beta and gamma sensors with the addition of alpha, beta/gamma, neutron, and X-ray probes to provide complete coverage of the nuclear radiation spectrum. STATUS: SON - 5 Jan 89. Program unfunded.

4.2.1.18. (CE18) Inadequate ability to rapidly harden facilities, aircraft parking and utility systems.

No solutions currently available.

4.2.1.19. (CE19) Inadequate chem/bio collective protection.

4.2.1.19a. Transportable Collective Protection Systems (TCPS).

Description: The TCPS is a toxic free shelter designed to protect up to 10 personnel in a chem/bio threat environment. The system has three configurations: Tent, Extendible, Modular, Personnel (TEMPER); Expandable Shelter/Container (ES/C); and Stand-Alone. STATUS: Unfunded.

4.2.2. Security Police. (Figure 4-2.) Only the top 10 were prioritized, with the understanding that not all solutions can be funded.

Figure 4-2. Security Police Deficiencies/Solutions Matrix

4.2.2.1. (SP1) Inability to safely transport personnel in response to ground threats.

4.2.2.1a. Up-Armored Heavy HMMWV (UA-HHV) (SP concept).

Description: Focuses on off-the-shelf technology and replaces the M113 and Peacekeeper AFVC to satisfy EOD, SP and CE requirements. Joint program with USA and USMC. Provides multi-role vehicle for USAF CE, EOD and ABGD Post Attack Reconnaissance and Recovery Operations and SP Convoy Escort, Nuclear Security, and Contingency Operations Roles.

STATUS: Program partially funded.

4.2.2.2. (SP2) Limited capability to defend against new/emerging ground-based threats.

4.2.2.2a. Near-Infrared Illuminators.

Description: Near-infrared laser diodes can be mounted with battery power supply on rifles to provide night illumination and target designation.

4.2.2.2b. Delay/Denial Technology.

Description: An "umbrella" program for new automated systems to enhance the delay and denial of intruders attempting unauthorized access to critical weapons systems. This includes both lethal and non-lethal denial systems for use in open areas as well as individual structures or resources.

4.2.2.2c. Counter Sniper/Counter Battery Systems

Description: Systems in development testing which can track bullets and other ordnance in flight and identify point of origin within hundredths of a second. Potential to tie this tracking capability to a lethal "shoot-back" mechanism.

4.2.2.3. (SP3) Limited capability to defeat new/emerging ground-base threats.

4.2.2.3a. Incapacitants.

Description: Canister that sprays substance called Oleoresin Capsicum which is a natural pepper substance. Substance causes irritation of eyes and some difficulty breathing. The system would have a set of sensors and computer logic to track and engage multiple targets.

4.2.2.3b. M-16 Upgrades.

Description: A project to upgrade the M-16, to M16A2 standards. Gives USAF security personnel an improved weapon (increased range, three-round burst capability) as well as ensures interoperability with sister services and NATO forces.

4.2.2.3c. Multi-Role Weapon System

Description: A man portable replacement for the 90 mm recoilless rifle with day/night anti-armour, anti-personnel, and hardened facility penetration capabilities.

4.2.2.3d. Counter Sniper/Counter Battery

Description: (See 4.2.2.2c)

4.2.2.4. (SP4) Limited ability to detect enemy forces.

4.2.2.4a. Tactical Automated Security System (TASS).

Description: The TASS will integrate sensors, data communications devices, enunciators, and imaging devices to create an automated entry control system for perimeter security.

4.2.2.4b. Near-Infrared Illuminators.

Description: See 4.2.2.2a

4.2.2.4c. Remotely Piloted Air/Ground Surveillance Systems.

Description: Limited developmental, off-the-shelf systems are currently being developed which would limit exposure of personnel to unknown threats by sending in a remote vehicle with video/audio/sensor capability. Joint program with USA and USMC.

4.2.2.4d. Advanced Entry Control System (AECS).

Description: Provides positive identification of an individual using biometric devices that will integrate with AECS to identify characteristics unique to an individual such as the iris, retina, or a hand/finger print. Joint interest program with Navy and USA

4.2.2.4e. Video Motion Detection.

Description: Exploring various video motion-detection technologies to enhance intrusion detection in open areas or to integrate with other intrusion detection systems like TASS.

4.2.2.4f. Counter Sniper/Counter Battery

Description: (See 4.2.2.2c)

4.2.2.5. (SP5) Inadequate body armor.

4.2.2.5a. Replacement tactical body armor

Description: New state-of-the art, commercial body armor to replace current flak vests.

4.2.2.5b. Energy Absorbing Composite Materials.

Description: Formulate, characterize and develop theory for high strength foams, concrete, soils, and composites to be used in protective structures.

4.2.2.6. (SP6) Limited joint tactical communications interoperability.

4.2.2.6a. ABO Radios (Scope Shield II).

Description: See 4.2.1.9a

4.2.2.6b. Speakeasy/Digital Burst.

Description: See 4.2.1.9b

4.2.2.6c. Laser Pocket Communicator.

Description: The communicator consists of a 9-volt battery powered communications pack which can be attached to the uniform. Communications is established by pointing a hand held laser wand in the direction of the receiver. The voice signal is encoded on the laser beam and picked up by the receiving unit.

4.2.2.7. (SP7) Inadequate Night Vision Equipment (NVE)/imagery systems.

4.2.2.7a. Night Eye System.

Description: The system consists of a telescope or telephoto lens mounted together with a night vision scope and an eye piece or camcorder. The pieces are mounted on a single rail which creates a rigid, lightly portable system. Supplemental illumination is provided by a laser illuminator which is attached to the side of the rail and boresighted to the telescope or telephoto lens.

4.2.2.8. (SP8) Current tactical communications inefficient to operate.

4.2.2.8a. ABO Radios (Scope Shield II).

Description: See 4.2.1.9a

4.2.2.8b. Speakeasy/Digital Burst.

Description: See 4.2.1.9b

4.2.2.9. (SP9) Inability to rapidly erect defensive fighting positions.

4.2.2.9a. Deployable Defensive Fighting Positions (DFPs).

Description: An effort to develop deployable, high strength/lightweight, modular DFPs for protection against small arms fire and grenades.

4.2.2.9b. Global Positioning System to Sight DFPs.

Description: Joint program interest (USA). Defense forces do not have the capability to accurately sight defensive fighting positions, plot target reference points for heavy weapons fire, land navigation, and sensor employment. COTS equipment available.

