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The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author. They do not reflect the official position of the US Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force, or Air University.

Major Arden B. Dahl was commissioned through the United States Air Force Academy in 1982. Graduating from undergraduate pilot training in 1983, he went on to fly A-10s at RAF Woodbridge, United Kingdom; Suwon AB, Republic of Korea; and England AFB, Louisiana. Following a staff duty assignment at Air Combat Command, he attended Air Command and Staff College and the School of Advanced Airpower Studies at Maxwell AFB, Alabama. Major Dahl is a senior pilot with 2500 flying hours, and a graduate of the A-10 Fighter Weapons Instructor Course. He has a bachelor’s degree in Engineering Physics from the United States Air Force Academy. Major Dahl's current assignment is to the 52nd Fighter Wing at Spangdahlem AB, Germany.

I would like to thank Dr Harold Winton, Major Bruce DeBlois, Dr George Gawrych and Dr David Jones for patiently offering ideas, advice and constructive criticism for this study. In addition, I want to thank Dr James Corum for taking the time to translate some German World War II documents.

I also want to express my appreciation to my wife, Marcia, and children, Rachel, Karin, Eric, Steven, and Pamela, for their patience during the writing of this paper.

This paper analyzes the factors and conditions of command dysfunction from the cognitive, or mental, perspective of command and control warfare (C2W). The author examines the limitations of rational decision making and the tension that exists between rational and intuitive processes. Next, the paper examines the vulnerabilities of rational and intuitive processes in order to build a cognitive warfare framework. The framework consists of three categories: the command baseline, stressors, and deception. The stressor and deception categories act on the command baseline. The analysis also suggests that there are a number of possible interactions that exist between the stressor and deception categories. The paper then uses the framework to analyze evidence of command dysfunction in three historical campaigns. The historical analyses study the German command during the Normandy invasion, the Allied command during the first week of the Battle of the Bulge, and the Israeli command during the first half of the Arab-Israeli October 1973 War. In addition to showing that there are interactions between stressors and deception, the analyses highlight the importance of understanding the adversary’s command baseline. The paper concludes that effective C2W is not so much what is done to an adversary’s command, but rather what he does to himself, perhaps with a little help.

Chapter Page

DISCLAIMER................................................................................................................. ii

ABOUT THE AUTHOR.................................................................................................. iii

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS................................................................................................ iv

ABSTRACT.................................................................................................................... v

1 INTRODUCTION..................................................................................................... 1

2 DECISION PROCESSES.......................................................................................... 10

3 CONSIDERING A COGNITIVE WARFARE FRAMEWORK................................. 34

4 THE NORMANDY INVASION................................................................................ 51

5 THE BATTLE OF THE BULGE............................................................................... 71

6 THE OCTOBER 1973 WAR IN THE SINAI............................................................. 88

7 CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS................................................................... 111

APPENDIX A: JANIS VIGILANT PROBLEM SOLVING APPROACH........................ 125

APPENDIX B: BIAS-DECEPTION RELATIONSHIPS.................................................. 126

APPENDIX C: WHALEY’S STRUCTURE OF DECEPTION......................................... 127

BIBLIOGRAPHY............................................................................................................ 129

Illustrations

Table

1 COMPARISON OF THE HISTORICAL STUDIES: STRESSORS........................... 113

Figure

1 THE CONSTRAINTS MODEL OF POLICY MAKING DECISION PROCESSES.. 26

2 THE OODA CYCLE................................................................................................ 35

3 COGNITIVE WARFARE APPROACHES.............................................................. 37

4 COGNITIVE WARFARE FRAMEWORK FOR C2W............................................. 45

5 ORDER OF BATTLE OF OB WEST, 6 JUNE 1944.................................................. 54

6 NORMANDY LODGMENT AND BREAKOUT...................................................... 57

7 C2W FRAMEWORK FOR NORMANDY PRIOR TO D-DAY................................ 63

8 C2W FRAMEWORK FOR NORMANDY AFTER D-DAY...................................... 64

9 GERMAN ARDENNES PLAN................................................................................. 74

10 C2W FRAMEWORK FOR THE ARDENNES.......................................................... 82

11 ADAN’S COUNTERATTACK--8 OCT 93............................................................... 92

12 C2W FRAMEWORK FOR THE ARAB-ISRAELI 1973 WAR--

PRIOR TO 6 OCTOBER........................................................................................... 104

13 C2W FRAMEWORK FOR THE ARAB-ISRAELI OCTOBER 1973 WAR,

6-8 OCTOBER........................................................................................................... 105

While fighting is a physical act, its direction is a mental process.

Command and control warfare attacks the exercise of authority and direction of the enemy commander. It has a long history. In the past, the fall of the national monarch or the commanding general on the field of battle could decide the battle and the fate of the kingdom. The failure sometimes resulted from the physical test of arms in combat, leading to a mortal wound. At other times the fall was psychological, brought about by the dislocation or disordering of the mind. The mechanisms in the latter cases were focused on the mind--caused by surprise, perhaps deception or a sense of losing control. This in turn led to faulty decisions. Whatever the mechanism, the ancients realized long ago that warfare was far less costly if one could disrupt the enemy’s decision making and induce a mental paralysis in the opposing camp.

Joint Publication 3-13.1, Joint Doctrine for Command Control (C2W), defines Command and Control Warfare (C2W) as a military application of information warfare intended for the attack and protection of command and control. The doctrinal definition follows:

Stating it another way-- successful C2W execution enables a friendly commander to reason, decide and act faster and more accurately than the adversary in order to seize and maintain the initiative. The success of this, as emphasized by doctrine, depends on the synergistic integration of all C2W components.

C2W is applicable at all levels of command, from battlefield tactical execution to the strategic level of national military and political leadership. While the allied coalition dominated the electronic spectrum over the Iraqi army, the 1991 Desert Storm air campaign highlighted C2W at the strategic level--by attempting to isolate Iraq’s national leadership. Although it is not certain how effective these attacks were in coercing or degrading Saddam Huessein’s critical command arrangements, the potential of attacking an adversary’s strategic and operational decision makers has appeal. This appeal to focus C2W at the strategic level is fostering a maturing US strategic attack doctrine.

According to joint doctrine, attacks against enemy strategic centers of gravity, if not decisive in their own right, are designed to "cause paralysis and destroy cohesion" throughout the enemy’s depth. Although the above term "paralysis" can apply just as well to the collapse of industrial economies and the degradation of transportation nets, it is particularly appropriate to describe C2W objectives directed against an adversary’s leadership. The paralysis objective, in the C2W context, suggests the effective breakdown of an adversary’s ability to sense, orient, decide, and communicate decisions to his operational forces. Of the five C2W elements, the roles for physical destruction and electronic warfare have significantly expanded with the use of long-range precision attack capabilities and the development of sophisticated electronic communications. Whether or not airpower adherents and particularly strategic attack advocates can rightfully claim primacy in the conduct of C2W, the question arises as to the balance of emphasis paid to the other, more psychological, components of C2W.

The problem of emphasizing direct attack C2W targeting is that it potentially underplays the complementary aspect of leadership degradation--the more indirect method of disrupting the enemy’s cognitive decision processes. This battle of the minds, if understood and exploited for advantage, can multiply the effects of destroying significant components of an adversary’s command and control systems. This phenomenon was anticipated by B. H. Liddell Hart: "the impression made on the mind of the opposing commander can nullify the whole fighting power his troops possess." The more prominent role of information management systems in battle, which are vulnerable to manipulation, creates new means to make impressions on the minds of opposing enemy commanders.

The term paralysis is commonly used to describe the desired effects of strategic attack and C2W. However, its wide use in professional military writings and doctrine to describe the demise of an adversary’s decision-making capability masks the true character of a complex phenomenon.

This study defines command paralysis in two components: the degradation of decision speed and decision accuracy. In terms of decision speed, the best case "paralysis" is the complete cessation of decision making. In terms of accuracy, the best case "paralysis" is the utterly mistaken appreciation of reality, regardless of decision speed. The issue here is that paralysis is not an "all or nothing" phenomenon--it occurs along a continuum of failure, from slight to total. The connotation of the term paralysis implies that command function is governed by an "on/off" switch. In actuality, it is governed by a rheostat. A further complicating factor is that the degradation of both speed and perception can occur simultaneously. This point has important implications for manipulating the adversary’s decision making. For example, a C2W strategy that attempts to re-mold an enemy commander’s perception of reality may need give to him plenty of time to think. The fundamental problem, then, is that the term paralysis, which possesses such strong connotations of totality, is patently inadequate to describe the wide range of possible degradations of command function that exist in the richly varied reality of war.

To resolve this conundrum, this paper will employ the term dysfunction, in lieu of the term paralysis. Dysfunction is defined as the abnormal, impaired, or incomplete functioning of a system. It presents a way to capture the "rheostat" nature of command impairment without either requiring or ruling out the possibility of complete stoppage or collapse. The chapters that follow will attempt to alleviate confusion as to the nature of command dysfunction by carefully specifying its types and magnitude in the context of particular circumstances.

Cognition is defined as the act of knowing or perceiving. It is the act of processing perceived sensory inputs to build knowledge and awareness in order to make judgments and decisions.

Dislocation is the act of displacing, disordering, or disarranging. As Liddell Hart noted, it can be applied both physically and psychologically.

The question this thesis seeks to answer is, what factors or conditions lead to command dysfunction? This question leads to a number of others. Are there various types or kinds of decision dysfunction? How does one produce and recognize command dysfunction? Answers to these questions will enhance our understanding of C2W opportunities, limitations and strategies.

