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Peace Operations: Heavy Use of Key Capabilities May Affect Response to
Regional Conflicts (Chapter Report, 03/08/95, GAO/NSIAD-95-51).

Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided information on the
impact of peace operations on the U.S. military forces' capability to
respond to regional conflicts, focusing on the: (1) force structure
limitations that affect the military's ability to respond to other
national security requirements while engaged in peace operations; and
(2) options available for increasing force flexibility and response
capability.

GAO found that: (1) peace operations have heavily stressed some U.S.
military capabilities, including Army support forces and specialized Air
Force aircraft; (2) because there are relatively few support forces in
the military's active force, some of these units and personnel have been
deployed to consecutive operations, the tempo of operations has
increased, and the time available to prepare for combat missions has
been reduced; (3) extended participation in multiple or large scale
peace operations could impede the services' ability to timely respond to
major regional conflicts (MRC); (4) disengaging support units and
specialized aircraft from a peace operation and redeploying them to MRC
could be more difficult than estimated because some of these units would
not be available to facilitate a redeployment and need training and
supplies before deploying to another major operation; (5) the options
available to DOD to meet the demands of peace operations while
maintaining the capability to respond to MRC include changing the mix of
active and reserve forces and making greater use of reserves and
contractors; and (6) the United States needs to determine the resources
it needs and degree of risk it is prepared to take if it wishes to
continue participating in sizeable peace operations for extended periods
and still maintain the capability needed to rapidly respond to
simultaneous MRC.

--------------------------- Indexing Terms -----------------------------

 REPORTNUM:  NSIAD-95-51
     TITLE:  Peace Operations: Heavy Use of Key Capabilities May Affect 
             Response to Regional Conflicts
      DATE:  03/08/95
   SUBJECT:  Combat readiness
             Defense contingency planning
             Mobilization
             Defense capabilities
             Military aircraft
             Military airlift operations
             Military forces
             Strategic planning
             Operations analysis
             Emergency preparedness
IDENTIFIER:  Total Army Analysis Process
             Israel
             Sinai Peninsula
             Somalia
             Macedonia
             Bosnia
             Haiti
             Rwanda
             Iraq
             DOD Operation Provide Comfort
             DOD Operation Provide Relief
             DOD Operation Restore Hope
             DOD Operation Continue Hope
             DOD Operation Provide Promise
             DOD Operation Deny Flight
             DOD Operation Uphold Democracy
             DOD Operation Southern Watch
             DOD Operation Sharp Guard
             EC-130 Aircraft
             EF-111 Aircraft
             Airborne Warning and Control System
             E-3 Aircraft
             AWACS
             C-130 Aircraft
             UH-60 Helicopter
             
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Cover
================================================================ COVER


Report to Congressional Requesters

March 1995

PEACE OPERATIONS - HEAVY USE OF
KEY CAPABILITIES MAY AFFECT
RESPONSE TO REGIONAL CONFLICTS

GAO/NSIAD-95-51

Peace Operations


Abbreviations
=============================================================== ABBREV

  ABCCC - Airborne Battlefield Command and Control Center
  AWACS - Airborne Warning and Control System
  CFP - Contingency Force Pool
  DOD - Department of Defense
  MRC - major regional conflict
  PSRC - Presidential Selected Reserve Call-Up
  ROWPU - Reverse Osmosis Water Purification Unit
  USAFE - U.S.  Air Forces in Europe

Letter
=============================================================== LETTER


B-259367

March 8, 1995

The Honorable Floyd D.  Spence
Chairman
The Honorable Ronald V.  Dellums
Ranking Minority Member
Committee on National Security
House of Representatives

The Honorable James V.  Hansen
The Honorable Norman Sisisky
House of Representatives

This report discusses the impact that peace operations have on U.S. 
military forces, force structure limitations that may affect the
military's ability to respond to other national security requirements
while engaged in peace operations, and options for increasing force
flexibility and response capability.  We prepared the report at the
request of the former Chairman and Ranking Minority Member of the
Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, House Committee on
Armed Services.  The information in this report should be useful to
your Committee in its deliberations on the impact of peace operations
on the military.  The report contains a recommendation to the
Secretary of Defense concerning the staffing of high-priority support
units. 

We are sending copies of this report to other interested congresional
committees; the Secretaries of Defense, the Army, the Navy, and the
Air Force; the Commandant, U.S.  Marine Corps; and the Director,
Office of Management and Budget.  Copies will also be made available
to others on request. 

If you or your staff have any questions on this report, please call
me on (202) 512-3504.  Major contributors to this report are listed
in appendix II. 

Richard Davis
Director, National Security
 Analysis


EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
============================================================ Chapter 0


   PURPOSE
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:1

Since the end of the Cold War, the U.S.  military has become
increasingly involved in a number of peace operations,\1 such as the
ones in Somalia and Haiti.  The former Chairman and Ranking Minority
Member of the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, House
Committee on Armed Services, asked GAO to review the suitability of
the current U.S.  force structure for peace operations.  They wanted
to know whether the U.S.  military had the capabilities necessary to
operate effectively in a peace operations environment, while
maintaining the capability to respond to two nearly simultaneous
major regional conflicts (MRC).  GAO did not assess whether the
United States should participate in peace operations.  GAO examined
(1) the impact that peace operations have on U.S.  military forces,
(2) force structure limitations that may affect the military's
ability to respond to other national security requirements while
engaged in peace operations, and (3) options for increasing force
flexibility and response capability. 


--------------------
\1 For the purpose of this report, "peace operations" includes
everything from low-intensity peacekeeping operations, such as
military observer duty, to high-intensity peace-enforcement
operations.  In addition to peace operations, DOD continues to
participate in humanitarian and disaster relief operations, as it has
done for many years. 


   BACKGROUND
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:2

Recent changes in the international security environment, led by the
collapse of the Soviet Union, are redefining the role of the U.S. 
military.  In addition to emphasizing the capability to respond to
two nearly simultaneous MRCs, the Department of Defense's (DOD)
bottom-up review notes that U.S.  military forces should also be
prepared for operations short of declared or intense war, including
peace operations.  According to the bottom-up review, U.S.  forces
are more likely to be involved in these other- than-war operations. 

As the number, size, and scope of peace operations have increased in
the past several years, the nature and extent of U.S.  military
participation has changed markedly.  While U.S.  military forces have
participated in peace operations for many years, notably as part of
the Multinational Force and Observers on the Sinai Peninsula, the
size of the U.S.  military contingent has traditionally been limited. 
Recently, however, the United States has used more military forces,
of an increasingly varied nature, in peace operations in Somalia,
Bosnia, Haiti, and Northern and Southern Iraq.  These operations
often take place for an extended duration, usually occurring in
austere environments with little or no infrastructure from which to
base and sustain an operation. 


   RESULTS IN BRIEF
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:3

Peace operations heavily stress some U.S.  military capabilities,
including certain Army support forces such as quartermaster and
transportation units and specialized Air Force aircraft, while having
less impact on other forces, such as Army armored combat divisions
and general purpose Air Force combat aircraft outside Europe. 
Repeated use of these forces, of which there are relatively few in
the active force, has resulted in some units and personnel deploying
more than once to an operation or to consecutive operations,
increased the tempo of operations, and reduced the time available to
prepare for combat missions.  Because of their forward-deployed mode
of operations, the Navy and the Marine Corps have not faced the same
force structure constraints.  However, the increased naval commitment
to peace operations, combined with the decrease in forward-deployed
forces, has escalated the tempo of operations and reduced the
preparation time between deployments for certain naval forces. 

Extended participation in multiple and/or large scale peace
operations could impede the services' timely response to MRCs because
certain active component support units and specialized Air Force
aircraft used for these operations would also be needed initially in
a MRC.  Contrary to the bottom-up review's assumption, it could be
difficult to disengage these support units and specialized Air Force
assets quickly from a peace operation and redeploy them to a MRC. 
First, some of the forces needed in the early days of a MRC would
also be needed to facilitate a redeployment from the peace operation. 
Second, airlift assets would have to be diverted to pick up personnel
and equipment from the peace operation.  Finally, some of the forces
would need training, supplies, and equipment before deploying to
another major operation. 

There are a number of options available that could allow DOD to meet
the demands of peace operations while maintaining the capability to
respond to MRCs.  These options include changing the mix of active
and reserve forces and making greater use of the reserves and
contractors.  DOD is currently examining these and other options GAO
mentions in this report.  If the United States wants to continue
participating in sizable peace operations for extended periods and
still maintain the capability to respond rapidly to two nearly
simultaneous MRCs, it must make choices involving the use of
resources and the degree of military risk it is prepared to take. 


   PRINCIPAL FINDINGS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:4


      PEACE OPERATIONS HAVE
      STRESSED KEY MILITARY
      CAPABILITIES
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:4.1

Peace operations have heavily stressed certain key military
capabilities, of which there are few in the active component,
particularly certain Army support forces such as quartermaster and
transportation units and Air Force specialized aircraft, while having
less impact on other capabilities such as Army armored combat
divisions and general purpose Air Force combat aircraft.  Because
each peace operation is different, the experiences provided and the
impact on the forces differ. 

Sustaining large-scale peace operations for an extended period of
time uses a large number of some kinds of active Army support forces
to establish infrastructure in what is often an austere environment. 
Support forces provide basic necessities--food, water, toilets, and
showers--to U.S.  military forces and, in many cases, to coalition
forces and the local population.  If nation building is part of the
military mission, support requirements increase even further as the
military builds schools, hospitals, and local housing and establishes
police and other civil administration services. 

The Army's combat support forces (such as military police) and combat
service support forces (such as port handlers and quartermaster
personnel) provide these important support capabilities.  However,
many of these forces are in the reserve component and, for the most
part, have not been activated for peace operations.  As a result, the
responsibility for these operations has fallen on the smaller number
of forces in the active component.  In some cases, nearly all the
active units for particular support capabilities have had to deploy
to specific operations.  For example, 100 percent of the air terminal
movement control teams and 75 percent of the petroleum supply
companies in the active component deployed to Somalia.  In many
cases, certain personnel have had to deploy multiple times to the
same operation or to consecutive operations. 

The stress of peace operations on the Army has been exacerbated by
the practice of cross-leveling.  This practice involves maintaining
support units at about 10 to 20 percent below their authorized
personnel levels during peacetime and increasing their personnel
levels during deployment by borrowing personnel from units that are
not deploying.  Given the decrease in the size of the Army, GAO
believes that this practice needs to be reassessed. 

The Army's experience in Somalia illustrates the challenges that
could lie ahead if the United States chooses to deploy sizable forces
to Bosnia or to other large-scale peace operations throughout the
world.  While the Army provided approximately a brigade-size force to
Somalia, it likely would provide a division-size force to
Bosnia--roughly three times the Army's force in Somalia.  Army
officials have stated that if the United States sends approximately
22,000 Army forces to Bosnia, access to the reserve component likely
would be required for the second 6-month rotation because the large
support requirement would exceed the number of active forces
available in certain support capabilities. 

The Air Force has contributed to recent peace operations by providing
airlift, delivering humanitarian relief, and participating in various
no fly zone air operations.  Air Force officials stated that these
operations have provided valuable experience in joint and coalition
operations.  However, they have placed considerable stress on (1)
specialized capabilities that only exist in small numbers, such as
command and control, surveillance, reconnaissance, and radar jamming
aircraft and (2) forward-deployed units in the European theater,
where most recent operations have occurred.  Many of these units have
experienced increased operational and personnel tempo because of
sustained deployments and have had fewer opportunities for training
in the broad spectrum of warfare requirements, such as night
intercept operations and advanced aircraft handling characteristics. 
For example, 48 percent of EF-111 aircrews and 42 percent of active
component F-4G aircrews received waivers for training requirements
they were not able to complete during the January-June 1994 training
cycle.  These waivers were needed because of the crews' extensive
participation in peace operations. 

In addition, deploying part but not all of a unit to peace operations
has created planning and logistics challenges for the Air Force,
because squadrons are structured to fight in place or deploy as a
whole unit rather than in smaller packages as they are doing for
peace operations.  Consequently, essential unit personnel and
equipment have to be shared by the forces at the home base and those
in the deployed location. 

The traditional practice of meeting operational requirements with a
command's own resources as much as possible combined with the
drawdown of forces in Europe have increased the strain on the
remaining Air Force assets in Europe.  For example, since their
inception in July and November 1993, the U.S.  Air Force Europe's two
new F-15E squadrons, designed for delivering precision-guided
munitions at night in a high-threat environment, have been
participating continuously in two peace operations--Provide Comfort
and Deny Flight.  Because of their participation in these operations,
the squadrons have had to forego major training exercises that would
have provided them with the most realistic combat training available. 
This training is particularly important for these squadrons because
they have not had the opportunity to participate in a major tactical
air combat exercise since they were established in 1993.  Air Force
volunteer reservists have been used in peace operations to reduce the
burden on certain active component units, such as C-130, A-10, and
F-16 units, but full-time jobs and family obligations prevent
reservists from devoting extensive amounts of time to the operations. 
Many of these problems are now being addressed by heavier reliance on
U.S.-based active, reserve, and Guard units that have deployed to
Operations Provide Comfort and Deny Flight to relieve some of this
burden. 

Peace operations have not been as disruptive to the Navy and the
Marine Corps because they are normally forward deployed throughout
the world.  Certain Navy and Marine Corps units, however, have
experienced increased operating tempo and decreased time between
deployments due to their increased participation in these sustained
operations and to the reduced force structure available to respond to
them and other forward deployment requirements.  For example, a
Marine Expeditionary Unit that returned on June 23, 1994, from a
6-month deployment, including 3 months off the coast of Somalia, was
sent back to sea in less than 3 weeks to support U.S.  operations off
the coast of Haiti.  Navy officials told GAO that increased
operational tempo has resulted in reduced U.S.  naval participation
in certain training and exercises, less time for intermediate
maintenance and repair, and reduced U.S.  naval presence in certain
geographic areas. 


      PARTICIPATION IN PEACE
      OPERATIONS MAY DELAY
      SERVICES' RESPONSE TO MAJOR
      REGIONAL CONFLICTS
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:4.2

According to the bottom-up review, military forces needed for peace
operations will come from the same pool of forces identified for use
in the event of one or more MRCs.  Certain key Army support units and
specialized Air Force aircraft used in recent peace operations have
been identified as being needed in the early stages of a MRC. 
However, it may be difficult to disengage these forces from the peace
operation and redeploy them quickly to the MRC.  This is significant
because in the event of a short-warning attack, forces are needed to
deploy rapidly to the theater and enter the battle as quickly as
possible to halt the invasion. 