4.2.2.10. (SP10) Inadequate Point Air Defense (PAD) Capability.

4.2.2.10a. Multi-Role Weapon System.

Description: See 4.22.3d

4.2.2.10b. Terminal/Point Air Defense (Avenger).

Description: Provides the USAF a viable, organic, mobile, and highly lethal terminal/point air defense capability. It will provide USAF forces operating from forward airfield fixed and rotary wing aircraft, particularly before USA air defense assets can be deployed.

4.2.2.10c. Early Warning System for PAD System.

Description: Joint program initiative with USA and USMC. Procure NDI tactical early warning systems for integration with PAD systems. The system will be capable of acquiring and tracking targets. Additional benefits may be derived from this system to cover the inability to detect small radar cross-section objects.

4.2.2.10d. Transportable Short Range Autonomous Air Defense System.

Description: This short-range air defense system is easily transportable and can be deployed to remote locations to support special operations of expeditionary forces. The system consists of a small lightweight frequency agile bistatic FM/CW MMW phased array radar capability of scanning at 2400 deg/sec, an integral IFF, and a slewable tripod assembly holding four Stinger missiles.

4.2.2.10e. USMC Point Air Defense System (PADS).

Description: Procure the USMC Light Armored Vehicle-Air Defense (LAV-AD) system for protection of air bases against fixed and rotary wing aircraft.

4.2.2.11. (SP11) Limited ability to track friendly forces.

4.2.2.11a. Near-Infrared Illuminators.

Description: Near-infrared laser diodes mounted on rifles to provide night illumination and target designation.

4.2.2.11b. Fleet Tracking/Vehicle Locator System (GPS Based System).

Description: A proposed project to acquire and field a modified commercial fleet tracking system which will allow control centers to know the location of their vehicles through a GPS system.

4.2.2.12. (SP12) Inadequate training for base personnel in Air Base Defense (ABD).

4.2.2.12a. Fire Arms Training Simulator (FATS).

Description: System which provides realistic targeting and measurement of marksmanship while reducing the cost, hazards and environmental concerns of firing weapons and expending ammunition.

4.2.2.12b. CBO Training Program.

Description: A program to provide the combat skills needed in the CBO environment to all CBO forces, not just SP as the primary defenders. (AF Doctrine...every mobility component..."both operational and support should be designed with mobility and sustainment in mind and every unit member should be trained and equipped accordingly.

4.2.2.12c. Weapons Simulation Training Systems.

Description: See 4.2.2.12a

4.2.2.12d. Joint Security Modeling Capability.

Description: A computer based analytical tool to assist personnel responsible for planning and conducting security operations for Air Force assets.

4.2.3. Services. (Figure 4-5.) These solutions are in priority order.

Figure 4-5. Services Deficiencies/Solutions Matrix

 

4.2.3.1. (SV1) Field kitchen equipment labor intensive/inefficient/hazardous to operate.

4.2.3.1a. Initial Deployment Kitchen.

Description: Self-contained, deployable shelter facility. Provides capability to prepare/feed 500 meals twice/day for first 10 days of an operation. STATUS: MNS - CAF 316-92, ORD - CAF 316-92-I-A. Program fully funded.

4.2.3.2. (SV2) Field kitchen facilities labor intensive/inefficient to set up/maintain.

4.2.3.2a. Initial Deployment Kitchen.

Description: See 4.2.5.1a

4.2.3.3. (SV3) Inadequate capability to provide personal/organizational laundry.

4.2.3.3a. Deployable Laundry.

Description: Water-based and dry cleaning systems for personal and organizational laundry. STATUS: ORD - CAF 316-92-I-C. Program fully funded.

4.2.3.4. (SV4) Inadequate capability to process/store remains.

4.2.3.4a. Deployable Casualty Processing - COTS - No specific solutions identified.

4.2.3.5. (SV5) No capability to ship refrigerated/frozen items aboard aircraft.

4.2.3.5a. Deployable Container - COTS - No specific solutions identified.

4.2.3.6. (SV6) Inadequate capability to provide exchange services.

4.2.3.6a. Deployable Exchange Services - COTS - No specific solutions identified.

4.2.3.7. (SV7) Inadequate capability to provide flight/flightline meals.

4.2.3.7a. Deployable Flightline Meals System - COTS - No specific solutions identified.

4.2.3.8. (SV8) Limited ability to provide fitness/recreation facilities.

4.2.3.8a. Deployable Fitness/Recreation Facilities - COTS - No specific solutions identified.

4.2.4. Surgeon General. (Figure 4-4.) These solutions are in priority order.

Figure 4-4. Surgeon General Deficiencies/Solutions Matrix

 

4.2.4.1. (SG1) Inability to protect against/treat all known chem/bio agents.

No solutions identified.

4.2.4.2. (SG2) Inability to detect/identify/warn of NBC attack.

No solutions identified.

4.2.4.3. (SG3) Preventative care overwhelmed by Third World health conditions.

4.2.4.3a. Early involvement of PAM Team to bare base site. Field expedient testing systems are required to accomplish this. As yet, they have not been identified.

4.2.4.4. (SG4) Medical facilities (deployable) are airlift/labor intensive.

4.2.4.4a. See 4.2.1.3b New Family of Portable Shelters and 4.2.1.3d New Family of ECUs.

4.2.4.5. (SG5) Current medical facilities are vulnerable to NBC contamination.

4.2.4.5a. Chemically Hardened Air Transportable Hospital (CHATH) liners. Liners are either on order or being added to current inventory of ATHs. Provides a non-breathable/penetrable physical protective layer against chemical agents. Allows for the treatment of casualties absent the presence of harmful/mortal agents.

4.2.4.5b. Chemically Hardened Air Management Plant (CHAMP). Development is underway for a combined overpressured and environmentally controlled heating and air conditioning system for ATHs. When combined with the internal tentage liners, the ATH will be capable of operating in chemical environments. This apparatus will eliminate the need for current ECUs and reduce the airlift requirement of the ATH.

4.2.4.6. (SG6) Limited diagnostic equipment capability.

4.2.4.6a. Therapeutic lab equipment. COTS - No specific solutions identified..

4.2.4.7. (SG7) Limited capability to project specialty medical expertise forward.

4.2.4.7a. Telemedicine system. COTS - No specific solutions identified.

4.2.4.8. (SG8) Current anesthesia, and x-ray equipment is inadequate for deployed medical assemblages (ATHs).

