[Mission Area Plans]

 

Air Force Modernization Planning

 

Strategic Air Defense

Mission Area Plan

FY1996

 

 

 

General, USAF

 

15 November 1995

OPR: HQ ACC/DRC

Phone: DSN 574-2269

Comm: (804) 764-2269

 

Executive Summary

Strategic Air Defense is an umbrella term which includes all required functions and assets to plan, execute, and monitor theater air combat operations in North America. It includes automated systems, sensors, communications connectivity, logistics support, and personnel necessary to fight and effectively defend North America. This MAP discusses the capabilities needed by the Combat Air Forceís (CAF) continental theater command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence systems to support the planning and execution of the air war.

Mission Area Assessment (MAA). In the context of this MAP, the national strategy is to protect the sovereignty of North America. The threat of greatest concern is from the proliferation of technologically advanced weapons systems with increased accuracy that can be delivered against key command and control nodes in North America. Of similar concern are those technological threats that will operate solely in the electromagnetic spectrum, necessitating the need for increased information warfare (IW) protection efforts.

Mission Needs Analysis (MNA). The operational concept for strategic air defense is to maintain constant surveillance, warning, and attack capability for defense of the North American continent and maintenance of air sovereignty. The forces/systems must be sustained in order to maintain readiness and achieve victory. Significant limitations exist in the areas of data processing and display, track detection, identification by type/intentions, and Beyond Line of Sight (BLOS) communications. Additional areas considered deficient include detection and tracking of low observables and low altitude targets, and Ultra High Frequency (UHF) LOS communications.

Mission Area Plan (MAP). Existing inventory items and their inherent growth potential allows a near- to mid-term modification or modernization plan. Outright acquisition of new systems is generally envisioned to meet far-term objectives. New emphasis on use of Commercial Off-The-Shelf (COTS) and Government Off-The-Shelf (GOTS) equipment, as well as reusable and modular software, may allow acquisition of a new capability, inexpensively, to meet near- to mid-term needs. Notable in this category is the planned replacement of the R/SOCC computer and display consoles to increase data handling, track correlation, and display capabilities. The long range goal of strategic air defense systems architecture is to convert functionally unique command and control centers into multifunctional centers sharing common software, hardware, and communications to perform operations.

Impact: It is possible to meet the current and future threat to North American airspace and US sovereignty, but only if current programs and enhancements continue to satisfy near- to mid-term shortfalls. Additionally, technological advances must be applied to far-term modifications and the development of new programs. A "systems approach" is imperative when dealing with strategic air defense and should be used to ensure bits and pieces are not replaced without a view to the overall strategic atmospheric mission.

 

MISSION AREA PLAN

for

STRATEGIC AIR DEFENSE

Table of Contents

 

Page

   

Mission Area Plan Overview

1

   

1. Introduction

1

   

2. Mission Area Assessment (MAA)

3

   

2.1. Strategies-to-Task Analysis

3

   

2.2. Threat

3

   

2.3. Concept of Operations

5

   

2.4. Operational Concepts

6

   

2.5. Operational/Functional Tasks

6

   

3. Mission Needs Analysis

11

   

3.1. Mission Area Current Assessment

11

   

3.2. Initial Analysis

15

   

4. Mission Area Plan

16

   

4.1. Weapons System/Capability Modernization Roadmaps

17

   

4.2. Mission Area Critical/Enabling Technologies

23

   

4.3. MAP Science and Technology Products

32

   

5. Mission Area Post Investment Assessment

33

   

6. Summation

34

Overview. Strategic Air Defense is an umbrella term which includes all required functions and assets to plan, execute, and monitor theater air combat operations in North America. It includes automated systems, sensors, communications connectivity, logistics support, and personnel necessary to fight and effectively defend North America. Strategic air defense supports the principle of Unity of Command by enabling the Commander in Chief, North American Aerospace Defense Command (CINCNORAD) to control his forces in a united and coordinated manner. Strategic air defense is absolutely necessary for aerospace forces to perform aerospace control and supports force application, force enhancement, and force support. Also, strategic air defense is the means by which the tenant of centralized control/decentralized execution is performed. An information revolution is occurring and will be felt on the future battlefield. This revolution places knowledge, in various forms, at the core of military power

1. Introduction. The Strategic Air Defense Mission Area Plan discusses the capabilities needed by the Combat Air Forceís (CAFís) continental theater command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence (C4I) systems to support the planning and execution of the air war. This MAP is related to other MAPs in that this is the core information and tasking source for weapons systems which are also tasked to perform missions covered by other MAPs. References to other MAPs can be found in the individual weapons systemsí paragraphs. Information for this MAP was gathered via combined CAF staff, user working groups, and technology discussions with ESC/XRT, AFMC personnel, and laboratory representatives. This MAP supports requirements definitions, research priorities, and future investment strategies. The baseline for this effort is the strategic air defense role in a theater conventional scenario in a single major regional conflict (MRC).

1.2. Critical aspects of strategic air defense revolve around two basic assumptions. The first is that defense of North American airspace will continue to be a mission requirement. The second is that the threat against North America will remain significant as we move into the future. The first assumption is amply supported by current defense planning guidance. The second can only be based on accurate intelligence assessments. Forces will be employed anywhere in North America and these operations must be sustained for the duration of the conflict. The theater of operations includes remote operating locations which rely on both space and ground based communications capabilities to connect the deployed forces to theater/command headquarters.

1.3. In order to operate in a Joint Service and allied environment, air defense systems will be required to integrate and interface with non-Air Force systems and allied systems. Additionally, air defense systems must interface with national systems contributing to theater operations. This will require passing data, imagery, and information among these participants in order to plan for and employ these varied forces.

1.4. The scope of this MAP focuses on getting useful information to the warfighter centered around the concept of CINCNORADís ability to assess, plan, direct, execute, and monitor. The ability to rapidly deploy and fight on arrival, in a coordinated and self-sustaining manner, is critical.

1.5. The Integrated Priority List (IPL) is the CINCís method of identifying his most critical concerns: "The IPLs are intended to provide visibility for those few key problem areas which, in the judgment of a CINC, require the highest priority attention by the Department of Defense in finding solutions" (DoD Instruction 7045.7). Integrated Product Teams (IPT) identify mission deficiencies that drive modifications, new acquisitions, tactics and procedures updates, and key technologies. Long range force modernization integrates these concerns. The IPTs ensure MAP deficiencies are addressed in the CINC IPL and Program Objective Memorandum (POM)/Resource Management Team processes through the Forces Division within Headquarters, Air Combat Commandís (ACC) Directorate of Plans.

1.6. The MAP Office of Primary Responsibility will review this MAP as needed to ensure the effective integration of the latest aerospace and weapons technologies into the force structure and examine the effects of changing fiscal and environmental constraints.

 

2. Mission Area Assessment (MAA).

2.1. Strategies-to-Tasks (STT) Analysis. The Major Commands (MAJCOMs) identify mission needs through the MAA process. Using the Defense Planning Guidance as a base, the formal Combat Air Forces MAA was conducted and an STT methodology was used to determine the linkages from the National Security Strategy down to the tasks that are the primary responsibility of strategic air defense (Figure 2-1). Then, an analytical process was used to prioritize Theater/Regional Objectives down to the deficiencies. The process used was a system where linkages between items are determined by matching the items and then rating their relationship (weak, medium, strong). These methodologies were used to standardize the CAF MAPs to the maximum extent possible and enable senior leadership to prioritize the order of deficiencies to which they may want to apply solutions. An integrated product team process (a combination of the AFMC Technical Planning Integrated Product Team (TPIPT) and the "User Command" Mission Area Team) incorporates modifications, new acquisition, tactics/procedures updates, and key technologies into modernization roadmaps to correct identified deficiencies. The result of the process is the MAP. During the CAF MAA process, ACC reviewed its tasking and assigned missions. These plans assign specific operational military objectives for Air Force assets. MAJCOMs continually evaluate plans and Joint Staff guidance for changes in assigned missions and objectives that may change the tasks required for that mission.

