[Mission Area Plans]

Air Force Modernization Planning

 

Theater Battle Management

Mission Area Plan

FY1996

 

 

 

 

 

15 November 1995

OPR: HQ ACC/DRC

Phone: DSN 574-2269

Comm: (804) 764-2269

Executive Summary

1. Theater Battle Management (TBM). As the United States Air Force continues to shrink, commanders will need to use their limited resources in the most efficient manner possible. Also, the American public is beginning to think that U.S.-led conflicts can be fought and won quickly with few/no U.S./friendly casualties. Efficient TBM is essential if either of these objectives is to be met. TBM encompasses all the activities, hardware, and software necessary to achieve effective command and control of theater aerospace forces.

2. Mission Area Assessment (MAA). The Strategy-To-Task (STT) process is used to conduct a MAA to identify TBM tasks. National military strategy dictates projection and sustainment of United States power to credibly deter and, if required, decisively defeat aggression. To support national strategy, the theater Air Component Commander (ACC) employs aerospace forces to establish aerospace control of the combat environment, thereby permitting friendly forces to operate more effectively. The operational objective of TBM is to deploy and employ as directed, and control aerospace forces to achieve effective joint air operations.

3. Mission Needs Analysis (MNA). Task-To-Need (TTN) is used to conduct a MNA, which is a comparison of mission needs with current doctrine and tactics, coupled with weapon system performance against the current and future threats to determine non-material and material deficiencies. The MNA has highlighted deficiencies in several areas that impact TBM operations.

4. Mission Area Plan (MAP). The MAP provides an investment strategy for the programming, requirements, laboratory technology planning/execution, and independent research and development (IR&D) processes. It supports the acquisition/modification of command and control systems used to conduct TBM, thereby ensuring our forces have the necessary tools to accomplish those missions.

4.1. Continued emphasis and support of joint battle management/C4I systems are required for TBM to evolve into the more capable systems our integrated forces of the future will require. Current acquisition, coupled with P3I initiatives, should be continued to meet our requirements. Near-term modifications add capability to meet immediate system requirements. Mid-term modifications will focus on sustainability requirements and the evolving mission of theater missile detection. In the far-term, new systems will be required to meet voice and data communications needs for extensive capability, flexibility, and small size with low probability of intercept/low probability of destruction (LPI/LPD).

4.2. Communications modifications to comply with evolving joint standards, migration to modular open systems, and radar sensitivity upgrades will be required. Communications systems must ensure both intra- and inter-theater interoperability and connectivity. Finally, theater forces require small, lightweight, modular systems which provide high capacity, anti-jam, and secure communications.

4.3. Critical enabling technologies must be developed to correct remaining deficiencies and meet far-term needs. To ease the logistics burden, TBM systems/subsystems must be more reliable, maintainable, supportable, and affordable, with reduced support equipment requirements.

5. Bottom-line impact. Planned communications, sensors, and planning systems improvements will correct many existing deficiencies, but we must continue to push technology to ensure TBM systems are able to manage aerospace forces in any situation.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

MISSION AREA PLAN

For

THEATER BATTLE MANAGEMENT

 

Table of Contents Page

Mission Area Plan Overview 1

1. Introduction 1

2. Mission Area Assessment 3

2.1. Strategies-to-Task Analysis 3

2.2. Threat 3

2.3. Concept of Operations 5

2.4. Operational Concepts 6

2.5. Operational/Functional Tasks 13

3. Mission Needs Analysis 15

3.1. Mission Area Current Assessment 15

3.2. Initial Analysis 24

4. Mission Area Plan 25

4.1 Weapons System/Capability Modernization Roadmaps 26

4.2 Mission Area Critical/Enabling Technologies 80

4.3 MAP Science and Technology Products 88

5. Mission Area Post Investment Assessment 89

6. Summation 91

Appendix: Acronyms A-1

Overview. Theater Battle Management (TBM) is an umbrella term which includes all required functions and assets to plan, execute, and monitor theater air combat operations. It includes automated systems, communications connectivity, logistics support, personnel, and assets necessary to fight an effective and decisive war. TBM supports the principle of Unity of Command by enabling the Air Component Commander to control his forces in a united and coordinated manner. TBM is absolutely necessary for aerospace forces to perform their four basic roles: aerospace control, force application, force enhancement, and force support. Also, TBM is the means by which the tenet of centralized control/decentralized execution is performed.

An information revolution is occurring and will be felt on the future battlefield. This revolution places knowledge, in various forms, at the core of military power. TBM systems focus this knowledge for commanders. The TBM Mission Area Plan provides information that should be used in conjunction with the TBM Architecture’s functional and systems models developed by HQ ACC/DR-SMO-I. The current "as-is" functional models document activities performed and the relationships between activities; the systems models document physical systems used to accomplish activities and the links between systems. This information is being incorporated into this product. In addition, the long range TBM "objective" architecture, which will significantly impact the out years (10-25 years), is captured in this MAP.

1. Introduction. The TBM MAP discusses the capabilities needed by the Combat Air Force’s (CAF) deployable and in place theater command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence (C4I) systems to support the planning and execution of the air war, and provide Command and Control (C2) for CAF support to the theater commander’s battle objectives. This MAP is related to other MAPs in that this is the core information and tasking source for weapons systems which are also tasked to perform missions covered by other MAPs. References to other MAPs can be found in the individual weapons systems’ paragraphs. Information for this MAP was gathered via combined CAF staff, user working groups, and technology discussions with ESC/XRT, AFMC, and laboratory representatives. This MAP will support requirements definitions, research priorities, and future investment strategies. Coordination and approval of this MAP was accomplished in an iterative manner with the above. The baseline for this effort is TBM's role in a theater conventional scenario in a single major regional conflict (MRC). A two MRC scenario is mentioned in this MAP. However, due to time constraints, this MAP does not explore a two MRC scenario in great detail, and future MAP iterations will delve more into the problems associated with a two MRC scenario.

1.1. A critical aspect of TBM is the assumption that the Air Force will be a smaller force with fewer forward-based forces. TBM must support operations ranging from relief efforts, surgical one-time attacks, projecting decisive force into a major regional conflict, to strategic war. Forces may be employed from the Continental United States (CONUS) and/or forward deployed locations, and these operations must be sustained for the duration of the conflict. The theaters of operation are expected to be remote, necessitating increased reliance on space-based assets and reachback communications capability connecting the deployed forces to rear theater/command headquarters.

1.2. In order to operate in a Joint Service and allied environment, TBM systems will be required to integrate and interface with non-Air Force systems and allied systems under the direction of a Joint/Combined Force Commander (J/CFC). Additionally, TBM systems must interface with national systems contributing to theater operations. This will require passing data, imagery, and information among these participants in order to plan for and employ these varied forces.

1.3. The scope of this MAP focuses on getting useful information to the warfighter centered around the concept of a Joint/Combined Force Air Component Commander's (J/CFACC's) ability to assess, plan, direct, execute, and monitor aerospace operations. The ability to deploy rapidly to any theater and fight on arrival, in a coordinated and self-sustaining manner, is critical.

1.4. The MAP Office of Primary Responsibility (OPR) will review this MAP annually to ensure the effective integration of the latest aerospace and weapons technologies into the force structure and examine the effects of changing fiscal and environmental constraints.