4.2.4.8a. New anesthesia ventilator. COTS - No specific solutions identified.

4.2.4.8b. Modernized x-ray equipment-portable & fixed. COTS - No specific solutions identified.

4.2.4.8c. Field sterilizer unit. COTS - No specific solutions identified.

4.2.4.9. (SG9) Limited ability to prevent/mitigate environmental damage .

4.2.4.9a. Field incinerator. COTS - No specific solutions identified.

4.2.4.10. (SG10) Inadequate medical threat assessment.

No solutions identified.

4.2.4.11. (SG11) Limited clinical automation support.

No solutions identified.

4.2.4.12. (SG12) Inadequate patient tracking/reporting capability.

4.2.4.12a. Computer/software systems. COTS - No specific solutions identified.

4.2.4.12b. Local Area Network systems for ATHs. COTS - No specific solutions identified.

4.2.4.13. (SG13) Undefined contingency industrial surveillance program requirements.

4.2.4.13a. Development/implementation of Preventative Aerospace Medicine (PAM) Team. Specific requirements of team to be determined as team is currently forming into a Unit Type Code (UTC).

4.2.5. Communications. (Figure 4-3.) These solutions are in priority order.

Figure 4-3. Communications Deficiencies/Solutions Matrix

 

4.2.5.1. (SC1) Data networks vulnerable to intrusion/exploitation/disruption.

4.2.5.1a. Deployed Network Control Center (DNCC).

Description: The DNCC aggregates all CBO computer networks and provides centralized control. It also includes computer maintenance and operations personnel trained in defense of the network against these intrusions.

4.2.5.1b. Policy. USAF/SC is developing policy to put the Air Force in the center of information warfare. This includes new units that would not only provide defense against intrusion, but also offensive exploitation of the enemy’s systems.

4.2.5.2. (SC2) Inadequate ability to support secure voice requirements.

4.2.5.2a. Theater Deployable Communications (TDC).

Description: TDC uses standard commercial interfaces that support STU-III instruments. Customers deploy with STU-III’s, making the supply nearly limitless. Communications units would bring a small number of STU-III’s.

4.2.5.3. (SC3) Inability to provide PA services.

No specific solutions identified - COTS.

4.2.5.4. (SC4) Portable comm infrastructure is large/inflexible/fragile.

No specific solutions identified - COTS.

4.2.5.5. (SC5) Inability to Integrate Deployed Data Network.

4.2.5.5a. TDC--TDC provides a state-of-the-art data communications infrastructure, including routers, servers, and (where necessary) encryption. This allows the several data networks on a CBO to share information among them.

4.2.5.5b. DNCC--Central management of the base network maximizes reliability and provides customer support for individual network owners and users.

4.2.5.6. (SC6) Current deployable comm systems are airlift intensive.

4.2.5.6a. TDC--TDC is designed to be modular and lightweight. It will reduce airlift requirements by 25%. It will also reduce support requirements by 20%, further reducing the CBO total airlift requirement.

4.2.5.7. (SC7) Current information infrastructure setup is manpower/airlift intensive.

4.2.5.7a. TDC--By using smart multiplexing of different types of channels at the end user’s location, TDC allows vast reductions in the amount of cable in the base infrastructure. All the telephone and data channels destined for an area of the base converge onto a single cable.

4.2.5.8. (SC8) Limited interoperability with joint/coalition C4I systems.

4.2.5.8a. TDC--Commercial standards are incorporated into all parts of the TDC architecture. Furthermore, the modular design of TDC makes it flexible enough (by swapping or adding circuit cards) to adapt to many existing data and voice standards.

4.2.5.8b. Policy--Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA) is attempting to establish policy that would require new systems across all services to be interoperable with each other. The very different environments in which we operate.

4.2.5.9. (SC9) Software features inadequate for coalition releasability.

No solutions identified.

4.2.5.10. (SC10) Limited ability to counter EM interference.

No solutions identified.

4.3. Emerging Technologies In order to execute the programs described in this MAP, certain technology advances must be made. Specifics on required technology is located in the HQ ASC/XR Technical Investment Recommendation Report (TIRR). The following section lists emerging technologies that show potential for solving CBO deficiencies. For this year’s MAP, a very broad and general definition was used to categorize an effort as an emerging technology. The CBO MAT directed the TPIPT to list as an emerging technology any project that was not immediately available for product development.

4.3.1. Civil Engineer. (Figure 4-6a, and 4-6b.)

Figure 4-6a. Civil Engineer Emerging Technologies

Figure 4-6b. Civil Engineer Emerging Technologies (Cont’d)

 

4.3.1.1. Inadequate groundcrew individual protective equipment.

4.3.1.1a. Permeable Membranes.

Description: Technologies employed in chem/bio protective ensembles to provide layered protection against percutaneous agents.

4.3.1.1b. Body Cooling.

Description: Program will develop body cooling capability for incorporation into the chem/bio ensemble; reduced heat stress would be realized, thus allowing extended wear of suit while performing difficult tasks. Reduced heat stress would preclude sickness/injury to personnel while allowing longer wear of the suit.

4.3.1.2. Inadequate deployable shelter systems.

4.3.1.2a. Composite Materials for Deployable Structures.

Description: Investigates and evaluates structural composite materials that are low-cost and have a very high strength-to-weight ratio.

4.3.1.2b. Energy Absorbing Materials.

Description: Formulates, characterizes and develops theory for high strength foams, concrete, soils and composites to be used in protective structures. Identifies and characterizes materials to be used in anti-penetration layered systems, modular structures, airmobile systems and advanced buried facilities.

4.3.1.2c. Self-Erecting Mobile Shelters.

Description: The process for providing a useable shelter includes unloading, locating, unpacking, layout and erection with personnel involved in each process. This project investigates self erecting systems that could reduce the process to the unloading and locating functions with no personnel involved in unpacking, layout and erection except for process initiation.

4.3.1.2d. Stealth Shelters

Description: Investigates the application of stealth materials and geometrics from the aerospace arena for groundbased structures. The use of these technologies in an airmobile shelter could provide protection to bare base assets from a variety of threats. Bases with low visibility to multi-operational sensors will be the high payoff for investment.

4.3.1.2e. Structural Retrofit for Facility Hardening.

Description: Identifies materials, techniques, and processes for gluing high strength carbon and fiberglass laminates to the inner walls, beams, floor and ceiling joists of reinforced concrete or masonry block structures to double their load carrying capacity.