During the Somalia operation, the Army used a large percentage of
certain support forces needed in the early stages of a MRC, such as
forces for opening ports and airfields.  In certain cases, nearly 100
percent of the contingency support forces for particular capabilities
had deployed to Somalia and hence were unavailable for deployment
elsewhere.  For example, during the course of the operation, the Army
used all its contingency support forces attached to general supply,
air terminal movement control, medium truck (petroleum), cargo
transfer, and water purification units.  Some of these support
capabilities, of which there are few in the active component, would
also be needed to facilitate a redeployment from the peace operation
theater and hence would not be immediately available for the MRC. 
The Army has recognized this as a challenge and is currently
examining this issue as part of the Total Army Analysis 2003, a
biennial process to determine nondivisional support requirements. 
The Army expects to complete this analysis by mid-1995. 

The Air Force is in a similar situation.  Many of its special
capability units have been participating in peace operations on a
fairly continuous basis, yet DOD plans to use some of these units in
both MRCs.  While the aircraft and aircrews could easily move to
another location, the supplies, equipment, and personnel associated
with the support of the aircraft would have to wait for available
airlift. 

On the other hand, participation in the enforcement of no fly zones
and other operations that require the forward deployment of U.S. 
forces can also enhance the ability of the U.S.  military to respond
quickly to regional contingencies.  This was the case in Operation
Vigilant Warrior in October 1994, where having U.S.  aircraft already
operating from Saudi Arabia greatly facilitated the initial coalition
response to Iraq's threatened aggression against Kuwait. 


      A NUMBER OF OPTIONS ARE
      AVAILABLE FOR EASING THE
      STRAIN OF PEACE OPERATIONS
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:4.3

There are options available for reducing the strain of continued
military participation in numerous and/or sizable sustained peace
operations while maintaining the capability to rapidly respond to
MRCs.  DOD has a number of ongoing analyses that are examining such
options.  These options have their own advantages and disadvantages
and will require choices on the use of the nation's resources.  While
there are costs associated with some of these options, GAO has not
examined their magnitude and how DOD might fund them. 

One option involves increasing the number of support forces on active
duty and decreasing the number of combat forces.  The Army maintains
limited numbers of certain types of support capability on active duty
and substantial active combat capability.  While changing the mix of
active combat and support forces would make more support forces
available for peace operations, it would decrease available active
combat forces for regional conflicts.  Alternatively, GAO has
recently reported that DOD may be able to increase the number of
combat and combat service support forces without decreasing the
number of combat forces by making more use of civilian employees. 

Another option involves greater use of the reserves.  This would ease
the strain on Army support forces and on Air Force airlift and combat
forces.  The disadvantage of this option would be the disruption to
reservists' lives, which ultimately could affect the willingness of
Americans to join the reserves.  The President called up
approximately 1,900 reservists to support the September 1994 military
intervention in Haiti.  Prior to that call-up, the President's
Selected Reserve Call-Up Authority had been invoked only once since
its 1976 enactment--for the Gulf War.  Reserves were not called up
for the operations in Grenada in 1983, Panama in 1989, and Somalia in
1992.  DOD is examining the issue of making greater use of the
reserves for peace operations. 

Other options include making greater use of contractors to augment
support forces, using worldwide Air Force assets rather than regional
assets to support peace operations, and changing forward presence and
deployment goals to relieve the strain on naval forces.  Although no
one option addresses all the problems GAO has identified, a
combination of these options could substantially ease the problems. 


   RECOMMENDATIONS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:5

Congress, concerned about the bottom-up review and the defense
budget, has directed DOD to review the assumptions and conclusions of
the President's budget, the bottom-up review, and the Future Years
Defense Program.  The review is to consider peace operations and
directs among other things that the report describe in detail the
force structure required to fight and win two MRCs nearly
simultaneously in light of other ongoing or potential operations. 
Consequently, GAO is not making recommendations regarding reassessing
the impact of participation in peace operations in this report. 

On another matter, however, GAO believes that because of the Army's
significantly reduced size, the staffing of support forces at 10 to
20 percent below their authorized levels needs to be reassessed. 
Consequently, GAO is recommending that the Secretary of Defense
direct the Secretary of the Army, as part of the Total Army Analysis
2003, to reexamine whether high priority support units that would
deploy early in a crisis should still be manned at less than 100
percent of their authorized strength. 


   AGENCY COMMENTS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:6

DOD's comments on a draft of this report appear in appendix I.  DOD
generally agrees that peace operations have stressed certain military
capabilities but disagrees with GAO's conclusion that participation
in peace operations could delay the timely response of U.S.  forces
to MRCs.  Regarding GAO's recommendation, DOD states that a review of
Army support requirements is underway as part of Total Army Analysis
2003. 

DOD agrees that there are only a small number of certain active
support units that are likely to be needed to conduct both peace
operations and MRCs.  However, it believes that GAO's resultant
conclusions reflect a lack of understanding of how U.S.  forces would
respond to a MRC.  GAO's conclusions in this regard focus on certain
critical capabilities that exist in limited numbers, specifically
certain Army support units and certain Air Force aircraft.  GAO
reached its conclusions through analysis of how these capabilities
have been used in peace operations and past conflicts and its planned
use in future conflicts.  GAO agrees that most combat forces would be
readily available to respond to a MRC. 

DOD specifically disagrees with GAO's discussion of specialized
aircraft.  DOD's comments on specialized aircraft and GAO's
evaluation are discussed in chapters 2 and 3. 


INTRODUCTION
============================================================ Chapter 1

With the end of the Cold War, the number, scope, and size of
operations other than war have increased dramatically, and the United
States has become an active participant in some of these operations. 
Senior administration officials have testified that multilateral
peace operations are an important part of this administration's
national security strategy,\1 albeit not the centerpiece of U.S. 
foreign policy.  These officials have stated that the United States
must be willing to act to preserve peace and stability in order to
advance and protect U.S.  interests in the world.  This in turn
demands that the United States encourage the successful conduct of
multilateral peace operations and, when it is in the United States'
interests, participate in these operations. 


--------------------
\1 For the purpose of this report, "peace operations" includes
everything from low-intensity peacekeeping operations, such as
military observer duty, to high-intensity peace-enforcement
operations.  In addition to peace operations, DOD continues to
participate in humanitarian and disaster relief operations, as it has
done for many years. 


   DEMAND HAS INCREASED FOR U.S. 
   MILITARY RESPONSE TO PEACE
   OPERATIONS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 1:1

U.S.  military forces have been participating in peace operations for
almost 50 years, with limited numbers of personnel.  However, as the
number, size, and scope of peace operations have increased
dramatically in the past several years, the nature and extent of U.S. 
participation have changed markedly.  Recently, the United States has
used much larger numbers of combat and support forces to respond to
events in a number of locations, including Somalia, Macedonia,
Bosnia, Haiti, Rwanda, and Iraq.  (See table 1.1) For example, while
the United States has approximately 1,100 military personnel
committed to the Multinational Force and Observers for the 12-year
operation on the Sinai Peninsula,\2 starting in December 1992 it
deployed approximately 26,000 to Somalia and approximately 20,000 to
Haiti beginning in September 1994. 

While U.S.  participation in peace operations has increased, the size
of the armed forces has declined over the past 8 years.  From a
post-Vietnam War peak of 2.2 million in fiscal year 1987, the active
armed forces have been reduced to an authorized level of 1.5 million
in fiscal year 1995. 



                          Table 1.1
           
             U.S. Participation in Selected Peace
                          Operations

                                                   Approxima
                                                          te
                                                     maximum
            Time        Country or                 number of
Operation   period      region      Mission           forces
----------  ----------  ----------  -------------  ---------
Multinatio  1982 -      Sinai       Sinai buffer       1,100
nal Force   present                 force between
and                                 Egypt and
Observers                           Israel

Provide     1991 -      Northern    Provide safe       1,500
Comfort     present     Iraq        havens for
                                    population of
                                    northern Iraq

Provide     1992 -      Somalia     Provide           26,000
Relief/     1994                    security and
Restore                             support for
Hope/                               relief
Continue                            efforts
Hope

Provide     1992 -      Bosnia      Provide            1,000
Promise     present                 humanitarian
                                    assistance

Deny        1992 -      Bosnia      Support U.N.       2,000
Flight      present                 no fly zone
                                    over Bosnia-
                                    Herzegovina

Southern    1992-       Southern    Monitor           14,000
Watch       present     Iraq        repression of
                                    southern Iraq
                                    population

Sharp       1993 -      Adriatic    Prevent arms      11,700
Guard       present     Sea         from entering
                                    the former
                                    Yugoslavia

Uphold      1994 -      Haiti       Secure            20,000
Democracy   present                 conditions
                                    for the
                                    return of
                                    democracy
------------------------------------------------------------

--------------------
\2 The Multinational Force and Observers is a buffer force of 11
nations, deployed to supervise a demilitarized zone in the Sinai. 
The force's mission is to ensure that Israel and Egypt abide by the
provisions of the Peace Treaty pertaining to the Sinai. 


   PEACE OPERATIONS REQUIRE
   EXTENDED FORCE COMMITMENTS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 1:2

Peace operations tend to be sustained rather than short-term
operations and sometimes have required extended force commitments
from the U.S.  military services.  U.S.  military forces continue to
maintain a 12-year commitment to the Multinational Force and
Observers on the Sinai Peninsula, a 3-year commitment to Operation
Provide Comfort in northern Iraq, and were committed to Operation
Restore Hope in Somalia for almost 2 years.  Numerous units provide
forces during these operations and are rotated to ensure a ready
presence.  During Operation Restore Hope, the Army rotated forces to
and from Somalia approximately every 4 months.  The Air Force tends
to rotate its aircrew more frequently.  In peace operations such as
Provide Comfort, Provide Promise, Deny Flight, and Southern Watch, it
rotated forces every 3 months.  In addition to the forces deployed,
additional forces are preparing to deploy or have recently
redeployed. 


   FORCE DRAWDOWN HAS INCREASED
   CHALLENGE OF RESPONDING TO
   PEACE OPERATIONS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 1:3

The continuing force drawdown has compounded challenges for the U.S. 
military in responding to extended peace operations.  All four
services have experienced reductions in personnel and equipment that
have forced military planners to reevaluate how the services will
respond to peace operations and major regional conflicts (MRC).  For
example, with the reduction in the number of overseas bases and
forward-deployed forces in Europe, the Army and the Air Force have
returned part of their Cold War-era European force structure to the
United States and decommissioned some units.  The forces that
remained in the force structure, which once could have responded to
peace operations from forward locations, now may have to be augmented
by forces from the United States. 


   OBJECTIVES, SCOPE, AND
   METHODOLOGY
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 1:4

The former Chairman and Ranking Minority Member of the Subcommittee
on Oversight and Investigations, House Committee on Armed Services,
asked us to review the suitability of the current U.S.  force
structure for peace operations.  They wanted to know whether the U.S. 
military had the capabilities necessary to operate effectively in a
peace operations environment, while maintaining the capability to
respond to two nearly simultaneous MRCs.  We did not assess whether
the United States should participate in peace operations.  We
examined (1) the impact that peace operations have on U.S.  military
forces, (2) force structure limitations that may affect the
military's ability to respond to other national security requirements
while engaged in peace operations, and (3) options for increasing
force flexibility and response capability. 

To determine the impact of peace operations on U.S.  military forces,
we held discussions with personnel who participated in recent peace
operations.  We also reviewed after-action reports and situation
reports and conferred with service, unified command, and Office of
the Secretary of Defense officials to identify the units involved,
their level of participation, the types of capabilities provided, and
the problems encountered in providing these capabilities.  In
addition, we reviewed the before- and after-deployment personnel and
equipment readiness reports of some participating units and
interviewed (1) officials responsible for the readiness of these
forces and (2) some of the forces that participated in these
operations. 

To determine the effect on the Army of participating in peace
operations, we reviewed the experiences of combat and support forces
who participated in Operation Restore Hope in Somalia and in a number
of other smaller operations such as the Multinational Force and
Observers in the Sinai.  However, we focused our efforts primarily on
Operation Restore Hope, the largest Army peace operation deployment
to date.  We also reviewed the plans for employment of Army forces in
Bosnia should a peace plan be implemented.  The operations in Rwanda
and Haiti took place after we completed the bulk of our work, so we
were not able to fully address them. 

As a means of determining the effects of peace operations on the Air
Force, we selected four of the specialized U.S.-based platforms
identified by the Air Force as most affected by participation in
peace operations, reviewed data concerning their participation, and
interviewed aircrew and maintenance personnel involved in the
missions.  Similarly, we analyzed data and met with military
personnel concerning heavily tasked Air Force units based in Europe. 
We concentrated our efforts on peace operations involving relatively
large numbers of Air Force units, such as Operations Provide Comfort
in Northern Iraq, Southern Watch in Southern Iraq, and Provide
Promise and Deny Flight in Bosnia. 

For the Navy, we compared pre-Desert Storm Sixth Fleet aircraft
carrier deployments in the Mediterranean area with current Sixth
Fleet deployments where the U.S.  Navy is supporting Operations Deny
Flight and Sharp Guard.  We also briefly reviewed Navy participation
in Haiti and Cuban operations in the Caribbean.  We focused on the
Marine Corps' participation in Operation Restore Hope in Somalia
since it was the largest Marine Corps participation to date in a
peace operation. 

To determine whether there are force structure limitations that may
affect the military's ability to respond to other national security
requirements while engaged in peace operations, we held discussions
with the Office of the Secretary of Defense and unified command and
service officials, including officials associated with MRC planning. 
Using the national security requirements in the bottom-up review as
our criteria, we obtained data describing the capabilities necessary
to respond to a MRC within the initial days of conflict.  We then
compared this with the capabilities that had recently been used in
peace operations and the total number of the same capabilities
available in the active force.  We also discussed the actions that
would be necessary to disengage from a peace operation in order to
deploy to a MRC with officials from each of the military services. 

To identify options for increasing force flexibility and response
capability for peace operations, we reviewed pertinent documents and
interviewed senior service, unified command, and other Department of
Defense (DOD) officials to obtain information concerning proposed
initiatives and options. 