2.2. Threat. The nature of the threats against North America has changed dramatically since the collapse of the Soviet Union. In the foreseeable future, threats to the US, its allies, and its friends will come from a variety of sources. Among these are the ability of potential adversaries to acquire or use weapons of mass destruction, attempts by regional powers hostile to US interests to gain hegemony over their regions, and internal conflicts among ethnic, national, religious, or tribal groups that threaten innocent lives and undermine stability and international order. Any potential adversary in an MRC may present a formidable threat to the US military by possessing modern weapons and motivated personnel. For example, US forces may face a future adversary who possesses current high technology weapons. The threat from potentially hostile forces will cover a broad spectrum, from employment of numerous, older weapons systems to the employment of modern, accurate, and increasingly sophisticated weapons and command and control systems against the US. In the context of this MAP, the threat of greatest concern is from the proliferation of technologically advanced weapons systems with increased accuracy that can be delivered against key command and control nodes in North America. Of similar concern are those technological threats that will operate solely in the electromagnetic spectrum, necessitating the need for increased information warfare (IW) protection efforts. In summary, due to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, delivery means, and guidance systems, threats to STRAD systems may come from either high or low technology weapons delivered through the atmosphere and systems that operate solely in the electromagnetic spectrum.

Figure 2-1

2.2.1. System Specific Threats. The cruise missile threat to North America remains dynamic. Only Russia has both the systems and platforms capable of placing a weapon within North America. However, more countries are expected to possess land attack cruise missiles in their inventories. These systems will become more sophisticated in the near-term before stabilizing over the next 10 to 15 years. It is possible that, given extensive marketing, very potent systems will be in the hands of third world nations not now considered a threat. To be effective against North America, cruise missiles require a "first stage carrier." Russia maintains a viable fleet of intercontinental bombers and submarines which are capable of carrying cruise missiles. Most other countries will need similar "first stage carriers" of some type for current design cruise missiles.

2.2.2. Information Warfare Threat. The air defense system is a system of systems used to plan, execute, and monitor theater air operations in North America. It consists of computers, sensors, communications connectivity, logistics support, and personnel networked to form an automated infrastructure which provides for the security of North America. All aspects of this infrastructure are vulnerable to a variety of threats from a variety of sources, including direct intrusion. There is not enough data available to identify where and when intrusion into the system will occur, but indications and incidents clearly establish this as a growing and dangerous pattern of the information warfare threat. Intelligence collection against those who may exploit the air defense system is in its infancy. However, as other countries acquire new technologies, they may attempt to use them against us in a type of warfare that we havenít seen before. Todayís communications/networks infrastructure allows intelligence agents to conduct collection activities without ever leaving their country. For the STRAD MAP, the emerging IW threat is of great concern.

2.3. Concept of Operations. All of the sensor, fusion, control, and combat systems work together to provide CINCNORAD and his commanders with the capability to defend North American airspace from threat, regardless of alert levels. The sensor systems augment one another to some degree to provide varying levels of geographic, altitude, and range coverage. The Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) augments both the sensors and the Region/Sector Operations Control Centers (R/SOCC) in providing a highly flexible command and control platform for long range detection and engagement of airborne threats. Sensor data from all available sources is fed to command, fusion, or intelligence centers where it is processed and correlated with available flight planning data from several US and other government sources. Applicable data is then displayed to allow operational commanders to make decisions as to level of response required, if any, from monitoring to neutralizing or destroying the target. Ground based systems are usually fixed although some are technically mobile. AWACS is used based on need and availability. In addition to long range detection, it is used to provide higher confidence level identification and monitoring of ambiguous threats. It can also be used as a gap filler in case of problems with primary systems.

Figure 2-2

2.4. Operational Concepts. The operational concept for strategic air defense is to maintain constant surveillance, warning, and attack capability for defense of the North American continent and maintenance of air sovereignty. The forces/systems must be sustained in order to maintain readiness and achieve victory.

2.4.1. Readiness. Readiness is maintained through exercise of the strategic air defense system 24 hours a day, 7 days a week. Additionally, both live and simulated exercises such as Amalgam Warrior and Vigilant Overview provide an arena for units to employ their skills and training against the threat.

2.4.2. Deployment. Most sensors, communications links, and command and control assets are fixed and therefore not deployed to other theaters of operations. A key exception is AWACS, which plays a crucial role in extending North American sensor and C2 coverage, but could be tasked to other theaters. Aerial refueling support is critical to achieve long-range aircraft response for monitoring, neutralization, or destruction of the threat. Strategic lift is critical in deploying air defense forces to their forward deployed locations.

2.4.3. Employment. The overall system is employed on a continuous basis. When air defense fighters scramble, they establish communications with command and control elements, either AWACS, the ROCC/SOCC, or both. They then conduct counterair missions as required by the appropriate commander.

2.4.4. Sustainment. Logistics support, via intra-theater airlift assets, is necessary to provide critical items for short term contingencies or air defense emergencies, as well as strategic air defense over a long period.

2.4.5. Reconstitution. Once the conflict is over, fighter units will redeploy and replenish war reserve material stockpiles as quickly as possible to enable them to respond again when needed.

2.5. Operational Tasks. Operational tasks in support of air sovereignty revolve around the basic concept of operations. Sensors conduct constant surveillance of the airspace around North America to provide threat warning. That data is passed over space and ground based communication lines to the AWACS and ROCC/SOCCs for display and identification. Based on that identification and other available information the threat is characterized, necessary actions taken, and warnings sent. Strategic aerospace defense systems are a key part of overall Integrated Tactical Warning and Attack Assessment (ITW/AA). These systems allow rapid employment of counterforce to successfully overcome a threat to North American airspace. This threat is dynamic, evolving from the scenario of the mass attack to the lone drug smuggler in a small, low flying, slow aircraft.

Figure 2-3

2.5.1 Surveillance capabilities must include detection of low observables at both high and low altitudes and at long or extremely long range. Extended range is needed to detect stand-off weapons systems such as cruise missile launch platforms.

2.5.2 Real-time or near-real-time attack warning is crucial to proper employment of available weapons to counter threats. The earliest possible positive identification must be provided to allow maximum time to respond to the threat prior to its reaching the North American continent.

2.5.3. Response management occurs as a result of linking surveillance data with command centers and presenting data in a usable form so commanders can make rapid decisions as to the appropriate response. Jam resistant, secure, and robust communications links with high volume throughput, along with high capacity processors, are required to effectively employ the continuous large volume of sensor data.

2.5.4. Force Structure (Figures 2-4, 2-5, 2-6).

2.5.4.1. The backbone of strategic air defense sensor segment is the Joint Surveillance System (JSS). Within the JSS, the FAA/Air Force Radar Replacement (FARR) program replaces current radars with new air route surveillance radars (ARSR), specifically the ARSR-4. Other sensor systems tying into the strategic air defense network are the North Warning System (NWS) with AN/FPS-117 long range radars and AN/FPS-124 short range, unattended radars; the Iceland Air Defense System (IADS) with AN/FPS-117 long range radars; the Caribbean Basin Radar Network (CBRN) with AN/TPS-70 and AN/FPS-67 long range radars; the Over-the-Horizon Backscatter (OTH-B) and Relocatable Over-the-Horizon Radar (ROTHR) systems; and the Tethered Aerostat Radar System (TARS) with short range radars. Figure 2-4 depicts the numbers of fielded sensor systems and their projected operational life.