Assumptions

The issue of command dysfunction will be addressed in the context of opposing command organizations exercising some form of command and control over conventionally armed forces.

A second assumption is that there is some common or generic set of factors or conditions that affect decision processes in general and military decision making in particular. A related assumption is that there will be individual, cultural and organizational factors that significantly influence specific decision making contexts.

The fourth assumption is that the findings of the behavioral sciences may provide some insight to the nature of decision making to include its defects and limitations. Finally, the study assumes that the insights drawn from behavioral science may be useful in sensitizing the historical examination of command dysfunction to certain categories of relationships.

A critical look at the preceding assumptions and the following chapters highlights some limitations to this examination. First, the cognitive sciences generally deal with universal human traits; however, much of the literature is written from the Western perspective. Conclusions must therefore be tempered in this light. The three historical studies, though varied in culture to include a Middle Eastern adversary, all involve Western "victims." The cases were selected because of their relevance to the issue of command dysfunction and the availability of credible evidence.

Another important limitation is the scope of dysfunctional factors developed into a cognitive warfare framework in Chapter 3. The scope focuses on cognitive weaknesses and tendencies of a rational military commander. It focuses less on the affiliative (political) and egocentric factors that greatly complicate decision processes and outcomes, although these can be significant. Because of this last limitation, the corroboration of dysfunctional factors and conditions upon decision making in the historical evidence may be masked or made inconclusive by the attributes of individual personalities, military traditions and specific organizational behavior. Finally, conditions of combat are not easily studied by the scientific disciplines.

Chapter 2 begins by describing the rational decision process as offered by, among others, James G. March, Herbert A. Simon and Graham T. Allison. The rational decision process produces optimal decisions and forms the underlying basis of normative decision making. Following this, the chapter will examine a number of limitations that degrade rational decision processes. These include the limitations of human information processing; perceptual and cognitive biases; and the effects of stress induced by consequential decisions, uncertainty and time pressure. We will also briefly examine the motivational, cultural and organizational factors that degrade rational decision processes.

The chapter continues with an examination of two decision models that attempt to describe and account for the limits and outcomes of nominally rational processes. The first is Irving L. Janis’ Constraints Model of Policy Making. The second is the Recognition-Primed Decision model developed by Gary A. Klein. Janis’ model imbeds a prescriptive rational process called Vigilant Problem Solving into the larger descriptive model. The larger model contains cognitive, political, and egocentric obstacles that must be overcome to employ the vigilant process. Klein’s model describes how experienced decision makers recognize problems and apply rapid solutions in high-tempo operational environments. Together, the models highlight the tension that exists in military decision environments, the tradeoff between decision accuracy and decision speed. This tradeoff nature of operational decision making will be explored further in Chapter 3.

The intention in Chapter 3 is to develop a framework for cognitive C2W. To begin, the chapter briefly examines John Boyd’s well known Observation-Orientation-Decision-Action ("OODA") Loop as a tool to illustrate the different ways a C2W campaign may address a notional adversary’s decision cycle. A review past and current C2W contributions from historical war theorists and 20th century deception theorists follows. The aim is to gather some insights for a cognitive C2W framework. The basis of this framework will flow from two areas. The first is the nature of a "target" decision process and its limitations, the insights gained from Chapter 2. The second area draws on the theories and methodologies of stratagem--the use of deception and surprise in warfare. Some consideration will also be offered as to the combined effects of deception and operational stress.

The following three chapters examine historical cases in an effort to determine if command dysfunction occurred, its form and extent, and the extent to which it was a factor in the outcome of the campaign. Each case will be analyzed in light of the cognitive warfare framework regarding the impact of the C2W campaign on the target decision makers. Chapter 4 examines the conduct of the German command at the time of the Normandy invasion. Chapter 5 analyzes the conduct of the Allied theater and operational commands in the events leading up to and during the Battle of the Bulge. Chapter 6 analyzes the problems that occurred within the Israeli command echelons before and during the initial stages of the October 1973 Arab-Israeli War.

Chapter 7 reviews the major conclusions of the historical studies for relevance to the cognitive warfare framework developed in Chapter 3. The analysis that follows will include necessary refinements to the cognitive warfare framework and comment on its general utility for analyzing and planning C2W campaigns. The chapter will conclude by noting implications for current C2W doctrine and suggested areas for future research.

There is good reason for this analysis. Military planning procedures generally follow rational or analytical decision making patterns. How military decision making adjusts or departs from these rational processes under high-load ambiguous operational environments may be important to the design of C2W.

Rational models are consequential and preference-based decision processes. They are consequential in that current decisions are based on expected outcomes. They are preference-based in that consequences are appraised in terms of rank-ordered criteria. Rational processes also follow a logic of consequence by seeking answers to four basic questions:

Simply put, a rational decision process surveys the environment for all solution strategies, determines their consequences and makes a comparative evaluation of these solutions and their consequences against one’s preferences. Given an intelligent conduct of the process, the rational or analytical approach establishes a prescriptive baseline for decisions. Operative military decisions fall into this category.

Limited rational models have attempted to account for a number of deviations. For instance, not all alternatives can be known, not all discernible alternatives are considered, preferences are inconsistently applied and decision processes do not necessarily simultaneously compare the solution set. The decision makers also bring a number of limitations to the decision environment. These common limitations have given rise to the idea of limited rationality.

The limited rational process generally follows the prescriptive logic of consequence while giving allowance to a variety of human limitations and coping mechanisms. The first limitation is the cognitive inability to handle large amounts of information. Specifically, decision makers have limited abilities to focus attention, remember, communicate, and comprehend large amounts of data. To cope, decision makers typically arrange incoming data into simplified models, stereotypes, typologies or schemas. Four of the information coping mechanisms are described below.

Related to the information coping mechanisms described above, decision makers also employ various cognitive decision rules to work through complex problems. These rules allow decisions in the face of incomprehensible problem issues and limited resources in which to conduct in-depth analysis. A few of these strategies are described below.

The above lists are not exhaustive, but they provide a representative sample of the kinds of strategies decision makers use to cope with inherent human information-processing limitations. The next section addresses the cognitive biases that operate alongside these coping mechanisms.

Perception and cognition perform distinct roles in the formation of judgment. Perception answers the question: What do I see? Cognition answers the next question: How do I interpret it? However, general perceptual and cognitive biases cause decision makers to deviate from objectivity and make errors of judgment. Perceptual biases occur from the way the human mind senses the environment and tend to limit the accuracy of perception. Cognitive biases result from the way the mind works and tend to hinder accurate interpretation. These biases are general in that they are thought to be normally present in the general population of decision makers--regardless of their cultural background and organizational affiliations.

The tendency is to view "perception" as a passive reception of data from one’s senses. However, perception is not passive. It is an active process of inference in which one builds reality from data input from the senses. We do not understand the mental process of perception with great certainty. We understand that it depends a great deal on one’s experience and background as well as the content of what one senses. There are three perceptual biases that affect the accuracy of one’s view of the environment: the conditioning of expectations, the resistance to change and the impact of ambiguity.

A decision maker’s experience forms the basis for expectations. The expectations predispose a "mindset" to look for certain data in the environment and organize it in a particular way. The mind also organizes various mental schemes to organize expectations. These include simple models, typologies, stereotypes and ready made "plots and narratives." One notable effect of the conditioned expectancy bias is that it takes more unambiguous data to discern an unexpected event than it takes to discern an event one expects.

Another systematic bias of perception is its resistance to change. The related effect is that once decision maker establishes a "mindset" or image, he will assimilate new information to that image. The implication is that it is difficult to detect small changes once one establishes a perception.

The last biasing factor considered is the impact of ambiguity on perception. Decision makers who form an initial but perhaps incorrect impression in the midst of high ambiguity usually need more pieces of unambiguous data to recognize that their initial "picture" is not correct. This relates to the bias of expectations and the bias that resists change to initial images. In effect, an analyst will persistently fit new information to the poor image until the contradiction becomes painfully obvious.

There are three primary areas in which cognitive biases degrade the accuracy of judgment within a decision process: the attribution of causality, the evaluation of probability and the evaluation of evidence.

Attribution of Causality: Although one can witness an event, one cannot in the same sense see the event’s causation--this must be inferred. Psychologically, the mind prefers to have events and causes ordered in a comprehensible pattern, a condition that biases the mind to find order in random or incomprehensible events. The bias causes decision makers to misread the motivational intent behind the action of their opponents. In other words, decision makers tend to overestimate the nature and intentions of other actors and disregard how external constraints affect those actions. Conversely, decision makers tend to analyze their own behavior as being constrained by the external environment and then project this view of themselves into the minds of other decision makers.

Estimation of Probability: Decision makers estimate outcome probabilities in order to make choices among solutions. Three systematic biases that affect this estimation are the availability, anchoring, and overconfidence biases.

The availability bias is a rule of thumb that works on the ease with which one can remember or recall other similar instances--the number of times that an event has occurred. The bias is not necessarily detrimental unless the ease in which an event comes to mind is influenced by its lingering emotional impact or recency--factors that are not necessarily related to the probability of its reoccurrence. Conversely, decision makers have difficulty appreciating the probability of unlikely events. Unlikely events are by definition rare, and thus not mentally available to most decision makers. This can lead to the underestimation of low probability events.

The anchoring bias is a phenomenon in which decision makers adjust too little from their initial judgments as additional evidence becomes available. After making an initial estimate, the bias causes decision makers to make changes within a narrow range of possibilities. The anchoring bias is related to the perceptual bias based on resistance to change.

