[Mission Area Plans]

(U) This Mission Area Plan pertains to weapon systems specifically designed to perform the theater airlift mission--the C-130 and C-27. It does not address all systems that occasionally may perform theater airlift on a limited basis, such as the C-17 or C-141. It describes mission area deficiencies and a corrective investment strategy using the strategy to task process.

(U) The mission of the C-130 is to provide rapid transportation of personnel or cargo for delivery by parachute to a designated drop zone, or by landing at austere locations within the theater of operations. The C-130 provides long range, day or night capability that is degraded in most threat environments. Adverse Weather Aerial Delivery System (AWADS)-equipped

C-130s have the additional capability of performing airdrops without external assistance in inclement weather. It can be used as a tactical transport and can be readily converted for aeromedical evacuation or aerial delivery missions. The C-130 can land and take off on short runways, and it can be used on landing strips such as those usually found in advance base operations. It is a highly versatile weapons system with many specialized variations.

(U) The C-27A is a twin-engine turboprop aircraft which provides all weather airland and a limited Visual Meteorological Conditions (VMC) airdrop capability with a shorter range and smaller payload than the C-130. Its capabilities are degraded in some threat environments. The C-27 was designed to deliver conventional combat equipment/troops into austere airfields and onto marked or unmarked assault zones with shorter runways than the C-130 requires. It can be used as a tactical transport and can be readily converted for aeromedical evacuation or aerial delivery missions.

-- (U) Maintain current operations tempo, frequency of humanitarian missions, and two major regional contingency taskings

-- (U) Execute tasking during both peace and war, hostile or non-hostile environments, in visual or adverse weather conditions

-- (U) Sustain force’s readiness to deploy to theater of operations.

-- (U) Combat delivery of personnel, equipment, and material (hostile environment).

-- (U) Transport personnel, equipment, and material into the theater.

-- (U) Transport personnel, equipment, and material within the theater (non-hostile environment).

-- (U) Disrupt enemy political base.

-- (U) Sustain forces and operations tempo within the theater of operations

-- (U) Establish/sustain contingency operating locations.

-- (U) Airland movement of personnel, equipment, and material. Purpose is power projection or force sustainment.

-- (U) Airdrop of personnel, equipment, and material. Purpose is power projection or force sustainment.

-- (U) Train mission ready personnel. Provide adequate personnel, equipment, airspace, and exercises to train mission ready personnel. Includes joint and combined operations, and exercises periodically conducted with allied nations.

-- (U) Reduce operations and support (O&S) costs and sustain efficient full spectrum operations. Enhance readiness and maintain a robust force by reducing O&S costs and balancing force readiness, support, and modernization requirements through the application of various programs, policies, and methods. Included but not limited to Weapon System Cost Reductions related initiatives and actions to reduce weapon system and support costs.

-- (U) Conduct aeromedical evacuation operations. Movement of casualties by air transportation under the supervision of qualified aeromedical evacuation crew members to/between medical treatment facilities.

-- (U) Support psychological operations. Support of operations targeted against the minds of the enemy civilian population and combat forces. Speaker operations and leaflet airdrops can be used to influence and demoralize hostile forces prior to and during offensive operations.

-- (U) Conduct aerial firefighting operations. Suppression and containment of forest fires or chemical fires via airdrop of extinguishing agents onto the fire.

-- (U) Conduct aerial spray operations. Aerial dispersal of disinfectant or insecticide for purposes of disease or pest control. Other chemicals may be dispersed through this system for wide area coverage.

-- (U) Lack of adequate detection and defensive systems.

-- (U) Dependence upon limited supply of material handling equipment (MHE).

-- (U) Specific theater combat delivery tasks are not fully articulated.

-- (U) Limited capability for protection and decontamination of aircraft, cargo, and cargo compartment.

-- (U) Manning shortfalls in key areas limit mission accomplishment.

-- (U) Lack of sufficient capability to operate in a low light, low visibility environment.

-- (U) Dependence on reduced enroute/theater support, which limits mission flexibility.

-- (U) Simulation capabilities do not provide adequate mission training.

-- (U) Lack of commonality/interoperability in configuration and maintenance, which increases training cost and time.

-- (U) Limited ability to detect NBC threats.

-- (U) Aircraft cockpit architecture and design restrict aircrew effectiveness.

-- (U) Mission planning systems lack flexibility, efficiency, user friendliness, or DoD interoperability.

-- (U) Combat control teams (CCTs) lack sufficient equipment for mission accomplishment.

-- (U) Training capabilities for aircrew and maintainers are inadequate.

-- (U) Lack of configuration control and commonality limits forces’ flexibility.

-- (U) Lack of an effective CONOPS for an NBC environment.

-- (U) Aircraft cannot carry all the Army equipment required to be airlifted within the theater.

-- (U) Forces are limited in their ability to precision airdrop.

-- (U) Aircraft lack database and charts for worldwide mission planning and execution.

-- (U) Combat delivery flight management systems are a limiting factor in mission accomplishment.

-- (U) Forces lack the capability to plan and operate in a laser environment.

-- (U) Campaign modeling tools do not exist to identify combat delivery shortfalls and impacts on warfighting effectiveness.

-- (U) Subsystem sustainability is becoming cost prohibitive.

-- (U) Aircraft lack expansion capability to comply with planned ICAO/FAA air traffic control system modernization.

-- (U) Cargo restraint devices are bulky/heavy and time-consuming to use.

-- (U) Aircraft lack combat identification capability.

-- (U) Required weather information is not quickly disseminated to deployed theater airlift assets.

-- (U) Forces lack electronic technical orders, causing added cost for paper manuals and wasted man-hours updating manuals.

-- (U) Aircraft lack access to real time and threat order of battle information to aid in avoidance.

-- (U) Multiple C-130 configurations increase complexity and cost of logistics for combat delivery forces.

-- (U) Economic service life of combat delivery aircraft, including effects of structural corrosion, is unknown.

-- (U) Forces lack autonomous precision approach capability in austere environments.

-- (U) Aircraft do not offer adequate passenger emergency life support protection.

-- (U) Aircraft lack collision avoidance capability in areas without radar coverage.

-- (U) Aircraft security and protection capabilities at deployed locations are limited.

-- (U) C-130 aircraft cannot communicate with ground forces during critical mission phases.

-- (U) Aircraft lack over-the-horizon secure voice and data communications capability.

-- (U) Theater aeromedical evacuation (AE) support equipment is not fully compatible with combat delivery aircraft.

-- (U) Forces are limited in their ability to deploy and sustain themselves.

-- (U) Aerial firefighting equipment is nearly unsupportable.

-- (U) C-130 bleed air duct system is not reliable.

-- (U) Combat delivery mission support forces lack consistent C2 for all operations.

-- (U) Threat Avoidance. Improved capability to detect/degrade/defeat threats. Install chaff/flare dispensers, missile warning system, radar warning system, radar jammers.

-- (U) Maintainability. Research/identify high maintenance items. Initiate programs to improve, including replacements for autopilot, APN-59 radar, and station keeping equipment system; replace magnetic compass system with dual inertial navigation units; install secure radios.

-- (U) Reliability. Replace aging C-130E aircraft with C-130J. Upgrade electrical system to produce steady power supply.

-- (U) Modeling. Produce useable logistics module to an existing campaign level model to determine impact of combat delivery force structure and modifications on outcome of theater campaign.

-- (U) Training. Procure weapon system trainer for C-130H3 and C-130J. Ensure simulator mods keep pace with aircraft mods.

-- (U) Precision Airdrop. GPS integration will increase capability for first pass precision airdrop.

- (U) Bottom Line Impact. The proposed investment strategy for combat delivery emphasizes reliability and maintainability improvements in current operational systems and modification of those systems with capabilities required to perform the mission. Modifications will depend on current technology and off-the-shelf equipment. During these R&M and modification efforts, technology developments in materials, design, and avionics will be pursued. These technology developments will then be incorporated into the next generation of combat delivery operational assets. As the combat delivery fleet, particularly active C-130Es, begins to reach the end of its service life in the first decade of the next century, an acquisition program for replacement aircraft is critical. This strategy depends heavily on current technologies applied in new ways.

1. (U) Introduction. This Mission Area Plan pertains to weapon systems specifically designed to perform the theater airlift mission--the C-130 and C-27. It does not address all systems that occasionally may perform theater airlift on a limited basis, such as the C-17 or C-141. It describes mission area deficiencies and a corrective investment strategy using the strategy to task process.

1.1. (U) C-130. The C-130 is an all-metal, high-wing, long-range, land-based monoplane. The fuselage is divided into the cargo compartment and the flight station. It can be fully pressurized and air conditioned in flight. The mission of the airplane is to provide rapid transportation of personnel or cargo for delivery by parachute to a designated drop zone, or by landing at austere locations within the theater of operations. The C-130 provides long range, day or night capability that is degraded in most threat environments. Adverse Weather Aerial Delivery System (AWADS) equipped C-130s have the additional capability of performing airdrops in inclement weather without external assistance. It can be used as a tactical transport carrying 92 ground troops or 64 paratroops and equipment, and can be readily converted for aeromedical evacuation or aerial delivery missions. When used as an aeromedical evacuation asset, the airplane can carry 70 litters. There are provisions for normal life raft storage to accommodate 80 persons for overwater flights. The C-130 can land and take off on short runways, and it can be used on landing strips such as those usually found in advance base operations. It is a highly versatile weapons system with many specialized variations.