Figure 2-4

2.5.4.2. Command and control and computer systems elements of strategic air defense systems are embodied by the R/SOCC with the FYQ-93 computer processor and associated display devices. Figure 2-5 depicts the number and projected operational life of battle management systems within the air defense architecture. The FYQ-X is the expected replacement for the FYQ-93 under the Region/Sector Operations Control Center (R/SOCC) Modernization program, the exact nomenclature has not been determined. Similarly, the HMD-X is the expected display system replacement under the R/SOCC Modernization program, its nomenclature has not been determined.

Figure 2-5

 

2.5.4.3. Communications systems and networks are vital to the conduct of strategic air defense operations. Long haul terrestrial communications are not depicted in this MAP. Their upgrade is generally dependent on commercial systems upgrades at the discretion of the service provider. Space based systems are not depicted due to the relatively low numbers in use. This in no way diminishes their importance, but strategic air defense does not place any unique requirements on satellite communications systems. Execution of the air defense mission is conducted over ground-air-ground radios. These radios are located at the JSS sites and several Ground to Air Transmitter/Receiver sites in the CONUS. Figure 2-6 depicts the numbers of radios, receivers, and transmitters in place and their projected operational life.

Figure 2-6

 

3. Mission Needs Analysis (MNA). Once a task is identified, MAJCOMs conduct an MNA by analyzing the factors which impact current and programmed capability to accomplish that task. The task-to-need process evaluates our force structure, the environment, and the threat we expect to encounter while conducting the assigned mission. Once deficiencies are identified, doctrine, tactics, and training (non-material solutions) are examined to determine if changes in these areas can solve the deficiency. A Mission Needs Statement documents the changes if modifications to current systems or new systems are required.

3.1. Mission Area Current Assessment.

3.1.1. Strategic air defense deficiencies stem from shortfalls in our current systems, procedures and/or tactics, advances/changes in enemy capabilities or tactics (i.e., advances in hostile aircraft radar signature designs), wide area surveillance, and Beyond Line of Sight (BLOS) communications availability. Also, there are technical obstacles in securing current systems and interoperating with current sister service systems.

3.1.2. Significant limitations exist in the areas of data processing and display, track detection, identification by type/intentions, and BLOS communications. Additional areas considered deficient include detection and tracking of low observables and low altitude targets, and ultra high frequency (UHF) line of sight (LOS) communications. Deficiencies may be corrected through one or more of the following: a change in our procedures/tactics; increased/improved training; acquiring more, newer, or better systems; and technical/scientific breakthroughs resulting in significantly more capable systems which must then be acquired. Current assessments, presented as deficiencies, are in Table 3-1. These prioritized deficiencies prevent the operational tasks listed earlier from being accomplished or being accomplished as efficiently as desired. The affected strategic air defense elements are listed to better focus efforts at solutions.

Rank

Deficiency

Deficiency Explanation

Element

1.

R/SOCC unable to perform mission without upgrades.

R/SOCC currently operates at or near capacity and needs upgrades to meet mission requirements. Examples include: open architecture, distributed processing, computer upgrades to increase processing capability, increased memory, improved displays, multi-source data fusion, etc.

Command and Control

2.

Sensors unable to see all targets.

Low altitude and low radar cross section (RCS) targets cannot always be detected by current air defense sensors.

Sensors

3.

Inability to add new missions and change hardware and/or software

Due to closed architectures and proprietary software, current hardware and software cannot be easily or dynamically modified or replaced to cover new and changing mission requirements. Similarly, systems are not responsive to improvements in technology. Additionally, its method of display prohibits rapid and dynamic update to map and geodesic adaptation files.

Command and Control

4.

Lack of ability to remotely rekey cryptographic material at the sensor site

With the unmanning of radar sites due to the installation of next generation radars (ARSR-4; FPS-117), the capability to use Mode IV and other cryptographic devices will be lost. This represents a loss in mission capability.

Communications

5.

Current sensors unable to track from origin

Current sensors cannot track atmospheric targets on a global scale. Supports NORAD requirement for wide area surveillance.

Sensors

 

Rank

Deficiency

Deficiency Explanation

Element

6.

Unable to efficiently maintain air defense equipment

Current equipment uses closed architecture, proprietary software, and multiple "add-on" components. Differences in equipment coupled with equipment age has resulted in many items which are either unsupportable or expensive to manufacture and maintain.

Command and Control, Sensors

7.

Current processing systems and data bases unable to move/store large volumes of data

Neither the processing systems, communications systems, nor the data bases have the capacity to move and store required volumes of intelligence and radar data. Many small dedicated circuits tie up satellite transponder space. Therefore, the receipt of information by the warfighter is not adequate.

Command and Control

8.

Unable to efficiently operate current air defense equipment

Current equipment is not able to take advantage of improvements in software and technology relating to automation and picture fusion. As a result, additional personnel are required to operate display consoles and manually sort data.

Command and Control

9.

Lack of adequate beyond line of site communications

BLOS communications are needed for long range control of air defense forces in the detection of an attack. Supports ITW/AA. Supports NORAD Statement of Requirement.

Communications

10.

Force structure limits sensor coverage

The impact of budget reductions has forced a reduction in the number of radar sites available for use. As radar sites are closed, overlap in radar coverage will be lost allowing gaps for threat access.

Sensors

11.

Lack of responsive, automated collection/ requirements management capability.

Lack of a responsive, automated collection and requirements management schema, due to deficiencies in both systems and training/awareness, prevents the R/SOCC and unit level intelligence activities from maintaining clear visibility over requests for intelligence

Intelligence

12.

Sensors/computer systems unable to positively identify friends and hostiles.

Unable to positively identify friend from foe with current Mark XII Identification Friend or Foe/Selective Identification Feature (IFF/SIF) equipment.

Command and Control, Sensors

Rank

Deficiency

Deficiency Explanation

Element

13.

Forces unable to reconstitute due to lack of reconstitution plans

There are no set procedures and only limited system support for the reconstitution and return to operations of systems placed in either cold or warm storage.

Sensors

14.

Wide spectrum and electromagnetic interference problems between sensors

Broad transmission spectrum in the FPS-124 short range radars causes electromagnetic interference with adjacent sensors and civilian systems.

Sensors

15.

Limited ground-air-ground radio coverage

Holes exist in UHF radio coverage for ground-air-ground radio communications between air defense fighters and the SOCCs. With the fielding of HAVE QUICK II radios at JSS sites, the radio coverage will be further reduced due to the power output of the radio.

Communications

16.

Sensors unable to meet future operational requirements

The ARSR-4, FPS-117, and FPS-124 need continued upgrade to meet future operational needs. A partial list of improvements to capability and reliability is: improved Meam Time Between Failures, radar remoting capability, in-house system calibrator, frequency synthesizer.

Sensors

17.

Sensors unable to fully employ Electronic Counter-Countermeasures (ECCM) capabilities

Electronic counter-countermeasures require radars able to make use of a broad frequency spectrum for frequency agility. Due to commercial sell off of government frequency bands, sensors loose their agility and adjacent sites begin to interfere with one another.

Sensors

18.

Air defense system is unable to passively detect targets.

Air defense radars do not have a passive capability which would provide target detection without possible detection/destruction by the enemy

Sensors

19.

Lack of common C4I architecture

Battle management systems operate with different symbologies, tabular displays, and decision support aids, but have similar functionalityís. System differences lead to increased training requirements slowing transition between systems and reducing situational awareness.

Command and Control

 

Rank

Deficiency

Deficiency Explanation

Element

20.

Battle management systems unable to provide/handle Multi-Level-Secure data.

Thereís no current or planned capability to enable users to tag data elements with its associated classification and let the system move the data elements around securely.

Command and Control

21.