During the course of this review, we did not examine the adequacy of
the funding for DOD's participation in peace operations or the impact
of participation on DOD's planned spending.  We are examining these
issues as part of a separate request of the Subcommittee on Military
Readiness, House Committee on National Security, and will report the
results separately. 

Our review was conducted primarily at Army, Navy, Air Force, and
Marine locations, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and
component and unified command headquarters within the United States
and Europe.  We contacted by telephone any relevant organizations we
did not visit, such as the 7th Transportation Group at Fort Eustis,
Virginia; the Military Police Center and School at Fort McClellan,
Alabama; the 57th Wing at Nellis Air Force Base, Nevada; the 27th
Operations Group at Cannon Air Force Base, New Mexico; the 552nd
Operations Group at Tinker Air Force Base, Oklahoma; and the 7th Air
Command and Control Squadron at Keesler Air Force Base, Mississippi. 

Our review was performed from August 1993 to July 1994 in accordance
with generally accepted government auditing standards.  We obtained
DOD comments on a draft of this report. 


RECENT PEACE OPERATIONS HAVE
STRESSED KEY MILITARY CAPABILITIES
============================================================ Chapter 2

Peace operations have affected each of the military services
differently.  These operations heavily stress some U.S.  military
capabilities, including certain Army support forces such as
quartermaster and transportation units and specialized Air Force
aircraft, while having less impact on other forces, such as Army
armored combat divisions and general purpose Air Force combat
aircraft outside Europe. 

In the Army, a large percentage of certain support capabilities in
the active component have been used for peace operations.  Most of
these support capabilities are in the reserves and, for the most
part, the reserves have not been activated for use in peace
operations.  The adverse impact on these support forces has been
further exacerbated because the Army frequently borrows people from
one unit to supplement another that lacks sufficient personnel to
deploy and assigns some personnel to the same operation more than
once, or to consecutive operations, because of the high demand for
their capability. 

In the Air Force, peace operations have placed considerable stress on
the relatively limited number of forces providing specialized
capabilities and on forward-deployed units in the European theater. 
The increased flying hours necessary to support these operations have
resulted in extended temporary duty in excess of established goals,
increased aircraft maintenance, cannibalization of home station
aircraft, and missed training. 

Peace operations have not been as disruptive to the Navy and the
Marine Corps.  However, forward-deployed naval forces have
experienced increased operating tempo and, in some cases, reduced
time to prepare for deployments, both of which have limited the
forces' availability for training.  Naval officials point out,
however, that in many cases, peace operations have exposed the naval
services to unique experiences in joint and coalition operations. 


   CERTAIN ARMY SUPPORT FORCES IN
   THE ACTIVE COMPONENT BEAR HEAVY
   BURDEN
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:1

Certain kinds of Army combat support and combat service support
capabilities, including quartermaster and transportation companies,
are critical in peace operations.  The need to establish and provide
continued infrastructure support for U.S.  military forces, coalition
forces, and the local population is the key reason support forces are
needed in peace operations.  The type and amount of support differs
with each operation, depending on the mission and the nature of the
operating environment.  Peace operations often occur in austere
locations where there is limited electric power, roads, water, port
facilities, and air fields.  As such, support forces have played an
important role in establishing and sustaining a working
infrastructure, not only for U.S.  forces but also for coalition
forces and the local population.  In Somalia, for example, the Army
encountered an environment completely devoid of any useful
infrastructure and had to refurbish or build even the most basic of
facilities.  If nation building is part of the military mission,
support forces are additionally burdened with tasks such as building
schools, hospitals, and local housing and establishing police and
other civil administration services. 

Operational and environmental challenges further tax support forces. 
In Somalia, for example, the area of responsibility for U.S.  and
coalition forces consisted of approximately 21,000 square miles in
the southern half of the country, with U.S.  military and coalition
forces dispersed over considerable distances throughout the country. 
As shown in figure 2.1, Mogadishu is more than 200 miles from Kismayo
(a key Army location) and about 200 miles from the Marine base in
Bardera, which in turn is about 200 miles from Kismayo.  Support
forces had to frequently move between these locations to deliver
food, water, fuel, and other supplies.  To the extent possible,
decentralized support operations were established at various
locations throughout the country to reduce the time spent moving
between locations.  In some cases, however, this posed even greater
stress on support forces because they had to divide already limited
support assets.  For example, the 10th Mountain Division's 710th Main
Support Battalion divided some of its water teams so that they could
provide water purification capabilities at additional locations. 

   Figure 2.1:  Area of
   Responsibility for U.S.  and
   Coalition Forces in Somalia

   (See figure in printed
   edition.)

Source:  10th Mountain Division After Action Report:  U.S.  Army
Forces, Somalia. 

Combat forces also have played a significant role in peace
operations.  However, because more of these forces are in the active
component, a larger number of them have been available for peace
operations.  Armored combat divisions have had limited involvement. 


      ARMY USES A LARGE PERCENTAGE
      OF SOME SUPPORT CAPABILITIES
      TO MEET PEACE OPERATIONS
      REQUIREMENTS
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:1.1

The Army's capacity for providing unique support capabilities exceeds
that of any other military service or nation.  Yet, most of these
support capabilities are in the reserves and, except for volunteers,
the Army has been authorized to draw on reserves for peace operations
only once--in September 1994 for the operation in Haiti.  Without a
presidential decision to call up reserve forces, the Army has had to
draw upon the smaller number of active forces and reserve volunteers
to meet support requirements.  In some cases, nearly all the active
units for a particular support capability deployed to a peace
operation.  For example, 75 percent of the petroleum supply companies
in the active force structure deployed to Somalia.  Similarly, 67
percent of the medium petroleum truck companies and 100 percent of
the air terminal movement control teams deployed to Somalia.  Table
2.1 provides a list of selected Army capabilities within
quartermaster, transportation, engineering, and miscellaneous support
units that experienced heavy deployments to Somalia. 



                          Table 2.1
           
               Selected Army Support Units That
           Experienced Heavy Deployments to Somalia

                              of
                            acti               Percentage of
                              ve      Number    active units
                            unit    deployed     deployed to
Type of unit                   s  to Somalia         Somalia
--------------------------  ====  ----------  --------------
General supply company\a       4         5\b             100
Air terminal movement          1           1             100
 control detachment\c
Petroleum supply company       4           3              75
Medium truck company           3           2              67
 (petroleum)\d
Cargo transfer company         3           2              67
Light-medium truck company    10           6              60
Fire-fighting truck            7           4              57
 detachment
Water purification ROWPU\e     4           2              50
 detachment
Perishable Subsistence         2           1              50
 Team\f
------------------------------------------------------------
\a A company generally ranges from about 90 to about 200 personnel. 

\b The additional unit comprised volunteer reserves. 

\c Detachments are not limited to a certain number; according to Army
officials, they range from 2 to 60 personnel. 

\d While there are other medium truck companies for transporting
petroleum, these units have particular tactical capabilities. 

\e ROWPU--Reverse Osmosis Water Purification Unit.  This particular
detachment is capable of producing drinkable water from any water
source, as opposed to a similar detachment that can only produce
drinkable water from fresh water sources. 

\f This team deployed about 65 people. 

Source:  Army Command and Control Agency, Department of the Army. 


      ARMY'S CROSS-LEVELING AND
      MULTIPLE ROTATION PRACTICES
      TAX THE ALREADY OVEREXTENDED
      SUPPORT FORCES
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:1.2

To prioritize scarce resources, many of the Army's active support
units are assigned fewer people in peacetime than are required to
perform their wartime missions.  If the Army's early-deploying
support units were needed for war, the Army would supplement the
units with people and equipment from other active and reserve units. 
After the Army restructured its forces in the mid-1980s, we reported
that its goal was to authorize combat units, which are the chief
means of deterrence, to be staffed at 100 percent of their wartime
requirements and support units to be staffed at an average of 90
percent of their wartime requirements.\1 In discussions with XVIIIth
Airborne Corps officials, the most ready and resourced of all the
Army corps, we were advised that units deploying to Somalia needed
100 percent or more of their authorized people and equipment in order
to meet operational requirements.  Most units did not have the
people, and many did not have the equipment to satisfy this
requirement.  For example, almost half of the XVIIIth Airborne Corps'
First Corps Support Command units were authorized 90 percent or less
of their authorized people, and several support units were authorized
80 percent or less of their authorized people.  Other corps support
commands, such as the Third Corps', which provided initial corps
support for operations in Somalia, are resourced at an even lower
level than the XVIIIth Airborne Corps. 

The Army supplemented the personnel-deficient units deploying to
Somalia by borrowing from other units throughout the Army force
structure.  This practice is known as "cross-leveling."
Cross-leveling has occurred at both the division and corps level. 
For instance, the 210th Forward Support Battalion, an element of the
10th Mountain Division, took people and equipment from the Division's
46th Forward Support Battalion and the 710th Main Support Battalion
before deploying to Somalia.  The 710th Main Support Battalion also
supported the 46th Forward Support Battalion's deployment, thereby
creating a domino effect within the 10th Mountain Division. 
According to the 710th commander, the battalion deployed with fewer
than all its people and equipment.  Thus, the remaining people were
burdened to make do with less. 

People from some units rotated more than once to the same peace
operation or deployed to consecutive peace operations and/or
participated in domestic relief operations because of the high demand
for their particular capability.  For example, almost all of the
people from the XVIIIth Airborne Corps' 364th Direct Support Supply
Company that deployed to Hurricane Andrew also deployed to Somalia
within the next year.  Other units within the XVIIIth Airborne Corps
had similar experiences.  According to Army officials, support
personnel from other Army units rotated more than once to Somalia. 
The 10th Mountain Division, which responded to the Hurricane Andrew
relief operation and to Operation Provide Hope in Somalia, also
deployed to Operation Uphold Democracy in Haiti in September 1994 to
provide the predominant Army force in support of this peace
operation.  According to Army officials, approximately 40 percent of
the participants in the Haiti operation also participated in the
Somalia operation less than 1 year ago. 

Cross-leveling and frequent deployments in turn affect the ability of
a unit's non-deployed elements to meet their operational
responsibilities.  A combat support group headquarters has
considerable responsibility, particularly as part of the XVIIIth
Airborne Corps.  When the approximately 150 of 180 military personnel
from the XVIIIth Airborne Corps's 507th Combat Support Group
Headquarters deployed to Somalia for several months, they left
approximately 30 headquarters personnel at Fort Bragg, along with the
group's three battalions, without any additional augmentation.  The
headquarters was still responsible for (1) supporting the group's
three battalions, (2) supporting the Multinational Force and
Observers rotation, (3) conducting logistics operations missions on
the installation, and (4) preparing quarterly training briefs to
XVIIIth Airborne Corps.  In addition, several of the remaining
personnel had to participate in two emergency deployment and
redeployment exercises and conduct testing and a major briefing for
the Army Chief of Staff.  In order to cope with the absence of so
many headquarter personnel, many operational requirements were
decentralized to the battalion level.  In some cases, remaining
headquarter personnel (1) took on responsibilities typically assigned
to more senior personnel, and (2) doubled and tripled workloads
throughout the deployment period. 


--------------------
\1 Army Force Structure:  Future Reserve Roles Shaped by New
Strategy, Base Force Mandates, and Gulf War (GAO/NSIAD-93-80, Dec. 
15, 1992). 


      RESERVE FORCES CONTAIN KEY
      SUPPORT CAPABILITIES, BUT
      THEY HAVE NOT OFTEN BEEN
      ACTIVATED FOR PEACE
      OPERATIONS
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:1.3

Until recently, the President has elected not to activate reserve
personnel for use in peace operations.  Therefore, only reserve
volunteers have participated in most peace operations.  This policy
has posed particular difficulties because, as shown in table 2.2,
many of the support capabilities most heavily relied upon in recent
operations reside predominantly in the reserves. 



                          Table 2.2
           
           Percentage of Selected Support Forces in
           the Reserve Component (as of April 1994)

                                               Percentage of
                                                    units in
                                                     reserve
Support capability                                 component
--------------------------------------------  --------------
Quartermaster                                             76
Engineer                                                  69
Transportation                                            63
Psychological operations                                  75
Civil affairs                                             97
------------------------------------------------------------
The Army relied on many reserve volunteers in the Somalia operation. 
While Army volunteers have been helpful, the volunteers available are
not always the ones with the specific capabilities, equipment, and
training required for the peace operation.  Furthermore, individual
volunteers do not meet the Army's requirement for units, in which a
group of individuals are trained and organized to perform a mission
as a cohesive entity.  For example, when Army planners needed a
postal unit for operations in Somalia, they created a unit from
available volunteers.  This process proved to be time-consuming,
taking 1 month to create a 49-person postal unit. 

The recent initiative for using reserve volunteers for the
peacekeeping operations in the Sinai has been time-consuming due to
planning and procedural processes associated with activating
approximately 420 reserve personnel.  The reserve volunteers will be
ready to deploy to the Sinai by January 1995 after completing 3 to 6
months of training.  More senior personnel will train longer.  While
there has been no shortage of volunteers for the current deployment,
Army officials are concerned that they will not be able to recruit
enough volunteers to continue this on an annual basis.  Therefore,
the Army is considering the use of volunteers for every third
rotation. 


      FUTURE OPERATIONS COULD
      FURTHER BURDEN SUPPORT
      CAPABILITIES IN THE ACTIVE
      COMPONENT
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:1.4

The Army's experience in Somalia illustrates the challenges that
could lie ahead if the United States chooses to deploy forces to
Bosnia or to other peace operations throughout the world.  The Army
will likely send at least a division-size force to Bosnia if a peace
plan is signed.  This could have almost three times the impact on the
Army as the Somalia operation, which generally required one-third the
number of forces designated for Bosnia. 

Military police units, in particular, have been kept extremely busy
as a result of peace operations.  In September 1994, 40 percent of
the military police combat support companies stationed in the United
States were deployed to Guantanamo Bay supporting the Cuban and
Haitian refugee operation.  Three other companies were deployed to
Suriname, Honduras, and Panama, leaving just 13 companies to patrol
nine installations in the United States.  According to an Army
official, this is a problem because many installations require more
than one military police combat support company for patrol duties. 
Because the increase in military police deployments, mostly due to
the refugee crisis, has exceeded the number available in the Army's
force structure, Army infantry units have been used to help meet
military police deployment requirements.  For example, upon
completion of their rotation to Guantanamo Bay, military police
companies will return home while rifle companies rotate to Cuba. 
According to an Army official, while rifle companies will undergo 2
weeks of training to perform the military police function, the
training will not provide them with the full breadth of skills that
military police possess. 