4.3.1.3. Inadequate biological agent detection capability.

4.3.1.3a. Deoxyribonucleic Acid (DNA) Assay Technology.

Description: This technology is similar to that of the antibody-antigen technology described in concept C-124. The DNA technology makes use of genetic material instead of the much larger organisms like bacteria and viruses. The sensor systems that use the antibody technology can, in general, be adapted readily to use DNA technology which would increase the selectivity of the overall system.

4.3.1.3b. Chem/bio Standoff Detection.

Description: An air-transportable, light detection and ranging system for chem/bio warfare agents. The Air Force needs to develop and procure an air-transportable stand-off detection system which will actively scan airspace surrounding AF operating locations for selected chem/bio agents. Moderate risk exists, relative to previous efforts in this technical area.

4.3.1.3c. Antigen-Antibody Immunoassay Technology.

Description: This can be best described as lock and key technology. A specific biological material will be developed to recognize and only react with a specific target biological material.

4.3.1.3d. Biological Agent Remote Detector.

Description: The objectives is to develop a biological detector capable of providing warning of the presence of biological warfare agents in the environment and remotely transmitting the analyzed results to command centers.

4.3.1.4. Inadequate chemical agent detection capability.

4.3.1.4a. Chem/bio Standoff Detection.

Description: See 4.3.1.3c

4.3.1.4b. Ion Mobility Spectroscopy (IMS).

Description: IMS technology is one of the primary focus for chemical vapor detection. The current generation of fielded equipment is based on this technology. The effort in this area is to enhance the sensitivity and selectivity, reduce the problem of interference, and to miniaturize the overall system. The approach is to combine IMS with other technologies like gas chromatography, new concepts in IMS cell design, and new ionization sources.

4.3.1.4c. Optical Spectroscopy.

Description: This technology is a catch-all phase that includes a wide range of programs. This technology is based on the use of light from the infrared region up through the visible and into the ultraviolet range. The programs involved uses a combination of both the active (lasers) and passive (detectors) forms of this technology. The primary focus in past years has been in the area of stand-off detection, light detection and ranging (LIDAR), active and passive IR, etc for chemical detection. In more recent years, the push has been in biological stand-off detection area with a spin-off potential for point detection.

4.3.1.4d. Surface Acoustic Wave Device.

Description: Microsensor technology with potential application as small, sensitive chemical vapor sensors. Basic operating principle is reversible adsorption of chemical vapors by adsorbent coatings that are sensitive to the vapor one is trying to detect. This technology is in parallel development with IMS technology to address the problem of chemical vapor detection. This concept impacts directly on concept C-133.

4.3.1.4e. Satellite, Airborne Platforms.

Description: This is part of Project Safeguard. It is the development of a passive IR system on a high flying platform for the detection of chemical agents. This program is considered to be a national asset.

4.3.1.4f. Mass Spectroscopy.

Description: The technology is based on a fingerprint style identification process that looks at the weight of the target material. The target material is fragmented in a controlled process. The fragmentation pattern is used to identify the target agent. This technology can readily identify chemical agents, but needs to be hardened and miniaturized for field use.

4.3.1.5. Inadequate portable generators and electric distribution.

4.3.1.5a. Bare Base Solar Power System

Description: This project will develop an advanced and efficient power supply using solar power to meet AF bare base energy needs. It will evaluate the use of solar cells roll technology in the design of a power generation unit. It will also evaluate the use of ultramicroelectrade technology in the design of high-power-density fuel cell and high-yield hydrogen reactor.

4.3.1.5b. Electromagnetic Energy Conversion

Description: This project will explore a conceptual design for a new generation of equipment to generate electrical power from solar radiation. The proposed technology has the potential to provide photoelectric energy conversion at much higher efficiencies than those currently available (~10% for quantum technology.)

4.3.1.5c. Superconductive Power

Description: This project will establish the feasibility of using advanced superconductive materials in the construction of large capacity power generators. Superconducting systems operate at near 100% electrical efficiency (minimal line losses), so superconducting materials offer the potential for dramatic reductions of size and weight for future generators.

4.3.1.5d. Magnetic Energy Storage.

Description: This project will develop a system to store electrical energy by using a magnetically suspended rotating disk. This system utilizes recent advances in high speed switching, electronic controls, and high strength composite structures, providing a system which can store energy for use in the electrical grid.

4.3.1.5e. Metal Oxide Fuel Cell.

Description: This project will validate the concept of fuel cells for bare base backup power applications. An analytical model will be developed incorporating the latest advancements in fuel cell technology. This model will then be used to evaluate and optimize the cell design.

4.3.1.6. Inadequate ability to safely locate and neutralize unexploded ordnance.

4.3.1.6a. Electronic Safe and Arm Fuze (ESAF) Render Safe Tool.

Description: A tool capable of rendering safe any electronic safe and arm fuze from a maximum stand-off distance from the unexploded ordnance, and provide the operator with a signal that the fuze has been rendered safe.

4.3.1.6b. Electronic Safe and Armed Fuzes (ESAF).

Description: The Detection Technology Program will transition into ESAF Program. The Objective of the program is to use passive circuit detection techniques developed within the detection technology program to access the electrical status of ESAFs.

4.3.1.6c. EX 3 Mod 0 Remote Ordnance Neutralization System (RONS).

Description: Remote controlled system that provides EOD technicians the means to secure unexploded ordnance, attach a render safe procedure (RSP) device/tool, and withdraw to a safe area and fire/function the tool. The system will safely separate the EOD operator from hazardous sites where explosive, chemical, and radiation hazards are present.

4.3.1.6d. Full Lightweight Protective Armor Material.

Description: To develop a more efficient lightweight and flexible bomb suit to protect EOD personnel during emergency response operations involving improvised explosive devices, hazardous explosive compounds and substances, or unsafe munitions/ordnance.

4.3.1.6e. High Velocity Shaped Charge.

Description: Design and develop a precision high velocity shaped charge that will explosively accelerate a metallic projectile to high velocity for performance of RSPs.

4.3.1.6f. Imaging Ordnance Locator.

Description: Develop an improved ground penetrating radar to increase detection depth and resolution, provide discrimination between ordnance and other buried objects, and make the system man-portable.

4.3.1.6g. Lightweight Disposable Disrupter.

Description: Provides the EOD technician with neutralization capability in a highly contaminated, modern UXO environment.

4.3.1.6h. Main Charge Disrupter .