The overconfidence bias is merely a tendency for individual decision makers to be subjectively overconfident about the extent and accuracy of their knowledge. Another way of saying this is that there is a tendency to overestimate certainty, or downplay uncertainty. The implication in this case is that even if a decision maker hedges his estimate, his high confidence will not encourage the effort to look again.

Other typical problems in estimating probabilities derive from the misunderstanding of statistics. For instance, analysts tend to "overestimate the probability of future-event scenarios constructed from a series of discrete and individually probable events." In other words, many decision makers are unaware of the low probabilities that exist at the end of a long decision tree made of a number of discrete assumptions.

Evaluation of Evidence: Decision makers may also prejudice the way they handle evidence. Generally, the first information a decision maker gets has greater impact than the data that arrive later. Oversensitivity to Consistency, Absence of Evidence and Persistence of Impressions biases describe various forms of this cognitive bias.

Normally consistency in data evaluation is appropriate. However, when very little evidence is available, decision makers tend to value consistent information from a small data set over more variable information from a larger sample. This Oversensitivity to Consistency bias leads decision makers to infer erroneous conclusions from the data, and is caused by the false notion that small and large samples have the same variability.

It is not unusual for decision makers to miss data in complicated problems. In an ideal setting, analysts would recognize that data is missing and adjust the certainty of their inferences accordingly. When this does not happen, it is usually the influence of the Absence of Evidence bias. Simply put, this bias translates to "out of sight, out of mind" and resists mental efforts to give much credit or probability to the "unknown" category.

The Persistence of Impressions bias follows a natural tendency to maintain first impressions concerning causality. It appears that the initial association of evidence to an outcome forms a strong cognitive linkage. The linkage is strong enough to subsequently make the same causal connection despite the presence of contradictory data. This bias appears to be related to the perceptual bias of conditioned expectations and the cognitive availability bias.

Thus far, the argument has established that a decision maker’s inability to process and analyze large amounts of data will limit his rational basis for decision making. Decision makers compensate by employing simple cognitive strategies and rules to sift information and make choices. These tools tend to be useful as long as the decision maker appreciates their limitations and simplifying nature. However, a number of perceptual and cognitive biases also influence the decision process, potentially reducing the rationality of judgment.

There are, however, even more decision factors that complicate the rational decision process. These are examined briefly below to gain an appreciation for how complex the decision environment can become for a military commander.

A commander’s rational decision process is invariably affected by organizational and political processes both within and without his particular command. Insights into these organizational and political factors can be considered by examining two of the three models that Graham T. Allison developed to explain governmental behavior during the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis. His second model attempts to describe how organizational processes affect the decision process and is referred to as Model II: Organizational Process. The third model describes how the pursuit of political power within an organization affects decision making; this model is referred to as Model III: Governmental Politics.

Allison’s Model II contains several propositions that describe how organizational processes can constrain a commander’s decision process. The first is that organizations run on standard operating procedures (SOPs) and programs. SOPs and programs (clusters of SOPs) are derived from established missions, doctrine, training and historical experience. These in turn produce a set of capabilities for the execution of particular operations. Organizational SOPs and programs are complex and do not lend themselves to rapid change or the flexible implementation of a wide range of options. A second proposition is that organizational SOPs structure both the search for information and the generation of alternatives. In short, Allison’s Model II suggests that the established procedures and capabilities of a military commander’s organization narrow his range of decision options. It may be that the rational choice among the alternatives is not feasible due to the inability of organizational programs to find or analyze the choice.

A third Model II proposition that influences rationality is the nature of the organization’s distribution of responsibility and power. Large complex organizations facing complex environments require a factored division of labor, attention and command authority to perceive and analyze, generate alternatives and execute decisions. While the division of labor and SOP specialization is intended to make the organization efficient, the same division generates requirements to coordinate the intelligent collection and analysis of data. The failure to coordinate the varied perceptions and interests within the organization can lead to a number of uncoordinated rational decisions at the lower echelons, which in turn lead to an overall irrational outcome.

Allison’s Model III views decision making as a process of political bargaining. The bargaining takes place between a number of actors, each whom views the decision issue differently depending on his own goals. Influence depends on a number of factors to include personal prestige and reputation, authority derived from one’s position, persuasive skills, knowledge of the bargaining rules, and personal interest in the decision. For a military commander, for whom the lines of command authority may be well defined (both up and down the chain), organizational discipline may temper the political bargaining that occurs. However, political and personal differences can paralyze even a disciplined organization. The problem is worse when command arrangements are ill-defined or inept. The struggle for power and influence can devastate can devastate the rational decision process.

Before moving on to external effects on the decision process, several cultural and individual biases need addressing. The first of these is cultural bias. Cultural dispositions toward perception are highly contextual and are therefore difficult to incorporate into a general C2W model. Nevertheless, there are two common cultural biases that deserve mention for their role in forming erroneous perceptions: arrogance and projection. Arrogance is the attitude of superiority over others or the opposing side. It can manifest as a national or individual perception. In the extreme case, it forgoes any serious search of alternatives or decision analysis beyond what the decision maker has already decided. It can become highly irrational. The projection bias sees the rest of the world through one’s own values and beliefs, thus tending to estimate the opposition’s intentions, motivations and capabilities as one’s own.

This section concludes with a final mention of three noteworthy and highly contextual motivational biases: risk-taking, overconfidence (hubris), and hubris-nemesis. The motivational bias of risk-taking is unlike the normal deliberation of calculated risk--the rational consideration of possible losses and gains in an uncertain environment. The decision maker motivated by the risk-taking bias gambles as a matter of personality--without considering costs and gains beforehand, or when the risks are so ominous that a rational decision maker would not even consider the question. The overconfidence or hubris bias tends toward an overreaching inflation of one’s abilities and strengths. In the extreme it promotes a prideful self-confidence that is self-intoxicating and oblivious to rational limits. A decision maker affected with hubris will in his utter aggressiveness invariably be led to surprise and eventual downfall. The Hubris-Nemesis Complex is dangerous mindset that combines hubris (self intoxicating "pretension to godliness") and nemesis ("vengeful desire" to wreak havoc and destroy). Leaders possessing this bias combination are not easily deterred or compelled by normal or rational solutions.

At this point, the argument has followed the logic of the rational decision process, the inherent information limitations of rationality, the effects of perceptual and cognitive biases, organizational effects and finally, the potentially debilitating effects of several cultural and individual biases. The next section will examine the effects of stress on the decision process followed by two models that attempt to synthesize the various factors that constrain rational decision making.

There is a rich scientific literature concerning the effects of stress on humans. It examines biological processes, physical health, psychological conditions, social relationships and motor performance. In the domain of warfare, stress studies have generally focused at the tactical level, examining the effects of stress on the performance of individual soldiers and reactions to emotional trauma. The knowledge of how stress affects decision making processes is not, however, well understood. The behavioral sciences have only begun to seriously study stress in decision making in the last few years. Stress, however, has a demonstrative effect on decision making, and some studies do exist. Three major stress areas include the consequential weight of the decision, uncertainty and the pressure of time.

Decisions that determine the outcomes of major battles, campaigns or the fate of nations can bear strongly on the mind of a commander. The weight of a decision generally induces an internal stress, which acts differently on each individual. The extent to which this strain of responsibility detracts from a commander’s judgment is also individually dependent. But there is another issue as well--proper judgment does not necessarily lead to a proper decision--knowing the right thing to do does not automatically lead to the right decision. Again, the outcome is dependent on the individual’s moral determination and courage to carry a decision through to the end. An excellent example is General Eisenhower’s monumental and personal decision to launch the Normandy invasion. Given the high stakes of the operation, the uncertainty of its potential consequences (both good and bad) and the vagaries of weather and enemy action, the decision was not easy. Eisenhower made the decision and saw it through, but his words concerning just one aspect of the decision (the airborne drop behind Utah beach) hint at the stress that comes with serious consequences.

The other two stressors under consideration, uncertainty and time pressure, are not unique to the field of military decision making. However, in the conduct of military campaigns, they are pervasive. Crisis settings complicate the use of rational and analytical decision processes in two ways. First, they add numerous unknowns, which in turn create many possible alternatives to the decision problem. Second, they reduce the time available to process and evaluate data, choose a course of action, and execute it.

Uncertainty has two connotations. First is the uncertainty that derives from the variability of outcomes. Second is the uncertainty or ambiguity of one’s information about the world, or, in other words, the uncertain accuracy of the data that describes the problem environment. Stress research indicates that intense levels of uncertainty induce increasing psychological stress. The logic proceeds that as uncertainty becomes severe, decision makers begin resorting to maladaptive search and evaluation methods to reach conclusions. Part of this may stem from a desire to avoid the anxiety of being unsure, an intolerance of ambiguity. It may also be that analytical approaches are difficult when the link between the data and the outcomes is not predictable.

Uncertainty derived from inaccuracies of the problem environment may be a product of time stress. The lack of sufficient time to gather and process data may produce low confidence, or uncertainty about one’s conclusions. On the other hand, profound uncertainty may also exist in environments devoid of time pressure. Having too much time may permit one to collect so much conflicting information that one increases rather than reduces uncertainty. Returning to a multiple choice test question and taking a second (and wrong) stab is not an uncommon experience. Generally, this exception to the speed-accuracy trade-off occurs when the initial decision appraisal is mostly correct and the difference between the right and wrong solution is difficult to discriminate.

Time pressure does, however, frequently create stress. While mild time pressure tends to motivate decision activity, the increasing imposition of time pressure frequently degrades decision processes. Whether the degradation is graceful or not depends on the decision maker, his staff and resources. It also depends on the rate of change of the imposed time pressure. Sudden tempo changes tend to shock current decision strategies leading to a drop in performance. Recovery may occur as new decision strategies are adopted.