The Army will continue to face challenges in responding to sizable
peace operations if reserve forces are not activated.  The need for
reserve activation depends on a variety of factors, such as the size
of a peace operation and the number of such operations ongoing at one
time.  For example, Army officials stated that if the United States
participates in enforcing a peace agreement in Bosnia, with an Army
deployment of approximately 22,000 soldiers, access to the reserve
component could be required for the second 6-month rotation because
the large support requirement exceeds the number of active forces
available in certain support capabilities.\2 According to Army
officials, reserve forces would also likely be required if a number
of smaller size peace operations were ongoing at one time. 

On September 15, 1994, the President authorized the Secretary of
Defense and the Secretary of Transportation to call to active duty
about 1,900 Selected Reserve military personnel in the Army, Navy,
Air Force, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard to support operational
missions in Haiti.  The call-up included reservists in specialties
such as tactical airlift, aerial port operations, military police,
medical support, and civil affairs.  These specialties are those that
maintain most of their capabilities in the reserve component.  In
regard to this activation, the Secretary of Defense stated that DOD
".  .  .  cannot conduct operations involving significant numbers of
personnel and amounts of equipment being moved without using the
Reserves."


--------------------
\2 Civilian contractors could provide support in specific
capabilities, such as petroleum and medium truck companies.  Their
introduction, however, requires a stabilized operating environment,
and this may not be the case in Bosnia.  Furthermore, using civilian
contractors to provide this support is costly. 


   PEACE OPERATIONS STRESS CERTAIN
   AIR FORCE UNITS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:2

Since Operation Desert Storm, the Air Force has responded to
numerous, and often simultaneous, peace operations throughout the
world on a sustained basis.  While these operations have provided
valuable experience in joint and coalition operations, they also have
taxed the Air Force's specialized capabilities and the units that are
forward deployed in the European theater, where most recent
operations involving the Air Force have occurred.  The Air Force's
participation in these operations has resulted in extended tours of
duty, missed training, increased maintenance on aircraft, and
cannibalization of aircraft.  There are some reports that the
stresses on personnel are affecting morale and families.  The Air
Force has used reserve force volunteers to relieve part of the
operational burden on these forces. 


      INCREASING NUMBER OF PEACE
      OPERATIONS STRESS
      SPECIALIZED FORCES IN THE
      ACTIVE COMPONENT
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:2.1

The Air Force's specialized support aircraft provide reconnaissance,
surveillance, command and control, and other capabilities that are
often not available from other services or nations.  This report
focuses on four of these specialized aircraft, all of which (except
two E-3B/C aircraft) are based in the United States--the EC-130E
Airborne Battlefield Command and Control Center (ABCCC), for command,
control, and communications, and on-scene tactical battle management;
the EF-111 Raven, for suppression of enemy air defenses; the E-3
Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS), for surveillance and
command and control; and the F-4G Wild Weasel, for suppression and/or
destruction of enemy radars. 

The Air Force has relatively few of these specialty aircraft in the
active component,\3 and they are being used in an increasing number
of peace operations, most of which require a sustained presence.  For
example, as shown in table 2.3, in June 1994 more than 40 percent of
available E-3 AWACS, EC-130E ABCCC, and active component F-4G
aircraft were being used in peace operations. 



                          Table 2.3
           
              Percentage of Selected Specialized
           Aircraft Used in Peace Operations (June
                            1994)

                                      Number         Percent
                                 deployed to     deployed to
                      Number           peace           peace
Aircraft         available\a      operations      operations
------------  --------------  --------------  --------------
EC-130E                    7               3              43
 (ABCCC)
EF-111                    25               7              28
E-3                     17\b               7              41
 (AWACS)
F-4G                      19              14              74
------------------------------------------------------------
\a This column indicates the average number of aircraft available for
mission-ready training or deployment to a contingency in June 1994. 
Excluded are test aircraft and aircraft undergoing depot, phase, or
intermediate phase maintenance. 

\b Four additional aircraft were not available for peace operations
during this period because they were assigned to the initial
qualification training squadron. 


--------------------
\3 The EC-130E ABCCC, EF-111, and E-3 AWACS are found only in the
active component.  Only the F-4G aircraft are in both the active and
reserve components. 


         INCREASE IN FLYING HOURS
         HAS STRESSED AIRCRAFT AND
         HOME STATIONS
------------------------------------------------------ Chapter 2:2.1.1

Participation in multiple peace operations by a limited number of
specialized U.S.-based assets has resulted in increased flying hours
for those aircraft involved.  This has led to additional wear on the
aircraft and more frequent intermediate and phase maintenance.  For
example, aircraft in the only F-4G squadron in the active component,
the 561st fighter squadron, are undergoing major phase maintenance
every 4 to 6 months versus every 7 to 8 months 1 year ago. 
Similarly, EF-111 maintenance officials noted that maintenance teams
now must work longer to achieve desired results over a shorter time
span than normally required. 

In order to support increased peace operation flying hour
requirements and maintain the operational effectiveness of forward-
deployed forces, the home station has had to share key operational
and support personnel with the deployed portion of the squadron.  At
times, the home station has gone without certain equipment and
supplies to ensure that deployed forces can operate effectively.  For
example, the 7th Air Command and Control Squadron, the only EC-130E
ABCCC squadron in the force structure, had to cannibalize home
station aircraft and use their parts to support the squadron's
forward-deployed aircraft when parts were not available from other
sources. 


         AIRCRAFT PERSONNEL ARE
         EXCEEDING RECOMMENDED
         TIME ON DUTY
------------------------------------------------------ Chapter 2:2.1.2

Due to the extended nature of these operations, participating forces
periodically rotate their aircrews, maintenance personnel, and
aircraft in order to maintain a continuous ready presence in theater
and reduce stress on aircraft and personnel.  The Air Combat Command
has established 120 days as the recommended maximum number of
temporary duty days that Air Combat Command personnel should accrue
in a year.  However, because of the increasing number of peace
operations, personnel associated with specialty aircraft have spent
an increased number of days on temporary duty, away from their home
bases.  In 1994, personnel for the EF-111 and the F-4G approached the
Air Combat Command's recommended maximum number of temporary duty
days in a year--120.  According to one of their senior commanders,
the F-4G's deployment schedule for 1994 indicates that many
individuals will be on temporary duty for about 180 days.  According
to squadron officials, the increased number of temporary duty days
has affected the morale of Air Force personnel participating in peace
operations and their families.  Some Air Force personnel believe that
this increase in temporary duty days is contributing to increased
instances of divorce and decisions to leave the Air Force, although
no direct link has yet been formally documented. 


         AIRCRAFT PERSONNEL MISS
         TRAINING NECESSARY TO
         PREPARE FOR HIGH-THREAT
         COMBAT ENVIRONMENT
------------------------------------------------------ Chapter 2:2.1.3

Aircrews flying extended hours in peace operations sometimes do not
get the opportunity to train to the broad range of skills necessary
for maintaining combat efficiency.  For example, while deployed in
support of Operation Provide Comfort, F-4G aircrews conducted lethal
suppression of enemy defenses but were unable to remain proficient in
formation take-off and landing events, night intercept operations,
and advanced aircraft handling characteristics.  In addition,
according to squadron officials, aircrews maintained weapons
qualifications at minimum proficiency while participating in peace
operations.  Without this training, aircrews do not meet the
technical requirements needed to qualify for participation in a
high-threat, combat environment. 

On a selected basis, wing commanders can waive certain training
requirements for aircrew participating in operations that prevent
them from completing all required training.  According to senior Air
Force officials, the number of waivers granted recently has far
exceeded those granted prior to Air Force involvement in these
sustained operations.  During the January through June 1994 training
cycle, 30 of the 71 aircrew personnel of the only F-4G squadron in
the active component required a waiver for at least one Graduated
Combat Capability event.\4 Similarly, 29 of the 61 aircrew in the
only EF-111 squadron required one or more waivers for events to which
they could not train.  Squadron officials attribute most, if not all,
of these waivers to extensive participation in peace operations.  The
Operations Group Commander, to whom the EF-111 squadron reports,
considers the events waived to be critical mission areas.  According
to the commander, if a large number of aircrew personnel are not
flying the required number of sorties required by the Air Combat
Command, overall squadron and wing combat capability will suffer. 

While there were no waivers received by E-3 AWACS aircrews for the
training cycle ending June 30, 1994, squadron officials said that
they still have training concerns.  The AWACS Operations Group
Commander noted that the quality of the training conducted from home
station and/or at exercises is significantly greater than that logged
on deployed sorties.  However, in general, approximately 50 percent
of the aircrews' training requirements were accomplished on deployed
sorties.  While the training was completed, the commander believes
that the aircrews did not receive the quality training they needed. 
As a means of ensuring quality training in the future, an Air Combat
Command task force is reviewing Graduated Combat Capability training
regulations.  In addition, according to Air Force officials, the
number of deployed E-3 AWACS aircraft will be reduced so that there
will be more available at the home station for training.  The
reduction will be felt in the drug interdiction program. 


--------------------
\4 General Graduated Combat Capability events are training events
necessary to prepare mission-ready pilots for combat and all possible
missions in their respective aircraft.  This training is broken into
three increments known as Graduated Combat Capability levels A, B,
and C.  The levels are defined by the number of sorties, specific
weapons qualifications, and other sorties and events as determined by
the major command. 


      EUROPEAN-BASED AIR FORCE
      ASSETS CARRY HEAVY BURDEN IN
      SUPPORTING PEACE OPERATIONS
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:2.2

Since 1991, the end of Operation Desert Storm, three peace operations
requiring substantial and sustained Air Force participation have
occurred in the European theater of operations--Operations Provide
Comfort, Provide Promise, and Deny Flight.  These operations,
combined with reductions in the U.S.  Air Forces in Europe's (USAFE)
force structure--from 8.8 to 2.3 fighter wing equivalents\5 --and
corresponding squadron relocations, have resulted in many of the same
conditions experienced by specialized U.S.-based assets participating
in these operations, such as increased flying hours, high temporary
duty rates, and missed training opportunities. 

In addition, because recent peace operations have occurred in parts
of the European theater where the Air Force has not maintained a
permanent presence, a significant number of USAFE personnel have been
required to build and maintain infrastructure from which to base
forces.  Weapons training deployment facilities in Aviano, Italy, and
Incirlik, Turkey, had to be expanded greatly in order to accommodate
the large numbers of military personnel supporting Operation Deny
Flight and Operation Provide Comfort.  The Air Force constructed tent
cities in these two locations to provide additional housing and other
services for deployed personnel. 

With the reduction of forward-deployed squadrons in the European
theater, considerable portions of some USAFE capabilities have been
dedicated to peace operations.  For example, USAFE has two F-15E
squadrons designed for delivering precision-guided munitions at night
in a high-threat environment.  For more than a year, about 14
aircraft from both squadrons, which have a combined total of about 48
aircraft, have been participating in Operations Provide Comfort and
Deny Flight.  The F-15E's night navigational and targeting system and
high resolution radar have been valuable in identifying ground
targets during these operations.  Similarly, USAFE has one A-10
squadron, which provides close air support and forward air control. 
Twelve of its 21 aircraft have been participating in Operation Deny
Flight for more than a year.  According to Air Force officials,
although all the squadrons' aircraft were not involved in the
operation at any one time, peace operations affect entire squadrons
because they are structured to fight in place or deploy as a whole
unit rather than in smaller packages. 

Recent peace operations in the European theater have also placed a
heavy demand on USAFE's C-130 Hercules, which provides intra-theater
airlift capabilities.  The Air Force has only one active C-130
squadron in the European force structure, and almost the entire
squadron--17 of 19 aircraft--has been participating in peace
operations in the European theater.  Operation Provide Promise's
missions into Bosnia have required the heaviest use of C-130 assets. 
The squadron's capabilities were supplemented by reserve aircraft
from the United States; nevertheless, the squadron had to curtail
training in certain skill areas in order to fly scheduled airlift
missions between bases to deliver supplies and participate in
Operation Provide Promise. 

USAFE, which had primary responsibility for responding to these
operations since they have occurred within its area of
responsibility, met operational requirements with its own forces as
much as possible.  This is traditional Air Force practice.  Where
USAFE did not have the necessary assets (such as the E-3 AWACS) or
had shortfalls (such as in C-130s), it sought augmentation from
outside Europe.  To the extent other USAFE assets could have been
augmented with active-duty units from the United States, such as in
the case of the F-15E aircraft, some of the adverse impact of
participation in these peace operations might have been mitigated. 
In commenting on a draft of this report, DOD noted that the Air Force
has recognized these challenges and is addressing them by relying
more on active, reserve, and Guard units based in the continental
United States, which have deployed to Operations Provide Comfort and
Deny Flight to relieve some of the operational burden. 


--------------------
\5 A fighter wing equivalent generally comprises 72 combat aircraft. 


         SPLIT OPERATIONS CREATE
         LOGISTICS AND PERSONNEL
         CHALLENGES FOR SQUADRONS
         SUPPORTING PEACE
         OPERATIONS
------------------------------------------------------ Chapter 2:2.2.1

Deploying to peace operations from bases in Europe or the United
States has created planning and logistics challenges for the Air
Force because essential unit equipment and personnel have to be
shared by the forces at the home base and in the deployed location. 
These split operations have had a significant impact on home bases,
which sometimes have had to make due with a reduced number of
maintenance and operational personnel and essential unit equipment to
ensure that the deployed forces maintain a high state of readiness. 
Even if a squadron deploys less than half of its aircraft, the effect
on the home base is still significant because key operations and
maintenance personnel and equipment must deploy to support the
aircraft.  According to Air Force officials, split operations
challenges exist because Air Force squadrons are still structured to
fight in place or deploy as a whole unit rather than in smaller
packages as they are doing for peace operations.  According to
squadron personnel, split operations impede squadron-wide
communication processes and long-term squadron planning, and tax
senior squadron leaders who often have to perform the jobs of their
absent colleagues in addition to their own.  According to one
squadron commander, it is difficult to plan the future vision for the
squadron because the squadron's senior leaders are geographically
separated. 