Weapons quantity discharge requirements

With the introduction of the AIM-120 capability into Air National Guard (ANG) air defense fighter units, problems with the increased size of the quantity discharge area are being experienced. The small physical size of ANG bases and location of weapons storage require that a good deal of vital base support activities be curtailed once the weapon is removed from its storage container.

ADF

22.

Battle management systems lack lightweight, compact, common displays.

Common displays are required in all battle management systems to reduce training and maintenance requirements and improve reliability. Additionally, displays should be lightweight and compact to reduce dependence on large custom operator consoles.

Command and Control, AWACS

23.

Regions unable to automate frequency management

With the limitations in frequency availability and the increased chances of interference with adjacent sites or other systems, the R/SOCCs need the ability to model and implement the best frequency use options for sensor operation and ground-air-ground radios.

Command and Control

24.

Lack of updated, populated all-source integrated databases.

Current national intelligence all source integrated databases are out of date, contain numerous empty data fields, do not provide global coverage

Intelligence

25.

Lack of broad area/ multispectral coverage.

Present capabilities to provide Broad Area Imagery support in both single-band and multispectral modes are not adequate to meet air campaign requirements.

Intelligence

Table 3-1

3.2. Initial Analysis. Detailed analysis would be documented in Cost and Operations Effectiveness Analysis reports on the individual systems/capabilities. However, an initial analysis leads to the conclusions that a number of improvements are required in order to support the user and meet mission needs. These improvements are considered under two timelines: near- to-mid term (1995 - 2005) and far term (2005 - 2020).

 

4. Mission Area Plan (MAP). The MAP summarizes and uses the products of the MAA and MNA processes to identify key technologies and weapons systems modernization efforts required to correct known deficiencies. The MAP products are modernization roadmaps, mission area leveraging technologies summaries, and recommended updates to procedures and tactics. The MAP is the primary planning document for acquisition strategies, national and Air Force laboratory efforts, and industrial Independent Research and Development programs, providing focus for limited investment dollars. This ensures the required technologies are developed and matured as quickly as possible. The MAP office of primary responsibility will conduct reviews as needed to ensure the effective program integration of aircraft and weapons technologies into the force structure.

- Pros and Cons of Changing Strategy, Tactics, Techniques, or Procedures. Technological advances in stand-off capability and low RCS platforms, and the emergence of low altitude threats underlies both sensor and command and control systems deficiencies captured in this MAP. To date, existing systems have coped with these changes through alterations in strategies, operational procedures, and system employment. The result has been a mitigation of current deficiencies, but not their solution. Non-technical solutions, simply, do not solve all the deficiencies. Many of these deficiencies exist systemically in that changes in procedures or tactics do not always offset inadequate computer processing or radar detection limitations. The application of technology promises high payoff in terms of enhancing current system capabilities and developing significant new capabilities. Additional benefits may be reductions in both manpower requirements and operations and maintenance costs.

- Pros and Cons of Increasing Quantities in Terms of Manpower, Equipment, or Other Support. Mandated decreases in government manning across the board eliminates increased manpower as an option. Furthermore, such an increase would not address many of the system deficiencies. Further erosion in authorized end strengths and weapons system procurement budgets mandates a qualitative based investment approach with joint/combined emphasis.

- Pros and Cons Associated with Modifying or Modernizing Existing Equipment. Existing inventory items and their inherent growth potential allows a near- to mid-term modification or modernization plan. Weapons systems procurement standards have imposed strict requirements on industry which facilitate simplified modifications to existing designs. However, in some cases, modernization of an existing weapons system is not cost effective and it is more cost effective to replace it with commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) or government off-the-shelf (GOTS) equipment.

- Pros and Cons Associated with Developing and Acquiring a New Capability. Outright acquisition of new systems is generally envisioned to meet far-term objectives. The chief advantage of this approach is that it allows for the capture of innovative technologies which lack sufficient maturity for incorporation during near- to mid-term modification/modernization activities. A full blown developmental approach to acquiring new systems is not particularly well suited to meeting near- to mid-term needs as the typical development cycle exceeds five years. However, with new emphasis on use of COTS and GOTS, as well as reusable and modular software, development cycles may significantly shorten to allow acquisition of a new capability to meet near- to mid-term needs. Notable in this category is the planned replacement of the R/SOCC computer and display consoles to increase data handling, track correlation, and display capabilities.

- Selected Solutions Rationale. Generally, the two phased solution cited above calls for near- to mid-term modification/enhancement activities combined with acquisition of new systems in the far term. This phasing scheme acknowledges the fact that at some point further modification to existing systems is neither cost effective nor practical.

4.1. Weapons System/Capability Modernization Roadmaps. The core systems for this MAP are divided into three functional areas, battle management, sensor, and communications systems. The sensor area comprises those deficiencies and solutions dealing with radar and other sensor systems and equipment. The communications area contains those deficiencies and solutions related specifically to communications systems and equipment. Deficiencies dealing with computer processing, data handling, architectures, and force management systems will be grouped under the functional heading of battle management systems. Deficiencies which can be solved by other than material acquisition are listed separately.

- "Funded" indicates that a program or technology has sufficient funding programmed to fully execute acquisition and fielding.

- "Partially funded" indicates that a program or technology does not have all the funding required for its completion. Generally, these programs submit, or have submitted, POM initiatives or disconnects detailing specific needs for additional funding.

- "Unfunded" indicates that a program or technology has no money programmed for its execution.

4.1.1. Battle Management Systems.

4.1.1.1. Region/Sector Operations Control Center (R/SOCC) Modernization. A deficiency was identified in the current R/SOCC capability to support the air sovereignty mission into the 21st century. The AN/FYQ-93 computer system and display systems are rapidly approaching the end of their useful, reliable service life. They are fast becoming non-supportable and have reached their limits in data handling and display capacity. A NORAD Statement of Requirement validated expanded ITW/AA and counterdrug mission requirements. This included increased processing and display of more plots/tracks/flight plans, interfaces with additional sensors, support of larger geographic areas of responsibility, interoperability with other command and control systems and provisions for automated aids to improve operator efficiency. The program is currently funded in the FY 97 POM and declared Milestone I in Aug 95.

4.1.1.2. AN/FYQ-93 Enhancement and Technology Insertion (ETI). This is an enhancement being installed at the R/SOCCs to alleviate immediate reliability and maintainability problems being encountered as a result of aging wire interconnection systems. Air Force participation is required for requirements definition, kit installation and check out, system recertification, and technical manual validation. The modification will maximize use of COTS and commercial grade hardware and assume a remove-replace-discard maintenance concept. Examples of the hardware changes/modifications include replacing magnetic tape units with removable cartridge hard disk drives and replacing single line printers with multiple-line printers. The program is funded and kits are being installed.

4.1.1.3. Automated Air Movement Data System (AAMDS). The system provides a semi-automatic interface between the R/SOCCís AN/FYQ-93 and the flight management/control systems used by the FAA and Transport Canada. The program is funded and will be completed during FY 96.

4.1.1.4. Iceland Air Defense System (IADS). The IADS is an NATO-sponsored program with the US as the host nation. It provides a modern ground based air defense system for Iceland, updating the interim automated program completed in 1988. The system consists of a Control and Reporting Center (CRC) and Iceland Software Support Facility (ISSF) located on Keflavik Naval Air Station in Iceland and four AN/FPS-117 long range radars installed at the four corners of the island. The program is in its final phase with the installation of the CRC and ISSF hardware and software. The program is funded and will be complete in FY 97.

Figure 4-1

 

Deficiency

Proposed Solution

Impact

Status

R/SOCC unable to perform mission without upgrades.