2. Mission Area Assessment.

2.1. Strategies-To-Tasks (STT) Analysis. The Major Commands (MAJCOMs) identify mission needs through the Mission Area Assessment (MAA) process. Using the Defense Planning Guidance (DPG) as a base, the formal Combat Air Forces MAA (CAF MAA) was conducted and a STT methodology was used to determine the linkages from the National Security Strategy down to the tasks that are the primary responsibility of TBM (Figure 2-1). Then, an analytical process was used to prioritize Theater/Regional Objectives down to the deficiencies. The process used was a system where linkages between items are determined by matching the items and then rating their relationship (weak, medium, or strong). These methodologies were used in an attempt to standardize the CAF MAPs to the maximum extent possible and to enable senior leadership to prioritize the order of the deficiencies to which they may want to apply solutions. An integrated product team process (combination of AFMC Technical Planning Integrated Product Team [TPIPT] and the "User Command" Mission Area Team [MAT]) incorporates modifications, new acquisitions, tactics/procedures updates, and key technologies into modernization roadmaps to correct identified deficiencies. The result of this process is the MAP. During the CAF MAA process, Air Combat Command (ACC) reviewed its tasking(s) and assigned mission(s). These plans assign specific operational military objectives for Air Force assets. MAJCOMs continually evaluate plans and Joint Staff guidance for changes in assigned missions and objectives that may change the tasks required for that mission.

2.2. Threat. The nature of the threats to the U.S. has changed dramatically since the collapse of the Soviet Union. In the foreseeable future, threats to the U.S., its allies, and its friends will come from a variety of sources. Among these are the ability of potential adversaries to acquire or use weapons of mass destruction, attempts by regional powers hostile to U.S. interests to gain hegemony over their regions, and internal conflicts among ethnic, national, religious, or tribal groups that threaten innocent lives and undermine stability and international order. Any potential adversary in a MRC may present a formidable threat to the U.S. military by possessing modern weapons and motivated personnel. For example, U.S. forces may face a future adversary who possesses current high technology weapons. The threat from potentially hostile forces will cover a broad spectrum, from employment of numerous, older weapons systems to the employment of modern, accurate, and increasingly sophisticated weapons and command and control systems against U.S. forces. In context of this MAP, the threat of greatest concern is from the proliferation of technologically advanced weapons systems with increased accuracy that could be delivered against key U.S. TBM nodes. Of similar concern are those technological threats that will operate solely in the electromagnetic spectrum, necessitating the need for increased information warfare (IW) protection efforts. In summary, threats to TBM architectures may come from low technology conventional weapons, high technology precision weapons, or systems that operate solely in the electromagnetic spectrum.

2.2.1. System Specific Threats. Fuller discussion of these threats can be found in specific Threat Environment Descriptions (TED) such as the Air Combat TED, Space Systems TED, Electronic Combat TED, and the C4I/AIS TED.

2.3. Concept of Operations. The objectives in a MRC is to first halt the invasion and neutralize the enemy’s offensive capabilities. Then, the build-up of U.S. and allied combat power in the theater will begin and the reduction of the enemy’s combat power through attrition will continue. Once enough U.S. and allied combat power is in theater, the enemy must be effectively engaged and decisively defeated. Finally, the military will be required to secure post-war stability in the defeated enemy’s country. Figure 2-2 depicts the basic phases of military options in a two MRC, while Figure 2-3 shows the global view of the CONOPS.

Figure 2-2

Figure 2-3

2.4. Operational Concepts.

2.4.1. Readiness. Readiness (Figure 2-4) involves all the activities that ensure U.S. military forces are ready to respond to any crisis. The major operational activities during the pre-crisis phase include planning, training, and equipping component and unit-level air forces for employment by the combatant commands. These activities intensify and become more focused as the crisis develops and the National Command Authority (NCA) issues a warning order for the impending contingency operation. Correspondingly, the required response by U.S. and allied forces could fall anywhere along the operational continuum, from a show of force to a major regional conflict. Regardless of the situation, U.S. forces and their supporting C4I systems must be flexible and able to operate wherever sent, whether it be from a host country, a forward location with austere facilities, or across a regional area.

Figure 2-4

 

 

2.4.2. Deployment. Deploying a fighting force over great distances from several locations requires ready, mobile forces, and deployment concepts to rapidly respond to changing contingency priorities (Figure 2-5). Typically, during this phase, the AOC, wings and squadrons deploy forward; air refueling aircraft position for global and theater operations; airlift aircraft prepare for deployment operations; a portion of the bomber force may move to forward operating locations (FOLs); Marine Expeditionary Brigades (MEBs) embark; Army division ready brigades move out; and Navy carrier battle groups or amphibious readiness groups (ARGs) sail to the area of responsibility (AOR). If necessary, a bomber force from the CONUS may execute an initial attack in the AOR, followed by composite air intervention wing operations or carrier operations. The composite wing may also conduct attacks against enroute and in-theater threats while in transit from home base to its beddown base. The AOC and advance unit elements and squadrons will deploy with initial operations and threat information to allow for 24 hours worth of mission planning and collaborative strike planning on their portable mission planning systems. These elements require a copy of the ATO generated by the AOC, and all threat and imagery information related to that ATO. JFACC planners require knowledge of enroute and in-theater threats, i.e., enemy capabilities to disrupt movement and beddown and targeting information to guide the planning and deployment of operational forces to the AOR. JFACC planners must coordinate with CONUS based AOC and resolve overflight requirements during the deployment phase. During this phase, the Air Tasking Order (ATO) may be generated and transmitted from a CONUS or forward-based Joint/Combined Air Operations Center (AOC). Air Force composite wings and naval carrier air assets could be tasked to execute the ATO during the deployment of other operational forces to the AOR. Subsequently, the deployed composite wing may be tasked to generate and execute mission type orders (MTOs) while in theater until a full-up AOC is in place. If a naval component is designated as the JFACC, the ATO would be generated from the designated command ship. Additionally, deploying forces will establish initial reachback requirements for logistics, intelligence, MC&G, weather, and weapons systems’ unique target materials, and other kinds of CONUS and theater-generated support. During this phase, command direction may come from outside the AOR, assuming that the theater does not already have an established C2 network. However, a C2 presence is required for any initial attack (i.e., Airborne Warning And Control System [AWACS]). C4I systems must be able to support these activities. Capability for storing critical data outside the AOR must be ensured and capable of supporting all activities.

Figure 2-5

2.4.2.1. Initial Phase Scenario. CAF and air support elements deploy to a contingency area and conduct limited air operations (Figure 2-6). Theater surveillance forces are one of the early deployed CAF forces. Their initial mission normally includes support to achieve aerospace control in order for air, ground, space, and maritime operations to continue without enemy threats. Another initial mission is to establish an air forces’ command and control system, from force to sortie-level, including the Contingency Theater Automated Planning System (CTAPS), capable of supporting the Air Component Commander’s ATO, while interfacing with joint and host nation command and control systems, and unit-level mission planning systems. Communications between forward area correlation/sensor centers and supported fighter aircraft will be conducted on HAVE QUICK for air-to-air operations. Communications will also be required to support initial deconfliction and collaborative mission planning between the Air Force Mission Support System (AFMSS) and the Navy’s Tactical Air Mission Planning System (TAMPS) through the Common Operational Modeling, Planning and Simulation Strategy (COMPASS). Coordination and targeting of all air operations will be conducted using the Improved Data Modem (IDM) either over an ultra high frequency (UHF) or very high frequency (VHF) communications circuit (such as HAVE QUICK or anti-jam VHF SINCGARS). Air-to-ground missions will use HAVE QUICK, anti-jam VHF voice communications that are compatible with host nation or Allied assets. Exchange of situation information between joint and host nation command and control systems will be conducted over Tactical Digital Information Links (TADILs A and B plus LINK 1), the Joint Tactical Information Distribution System (JTIDS) using the Interim JTIDS Message Specification (IJMS) today or the TADIL-J message standard shortly. Beyond line of sight (BLOS) digital connectivity will be through a relay of JTIDS or non-jam-resistant TADIL-A. Voice backup, adequate for low operational tempos, could use high frequency (HF), HAVE QUICK, or VHF radio communications. However, the 32 AOG at Ramstein AB has no voice capability.