1.1.1. (U) C-130 Current Variations. The USAF inventory includes AC-130A/H/U,

C-130E/H, EC-130E/H, HC-130N/P, LC-130H, and MC-130E/H aircraft. As AF Special Operations Command assets, the AC-130A/H/U, EC-130H COMMANDO SOLO, MC-130E/H, and HC-130N/P COMBAT SHADOW are discussed in the AFSOC Force Application MAP. ACC HC-130N/P assets are discussed in the Rescue MAP. The EC-130E Airborne Battlefield Command, Control, and Communications (ABCCC) is discussed in the Theater Battle Management MAP. The EC-130H COMPASS CALL is discussed in the Electronic Warfare MAP. ACC also has specially modified C-130s used in a reconnaissance role and addressed in the Reconnaissance MAP.

1.2. (U) C-27. The C-27A is a twin-engine turboprop aircraft. The basic aircraft is an Alenia G-222-710 modified by the Chrysler Technologies Airborne Systems Division. The C-27 provides Instrument Meteorological Conditions (IMC) airland and a limited Visual Meteorological Conditions (VMC) airdrop capability with a shorter range and smaller payload than the C-130. Its capabilities are degraded in most threat environments. The C-27 was designed to deliver conventional combat equipment/troops into austere airfields and onto marked or unmarked assault zones with shorter runways than the C-130 requires. It can be used as a tactical transport carrying 34 ground troops or 24 paratroops and equipment, and can be readily converted for aeromedical evacuation or aerial delivery missions. When used as an aeromedical evacuation asset, the airplane can carry 24 litters.

1.3. (U) Operational Support Airlift (OSA). The primary use of OSA aircraft is movement of high priority personnel and small cargo between main operating bases within the theater. OSA aircraft can be used to transport Air/Integrated Tasking Orders to units with no classified electronic reception capability. OSA aircraft can be used for aeromedical evacuation and movement of maintenance recovery teams into austere locations with short runways.

1.3.1. (U) C-21. The C-21 is a twin engine jet executive transport aircraft manufactured by Lear. The primary use of this aircraft is movement of high priority personnel and small cargo between main operating bases within the theater. Air Mobility Command is the USAF proponent for Operational Support Airlift and includes the C-21 in its Airlift MAP.

1.3.2. (U) C-12. The C-12J is a twin-engine turboprop aircraft. The basic aircraft is a Beech 1900 executive transport aircraft. Pacific Air Forces is the lead command for the C-12J.

1.4. (U) Other MAPs referencing the Combat Delivery MAP. The following is a list of other MAPs that reference Combat Delivery assets:

1.5. (U) Annual Review. This MAP will be reviewed annually or as required to ensure aircraft and weapons technologies are effectively integrated into our force structure. This is the second version of the Combat Delivery MAP.

1.6. (U) Process Overview. The Operational Requirements Planning Process is described in AFI 10-1401, Modernization Planning Documentation, and AFI 10-601, Air Force Mission Needs and Operational Requirements. Long-range plans for force modernization and strategy are derived from national and Joint Staff strategy guidance. HQ ACC is designated as the Air Force proponent Major Command (MAJCOM) for combat delivery. The HQ ACC Directorate for Plans and Programs develops the Theater Airlift Concept of Operations (CONOPS) and Roadmap to provide guidance for combat delivery operations and force structure respectively. HQ ACC Directorate of Requirements develops this MAP to provide guidance on the modernization of the force structure and to ensure the capabilities required in the CONOPS are fielded today and in the future.

1.6.1. (U) Strategy-To-Task/Task-To-Need. The Strategy-to-Task (STT) and Task-to-Need (TTN) processes are used to conduct Mission Area Assessment (MAA) and Mission Needs Analysis (MNA). A Combat Delivery Mission Area Team (MAT) comparison of mission needs with current doctrine and tactics, coupled with weapon system performance against the current and future threats, determines non-material and material deficiencies. Comparisons are made using time phasing to allow for a near, mid, and far-term assessment of capabilities to assist long-term planners to match investments to documented needs. After deficiencies are identified, the Mobility Technical Planning Integrated Product Team (TPIPT) and the MAT gather solution concepts, and analyze, select, and prioritize the solutions based upon urgency, technology risk, cost, and the effect a solution has on multiple deficiencies. Selected solutions are integrated into the combat delivery modernization roadmaps.

1.6.2. (U) Mission Area Assessment. The Air Staff, Major Commands (MAJCOMs), and Field Operating Agencies (FOAs) identify missions through the MAA process. This process is depicted in Figure 1.1 and links mission tasks requiring certain capabilities (current and programmed) to the military strategy provided by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. During the MAA phase, MAJCOMs review their tasking and assigned missions under concepts of operations (CONOPS) for the various regional plans. These regional plans assign specific military objectives for Air Force assets. MAJCOMs continually evaluate plans and Joint Staff guidance for changes in assigned missions and objectives which may change the tasks required for that mission.

Figure 1.1. (U) Mission Area Plan Process

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1.6.2.1. (U) In January 1995 a CAF MAA process was initiated to standardize STTs within ACC mission areas. The analysis was performed by an integrated product team (IPT) consisting of representatives for eleven CAF Mission Area Plans and functional area representatives from XP, DO, SG, SC, LG, and IN. The IPT developed and prioritized a common Mission Area Assessment of all CAF MAPs.

1.6.2.1.1. (U) The group began with a USAF/XOX STT Baseline which describes the STT process and terms. The final product contains objectives & tasks for scenarios across the entire spectrum of conflict. References for the effort were the Defense Planning Guidance (DPG); AFM 1-1; Army Field Manual 1; Naval Doctrine Publication 1; Joint Pub 1, Joint Warfare of US Armed Forces; Joint Pub 3, Doctrine for Joint Operations; and Joint Pub 5, Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations.

1.6.2.1.2. (U) The IPT identified and defined CAF objectives and tasks. Relationships were established between levels using Quality Function Deployment (QFD), a structured process which identifies and prioritizes customer requirements and the translation of these requirements into appropriate solutions.

1.6.3. (U) Mission Needs Analysis. Once a task is identified, MAJCOMs conduct an MNA by analyzing the factors which impact our current and programmed capability to accomplish that task. The task-to-need process evaluates our force structure, the environment, and the threat we expect to encounter while conducting the assigned mission. Once deficiencies are identified, doctrine, tactics, and training (non-material solutions) are examined to determine if changes in these areas can solve the deficiency. If modifications to current systems or new systems are required, a Mission Needs Statement (MNS) documents the required characteristics of the new system. Procedures outlined in AFI 10-601 are followed.

1.6.4. (U) Mission Area Plan. The MAP summarizes and uses the products of the MAA and MNA processes to identify key technologies and weapons system modernization efforts required to correct known deficiencies. The MAP is the primary planning document for acquisition strategies, national and Air Force laboratory efforts, and industrial independent research and development (IR&D) programs providing a focus for limited investment dollars. This ensures the required technologies are developed/matured as quickly as possible.

2.1. (U) Strategy-to-Task (STT) Analysis. The current strategy-to-task framework for the combat delivery mission area is depicted in Figure 2.1, which depicts campaign objective/ operational objective linkages. Operational objective/operational task linkages are depicted in paragraph 2.2 through 2.7.

Figure 2.1. (U) Combat Delivery Strategy-to-Task.

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2.1.1. (U) National Military Strategy. New national military strategy calls for flexible and selective engagement, involving a broad range of activities and capabilities to address and help shape the evolving international environment. Our military forces must perform three sets of tasks to achieve the military objectives of promoting stability and thwarting aggression. These three components of the strategy are peacetime engagement, deterrence and conflict prevention, and fighting and winning our nation's wars. Accomplishing the specific tasks of the strategy is facilitated by the two complementary strategic concepts of overseas presence and power projection.

2.1.1.1. (U) Peacetime Engagement. Peacetime engagement describes a broad range of noncombat activities undertaken by our Armed Forces that demonstrate commitment, improve collective military capabilities, promote democratic ideals, relieve suffering, and enhance regional stability.

2.1.1.2. (U) Deterrence and Conflict Prevention. In concert with the other elements of US national power, our military capabilities serve to deter aggression and prevent conflict by convincing potential adversaries that their objectives will be denied and that their aggression will be decisively defeated.

2.1.1.3. (U) Fighting and Winning. Being ready to fight and win the Nation's wars remains our foremost responsibility and the prime consideration governing all military activities. This ability serves as the ultimate guarantor of our vital interests and is the fundamental reason that our Nation has raised and sustained its military forces.

2.1.1.4. (U) Overseas Presence. Overseas presence takes the form of both permanently stationed forces and forces temporarily deployed abroad.

2.1.1.5. (U) Power Projection. With fewer US forces permanently stationed overseas, we must proportionately increase our capability to project forces abroad. The existence of a credible power projection capability complements our overseas presence in acting as a deterrent to potential adversaries. It further provides our national leaders greater flexibility in employing military force.

2.1.2. (U) Theater Campaign Objectives. To support the national strategy, the theater Joint Forces Air Component Commander (JFACC) must be provided with mission ready personnel capable of rapid deployment to, employment within, and redeployment from the desired area of operations. Furthermore, these forces must be supported and sustained throughout the campaign. Ground forces directly supported by combat delivery will degrade the enemy’s war sustaining capability. Individual campaign objectives and definitions follow.

2.1.2.1. (U) Maintain mission readiness/affordability and perform peacetime operations. Maintain a high state of readiness to respond to enemy aggression. Perform those operational functions necessary to ensure compliance with the designed operational capability (DOC) tasking provided by the MAJCOM. Conduct other peacetime operations in support of the national military objectives. Reduce operating and support costs of forces and balance readiness, support, and modernization requirements.