R/SOCC Modernization

Increases data handling, processing and display capability; modular and reusable software; improved displays; multi-source data fusion

Partially Funded

Inability to add new missions and change hardware and/or software

R/SOCC Modernization

Open system architecture; uses modular and reusable software; uses distributed processing

Partially Funded

Unable to efficiently maintain air defense equipment

R/SOCC Modernization and IADS

Uses COTS/GOTS hardware and software to maximum extent; reduces maintenance manpower needed

Partially Funded

Current processing systems and data bases unable to move/store large volumes of data

R/SOCC Modernization and IADS

Partial solution through increased processing and memory capabilities

Partially Funded

Unable to efficiently operate current air defense equipment

R/SOCC Modernization and IADS

Uses automation to effectively reduce operator intervention and manpower requirements

Partially Funded

Sensors/computer systems unable to positively identify friends and hostiles.

AAMDS

Partial solution through the improved handling and correlation of flight plans

Funded

Lack of common C4I architecture

Common Air Control System

Standard system for all air control and battle management functions

Unfunded

Battle management systems unable to provide/handle Multi-Level-Secure data.

TBD

TBD

 

Battle management systems lack lightweight, compact, common displays.

TBD

TBD

 

Table 4-1

 

4.1.2. Sensor Systems.

4.1.2.1 Remote On-Line Maintenance System (ROMS)/Remote Analysis, Monitoring, and Maintenance System (RAMMS)/Reliability, Maintainability, and Supportability (RMS) Program. These are a series of improvements to the reliability and maintainability of the AN/FPS-117 long range radars. They will provide remote control of each radar from a central location at the Canadian SOCC, Alaskan ROCC, and potentially at the Iceland CRC. Currently, technicians at each remote radar site monitor the radar and respond 24 hours a day to requests or directions from the control facility. This remote control capability will eliminate the requirement for permanently assigned technicians at the remote sites, as well as the requirement for continuous site manning. The program is funded and awaiting installation.

4.1.2.2. AN/FPS-124 Spectrum Modification. The AN/FPS-124 short range unattended radars serve as gap fillers between the long range AN/FPS-117s of the NWS. The spectrum modification is designed to eliminate strobing and adjacent site interference caused by the radarís broad transmission spectrum. The program is a modification to an existing system and is awaiting funding for kit procurement.

4.1.2.3. Tethered Aerostat Radar System (TARS). The TARS is a series of lighter-than-air platforms called aerostats, with associated look-down capable radars anchored to the ground by a tether. This creates an effective low-level radar detection capability in areas normally masked by terrain. Enhancements would equip TARS radars with improved location correction capability to solve drift problems and improve reliability and maintainability.

4.1.2.4. FAA/Air Force Radar Replacement (FARR) Program. The FARR program is a CONUS wide replacement of outmoded JSS two-dimensional surveillance radars. They are being replaced with the ARSR-4, a modern, reliable, solid state three dimensional radar. The program is a 50-50 cost share between the FAA and the AF and was a joint development effort. The FAA is the lead agency charged with the procurement of each system. The FAA will also operate and maintain the radars after acquisition. The program is funded and installations are ongoing.

4.1.2.5. Tracker Aircraft. This counterdrug program integrates off-the-shelf technologies into an aircraft with sufficiently slow speed and appropriately long range and loiter time to provide a continuous tracking, identification, and surveillance platform capable of monitoring suspect aircraft throughout their entire time of flight. The program is funded, requirements documentation is complete, procurement and operation will be provided by the National Guard.

Figure 4-2

Deficiency

Proposed Solution

Impact

Status

Unable to efficiently maintain air defense equipment

ROMS/RAMS/RMS

Increases reliability and maintainability of radars through improvements in technology and software. Reduces need for and centralizes maintenance manpower.

Funded

Sensors unable to see all targets.

Track Processing, Transmit/Receive Upgrades, Spectrum Modification, TARS Enhancements, Tracker

Improves small target detection, lower angle tracking, transmission spectrum usage.

Unfunded

Force structure limits sensor coverage

TBD

TBD

 

Sensors/computer systems unable to positively identify friends and hostiles.

TBD

TBD

 

 

Deficiency

Proposed Solution

Impact

Status

Current sensors unable to track from origin

TBD

TBD

 

Sensors unable to meet future operational requirements

Track Processing, Transmit/Receive Upgrades, Spectrum Modification, TARS Enhancements, Tracker

Allows sensors to continue to meet operational requirements.

Unfunded

Wide spectrum and electromagnetic interference problems between sensors

Spectrum Modification

Refines system transmission spectrum. Evaluates and eliminates bulk of strobing produced by adjacent site interference.

Unfunded

Sensors unable to fully employ ECCM capabilities

TBD

TBD

 

Air defense system is unable to passively detect targets.

TBD

TBD

 

Regions unable to automate frequency management.

TBD

TBD

 

Table 4-2

4.1.3. Communications Systems.

4.1.3.1. FARR/IADS Remote Rekey System (FIRRS). This is an electronic key management system which allows the rekeying of remote cryptographic devices from a central location. The IADS portion of the system is funded and will be installed in the CRC and the four associated radars in FY 97. Subsequent installations at R/SOCCs and FARR sites are awaiting funding.

Deficiency

Proposed Solution

Impact

Status

Lack of adequate BLOS communications.

TBD

TBD

 

Limited ground-air-ground radio coverage.

TBD

TBD

 

Lack of ability to remotely rekey cryptographic material at the sensor site.

FIRRS

Allows central distribution of key material and the keying of remote cryptographic devices from a central location.

Unfunded

Table 4-3

4.1.4. Potential Material Alternatives.

4.1.4.1. Forces unable to reconstitute due to lack of reconstitution plans. The responsible headquarters must develop necessary plans to bring equipment back to an operational status based on their reconstitution timeline.

4.1.4.2. Weapons Quantity Discharge Requirements. Applicable regulations need review to determine quantity discharge limits and their effect on ANG facilities.

4.1.5. Deficiencies beyond the scope of this MAP.

4.1.5.1. Lack of responsive, automated collection/requirements management capability. This capability will allow R/SOCC and subordinate unit intelligence sections to track requests for intelligence information.

4.1.5.2. Lack of updated, populated all-source integrated databases.

4.1.5.3. Lack of broad area/multispectral coverage.

4.2 Mission Area Critical/Enabling Technologies. The command and control functions in the post-1996 time period need to support the continuation of the defense of US sovereign airspace and defense of the North American continent. Delineation of basic air defense is specified in Air Force Manual 1-1, Aerospace Doctrine of the United States Air Force. Based on a continuation of existing missions, it is postulated that the 1996 command and control structure will continue to exist in the future. Within this structure, increased needs will exist for interfacing and integration. Increased needs to operate in a joint arena will necessitate that the command and control structure integrate with a variety of military and government agencies. A number of emerging technologies should be available for inclusion in post-1996 battle management systems architectures to include: (a) direct voice interaction with the computer and handwritten inputs using an electronic notepad to augment the keyboard and track ball/mouse; (b) virtual displays to present high-fidelity pictures of the real world, enabling better visualization and situation awareness; (c) terrain data draping on map backgrounds to allow graphic displays to present perspective views; and (d) the use of pictures or 3-D sketches to represent entities replacing abstract symbols and vectors. Salient aspects of battle management systems architectures and leveraging technologies are summarized as follows:

- The 1996 and subsequent information distribution needs can best be met by the use of broadcast networks which allow all elements to receive data and perform the required sorting and correlation to match their assigned responsibilities.

- Non-conventional sensors should be used to identify targets. Primary emphasis is to positively identify the threat as far away from the CONUS as possible to enable a timely and accurate response.

- Improvement to existing sensors should be provided to combat the threat.

- Even after improving existing sensors, insufficient low-observable and wide area surveillance will exist. The only way to overcome these shortfalls is through new sensors. Advanced over-the-horizon (AOTH) radar, bistatics, and space based systems are candidates to attain these needed capabilities.