Figure 2-6

2.4.3. Employment. Employment concepts (Figure 2-7) and C4I systems must be flexible enough to handle multiple and/or expanding contingency operations. In this phase, if not already in theater, the command authority, as well as the command and control assets, should be in place. Augmenting forces are coming into the theater at a steady pace, resulting in an increased demand for mobility assets. At this point, the ATO is generated and disseminated within theater. Because of the heavy demands for information during this phase, C4I systems must possess the capacity to transmit, receive, and manipulate high volumes of data and information without saturation. Saturation would cause long delays in communication transmission or reception. This capability must be possible in joint operations as the JFACC may be in another service and using non-AF equipment. These requirements must be considered when developing new C4I systems to integrate with the existing C4I architecture.

Figure 2-7

2.4.3.1. Build-Up Phase. As the scope of the conflict increases, deploying CAF units are able to increase air operations (Figure 2-8). During the initial phase, missions of aerospace control and air-to-ground support continue and air missions deep into threat territory increase. The complexity of an air war increases as more joint and allied nation command and control echelons deploy and link through interoperable communications. Theater surveillance forces extend coverage, along with reconnaissance forces, to provide threat warning, engagement direction, and execution phase command and control connectivity with other deployed CAF, joint, and allied nation forces, as appropriate. The E-3 AWACS provides long range/low altitude theater air surveillance support, the Modular Control Equipment (MCE), along with its ground-based radar, provides gap filler and extended air surveillance coverage, and the E-8 Joint STARS provides ground surveillance coverage. Generally, anti-jam (AJ) communications are used to support all CAF air operations missions. Some of the anti-jam communications systems have adjustable levels of resistance to communications jamming and settings will be determined by the level of the threat. The most forward employed air missions that have the highest priority to exchange information using anti-jam communications will generally use the most jam-resistant systems. Deep air missions use HAVE QUICK for communications. The volume and complexity of the command and control system may require the use of overlapping and multiple JTIDS and TADIL-A networks to reach all participants and to avoid data overload.

Figure 2-8

2.4.4. Sustainment. As the scope of the conflict increases, theater battle management requirements should increase. Additional TBM systems will be deployed to meet the sustainment (Figure 2-9) levels required. Airlift and sealift will also provide resupply as needed. Several logistics systems are essential for logistics command and control. They include Consolidated Aircraft Maintenance System (CAMS), Reliability and Maintainability Information System, Integrated Maintenance Data System (IMDS), Logistics Feasibility Analysis Subsystem (LOGFAC), Combat Supplies Management System (CSMS), Weapons Systems Management Information (WSMIS), Fuels Automated Management System (FAMS), Combat Fuels Management System (CFMS), Cargo Movement Operation Systems (CMOS), and Computer Movement Operations System (CALM). These systems and others provide theater support and reachback capability.

 

 

Figure 2-9

2.4.4.1. Mature Phase. A mature theater (Figure 2-10) includes multiple air wings, the entire range of the Theater Air Control System (TACS), and a complete Air Operations Center (AOC), supporting the JFACC’s Concept of Operations and the JTF/CC’s campaign plan. The basic

anti-jam communications systems remain; however, the numbers of separate communications nets continue to multiply, increasing the possibility of interference by friendly communications users and reducing flexibility in moving around within the frequency bands.

Figure 2-10

2.4.5. Redeployment. The Defense Planning Guidance (DPG) with its Win-Win strategy requires that two MRCs be supported. As the campaign in one or both theaters concludes, a redeployment strategy is necessary to ensure coordinated withdrawal (Figure 2-11) and possible reinsertion into another theater conflict. Near-real-time threat updates of enemy capabilities and intentions will help determine the redeployment scheduling and flow of air forces. Therefore, Reconnaissance and Surveillance forces are the last to redeploy from the first MRC and the first to deploy into the second MRC. TBM systems must be capable of rapid reconfiguration to continuously support orderly theater force drawdowns. Adverse weather data which may affect redeployment will be input into applicable TBM systems. To ensure a successful redeployment, the following must be developed: a redeployment air strategy; preplanned redeployment operations; and an improved capability to direct, execute, and monitor redeployment operations.

Figure 2-11

 

2.5. Operational Tasks. Key tasks for TBM systems belonging to MAJCOMs, other military services, and allies are to support deployed CAF air elements in the execution of their air missions. At times, TBM systems may be tasked to support the host nation or other services. Key sub-tasks to support air missions are space, air, surface, and sub-surface surveillance, identification, collaborative joint and combined mission planning, and communications with power projection forces and command and control nodes. Characteristics of deployable TBM forces include rapid and responsive deployment, flexible employment during the air war, a survivability capability that does not require large amounts of air and ground resources to defend, long endurance to ensure air situation continuity, an ability to provide threat warning and engagement commitment, and the ability to support the air component, joint, or allied force commander.

2.5.1. Reconstitution must also be accomplished. With two MRCs, a new look was given to reconstitution. It is a task in a two MRC situation and may be accomplished within the first deployment/regional conflict theater, en route to the second regional conflict/redeployment theater, or in CONUS prior to deploying to the second regional conflict (Fig 2-12).

Figure 2-12

 

3. Mission Needs Analysis (MNA). Once a task is identified, MAJCOMs conduct an MNA by analyzing the factors which impact current and programmed capability to accomplish that task. The task-to-need process evaluates our force structure, the environment, and the threat we expect to encounter while conducting the assigned mission. Once deficiencies are identified, doctrine, tactics, and training (non-material solutions) are examined to determine if changes in these areas can solve the deficiency. A Mission Needs Statement (MNS) documents the changes if modifications to current systems or new systems are required.

3.1. Mission Area Current Assessment.

3.1.1. Theater Battle Management deficiencies stem from shortfalls in our current systems, procedures and/or tactics, advances/changes in enemy capabilities or tactics (i.e., advances in hostile aircraft radar signature designs), increased emphasis on use of theater ballistic missiles, reduced line-of-sight (LOS) communications and limited BLOS communications channel availability. Also, there are technical obstacles in securing current systems and interoperating with current sister service systems. Finally, the release and disclosure of data within the coalition and combined environments must be addressed from a political, not technological, point of view.