Split operations create other personnel challenges as well. 
Operations and maintenance personnel rotate between the home station
and the peace operation.  For example, according to USAFE officials,
aircrews from USAFE's A-10 squadron deploy to Operation Deny Flight
for an average of 6 to 9 weeks and remain at the home station for
varying periods of 2, 5, or 7 weeks.  Maintenance personnel remain
deployed for 90 days.  While at home station, personnel must train
and attend to squadron administrative responsibilities.  According to
the squadron commander, this allows personnel minimal time for leave
and attending to family responsibilities before rotating again to the
peace operation. 


         AIRCRAFT SQUADRONS OFTEN
         HAVE TO FOREGO NECESSARY
         TRAINING BECAUSE OF PEACE
         OPERATION DEMANDS
------------------------------------------------------ Chapter 2:2.2.2

Many USAFE squadrons participating in peace operations on a sustained
basis have found it difficult to attend major training exercises at
the same time they are participating in a peace operation.  According
to squadron and wing officials we talked with, the squadrons do not
have enough people or equipment to support the peace operation, home
station requirements, and the training exercise concurrently. 
Because of their participation in peace operations, both of USAFE's
F-15E squadrons have had to reduce their level of involvement or
cancel their participation altogether in training exercises.  For
example, the squadrons were not able to participate in major tactical
air combat exercises, such as Maple Flag, a Canadian exercise similar
to Red Flag, which would have provided them with realistic combat
training.  This type of training is particularly important for these
F-15E squadrons since they were established in 1993 and have not had
the opportunity to participate in a major tactical air combat
exercise. 

While USAFE squadrons have not deployed all their forces to peace
operations, the forces remaining at the home station often find it
difficult to maintain enough aircraft to conduct home station
training.  For example, beginning with its initial deployment in July
1993, USAFE's only A-10 squadron provided 12 of its 21 aircraft on
hand to support Operation Deny Flight.  Of the remaining nine, two
were undergoing phase maintenance inspections at the home station;
one was undergoing depot repair; and one was used for spare parts in
support of forward-deployed aircraft.  Thus, only five of the
remaining aircraft were available for pilot training sorties at the
home station.  Because of the limited number of available aircraft,
the remaining aircrews were only able to fly the minimum number of
hours needed to maintain mission-ready status.  On the occasions when
an additional aircraft had to be dedicated to Operation Deny Flight,
the squadron did not have enough aircraft available to meet training
needs.  According to squadron officials, this was also true for USAFE
F-15E, F-15C, F-16, and C-130 aircrews. 

The Commander of USAFE's A-10 squadron identified four training
events that could not be accomplished at Operation Deny Flight
because of various restrictions in the operating theater.  These
events also were difficult to accomplish at home station because of
environmental and other restrictions on low-level flight (below 500
feet), target marking, full scale-weapons delivery, and certain types
of approaches.  Had the squadron not been participating continuously
in Operation Deny Flight, it would have had the opportunity to deploy
elsewhere for this training. 

As is the case with certain U.S.-based squadrons, aircrews from
Europe-based squadrons participating in peace operations have also
had to obtain waivers for training requirements they were not able to
satisfy during the last training cycle.  According to the squadron
and wing officials we interviewed at home stations and deployed
locations, pilot proficiency in a low-threat environment is at an
all-time high due to the nature of the missions over Bosnia and
Northern Iraq.  However, proficiency in high-threat, low-altitude
mission profiles has suffered and will continue to suffer as long as
training opportunities and peace operation mission taskings remain at
their present levels.  As shown in table 2.4, for example, all of the
aircrews in USAFE's two F-15E squadrons obtained waivers for one or
more training events they were not able to accomplish during the
6-month training cycle ending June 30, 1994.  Aircrews received
waivers in areas such as Night Weapons Delivery, Air Combat
Maneuvers, Air Combat Tactics, and Basic Fighter Maneuvers. 



                          Table 2.4
           
            Number of Training Waivers Granted to
            USAFE Personnel Participating in Peace
                 Operations (as of June 1994)

                                                  Percentage
                                 Number of 51-   of air crew
                             series regulation     receiving
USAFE platform               waivers granted\a       waivers
---------------------------  -----------------  ------------
F-15E                                      737           100
A-10                                        55            55
F-15C                                       38            66
C-130                                        0             0
------------------------------------------------------------
\a These 51-series regulations are Multi-Command Regulations for
major training and include training unique to each airframe.  Events
within these regulations are waived at the major command level, such
as the Air Combat Command. 

As mentioned earlier, USAFE's only C-130 squadron had to curtail
training in order to meet its peace operation and normal operational
requirements.  However, after March 1994, its operational
requirements for Operation Provide Promise declined significantly. 
As a result, C-130 aircrew did not require training waivers for the
training cycle ending June 30, 1994.  At the height of Operation
Provide Promise, squadron aircrew required training waivers for two
consecutive periods ending June 30 and December 31, 1993.  For these
training cycles, 42 and 52 percent of squadron cockpit crew required
102 and 127 training waivers, respectively.  Squadron aircrew
received training waivers in critical areas such as night vision
profiles and assault approaches. 

In September 1994, the newly appointed USAFE Commander acknowledged
that USAFE units were having difficulty accomplishing their training
tasks because they are supporting peace operations.  He noted that
operations such as Deny Flight and Provide Comfort are competing for
combat training time and causing combat skills to atrophy.  According
to the Commander, fighter pilots need to practice intercepts, bomb
dropping, and air-to-air combat, yet they do not typically get this
experience during the course of a peace operation.  He stressed that
USAFE can no longer continue to accept degraded levels of training. 
As noted earlier in this chapter, the Air Force is now relying more
on active, reserve, and Guard units based in the continental United
States to relieve some of the operational burden. 


      RESERVES PROVIDE OPERATIONAL
      RELIEF TO CERTAIN FORCES IN
      THE ACTIVE COMPONENT
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:2.3

Air Force reserve volunteer participation in peace operations has
more than doubled since fiscal year 1991.  Reserve forces have
participated in such major operations as Restore Hope, Provide
Comfort, Provide Hope, and Southern Watch, as well as other smaller
international peace operations and domestic disaster relief
operations.  In some cases, reserves have been needed to meet mission
requirements that active forces were unable to fulfill.  For example,
since there is only one F-4G squadron in the active component and it
is participating in Operation Provide Comfort and Southern Watch,
reserve F-4Gs have had to provide augmentation to Operation Southern
Watch.  In particular, the 190th Air National Guard Fighter Squadron
deployed to Southwest Asia in support of Operation Southern Watch in
December 1993, within a year of returning from another Southern Watch
deployment.  According to squadron officials, the 190th Fighter
Squadron was deployed 12 out of 18 months during this time period. 

In other cases, reserve volunteers have provided operational relief
to active forces.  For example, from November 15, 1993, to January
15, 1994, and again during the summer of 1994, reserve A-10 personnel
and aircraft from the United States relieved USAFE's A-10 squadron so
that its personnel could attend scheduled training at Nellis Air
Force Base.  Operational relief for other USAFE aircraft was provided
by F-16, KC-135, C-141, and C-5 reserve aircraft from the United
States.  In addition to providing this operational relief, reserve
forces still have had to meet most of their individual and unit
training; attend exercises; and satisfy other operational
responsibilities for local, state, and federal agencies, such as
providing assistance in weather reconnaissance, disaster relief,
aeromedical evacuations, and counternarcotics. 

The majority of C-130s are in the reserves.  Given Operation Provide
Promise's extensive C-130 requirements and USAFE's relatively small
number of C-130s, reserve aircraft and personnel were looked to for
meeting mission requirements.  Initially, reserve aircraft and
personnel augmented USAFE's only C-130 squadron.  However, in January
1994, because an increasing number of U.S.-based aircraft and
personnel were needed, the Air Force formed another squadron, known
as the Delta squadron.  This squadron consisted of reserve and active
C-130 aircraft and personnel that operated out of Germany.  Aircrew
and maintenance personnel rotated every 2 to 3 weeks.  The reserve
deployments allowed the active component C-130 squadron in Europe to
reduce its flying hours and subsequently increase its mission capable
rates.  As of May 1994, volunteer Air Force reservists flew
approximately 62 percent of the airlift sorties in support of
Operation Provide Promise.  However, while reservists generally are
willing to participate in these operations, Air Force Reserve and
National Guard officials noted that this level of reserve
participation in peace operations is affecting the willingness of
reserves to volunteer for exercises.  As of May 1994, however, the
need for reservists to support Provide Promise dropped as operational
demands diminished. 


   NAVAL FORCES HAVE NOT BEEN AS
   TAXED BY PEACE OPERATIONS AS
   OTHER SERVICES, BUT OPERATIONAL
   STRESS IS INCREASING
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:3

Certain Navy and Marine Corps units have experienced increased
operating tempo and reduced time to prepare for deployments due to
their participation in peace operations.  The ability to obtain
necessary training while participating in these operations is also
becoming an increasing concern.  However, peace operations have
provided the naval services with unique experiences in joint and
coalition operations that in many cases may be more valuable than
training exercises. 


      NAVAL SERVICES EXPERIENCE
      HIGH OPERATING TEMPO IN
      PROVIDING FORCES FOR PEACE
      OPERATIONS
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:3.1

The Navy and Marine Corps in peacetime are inherently crisis- and
contingency-oriented forces and have conducted peace operations in
littoral areas since their creation.  Navy and Marine Corps force
structure is designed so that the naval services can maintain a
forward presence and rapidly respond to crises, as well as the
war-fighting requirements of MRCs.  The peacetime role of
forward-deployed carrier battle groups and amphibious task forces
covers the spectrum of military involvement--from single-ship port
visits, maritime interdiction and blockades, humanitarian relief
missions, and emergency evacuation of U.S.  nationals, to major
amphibious operations. 

According to naval officials, in attempting to meet both the
requirements of peace operations and normal peacetime presence
commitments, naval forces have exceeded established operating tempo
standards for forward-deployed forces in the Central Command,
European Command, and Pacific Command areas of operation.  The
officials indicated that this was due in part to participation in
peace operations involving Bosnia, Iraq, and Somalia and in part to
the reduction in force structure and forward-deployed forces
available to respond to the same or greater number of operational
commitments.  While the Navy and Marine Corps have tried not to
extend deployments beyond 6 months, the operating tempo has increased
during deployments.  This is reflected, for example, by an increased
number of steaming days incurred by Navy aircraft carriers operating
in the Mediterranean and adjoining seas in 1993 versus 1989 (the year
before Operation Desert Shield). 


      PARTICIPATION IN PEACE
      OPERATIONS AFFECTS TRAINING
      OF NAVAL FORCES
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:3.2

Sustained commitments to particular peace operations, such as
Operations Sharp Guard and Deny Flight in Europe and Operation
Southern Watch in Southwest Asia, require a sustained presence of
surface ships and an aircraft carrier in the Adriatic Sea and Arabian
Gulf.  This often reduces U.S.  naval participation in certain
exercises and training.  For example, in written responses to our
questions the Navy stated that several exercises have been canceled
in the European and Central Commands' areas of operation, severely
limiting training in anti-submarine warfare, amphibious operations,
and command and control.  These capabilities would be needed in a
major regional conflict.  Table 2.5 compares Sixth Fleet aircraft
carrier deployments in 1989 and 1993 and shows a decrease in the
number of days devoted to training exercises and an increase in the
number of days devoted to all other operations.\6



                          Table 2.5
           
             Comparison of Calendar Year 1989 and
              1993 Sixth Fleet Aircraft Carrier
                 Operations and Exercise Days


                                    for  exer
                              operation  cise
Year            in theater            s     s     in port
-------------  -------------  ---------  ----  -------------
1989                490             218   124       148
1993                368             299     5       64
------------------------------------------------------------
\a Days steaming comprises days in operations and days in exercises. 

Postponed or canceled training has not always had a negative effect
on naval forces, however.  Naval officials stress that peace
operations provide unique opportunities for realistic joint and
coalition experience and in many cases may be better than exercises. 
For example, naval forces may receive better training by
participating in a multilateral peace operation involving maritime
and air interdiction, such as Operations Sharp Guard and Deny Flight
in Europe, than by participating in a scheduled exercise with one or
two other nations.  Similarly, Marine support forces in Somalia
obtained valuable experience building infrastructure and providing
other logistical support to U.S.  and coalition forces. 

If naval forces are pulled out of training required before a major
deployment, they have to compress their training period and then work
longer hours to catch up when they return to port.  Some of the ships
that have participated in the Haiti operation were taken out of
single-ship basic training, such as damage control drills.  The Navy
considers interrupting this training less damaging to overall mission
effectiveness than taking ships out of intermediate or advanced
training that requires operating with more than one unit.  Much of
the basic training can be done at sea, even while a ship is
participating in an operation.  As more ships were dedicated to
support Cuban migrant interdiction, however, training opportunities
decreased because more of a ship's crew was involved in migrant
sighting, recovery, screening, care, and feeding.  When the ships
return to port, therefore, they have to perform in-port maintenance,
training, and many administrative and operational inspections
simultaneously to remain on schedule for their next major 6-month
deployment.  This has resulted in crewmen working longer hours and
has left less time for them to spend with their families prior to a
major deployment. 

Naval officials also told us that peace operations are resulting in
reduced intermediate training, such as that at instrumented ranges
for missile and gun shoots.  U.S.  European Command officials noted
that naval aviators participating in these operations are
experiencing many of the same challenges as the Air Force in terms of
training and operational tempo. 

Participation in sustained peace operations and a reduction in
forward-deployed forces has also contributed to reduced U.S.  naval
presence in certain geographic areas where U.S.  forces had been able
to visit on past deployments.  Among the results has been a reduced
level of participation in bilateral exercises and training with
countries that may not be participating in peace operations and fewer
port visits and military-to-military exchanges.  Quantifying the
effects of this reduction in presence is difficult since the
political and diplomatic factors at issue are somewhat intangible. 
Naval officials have noted, however, that some nations dedicate
considerable resources preparing for the opportunity to participate
in an exercise with the U.S.  Navy.  When exercises are canceled,
countries do not get the experience operating with technologically
superior U.S.  systems and therefore may not be capable of doing so
in the future should the need arise. 

Table 2.5 also shows the decrease in the number of days aircraft
carriers spent in port during Sixth Fleet Mediterranean deployments
in 1989 and 1993.  The reduced number of days in port has affected
the Navy's ability to conduct intermediate maintenance on its ships
and equipment.  According to U.S.  Navy officials in Europe, there
has been a 20-percent reduction in the Navy's ability to conduct
intermediate maintenance in this theater, which requires time in
port.  They are concerned that continued delays in conducting
intermediate maintenance may degrade equipment readiness and service
life, particularly since peace operations tend to expose equipment to
more wear and tear than would be expected during normal peacetime
operations. 