Description: A tool that would allow speedy entry, tool setup, and withdrawal in a minimum amount of time would be a valuable option in the scenarios where fuze attack is precluded. It should render safe UXO by attacking the main charge explosive.

4.3.1.6i. Millimeter Wave Radar Probe.

Description: Develop a portable device to determine the nature of the explosive electronic circuitry (e.g., timer, receiver) by analyzing the modulation imparted on the radar return by the circuitry.

4.3.1.6j. Sensor Defeat Tools.

Description: Develop technologies to shield an EOD technician from a motion detection sensor threat. One technology will shield the technician from microwave energy and allow the technician to maneuver through a protected area. Another technology will mask the technician's thermal energy, but allow background energy to be received; processed, and transmitted so it is not blocked by the technician's movements throughout a protected area.

4.3.1.6k. Serpentine Manipulator.

Description: Develop a serpentine manipulator for the examination, identification, and counter measure of area denial of explosive devices.

4.3.1.6l. Advanced Ordnance Locator.

Description: A method for detecting non-magnetic ordnance located on the surface, sub-surface, or underwater and determine depth, size and shape of the ordnance.

4.3.1.6m. Automated Ferrous Locator.

Description: Develop a small, man-portable ferrous ordnance locator that combines three technologies. These are the detection of ferrous magnetic signatures in soil; computer data storage; and position coordinate locator.

4.3.1.6n. Alternate Explosives Development.

Description: Replace the conventional demolition high explosives currently used by EOD personnel in the performance of their duties both domestically and when deployed. Replacements should include insensitive high explosives, alternatives to current initiators/detonators, and improved packaging and storage capability.

4.3.1.6o. Basic UXO Gathering System (BUGS).

Description: The BUGS consists of : (1) a semiautonomous sensor platform to detect and locate UXO to within a several meters square area; and (2) several smaller, expendable BUGS which receive initial general location information from the sensor platform, autonomously proceed to the search area, find the UXO and perform the desired mission.

4.3.1.7. Inadequate methods of assessing force beddown and survivability requirements for contingency base operations.

4.3.1.7a. CCD Simulation and Analysis Control System (SACS).

Description: A laptop computer based CCD simulation system will allow a CCD planner to characterize the airbase in visual, IR and radar spectra with various CCD treatments. This simulation will allow the planner to select the best mix of CCD treatments for the optimum survivability of any particular base.

4.3.1.7b. Chem/bio Warfare Effects Modeling.

Description: The objectives of this technology effect is to develop new or enhance existing models for chem/bio agent detection, diffusion, deposition, evaporation and decay.

4.3.1.8. Inadequate civil engineer communication and automation systems.

4.3.1.8a. Joint Warning & Reporting System (JWARS).

Description: Integration of the ALAD/M8A1 and the WCCS system into a system which will automatically compute and transmit warning information.

4.3.1.9. Inadequate contingency base pavement evaluation, repair and replacement capability.

4.3.1.9a. Transportable Lightweight Matting for Aircraft Parking.

Description: Transportable surfaces technology is an out year (FY 98) program to develop advanced technology to transport operating surfaces to remote forward operating locations in the form of lightweight structural mats installed over repairs or over stabilized materials. This effort will examine existing and developing technologies for their possible applicability to portable airfields. Advanced composite materials will be considered as part of the proposed solution.

4.3.1.9b. Rapid Pavement Creation Capability.

Description: This FY95 new start project will develop conceptual designs to utilize new thermal stabilization technologies to rapidly stabilize existing on-site materials. The project will demonstrate the feasibility of extending discrete plasma arc technology into a continuous penetration thermal soil stabilization device. Successful adaptation of this technology will provide the capability to rapidly make additional aircraft parking and other pavement surfaces during peacetime, contingency operations, and wartime using existing on-site materials.

4.3.1.9c. Smart Materials for Pavement Repair.

Description: This project will develop repair concepts using new and emerging "smart" materials that adapt their properties to the pavement loading and environmental conditions. Candidate materials will be identified and tested in the laboratory, and performance prediction models will be formulated on the basis of the materials’ properties.

4.3.1.10. Inadequate water purification, storage and distribution systems.

4.3.1.10a. Next Generation Bare Base Water System.

Description: This project will develop a new lightweight water purification process, pump, storage, and distribution systems for Bare Base use.

4.3.1.11. Inadequate camouflage, concealment, and deception (CCD) capabilities.

4.3.1.11a. CCD Ground Jammer.

Description: This project addresses contingency base operations mission area plan deficiencies, limited capability to defend/defeat against new/emerging ground-based threats, limited capability to detect/identify/warn of chem/bio agents, inadequate PAD capability, inability to safely remove UXOs from aircraft operating surfaces, limited capability to expediently harden facilities and utilities against conventional threats, limited capability to deceive enemy, and limited ability to rapidly repair operations surfaces.

4.3.1.11b. CCD Multispectral Materials.

Description: Classified program in the deception area. Details available on strict need-to-know basis at ASC/VXO-CCD.

4.3.1.12. Inadequate contingency airfield support systems.

No emerging technologies identified.

4.3.1.13. Inadequate ability to conduct damage assessment and explosive ordnance reconnaissance (EOR).

4.3.1.13a. Advanced Ordnance Locator.

Description: A method for detecting non-magnetic ordnance located on the surface, sub-surface, or underwater and determine depth, size and shape of the ordnance.

4.3.1.13b. Advanced Radiographic System.

Description: The ARS is an NDI, 2-person portable, field-worthy, filmless radiographic system utilizing the x-ray generator from the present MK 32 Mod 0/1 Tool Set (X-ray), electronic imaging, and computerized image enhancement and storage. It will also be capable of image transmission from the field control unit to a data base/expert center via phone line.

4.3.1.13c. Automated Image Recognition & Ordnance Identification.

Description: Develop a fast, reliable, and continuously updated means of ordnance identification using remote or stand-off methods. Automated image recognition will provide a method of ordnance identification using robot based or telescopic stand-off still video. An identification system that uses an off site centralized database could be updated as rapidly as technical intelligence information is analyzed and could also provide a temporary repository for incoming intelligence data that could be easily updated as a new ordnance item is encountered by other teams.

4.3.1.13d. Electronic Safe and Armed Fuzes (ESAF).

Description: The Detection Technology Program will Transition into an ESAF program. The objective of the program is to use passive circuit detection techniques developed within the detection technology program to access the electrical status of ESAFs.