3.1.2. Severe limitations exist in the areas of Theater Missile Defense (TMD), increased communications bandwidth, identification by type/intentions, and BLOS and VHF LOS communications. Additional areas considered deficient include detectability and tracking of low observables and ground targets, UHF LOS communications, and inability to replenish or augment existing space assets in a responsive manner. Existing and planned spacelift assets (including the planned Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle family) are geared toward scheduled deployments; there is little capability to launch replenishment or augmentation sensors in a timely manner. Deficiencies may be corrected through one or more of the following: a change in our procedures/tactics; increased/improved training; acquiring more, newer, or better systems; and technical/scientific breakthroughs resulting in significantly more capable systems which must then be acquired. Current assessments are in Table 3. The task is stated and the validated deficiencies (in ranked order) are listed immediately below each task. These deficiencies prevent the task from being accomplished or being accomplished as efficiently as desired. Then the TBM elements or functionalities affected by the deficiency are listed.

Note: More deficiencies have been identified since the original list was created. However, due to time constraints, these new deficiencies are not listed in this version of the MAP, but will be incorporated into the next version.

Task: Assess theater operations/provide indications and warnings

Deficiency

Deficiency Explanation

Element

01. AOR TBM forces have increasingly limited ability to communicate within AOR or outside AOR (for reachback).

Existing deployable comm assets do not serve data and voice requirements of TBM systems effectively and cannot support mix of high volume voice, data, and message traffic of AOC, wings, and other units.

AOC, CRC, CRE, WOC, ASOC, TACP,

AETACS

02. TACS radars unable to accomplish mission without transmitter fixes/replacement.

The transmitter section of the TPS-75 is 1960s technology and is rapidly becoming insupportable. AWACS also needs upgrades to maintain mission readiness.

Airborne and ground based radars

03. TBM systems unable to pass secure/anti-jam data/voice via common means in a timely manner.

Existing theater voice and data communications (TADIL A/B, LINK 11, LINK 4A, HAVE QUICK) do not have the netted throughput capability for rapid dissemination of battle info.

AOC, CRC, CRE, ASOC, TACP, WOC, AETACS

05. TBM systems unable to provide/handle Multi-Level-Secure data.

There’s no current or planned capability to enable users to tag data elements with its associated classification and let the system move the data elements around securely.

Intel, AOC, WOC

06. AWACS comm will be unable to handle requirements.

AWACS comm needs upgrading. SATCOM radios have interference problems and need to adopt MIL STD 188-183 by OCT 96, or they won’t be able to communicate BLOS via SATCOM. AWACS HF radios are becoming unsustainable and don't have ALE, required for NORAD ops.

AETACS

07. Lack of updated, populated all-source integrated databases.

Current national intelligence all source integrated databases are out of date, contain numerous empty data fields, do not provide global coverage.

Intel

08. TACS unable to positively identify friendlies and hostiles.

TACS unable to positively identify friend from foe with current Mark XII IFF/SIF equipment.

Airborne and ground based radars

10. TACS radar elements unable to passively detect targets.

TACS radars do not have a passive capability which would provide target detection without possible detection/destruction by the enemy.

Airborne and ground based radars

12. TBM systems unable to maintain common multi-source picture.

Separate systems like TIBS, TADIL A, JTIDS, are not capable of being fused into a common picture.

AETACS, CRC, CRE

16. AOC & JFACC unable to exert control over scarce recce and surveillance assets.

Documented limitations in the JFACC’s OPCON enable "national" agencies to override mission/campaign essential intelligence collection taskings in favor of national requirements.

AOC, Intel

17. Lack of capability to access and interface with national-level databases.

Lack of wide-band comms, interoperable software, and large on-line storage capacity limits the ability of AOCs and unit level intelligence elements to tie into national databases.

AOC, Intel

18. TACS unable to ID aircraft adequately in peacetime.

There are numerous issues that make peacetime identification a difficult problem for deployable units. Negotiations with numerous governments must be conducted to obtain appropriate data to make identifications.

Airborne and ground based radars

20. TBM users unable to utilize received WX data due to dissimilar format.

Dissemination means & protocols for WX data from AFW centers are not standard & do not meet C4I system data requirements. WX systems are not integrated into customer C4I systems for timely & effective use of data.

AOC, CRC, CRE, AETACS, WOC, ASOC, TACP

21. TBM systems unable to meet operational requirements in the future.

The TPS-75 is a TPS-43 with a new antenna and the E-3 is old technology. Both systems now need upgrading. Things need fixing to improve the reliability and maintainability of the systems.

Airborne and ground based radars

23. Targeting process data inadequate to support ATO development.

Some problems: lack of effective process/automated capability to feed, correlate, and fuse target databases. Lack of common numbering system for ground targets between Army (2alfa/4numeric) and USAF (2alfa/3numeric).

AOC, Intel

24. MCE unable to perform mission without upgrades.

MCE needs upgrades to continue to improve its performance. Examples include: multi-type radar feed/correlator capability (TPS-70, allied radars, etc.), computer upgrades to include; increased processing capability, increased memory, etc.

CRC, CRE

25. Warfighters unable to obtain theater specific intel products.

Lack of tailored products to MAJCOMs and AOCs from Joint Intelligence Center/ Joint Analysis Center (JIC/JAC).

AOC, WOC, Intel

27. All TACS lacking lightweight, compact, common displays.

Lightweight, compact common displays are required in all TACS elements if future requirements are to be met.

All TBM elements

28. TACS unable to see all targets with current radar.

Low RCS and TMD targets sometimes cannot be detected by TACS.

Airborne and ground based radars

31. Lack of broad area/multispectral coverage.

Present capabilities to provide Broad Area Imagery support in both single-band and multispectral modes are not adequate to meet air campaign requirements.

Intel, AOC, WOC

33. Lack of responsive, automated collection/requirements management capability.

Lack of a responsive, automated collection and requirements management schema, due to deficiencies in both systems and training/awareness, prevents the AOC and unit level intel activities from maintaining clear visibility over requests for intelligence.

Intel, AOC, WOC

37. HVAAs unable to receive near real time intel while airborne.

HVAAs do not contain equipment for receiving near real time intelligence updates while airborne.

AETACS, Intel

40. CREs unable to communicate via SHF SATCOM with all necessary end users.

CREs need larger satellite dishes to handle bandwidth requirements efficiently.

CRE

44. ASOC personnel unable to maintain accurate & timely FEBA and enemy info.

The ASOC does manual tracking of the FEBA, enemy movements, enemy ADA, etc. With future manning of the ASOC expected to be smaller, manual operations will soon be impossible.

ASOC, Intel

46. Combat planners unable to produce timely and accurate COAs.

Planners lack automated tools for quickly developing and analyzing COAs.

AOC

47. TBM Systems unable to interoperate well because of different symbologies.

Different symbologies for the same object within different current TBM systems create confusion among operators. In order to enhance interoperability and situational awareness, a common symbology set should be adopted by all elements of TBM.

All TBM elements

48. AOC unable to perform nodal analysis.

Lack of automated intel fusion tools, automated decision support tools and databases to perform nodal analysis.

AOC, Intel

53. Surveillance systems unable to provide 24 hour coverage.

Spectrum of conflict coverage. Lack of responsive and adequate 24 hour coverage throughout the full spectrum of conflict (air, ground, sea, space).

All surveillance systems, Intel

57. Mobile ground radar units unable to automatically reset filters after link outages.

CRCs/CREs experience long delays when reestablishing data links after equipment outages due to need to manually reenter filter information.

CRC, CRE

58. TBM systems unable to interoperate well because of different tabular displays.

Personnel who deal with different TBM systems can not go from one system to another without loss of operational time. This is due to the lack of commonality in the various systems’ displays.