According to the Navy, its participation in peace operations has not,
thus far, had a harmful impact on its ability to perform other more
traditional missions.  Thus, naval units have been able to meet a
variety of demands by moving within or across command
boundaries--such as between the European and Central Commands--in
response to emerging crises.  The Navy has generally been able to
maintain its policy mandating that deployments not exceed 6 months
and that the period between deployments be twice as long as the last
deployment.  The Navy had to break this policy in some cases,
however, so that ships could be made available to support Somalia
operations.  While in 1993 there were 5 of these cases, through
September 1994 the Navy had 15 cases in which it had to break this
policy.  According to the Navy, the 1994 cases were due chiefly to
operational requirements regarding Somalia, Haiti, Cuba, and
counter-drug missions.  The Marine Corps faces similar challenges. 
For example, a Marine Expeditionary Unit that returned on June 23,
1994, from a 6-month deployment, including 3 months off the coast of
Somalia, was sent back to sea in less than 3 weeks to support U.S. 
operations off the coast of Haiti. 

According to service officials, the Navy and Marine Corps have not
found it necessary to rely upon volunteer reserve forces in peace
operations to the same degree as the Army and Air Force.  Naval
forces are structured for daily peacetime forward presence operations
that require a complete range of combat forces and capabilities be
readily available for immediate response.  As a result, the majority
of these forces and capabilities are in the active component.  The
function of the Navy and Marine Corps reserve is to augment the
active component forces.  Nevertheless, there are certain
capabilities that reside exclusively, or nearly so, in the Naval
Reserve and are essential to many peace operations.  These
capabilities include units and individuals involved in cargo
handling, Navy air logistics, medical fleet hospitals, and mobil
construction battalions.  Recent Navy support to peace operations has
included the Naval Reserve in search and rescue and maritime patrol
support for Operations Deny Flight and Sharp Guard, as well as
construction support for operations in Somalia.  According to naval
officials, reliance on these limited, yet important, combat support
and combat service support capabilities may increase as the Navy's
commitment to future peace operations continues to expand. 


--------------------
\6 The U.S.  Sixth Fleet's area of operation includes the
Mediterranean, Adriatic, and Black seas. 


      SHORT DURATION OF MARINE
      CORPS PARTICIPATION IN
      SOMALIA OPERATION HAD
      LIMITED IMPACT
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:3.3

Marine Corps forces, chiefly from the First Marine Expeditionary
Force, supported operations in Somalia from December 1992 through
early May 1993.  Later, other Marine forces provided offshore
support.  While Marine Corps forces have participated in a variety of
peace operations, their participation in Operation Restore Hope in
Somalia represented their largest peace operation commitment.  Early
in the operation, the Marine Corps provided the predominant number of
forces, including initial entry and sustainment forces.  At its peak
in January 1993, there were over 11,000 U.S.  Marine forces in
Somalia.  However, by February 1993, the U.S.  Army gradually assumed
the majority of the support responsibilities for U.S.  and coalition
forces, and the Marine Corps began to redeploy. 

The deployment of Marine forces to Somalia resulted in certain
support units' devoting a significant percentage of their capability
to the operation, leaving minimal support available at the home base
for use in other operations.  For example, approximately 95 percent
of the 1st Marine Division's Combat Engineer Battalion and half of
the Division's Headquarters Battalion deployed to Somalia.  The
absence of the Headquarters Battalion required a secondary planning
staff, the 11th Marines, to handle division operations until the main
battalion returned.  While the 11th Marines, which functions normally
as an artillery unit, could have handled a contingency similar in
size and scope to the riots in Los Angeles or the Northridge
Earthquake, it did not have the capacity to orchestrate a response to
a MRC, according to Marine officials.  Had another conflict occurred
while these forces were in Somalia, the Marines would have to have
looked to one of the other two Marine Expeditionary Forces to
respond.  However, since the Marine Corps' major ground participation
was limited to several months and other forces were available for
crisis response elsewhere, the operation had a limited impact. 


   AGENCY COMMENTS AND OUR
   EVALUATION
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:4

DOD generally agrees that recent peace operations have stressed key
military capabilities and states that it is already examining various
means to reduce lengthy deployments in support of peace operations
and operations other than war.  DOD further states that high
temporary duty rates and heavy use of specialized aircraft are force
management issues that have been addressed by better use of worldwide
assets, heavier involvement of the reserves, and the purchase of
additional and replacement aircraft.  We describe DOD efforts to
address the stress peace operations have placed on key military
capabilities at several points in the report and modified the report
based on DOD's comments and further discussion with DOD officials. 

DOD disagrees with our characterization of the demand peace
operations have placed on specialized Air Force aircraft.  It
believes that we have painted an inaccurate and misleading picture
about the degree to which such Air Force capabilities are devoted to
peace operations.  Our report clearly states that the aircraft we
cite (see table 2.3) were the average number of aircraft available
for mission ready training or deployment to a contingency in June
1994 and that the number excluded test aircraft and/or aircraft
undergoing depot, phase, or intermediate phase maintenance.  We
recognize that the Air Force has more aircraft in its inventory than
those available at any one time.  However, we believe that in
evaluating how peace operations affect military capabilities the
appropriate focus is the number of aircraft available for use at any
one time. 


PARTICIPATION IN PEACE OPERATIONS
MAY DELAY SERVICES' RESPONSE TO
MAJOR REGIONAL CONFLICTS
============================================================ Chapter 3

As a result of the bottom-up review, DOD concluded that military
forces needed for peace operations will come from the same pool of
forces identified for use in the event of one or more MRCs.  Some of
the Army and Air Force forces used in recent peace operations,
including certain Army support units such as port and terminal
services units and petroleum handling units that exist in small
numbers in the active Army and specialized Air Force aircraft, such
as the E-3 AWACS, are also needed in the early stages of a MRC. 
Disengaging these forces from a peace operation and redeploying them
to the MRC quickly may be difficult.  Also difficult would be
obtaining sufficient airlift to redeploy the forces, retraining
forces to restore their war-fighting skills, and reconstituting
equipment.  These difficulties are significant because in the event
of a short-warning attack, forces are needed to deploy and enter
battle as quickly as possible to halt the invasion and minimize U.S. 
casualties. 


   BOTTOM-UP REVIEW ENVISIONS
   PEACE OPERATIONS AS SECONDARY
   MISSION
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:1

In 1993, the Secretary of Defense conducted the bottom-up review, a
reassessment of U.S.  defense requirements.  This review, completed
in October 1993, examined the nation's defense strategy, force
structure, modernization, infrastructure, foundations, and resources
needed for the post-Cold War era.  The Secretary's report on the
bottom-up review outlined the new dangers facing the U.S.  interests,
chief among them being regional aggression.  To deal with regional
aggression and other regional dangers, DOD's strategy is to (1)
defeat aggressors in MRCs; (2) maintain overseas presence to deter
conflicts and provide regional stability; and (3) conduct smaller
scale intervention operations, such as peacekeeping, humanitarian
assistance, and disaster relief.  To deal with the threat of regional
aggression, DOD concluded that it is prudent for the United States to
maintain sufficient military power to fight and win two MRCs that
occur nearly simultaneously.  According to the report on the
bottom-up review, while deterring and defeating major regional
aggression will be the most demanding requirement of the new defense
strategy, U.S.  military forces are more likely to be involved in
operations short of declared or intense warfare.  The forces
responding to these other operations will be provided largely by the
same collection of general purpose forces needed for MRCs and
overseas presence. 

DOD's report on the bottom-up review states that if a MRC occurs, DOD
will deploy a substantial portion of its forces stationed in the
United States and draw on forces assigned to overseas presence
missions.  Unless needed for the conflict, other forces that are
engaged in smaller scale operations like peacekeeping will remain so
engaged.  If a second conflict breaks out, the bottom-up review
envisioned that DOD would need to deploy another block of forces,
requiring a further reallocation of overseas presence forces, any
forces still engaged in smaller scale operations, and most of the
remaining U.S.-based forces.  In determining force requirements for
the two-conflict strategy, DOD assumed that forces already engaged in
peace operations could rapidly redeploy to a regional conflict. 


      CONGRESS DIRECTS REVIEW OF
      BOTTOM-UP REVIEW
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:1.1

In the Fiscal Year 1995 Defense Authorization Act, Congress expressed
concern about the bottom-up review and the defense budget.  Regarding
peace operations, Congress found that U.S.  forces are involved in a
number of peace operations, there was a possibility of even larger
future involvement, and many of the forces participating in peace
operations would be required early on in the event of one or more
MRCs.  Consequently, Congress directed that DOD review the
assumptions and conclusions of the President's budget, the bottom-up
review, and the Future Years Defense Program.  The review is to
consider the various other-than-war or nontraditional operations in
which U.S.  forces are or may be participating and directs among
other things that the report describe in detail the force structure
required to fight and win two MRCs nearly simultaneously in light of
other ongoing or potential operations.  Congress also stated that the
President should be willing to increase defense spending if needed to
meet new or existing threats. 


   KEY FORCE CAPABILITIES RELIED
   ON FOR BOTH PEACE OPERATIONS
   AND MRCS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:2

We found that certain Army support forces as well as specialized Air
Force aircraft and Marine Corps prepositioned equipment and stocks
that would be needed early in a first MRC have been engaged in peace
operations. 


      ARMY SUPPORT FORCES
      DESIGNATED FOR EARLY USE IN
      A MRC ARE USED IN PEACE
      OPERATIONS
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:2.1

The Army identified 5-1/3 active combat divisions and associated
support forces that are needed in the early stages of a MRC.  An
additional 3-1/3 active combat divisions and associated support
forces--follow-on forces--would either be deployed later in a MRC or
could provide part of the response for a second MRC. 

The support units that accompany active combat forces are organized
into seven packages.  The first three packages, called Contingency
Force Pool (CFP) 1-3, support the first 5-1/3 divisions.  While the
fourth package, CFP 4, does not support the first 5-1/3 divisions
directly, it rounds out the theater support that would be required
for these early deploying forces.  The follow-on 3-1/3 divisions are
supported principally by CFP 5-7. 

Army planners try to avoid using forces designated for early
deployment to a MRC for contingencies such as peace operations. 
Although planners have been able to minimize the use of these forces
in peace operations, they have had to use a large portion of some of
the Army's CFP 1-3 support forces in large-scale and/or multiple
peace operations because there is a limited number of such forces in
the active component. 

In the Somalia operation, 50 percent of the active support forces
used were from CFP 1-3 units.  Specifically, 92 percent of
quartermaster forces, 69 percent of engineering support forces, 64
percent of miscellaneous support forces, and 65 percent of
transportation forces deployed to Somalia were CFP 1-3 units.  As
shown in table 3.1, certain support capabilities within those areas
had an even higher percentage of CFP 1-3 units. 



                          Table 3.1
           
           Selected Active Support Units Within CFP
                 1-3 That Deployed to Somalia

                                                  Percentage
                                                   of active
                                    Active CFP       CFP 1-3
                                     1-3 units    capability
                                   deployed to   deployed to
Type of unit      CFP 1-3 units        Somalia       Somalia
---------------  ---------------  ------------  ------------
General supply          3                    3           100
 company\a
Air terminal            1                    1           100
 movement
 control
 detachment\b
Medium truck            2                    2           100
 company
 (petroleum)\c
Cargo transfer          1                    1           100
 company
Water                   1                    1           100
 purification
 ROWPU\d
 detachment
Perishable              1                    1           100
 subsistence
 team\e
Petroleum               4                    3            75
 supply company
Light-medium            3                    2            67
 truck company
Fire fighting           4                    2            50
 truck
 detachment
------------------------------------------------------------
\a A company generally ranges from about 90 to about 200 personnel. 

\b A detachment is not limited to a certain number; according to Army
officials, it ranges from 2 to 60 personnel. 

\c While there are other medium truck companies for transporting
petroleum, these units have particular tactical capabilities. 

\d ROWPU--Reverse Osmosis Water Purification Unit.  This particular
detachment is capable of producing drinkable water from any water
source, as opposed to a similar detachment that can only produce
drinkable water from fresh water sources. 

\e This team deployed about 65 people. 

Source:  Army Command and Control Agency, Department of the Army. 

Similarly, should a peace plan be signed and U.S.  military forces
deploy to Bosnia to support the implementation of this plan, the Army
likely would need to draw on support forces, including CFP units, to
meet support requirements.  For example, approximately 64 percent of
the total number of forces planned to deploy are support forces, and
approximately 14 percent of those forces will likely come from CFP
1-3 units. 


      AIR FORCE WILL NEED
      SPECIALIZED AIRCRAFT FOR
      MRCS THAT ARE ALSO USED IN
      PEACE OPERATIONS
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:2.2

The Air Force anticipates needing almost all its specialized and
unique capability aircraft, such as the EF-111, F-4Gs, E-3 AWACS,
EC-130 ABCCC, and F-15E in the early days of a MRC.  The Air Force's
experience in Operation Desert Storm documents the early demand for
these aircraft.  For example, approximately 63 percent of the F-4G
aircraft were deployed in support of Operation Desert Storm at the
beginning of the hostilities.  According to the bottom-up review,
some of these aircraft are so important to a MRC's success and are of
such limited number in the active force structure that they are
tasked to both MRCs, even in the case of nearly simultaneous MRCs. 
Recent peace operations have required varying numbers of the Air
Force's specialized and unique capability aircraft on a fairly
continuous basis.  For June 1994, we calculated that approximately 46
percent of these aircraft were involved in Operations Provide
Comfort, Provide Promise, Deny Flight, and Southern Watch. 

According to DOD officials, participation in the enforcement of no
fly zones and other operations that require the forward deployment of
U.S.  forces can also enhance the ability of the U.S.  military to
respond quickly to regional contingencies.  These officials said that
this was the case in Operation Vigilant Warrior in October 1994,
where having U.S.  aircraft already operating from Saudi Arabia
greatly facilitated the initial coalition response to Iraq's
threatened aggression against Kuwait. 