4.3.1.13e. Hands-Free Video/Light System.

Description: Develop head-mounted, video and lighting systems for use by EOD teams on land and underwater during ordnance inspections and RSPs and provide real-time transmission of the video signal upgrade.

4.3.1.13f. Imaging Ordnance Locator.

Description: Develop an improved ground penetrating radar to increase detection depth and resolution, provide discrimination between ordnance and other buried objects, and make the system man-portable.

4.3.1.13g. Improved EOD X-ray.

Description: Develop a small, lightweight, man-portable EOD x-ray capable of 4" x 5" cassette developing as well as the standard 8" x 10" cassette, and designed to operate in any surface environment.

4.3.1.13h. Infrared Goggles.

Description: Demonstrate a new generation night vision goggle for use by EOD teams during operations involving booby-trap clearance/avoidance and explosive device entry, to make visible slight temperature differences emitted from a wide variety of sources.

4.3.1.13i. Millimeter Wave Radar Probe.

Description: Develop a portable device to determine the nature of the explosive electronic circuitry (e.g., timer, receiver) by analyzing the modulation imparted on the radar return by the circuitry.

4.3.1.13j. Remote Controlled Reconnaissance Monitor (RECORM).

Description: Light weight, remote controlled vehicle used to search for, locate, identify, and monitor UXO/IEDs in extremely hazardous areas from a stand-off location up to 650 meters.

4.3.1.13k. Serpentine Manipulator.

Description: Develop a serpentine manipulator for the examination, identification, and counter measure of area denial of explosive devices.

4.3.1.13l. Universal Remote Measuring.

Description: Develop a remotely controlled vehicle mounted measuring system for determining the dimensions of unidentified ordnance items, using a laser or ultrasonic range finder with a video link/camera on a robotic arm.

4.3.1.13m. V2 Computer Enhancement.

Description: Develop an enhanced version of the V2 computer which will be capable of electronically transmitting digital imagery, accurately mapping impacts on firing ranges, and supporting the CD-ROM version of the 60-series publications.

4.3.1.14. Inadequate deployable waste management systems.

4.3.1.14a. Next Generation Bare Base Waste Processing System.

Description: This project will develop new Bare Base waste storage, treatment and disposal methods. It will qualify and quantify contingency base waste process and products; evaluate waste storage, treatment, and disposal technologies

4.3.1.15. Inadequate chem/bio agent decontamination ability.

4.3.1.15a. Electronic Parts Cleaning System.

Description: In the last few years, since the freon ban, a number of systems have been developed and are being marketed for use in the electronics industry as electronic parts cleaners. These systems have the potential to be chemical agent decontamination systems for electronic parts like avionics packages. These systems need to be evaluated for this function.

4.3.1.15b. High Energy Photo Ionization/Thermal Degradation System.

Description: Recent advances in the production of high energy/high flux density ultra-violet lights have rekindled the potential for using flashlamps as a decontamination system. These new lamps have been used commercially to remove lead contaminated paints. This new technology needs to be evaluated for the potential to decontaminate liquid and adsorbed chemical agents on surfaces.

4.3.1.15c. New Sorbent Materials.

Description: These are the next generation of materials that have the ability to adsorb chemical agents. These materials will be enhanced for increased capacity, to be reactive, and should be low cost.

4.3.1.15d. Surfactant Enhanced Aqueous System.

Description: These systems are basically detergent systems. The problem in using a water based system for decontamination is that the typical chemical agent does not readily dissolve or go into water. The chemical agents behave like oil. These new formulations behave like soap and are environmentally safe thus have the potential as a decontamination system.

4.3.1.16. Inadequate ability to rapidly harden facilities, aircraft parking and utility systems.

4.3.1.16a. Energy Absorbing Materials.

Description: Formulates, characterizes and develops theory for high strength foams, concrete, soils and composites to be used in protective structures. Identifies and characterizes materials to be used in anti-penetration layered systems, modular structures, airmobile systems and buried facilities.

4.3.1.16b. Expedient Underground Storage for POL and Munitions

Description: Investigates the feasibility and technology development of a method to excavate or explosively form cavities below ground to store POL.

4.3.1.16c. Structural Retrofit for Facility Hardening.

Description: Identifies materials, techniques, and processes for gluing high strength carbon and fiberglass laminates to the inner walls, beams, floor and ceiling joists of reinforced concrete or masonry block structures to double their load carrying capacity.

4.3.1.17. Inadequate chem/bio collective protection.

4.3.1.17a. Pressure Swing Adsorption.

Description: PSA is a chemical filtration, which will be evaluated as an alternative to carbon bed filtration. It consists of two adsorption beds, one on-stream at pressure and the other off-stream being regenerated. The regeneration of the contaminated adsorbent is accomplished by relatively frequent purging with purified air.

4.3.1.17b. Regenerable Filtration Systems.

Description: This project will investigate the absorption of gases on sieve bed material and then flush the adsorption beds with purified gases.

4.3.1.17c. Temperature Swing Adsorption.

Description: TSA is a chemical filtration technology which could play a role in providing regenerative filtration for collective protection systems. It is similar to PSA, except that TSA uses high temperature as the driving force vice high pressure in PSA.

4.3.2. Security Police. (Figure 4-7

Figure 4-7. Security Police Emerging Technologies

 

4.3.2.1. Inability to safely transport personnel in response to ground threats.

No emerging technology identified.

4.3.2.2. Limited capability to defend against new/emerging ground-based threats.

4.3.2.2a. 21st Century Soldier

Description: Increased battlefield awareness, enhancement target detection, night vision, integration with other weapon systems, identification friend or foe, GPS aided location and navigation, imagery shared between soldiers and higher echelons. Adaptability tailorable to specific mission needs accomplished by modularity. Includes signature suppression, quiet microclimate cooler, and map display capability on headgear. Lethality increased through interface with thermal weapon sight.

4.3.2.3. Limited capability to defeat new/emerging ground-base threats.

4.3.2.3a. Microwave.

Description: Weaponized radiation is directed energy designed to repel, incapacitate or render aggressors ineffective. Microwave energy can produce a full range of effects from mild annoyance to severe impact on the ability of a human to function normally. Some energy, including near infrasound, audible, and ultrasound, can produce effects ranging from lack of concentration to severe illness.

4.3.2.3b. 21st Century Soldier.

Description: See 4.3.2.2c

4.3.2.4. Limited ability to detect enemy forces.

4.3.2.4a. Night Eye System.