The logic of dealing with the time pressure normally follows a somewhat standard pattern. Increasing time pressure first leads to an acceleration of information processing. Decision makers and their organizations will pick up the pace by expending additional resources to maintain existing decision strategies. As the pace begins to outrun in-place processing capabilities, decision makers reduce their data search and processing. In some cases this translates to increased selectivity, which the decision maker biases or weights toward details considered more important. In other cases, it does not change data collection but leads to a shallower data analysis. As the pace continues to increase, decision strategies begin to change. At this point major problems can creep into the process. The problems result from maladaptive strategies (satisficing, analogies, etc.) that save time but misrepresent data to produce inappropriate solutions. The lack of time also prevents critical introspection for perceptual and cognitive biases. In severe time pressure cases, the process may deteriorate to avoidance, denial or panic.

While many questions still exist concerning the general effects of stress on decision processes, the evidence seems to indicate that time stress induces decision makers to narrow attention to data, analysis or options. What becomes narrowed will depend on the context of the decision process.

Time pressure and uncertainty operate in two different but related ways within decision processes: externally and internally--or put another way--physically and perceptually. For instance, increasing time pressure by increasing the pace operates "mechanically" or externally against the decision process. It limits the time available to analyze data and generate alternatives. This occurs regardless of whether the decision maker feels "pressured," or is even aware of the limitation. On the other hand, time pressure can be perceived internally in the decision maker’s mind more than it may actually be affecting his problem solving resources. The same can be said for the stress caused by uncertainty. If a decision maker is not mentally "stressed" by his uncertain setting, he must still consider the environment’s variability. Conversely, perceptions of uncertainty can stress some minds to a point that far outweighs the actual ambiguity and variability of the environment.

To summarize, the consequences of decisions can create considerable internal stress. Increasing levels of uncertainty and time pressure can degrade rational decision processes by creating the need to generate additional alternatives while limiting resources to do so. The combined effects of these phenomena have strong potential to degrade decision making effectiveness. In any case, the impact of stress will most likely lead to some narrowing of attention and resources on the part of the decision maker. Some explanation is therefore required to synthesize the problem of rational decision making in a world of limitations, biases and stress.

Irving Janis has developed a comprehensive decision model that attempts to capture the difficulty of utilizing rational processes in the real world. The model is called The Constraints Model of Policy Making Processes. It inserts a rational decision procedure into a larger descriptive framework that contains many of the previously discussed limitations. The imbedded rational procedure is called the Vigilant Problem Solving Approach. The overall model illustrates the pitfalls that the vigilant procedure must negotiate to reach a sound decision. It also shows that the vigilant procedure is not necessary for all problems. Appendix 1 depicts the Vigilant Problem Solving Approach.

The Constraints Model of Policy Making Processes is depicted in Figure 1. The logic flow begins when the decision maker (or process) recognizes a problem as either routine or complex--or unimportant or consequential. If the problem is routine or unimportant, the process applies a SOP or simple decision rule to deal with the matter. If the issue is indeed routine, the process incurs little cost and risk. The Vigilant Problem Solving Approach works non-routine and consequential problems (shown at the bottom of Figure 1). However, they must first get by three different hurdles, any of which may deflect the decision maker to another mechanism. An overriding constraint will deflect the process to a simple decision rule. Overriding constraints are limitations in the decision maker’s cognitive resources, affiliative relationships or his personal motives and emotional make-up. The constraints, encountered singly or in combination, induce the employment of simple decision rules from one or more categories (cognitive, organizational-affiliative, egocentric). The fact that a problem does not get vigilant treatment does not necessarily spell disaster. The problem’s consequences may be unimportant in the end. The solution may also be "not too wrong" despite the use of intuitive guesses, political battles and self-serving motives.

Janis’ model is appealing because it incorporates the issues of human limited information capacities, perceptions and biases, and Allison’s portrayal of organizational (Model II) and political bargaining (Model III) decision processes. Nevertheless, Janis’ model does not offer a prescription for decision makers who are overwhelmed by resource constraints such as time pressure (not to mention affiliative and egocentric concerns)--a possibility that looms large for military planners and operational commanders.

Source: Irving L. Janis, Crucial Decisions, (New York: The Free Press, 1989), 154-155.

In some decision situations, a timely, relatively correct response is better than an absolutely correct response that is made too late. In other words, the situation generates a tension between analysis and speed.

A relatively new family of decision theories known as naturalistic decision making provides some insight into this tension. These theories describe how decision makers make highly consequential decisions in ill-defined, dynamic, high-paced and complex environments. One of the main features of naturalistic decision making is that decision makers do rely on rational decision processes or approaches. Limited time is the defining characteristic of most of these situations.

The Recognition-Primed Decision (RPD) model is one of the more interesting of those derived from naturalistic decision settings. The RPD model was developed out of research findings that decision makers assess their situational problem based on recognition patterns rather than analysis. The key feature is the emphasis on situation assessment, not the generation and comparison of alternatives. Experience is the source of the ability to recognize problems and their solutions.

The RPD process works in the following manner. First, an experienced decision maker recognizes a problem situation as familiar or prototypical. The recognition brings with it a solution. The recognition also evokes an appreciation for what additional information to monitor: plausible outcomes, typical reactions, timing cues and causal dynamics. Second, given time, the decision maker evaluates his solution for suitability by testing it through mental simulation for pitfalls and needed adjustments. Normally, the decision maker implements the first solution "on the run" and makes adjustments as required. The decision maker will not be discard a solution unless it becomes plain that it is unworkable. If so, he will attempt a second option, if available. The RPD process is one of satisficing. It assumes that experienced decision makers identify a first solution that is "reasonably good" and are capable of mentally projecting its implementation. The RPD process also assumes that experienced decision makers are able to implement their one solution at any time during the process.

The RPD is a descriptive model that explains how experienced decision makers work problems in high stress decision situations. From the perspective of effectiveness, however, it is not the best model for all decision environments. Situations that require the careful deployment of resources and analysis of abstract data, such as anticipating an enemy’s course of action, require an analytical approach. If there is time for analysis, a rational process normally provides a better solution for these kinds of problems. The implication is that decision makers who rely mainly on pattern recognition for every decision problem could do better. The RPD model complements the analytical approach. Neither is appropriate for all decision problems.

The RPD model provides some insight as to how operational commanders survive in high-load, ambiguous and time pressured situations. The key seems to be experience. The experience serves as the base for what may be seen as an intuitive way to overcome stress. A decision maker's reliance on pattern recognition appears to the primary difference between rational and intuitive decision processes. Decision makers with more experience will tend to employ intuitive methods more often than analytical processes. This reliance on pattern recognition among experienced commanders may provide an opportunity for an adversary to manipulate the patterns to his advantage in deception operations.

Although normative decision models generally prescribe a rational process to optimize problem solutions, a number of factors tend to limit and degrade its execution. These factors include the limitations of human decision makers to process data and the existence of various inherent biases: cognitive, perceptual, motivational and cultural. Other potential detractors to rational processes derive from organizational processes and politics. Military decision making occurs in operational settings in which the consequences of decisions, uncertainty and time pressure create acute stress. This phenomenon creates a tension between the desire for getting optimal decisions, which usually take time to generate, and the desire for responsive decisions, which may be less than optimal. The Vigilant Problem Solving Approach and the Recognition-Primed Decision Model illustrate normative and descriptive mechanisms for coping with this tension. We will now build upon our understanding of decision making under general conditions of stress to address explicitly the process at work in a combat environment.

John Boyd’s so-called OODA Loop illustrated at Figure 2, is a simple and useful construct for conceptualizing decision cycles. The basic notion is that commanders observe, orient, decide, and act. They then observe the outcome and begin the cycle over again. It is obvious that actual decision cycles are not this simple. Although there may be an overall command decision cycle that approximates an operational OODA Loop, such as an Air Tasking Order (ATO), there are a multitude of decision cycles in every operation. Nevertheless, two cognitive warfare approaches to command dysfunction can be visualized by using the model.

If one compares the decision cycles of two opposing military commands to a "gunfight" between two antagonists, one can appreciate the requirements for good eyesight (Observation), accuracy (Orientation), and a fast draw (Decision and Action). If comparably skilled, the quicker of the two will tend to get the upper hand. However, a faster draw does not necessarily help a skilled gunfighter whose aim is obstructed by blowing dust. So it is with competing decision processes. Both speed and accuracy are required, and they are measured in relation to the speed and accuracy of one’s opponent. These two factors become the basis of a cognitive warfare framework.

Source: Joint Publication 3-13.1, Joint Doctrine for Command and Control Warfare (C2W)

The "anti-speed" approach attempts to slow an adversary’s decision cycle so his decisions are irrelevant at the time of execution. The focus is on degrading the efficiency of the decision cycle by denying the "observation" function the ability to see and impeding the flow of accurate information through the physical links of the loop. Data denial is usually achieved by preventing the adversary’s observation function, or sensors, from operating effectively in one or more channels. Decisions and accompanying data are also slowed by neutralizing or destroying the communication links that connect the commander to the subordinates who carry out his will. Operations security, electronic warfare (EW) and physical attack are used to execute this approach. Contemporary American doctrine advocates domination of air, space, and the electromagnetic (EM) spectrums to achieve this effect. A successful "anti-speed" strategy also indirectly affects the adversary’s orientation. Late and missing data degrade accurate perceptions of reality.