2.1.2.2. (U) Rapidly deploy to, employ within, and redeploy from desired area of operations. Relocation of forces and material to desired areas of operations. Encompasses all activities from origin or home station through destination, specifically including intra-continental CONUS, inter-theater, and intra-theater movement legs, staging, and holding areas. (JCS Pub 1-02, 24 Mar 94)

2.1.2.3. (U) Degrade war sustaining capability and support surface operations. Stop enemy ground forces from achieving their critical objectives. Move to isolate and destroy enemy forces, including reserve forces prior to their commitment. Disrupt and destroy the enemy’s C4I, logistics network, and other associated military targets needed to continue/maintain their ground operations. Includes disruption of enemy political base. Support US and allied counteroffensive to seize territory and engage, envelop, destroy, or capture enemy ground forces occupying key objectives.

2.1.2.4. (U) Support employment and sustainment of forces. All support activity to employ and sustain the force in the execution of theater strategy, campaigns, and unified operations. This activity links national military strategic sustainment to operational objectives.

2.1.3. (U) Operational Objectives. Individual definitions follow. Figures 2.2 through 2.7 depict linkages with operational tasks.

2.1.3.1. (U) Sustain force’s readiness to deploy to theater of operations. (Figure 2.2) Peacetime processes enabling forces to maximize equipment and personnel readiness for deployability to a given theater within a specified period. Includes providing mission ready personnel. Includes actions to enhance readiness by reducing weapon system operating and support costs.

2.1.3.2. (U) Combat delivery of personnel, equipment, and material. (Figure 2.3) Delivering forces directly into battle and sustaining them by either airland delivery or aerial delivery. It includes airland assault, airborne assault, and combat resupply (AF Doctrine Document 30, Airlift Operations)

Figure 2.2. (U)

Combat Delivery Operational Objective-to-Task

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Figure 2.3. (U)

Combat Delivery Operational Objective-to-Task

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2.1.3.3. (U) Transport personnel, equipment, and material into the theater. (Figure 2.4) Includes movement into theater, and airlift of forces, personnel, and material from theater to second MRC or point of origin.

2.1.3.4. (U) Transport personnel, equipment, and material within the theater. (Figure 2.4) Deployment, employment, and redeployment of personnel, munitions, supplies, and equipment within the theater under non-hostile conditions.

Figure 2.4. (U)

Combat Delivery Operational Objective-to-Task

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2.1.3.5. (U) Disrupt enemy political base. (Figure 2.5) Conduct operations to influence public opinion and offensive operations against key non-military leadership agencies (Congress, Parliament, Palace, etc.). Combat delivery forces do not directly plan and execute psychological operations; however, they support this task and its associated objective, disruption of the enemy’s political base, by providing airborne platforms.

Figure 2.5. (U)

Combat Delivery Operational Objective-to-Task

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2.1.3.6. (U) Sustain forces and operations tempo within the theater of operations. (Figure 2.6) Logistical support activity required across the full spectrum of conflict to sustain the force and continuity of operations in campaigns and major operations within the theater for (1) support of sortie production (organizational, squadron, etc.), (2) replenishment of arms, ammunition, and equipment required to support forces, (3) providing an uninterrupted flow of fuel to joint/combined forces, (4) establishing facilities in the rear area to repair and replace material and establish policies for repair and evacuation of equipment to support theater forces, and (5) maintain timely flow of stocks and maintenance/manpower.

Figure 2.6. (U)

Combat Delivery Operational Objective-to-Task

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2.1.3.7. (U) Establish/sustain contingency operating locations. (Figure 2.7) Those tasks necessary to provide the infrastructure to sustain an operating force in an area of operations. These include health services, military police, construction of base facilities and infrastructure, facilities engineering, topographic and geodetic engineering functions, food services, graves registration, laundry, dry cleaning, bath, property disposal, and other logistic services. Does not include direct sortie generation activities (i.e., aircraft maintenance activities).

Figure 2.7. (U)

Combat Delivery Operational Objective-to-Task

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2.1.4. (U) Operational Tasks. To meet these objectives, combat delivery has two primary operational tasks, airland and airdrop, which allow delivery of personnel, equipment, and material. Combat delivery will use any or all tasks to accomplish the mission.

2.1.4.1. (U) Airland personnel, equipment, and material. Intratheater missions employing point to point movement of personnel, equipment, and material using runway operations. Purpose is power projection or force sustainment.

2.1.4.1.1. (U) Airland - Power Projection. All sorties which involve point to point insertion of resources using runway operations only (Figure 2.8.). Runway types may range from hard surfaced concrete to sand or grass. The airland task includes airland of personnel, equipment, supplies, and a specialized subtask (C-130 only), Pathfinder. Pathfinder missions provide covert insertion of combat control or special operations forces.

Figure 2.8. (U) Combat Delivery Strategy-to-Task,

Airland - Power Projection

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2.1.4.1.2. (U) Airland - Force Sustainment. These missions include airland of personnel, equipment, supplies, plus one specialized C-130 subtask, Pathfinder (Figure 2.9). Pathfinder missions provide covert insertion of combat control or special operations forces. A conventional subtask for both the C-130 and C-27 is noncombatant evacuation operations. Noncombatant evacuation operations pertain to the air movement of dependents and other noncombatants from potentially hostile environments. The C-130 also has the conventional subtask of moving nuclear weapons if tasked for that mission.

Figure 2.9. (U) Combat Delivery Strategy-to-Task,

Airland - Force Sustainment

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2.1.4.2. (U) Airdrop personnel, equipment, and material. Missions employing aerial delivery of personnel, equipment, or material from an aircraft in flight for power projection or force sustainment purposes.

2.1.4.2.1. (U) Airdrop - Power Projection. Missions employing aerial delivery from an aircraft in flight for direct insertion of resources into a conflict area (Figure 2.10). The airdrop task includes aerial delivery of personnel, equipment, supplies, and two specialized subtasks

(C-130 only). These are flare launch and Pathfinder. Flare launch missions provide illumination to highlight hostile force movements during offensive operations. Pathfinder missions provide covert aerial delivery of combat control or special operations forces into areas not accessible by airland operations. There is one specialized subtask for the C-27, personnel airdrop. Personnel airdrop provides for the overt insertion of troops during combat operations.

Figure 2.10. (U) Combat Delivery Strategy-to-Task,

Airdrop - Power Projection

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2.1.4.2.2. (U) Airdrop - Force Sustainment. These missions employ both conventional and special airdrop operations (Figure 2.11). Conventional missions include airdrop of personnel equipment and supplies to sustain combat and support operations and operations other than war. Equipment airdrops (C-130 only) use door bundle or load extraction methods. Supplies use Containerized Delivery System (CDS) methods of delivery. There is one specialized subtask utilizing only the C-130, which is Pathfinder. Pathfinder missions provide covert resupply, personnel and equipment, to combat control or special operations forces. C-27 conventional missions only airdrop personnel or door bundles.

Figure 2.11 (U) Combat Delivery Strategy-to-Task,

Airdrop - Force Sustainment

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2.1.4.3. (U) Train mission ready personnel. Provide adequate personnel, equipment, airspace, and exercises to train mission ready personnel. Includes joint and combined operations, and exercises periodically with allied nations.

2.1.4.4. (U) Reduce operations and support (O&S) costs and sustain efficient full spectrum operations. Enhance readiness and maintain a robust force by reducing O&S costs and balancing force readiness, support, and modernization requirements through the application of various programs, policies, and methods. Included but not limited to Weapon System Cost Reductions related initiatives and actions to reduce weapon system and support costs.

2.1.4.5. (U) Conduct aeromedical evacuation operations. Movement of casualties by air transportation under the supervision of qualified aeromedical evacuation crew members to/between medical treatment facilities.

2.1.4.6. (U) Support psychological operations. Support of operations targeted against the minds of the enemy civilian population and combat forces. Speaker operations and leaflet airdrops can be used to influence and demoralize hostile forces prior to and during offensive operations. Combat delivery forces do not directly plan and execute psychological operations; however, they support this task and its associated objective, disruption of the enemy’s political base, by providing airborne platforms.

2.1.4.7. (U) Deliver/maintain timely flow of people, equipment, data, spares, consumables, POL, and munitions. The actual movement from a point of embarkation outside the theater of operations to a point of debarkation in the theater of operations. Includes maintaining timely flow of stocks and maintenance/manpower and movement from first to second MRC.

2.1.4.8. (U) Pack/configure/assemble (for movement) people, equipment, data, spares, consumables, POL, and munitions. Packing includes those actions associated with the physical acts of making ready and packing technical data, mission equipment, support equipment, tools, spares, consumables, POL, and munitions. Configuring includes actions associated with making operational, technical, and physical changes required to ensure compliance with current practices; and standardization of data, equipment, tools, spares, consumables, POL, and munitions. Assembling includes the pre-deployment staging of personnel, equipment, and material for movement.

2.1.4.9. (U) Conduct aerial firefighting operations. Defined as containment of forest and grassland wildfires by airdrop of chemical retardants in advance of the fire line. With proper equipment and aircrew procedures, this task could apply across the full spectrum of conflict. However, theater CINCs have neither developed nor stated their requirement for an airborne combat firefighting system. Existing equipment, which is not owned by DoD, is unprotected and unusable in hostile or urban environments. Additionally, aircrew procedures and tactics do not exist for employment of firefighting systems in hostile or urban environments. Therefore, equipment and procedures are currently limited to NON-HOSTILE OPERATIONS ONLY.

2.1.4.10. (U) Conduct aerial spray operations. Aerial dispersal of disinfectant or insecticide for purposes of disease or pest control. Other chemicals may be dispersed through this system for wide area coverage.