- Multifunctional command and control centers with common operating systems and displays should be implemented when the existing centers are phased out or when logistics costs call for replacement of the hardware and software.

- Even with the continued drive to use standards, there will be situations where non-standard data links exist resulting in the need for a data link translator. This future translator must adapt quickly to new interface situations.

4.2.2. The long range goals of strategic air defense systems architecture, as summarized in Command and Control, Sensors, and Communications areas, are as follows:

4.2.2.1. In the command and control area, work to convert functionally unique command and control centers into multifunctional centers sharing the same software, types of hardware, and types of communications to perform operations. With this common air control and battle management system, the centers would be modular building blocks of COTS workstations, simplifying operations, maintenance, and training.

4.2.2.2. The need for sensors is dependent upon threat levels. Increases in performance can be made to existing sensors to satisfy moderate threat level increases over current projections. However, if the threat level is increased (lowering of RCS as an example), then a family of new sensors will be needed. Identification should be performed using new and non-conventional methods that can distinguish friend and enemy characteristics in combination with intelligence and sensor data.

4.2.2.3. Communications represents a key area in strategic air defense. Command and control centers must be interconnected through a combination of terrestrial and space systems. Improved access to satellite communications and high data throughput are essential to ITW/AA.

 

 

 

4.2.3 Strategic Air Defense Leveraging Technologies.

Sensor Technologies

Leveraging Technology Descriptions

Investment Focus

Electronic Counter Countermeasures: Capability to exercise full use of the electromagnetic spectrum despite enemy action to prevent such use.

FY 96 - 09

Increased Low Observable Detect Capability: Ability to detect targets with small radar/infrared cross sections.

FY 96 - 11

Low Altitude Detection Capability: Ability to detect low level (below 10,000 feet) targets.

FY 98 - 09

Increased Position Accuracy: Capability to determine target position with a greater degree of precision.

FY 96 -07

Increased Detection Envelope: Allows enemy and target detection from a greater distance.

FY 96 - 11

Adverse Weather/Atmospheric Capability: Ability to filter weather and spurious atmospheric returns.

FY 98 - 09

Improved Reliability, Maintainability, and Efficiency: Improve self-diagnostics, remote maintenance capabilities, operational availability, graceful degradation, etc.

FY 96 - 06

Command and Control Technologies

Leveraging Technology Descriptions

Investment Focus

Increased Data Handling: Allows computer processors to take in and process more data.

FY 96 - 05

Multiple Source Data: Real-time integration and presentation of intelligence, weather, and sensor data.

FY 96 - 06

Joint Service/Tactical Interoperability: Maximize ease of data and information interchange.

FY 96 - 04

Non-Cooperative Target Identification: Technology to positively identify targets without their knowledge or cooperation.

FY 96 - 04

Open Architecture: Produce system hardware and software that meets internationally developed standards.

FY 96 - 07

Multi-Level Security: Provide capability to enhance real-time access to multiple levels of classified information.

FY 96 - 05

Near-Real-Time Display: Improve likelihood that displayed data reflects actual target position.

FY 96 - 03

 

 

 

Communications Technologies

Leveraging Technology Descriptions

Investment Focus

Cryptographic Item - 13 (CI-13): Packages electronic key management technology to enable remote rekeying of cryptographic systems from a central location.

FY 96/97

Beyond Line of Sight Communication: Adaptive signal processing techniques applicable to UHF satellite communications and high frequency air-to-ground links.

FY 96 - 01

Note: Additional communications technologies usable with strategic air defense can be found in the Theater Battle Management MAP.

4.2.4. Strategic Air Defense Critical Enabling Technologies.

Sensor Technologies

Critical Enabling Technology Description

PE

Status

Over-the-Horizon Technology Development/Experiments: Application to wide area surveillance and long range detection of small radar cross section targets.

62702F

Funded

Bistatic Sensor Technology: Extends the range, sensitivity, and ECCM capability for surveillance and detection of small aircraft and cruise missiles.

62702F

63238F

63726F

63728F

63789F

Funded

Space-Time Adaptive Processing: Applies to detection of cruise missiles and aircraft at extended ranges.

 

Unfunded

Adaptive Sidelobe Nulling/Processing: Reduces sensor susceptibility to countermeasures by reducing jamming in antenna sidelobes.

62702F

63238F

63726F

63728F

63789F

Funded

Improved Subsystems/Components: Engenders less frequent failure and improves equipment reliability to reduce operating costs.

62702F

63238F

63726F

63728F

63789F

Funded

Faster Automated Diagnostics: Faster indication and pin-pointing of failures, making equipment easier to repair and reducing operating costs.

62702F

Unfunded

 

Critical Enabling Technology Description

PE

Status

Improved Sensor Resolution Techniques: Improves target detection sensitivity, target location accuracy, and range, particularly for low altitude targets.

 

Unfunded

Indirect Hostile Target Identification: Target detection techniques using off-board sensors to improve target identification capabilities.

63238F

63726F

63728F

63789F

ISR TPIPT

Real-Time Signal Processor Enhancement: Advanced processor with higher throughput, reduced size/weight/power requirements and easily programmable. Permits use of more powerful algorithms for improved target detection and tracking.

63238F

63726F

63728F

63789F

ISR TPIPT

Cryogenic Electronics Technology: Leads to noise reduction which improves detection sensitivity and enhances target detection.

62702F

Unfunded

Command and Control Technologies

Critical Enabling Technology Description

PE

Status

Architecture for Distributed Processing: Determines the appropriate locations for various types of processing and data hand-offs to increase the number of data sources that can be accommodated, as well as data throughput. This will also help to enable sharing data with other agencies and services.

62702F

63238F

63726F

63728F

63789F

Funded

3-D Large Screen Displays: Facilitates the human interface, improving target detection and identification.

63238F

63726F

63728F

63789F

Unfunded

Extremely High-Capacity/High Speed Memory: Extremely large memory with high speed read and write capability permits temporary storage of more data, which makes possible orderly data processing with minimal lost time waiting to process data once it is called for.

63238F

63726F

63728F

63789F

Funded

Software for Distributed Computing: Just the right software at each computer node will permit all computer facilities to operate at maximum rates. This enables faster data processing of all data types, and hence, faster movement of more date from more sources.

63238F

63726F

63728F

63789F

Funded

Utilization Software for Imagery Weather and Geographic Data: Permits admission of data into processing capability for further utilization.

63238F

63726F

63728F

63789F

RSI TPIPT

Multi-Spectral Observables Fusion: Fusion of observables permits increased detection sensitivity and improved target ID.

62702F

Partially funded

 

Critical Enabling Technology Description

PE

Status

Near Real Time Target Classification: Algorithms and software to identify targets with almost no delay after receipt of target data.

62702F

Partially funded

Intelligence Data Correlation: Meshes all intelligence data and other source data to provide reliable and unambiguous information, as well as improved target ID.

63238F

63726F

63728F

63789F

Partially funded

Sensor Data Fusion: Meshes data from many sensors to provide reliable and unambiguous track/identification data, with improved likelihood of finding and holding targets.

63238F

63726F

63728F

63789F

Partially funded

Automated Correlation/ID Systems for Decision Aids: Automation saves manpower, improves reliability, and makes maintainability simpler; correlation /ID decision aids improve target detection and tracking and enhance ability to find and identify targets.

63238F

63726F

63728F

63789F

Funded

Data Fusion: Provides for improved target ID and position determination. Fusing data from a number of sources improves ability to find and identify targets.

63238F

63726F

63728F

63789F

Unfunded

System Software Support Tools: Permits more efficient software maintenance and manpower savings.

63238F

63726F

63728F

63789F

Funded

Faster/Automated Diagnostics: Saves manpower and improves reliability by providing earlier trouble indications.