However, a pure "anti-speed" strategy against an enemy’s communication links and observation functions is not normally sufficient to induce command dysfunction. Cutting communications and blinding sensors can seriously hamper command and control; they will, however, not go unopposed by an adversary who expects these kinds of attacks. An adversary may simply switch to unaffected media to communicate and observe. An adversary can also change his command arrangements, objectives or strategy to compensate for his increased decision cycle difficulties. Potential countermeasures suggest that the effort to slow an adversary’s decision cycles may not always work, and even if it does, other coping mechanisms can reduce the impact of the impediments. This leads us to the second approach.

The second approach attempts to corrupt the adversary’s orientation. The focus is on the accuracy of the opponent’s perceptions and facts that inform his decisions, rather than their speed through the decision cycle. Operations security, deception and psychological operations (PSYOPS) are usually the primary C2W elements in the corruption effort. The corruption scheme’s relationship to decision speed is somewhat complicated. In fact, the corruption mechanism may work to vary the decision speed depending on the objective of the intended misperception. For example, the enemy might be induced to speedily make the wrong decision. Even so, an adversary decision process would likely slow down in an environment of increased ambiguity and apparent contradictions (if discerned). As with the narrow employment of a pure "anti-speed" strategy, the projection of falsehoods and ambiguity into the enemy’s decision cycle is not necessarily a sufficient strategy by itself. Other C2W elements may be needed to isolate the target from information channels that can undermine the corruption endeavor.

In summary, a cognitive warfare strategy can view an opposing decision process from the perspective of decreasing its speed, decreasing its accuracy, or both. The "anti-speed" strategy prevents the adversary’s OODA Loop from keeping pace with events. If successful, the outcome makes the opponent reactive, ceding the initiative to the other side. The corruption approach concentrates on affecting decision accuracy and may or may not degrade the speed efficiency of the opponent. If successful, the adversary makes inappropriate decisions. A more complex strategy would combine the approaches. Figure 3 illustrates the two basic approaches. A closer look at the possible combination of approaches will follow later in the chapter. However, it is appropriate at this point to examine some formal insights into cognitive warfare expressed by military theorists.

Sun Tzu wrote as follows concerning planning and intelligence:

Sun Tzu’s ledger of war truths can be thought as a list of proverbial wise sayings. They are rationally appealing; simple to remember; and as the expression goes, easier said than done. Michael Handel writes that Sun Tzu’s was a prescriptive optimist regarding the planning and execution of warfare in general and C2W in particular. Sun Tzu’s axioms assume an omniscient ability to gather intelligence in order to make detailed plans to win a victory--a victory that can be forecast. Sun-Tzu’s explicit advocacy for deception in all aspects of warfare is cited regularly as support for its continued importance today. There is, however, an internal contradiction between his assumption of accurate intelligence and the insistence upon deception. The presence of deception in the decision environment would seem to lessen one’s confidence of accurate intelligence. Another note of interest is Sun-Tzu’s position concerning command decision processes. His emphasis on methodical and detailed planning indicates an assumption of analytical decision making. His words on how decisions are made in the battle say little--but perhaps imply the requirement for pattern recognition and intuition:

Carl von Clausewitz wrote the following concerning planning and intelligence:

Concerning surprise and deception:

Clausewitz’s perspective is vastly different from Sun-Tzu with respect to C2W. Clausewitz was pessimistic in his outlook concerning the costs and benefits of deception and surprise at the strategic and operational levels. This pessimism stemmed from the difficulty of hiding extensive logistics and troop preparations necessary for major campaigns and the relatively limited mobility of the armies of his era. Clausewitz saw more utility of deception and surprise at the tactical level in operations that took little time. Friction and uncertainty also gave him a healthy skepticism for the value of intelligence in planning and conducting the battle. Clausewitz’s major contribution to C2W thought is his realistic appraisal of the friction and chaos that confronts an operational commander and the requirements of courage and intuition to make the required decisions.

Sun Tzu and Clausewitz paint different pictures of the command environment. While Sun-Tzu sees a predictable campaign in which deceptive ploys and surprises can be planned, Clausewitz sees fog as the primary instigator of surprise--wielded by chance.

B. H. Liddell Hart wrote as follows concerning movement and surprise:

Concerning alternate objectives:

Concerning deception:

The renewal of maneuver warfare during World War II brought with it a resurgence in C2W thinking--and connected it to maneuver. B. H. Liddell Hart’s contribution to C2W is the indirect approach. The indirect approach avoids enemy lines of expectation (the line of greatest resistance) by taking a line that is not expected, and moves unexpectedly into the rear of the enemy. This physical movement dislocates the opposing forces from their lines of communication. This "sudden" dislocation also causes a mental dislocation in the mind of the commander--a "sense of feeling trapped." The unsettling psychological effect of having unexpected enemy forces in the rear tends to delay the commander’s response. Liddell Hart’s starting mechanism to unleash the war of dislocation rests on the use of a "distracter." This distracter can take two forms. The first is the creation of ambiguity in the enemy’s mind as to one’s real objectives among many (alternative objectives). The other is a deliberate deception ploy to create false certainty in the enemy commander’s mind as to one’s objectives. That said, Liddell Hart’s C2W dislocation effects were for the most part related to maneuver. However, the widespread practice of strategic and operational deception during World War II has also led to a resurgence of deception theory.

Deception advocates argue that the increasing sophistication and capabilities of battlefield surveillance have paradoxically increased the importance of and opportunities for deception. They are important because the battlefield is only transparent in the physical sense. They are opportune because of inherent perceptual biases--made ready by the mind’s expectations.

The discussion in Chapter 2 on biases presented the concept that expectations influence what is perceived. New data are added to existing conceptions and images. The perceptions that form tend to do so quickly and, once formed, are resistant to change even in the presence of contradictory information. Other cognitive biases affecting probability estimation and the evaluation of evidence tend to reinforce the persistence of these perceptions. This persistence is the key lever for deception. It is easy to reinforce what is already expected. The issue is to understand the victim’s expectations in relation to one’s own objectives and intentions. The task is much tougher when the target’s expectations do not match up with the deceiver’s deceptive story. This is due to the strength of initial impressions. However, deception can also work against the adversary’s current expectations by weakening his confidence in them. Appendix 2 lists the relationships between deception and perceptual and cognitive biases.

Fundamentally, all deception ploys are constructed in two parts: dissimulation and simulation. Dissimulation is covert, the act of hiding or obscuring the real; its companion, simulation, presents the false. Within this basic construct, deception programs are employed in two variants: A-type (ambiguity) and M-type (misdirection). The A-type deception seeks to increase ambiguity in the target’s mind. Its aim is to keep the adversary unsure of one’s true intentions, especially an adversary who has initially guessed right. A number of alternatives are developed for the target’s consumption, built on lies that are both plausible and sufficiently significant to cause the target to expend resources to cover them. The M-type deception is the more demanding variant. This deception misleads the adversary by reducing ambiguity, that is, attempting to convince him that the wrong solution is, in fact, "right." In this case, the target positions most of his attention and resources in the wrong place.

Although the A-type and M-type programs are conceptually different, in practice they are used simultaneously in various shades and emphases. A deception program may start out as an M-type ploy to confirm the adversary’s expectations about what is going to happen (usually what he expects on the basis of logic and experience). However, since most adversaries are prudent enough to consider other possibilities (of which one may be the real solution), the deceiver also may employ an A-type program to increase the number of alternatives. This, if effective, causes the deception target to spread his remaining resources over a number of possibilities. Appendix 2 lists the main principles and techniques of deception.

A comparison of the insights of Sun-Tzu, Clausewitz, Liddell Hart and the modern deception theorists reveals tension concerning command and the conduct of C2W. A tension exists between Clausewitz’s call for intuitive decision making amidst the chaos and Sun-Tzu’s prescription for detailed planning based on excellent intelligence. There is also a tension between Clausewitz’s skeptical view of the cost/benefit value of deception and surprise and both Sun-Tzu’s and Liddell Hart’s strong advocacy for it. Both Sun-Tzu and Liddell Hart highlighted the dilemma of alternative objectives upon an adversary’s mind made possible by movement. Clausewitz emphasized the weight of chance and consequences upon the commander’s mind concerning the imponderables of battle. 20th Century deception theorists point out the tension between the modern trend of battlefield transparency and the opaque nature of intentions. The discussions of Chapter 2 also presented a number of rational limitations, biases and stress effects that affect decision making. The question, therefore, arises as to how one should use these different insights and issues for military decision making in settings that range from peacetime training to those that are opposed, high-paced, ambiguous and immediately consequential.

One way to visualize the cognitive warfare approach of C2W is in a three-category framework depicted at Figure 4. The categories include of the adversary’s command baseline, stressors, and deception. The command baseline represents the adversary’s existing decision making characteristics. It consists of his expectations, perceptions, command arrangements, decision procedures, experience, training, tradition, culture and any other significant factors that constitute his decision making. The baseline includes both strengths and weaknesses. Weaknesses include self-induced problems that affect the accuracy and speed of his decision cycle. The command baseline establishes the opportunity "menu" for the other two categories.