2.1.5. (U) Supporting Systems. The threat environments that combat delivery assets operate within can be adjusted by the use of supporting aircraft. Supporting aircraft providing air-to-air protection, air-to-ground fire support, and Suppression of Enemy Air Defense (SEAD) coverage can degrade the threat, either temporarily or permanently, permitting combat delivery assets to reach the objective area. Combat delivery forces may be augmented by these supporting systems depending on the threat environment, distance to the objective area, and availability of assets. A-10, F-15E, F-16, or other capable CAF and joint assets can provide suppression of the ground threat. CAF F-16 and F-15 aircraft, as well as joint air superiority fighters, can prevent interception of combat delivery assets by hostile aircraft. F-15, F-16, EF-111, and EC-130 can provide lethal or non-lethal SEAD. E-3, E-8, and Airborne Battlefield Command, Control, and Communication (ABCCC) can provide command, control, and communication support for the combat delivery mission. The Global Positioning System (GPS) and Defense Satellite Communication System can be used to provide navigation and communication support to all or part of the package.

2.2. (U) The Threat. Combat delivery assets operate at low level and a relatively slow airspeed. They are susceptible to the full range of ground-based enemy air defense weapons and enemy aircraft. Reference classified Annex B, Combat Delivery Threat Assessment (U), for the specific 25-year combat delivery threat MAA.

2.2.1 (U) Threat Environment Classifications. The threat environment relates primarily to the enemy's ability to detect and lethally engage combat delivery aircraft.

2.2.1.1 (U) No Threat/Permissive: Environment permits operations with virtually no probability of combat or enemy detection leading to engagement.

2.2.1.2 (U) Low: Environment contains threats; however, dispersal, concentration, and warfare capabilities of the enemy permit operations to proceed with passive measures taken to avoid detection. Detection of combat delivery forces by the enemy is likely to be without consequence; if the enemy engages, weapons encountered will typically be small arms, man portable (MANPAD) surface-to-air missiles (SAM), rocket-propelled grenades, and light optically aimed anti-aircraft artillery (AAA) up to .50 caliber/14.5mm.

2.2.1.3 (U) Medium: Environment contains significant threats. Dispersal, concentration, mobility, and warfare capabilities of the enemy permit operations to proceed with active measures taken to avoid detection and threats. Detection of combat delivery forces by the enemy is likely to result in engagement. Weapon systems typically include low-threat systems plus early generation SAM, radar-controlled AAA, and aircraft lacking effective look-down/shoot-down and/or all-weather capability. Aircrews can expect to employ extensive mission planning, threat evasive maneuvers, avoidance tactics, onboard electronic countermeasures systems, and/or defensive threat suppression measures to accomplish the mission

2.2.1.4 (U) High: A high-threat environment is created by a hostile force which includes widely dispersed, densely concentrated, integrated air defense systems; advanced or late generation SAMs; aircraft with all-aspect and look-down/shoot-down capabilities; modern ground-based radars or passive detection systems; significant quantities of highly trained and mobile ground forces; and electronic warfare capabilities which would seriously diminish the ability of combat delivery operations to proceed without large-scale combat protection packages. Some of the ground-based systems may be hardened or be unusually difficult to destroy/render inoperable. Combat delivery- specific assets should be employed in environments with integrated defense systems only when those systems can be adequately suppressed by other CAF assets. Combat delivery forces are not currently capable of prosecuting their missions in a high-threat environment without significant threat degradation and force protection from enemy air- and ground-based weapons.

2.3. (U) Concept of Operations (CONOPS). (Figure 2.12.) Theater airlift assets participate throughout the spectrum of conflict (see Figure 2.13.) and the type of missions performed during peacetime and contingencies are basically the same. Threat, availability of suitable airfields or assault zones, and aircraft capabilities all determine the delivery method.

Figure 2.12. (U) Concept of Operations.

This figure is UNCLASSIFIED.

Figure 2.13. (U) Combat Delivery Spectrum.

This figure is UNCLASSIFIED.

2.3.1. (U) Peacetime. For administrative purposes, theater airlift forces are assigned to the Commander of ACC, USAFE, PACAF, AFRES, or National Guard Bureau (NGB), as appropriate. HQ ACC is designated lead command for areas affecting theater airlift. Sourcing, tasking, planning, and execution of missions will be in accordance with procedures established by the appropriate headquarters. C-27 missions which arrive and depart the MOB on a regularly scheduled basis to move cargo and personnel to destinations within the theater of operations are validated by USSOUTHCOM. USSOUTHCOM will validate and prioritize specific requirements to establish scheduled missions. Missions will be justified largely on the volume and frequency of requirements for delivery to specific destinations other than established main operating bases and established aerial ports.

2.3.2.1. (U) AOC Airlift Coordination Cell (ALCC). Each theater’s Joint Force Air Component Commander (JFACC) or Commander of Air Force Forces (COMAFFOR), as appropriate, is responsible for air operations within the area of responsibility (AOR). The AOC is the deployed operational facility in which the JFACC or COMAFFOR exercises centralized functions of planning, directing, and controlling theater air resources. It acts as the Air Forces Component Commander’s (AFCC’s) focal point for planning and managing the theater air campaign, including theater airlift operations. It provides the capability to monitor the activities of friendly and enemy forces. It is the senior control element of the Theater Air Control System (TACS) and includes personnel and equipment of all the necessary disciplines to ensure the effective conduct of air operations. The airlift cadre residing within the NAFs' Air Operations Group (AOG) form the nucleus of the ALCC. The ALCC is part of the AOC and bears overall responsibility for planning, coordinating, managing, and executing theater airlift operations within the AOR. It integrates theater airlift activity with other theater air operations. It normally consists of an airlift plans branch, an airlift operations branch, and an airlift support branch. The ALCC is headed by the Chief, ALCC, who reports to the Director of the AOC. Critical to the success of the theater airlift system is the ALCC’s ability to coordinate directly with theater logistics planners in the Joint Movement Center (JMC) and the C2 system supporting the USTRANSCOM strategic air mobility effort. The theater airlift system is dependent on AMC-owned or controlled strategic air mobility assets. Aerial Port, Tanker Airlift Control Element (TALCE), and Combat Control Team (CCT) resources are limited and required by both the theater and strategic systems. The ALCC will work closely with either the TACC or the Air Mobility Element (AME), if deployed, to manage support forces so that strategic and theater missions are supported. The Director of Mobility Forces (DIRMOBFOR), if established, exercises coordinating authority to ensure theater and strategic requirements are fulfilled.

2.3.2.1.1. (U) Functions. The ALCC will normally perform flight and system management functions.

2.3.2.1.1.1. (U) Flight Management. Flight management consists of planning, development, and dissemination of an airlift mission schedule (AMS) section in the ATO and then monitoring and tracking mission progress. If AMC is providing flight management, mission information may be provided via an Air Movement Table (AMT) versus the AMS section of the ATO.

2.3.2.1.1.2. (U) System Management. System management consists of: managing the theater airlift system, the assets required for efficient airlift operations, the interface between theater airlift and strategic mobility forces, and satisfying validated user requirements.

2.3.2.2. (U) Supporting Organizations. To manage and maintain an effective theater airlift operation, a variety of support organizations are required. With the division of assets between ACC, PACAF, USAFE, and AMC, extensive coordination will be required to effectively utilize these airlift support elements. Thoroughly planned operations will enable both strategic and theater missions to be serviced by all support elements, whether ACC, PACAF, USAFE, or AMC assigned.

2.3.2.2.1. (U) Air Mobility Operations Groups (AMOGs). AMOGs are in-garrison units which provide personnel and equipment to augment the air mobility en route structure during surge operations. They include maintenance, aerial port, C2, communications, and combat camera specialists. Currently, AMC AMOG and Air Mobility Operations Squadron (AMOS) personnel provide the cadre of deployable personnel and equipment for Air Mobility Element (AME) operations. The AME is provided, upon request of a theater CINC through coordination with USTRANSCOM, to augment or establish strategic airlift operations for the theater, and will not be an element of the AOC. It reports directly to the AMC Tanker Airlift Control Center (TACC) and performs strategic mobility coordination and monitoring, operations support, intelligence, and airlift mission support functions. The AME serves as an extension of TACC deployed to help support and integrate strategic air mobility operations with theater air operations. AMC TACC, ACC/DOO, and ACC NAFs will work in parallel to validate user requirements and ensure an appropriate airlift system is provided to the theater.

2.3.2.2.2 (U) Airlift Control Squadrons (ALCSs). ALCS and CAF Airlift Control Flights (ALCFs), located at C-130 bases, will be ACC assigned/gained and will continue to support worldwide mobility operations. ALCSs form the cadre for deployed Tanker Airlift Control Elements (TALCEs) and are augmented by communications, maintenance, and aerial port assets. TALCEs deploy to establish control, coordinate, and report AF airlift/tanker operations at a base where normal airlift and tanker control facilities are not established or require augmentation. TALCE cadre personnel may also come from AMC Air Mobility Control Squadrons/Flights (AMCSs/AMCFs).

2.3.2.2.3. (U) Aerial Port Squadrons (APSs). APSs provide fixed and deployable air terminal operations, air freight, passenger service, and fleet service support to assigned and enroute air mobility aircraft, passengers, and cargo.

2.3.2.2.4. (U) Combat Control Squadrons (CCSs). CCSs and Combat Control Flights (CCFs) are sized and deployed as Combat Control Teams (CCTs) and provide VMC/limited IMC air traffic control and limited airfield operations for expeditionary airfields. CCTs establish and control assault zones, conduct tactical assault zone assessments, position and monitor terminal navigation aids, and provide long range secure command and control (C2) and communications. Corollary missions include removal of obstacles and unexploded ordinance by demolition, gathering and reporting ground intelligence, and providing local weather observations.