      NAVAL SERVICES USE
      FORWARD-DEPLOYED FORCES FOR
      PEACE OPERATIONS AND MRCS
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:2.3

U.S.  naval forces are structured to respond to regional
contingencies with their forward-deployed carrier battle groups and
amphibious-ready groups, which rotate on a regular basis between home
ports and regional theaters.  The Navy and the Marine Corps respond
to many types of operations, from MRCs to peace operations, with the
same forward-deployed forces.  Generally, this has not been a problem
because of the flexibility and rotational nature of naval forces. 
However, to respond to recent peace operations in the Caribbean Sea,
the Navy has had to use its non-deployed forces, which were training
and conducting maintenance in preparation for their upcoming
scheduled 6-month deployments. 


      ARMY AND MARINE CORPS USE
      PREPOSITIONED EQUIPMENT AND
      STOCKS FOR PEACE OPERATIONS
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:2.4

The Marine Corps and the Army have prepositioned equipment and stocks
afloat for use in the event of a MRC.  The Marine Corps has relied on
prepositioned equipment and supplies stored on their Maritime
Prepositioned Ships for a quick contingency response capability. 
Equipment and supplies that the Marines used in Somalia came from 4
of the 13 Maritime Prepositioned Ships that are organized into three
squadrons positioned throughout the world.  Each squadron is designed
to provide enough ground combat and combat support equipment and
supplies to sustain about 17,300 Marines for 30 days.  The equipment
and supplies aboard these ships are also needed to support other
conflicts in which U.S.  Marine forces are involved.  To the extent
these ships have been off-loaded to support a peace operation, their
equipment and supplies are unavailable to respond to a MRC. 

Similarly, the Army has prepositioned equipment afloat to facilitate
the rapid deployment of a heavy Army brigade.  Ships from the Army's
Prepositioning Afloat Program, which contains 12 ships with combat
and support equipment and supplies, were recently positioned for use
in supporting the Rwanda humanitarian operation.  Five of these
ships, containing support equipment and supplies, were positioned off
the coast of Africa to support this operation if necessary.  The need
to unload these ships' equipment and supplies never arose.  In early
October 1994, all 12 of these ships were sent to Southwest Asia to
support U.S.  forces responding to Iraqi troop movements.  Had the
five ships positioned off the African Coast been unloaded to support
the Rwanda operation, their supplies and equipment likely would not
have been available for use in Southwest Asia. 


   DISENGAGEMENT FROM PEACE
   OPERATIONS AND REDEPLOYMENT TO
   MRCS WOULD BE DIFFICULT
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:3

U.S.  military forces would encounter numerous challenges if they
needed to redeploy on short notice from one or more sizable peace
operations to a MRC.  The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy
and Requirements stated in June 1994 that the United States would
"liquidate" its commitments to peace operations in the event of two
simultaneous regional conflicts.  Discussions with service officials
and review of data concerning the types and number of forces
committed to peace operations indicate that disengagement from one or
more sizable peace operations and redeployment of forces to a MRC on
short notice could be difficult. 

Obtaining sufficient airlift would be one of the primary challenges
encountered in redeploying forces from one or more peace operations
to a MRC.  In order to redeploy ground personnel and equipment from
the peace operations, the already limited number of airlift assets
flying from the United States to the MRC would have to divert to the
peace operation, in some cases pick up personnel and equipment, and
take them to the MRC.  The Air Force has not yet fully studied the
implication of such a redeployment and hence could not quantify the
impact of this delay on the Air Force's ability to meet MRC
deployment requirements.  Air Force officials did say that it would
make a difficult situation even worse.  According to Air Force
officials, the Air Force's tactical forces would also encounter an
airlift problem in moving from a peace operation to a MRC.  While
aircraft and aircrews could easily fly from one operation to another,
the maintenance and logistics support needed to keep the aircraft
flying--supplies, equipment, and personnel--would have to wait for
available airlift. 

Another challenge that would be encountered is that certain Army
contingency support forces (such as port handlers, air and sea
movement control personnel, and petroleum handlers) needed in the
early days of a MRC, would still be needed within the peace operation
theater to facilitate the disengagement and redeployment.  As a
result of our analysis comparing the support capabilities needed in
the first 30 days of a MRC with the contingency support capabilities
deployed to Somalia, we found that in some cases 100 percent of some
of these active component support forces were used in the Somalia
peace operation.  Had a MRC arisen during this time, immediate access
to reserve component forces would have been necessary.  According to
DOD officials, the Army has recognized this as a challenge and is
currently examining this issue as part of the Total Army Analysis
2003, which it expects to complete in mid-1995.\1

According to Navy officials, the response of Navy ships to a MRC
would depend more on their overall distance to the crisis location
than on the operations they were currently conducting.  With some
peace operations, however, Navy ships may not be directed to
disengage quickly and move to a MRC.  A senior Navy official noted,
for example, that it took approximately 7 months to resolve a crisis
in Liberia in 1990-91 and until that time the amphibious ready group
was not directed to participate in Operation Desert Shield/Desert
Storm. 

Each service faces challenges with reconstituting its forces in terms
of training, equipment, and supplies in order to deploy directly to a
MRC.  Army officials have expressed some concern that participating
in peace operations may degrade combat unit readiness for combat
operations because of the inability to practice certain individual
and collective wartime skills.  In Somalia, for example, while the
combat forces received extensive experience in military operations
conducted in an urban environment, they were not able to practice
collective training skills.  According to 10th Mountain Division
officials, in some cases it took approximately 3 to 6 months to bring
these skills back to a level acceptable for combat operations once
they returned from Somalia.  Army officials also noted that while
peace operations offered the opportunity to practice and enhance
logistic skills, logistics training provided in Somalia did not
substitute completely for the training that would result from a
prepared training exercise, such as those at the National Training
Center.  In the latter, the support forces would work with combat
forces as they would in high-intensity combat operations.  Marine
Corps ground forces had similar experiences in Somalia. 

According to Air Force officials, peace operations tend to degrade
the overall combat readiness of Air Force flight crews that
participate in these operations on a sustained basis because they
often restrict night and low-level flight operations and do not
provide experience in other combat skills such as night intercept
maneuvers.  Similarly, naval aviators find that they lose proficiency
in some combat skills, such as air combat maneuvering, through
prolonged participation in peace operations.  As with the Air Force,
naval aviators who participate in these operations on a sustained
basis are not as able to get to combat ranges where they can practice
their full breadth of combat capabilities. 

The reconstitution of equipment used in peace operations may also
hinder a timely disengagement and redeployment to a MRC.  The
extensive use of certain equipment, combined with the harsh
environmental effects encountered in certain peace operations, has
required extensive maintenance before the equipment can be used
again.  For example, upon their return from Somalia, the 10th
Mountain Division's AH-60 helicopters had to enter depot level
maintenance as a result of the harsh desert environment and the
extensive use of these helicopters in Somalia. 


--------------------
\1 This analysis is a computer-assisted study involving the
simulation of combat to generate nondivisional support requirements,
based on war-fighting scenarios DOD developed. 


   AGENCY COMMENTS AND OUR
   EVALUATION
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:4

DOD disagrees with our conclusion that participation in peace
operations could impede the timely response of U.S.  forces to MRCs. 
It agrees that there are only a small number of certain active
support units that are likely to be needed to conduct both peace
operations and MRCs.  However, it believes that our resultant
conclusions reflect a lack of understanding of how U.S.  forces would
respond to a MRC.  Our conclusions in this regard focus on certain
critical capabilities that exist in limited numbers, specifically
certain Army support units and certain Air Force aircraft.  We
reached our conclusions through analysis of how these capabilities
have been used in peace operations and past conflicts and their
planned use in future conflicts.  We agree that most combat forces
would be readily available to respond to a MRC. 

In its comments DOD states that, on the basis of the recent response
of U.S.  forces to the possibility of Iraqi aggression against Kuwait
while U.S.  forces were engaged in Haiti, it does not see any
evidence that significant support unit shortfalls exist.  It further
states that the participation of certain Air Force aircraft in peace
operations in that part of the world facilitated the response to
Iraqi movements.  Since these events occurred after we had completed
our audit work, we were not in a position to analyze them. 


CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
============================================================ Chapter 4

Participation in large-scale and/or multiple peace operations could
impede the ability of U.S.  forces to rapidly respond to MRCs because
of several factors.  First, certain critical support forces needed in
the early days of a major regional conflict would also be needed to
facilitate a redeployment from the peace operation.  Second, airlift
assets would have to be diverted to pick up personnel and equipment
from the peace operation.  Finally, some of the forces would need
training, supplies, and equipment before deploying to another major
operation. 

Forces with capabilities that exist in limited numbers in the active
Army and would be needed in the early stages of a MRC have been used
repeatedly in peace operations.  Similar-type units that are not
engaged in peace operations may not be able to respond quickly or
effectively to MRCs because they are assigned fewer people than
authorized and they may have loaned some people to the units engaged
in the peace operations, which exacerbates an already difficult
situation. 

Specialized aircraft that exist in limited numbers in the active
force structure and their crews are also being used more frequently
in peace operations.  The Air Force anticipates needing almost all
its specialized aircraft in the early days of a MRC. 

Some forces in each service are missing training and exercises that
affect their overall combat readiness and their ability to redeploy
directly to a MRC.  Numerous waivers have been issued for aircrews
that have not been able to complete required training due to the
demands of peace operations.  Naval forces involved in peace
operations are spending almost all their time at sea conducting
operations and so have been unable to participate in some exercises
and training. 

Peace operations are also likely to have a long-term impact on the
people who participate in them although it is difficult to quantify
that impact.  In 1994 personnel for specialized aircraft have
approached the Air Force's recommended maximum number of temporary
duty days away from home station in a year--120.  In the case of the
F-4Gs, squadron personnel are likely to exceed the recommended
maximum by 50 percent.  There are reports that increased temporary
duty days for Air Force personnel are affecting their morale and
their families and that it is contributing to increased instances of
divorce and decisions to leave the Air Force.  Naval personnel,
unable to perform as much maintenance, training, and operational
inspections while at sea, are working longer hours in port and have
less time for their families prior to a major deployment. 

A June 1994 Defense Science Board Report on Readiness notes that the
amount of time individuals are away from home has been affected by,
among other things, the rapid force drawdown and a higher level of
contingency operations.  This has increased deployment frequency and
placed new strains on personnel.  The report further notes that
family separation has always been a major, if not the number one,
retention variable. 


   OPTIONS FOR EASING THE STRAIN
   OF PEACE OPERATIONS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 4:1

There are options available to allow DOD to meet the demands of
participation in numerous and/or sizable sustained peace operations
on military forces while maintaining the capability to rapidly
respond to MRCs.  These options have their own advantages and
disadvantages and will require choices on the use of the nation's
resources.  Although no one option addresses all the problems we have
identified, a combination of these options could substantially ease
the problems.  While there are costs associated with some of these
options, we have not examined their magnitude and how DOD might fund
them.  DOD is currently examining a range of such options. 


      CHANGE THE MIX OF ARMY
      COMBAT AND SUPPORT FORCES
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 4:1.1

One option involves increasing the availability of support forces for
peace operations by maintaining fewer combat and more support forces
on active duty.  At present, the Army has placed many support
functions in the reserve component.  For example, many units that
open and operate ports overseas are in the reserve component.  This
capability was placed in the reserve component during the Cold War,
and DOD expected that when forces were needed in wartime it would be
able to quickly access and deploy these reserve forces.  However,
many of these forces that are in the active component have been
required in peace operations because the Army has not been authorized
to involuntarily access reserve units in most peace operations. 
While the Army maintains limited numbers of certain types of support
capability on active duty, it maintains substantial combat capability
in the active component.  More support forces could be made available
for peace operations if the Army maintained fewer combat forces and
redirected those resources to maintaining more support forces. 
According to Army officials, this is one of the issues that is being
examined as part of the Total Army Analysis, which should be
completed by mid-1995. 

Alternatively, DOD may be able to increase the number of combat and
combat service support forces without decreasing the number of combat
forces by making more use of civilian employees.  We recently
reported that the services use thousands of military personnel in
support functions, such as personnel management and data processing,
that are typically performed by civilian personnel and do not require
skills gained from military experience.\1 We further reported that
replacing these military personnel with civilian employees would
reduce peacetime personnel costs and could release military members
for use in more combat-specific duties. 


--------------------
\1 DOD Force Mix Issues:  Greater Reliance on Civilians in Support
Roles Could Provide Significant Benefits (GAO/NSIAD-95-5, Oct.  19,
1994). 


      MAKE GREATER USE OF THE
      RESERVES
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 4:1.2

Making greater use of the reserves would ease the burden on Army
active support forces and Air Force airlift and combat forces. 
Authority to call up the reserves rests with the President.  There
are three provisions of Title 10 of the U.S.  Code that provide
access to large numbers of reservists, one of which is section
673b--Presidential Selected Reserve Call-Up (PSRC).  This section
provides access to 200,000 members in the Selected Reserve for up to
270 days and would only require the President to notify Congress that
he was making the call-up. 

DOD policy guidance regarding the use of reserves for peace
operations requires that maximum consideration be given to the use of
volunteers before involuntary activation is ordered.  The President
called up approximately 1,900 reservists to support the September
1994 military intervention in Haiti.  Prior to that call-up, PSRC had
been invoked only once (for the Gulf War) since its 1976 enactment. 
The reserves were not activated for the operations in Grenada in
1983, Panama in 1989, or Somalia in 1992.  According to senior Army
officials, a request went from the Army to the Joint Chiefs of Staff
for involuntary access to reserves for Somalia.  The request
ultimately was never presented to the President.  An April 1994 DOD
report on accessibility of reserve forces notes that using PSRC
authority would raise sensitive domestic and foreign policy concerns
that require time to resolve before the President could be expected
to decide on when large numbers of reservists should be ordered to
active duty. 

Prior to the Haiti intervention, DOD had stated in its April 1994
report on accessibility of reserve forces that the decision to not
invoke PSRC in Grenada, Panama, and Somalia supported the perception
that PSRC has evolved into a de facto mobilization authority. 

As DOD's report on the reserves notes, gaining involuntary access to
reserve personnel for any mission is a sensitive matter.  A reserve
call-up has the potential to disrupt the lives of reservists, their
families, and their employers or customers.  According to DOD, the
assumption of many reservists is that reservists would be called up
for service only when vital interests of the United States are
threatened.  This is based on Cold War experiences and certain
post-Cold War contingencies such as Desert Storm.  U.S.  Army Reserve
Command officials advised us of their concern that involuntary use of
the reserves for peace operations would be disruptive to reservists'
lives and ultimately could affect the willingness of Americans to
join the reserves. 