All TBM elements

63. AOC unable to receive Joint STARS picture.

Because the Joint STARS does not have a beyond line of sight capability to send its picture, the AOC will not be able to get the Joint STARS picture.

AOC, AETACS

Task: Plan/adjust theater operations plan

Deficiency

Deficiency Explanation

Element

01. AOR TBM forces have increasingly limited ability to communicate within AOR or outside AOR (for reachback).

Existing deployable comm assets do not serve data and voice requirements of TBM systems effectively and cannot support mix of high volume voice, data, and message traffic of AOC, wings, and other units.

AOC, CRC, CRE, WOC, ASOC, TACP, AETACS

03. TBM systems unable to pass secure/anti-jam data/voice via common means in a timely manner.

Existing theater voice and data communications (TADIL A/B, LINK 11, LINK 4A, HAVE QUICK) do not have the netted throughput capability for rapid dissemination of battle info.

AOC, CRC, CRE, WOC, ASOC, TACP, AETACS

05. TBM systems unable to provide/handle Multi-Level-Secure data.

There’s no current or planned capability to enable users to tag data elements with its associated classification and let the system move the data elements around securely.

Intel, AOC, WOC

07. Lack of updated, populated all-source integrated databases.

Current national intelligence all source integrated databases are out of date, contain numerous empty data fields, do not provide global coverage.

Intel

09. Air Force and MAJCOMs unable to perform deliberate and crisis action planning and execution capability.

The Air Force does not have an integrated, automated information system and communications infrastructure capable of supporting operations planning or execution.

AOC

12. TBM systems unable to maintain common multi-source picture.

Separate systems like TIBS, TADIL A, JTIDS, are not capable of being fused into a common picture.

AETACS, CRC, CRE

15. ABCCC unable to interoperate with Army radios.

The ARC-186 is the current VHF radio in the ABCCC capsule. The Army is fielding the SINCGARS frequency hopping VHF-FM radio as its standard battlefield voice communications system. ABCCC is not interoperable with SINCGARS.

AETACS

16. AOC & JFACC unable to exert control over scarce recce and surveillance assets.

Documented limitations in the JFACC’s OPCON enable "national" agencies to override mission/campaign essential intelligence collection taskings in favor of national requirements.

AOC, Intel

19. CTAPS unable to track logistics.

CTAPS unable to track data for APS automatically.

AOC

20. TBM users unable to utilize received WX data due to dissimilar format.

Dissemination means & protocols for WX data from AFW centers are not standard & do not meet C4I system data requirements. WX systems are not integrated into customer C4I systems for timely & effective use of data.

AOC, AETACS, CRC, CRE, ASOC, TACP, WOC

22. Current imagery comm pipes & data bases unable to move & store large volumes of data

The comm pipes are not big enough to handle this task, nor are they efficiently used. Many small dedicated circuits tie up satellite transponder space. Also, the current databases are not big enough. Therefore, the receipt of information by the warfighter is not adequate.

Intel, AOC

23. Targeting process data inadequate to support ATO development.

Some problems: lack of effective process/automated capability to feed, correlate, and fuse target databases. Lack of common numbering system for ground targets between Army (2alfa/4numeric) and USAF (2alfa/3numeric). Process is also too slow to be effective.

AOC, Intel

26. WX systems unable to produce complete and accurate WX data.

Key environmental parameters are not sensed by current fixed and/or tactical observing equipment. Weather equipment difficult to deploy and maintain.

All TBM elements

29. AOC unable to rapidly incorporate BDA into ATO process/cycle.

Lack of standardized BDA methodology and reporting structure. Even 4 years after the end of DESERT STORM, there is no appearance as to how to conduct effective BDA.

AOC, Intel

30. Lack of MC&G global coverage, detail, and currency.

Deficiencies in production of MC&G materials has led to a DMA production schedule which is inadequate.

Intel

32. Different message and data formats hamper info transfer.

Non-standard formats hamper interoperability.

All TBM elements

33. Lack of responsive, automated collection/requirements management capability.

Lack of a responsive, automated collection and requirements management schema, due to deficiencies in both systems and training/awareness, prevents the AOC and unit level intel activities from maintaining clear visibility over requests for intelligence.

Intel, AOC, WOC

35. Intel unable to provide weapon system specific target materials.

There is no established product standard or product lines for weapon specific target materials except those produced by the 480th IG.

Intel

43. CIS lacks capability to exploit DPPDBs.

There is currently no DPPDB exploitation capability on CIS. The Defense Mapping Agency (DMA) is producing the first 50 DPPDB cells this fiscal year and is scheduled to produce 350 DPPDB cells for FY96. This is too late for operations.

Intel

45. AOC planners unable to store & maintain target info.

Lack of archival databases for target development; lack of capability at AOC to store folder materials and maintain target dossiers.

AOC, Intel

46. Combat planners unable to produce timely and accurate COAs.

Planners lack automated tools for quickly developing and analyzing COAs.

AOC

49. Command Posts unable to manage either the quantity or the urgency of information dissemination during crisis and wartime.

Deficiencies exist in the areas of system reliability, maintainability, standardization, interoperability, training, deployability, responsiveness due to task overload, and information timeliness.

WOC

54. AOC unable to track/locate inserted SOF.

SOF do not adequately coordinate with the AOC about the location of inserted SOF.

AOC

55. TBM forces unable to maintain friendly force data.

Current Friendly Forces and Facilities (F3) reporting does not provide sufficient data to determine capabilities of coalition forces.

AOC

61. SOF and conventional forces unable to fully interoperate.

Procedural problems and hardware differences prevent full interoperability between SOF and conventional forces.

AOC

64. ADS unable to provide CADS data to CTAPS.

ADS must use approx. 6-7 CTAPS terminals to work. CADS needs only 2 PCs to do the airspace deconfliction job. Plus, CADS has some functionality that ADS does not.

AOC

Task: Respond to taskings/prepare for execution

Deficiency

Deficiency Explanation

Element

01. AOR TBM forces have increasingly limited ability to communicate within AOR or outside AOR (for reachback).

Existing deployable comm assets do not serve data and voice requirements of TBM systems effectively and cannot support mix of high volume voice, data, and message traffic of AOC, wings, and other units.

AOC, CRC, CRE, WOC, ASOC, TACP, AETACS

05. TBM systems unable to provide/handle Multi-Level-Secure data.

There’s no current or planned capability to enable users to tag data elements with its associated classification and let the system move the data elements around securely.

Intel, AOC, WOC

14. TACPs unable to communicate with ABCCC & ASOC while dismounted.

TACPs have limited dismounted comm capability and need Automatic Link Establishment (ALE).

TACP, ASOC, AETACS

20. TBM users unable to utilize received WX data due to dissimilar format.

Dissemination means & protocols for WX data from AFW centers are not standard & do not meet C4I system data requirements. WX systems are not integrated into customer C4I systems for timely & effective use of data.

Weather

21. TBM systems unable to meet operational requirements in the future.

The TPS-75 is a TPS-43 with a new antenna and the E-3 is old technology. Both systems now need upgrading. Things need fixing to improve the reliability and maintainability of the systems.

Airborne and ground based radars

22. Current imagery comm pipes & data bases unable to move & store large volumes of data.

The comm pipes are not big enough to handle this task, nor are they efficiently used. Many small dedicated circuits tie up satellite transponder space. Also, the current databases are not big enough. Therefore, the receipt of information by the warfighter is not adequate.