2.3.2.2.5. (U) Aeromedical Evacuation (AE) Assets. AE assets are responsible for the transport and care of casualties from the forward combat areas to and between treatment facilities within a theater. Duties include matching requests for patient AE with available combat delivery resources.

2.3.2.2.6. (U) Theater Airlift Liaison Officers (TALOs). In peacetime, TALOs coordinate Army deployment planning and assist Army commanders in JA/ATT planning. TALOs also instruct Army personnel on the airlift system. During contingencies or exercises, TALOs deploy to coordinate theater airlift support for their assigned Army unit. TALOs are aligned against each Tactical Air Control Party (TACP) at Corps, Division, or Brigade levels or assigned to active duty C-130 wings. Wing assigned TALOs will fall under the senior Air Liaison Officer (ALO) at the TACP when deployed.

2.3.2.2.7. (U) Air Force Weather Support. Weather support is required to support this mission area. Commanders, planners, and aircrews require timely and accurate observed and forecast environmental products to efficiently employ assigned forces. Effective integration of environmental information into the combat force employment process can successfully influence decisions regarding weapon selections and target options, sortie generation, and support to base-level operations. Because weather support is a backbone objective cross-cutting all operational and supporting mission tasks, the Air Force has developed a weather Functional Area Plan (FAP). The FAP provides a roadmap for supporting MAJCOM validated operational requirements and a strategy for correcting deficiencies. Air Force and Air Weather Service program and budget for standard systems and capabilities required for Air Force and Army support as outlined in the FAP.

2.3.2.2.8. (U) Intelligence Support. Intelligence support is required to support the combat delivery mission area. Commanders, mission planners, and aircrews require comprehensive, accurate, and continuous intelligence products to efficiently employ assigned forces. Integration of tactical and national level intelligence information into the decision making process is essential for successful operations. Because intelligence support is a backbone objective cross-cutting all operating and supporting mission tasks, the Air Force has developed an Intelligence FAP. The FAP provides a road map for supporting MAJCOM validated operational requirements and a strategy for correcting deficiencies identified in individual mission area plans.

2.3.2.2.9. (U) Communications Support. Communications support is essential to coordinate all combat delivery activities within the theater of operations. It is especially critical to support both the AOC and all forward bases. The communications support package will include, but is not limited to, telephones, computers, and connectivity to CONUS and other theater agencies. Additional information on communications support is in the Theater Battle Management MAP.

2.4. (U) Operational Concept. Combat delivery operates under the operational concept depicted in Figure 2.14.

Figure 2.14. (U) Operational Concept

This figure is UNCLASSIFIED.

2.4.1. (U) Readiness. Combat delivery forces maintain a high state of readiness through realistic training sorties and exercise participation. Training and exercises are conducted day and night and in all environmental conditions, to include water, desert, and mountain operations. As a minimum, each crewmember requires 24 training sorties annually to maintain currency in the C-130 and 24 training sorties annually to maintain currency in the C-27. Minimum mission qualification in the C-130 includes: day/night VMC/IMC formation, day/night VMC tactical airdrop (IMC for AWADS and SKE-equipped units), and day/night VMC assault. Minimum mission qualification in the C-27 includes: day/night VMC assault.

2.4.2. (U) Deployment. Combat delivery aircrews are prepared, if on Alpha alert status, to launch within one hour of notification and proceed to the objective area. Bravo status requires a launch within three hours of notification. In theater, the ALCC is notified of the requirement and tasks forces to support the mission. The magnitude of forces required to accomplish a mission can range from a single unescorted aircraft to a full formation package consisting of all forces required to defeat the threat. When acquired, premission planning of the operation would be accomplished using the Air Force Mission Support System (AFMSS). AFMSS should permit a quick and standardized flight planning format for decentralized mission preparation in the field. C-130 units are not air refuelable and require staging bases to deploy into the theater of operations.

2.4.2.1. (U) C-130 Deployment. Presently, C-130 units are the only theater airlift forces with limited capability to self-deploy their aviation package to a theater. The sizing and tailoring of airlift Unit Type Codes (UTCs) will be designed to meet a variety of theater and commander requirements. Wing Operations Center (WOC), Aerial Delivery Support Branch (ADSB), TALCE, PRIME RIBS/BEEF, Security Police, aeromedical evacuation (AE), and Combat Control Team (CCT) deployment will require strategic airlift assistance to the theater due to the C-130's limited range and allowable cabin load. Also, ADSB, TALCE, Security Police, AE, and CCT functions may not be deployed to the same location as their parent wing. C-130 units may be deployed in-theater to Main Operating Bases (MOBs), Forward Operating Bases (FOBs), or bare bases depending on theater airlift/basing requirements.

2.4.2.2. (U) C-27 Deployment. The single C-27 unit has a limited deployment capability from its MOB to support the SOUTHCOM AOR. To meet the requirements of the theater commander, C-27A forces are capable of mobility deployment for at least thirty days. Contractor support personnel, equipment, and spares are required to deploy with C-27A forces for exercises, contingencies, or during wartime. The C-27A has the capability to ferry to operational locations but is not normally self-deployable. Mission support airlift may be required to move Tanker/Airlift Control Element (TALCE), maintenance, and transportation personnel and support equipment to FOBs. SOUTHAF, in conjunction with HQ ACC, 24 WG, and 310 ALS, will develop a mobility plan under the provisions of ACCR 28-2. The contractor is required to develop a transportation/ deployment plan. The SOUTHAF mobility plan will incorporate the contractor's plan. For contingency operations downstream of the MOB, the contractor will be ready to deploy within 48 hours after notification. This 48-hour period will include assembly and packing time for any required onboard support kits. Deployments will require contractor mission support kits and maintenance personnel to accompany the aircraft to FOBs. The contractor is capable of deployment supporting one semi-permanent and one additional FOB with two aircraft each for exercises/contingencies. During wartime circumstances, all aircraft may be deployed to one or more FOBs.

2.4.3. (U) Employment. A C-130 wing can be expected to deploy and operate as a self-supporting, or augmenting unit to composite wings, or multinational operations tailored to the theater commander's airlift requirement. Operations will be conducted day or night in adverse weather conditions, to include airdrop and airland taskings. The theater AOC, through the ALCC, will publish the Air Tasking Order (ATO) for dissemination to the deployed C-130 WOCs for mission preparation. Theater management of airlift will be accomplished by the ALCC. Strategic mobility assets will normally carry cargo from the Aerial Port of Embarkation (APOE) and off-load at theater MOBs and theater assets will carry the cargo from the MOBs to FOBs, Forward Operating Locations (FOLs), or drop zones for off-load (hub and spoke system). Strategic lift can and does operate into FOBs. C-141, C-5, and C-17 operations can go from APOE to FOL depending on user requirements. In these instances, AMC will control the aircraft. The airlift wing must possess standardized C4I assets, to maintain connectivity with the AOC, TACC, TALCE, AME, and CCT.

2.4.3.1. (U) Employment Capabilities. Combat delivery aircraft ingress to the objective area via low level flight in day or night visual meteorological conditions (VMC) to avoid detection and reduce threat exposure. AWADS C-130s are capable of executing airdrops in instrument meteorological conditions (IMC) and leading formations of non-AWADS C-130s to timing drops using Station Keeping Equipment (SKE). The C-27 has a capability of VMC personnel airdrop and a Container Delivery System (CDS) airdrop capability currently in the developmental stage.

2.4.3.2. (U) Employment Support. Additional supporting assets can be added to the package depending on the threat environment, distance to the objective area, and availability of assets.

2.4.3.2.1. (U) Employment Support-Escort. Aircraft designated to perform the escort mission will escort the combat delivery package and provide suppressive fire to any enemy ground threats encountered. This escort will usually be initiated prior to the combat delivery's entry into enemy controlled terrain. Escort aircraft should provide coverage of the combat delivery package through run-in to the objective area, airdrop, and escape to friendly lines. The escort mission is primarily assigned to A-10, F-16, or AC-130 aircraft.

2.4.3.2.2. (U) Employment Support-Combat Air Patrol. (U) Aircraft designated to perform the CAP mission should prevent interception of the combat delivery package, and supporting aircraft, from enemy air-interception aircraft. The CAP mission is primarily assigned to F-15 or F-16 aircraft.

2.4.3.2.3. (U) Employment Support-Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence (C3I). C3I aircraft may be assigned to provide tactical communications links for near real time order of battle information, or to assume the role of Airborne Mission Command. C3I aircraft includes the E-3, EC-130 ABCCC, or E-8.

2.4.3.2.4. (U) Employment Support-Inflight Refueling. Aircraft supporting the Combat Delivery package may require the support of KC-10 or KC-135 aircraft for inflight refueling.

2.4.3.2.5. (U) Employment Support-Other Services . (U) Assets from other United States or foreign services can also be tasked by the theater CINC to support a combat delivery effort.

2.4.4. (U) Sustainment. C-130 combat delivery forces are capable of operating from bare-base facilities. The C-27 is supported by contractor logistics personnel, who are required to deploy with C-27 forces for exercises, contingencies, or during wartime. Reference classified Annex C, Operational Assumptions and Sustainment (U), for the combat delivery supply sustainment periods.

2.4.5. (U) Reconstitution. After cessation of employment operations, both C-27 and C-130 combat delivery forces redeploy using the same procedure as deployment. Upon return to peacetime basing, spares are replenished and deferred maintenance is accomplished. "Lessons learned" and tactics developed during the deployment are incorporated into combat delivery procedures.