Description: The system consists of a telescope or telephoto lens mounted together with a night vision scope and an eye piece or camcorder. The pieces are mounted on a single rail which creates a rigid, lightly portable system. Supplemental illumination is provided by a laser illuminator which is attached to the side of the rail and boresighted to the telescope or telephoto lens.

4.3.2.4b. Spectral Sensors.

Description: This project includes sensors in the ultraviolet through long range infrared (LRIR) for stationary mounts, UAVs and space platforms.

4.3.2.5. Inadequate body armor.

4.3.2.5a. 21st Century Soldier

Description: See 4.3.2.2c

4.3.2.6. Inadequate Night Vision Equipment (NVE)/imagery systems.

4.3.2.6a. Night Fighting Surveillance/Assessment System.

Description: Current night vision/imagery systems are ineffective during inclement weather. We require improved night vision/imagery equipment which is easily maintained, cost effective and capable of detecting ground/air threats during inclement weather/reduced visibility conditions.

4.3.2.6b. 21st Century Soldier

Description: See 4.3.2.2c

4.3.2.7. Inability to rapidly erect defensive fighting positions.

4.3.2.7a. 21st Century Soldier

Description: See 4.3.2.2c

4.3.2.8. Inadequate Point Air Defense (PAD) Capability.

4.3.2.8a. Shortstop Program.

Description: A man-portable or vehicle mounted radio frequency device that causes artillery, mortar, or aerial dropped altimeter proximity fuse munitions to explode prior to reaching the set altitude of explosion.

4.3.2.8b. HAMR.

Description: A joint Army & AF effort that integrates AMRAAM into the Hawk air defense system of ground to air missiles.

4.3.2.9. Limited ability to track friendly forces.

4.3.2.9a. 21st Century Soldier

Description: See 4.3.2.2c

4.3.2.10. Inadequate training for base personnel in Air Base Defense (ABD).

4.3.2.10a. Holograms.

Description: Improved training environment which simulates realistic situations by providing 3-D images, movement and features that make the trainee feel that he/she has been projected directly into the scenario.

4.3.3. Services. (Note: There are no Emerging Technologies applied to this area at this time. The new CBO concept concentrated on Services solutions for the development of this year’s MAP.

4.3.4. Surgeon General. (Note: There are no Emerging Technologies applied to this area at this time. The new CBO concept concentrated on Surgeon General solutions for the development of this year’s MAP.

4.3.5. Communications. (Note: There are no Emerging Technologies applied to this area at this time. The new CBO concept concentrated on Communications solutions for the development of this year’s MAP.

5. Post-Investment Assessment. (Figure 5-1) Section 3 provides the current assessment for the three CBO operational tasks in the near term. This assessment provides a status of CBO capability for both the mid (FY02-FY12) and far (FY13-FY20) terms. This assessment assumes appropriate funding levels and technological advances necessary to implement the majority of solutions and emerging technologies described in this document.

5.1. Provide:

Mid: Yellow: Due to continued quantity and quality deficiencies in Bare Base assets, CBO will be stressed to provide 100% of the required capability for a two MRC scenario. Reliance on obsolete, 1960’s technology equipment that is airlift intensive, difficult to erect, and sustain, prevents a Green rating for all functional areas. Specific examples include obsolete power generators, shelters, and deployable kitchens. The security police need upgraded perimeter security equipment to ensure base assets are protected on a routine basis. Off-the-shelf equipment and projected development of new families of bare base equipment will correct most deficiencies. However, due to funding constraints not all functional areas will realize full force modernization or quantity increases.

Far: Green: Assuming a steady flow of funding at a moderate level, all CBO functional areas should realize significant force modernization.

5.2. Defend:

Mid: Yellow: Absence of technologies and full funding continue to prevent higher ratings. For CE, projected technological advances will not result in the necessary equipment to provide a real-time, stand-off chem/bio detection capability. SPs will continue to lack the means to counter all ground/air threats. If adequately funded, the Up-Armored HWWMV, next generation detection equipment, and a new family of ABGD weaponry will push the SPs to a green rating. For the SG to improve to green, technology must provide safe and effective vaccines against chem/bio agents. Communications must develop data networks that are invulnerable to intrusion/exploitation. Most deficiencies can be corrected with projected OTS and equipment development. However, projected funding levels will prevent full force modernization. CBO functional areas will continue to rely on obsolete equipment to defend contingency air bases resulting in an overall yellow rating.

Far: Green: Only in the out years will technology appear that provides the required advances in chem/bio detection capabilities. Assuming moderate funding streams, functional areas should realize adequate force modernization boosting all areas to green.

 

Figure 5-1. Post Investment Assessment

 

5.3. Recover:

Mid: Yellow: For CE, technology does not allow an acceptable method of chem/bio decontamination that is not inherently hazardous and corrosive. Due to inadequate funding, existing technology cannot be developed to safely dispose of UXOs. Projected funding also prevents the SG community from using COTS and medical equipment developments to provide advanced tele-medicine and treatment facilities.

Far: Green: In the out years, technology should provide the advances necessary to develop adequate chem/bio decontamination methods. Assuming moderate funding streams, COTS and equipment development will all the entire CBO community to solve deficiencies and establish a green rating.

6. Summary.

6.1. A tremendous amount of foresight and hard work from many people resulted in the creation of the new Contingency Base Operations mission area. The publication of this MAP continues the shift from an Air Base Operability/Warsaw Pact scenario to a Contingency Base Operations/Power Projection strategy. Incorporating the major ACC functional areas necessary to provide, defend and recover any type of contingency operating location, for any employment scenario ensures we have the appropriate systems approach to accomplish the mission.

6.1.1. To fully understand what we "need" to accomplish the mission, the CBO functional areas conducted a MAA (strategy-to-task) and MNA (task-to-need) to identify the deficiencies CBO will face in the next 25 years. The ABS TPIPT provided proposed solution concepts to solve these deficiencies.

6.1.2. The CBO MAT prioritized deficiencies and solutions by functional area. We intend to move to a consolidated CBO priority list for the next MAP, and Development Plan. The challenge is to manage a step-by-step process to implement these solutions:

1) Each CBO functional area must identify the solutions and emerging technologies they deem appropriate to solve their deficiencies.

2) The ABS TPIPT must provide a comprehensive input to AFMC/ST to ensure our labs receive appropriate funding for emerging technology research and development.