62702F

Funded

Neural Nets/Artificial Intelligence: Relatively inexpensive and fast (special purpose) computing technique for automating various functions to decrease manpower requirements and increase processing power to increase the number of sources and amount of data handled, and to improve the detection of targets.

63238F

63726F

63728F

63789F

Funded

Multi-Level Secure Distributed Processing: Provides multi-level security when processing is distributed among a number of processors at different locations.

63238F

63726F

63728F

63789F

Funded

Computer Security: Permits use of computers for applications at various levels of security and ensures data is transferred only to authorized users.

63238F

63726F

63728F

63789F

Partially funded

Improved Processing Techniques: Improved processing techniques permit use of more complex and time consuming algorithms and larger amounts of data from more sources.

63238F

63726F

63728F

63789F

RSI TPIPT

 

Critical Enabling Technology Description

PE

Status

Distributed Interoperable Systems Techniques: Uses and implements common standards facilitating inter-system communication and data transfer.

62702F

Partially funded

Operations/Intelligence Integration: Provides fast and simple information transfer among plans, operations, intelligence, and situation cells. Helps integrate them with advanced planning systems.

63238F

63726F

63728F

63789F

RSI TPIPT

Enhanced All-Source Fusion Technology for Electronic Warfare: Fuses many sources of data to create unambiguous depictionís of the electronic environment.

63238F

63726F

63728F

63789F

RSI TPIPT

Multiple DATA Integration and Update: Automatically fuses multiple source data into cartographic and intelligence data bases.

63238F

63726F

63728F

63789F

RSI TPIPT

Update Analysis: Improves situation awareness by automatically incorporating, in real time, new battlespace data.

63238F

63726F

63728F

63789F

RSI TPIPT

Communications Technologies

Critical Enabling Technology Description

PE

Status

High-Speed Communications: Faster communications reduces backlog and increases the number of data sources and amount of data that can be handled.

62702F

63238F

63726F

63728F

63789F

Funded

Multi-Media Communications Routing: Ability to communicate different types of communications over different types of communications links assures all the data required will reach the point it is intended to reach and be integrated.

63238F

63726F

63728F

63789F

Funded

Automatic Communication Link Setup Control: Permits communication link setup with almost no manpower and improves reliability of communications links by way of increased availability.

62702F

63238F

63726F

63728F

63789F

Funded

 

Critical Enabling Technology Description

PE

Status

Improved Satellite Communications: Makes possible the transfer of data from sensors providing improved detection of low-level targets; also permits communication between site and sensors not in each otherís line of sight.

63238F

63726F

63728F

63789F

RSI TPIPT

Improved Communications Gateways: Facilitates ease of interconnectivity and interoperability by making access available to more users.

63238F

63726F

63728F

63789F

Unfunded

Electronic Key Management: Facilitates the centralized generation and distribution of key materials.

Unk

NSA

4.2.5. Strategic Air Defense Deficiency to Technology Linkage.

Figure 4-3

Figure 4-4

Figure 4-5

4.3 MAP Science and Technology Products. Strategic air defense deficiencies point to the creation of new technologies. The ability to have a seamless voice and data transmission capability is vital to achieve and maintain effective battle management. The sensors that create the battlespace picture need to have increased sensitivity to detect and track low RCS targets. Additionally, they need increased resistance to electronic countermeasures and some inherent protection against physical destruction. Data automation is important as decision makers shorten their decision cycle time.

 

 

5. Mission Area Post Investment Assessment. Current modifications of several systems are taking advantage of automation/centralization to allow unmanning at many radar sites. Concurrent improvements in processing capability should reduce labor hours expended at R/SOCCs. Mid-term improvements should include continuation of these programs along with upgrades and modifications to current systems to improve radar detection and clutter rejection. Long term solutions may involve combining multiple sensor and correlation systems into few or one, with increased emphasis on multi-purpose, joint use systems.

5.1 The following chart, Figure 5-1, depicts an assessment of strategic air defense systems after planned programs and enhancements are complete. It assumes current programs and modifications are funded, technology is applied to development of new systems, these initiatives are completed approximately within the time frame needed, and that the threat does not evolve outside currently recognized bounds.

Figure 5-1

 

6. Summation. It is possible to meet the current and future threat to North American airspace and US sovereignty , but only if current programs and enhancements continue to satisfy near- to mid-term shortfalls. Additionally, technological advances must be applied to far-term modifications and the development of new programs. A "systems approach" is imperative when dealing with strategic air defense and should be used to ensure bits and pieces are not replaced without a view as to the overall strategic atmospheric mission. Work that is ongoing now will have a significant effect on the evolution of this document as we progress into the next century.

6.1. Continued emphasis and support of joint battle management systems is required for strategic systems to evolve into the more capable systems future forces will require. Current acquisition, coupled with preplanned program improvements, should be continued to meet near term requirements. In all three areas discussed in this MAP, evolving joint standards, migration to modular systems, and radar sensitivity upgrades are needed to meet basic deficiencies. Mid-term modifications should focus on adapting to changes in missions, improving automation, data fusion and processing, and reliability, maintainability, and supportability. In the far-term, strategic systems should migrate to common software and hardware standards along side theater battle management systems.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Acronyms and Abbreviations

AACC Airborne Air Command Center

AASS Advanced Air Surveillance Radar

AATO Automated Air Tasking Order

ABCCC Airborne Battlefield Command and Control Center

ACCS Air Command and Control System (NATO)

ACO Airspace Control Order

ACPT Air Campaign Planning Tool

ADRG Arc Digital Raster Graphics

ADRI Arc Digital Raster Imagery

ADS Airspace Deconfliction System

AETC Air Education and Training Command

AFCC Air Force Component Commander

AFFOR Air Force Forces

AFINTNET Air Force Intelligence Network

AFMSS Air Force Mission Support System

AFNET Air Force Net

AFSOC Air Force Special Operations Command

AFSOF Air Force Special Operations Forces

AFWSS Air Force Weather Support System

AIG Air Intelligence Group

AJ Anti Jam

ALE Automatic Link Establishment

AMC Air Mobility Command

AMHS Automated Message Handling System

AN/TPS-75 Army-Navy/Tactical Radar Search Radar

ANDVT Advanced Narrowband Digital Voice Terminal

AOC Air Operations Center

AOR Area of Responsibility

AOTH Advanced Over-the-Horizon (radar)