2.5. (U) Operational Tasks. Two primary operational tasks, airland and airdrop, are involved in accomplishing the combat delivery mission. Upon receiving notification, combat delivery must proceed to the objective area and either airland or perform aerial delivery to ground combat or combat support forces.

2.5.1. (U) Airland. Airland is the preferred method of combat delivery. Both personnel and/or equipment can be moved throughout the theater. Feasibility of the airland option for personnel and equipment depends upon a number of factors. The airfield must be secured by friendly forces and remain secure for the duration of the airland flow. Landing zones are normally operated by USAF Combat Control Teams. The minimum runway length for assault takeoffs and landings is a function of aircraft weight, temperature, pressure altitude, and obstacles, (peacetime restriction is not less than 3000 feet for C-130 and 1800 feet for C-27). The maximum number of aircraft on the ground which the airfield can accommodate, as well as the speed at which ground crews can onload or offload each aircraft, will determine the takeoff and landing interval of the flow. Dirt landing zone conditions will deteriorate after sustained operations and/or heavy precipitation. Visual flight operations are degraded in inclement weather, although portable navigation aids may allow instrument approaches. Ground transportation must be available from the airfield to the battle area. Most importantly, the airland option must support the airland battle plan for ground combat forces in order to be effective.

2.5.1.1. (U) Combat Offload. Both aircraft are capable of conducting rapid offload of palletized cargo, without material handling equipment, using aircraft acceleration to offload un- restrained cargo from the aircraft. All six C-130 pallet positions may be combat offloaded. Standardized procedures are in MCR 51-1, Volume III. C-27 can offload all three pallet positions.

2.5.1.2. (U) Engine-running Onload/Offload. Engine-running onloads/offloads are used to expedite aircraft movement on the ground and are normally not used for on/offload of explosive cargo unless authorized. Cargo, passengers, or patients may be on/offloaded through the ramp and door or the crew entrance door depending on quantity and size. Material handling equipment may or may not be used.

2.5.1.3. (U) Combat Transport of Passengers (tie-down). During contingency operations, passengers may be floor loaded and secured with tiedown straps fastened across the cargo compartment to provide restraint.

2.5.1.4. (U) Aeromedical Evacuation. Aeromedical evacuation utilizes the airland task for the rapid removal of casualties from forward operating bases to main operating bases for transfer out of the theater.

2.5.2. (U) Airdrop. The airdrop option, particularly in formation, affords the CINC a mass concentration of personnel and equipment where needed in the shortest possible time. It is used whenever threats or proximity to the objective area preclude use of the airland option. While

C-130 combat delivery assets can perform airdrops in visual conditions, AWADS C-130s are additionally capable of executing airdrops in IMC (independent of external navigation aids) and leading non-AWADS C-130 wingmen to timing drops using Stationkeeping Equipment. Non-AWADS C-130s can also perform IMC airdrops, but must rely on ground based radar beacons or zone markers for course guidance. Combat Control Teams, Theater Airlift Liaison Officers, or other DoD personnel who are Drop Zone Control Officer or Drop Zone Support Team certified, will communicate with combat delivery aircraft from the ground and control the drop zone. High winds on the surface or at altitude may affect drop accuracy or force cancellation of the drop by the user. Minimum drop zone size is another consideration, depending on type and number of loads. Any air and ground threats in the objective area, unless neutralized by CAP and escort aircraft, will impact airdrop mission success. Selection of the airdrop task to accomplish combat employment or aerial resupply objectives must support the overall airland battle plan. The C-27 has a single ship VMC personnel airdrop capability; its containerized delivery system airdrop capability is still in development.

2.5.2.1. (U) Pathfinder. C-130 Pathfinder (formerly SOLL I) aircrews normally fly single-ship night VFR missions to multiple blacked-out drop zones in support of US Special Operations Command users. They acquire the objective area through the use of Night Vision Goggles (NVGs), radar beacon, and/or zone marker. AWADS Pathfinder crews can navigate along the route and airdrop in inclement weather using ground radar targets.

2.5.2.2. (U) Flare Launch. C-130 aircraft can be used in a variety of roles; night reconnaissance, forward air control of strike aircraft, illumination in support of ground forces, and assisting search and rescue (SAR) operators. Due to the capability of a C-130 to carry a large number of flares and to remain on station for long periods, a single aircraft may perform in many roles on a single mission. The primary use for flares is illumination. However, there are other effects to be exploited. During reconnaissance, flares force vehicle and foot traffic to seek cover, thereby reducing movement. Continued pressure on the road, rail, and water traffic routes may force the enemy to move in daytime when strike aircraft conditions are more favorable. Flares are a source of sustained harassment which result in increased apprehension and lowered morale among enemy forces. The C-27 does not have a flare launch capability.

2.5.3. (U) Psychological Operations (PSYOPS). Contingency PSYOPS are used to distribute information to friendly forces and to indigenous personnel. PSYOPS can be delivered through the use of the Airborne Speaker System (C-130 only) or by leaflet drop. Psychological warfare units will supply necessary information, tapes, leaflets, and briefings on subject material as required.

2.5.4. (U) Aerial Spray. One C-130 unit is specially equipped to provide aerial delivery of oil dispersants, herbicides, and insecticides to target areas.

2.5.5. (U) Aerial Firefighting. The USAF provides support to US Forest Service (USFS) forest fire fighting operations through a memorandum of understanding between the DoD and Departments of Agriculture and Interior which authorizes the use of military aircraft in combating fires. Since 1973, USAF capability has been activated over 25 times to provide additional fire suppression support beyond the capability of available commercial airborne fire fighting assets. Each activation involved participation in numerous fire fighting operations during large scale fires throughout the US. With proper equipment and aircrew procedures, this task could apply across the full spectrum of conflict. However, theater CINCs have neither developed nor stated their requirement for an airborne combat firefighting system. Existing equipment, which is not owned by DoD, is unprotected and unusable in hostile or urban environments. Additionally, aircrew procedures and tactics do not exist for employment of firefighting systems in hostile or urban environments. Therefore, equipment and procedures are currently limited to NON-HOSTILE OPERATIONS ONLY.

2.6. (U) Force Structure. Combat delivery must provide sufficient forces to cover two major regional conflicts (MRCs) simultaneously. Each MRC will consist of 10 fighter wing equivalents. Reference classified Annex C, Operational Concept Assumptions and Sustainment (U), for the combat-coded (CA) primary mission aircraft inventory(PMAI) required for each MRC.

2.6.1. (U) Total Force Mix. (Figure 2.15) The Air Force C-130 force structure fully exploits the synergy possible with a Total Force relationship. Air National Guard (ANG), Active, and Air Force Reserve (AFRES) forces act in concert to provide rapid response, reinforcement, and sustainment of US forces and missions worldwide. The theater airlift force mix stands at 34 percent Active, 66 percent ARC and is not programmed to change appreciably through the FYDP. Conversion of ANG and AFRES units from fighters to theater airlift in the past 10 years, along with reductions in the Active duty force, has increased the Reserve component's share of the theater airlift force from 57 percent in FY84 to 64 percent in FY94. Each component, Active and ARC, offers distinct advantages. Active forces fill the role of immediate response for indeterminate lengths of time and a high operations tempo. The Active duty theater airlift force provides the bulk of the initial response in any crisis. Some missions such as Adverse Weather Aerial Delivery (AWADS) and Pathfinder, are unique to the Active forces. Training, readiness of other services, and requirements during contingencies also call for an Active force.

Figure 2.15. (U) C-130 Force Mix

This Figure is UNCLASSIFIED

2.6.1.1. (U) ARC. The ARC provides, at a lower cost during peacetime, augmentation capability to mobilize and expand the size of the force when the situation dictates. The Reserve component's primary peacetime role is training to ensure their capability to work beside the Active component during wartime. Peacetime airlift is a by-product of this training. Recent events have called for a high peacetime operations tempo and higher than anticipated ARC involvement. As the tempo of ARC operations increases, the cost of maintaining and operating the force also increases.

2.6.2. (U) Operational Status of the Fleet. Tables 2.1. through 2.3. list the current size and capabilities of each AFRES, ANG, and Active C-130 unit as of FY95/4. All units are SKE formation airdrop qualified except for the 109 AG, which is non-formation airdrop only, and the 189 AG, which is not airdrop qualified. The four LC-130s of the 109 AG are equipped with skis to land in polar areas and are not included in theater airlift numerical requirements. Units identified as ADS may not have all of their aircraft modified. Additional planes continue to be modified.

ADS - Airlift Defensive Systems

AWADS - Adverse Weather Aerial Delivery System

E - C-130E

H - C-130H

MAFFS - Modular Airborne Fire Fighting Systems

MDS - Mission Design Series

PAI - Primary Aircraft Inventory

RWR - Radar Warning Receiver

SKE - Stationkeeping Equipment (enables formation flying in adverse weather)

Snowstorm - Early version of ADS (with 12 flare/chaff dispensers versus 18 for ADS)

Table 2.1. (U) ANG Operational Fleet Status

This Table is UNCLASSIFIED

See Legend for Table 2.1.

Table 2.2. (U) Active Operational Fleet Status

This Table is UNCLASSIFIED

See Legend for Table 2.1.