3) Each functional area must submit a realistic FY98 POM request and obtain funding for their desired programs.

4) Each functional area must prepare the appropriate requirements documents (MNS/ORD) to obtain project approval.

5) Each functional area must become involved in the RD&A process from document approval to SPO development to product fielding.

6.1.3. In a general sense, we request that commercial industries interested in providing solutions to CBO deficiencies become more involved in the MAP process.

6.1.4. The ABS TPIPT must continue to reach out to all functional area supporting agencies, TPIPTs and labs to provide a coordinated development plan.

6.1.5. And finally, the CBO functional areas must continue to stress "Fighting the Base as a Weapon System" approach and consolidated efforts will result in the successful fielding of solutions to solve CBO deficiencies.

Glossary

A

ABD

Air Base Defense

ABGD

Air Base Ground Defense

ABS

Air Base Systems

ABO

Air Base Operability

ACC

Air Combat Command

AECS

Advanced Entry Control System

AFDD

Air Force Defense Doctrine

AFFF

Aqueous Film Forming Foam

AFI

Air Force Instruction

AFM

Air Force Manual

AIDECON

Aircraft Interior Decontamination

AMRAAM

Advanced Medium Range Air to Air Missile

ARMRV

Armored Multi-Role Vehicle

ARS

Advanced Radiographic System

ATH

Air Transportable Hospital

 

C

C2

Command and Control

C4I

Comand, Control, Communications, Computers, and Intelligence

CAF

Combat Air Forces

CB

Chem/bio

CBO

Contingency Base Operations

CCD

Camouflage, Concealment, and Deception

CE

Civil Engineer

CFRS

Contingency Fuel Recovery System

CHATH

Chemically/Biologically Hardened Air Transportable Hospital

CINC

Commander in Chief

CONOPS

Concept of Operations

CONUS

Continental United States

COTS

Commercial Off-the-Shelf

 

D

DFP

Defensive Fighting Positions

DFPS

Deployable Field Pavement System

DISA

Defense Information Systems Agency

DNCC

Deployed Network Control Center

DP

Development Plan

DRPS

Deployable Pavement Repair System

 

E

EALS

Emergency Airfield Lighting System

ECU

Environmental Control Unit

EM

Electromagnetic

EOD

Explosive Ordnance Disposal

ES/C

Expandable Shelter/Container

ESAF

Electronic Safe and Armed Fuzes

 

F

FAP

Functional Area Plan

FDECU

Field Deployable Environmental Control Unit

FOD

Foreign Object Damage

FOL

Forward Operating Location

FYDP

Future Year Defense Plan

 

G

GC

Gas Chromatography

GPS

Global Positioning System

GPSJ

Global Positioning System Jammer

 

H

HF

High Frequency

HMMWV

High Mobility Multi-Wheeled Vehicle

HVAC

Heating Ventilating and Air Conditioning

 

I

IDK

Initial Deployment Kitchen

IED

Improvised Explosive Devices

IFF

Identification Friend or Foe

IMS

Ion Mobility Spectroscopy

IPE

Individual Protective Equipment

IPT

Integrated Product Team

IR

Infrared

 

J

JCS

Joint Chiefs of Staff

JSLIST

Joint Studies List

JWARS

Joint Warning And Reporting System

L

LAV-AD

Light Armored Vehicle - Air Defense

LGW

Laser Guided Weapon

LGW

Laser Guided Weapon

LIDD

Lightweight Disposable Disrupter

LRIR

Long Range Infrared

LW/D

Laser Warning/Defeat

 

M

MAA

Mission Area Assessment

MAAS

Mobile Aircraft Arresting System

MAJCOM

Major Command

MANPAD

Manned Point Air Defense

MAP

Mission Area Plan

MCD

Main Charge Disrupter

MFR

Multi-Function Radiation

MNA

Mission Needs Analysis

MNS

Mission Needs Statement

MOB

Main Operating Base

MOB

Main Operating Base

MODS

Mobile Ordnance Disrupter System

MOOTW

Military Operations Other-Than-War

MOS

Minimum Operating Strip

MRC

Major Regional Conflict

MSGD

Multispectral Ground Decoys

MTF

Medical Treatment Facility

 

N

NAEDS

Non-Aqueous Equipment Decontamination System

NBC

Nuclear, Biological, Chemical

NDI

Non-Developmental Irem

NSN

National Stock Number

NVE

Night Vision Equipment

 

 

O

OPCON

Operational Concept

ORD

Operational Requirements Document

OTS

Off the Shelf

 

P

PA

Public Address

PAD

Point Air Defense

PAM

Preventive Aerospace Medicine

POC

Point of Contact

POL

Petrolium, Oil, Lubricants

POM

Program Objective Memorandum

PREPO

Propositioning

PSA

Pressure Swing Absorption

PTOS

Point Target Smoke Obscurant System

R

R&D

Research and Development

RAM

Rocket, Artillery, Mortar

RCFD

Remote Controlled Firing Device

RDT&E

Research, Development, Test and Evaluation

RECORM

Remote Controlled Reconnaissance Monitor

RF

Radio Frequency

RONS

Remote Ordnance Neutralization System

RORS

Rapid Ordnance Removal System

RQC

Repair Quality Criteria

RSP

Render Safe Procedures

RSRCV

Reduced Size Remote Controlled Vehicle

RURK

Rapid Utility Repair Kit

 

S

SACMS

Small Arms Common Module Sight System

SATCOM

Satellite Communication

SAW

Surface Acoustic Wave

SC

Communications

SCBA

Self Contained Breathing Apparatus

SG

Surgeon General

SON

Statement of Need

SORD

System Operational Requirements Document

SP

Security Police

SPO

Systems Program Office

STT

Strategy-to-Task

STU

Secure Telephone Unit

SV

Services

 

T

TBM

Tactical Ballistic Missiles

TCPS

Transportable Collective Protection Systems

TDC

Theater Deployable Communications

TEMPER

Tent, Extendible, Modular, Personnel

TIRR

Technical Investment Recommendation Report

TNN

Task-to-Need

TPFDL

Time Phase Force Deployment List

TPIPT

Technology Planning Integrated Product Teams

TSA

Temperature Swing Absorption

TTN

Task-To-Need

 

U

UA-HHV

Up-Armored Heavy HMMWV

UAV

Unmanned Aerial Vehicle

UTC

Unit Type Code

UXO

Unexploded Ordnance

W

WMD

Weapons of Mass Destruction