Table of Contents
Rapidly Halting an Armored Invasion: EFX ‘98
Disclaimer
Overview
The Full Spectrum Joint Operation (Emerging AF Concept)
Elements of “Respond”
Baseline EFX ‘98 Threat
Baseline EFX ‘98 Peacetime Posture
Assumed EFX ‘98 Posture on D-Day
Elements of “Halt”
U.S. Concept of Operations: Enable, then Attack
Estimating Extended Air and Missile Defense Needs Roughly Three USAF Squadrons Needed
Estimating Needs for Seizing Air Initiative 3-4 Additional USAF Squadrons
Even Highly Capable Fighters Require Time to Gain Dominance Over the Opponent
Estimating Aircraft Needed for Effective SAM Suppression
Initial Aircraft Deployments Reflect the Concept of Operations
Approach to Destruction of Enemy Force: “Defense in Depth”
Aircraft Deployments Reflect the Concept of Operations
Sortie Emphasis Will Vary Between Early and Late Halt Phase
Overview
A Simple Method for Assessing Halt Force Effectiveness:
Estimating “FEBA Movement”: A Simple Model
Some Additional Assumptions About the Red Force Are Needed
First Case: Planned 1998 SFW Inventories, Large-Scale Counter-Armor Attacks on Day 5
Second Case: Unlimited WCMD/SFW Inventories, Large-Scale Counter-Armor Attacks on Day 5
Third Case: Unlimited WCMD/SFW Inventories, No Bomber Counter-Armor Attacks
The Effects of Delay Large-Scale Counter-Armor Attacks Delayed Until Day 8
Overview
Key Scenario Issues and Questions
Backup Slides
These Calculations Are Consistent With Historical Experience
Assumptions Regarding Weapon Effectivness: Skeet Anti-Armor Munitions
Ground Force Firepower Systems Are Heavy
A “Dominant” Fighter Is Preferred for Early Air Dominance
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Author: RAND Project AIR FORCE
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[Index]