Intel, AOC

26. WX systems unable to produce complete and accurate WX data.

Key environmental parameters are not sensed by current fixed and/or tactical observing equipment. Weather equipment difficult to deploy and maintain

All TBM elements

30. Lack of MC&G global coverage, detail, and currency.

Deficiencies in production of MC&G materials has led to a DMA production schedule which is inadequate.

Intel

33. Lack of responsive, automated collection/requirements management capability.

Lack of a responsive, automated collection and requirements management schema, due to deficiencies in both systems and training/awareness, prevents the AOC and unit level intel activities from maintaining clear visibility over requests for intelligence.

Intel, AOC, WOC

35. Intel unable to provide weapon system specific target materials.

There is no established product standard or product lines for weapon specific target materials except those produced by the 480th IG.

Intel

36. CIS unable to transfer data within internal applications at the component level.

Interface difficulties abound with the CIS. As an evolution into a constellation of applications that were generally developed as "stand-alones" to meet specific requirements, it has several interface problems.

Intel

40. CREs unable to communicate via SHF SATCOM with all necessary end users.

CREs need larger satellite dishes to handle bandwidth requirements efficiently.

CRE

41. WX data unable to be disseminated to end users & other WX systems.

AFW cannot provide some critical WX data for use in assessing the WX’s impact on weapon systems' employment.

All TBM elements

42. ASOCs unable to receive ATO/ITO in a workable manner.

The ATO/ITO is not being received in a timely manner to allow the ASOCs sufficient time to plan and distribute tasking information to appropriate TACPs.

ASOC

44. ASOC personnel unable to maintain accurate & timely FEBA and enemy info.

The ASOC does manual tracking of the FEBA, enemy movements, enemy ADA, etc. With future manning of the ASOC expected to be smaller, manual operations will soon be impossible for mission accomplishment.

ASOC, Intel

45. AOC planners unable to store & maintain target info.

Lack of archival databases for target development; lack of capability at AOC to store folder materials and maintain target dossiers.

AOC, Intel

61. SOF and conventional forces unable to fully interoperate.

Procedural problems and hardware differences prevent full interoperability between SOF and conventional forces.

AOC

62. WCCS LAN unable to handle amount of info in future.

WCCS LAN needs to be improved. There is a lack of terminals for personnel to acquire/work data on WCCS LAN currently for simultaneous operations.

WOC

67. Wings unable to get ATO info prior to ATO publication.

In many cases the ATO arrives too late for mission commanders to have any input into the next day’s mission. However, informally the AOC provided a "heads up" at an earlier time that allowed some pre-planning and coordination to the wings.

WOC

68. Wings unable to track missions with current C2 structure.

Wing systems for operations and logistics mission tracking use different formats and cannot share data.

WOC

69. AETACS unable to interoperate with AFMSS.

The AFMSS does not have a software module which allows it to upload/download data/information to/from the ABCCC capsule. The ABCCC currently uses non-standard systems for mission planning.

AETACS

Task: Control alert/airborne missions

Deficiency

Deficiency Explanation

Element

01. AOR TBM forces have increasingly limited ability to communicate within AOR or outside AOR (for reachback).

Existing deployable comm assets do not serve data and voice requirements of TBM systems effectively and cannot support mix of high volume voice, data, and message traffic of AOC, wings, and other units.

AOC, CRC, CRE, WOC, ASOC, TACP, AETACS

02. TACS radars unable to accomplish mission without transmitter fixes/replacement.

The transmitter section of the TPS-75 is 1960s technology and is rapidly becoming insupportable. AWACS also needs upgrades to maintain mission readiness.

Airborne and ground based radars

03. TBM systems unable to pass secure/anti-jam data/voice via common means in a timely manner.

Existing theater voice and data communications (TADIL A/B, LINK 11, LINK 4A, HAVE QUICK) do not have the netted throughput capability for rapid dissemination of battle info.

AOC, , CRC, CRE, AETACS, ASOC, TACP, WOC

04. TBM systems' SATCOM radios do not comply with JCS directive.

Current configuration of SATCOM radios in TBM systems are not compliant with the JCS mandate to operate on 5-Khz and 25-Khz channels as well as Demand Assigned Multiple Access (DAMA).

All TBM elements

06. AWACS comm will be unable to handle requirements.

AWACS comm needs upgrading. SATCOM radios have interference problems and need to adopt MIL STD 188-183 by OCT 96, or they won’t be able to communicate BLOS via SATCOM. AWACS HF radios are becoming unsustainable and don't have ALE, required for NORAD ops.

AETACS

08. TACS unable to positively identify friendlies and hostiles.

TACS unable to positively identify friend from foe with current Mark XII IFF/SIF equipment.

Airborne and ground based radars

10. TACS radar elements unable to passively detect targets.

TACS radars do not have a passive capability which would provide target detection without possible detection/destruction by the enemy.

Airborne and ground based radars

11. AETACS unable to receive ATO/ACO once airborne.

AETACS have no capability to receive ATO/ACO or updates to ATO/ACO except by voice.

AETACS

13. TACPs unable to mark targets covertly or in adverse weather.

TACPs have limited covert target marking capability and limited ability to operate at night. Current NVG equipment is range limited. Therefore, while doing night or bad WX CAS, TACPs are required to be in close proximity to the target.

TACP

14. TACPs unable to communicate with ABCCC & ASOC while dismounted.

TACPs have limited dismounted comm capability and need Automatic Link Establishment (ALE).

TACP, ASOC, AETACS

21. TBM systems unable to meet operational requirements in the future.

The TPS-75 is a TPS-43 with a new antenna and the E-3 is old technology. Both systems now need upgrading. Things need fixing to improve the reliability and maintainability of the systems.

Airbone and ground based radars

24. MCE unable to perform mission without upgrades.

MCE needs upgrades to continue to improve its performance. Examples include: multi-type radar feed/correlator capability (TPS-70, allied radars, etc.), computer upgrades to include; increased processing capability, increased memory, etc.

CRC, CRE

28. TACS unable to see all targets with current radar.

Low RCS and TMD targets sometimes cannot be detected by TACS.

Airborne and ground based radars

34. ABCCC unable to efficiently utilize DCT/BCT.

Digital Communications Terminal (DCT)/Battlefield Communications Terminal (BCT) are being provided to ABCCC capsules, but are being fielded as stand-alone devices and not integrated with the capsule. Battlestaff must manually rekey systems.

AETACS

37. HVAAs unable to receive near real time intel while airborne.

HVAAs do not contain equipment for receiving near real time intelligence updates while airborne.

AETACS, Intel

38. Mobile ground radar units unable to communicate with CAS a/c.

Mobile ground radars are not able to communicate using VHF voice with aircraft performing CAS missions due to lack of VHF capability.

CRC, CRE

39. TACPs unable to determine precise target locations.

TACPs are required to locate targets. Even when they know own current location, only general target location is possible to pass to CAS/AFAC a/c.

TACP

44. ASOC personnel unable to maintain accurate & timely FEBA and enemy info.

The ASOC does manual tracking of the FEBA, enemy movements, enemy ADA, etc. With future manning of the ASOC expected to be smaller, manual operations will soon be impossible for mission accomplishment.

ASOC, Intel

59. Current EC-135 aircraft unable to meet conventional mission requirements.

EC-135s are not set up to handle conventional missions.