The second framework category consists of stressors. "Stressors" come in two sets, physical and psychological. The physical stressors are actions that complicate and degrade the adversary’s decision making by pressuring his capabilities and time resources. This relates back to the "anti-speed" approach discussed earlier. Targeted capabilities include the ability to communicate and use sensors. Increasing the tempo of operations reduces the adversary’s time to make decisions. Other physical stressors that degrade decision making derive from the nature of the operational environment. Briefly, these include environmental extremes (noise, temperature) and physical hardships (lack of sleep, food, water and hygiene). Common to all, physical stressors reduce decision resources in terms of information, time and physical capabilities. However, the introduction of physical stressors leads to the second kind, those that are psychologically felt in the mind of target. For example, while an increase in operational tempo reduces available decision cycle time, the available time may still be sufficient to make effective decisions. Nevertheless, the increased tempo may cause a decision maker to perceive significant time pressure and adjust his decision process. Whether or not this degrades his decisions is dependent on the severity of the perceived time stress and the types of coping mechanisms that are used to compensate. Similarly, other psychological stressors, including uncertainty and high stakes, affect the decision environment. The uncertainty in this case is based on the nature of chance--the unknowable events that are inherent in operational settings. This is in contrast to the uncertainty and ambiguity that is purposely introduced by deception. The other major psychological stressor is the weight of consequential decisions. This is also an internal stress, induced by the adversary’s own moral friction in the face of solving consequential problems.

The final framework category is deception. The A-type deception program increases uncertainty by generating a number of alternatives for the adversary to consider. M-type deception programs work in the opposite direction in terms of uncertainty and seek to convince the victim that he is "right" about the deceiver’s methods and objectives, when he is objectively "wrong." Both deception types exploit the command baseline’s expectations and perceptions. They also both employ operational security measures to hide real capabilities and intentions.

While it is apparent that there is a "targeting" relationship between the command baseline and the other two C2W "tool" categories, there might also be a number of interactions between the deception and the stressor categories. Examining time pressure and deception, the logic indicates that there may be either mutually reinforcing or interfering interactions. If one assumes the general notion that psychological time pressure causes decision makers to channelize information searches and analyses, then the question as to when to increase time pressure in conjunction with a deception program depends on the victim’s primary attention or expectations. If his attention is already focused on the deceiver’s plausible "story," then time pressure (if applicable to the deceiver’s operational plan) would likely assist. This is because the victim’s channelization will attenuate his data search and analysis on what he considers the peripheral matters--the place where the deceiver has hidden the truth. On the other hand, if the deceiver needs to change an adversary’s expectations, then adding time pressure will likely be counterproductive. In this case, time pressure may deny the victim sufficient time to perceive and consider the deception and reduce the victim’s confidence about existing his perceptions.

The real world application of intentional stressors and varied deception programs will require a sophisticated understanding of the stressor-deception interaction. This is in addition to understanding what cognitive and perceptual vulnerabilities are exploitable in the command baseline and having excellent intelligence resources that return feedback concerning the adversary’s thinking.

In Chapter 2, the discussion ended by describing the latent tension that exists between the requirements for decision accuracy and decision speed. The general idea was that given adequate time and information resources, the preferred way to decide consequential decisions was to use an analytical approach. If this was not possible due to time constraints, there was a need for experienced pattern recognition or some intuition to get an adequate decision in reduced time. The question now is how this tension between decision speed and accuracy fits into the designs of the cognitive warfare framework.

If one had insight to the decision process and expectations of the enemy command, a logical question may follow: On which end of the speed-accuracy tension is the enemy strength? Is it experienced-based intuition or rational analysis? An exploitable weakness on either end may indicate the deception-time pressure strategy to use to manipulate the enemy’s decision process. If the adversary has no weakness on either end of the decision spectrum, then one might determine what strategy places the enemy command in a position in which it has insufficient time to analyze the deception puzzle and not enough intuitive confidence to see through all the alternatives. The point here is that approaching the cognitive side of C2W from the perspective of the adversary’s decision process may provide some insight on the overall C2W operation.

This chapter considered two basic ways to approach a cognitive warfare strategy. The first approach attacked the speed of an adversary’s decision cycle; the second focused the attack on its accuracy. These approaches roughly line up with the two "tool" categories of the Cognitive Warfare Framework: stressors and deception. More often than not, one would expect these approaches to coexist and overlap in use and effects. The idea that there is an interdependent relationship between time pressure and deception was also considered. Although our knowledge of this relationship is incomplete, the logic indicates that there are both reinforcing and interfering interactions.

Most important is the fact that the overall cognitive warfare approach is dependent upon the enemy’s command baseline--the decision making processes, command characteristics and expectations of the decision makers. The skillful employment of stress and deception against the command baseline may be a principal mechanism to bring about its cognitive dislocation.

It is now appropriate to use these insights to examine the historical evidence. We begin with the Normandy campaign of 1944.

When the Allies selected the site for the long-awaited invasion, they sought to balance a number of important considerations: the state of enemy defenses, the reach of Allied air cover, logistics build-up feasibility, and suitability of the terrain for the subsequent breakout. The two possible landing sites were the Normandy coast and the beaches between Dunkirk and the mouth of the Somme River, referred to as the Pas de Calais. The latter had advantages in distance from embarkation to debarkation and from the beaches to the heart of Germany. On the other hand, because it was such an obvious place to land--it was also the place the Allies expected the Germans to defend most heavily. Therefore, the Allies chose Normandy.

The concept of operations for the Overlord invasion was fairly straightforward:

In more detail, the invasion plan envisioned dropping elements of the three airborne divisions at night behind the beaches near Carnelian and Caen. The airborne infantry mission was to seize important bridges and causeways that provided exits from the beaches. The initial amphibious assault that followed landed six infantry divisions on five different beaches along a 60-mile front. The landing on the extreme right (Utah Beach) on the Contentin Peninsula sought the early capture of Cherbourg. The American landing at Omaha Beach and the British/Canadian landings at Gold, June and Sword Beaches endeavored to move inland and occupy ground on the open plains south and west of Caen. Their objective was to establish a defensible beachhead for the landing and build-up of 36 divisions. Allied naval forces supporting the landings secured the sea approaches against enemy mines, submarines and surface combatants in addition to providing fire support for the landing force. Allied air forces provided overhead defense, interdiction and close air support.

The Allies labored through 1943 and the first half of 1944 to build the required assault forces and sustainable logistics capabilities to undertake the invasion. They also worked to achieve two other major prerequisites to ensure the success of the lodgment and break-out. The first was to reduce the Luftwaffe fighter force so that it could not threaten the beachhead. This was accomplished as a result of the strategic air campaign against Germany proper, culminating in Big Week in February 1944. The second was to limit the number or effectiveness of German offensive formations in France, especially those reserves the Germans could throw against the beachhead. The attainment of total air superiority over France went far toward achieving these conditions. Beginning in the early spring of 1944, the Allied air forces attacked the French rail system in an effort to isolate the Normandy and Pas de Calais areas. In May they began destroying rail and highway bridges across the Seine between Rouen and Paris. While the rail attacks had minor effects on German rail movement, the bridge campaign made German force movements very difficult. The Allied command was also depending on a deception named Fortitude South to limit the number of German forces confronting the beachhead.

German forces in the theater were deployed in four armies under the command of Generalfeldmarshall Gerd von Rundstedt (OB West): the 1st, 7th, 15th, and 19th Armies. Generalfeldmarschall Erwin Rommel commanded the 7th and 15th Armies (Army Group B). Generaloberst Johannes Blaskowitz commanded 1st and 19th Armies (Army Group G). The armies had a mixture of panzer (armor), panzer grenadier (mechanized infantry), infantry, and static divisions. The infantry and static divisions manned the "Atlantic Wall," a discontinuous series of fortifications, entrenchments and fighting positions along the coast. The panzer and panzer grenadier divisions were positioned inland from the coast as mobile reserves. The static divisions generally lacked the mobility, equipment, training and combat experience of German front-line units. The infantry, panzer and panzer grenadier divisions were more capable, but many were short their full combat equipment and manpower strengths. Some were in the process of formation or rehabilitation from recent combat action on the Eastern Front.

The German 15th Army held the coast from Caen to the Shelde estuary on the Dutch border. Its order of battle on the eve of the invasion consisted of fourteen static divisions, three infantry divisions, and two panzer divisions in reserve. The 7th Army held the Normandy and Brittany peninsulas with five static divisions, seven infantry divisions and one panzer division in reserve. 7th Army forces in the Normandy area consisted of three static, two infantry and the one panzer division. The 1st Army, consisting of one infantry and three static divisions, covered the long Bay of Biscay coast from the Loire River to the Spanish border. One panzer division was positioned in reserve. The 19th Army held the French Mediterranean coast with four static, three infantry divisions and two panzer divisions. OKW controlled the mobile armor theater reserve consisting of one panzer grenadier and three panzer divisions. Figure 5 depicts German force dispositions.

Source: Gordon A. Harrison, Cross Channel Attack, (Washington: OCMH, 1993), Map V.

The German defense along the Channel coast rested on the timely reinforcement of Rommel’s armor by the OKW mobile armor reserve to the Allied landing sites. Of these, the 1st SS Panzer Division was in Belgium, the 116th Panzer Divisions was north of the Seine behind the bulk of the 15th Army, the 12 SS Panzer and Panzer Lehr Divisions were south of the Seine near the 7th/15th Army boundaries, and the 17th SS Panzer Grenadier was located near the Loire. On the eve of the invasion, Rommel had just one panzer division near the Normandy landing beaches. Two panzer divisions of the OKW theater reserve were relatively nearby, south of the Seine; but required OKW’s permission to employ. Rommel’s two remaining panzer divisions had further to travel, and had to contend with the problem of destroyed Seine River bridges.

