[Index]

Rapidly Halting an Armored Invasion: EFX ‘98

December 1997


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Table of Contents

Rapidly Halting an Armored Invasion: EFX ‘98

Disclaimer

Overview

The Full Spectrum Joint Operation (Emerging AF Concept)

Elements of “Respond”

Baseline EFX ‘98 Threat

Baseline EFX ‘98 Peacetime Posture

Assumed EFX ‘98 Posture on D-Day

Elements of “Halt”

U.S. Concept of Operations: Enable, then Attack

Estimating Extended Air and Missile Defense Needs Roughly Three USAF Squadrons Needed

Estimating Needs for Seizing Air Initiative 3-4 Additional USAF Squadrons

Even Highly Capable Fighters Require Time to Gain Dominance Over the Opponent

Estimating Aircraft Needed for Effective SAM Suppression

Initial Aircraft Deployments Reflect the Concept of Operations

Approach to Destruction of Enemy Force: “Defense in Depth”

Aircraft Deployments Reflect the Concept of Operations

Sortie Emphasis Will Vary Between Early and Late Halt Phase

Overview

A Simple Method for Assessing Halt Force Effectiveness:

Estimating “FEBA Movement”: A Simple Model

Some Additional Assumptions About the Red Force Are Needed

First Case: Planned 1998 SFW Inventories, Large-Scale Counter-Armor Attacks on Day 5

Second Case: Unlimited WCMD/SFW Inventories, Large-Scale Counter-Armor Attacks on Day 5

Third Case: Unlimited WCMD/SFW Inventories, No Bomber Counter-Armor Attacks

The Effects of Delay Large-Scale Counter-Armor Attacks Delayed Until Day 8

Overview

Key Scenario Issues and Questions

Backup Slides

These Calculations Are Consistent With Historical Experience

Assumptions Regarding Weapon Effectivness: Skeet Anti-Armor Munitions

Ground Force Firepower Systems Are Heavy

A “Dominant” Fighter Is Preferred for Early Air Dominance

Author: RAND Project AIR FORCE