Table 2.3. (U) Air Force Reserve Operational Fleet Status

This Table is UNCLASSIFIED

3.1. (U) Current Assessment. A current assessment of combat delivery to conduct the ten operational tasks in threat (Combat) and non-threat (Military Operations Other Than War, MOOTW) environments was accomplished. The assessment was coordinated by HQ ACC/DRS with inputs from the Combat Delivery Mission Area Team (MAT) and the Mobility Technical Planning Integrated Product Team (TPIPT). The lack of modeling and simulation of combat delivery mandated this subjective assessment of combat delivery capabilities. A stoplight chart depicting current combat delivery capabilities is at Figure 3.1. Intratheater flight operations tasks are rated under combat and MOOTW conditions, while other tasks are independent of level of conflict. For each task and condition, green equals good capability, yellow equals limited capability, and red equals no capability.

3.1.1. (U) Intratheater Flight Operations. In general, tasks for which there is limited or no capability could be accomplished better in inclement weather with fleetwide AWADS equipment, and in combat conditions with fleetwide airlift defensive systems (chaff/flare dispensers and missile warning receivers) and radar warning receivers. Combat delivery aircraft are currently unable to perform IMC airland missions into austere landing zones due to lack of a ground collision avoidance system (GCAS) and an autonomous or combat delivery aircraft-transportable portable precision landing system. Night VFR operational capabilities could be greatly improved with integration of a fleetwide night vision imaging system. Currently, the

C-130 has only a limited capability to airdrop on covertly lighted drop zones. Combat delivery aircraft currently cannot degrade or prevent injury to aircrews from laser emissions, and theater aeromedical evacuation (AE) support equipment is not fully compatible with combat delivery aircraft. The C-27 currently has no IMC airdrop capability because it lacks the necessary equipment. Finally, current Modular Airborne Firefighting System (MAFFS) equipment is nearly unsupportable. NOTE: Aerial firefighting equipment and procedures are currently limited to NON-HOSTILE OPERATIONS ONLY.

Figure 3.1. - Combat Delivery Current Assessment

This figure is UNCLASSIFIED

3.1.2. (U) Other Tasks.

3.1.2.1. (U) Train Mission Ready Personnel. Simulation capabilities do not provide adequate mission training. Lack of an aircrew training system (ATS), including a weapon system trainer, for C-130H3 crews necessitates TDY travel to a contractor facility for completion of simulator continuation training events. Commonality with the aircraft is insufficient, training is unrealistic, and the course does not meet ATS standards. A C-130H3 ATS will provide standardized training for all CAF aircrews. In addition, the C-130J ORD requires an ATS acquisition with a ready-for-training date no later than initial aircraft delivery. Standardized courseware and contractor simulator training for CAF aircrews will ensure the same material is taught across the board. In addition, lack of night vision equipment degrades training. Combat delivery forces lack commonality/interoperability in configuration and maintenance, increasing training cost and time.

3.1.2.2. (U) Reduce Operations and Support Costs and Sustain Efficient Operations. Multiple C-130 configurations increase complexity and cost of logistics for combat delivery forces, and subsystem sustainability is becoming cost prohibitive.

3.1.2.3. (U) Maintain Timely Flow from Point of Embarkation to Point of Debarkation. Combat delivery aircraft lack expansion capability to adapt planned ICAO/FAA air traffic control system modernization.

3.1.2.4. (U) Pack/configure/assemble (for movement) people, equipment, data, spares, consumables, POL, and munitions. Combat delivery aircraft cannot carry all the Army equipment required to be airlifted within the theater. Also, combat delivery forces lack electronic technical orders, causing added cost for paper manuals and wasted man-hours in updateing manuals.

3.2. (U) Operational Tasks. In February 1995, the MAT and TPIPT conducted an analytical hierarchy process analysis which resulted in a "relative importance" rating of each operational task (Figure 3.2).

Operational Task Relative Importance

Train mission readiness 1.500

Sustain efficient operations 1.500

Airdrop 2.250

Airland 2.250

Aeromedical evacuation .750

Support psychological Ops .250

Deliver/maintain timely flow of people, etc. .750

Pack/configure /assemble people, etc. .250

Aerial firefighting operations .250

Aerial spray operations .250

Figure 3.2. - Combat Delivery Operational Tasks

This figure is UNCLASSIFIED

3.3. (U) Deficiencies. A MAT consolidated list of proposed current needs was developed through a review of Modification Proposals, Mission Needs Statements, Operational Requirements Documents, and formal correspondence submitted by user commands to the MAT OPR. This list of proposed needs was augmented by a TPIPT/MAT review of projected threat capabilities, current aircraft life-cycles, test plan final reports, defense planning guidance, and engineering studies of current aircraft. The lack of formal studies and analysis on combat delivery’s current capabilities mandated the subjective validation of these needs by the MAT. Needs validated by the MAT were defined and incorporated into the proposed deficiency list.

3.4. (U) Task-to-Deficiency. In February 1995, the MAT/TPIPT conducted a QFD analysis comparing each proposed deficiency against the weighted operational tasks. Each deficiency was scored based upon its effect on combat delivery to accomplish the assigned task. The result was a weighted and prioritized list of deficiencies. Linkages between deficiencies and tasks are depicted in Figures 3.3 and 3.4.

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Figure 3.3. - Combat Delivery Task-to-Deficiencies

This Figure is UNCLASSIFIED

Figure 3.4. - Combat Delivery Task-to-Deficiencies (Cont)

This Figure is UNCLASSIFIED

3.5.1. (U) Combat delivery forces lack adequate detection and defensive systems.

3.5.1.1. (U) Combat delivery aircraft require defensive systems to detect and defeat UNPLANNED encounters with hostile air and ground threats. This capability will allow combat delivery aircraft a measure of survivability while exiting the threat envelope. Current and planned defensive capabilities on combat delivery aircraft DO NOT give combat delivery aircraft the capability to deliberately penetrate a known hostile threat envelope.

3.5.1.2. (U) Combat, combat support, and participation in military operations other-than-war confirmed the requirement for Electronic Combat (EC) systems on C-130 aircraft, even in the most undeveloped regions of the world. Currently, airlift C-130 aircraft are funded for approximately only 57% of the fleet to receive the Airlift Defensive System (ADS) with missile warning and chaff/flare dispensing systems. Additionally, only 16% of the fleet is funded to receive radar warning receivers (RWR), although another 14% will receive wiring for the systems without the component boxes. Currently a limited number of aircraft will also be modified with limited RF countermeasures to be used against unplanned mobile or transportable threats. Current aircraft EC systems are not integrated, distracting crewmembers from other flying tasks. Aircraft are not like-configured, hampering training and operations. Simulator modifications are planned but lagging behind aircraft modification, and previous delays in technical order development are being corrected. Some support equipment items are in short supply or unavailable because of funding shortfalls. We need a fully configured fleet with standardized, integrated systems, complete and realistic training device support, complete and continuously updated technical orders, and all necessary support systems. Additionally, manning, funding, and testing are required to support C-130 EC systems to ensure combat programs and software are continuously updated and fielded to meet the most current threats.

3.5.1.3. (U) Combat delivery assets are inherently vulnerable to all types of threats. Typical mission profiles require formations to fly at high and low altitudes and relatively slow airspeeds, particularly on the run-in to the objective area. Aircrews plan simulated threats on nearly all low level training missions, participate in Red Flag, Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC), Combat Aerial Delivery School, and Advanced Airlift Tactics Training Center employment and resupply missions, and practice threat avoidance tactics on a regular basis to minimize their exposure. This realistic training has evolved over decades and will help crews to implement airlift defensive systems, but it is not a substitute for the modifications. Tactics alone will not defeat the threats.

3.5.1.4. (U) Installation of fleetwide defensive systems on combat delivery assets would provide detection of and protection from certain man-portable infrared (IR) surface-to-air missiles, light weapons fire, and radio frequency (RF) guided missiles. These systems include ADS, RWR, crew protection armor, and RF jamming systems. These systems are being installed on various parts of the fleet, but depending on the system, only between 6% and 57% of the aircraft will receive the modifications.

3.5.1.5. (U) Current C-130 EW systems are not integrated, therefore the missile launch warning is unable to differentiate between IR and RF missiles. Automatic dispensing of flares is possible, but chaff must be manually dispensed after RWR declaration of RF threats. This increases aircrew workload and the possibility that aircraft could sustain hostile damage due to incorrect countermeasures dispensing. ADS on most AFRES aircraft use older AN/ALE-40 flare/chaff dispensers that are not standard with the remaining aircraft, and do not allow future automatic integration with RWR or other systems. These dispensers should be replaced with AN/ALE-47 dispensers to solve the configuration and future integration problems.

3.5.1.6. (U) C-130 aircraft suffer from a lack of rearward vision due to the size and position of scanner/loadmaster windows. In an air threat environment there is an urgent need for the best possible 360 degree vision for the aircrew.

3.5.1.6.1. (U) C-130 aircrews have used a rear vision device (bubble) for ten years to spot air threats, SAM launches, and AAA and small arms fire. A crewmember must position himself on the top bunk, maintain a constant lookout through the bubble with an incomplete field of vision, and notify the pilot of the position and type of threat before evasive action is taken. Effective use of the rear vision device relies heavily on alertness of the "lookout" and good crew coordination. However, it should not be considered an alternative to chaff/flare dispensers and a missile warning receiver.

3.5.1.6.2. (U) The aircraft cannot be pressurized with the rear vision device installed. The bubble cannot be installed inflight because of safety considerations. As a result of being non-pressurizable, this bubble is restricted to use on missions that could remain unpressurized for the entire flight. Deployments or missions involving high altitude ingress to an objective area preclude the use of the bubble. A pressurizable bubble has been developed and is in use by the ANG. This bubble increases the flexibility of possible missions, while still affording the aircrew with the best possible rearward visibility in a threat environment.