AETACS

60. GTACS lack laser threat detection warning or countermeasures.

Current weapons use lasers in the targeting process. GTACS lack any laser detection capability, countermeasures, or self-protection against these weapons.

All GTACS elements

Task: Provide/Protect C2I networks and systems

Deficiency

Deficiency Explanation

Element

01. AOR TBM forces have increasingly limited ability to communicate within AOR or outside AOR (for reachback).

Existing deployable comm assets do not serve data and voice requirements of TBM systems effectively and cannot support mix of high volume voice, data, and message traffic of AOC, wings, and other units.

AOC, CRC, CRE, WOC, ASOC, TACP, AETACS

03. TBM systems unable to pass secure/anti-jam data/voice via common means in a timely manner.

Existing theater voice and data communications (TADIL A/B, LINK 11, LINK 4A, HAVE QUICK) do not have the netted throughput capability for rapid dissemination of battle info.

AOC, CRC, CRE, AETACS, WOC ASOC, TACP

04. TBM systems' SATCOM radios do not comply with JCS directive.

Current configuration of SATCOM radios in TBM systems are not

compliant with the JCS mandate to operate on 5-Khz and 25-Khz channels as well as Demand Assigned Multiple Access (DAMA).

All TBM

elements

05. TBM systems unable to provide/handle Multi-Level-Secure data.

There’s no current or planned capability to enable users to tag data elements with its associated classification and let the system move the data elements around securely.

Intel, AOC, WOC

06. AWACS comm will be unable to handle requirements.

AWACS comm needs upgrading. SATCOM radios have interference problems and need to adopt MIL STD 188-183 by OCT 96, or they won’t be able to communicate BLOS via SATCOM. AWACS HF radios are becoming unsustainable and don't have ALE, required for NORAD ops.

AETACS

15. ABCCC unable to interoperate with Army radios.

The ARC-186 is the current VHF radio in the ABCCC capsule. The Army is fielding the SINCGARS frequency hopping VHF-FM radio as its standard battlefield voice communications system. ABCCC is not interoperable with SINCGARS.

AETACS

17. Lack of capability to access and interface with national-level databases.

Lack of wide-band comms, interoperable software, and large on-line storage capacity limits the ability of AOCs and unit level intelligence elements to tie into national databases.

AOC, Intel

22. Current imagery comm pipes & data bases unable to move & store large volumes of data.

The comm pipes are not big enough to handle this task, nor are they efficiently used. Many small dedicated circuits tie up satellite transponder space. Also, the current databases are not big enough. Therefore, the receipt of information by the warfighter is not adequate.

AOC, Intel

32. Different message and data formats hamper info transfer.

Non-standard formats hamper interoperability.

All TBM elements

34. ABCCC unable to efficiently utilize DCT/BCT.

Digital Communications Terminal (DCT)/Battlefield Communications Terminal (BCT) are being provided to ABCCC capsules, but are being fielded as stand-alone devices and not integrated with the capsule. Battlestaff must manually rekey systems.

AETACS

36. CIS unable to transfer data within internal applications at the component level.

Interface difficulties abound with the CIS. As an evolution into a constellation of applications that were generally developed as "stand-alones" to meet specific requirements, it has several interface problems.

Intel

37. HVAAs unable to receive near real time intel while airborne.

HVAAs do not contain equipment for receiving near real time intelligence updates while airborne.

AETACS, Intel

40. CREs unable to communicate via SHF SATCOM with all necessary end users.

CREs need larger satellite dishes to handle bandwidth requirements efficiently.

CRE

41. WX data unable to be disseminated to end users & other WX systems.

AFW cannot provide some critical WX data for use in assessing the WX’s impact on weapon systems' employment.

All TBM elements

42. ASOCs unable to receive ATO/ITO in a workable manner.

The ATO/ITO is not being received in a timely manner to allow the ASOCs sufficient time to plan and distribute tasking information to appropriate TACPs.

ASOC

44. ASOC personnel unable to maintain accurate & timely FEBA and enemy info.

The ASOC does manual tracking of the FEBA, enemy movements, enemy ADA, etc. With future manning of the ASOC expected to be smaller, manual operations will soon be impossible for mission accomplishment.

ASOC, Intel

45. AOC planners unable to store & maintain target info.

Lack of archival databases for target development; lack of capability at AOC to store folder materials and maintain target dossiers.

AOC, Intel

47. TBM Systems unable to interoperate well because of different symbologies.

Different symbologies for the same object within different current TBM systems create confusion among operators. In order to enhance interoperability and situational awareness, a common symbology set should be adopted by all elements of TBM.

All TBM elements

51. Units unable to interoperate from squadron to force level.

Stovepipe systems exist both inside and outside the AOR, reducing combat capability.

All TBM elements

52. GTACS unable to operate without detection due to emission signatures of its equipment.

GTACS need to operate without being detected. Current radio systems provide an RF signature which can be easily detected. Generators have large heat/IR signature.

All GTACS elements

57. Mobile ground radar units unable to automatically reset filters after link outages.

CRCs/CREs experience long delays when reestablishing data links after equipment outages due to need to manually reenter filter information.

CRC, CRE

58. TBM systems unable to interoperate well because of different tabular displays.

Personnel who deal with different TBM systems can not go from one system to another without loss of operational time. This is due to the lack of commonality in the various systems’ displays.

All TBM elements

62. WCCS LAN unable to handle amount of info in future.

WCCS LAN needs to be improved. There is a lack of terminals for personnel to acquire/work data on WCCS LAN currently for

simultaneous operations.

WOC

65. Forces unable to communicate due to limited secure comm systems.

Reliable secure comm (i.e., KY-58, KY-57 compatibility) is a shortfall for all current combat systems. The ability to receive and relay vital data which may change the battle picture is not reliable and redundant enough in current comm systems.

All TBM elements

66. Split ASOC operations strain current communications capability.

For theaters where split ASOC operations are planned, current communications capability is unable to handle the comm requirements.

ASOC

Pacific Air Forces (PACAF) feels that deficiency 58 should read "TBM systems unable to interoperate well because of increased amounts of differential training required due to a lack of system commonality." PACAF also feels that a new deficiency needs be added to this task - "No facility for safeguarding data outside the AOR - Command centers must be able to reconstitute should they be rendered ineffective due to enemy action or other reasons. Restoring databases is one of the most critical components in reconstituting a command center at an alternate location. Therefore, a method for maintaining an off-site database is required."

Task: Provide self-protection for air vehicles

Deficiency

Deficiency Explanation

Element

50. HVAAs unable to self protect adequately.

HVAAs unable to self protect against threats.

AETACS

Task: Detect/identify/monitor theater situation/provide R & S

Deficiency

Deficiency Explanation

Element

02. TACS radars unable to accomplish mission without transmitter fixes/replacement.

The transmitter section of the TPS-75 is 1960s technology and is rapidly becoming insupportable. AWACS also needs upgrades to maintain mission readiness.

Airborne and ground based radars

04. TBM systems' SATCOM radios do not comply with JCS directive.

Current configuration of SATCOM radios in TBM systems are not compliant with the JCS mandate to operate on 5-Khz and 25-Khz channels as well as Demand Assigned Multiple Access (DAMA).

All TBM elements

05. TBM systems unable to provide/handle Multi-Level-Secure data.

There’s no current or planned capability to enable users to tag data elements with its associated classification and let the system move the data elements around securely.