As planned, the Allies air-dropped elements of three airborne divisions behind the beaches after midnight on 6 June. Elements of six infantry divisions landed on the Normandy beaches during the day on 6 June. The Allies made limited gains during the first days of the fighting, but suffered fewer losses than expected against uneven German resistance. By the end of the first week, the separate beachheads had linked up to carve out a lodgment eight-to-twelve miles in depth from the area near Caen to Quinneville, south of Cherbourg. The absence of the expected German armored counterattack during this time was remarkable. In fact, this would be the general story for the German defense in Normandy. While the Allies built up forces and expanded the bridgehead, the Germans reacted to fill gaps and hold off the inevitable. The bridgehead slowly pushed southward into the hedgerow country of the Bocages and toward Caen. The most the Germans could do in response was to mount local counterattacks from an increasingly strained perimeter. Allied air interdiction delayed the German reserves that the German High Command sent to Normandy. They were subsequently fed into the line piecemeal to hold the perimeter.

The battles in late June and through July developed into a drawn-out attrition operation among the hedgerows. The Allies continuously wore down German units as they attempted to force a breakthrough into open "tank" country to the south. The Germans hung on to the line while looking for ways to gather enough forces to counterattack. They were constantly in a dilemma. In order to mount a counterattack to drive the Allies into the sea or at least split the beachhead, they had to form a mobile reserve from local resources. As these mobile units were already committed defensively, their withdrawal threatened to collapse the defensive line from which they came, causing additional defensive scrambles. Allied naval gun fire and fighter-bomber attack further aggravated the planning and execution of these maneuvers. Although the Allies were frustrated at times with the slow progress against the German line, the Germans could not afford to fight the costly battle indefinitely.

The Allied Cobra operation west of St Lo (25-28 July) initiated the big push that allowed the U.S. Third Army to break out at Avranches on 1 August. From this point, the battle in Normandy and eastern France turned into one of high-tempo mobility. The German 7th Army made an ill-fated counterattack toward Mortain on 6 August in an attempt to contain the breakout. While the German counterattack advanced toward the west under punishing air attacks, the southerly advance of the U.S. Third Army turned east threatening the 7th Army’s southern flank and the Canadian First Army attacking from the northeast threatened its rear. The German forces paused to deal with these threats while continuing to attack westward toward Mortain. Then, as the Allies moved to complete the encirclement at Falaise, the Germans turned around and attempted to fight their way out back to the east. In the end, the Allies crushed much of German 7th Army and a portion of the 5th Panzer Army, albeit a portion of their forces were able to escape the pocket. Figure 6 depicts the lodgment and breakout battles.

Source: Forrest C. Pogue, The Supreme Command, (Washington D.C.: OCMH, 1954), Map III.

The success of the Allied Normandy campaign owes much to a successful C2W operation against the German Command. The analysis follows.

The German High Command concluded in early 1944 that the Allies were planning to launch a large-scale invasion in western Europe. However, exactly when and where this invasion would occur remained an open question in the minds of the German leadership. Von Rundstedt expected the invasion to take place during the good weather months, April to August. He believed the landing location would be between Le Havre and Calais. He based his estimate on the geographic advantages a subsequent breakthrough would enjoy in threatening the German Ruhr. As he considered the lack of German forces to stop a mobile breakthrough between the northern Channel coast and the German frontier, the Allied advantages appeared compelling. In short, von Rundstedt’s worst case scenario was a landing in the Pas de Calais area because it posed the greatest threat. This predisposition assisted the allies in their C2W efforts to protect the Normandy lodgment.

The primary C2W effort took place at the theater level--an elaborate deception program intended to spread German attentions and forces prior to the landings and to prolong the dislocation for some time afterward. The Fortitude South deception effort aimed to encourage German expectations that the Allies’ main effort in the invasion of western Europe, the schwerpunkt, would indeed take place on the Pas de Calais beaches.

The conceptual basis of Fortitude South was that of maximum plausible Allied strength. This told the story that the Allies had sufficient resources to conduct a diversionary landing in addition to the main assault. Second, it told the Germans that the Allies were going to hit them with the main assault at Pas de Calais. Finally, it told the Germans that the invasion at Normandy was in fact the diversion--that the main landing would come at Pas de Calais six weeks later.

The overall plan developed and executed elaborate security schemes (camouflage, signal discipline, restricted zoning, etc...) to conceal the real invasion force. The Allies fed their "intentions" to German intelligence through a closely controlled set of "turned" double agents. This was the primary channel. Fortitude South employed six supporting deception plans to confirm the "story" in secondary channels. These secondary channels included German radio intercepts, air reconnaissance and German observations of Allied air strikes on the continent. The six supporting operations are listed below:

The Allied ability to gain insights into the German High Command’s strategic thinking and to measure German reactions to Allied deception greatly aided their cause. Code named ULTRA, this source gave Allied planners access to German secret wireless communications traffic encrypted by the Enigma machine. The insights gained by Ultra gave the deception planners a critical tool in developing the "stories" the German command was to believe and permitted them to monitor German reactions to the deception plan as it unfolded.

The German command had major problems prior to and during the Normandy campaign. First, it was uncertain about the location of the main Allied landing. As mentioned previously, OB West, von Rundstedt expected the landing to occur in the Pas de Calais region. Rommel, the commander of Army Group B, comprising the 7th and 15th Armies, also believed that the main landings would occur there. The German High Command, OKW, also leaned toward this solution, to include Hitler himself. Nevertheless, they also had doubts. In early April 1944 Hitler suddenly ranked the Normandy area on the same level as Pas de Calais for probable invasion. With this revelation, the German command scrambled to find more reinforcements and build additional fortifications. However, Hitler ordered the Pas de Calais coast defenses not to be weakened. The German dilemma was simple--there were many possible places to defend, but inadequate forces to defend everywhere.

The uncertain aspect of the landing location combined with insufficient infantry divisions would not have been insurmountable if the Germans had possessed sufficient mobile forces. However, Allied air dominance translated this issue into a second dilemma--an uncertainty over defensive strategy. Von Rundstedt wanted to hold the panzers in the theater reserve and move them as necessary once they identified the Allied main effort. His principal army group commander, Rommel, wanted to position the panzers close to the coast in order to repel the landing forces immediately. Rommel had less confidence than von Rundstedt in moving mobile reserves in the face of Allied air attacks. The problem with Rommel’s posture was that one had to guess right. The same Allied air problems that made a rapid response difficult from the theater reserves also made it difficult to move laterally along the coast. On the other hand, if it was equally difficult to move no matter the starting point, at least Rommel’s plan had a chance to place the panzers at the right spot for the counterattack. In the end, the German High Command compromised between these two views--positioning some panzers forward under Rommel while holding the rest further inland in the OKW reserve.

The indecisive compromise on defensive strategy was an indicator of the poor state of the German command. It worsened when the invasion started. The major problem was the lack of freedom of action under a single unified theater command. The army, navy and air forces in theater cooperated in haphazard fashion, answering to independent chains of command that met at OKW. Neither the theater army commander, von Rundstedt, nor any of his subordinates could make a major move without the OKW’s permission. In addition to the use of the theater panzer reserves, this included the movement of forces between army groups and armies and even the tactical placement of individual divisions within sectors. This situation was exacerbated by the fact that these operational and tactical decisions were made in East Prussia, far removed from the action.. Cumbersome and centrally controlled from afar, the German command was incapable of making timely operational decisions.

The most significant consequence of this poor command arrangement was a near paralysis in operational decision-making. The high command handcuffed the operational planning and execution of the counterattacks against the beachhead. Hitler’s instructions included telling Rundstedt what types of artillery to use against specific enemy target sets. Inevitably, the German command lost the "big" operational picture very early in the campaign. Three days after the Allied D-Day, OB West concluded that the German forces in Normandy were insufficient to repel the Allied attack. Von Rundstedt’s suggestion was that the invasion at Normandy was successful and would lead to Germany’s defeat, whether or not the main landing came elsewhere at a later time. The response from Hitler in East Prussia was to trickle in a few divisions from southern France and the Ukraine. Meanwhile, the majority of the divisions along the Pas de Calais coast sat idle, pinned by German expectations and Fortitude South encouragement.

The story of obstinate German command remained consistent through the month of June and into most of July. Orders given to counterattack the bridgehead were rendered nearly impossible by Hitler’s refusal to shorten the defensive line to produce the required forces. At the end of June, OKW decided to hold the line and fight a war of attrition while waiting for the second landing to come. This was done to avoid an implausible maneuver war against superior Allied armor and air forces. The problem was that the attrition campaign was also implausible. In mid-July Hitler still could not overcome his hesitation, despite the urgings of his staff, to release the 15th Army on the Pas de Calais coast. Finally, in the latter part of July, OB West and OKW convinced Hitler to release part of the 15th Army’s reserves, but this action was again too little, too late. When the Allies finally broke out at Avaranches, the German command attempted to fight a war of maneuver to close the breach, but their decisions were never able to catch up with the pace of the Allied advance. Orders arrived at the units already overcome by events.

Figures 7 and 8 present a schematic of the Allied C2W operation, based on the framework established in Chapter 3. Figure 7 depicts the C2W campaign prior to D-Day on 6 June 1944; Figure 8 shows it afterwards. The Allied deception operation influenced the attentions, forces and defensive strategy of the German High Command, OB West and the Army B Group commander prior to and after D-Day. The difference between the role of the deception in the two time periods is subtle. Before the invasion, the program encouraged German beliefs that the assault would occur across the narrow section of the Channel, but that a diversionary landing was possible. The plausible case for a diversion also complicated the German defensive strategy. This relationship is shown by a dotted line in Figure 7.

Later, the deception operation encouraged the Germans to believe that Normandy was the diversion and to expect a second landing (depicted in Figure 8). There were two key factors in the deception. The first was the strong German preconception that the Pas De Calais area was the most likely place for the Allies to attack--because it was the most dangerous for the German perspective. The second was the Allies’ construction of "maximum plausible strength" in the minds of the German command. The creation and maintenance of more divisions in the German planning estimate than actually existed supported the deduction that the Allies could conduct a diversionary landing and a major landing to follow. The success of pre-D-Day Fortitude South can be measured by the German force’s heavier dispositions of 15th Army over 7th Army.