3.5.1.7. (U) The paratroop windows in most C-130 aircraft are inadequate for threat detection. The small size of the windows coupled with the black out "shower caps" ring, severely limits the aircrew members viewing angle. A crew member's helmet comes in contact with the ring three inches from the window, limiting visibility to no more than a 45 degree field of vision. These optical conditions severely limit the aircrews ability to visually acquire threats from the optimum attack angles of above or behind. The current paratroop door configuration provides no physical support or restraint for the observer. Today, the aircrew member must stand on uneven footing in a semi-crouched position while the aircraft, if engaged, will be subjected to -1 to +3 Gs. The current configuration greatly increases the odds that the aircrew member in this position will be injured during an engagement. The C-130 requires larger windows and an integral scanner’s seat in the paratroop doors to aid in threat acquisition. An observer position on the cargo door, similar to those on the AC-130U gunship, may be an acceptable solution.

3.5.2. (U) Combat delivery forces are dependent upon limited supply of material handling equipment (MHE). The Air Mobility Command (AMC) enroute structure has been drastically reduced in the last five years, and with it the MHE needed for timely loading/unloading of transient combat delivery aircraft. The lack of MHE has been identified as a deficiency in AMC’s Airlift MAP. The lack of available 60K loaders to support C-5 and C-17 operations must be remedied using already scarce MHE that would be normally tasked to support combat delivery aircraft. The Air Force currently lacks a C-27 transportable forklift capable of being delivered to C-27-only airfields to assist in loading operations. Currently C-27 crews must onload/offload by hand or combat offload at C-27-only airfields.

3.5.3. (U) Specific theater combat delivery tasks are not fully articulated. Warfighting CINCs must specify roles and missions required of combat delivery forces to support their specific operations plans. In a recent example of this shortfall, a theater CINC staff had neither developed nor stated their requirement for an airborne combat firefighting system, yet demanded this capability from combat delivery forces during a contingency operation. Deliberate war planning combat delivery force structure must be validated to ensure sufficient force allocation.

3.5.4. (U) Combat delivery forces are limited in their protection and decontamination of aircraft, cargo, and cargo compartment. Current combat delivery aircraft lack capability to successfully operate in a nuclear, biological, or chemical (NBC) environment. Reconstitution of aircraft and parts outside of the area of operations by air logistics center personnel has never been addressed for combat delivery aircraft. The two-level maintenance concept exacerbates this deficiency.

3.5.5. (U) Combat delivery aircraft lack sufficient capability to operate in a low light, low visibility environment. Combat delivery aircraft must be able to conduct flight operations 24 hours a day in support of peacetime and wartime taskings. To best accomplish a joint mission, the US Armed Forces must have the combined air forces to prosecute around-the-clock operations, thus denying an enemy freedom of action in what was previously a night sanctuary. To support this mission, Air Force aircraft must have a night operational capability which includes the employment of Night Vision Goggles (NVGs) during all phases of a combat mission. Combat experience in Operation DESERT STORM confirmed the tactical benefits gained with night attack, and lessons learned indicated that operational effectiveness could be enhanced by the use of NVGs. NVGs are being acquired to ensure CAF C-130s are survivable during night operations. The proliferation of NVGs also increases the probability of detection/tracking of C-130 aircraft that do not have NVIS exterior lighting.

3.5.6. (U) Manning shortfalls in key areas limit mission accomplishment. ARC, USAFE, and PACAF aircrew manning ratios are lower than those of ACC units, which does not allow them to sustain operations at the same Optempo. Therefore, warfighting CINCs will not receive the same sortie generation capability from non-ACC units.

3.5.7. (U) Mission planning systems lack flexibility, efficiency, user friendliness, or DoD interoperability. Combat delivery aircraft require robust, portable, and fixed mission planning systems that allow rapid integration of operational and intelligence data. This facilitates rapid mission changes dictated by changing taskings and threats.

3.5.8. (U) Combat control teams (CCTs) lack sufficient equipment for mission accomplishment. Current shortfalls in portable precision landing systems and lightweight airfield lighting systems degrade the ability of CCTs to support combat delivery operations at austere landing zones.

3.5.9. (U) Combat delivery forces lack commonality/interoperability in configuration and maintenance, increasing training cost and time. The proliferation of uniquely configured combat delivery aircraft creates a disproportionate workload for air logistics center and unit maintenance personnel. This problem is typified by the lack of any standardized, credible technical order (TO) description for even our older C-130Es. The lack of credible TOs inhibits training and operation of the current C-130 fleet. For successful configuration management, acquisition of combat delivery aircraft must be programmed on a total force basis, with equal priority assigned to modernization of ARC units IAW Air Force Policy Directive 10-3.

3.5.10. (U) Combat delivery aircraft are dependent on reduced enroute/theater support, limiting mission flexibility. The AMC-supported enroute support structure has been reduced, which adversely impacts non-AMC assigned combat delivery forces. Without sufficient enroute maintenance/C2/aerial port support, combat delivery forces cannot adequately maintain peacetime Optempo in support of humanitarian/peacekeeping operations.

3.5.11. (U) Combat delivery forces are limited in their detection of NBC threats. There is no current capability (other than litmus paper) for combat delivery aircraft to detect the presence of NBC contaminants. This is a critical deficiency, as combat delivery aircraft have the ability to transport contaminants across AORs without aircrew knowledge and contaminate other clean areas.

3.5.12. (U) Simulation capabilities do not provide adequate mission training.

3.5.12.1 (U) With half of the CAF C-130 fleet composed of C-130H2 and C-130H3 model aircraft, there is currently only one C-130H2 WST planned to support training. In contrast, the C-130E portion of the fleet is supported by seven WSTs. The C-130 fleet requires additional

C-130H Aircrew Training Devices (ATDs) to provide an equal level of training to both C-130E and C-130H aircrews. Congressional language directed modernization of the CAF C-130 fleet through the purchase of new aircraft. The requirements vehicle for the acquisition program is the C-130H ORD, which requires the procurement of state-of-the-art C-130H3 ATDs commensurate with force structure plans. These ATDs must be FAA Level III certified devices with modernized/updated ATD visual and landmass systems. In addition, the visual and landmass systems on nine C-130 WSTs require replacement. In order to provide realistic NVG training, a new visual and landmass that trains a student in a variety of atmospheric conditions, i.e., different moon illuminations, cultural lighting, rain and starlight, will be needed. According to Armstrong Laboratories, crewmembers using NVGs will require 25 hours of experience to see the effects, limitations, and illusions in the aircraft.

3.5.12.2 (U) C-27 has no flight simulator, only a paper mock-up of the flight deck which depicts an outdated instrument panel.

3.5.13. (U) Combat delivery aircraft cockpit architecture and design restrict aircrew effectiveness. The lack of human factors analysis in determining the placement of new avionics components on combat delivery aircraft adversely affects mission accomplishment and the aircrew’s ability to recognize and correct problems.

3.5.14. (U) Training capabilities for aircrew and maintainers are inadequate. Combat delivery forces lack part-task trainers and other training aids needed to effectively utilize scarce training time.

3.5.15. (U) Lack of configuration control and commonality limits combat delivery forces’ flexibility. C-130 aircrews often cannot interfly with other C-130 units due to dissimilar cockpit configurations.

3.5.17. (U) Combat delivery aircraft cannot carry all the Army equipment required to be airlifted within the theater. ACC, as the lead command for theater airlift and combat delivery aircraft, cannot fulfill the warfighting CINCs’ requirement for intratheater movement of outsized cargo. Outsized cargo [e.g., multiple launch rocket system (MLRS)] requires a 12 foot wide cargo compartment. The US Army has designed equipment required to successfully prosecute the ground war that cannot be transported in the theater by theater-assigned combat delivery aircraft. Warfighting CINCs must rely upon strategic assigned airlifters that they do not currently control to satisfy this deficiency.

3.5.18. (U) Combat delivery forces are limited in their ability to precision airdrop. Aircrews receive intensive low level airdrop training and regularly practice basic dead reckoning and visual airdrops. Factors inherent in our present airdrop systems lend themselves to errors which only material solutions can correct, i.e., increased radar reliability, more accurate ballistic wind sensors, and greater navigation accuracy.

3.5.19. (U) Combat delivery aircraft lack data base and charts for worldwide mission planning and execution. Factors include lack of reliable and detailed worldwide navigational charts and digitized terrain data. These shortfalls adversely impact aircrew ability to safely conduct effective low level operations in austere environments.

3.5.20.1. (U) The C-130 electrical system produces unstable voltage, causing four-engine power loss and interface difficulties with newer digital avionics systems.

3.5.20.2. (U) The C-130 fuel quantity system includes analog indicators with a MTBF of less than 1600 hours. The fuel tanks also require extensive in-tank maintenance.

3.5.20.3. (U) The APQ-122 radar on AWADS C-130Es has a mean time between failure (MTBF) of 17 hours and is nearly unsupportable due to lack of spare parts.

3.5.20.4. (U) APN-59 radar units on non-AWADS C-130s are becoming increasingly unreliable and unsupportable.

3.5.20.5. (U) C-130 Stationkeeping Equipment (SKE) used in formation is becoming unsupportable and requires modernization. It has a low Mean Time Between Failures (MTBF) and is too expensive to maintain.

3.5.21. (U) Combat delivery flight management systems are a limiting factor in mission accomplishment. SCNS units have already reached or exceeded their processing capacity. The current SCNS, an integrated navigation and radio management system which provides the aircrew with inertial and Doppler-based navigation solutions, was not originally designed to manage the number of avionics components now b