Intel, AOC, WOC

06. AWACS comm will be unable to handle requirements.

AWACS comm needs upgrading. SATCOM radios have interference problems and need to adopt MIL STD 188-183 by OCT 96, or they won’t be able to communicate BLOS via SATCOM. AWACS HF radios are becoming unsustainable and don't have ALE, required for NORAD ops.

AETACS

07. Lack of updated, populated all-source integrated databases.

Current national intelligence all source integrated databases are out of date, contain numerous empty data fields, do not provide global coverage.

Intel

08. TACS unable to positively identify friendlies and hostiles.

TACS unable to positively identify friend from foe with current Mark XII IFF/SIF equipment.

Airborne and ground based radars

10. TACS radar elements unable to passively detect targets.

TACS radars do not have a passive capability which would provide target detection without possible detection/destruction by the enemy.

Airborne and ground based radars

11. AETACS unable to receive ATO/ACO once airborne.

AETACS have no capability to receive ATO/ACO or updates to ATO/ACO except by voice.

AETACS

16. AOC & JFACC unable to exert control over scarce recce and surveillance assets.

Documented limitations in the JFACC’s OPCON enable "national" agencies to override mission/campaign essential intelligence collection taskings in favor of national requirements.

AOC, Intel

17. Lack of capability to access and interface with national-level databases.

Lack of wide-band comms, interoperable software, and large on-line storage capacity limits the ability of AOCs and unit level intelligence elements to tie into national databases.

AOC, Intel

18. TACS unable to ID aircraft adequately in peacetime.

There are numerous issues that make peacetime identification a difficult problem for deployable units. Negotiations with numerous governments must be conducted to obtain appropriate data to make identifications.

Airborne and ground based radars

21. TBM systems unable to meet operational requirements in the future.

The TPS-75 is a TPS-43 with a new antenna and the E-3 is old technology. Both systems now need upgrading. Things need fixing to improve the reliability and maintainability of the systems.

Airborne and ground based radars

24. MCE unable to perform mission without upgrades.

MCE needs upgrades to continue to improve its performance. Examples include: multi-type radar feed/correlator capability (TPS-70, allied radars, etc.), computer upgrades to include; increased processing capability, increased memory, etc.

CRC, CRE

28. TACS unable to see all targets with current radar.

Low RCS and TMD targets sometimes cannot be detected by TACS.

Airborne and ground based rdr

31. Lack of broad area/multispectral coverage.

Present capabilities to provide Broad Area Imagery support in both single-band and multispectral modes are not adequate to meet air

campaign requirements.

Intel, AOC, WOC

32. Different message and data formats hamper info transfer.

Non-standard formats hamper interoperability.

All TBM elements

33. Lack of responsive, automated collection/requirements management capability.

Lack of a responsive, automated collection and requirements management schema, due to deficiencies in both systems and training/awareness, prevents the AOC and unit level intel activities from maintaining clear visibility over requests for intelligence.

Intel, AOC, WOC

40. CREs unable to communicate via SHF SATCOM with all necessary end users.

CREs need larger satellite dishes to handle bandwidth requirements efficiently.

CRE

53. Surveillance systems unable to provide 24 hour coverage.

Spectrum of conflict coverage. Lack of responsive and adequate 24 hour coverage throughout the full spectrum of conflict (air, ground, sea, space).

All surveillance systems, Intel

55. TBM forces unable to maintain friendly force data.

Current Friendly Forces and Facilities (F3) reporting does not provide sufficient data to determine capabilities of coalition forces.

AOC

 

Note: The following tasks are not primary TBM tasks. They originated from the CAF MAA and are related to TBM activities.

Task: Pack/configure/assemble (for movement) people/equipment/etc.

Deficiency

Deficiency Explanation

Element

09. Air Force and MAJCOMs unable to perform deliberate and crisis action planning and execution capability.

The Air Force does not have an integrated, automated information system and communications infrastructure capable of supporting operations planning or execution.

AOC, WOC

27. All TACS lacking lightweight, compact, common displays.

Lightweight, compact common displays are required in all TACS elements if future requirements are to be met.

All TBM elements

56. GTACS unable to be easily deployed due to size of units.

GTACS equipment is too cumbersome to deploy quickly and efficiently. The number of airlift loads needed to move one unit is too many.

All GTACS elements

Task: Replenish/resupply munitions, equipment, tools, spares, consumables, tech data, POL

Deficiency

Deficiency Explanation

Element

19. CTAPS unable to track logistics.

CTAPS unable to track data for APS automatically.

AOC

Task: Collect/disseminate mapping data on area of operations

Deficiency

Deficiency Explanation

Element

01. AOR TBM forces have increasingly limited ability to communicate within AOR or outside AOR (for reachback).

Existing deployable comm assets do not serve data and voice requirements of TBM systems effectively and cannot support mix of high volume voice, data, and message traffic of AOC, wings, and other units.

AOC, CRC, CRE, WOC, ASOC, TACP, AETACS

13. TACPs unable to mark targets covertly or in adverse weather.

TACPs have limited covert target marking capability and limited ability to operate at night. Current NVG equipment is range limited. Therefore, while doing night or bad WX CAS, TACPs are required to be in close proximity to the target.

TACP

20. TBM users unable to utilize received WX data due to dissimilar format.

Dissemination means & protocols for WX data from AFW centers are not standard & do not meet C4I system data requirements. WX systems are not integrated into customer C4I systems for timely & effective use of data.

AOC, CRC, CRE, WOC, ASOC, TACP, AETACS

22. Current imagery comm pipes & data bases unable to move & store large volumes of data.

The comm pipes are not big enough to handle this task, nor are they efficiently used. Many small dedicated circuits tie up satellite transponder space. Also, the current databases are not big enough. Therefore, the receipt of information by the warfighter is not adequate.

AOC, Intel

30. Lack of MC&G global coverage, detail, and currency.

Deficiencies in production of MC&G materials has led to a DMA production schedule which is inadequate.

Intel

43. CIS lacks capability to exploit DPPDBs.

There is currently no DPPDB exploitation capability on CIS. The Defense Mapping Agency (DMA) is producing the first 50 DPPDB cells this fiscal year and is scheduled to produce 350 DPPDB cells for FY96. This is too late for operations.

Intel

 

 

Task: Locate/communicate/recover downed aircrews/isolated personnel

Deficiency

Deficiency Explanation

Element

01. AOR TBM forces have increasingly limited ability to communicate within AOR or outside AOR (for reachback).

Existing deployable comm assets do not serve data and voice requirements of TBM systems effectively and cannot support mix of high volume voice, data, and message traffic of AOC, wings, and other units.

AOC, CRC, CRE, WOC, ASOC, TACP, AETACS

06. AWACS comm will be unable to handle requirements.

AWACS comm needs upgrading. SATCOM radios have interference problems and need to adopt MIL STD 188-183 by OCT 96, or they won’t be able to communicate BLOS via SATCOM. AWACS HF radios are becoming unsustainable and don't have ALE, required for NORAD ops.

AETACS

Table 3

3.2. Initial Analysis. Detailed analysis would be documented in Cost and Operational Effectiveness Analysis (COEA) reports on the individual systems/capabilities. However, an initial analysis leads to the conclusion that a number of improvements are required in order to support the user and meet mission needs. These improvements are considered under two timelines: near-to-mid term (1995 - 2005) and far term (2005 - 2020).

 

 

 


CONTINUE TO PART TWO