The actions of the German High Command during the first critical days of the invasion, 9-10 June, also illustrate the success of Fortitude South. On 9 June OKW started the 1st SS Panzer and 116 Panzer divisions toward the Normandy area, but then redirected them on 10 June to cover the Pas de Calais coast. The evidence for the tasking change points to three "turned" agents who delivered their reports on 9 June. The consolidated report that went Jodl and Hitler is below.

The C2W model for the post D-Day period (Figure 8) illustrates the Fortitude South deception’s continuing encouragement for a second landing. This action effectively tied down a number of divisions in the other sectors. Additionally, the effects of the combat stressors increased pressure on a shaky German command arrangement. That Allied airpower caused havoc on German plans was obvious to the field commanders. OB West and his subordinates lacked reconnaissance, close air support and artillery spotting. They suffered from continuous air attack while there was good weather and daylight. Allied airpower (and ship to shore bombardment early on) slowed the German "action" portion of the "OODA" Loop to a crawl in relation to the Allies. This problem was aggravated by the fact that the operational decision makers (Hitler and the OKW) could not adjust to what was operationally feasible given the limited resources they had and the heavy opposition they were facing. The Allied breakout added speed and movement to the dislocation of German decisions and added the stress of uncertainty to the German command’s problems. The Allied war of maneuver, which turned initially to the west into Brittany, and then back to the east, created a classic "alternative objectives" problem. The Germans could not cover all potential offensive objectives. However, the problem was worse. The German command was not only uncertain of the direction and aim of Allied armor, it was slow to react due to their inability to observe Allied moves, decide, and execute a countering move. This furthered the gulf between the German High Command’s desires, perceptions, and reality.

Finally, because Hitler and the OKW were the operational decision makers for Normandy as well every other theater, one must add the distracting consequential decision stresses of other fronts. In the case of Hitler and the OKW in the summer of 1944, the list can get long; the Soviet Belorussian offensive is simply one example.

The Allied deception program, Fortitude South was a major factor in the malpositioning of the German army in the west prior to and after the Normandy landings. The deception operation keyed on two major factors: the strong German preconceptions of an Allied landing against the Pas de Calais coast and the construction of an Allied force structure estimate based on maximum plausible strength. The latter allowed the Allies to sell the Normandy lodgment as a diversion, thus freezing numerous forces along the Pas de Calais coast for six weeks.

While the Allied deception was a success, it acted on a German command that was already in trouble. The German command in the west was dysfunctional on its own--characterized by a non-unified command in which the theater and force commanders had little if any freedom of action. Control was centralized at OKW, which was enmeshed in tactical detail and disconnected from the actual happenings in the operational theater. The Allies aggravated this dysfunction with time pressure in the form of airpower before the break-out and maneuver afterwards. These stressors slowed German operational decision cycles relative to the Allies’ to the point that at the lower echelons (OB West and below), the Germans could only react to Allied moves.

The Germans did not recover from the consequences of their command problems until the Allies ran out of offensive momentum on the German frontier in the Fall of 1944. But even in retreat, Hitler was planning to turn the tables and create havoc for the Allied Command. This planning turned into the Battle of the Bulge.

This chapter examines the operational performance of the Allied command during the opening phase of the German Ardennes offensive of December 1944. The following paragraphs will summarize Allied offensive strategy in late 1944 and German aims and preparations for their winter offensive. After briefly describing the conduct of the battle, the study focuses on the Allied command’s expectations before the German attack, the German exploitation of those expectations and the subsequent Allied response during the first week of the campaign.

By the end of November 1944, Allied strategy pursued a broad front advance toward the Rhine and into the interior of Germany. Strained logistics and stiffening German resistance had dashed the high expectations for a quick end to the war. The long and cumbersome supply lines, supporting seven Allied field armies from the Normandy and Marseilles coast, were responsible for slowing and then halting the advance along the German border. The primary solution to the Allied problem was the capture of the Netherlands port of Antwerp. However, after the Allies captured the port, they were unable to use it for three months. As a consequence, the struggling Germans had time to reorganize a defense.

The Allies planned two main thrusts to penetrate into the German interior. Field Marshal Montgomery’s 21st Army Group and two American field armies of General Omar Bradley’s 12th Army Group, the 1st and 9th Armies, were to attack in the north, battling across the Roer and Rhine Rivers, to close on the Ruhr Valley from the west. The southern thrust employed General George Patton’s 3rd Army to cross the Rhine near Frankfurt and press northeast to envelop the Ruhr area from the south.

Between these two efforts was the Ardennes forest. This region had been a relatively quiet zone since October 1944--used by both the Americans and the Germans to rest weary divisions and train inexperienced personnel. The American 1st Army deployed the VIII corps in this sector, covering a seventy-mile front with two inexperienced and two battle-weary divisions. Eisenhower and Bradley accepted the thin American line here to make additional forces available for the attacks to the north and south.

Ever since the Allied breakout of Normandy and the sweep across France and Belgium, the German High Command had been seeking to turn the tables in the west. At the end of September, Hitler decided that this blow would originate from the West Wall (Siegfried Line). The counteroffensive objective sought the defeat of significant Anglo-American forces in the west in order to release strong German forces for the Soviet front. Hitler’s objective was to gain additional time for further technical developments and to sow political discord between the Americans and the British. The offensive used Germany’s last resources. There were not, however, many other options. Germany could not win a war of attrition against the Allies.

The winter counteroffensive aimed to split the Allied armies along a line from Bitburg through Brussels to Antwerp, capture the port, and destroy the British forces north of the divide. The attack had to catch the Allies by surprise in order to overcome the Germans’ inferiority in ground force ratios and command of the air. The offensive then had to rely on speed to get across the Meuse to Antwerp before the Allies responded with superior resources. The German High Command selected the Ardennes sector primarily because it was thinly manned. Additionally, the Eifel hill region to the east offered concealment from Allied air attack for assembling forces. The inadequacy of the road network, especially during the sloppy winter months, made the sector an unlikely place to attempt a major mobile offensive. Although this inhibited German mobility, it also abetted Allied expectations that an offensive would not occur in the Ardennes. To encourage this expectation, the Germans employed an extensive security and deception effort to hide the assembly of troops and mask their intentions to attack. The next section discusses the impact of this deception in more detail.

The timing for the offensive depended on the Germans’ ability to build up the needed forces and logistics infrastructure to launch the attack. However, the driving factor for an attack date was the requirement for poor weather to neutralize the Allied air forces. For this reason, Hitler set the attack window for 26-28 November. The Germans subsequently postponed the attack to 16 December due to delays in the assembly of forces caused by allied air interdiction. Unfortunately for the attackers, the delay also put the operations nearer to the periods of better flying weather. The German plan is depicted at Figure 9.

The Germans struck in the early hours of 16 December, surprising the American front line troops and the entire chain of command all the way to Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF). Twenty-eight panzer, panzer-grenadier and Volksgrenadier divisions pushed into the U.S. First Army’s V and VIII Corps, and quickly threatened a theater-level disaster. Three of the four front line divisions of the VIII corps were either overrun or sent reeling backward. For the Americans, the struggle became a battle of delay, fought by hastily assembled units at isolated crossroads, in an attempt to block the advance of German armor. Surprise gave way to confusion and in some cases panic in the American rear.

Despite the initial surprise, the Germans were not quick enough. The attack of the 6th SS Panzer Army on the northern flank suffered setbacks and delays against the U.S. V Corps. This was due primarily to the failure of the initial infantry assault to open wide enough gaps for the armor to exploit. Intended to be the main effort to the Meuse, most of the 6th SS Panzer Army eventually became tied up in a slow struggle to clear a route to the west. On the southern flank, the 7th Army was unable to advance to positions to protect the 5th Panzer Army’s southern flank. The 5th Panzer Army made better progress in the center, but could not meet the aggressive time-table to the Meuse River. This happened in part due to the rapid arrival of American reserves ahead of the panzers at two critical road junctions: St. Vith and Bastogne. Although the Germans bypassed both junctions and later took St. Vith, their denial slowed the German advance to the west.

The offensive gained ground for ten days before grinding to a halt a few miles short of the Meuse River. Its failure stemmed from a number of factors. From the German perspective, the list includes insufficient forces, training and transport, poor road conditions, allied air attacks, tough resistance from "weak" troops and the relatively prompt operational measures taken by the Allied command. The last factor is central to the analysis. Although rudely surprised, the Allies responded more quickly than the Germans had anticipated, quickly inserting armor units from the U.S. Ninth and Third Armies as well as the SHAEF theater reserve (XVIII Airborne Corps) into the path of the assault. Additionally, the Allies realigned the command on 20 December placing Field Marshal Montgomery in charge of the northern half of the bulge. This enabled the Americans to commit all their units to the northern shoulder with the knowledge that British reserves were coming (British XXX Corps) to blunt the west end of the German advance. From the south, the U.S. 3rd Army counterattacked into the exposed left flank of the German advance.

To overcome superior forces, the German plan relied on extensive operations security and deception to mask the offensive build-up up in the Eifel. The Germans enforced the following measures to maintain operational security:

While the security plan hid the attacking force, the deception exploited Allied perceptions concerning German capabilities. The Allies perceived the German army to be hard-pressed, short of troops, fuel and options. Still, the Allies knew the Germans were capable of making spoiling attacks against their advances into the Reich. Therefore, the Allies expec