The Office of Reserve Affairs, within the Office of the Secretary of
Defense, is examining the limits and impediments to volunteerism and
how to expand their use.  That office has identified several
impediments, including statutory requirements involving the lack of
some benefits for reservists on duty for less than 31 days, the lack
of employer support, and the lack of funds to pay the costs of
reservists on active duty, which currently is not included in the
annual defense budget, that must be eliminated if DOD is to rely on
expanded use of volunteers.  DOD reports that it is addressing a wide
range of proposals for mitigating these and other impediments. 


      MAKE GREATER USE OF
      CONTRACTORS
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 4:1.3

DOD could also use contractors to augment support forces.  The Army
is already making greater use of contract personnel to provide many
of the support services typically provided by its combat service
support personnel.  In Somalia, for example, the Army used the
logistics civil augmentation program, which uses a civilian
contractor to provide construction services and general logistic
support.  This reduced the Army support requirement.  The Army has
also tasked this contractor with developing a worldwide logistics
civil augmentation plan and a specific plan for a potential future
deployment to Bosnia.  The Bosnia plan describes the military support
the contractor personnel can provide and the types of military units
it can replace. 

Use of the contractor entails additional costs that, in Somalia, were
paid first from the Marine Corps' and then the Army's operations and
maintenance budget.  In addition, Army officials said that in
Somalia, the contractor needed to use Army equipment to perform its
tasks, which required taking equipment from Army units. 


      USE WORLDWIDE MILITARY
      ASSETS
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 4:1.4

The use of worldwide military assets could ease the strain on
military forces.  Peace operations had a number of negative impacts
on USAFE because USAFE followed its traditional practice of meeting
operational requirements with its own forces as much as possible. 
While USAFE's two F-15E squadrons and one A-10 squadron were heavily
engaged in supporting peace operations, there were several
active-duty F-15E and active-duty A-10 squadrons based in the United
States that might have been able to ease the strain if they could
have taken turns rotating aircraft and personnel to those operations. 
In commenting on a draft of this report, DOD noted that the Air Force
has recognized these challenges and is addressing them by relying
more on active, reserve, and Guard units based in the continental
United States, which have deployed to Operations Provide Comfort and
Deny Flight to relieve some of the operational burden. 


      CHANGE FORWARD PRESENCE
      GOALS
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 4:1.5

At present, one of the Navy's principal missions is to maintain
forward presence around the world.  Forward presence is also a key
component of national military strategy as described in the report on
the bottom-up review.  However, the extent of forward presence
necessary is a matter of judgement for the Navy and the Joint Staff. 

DOD could change the required level of forward presence to relieve
the strain on naval forces.  This would require a significant
military and diplomatic policy decision.  It could also result in
reduced crisis response capability and less opportunity to
participate in multilateral exercises. 


      ACCEPT THE STATUS QUO
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 4:1.6

The alternative to using defense resources differently is to accept
the status quo and so continue to treat peace operations as a
secondary mission.  The risk of accepting the status quo is that it
would continue the strain on the military as a result of its
participation in peace operations and could adversely affect the
military's ability to respond to a MRC if one should occur while
military forces were engaged in a sizable peace operation or several
smaller ones. 

Whether the risk is acceptable in part depends on the frequency with
which the United States engages in sizable peace operations and the
duration of these operations.  Each operation is different in terms
of size, operating environment, and duration.  For example, the
operation in Somalia required large numbers of ground forces in an
austere environment for over a year, while the Rwanda operation
required smaller numbers of ground and airlift forces for several
months.  Estimates for a potential Bosnia deployment call for even
larger numbers of ground forces in an austere environment for about 2
years.  Other operations, such as enforcement of the no-fly zones
over Iraq and Bosnia, have required aviation assets for an extended
period but few ground forces. 

Whether the risk is acceptable also depends on the extent to which
the services can mitigate the risks.  For example, the services might
be able to use civilian contractor logistics support, or use some of
the other options we have identified.  Ultimately, however, if
policymakers believe that the likelihood of U.S.  involvement in
large scale, extended duration operations is low, the risk may be
much more acceptable than if they believe that the likelihood is
high. 


   RECOMMENDATION
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 4:2

Concerned about the bottom-up review and the defense budget, Congress
directed DOD to review the assumptions and conclusions of the
President's budget, the bottom-up review, and the Future Years
Defense Program.  DOD is to review peace operations and report in
detail on the force structure required to fight and win two MRCs
nearly simultaneously while responding to other ongoing or potential
operations.  Consequently, we are not making recommendations
regarding reassessing the impact of participation in peace operations
in this report. 

We recently reported on the bottom-up review's assumptions concerning
the broader force structure issues, including the redeployment of
forces from other operations to MRCs, the availability of strategic
mobility, and the deployability of reserve combat forces.\2

On another matter, however, we believe that because of the Army's
significantly reduced size the staffing of support forces at 10 to 20
percent below their authorized levels needs to be reassessed. 
Consequently, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the
Secretary of the Army, as part of the Total Army Analysis 2003, to
reexamine whether high priority support units that would deploy early
in a crisis should still be staffed at less than 100 percent of their
authorized strength. 


--------------------
\2 Bottom-Up Review:  Analysis of Key DOD Assumptions
(GAO/NSIAD-95-56, Jan.  31, 1995). 


   AGENCY COMMENTS AND OUR
   EVALUATION
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 4:3

DOD states that it is addressing the matter we raise in our
recommendation as part of Total Army Analysis 2003.  If the Army
fully assesses the issue of staffing high priority support units as
part of the Total Army Analysis 2003, we believe that the intent of
our recommendation would be met. 




(See figure in printed edition.)Appendix I
COMMENTS FROM THE DEPARTMENT OF
DEFENSE
============================================================ Chapter 4



(See figure in printed edition.)



(See figure in printed edition.)

<apnote:28>See comment 1. 



(See figure in printed edition.)



(See figure in printed edition.)

<apnote:10>Now on pp.  2 and 12-14. 

<apnote:14>See comment 2. 



(See figure in printed edition.)

<apnote:22>Now on pp.  4 and 17-21. 

<apnote:31>See comment 3. 



(See figure in printed edition.)



(See figure in printed edition.)

<apnote:6>Now on pp.  4 and 21-23. 

<apnote:30>See comment 4. 



(See figure in printed edition.)

<apnote:25>Now on pp.  23-24. 

<apnote:39>See comment 5. 



(See figure in printed edition.)

<apnote:16>Now on pp.  4-5 and 24-25. 



(See figure in printed edition.)

<apnote:5>Now on pp.  5 and 25-29. 

<apnote:9>See comment 6. 



(See figure in printed edition.)

<apnote:12>Now on pp.  5-6 and 29-35. 

<apnote:33>Now on pp.  6 and 35-39. 



(See figure in printed edition.)

<apnote:32>Now on pp.  6-7 and 41-46. 

<apnote:35>See comment 7. 



(See figure in printed edition.)

<apnote:7>See comment 8. 

<apnote:28>See comment 9. 

<apnote:38>See comment 10. 



(See figure in printed edition.)

<apnote:18>See comment 11. 



(See figure in printed edition.)

<apnote:8>Now on pp.  6-7 and 46-48. 

<apnote:12>See comments 7
through 11. 

<apnote:17>See comment 12. 



(See figure in printed edition.)

<apnote:13>Now on pp.  7-8 and 51-54. 

<apnote:17>See comment 13. 

<apnote:36>Now on pp.  54-55. 

<apnote:40>See comment 14. 



(See figure in printed edition.)

<apnote:18>Now on pp.  8-9 and 55. 

<apnote:22>See comment 15. 


The following are GAO's specific comments on the Department of
Defense's (DOD) letter dated February 7, 1995. 


   GAO COMMENTS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 4:4

1.  We make one recommendation in our report, regarding the need to
reexamine whether high priority support units that would deploy early
in a crisis should be manned at less than 100 percent of their
authorized strength.  DOD's response to that recommendation appears
on the last page of its written comments. 

2.  We agree that in recent years there has been a proliferation of
terms used to describe military operations other than war.  We also
agree that the United States has participated in disaster relief and
humanitarian relief operations for many years and have revised our
report to reflect this fact.  Regarding our revised definition of
peace operations, we are using the same definition used in the DOD
Inspector General's September 1994 report entitled Specialized
Military Training for Peace Operations.  The peace operations
identified in table 1.1 of our report are included in the Secretary
of Defense's January 1994 Annual Report to the President and Congress
except for Operation Uphold Democracy in Haiti, which was authorized
after the date of the Secretary's report. 

3.  DOD disagrees with our conclusions regarding the extent that
peace operations may have stressed military capabilities.  DOD
specifically focuses its comments on our discussion of how peace
operations have stressed specialized aircraft, noting that there were
other aircraft in addition to the aircraft we enumerate as available. 
Our report states that the aircraft cited in table 2.3 were the
average number of aircraft available for mission ready training or
deployment to a contingency in June 1994 and that the number excluded
test aircraft and/or aircraft undergoing depot, phase, or
intermediate phase maintenance.  The aircraft we list were the ones
available for immediate use.  We have revised our report to state
that forward deployment of U.S.  forces, including aircraft, can
enhance the ability to respond to regional conflicts. 

4.  Our discussion focuses on support forces that participated in
peace and domestic relief operations, not installation support.  We
have revised our report to clarify the impact of cross-leveling and
frequent deployments on the ability of a unit's non-deployed elements
to meet their operational responsibilities. 

5.  We have clarified our discussion of the Army's use of reserve
volunteers. 

6.  As discussed in comment 2, the Secretary of Defense's Annual
Report characterizes the operations identified by DOD in this comment
as U.S.  forces acting in support of U.N.  peace operations.  We have
revised our report to exclude the E-3 AWACS aircraft used in the drug
interdiction program from our count of such aircraft used in peace
operations.  While we agree that participating in peace operations
provides aircrews valuable practical experience, as we discuss in
chapter 2, aircrews flying extended hours in these operations
sometimes do not get the opportunity to train to the broad range of
skills necessary for maintaining combat efficiency. 

7.  DOD does not believe that the use of significant percentages of
types of support units in Somalia represents the existence of a
shortfall in capabilities.  DOD states that substitute units or
capabilities are available in almost all cases and that recent
contingency operations, specifically the initial deployment of U.S. 
forces to deter potential Iraqi aggression against Kuwait while U.S. 
forces were involved in Haiti, verify the correctness of U.S.  force
posture.  Our report discusses the use of a large proportion of
certain types of support forces in Somalia that are designated for
early deployment to a MRC because there is a limited number of such
forces in the active component.  As DOD points out, there are options
available for some support missions, such as the use of contractors. 
However, these options may not be immediately available.  We discuss
several alternatives that would allow DOD to meet the demands of
peace operations while maintaining the capability to rapidly respond
to MRCs.  Until DOD takes steps to ease the strain on active duty
forces it will have to initially rely on active duty units to rapidly
respond to a MRC. 

8.  Our discussion focuses on the early availability of certain Army
support forces, Air Force specialized aircraft, and Army and Marine
Corps afloat prepositioned equipment.  We agree that infantry units
engaged in peace operations are likely to have adequate time to
redeploy to a MRC. 

9.  The changes in end strength have decreased the Army's flexibility
to provide more support units in areas of need.  The 13,000 person
decrement represents a net decrease in end strength for the active
component and the U.S.  Army Reserve--those components that provide
most of the Army's support units--and an increase in the Army
National Guard's end strength.  Within its increased end strength,
the National Guard is retaining more combat positions than it
retained under the base force.  Because of the decreases in end
strength in the active and U.S.  Army reserve components and the fact
that the increased National Guard end strength is being used to
retain combat positions, the Army has less flexibility for providing
more support units within its end strength. 

10.  We state that aircraft and aircrews could easily fly from one
operation to another and have revised the report to state that
forward deployment of U.S.  forces, including aircraft, can enhance
the ability to respond to regional conflicts.  Regarding redeploying
maintenance and logistics units from a peace operation to a MRC, we
state that the Air Force has not yet fully studied the airlift
implications of redeploying forces from a peace operation to a MRC
and hence could not quantify the impact of this delay on the Air
Force's ability to meet MRC deployment requirements.  We agree that
redeploying forces from one operation to another may not necessarily
increase lift requirements.  However, until DOD examines the lift
requirements for such redeployments, we believe that the specific
impact is unknown. 

11.  We have revised the report to reflect this information. 

12.  As discussed in chapter 3, our analysis comparing the support
capabilities needed in the first 30 days of a MRC with the
contingency support capabilities deployed to Somalia indicated that
in some cases 100 percent of some of these active component support
forces were used in Somalia. 

13.  We agree that feasibility, cost, and, impact of each option must
be considered.  Chapter 4 discusses some of the difficulties that
could be associated with these options and recognizes that there are
costs associated with them. 

14.  We are not making a blanket statement about the adequacy of
current force structure to respond to a MRC while U.S.  military
forces are engaged in a sizable peace operation or several smaller
ones.  Our report identifies certain limited capabilities that could
affect a timely response to a MRC and states that peace operations
have had less impact on other forces, such as Army armored combat
divisions and general purpose combat aircraft outside Europe.  As DOD
notes, U.S.  forces quickly responded to the possibility of Iraqi
aggression against Kuwait while U.S.  forces were engaged in Haiti. 
Since these events occurred after we had completed our audit work, we
were not in a position to analyze them. 

15.  DOD partially agrees with our recommendation, but it states that
it is addressing the matter we raise as part of Total Army Analysis
2003.  We believe that if this action is completed, it would meet the
intent of our recommendation and we have revised our recommendation
to reflect this. 


MAJOR CONTRIBUTORS TO THIS REPORT
========================================================== Appendix II


   NATIONAL SECURITY AND
   INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS DIVISION,
   WASHINGTON, D.C. 
-------------------------------------------------------- Appendix II:1

Jess T.  Ford, Associate Director
Steven H.  Sternlieb, Assistant Director
M.  Elizabeth Guran, Evaluator-in-Charge
Brenton E.  Kidd, Evaluator
Joseph W.  Kirschbaum, Evaluator
Lisa M.  Quinn, Evaluator


   EUROPEAN OFFICE, FRANKFURT,
   GERMANY
-------------------------------------------------------- Appendix II:2

Inez M.  Azcona, Senior Evaluator
David G.  Artadi, Evaluator