API Application Program Interfaces

APS Advanced Planning System

ARFOR Army Forces

ARM Anti-Radiation Missile

ASAR Advanced Synthetic Aperture Radar

ASIT Adaptable Surface Interface Terminal

ASOC Air Support Operations Center

ATCALS Air Traffic Control Liaison Section

ATO Air Tasking Order

AWACS Airborne Warning and Control System

AWDS Automated Weather Distribution System

BAN Base Area Networks

BAR Broad Area Review

BCT Battlefield Communications Terminal

BDA Battle Damage Assessment

B-ISDN Broadband-Integrated Services Digital Network

BLOS Below Line of Sight

BPSK Bipolar Phase Shift Keying

BSD Battlefield Situation Display

BTH Beyond the Horizon

C2 Command and Control

C3 Command, Control, and Communications

C3I C3 and Intelligence

C4I Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and Intelligence

CAF Combat Air Forces

CAMS Core Automated Maintenance System

CAFWSP CAF Weather Support Package

CARS Contingency Airborne Reconnaissance System

CAS Close Air Support

CAS-B Combat Ammunition System Base

CATIS Computer Aided Tactical Information System

CCT Combat Control Team

CID Combat Identification

CIS Combat Intelligence System

CIS-CL Combat Intelligence System - Component Level

CIS-UL Combat Intelligence System-Unit Level

CJCS Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

CMP Computational Map Processor/Configuration Management Plan

CMOS Cargo Movement Operations System

CMS Common Mapping System

CMTK Common Mapping Tool Kit

COA Courses of Action

COE Common Operating Environment

COEA Cost and Operations Effectiveness Analysis

COMSEC Communications Security

CONOPS Concept of Operations

CONUS Continental United States

COTS Commercial-off-the-Shelf

CRAF Civil Reserve Air Fleet

CRC Control and Reporting Center

CRE Control and Reporting Element

CS CONSTANT SOURCE

CSAF Chief of Staff of the Air Force

CSE Client-Server Environment

CTAPS Contingency Theater Automated Planning System

CTIS 3DS Command Tactical Information System Digital Decision Display System

CVBG Carrier Battle Group

CW Composite Wing

CWOC Composite Wing Operations Center

DAMA Demand Assigned Multiple Access

DCT Digital Communications Terminal

DDN Defense Data Network

DGS Deployable Ground Station

DISN Defense Information System Network

DISNET DDN Integrated Secure Network

DMA Defense Mapping Agency

DoD Department of Defense

DODIIS DoD Intelligence Information System

DPG Defense Planning Guidance

DSCS Defense Satellite Communications System

DTD Data Transfer Device

E-BTH Enhanced Beyond the Horizon

ECCM Electronic Counter Countermeasure

ECM Electronic Countermeasure

ELINT Electronic Intelligence

EO Electro Optical

EP Electronic Protect

ERPS External RFI Protection System

ES Electronic Support

ESM Electronic Support Measure

FAA Federal Aviation Administration

FAP Functional Area Plan

FAR Frequency Adjunct Radar

FDDI Fiber Distribution Data Interface

FLEX Force Level Execution Module

FOA Field Operating Agency

GBR Ground Based Radar

GCCS Global Command and Control System

GOTS Government-off-the-shelf

GMF Ground Mobile Force

GPS Global Positioning System

GTN Global Transportation Network

HDS Hard Disk Subsystem

HF High Frequency

HQAN HAVE QUICK A-Net

IAW In Accordance With

ICM Intelligence Correlation Module

ICNIS Integrated CNI Subsystem

ICNIA Integrated Communications-Navigation IFF Avionics

ICON Integration Contract

I-DGS Interim-Deployable Ground Station

IDHS Intelligence Data Handling System

IDM Improved Data Modem

IFF Identification Friend or Foe

IITS Intra-Theater Imagery Transmission System

IJMS Interim Joint Message Specification

IMINT Imagery Intelligence

IOC Initial Operational Capability

IPIX Interface Processor for Imagery Exchange

IR Infrared

IR&D Independent Research and Development

ISO International Standards Organization

ITV Interactive Television

JCMT Joint Collection Management Tool

JCS Joint Chiefs of Staff

JDAM Joint Direct Attack Munition

JDISS Joint Deployable Intelligence Support System

JDSS JFACC Decision Support System

JFACC Joint Force Air Component Commander

JIC Joint Intelligence Center

JINTACCS Joint Interoperability of Tactical Command and Control Systems

JM JTIDS Module

JMAPS Joint Message Analysis and Processing System

JMEM Joint Munitions Effectiveness Manual

JMI JTIDS MAOC Integration

Joint STARS Joint Surveillance and Target Attack Radar System; also, JSTARS

JOTS Joint Operational Tactical System (Navy)

JSIPS Joint Service Imagery Processing System

JTF Joint Task Force

JTFC JTF Commander

JTIDS Joint Tactical Information Distribution System

LAN Local Area Network

LCDL Low-Cost Data Link

LNA Low Noise Amplifier

LOS Line of Sight

LPD Low Probability of Detection

LPI Low Probability of Intercept

MAA Mission Area Assessment

MACOM Major Army Command

MAJCOM Major Command

MAMS Military Airspace Management System

MAOC Modular Air Operations Center

MAP Mission Area Plan

MARFOR Marine Forces

MAT Mission Area Team

MATT Multi-Mission Advanced Tactical Terminal

MAXI Modular Architecture for the Exchange of Information

MC&G Mapping, Charting, & Geodesy

MCG&I Mapping, Charting, Geodesy, & Imagery

MCE Modular Control Equipment

MEDS Meteorological Environment Data Systems

MIDB Modernized Intelligence Data Base

MIIDS Military Integrated Intelligence Data Base System

MIL-STD Military Standard

MLS Multi-Level Security

MMI Man-Machine Interface (being replaced by Human Machine Interface)

MMLS Mobile Microwave Landing System

MNA Mission Needs Analysis

MNS Mission Needs Statement

MSIP Multi-Stage Improvement Program

MSTS Multi-Source Tactical System

MTI Moving Target Indicator

NAF Numbered Air Force

NAS National Airspace System

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NAVFOR Naval Forces

NCA National Command Authority

N-ISDN Narrow Band-Integrated Services Digital Network

NRT Near-Real-Time

NTM National Technical Means

OB Order of Battle

OJT On the Job Training

OPFAC Operational Facility

OPR Office of Primary Responsibility

ORD Operational Requirements Document

OWS Operator Work Station

P3I Pre-Planned Product Improvement

PC Personal Computer

PCS Personal Communications System

PGM Precision Guided Munition

PINES PACAF Interim National Exploitation System

PMD Program Management Directive

PPU Protocol Processing Unit

PTS Portable SHF (SATCOM) Terminal System

RAAP Rapid Application of Air Power

RCS Radar Cross Section

REM Route Evaluation Module

RFI Radio Frequency Interference

RIDEX Reconnaissance/Intelligence Data Exchange

RM&S Reliability, Maintainability, and Survivability

RMS Requirements Management System

RSIP Radar System Improvement Program

RTIC Real Time Information to the Cockpit

SAR Synthetic Aperture Radar

SATCOM Satellite Communication

SB Sentinel Byte

SCSI2 Small Computer Systems Interface

SCDL Surveillance and Control Data Link

SCI Sensitive Compartmented Information

SEAD Suppression of Enemy Air Defense

SHF Super High Frequency

SIGINT Signal Intelligence

SINCGARS Single Channel Ground and Airborne Radio System

SIOP Single Integrated Operational Plan

SPO System Program Office

S-T-T Strategy-to-Task

SUA Special Use Airspace

TACP Tactical Air Control Party

TACS Theater Air Control System

TADIL Tactical Digital Information Link

TALCE Tactical Airlift Control Element

TASDAC Tactical Secure Data Communications

TBM Theater Battle Management

TDC Theater Deployable Communications

TDMA Time Division Multiple Access

TEL Transportable Erector Launcher

THAAD Theater High Altitude Air Defense

TIBS Tactical Information Broadcast Service

TISD Tactical Integrated Situational Display

TMD Theater Missile Defense

TNL Target Nomination List

TOD Time of Day

TOPS Tactical Onboard Processor System

TPIPT Technical Planning Integrated Product Team

TRAP Tactical Receive Equipment and Related Applications Program

TRE Tactical Receive Equipment

TRI-TAC Tri-Service Tactical Communications

TRV Tower Restoral Vehicle

TSSR TROPO Satellite Support Radio

TWR Tactical Weather Radar

UAV Unmanned Aerial Vehicle

UDLC Universal Data Link Control

UHF Ultra High Frequency

ULSA Ultra Low Sidelobe Antenna

U.S. United States

USAF United States Air Force

USMTF United States Message Text Format

USSOCOM US Special Operations Command

VHF Very High Frequency

VMAP Vector Smart Map Upgrade

WAN Wide Area Network

WBKPA Wide Band Klystron Power Amplifier

WCCS Wing Command and Control System

WICP Wing Initial Communications Package

WIN WWMCCS Intercomputer Network

WOC Wing Operations Center

WOD Word of the Day

WW Worldwide

WWMCCS World Wide Military Command and Control System

XIDB Extended Integrated Data Base