Index


Battlefield Automation: Requirements Need to Be Updated Before the Air Defense System Is Produced

(Letter Report, 09/22/94, GAO/NSIAD-94-213)


This report is based on GAO's follow-up review of the Army's efforts to
acquire a $1.1-billion command, control, and intelligence (C2I) system
as part of its forward area air defense system. This C2I system consists
of a ground-based sensor to detect and track aircraft and computer
hardware and software to process that information. Despite the Defense
Department's direction, the Army has not redefined the C2I system
requirements and may also award a $59-million low-rate initial
production contract before it receives the results of operational
testing. As a result, the Army could be committing to the procurement of
an unproven system that may not be justified.

--------------------------- Indexing Terms -----------------------------

 REPORTNUM:  NSIAD-94-213
     TITLE:  Battlefield Automation: Requirements Need to Be Updated 
             Before the Air Defense System Is Produced
      DATE:  09/22/94
   SUBJECT:  Army procurement
             Command/control/communications systems
             Air defense systems
             Combat readiness
             Warning systems
             Testing
             Military systems analysis
             Communications equipment
             Defense communications operations
             Defense appropriations
IDENTIFIER:  Forward Area Air Defense System
             FAADS C2I
             Soviet Union
             Warsaw Pact
             Avenger Missile System
             Air Defense Antitank System
             Bradley Fighting Vehicle
             Fiber Optic Guided Missile
             Army Rapid Force Projection Initiative
             Stinger Missile
             ADATS
             
**************************************************************************
* This file contains an ASCII representation of the text of a GAO        *
* report.  Delineations within the text indicating chapter titles,       *
* headings, and bullets are preserved.  Major divisions and subdivisions *
* of the text, such as Chapters, Sections, and Appendixes, are           *
* identified by double and single lines.  The numbers on the right end   *
* of these lines indicate the position of each of the subsections in the *
* document outline.  These numbers do NOT correspond with the page       *
* numbers of the printed product.                                        *
*                                                                        *
* No attempt has been made to display graphic images, although figure    *
* captions are reproduced. Tables are included, but may not resemble     *
* those in the printed version.                                          *
*                                                                        *
* A printed copy of this report may be obtained from the GAO Document    *
* Distribution Facility by calling (202) 512-6000, by faxing your        *
* request to (301) 258-4066, or by writing to P.O. Box 6015,             *
* Gaithersburg, MD 20884-6015. We are unable to accept electronic orders *
* for printed documents at this time.                                    *
**************************************************************************


Cover
================================================================ COVER


Report to Congressional Committees

September 1994

BATTLEFIELD AUTOMATION -
REQUIREMENTS NEED TO BE UPDATED
BEFORE THE AIR DEFENSE SYSTEM IS
PRODUCED

GAO/NSIAD-94-213

Battlefield Automation


Abbreviations
=============================================================== ABBREV

  COEA - cost and operational effectiveness analysis
  C2I - command, control, and intelligence
  DOD - Department of Defense
  FAAD - Forward Area Air Defense
  GBS - ground-based sensor
  LOSF - line-of-sight-forward
  LOSR - line-of-sight-radar
  LSDIS - Light and Special Division Interim Sensor
  NLOS - non-line-of-sight

Letter
=============================================================== LETTER


B-242246

September 22, 1994

The Honorable Sam Nunn
Chairman, Committee on Armed Services
United States Senate

The Honorable Daniel K.  Inouye
Chairman, Subcommittee on Defense
Committee on Appropriations
United States Senate

The Honorable Ronald V.  Dellums
Chairman, Committee on Armed Services
House of Representatives

The Honorable John P.  Murtha
Chairman, Subcommittee on Defense
Committee on Appropriations
House of Representatives

Because of continuing congressional interest about the cost,
schedule, and performance problems of the forward area air defense
(FAAD) system, we conducted a follow-up review focused on the Army's
efforts to acquire a $1.1- billion command, control, and intelligence
(C2I) system as part of its FAAD system.  The FAAD C2I system
consists of the ground-based sensor (GBS) to detect and track
aircraft and the computer hardware and software to process that
intelligence information. 

In our previous report,\1 we recommended that the Secretary of
Defense direct the Army to defer the GBS' low-rate initial production
until testing proved that it met performance requirements and a cost
and operational effectiveness analysis (COEA) justified the GBS as
the best alternative for meeting forward area air defense needs.  The
Department of Defense (DOD) concurred and directed the Army to take
corrective actions.  In addition, at the time of that review, the
Army was reevaluating its forward area air defense needs in light of
major changes in both the threat and the FAAD weapons it planned to
procure.  Responding to DOD concerns about program requirements, the
Army said a Division Air Defense Study would address and revise those
requirements, which are needed to form the basis for testing systems
and supporting the COEA. 


--------------------
\1 Battlefield Automation:  More Testing and Analysis Needed Before
Production of Air Defense Radar (GAO/NSIAD-93-175, July 30, 1993). 


   RESULTS IN BRIEF
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :1

Despite DOD's direction, the Army has not redefined the FAAD C2I
system requirements and may also award a $59- million low-rate
initial production contract before it receives the results of
operational testing.  As a result, the Army could be committing to
the procurement of an unproven system that may not be justified. 


   BACKGROUND
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :2

To protect soldiers and equipment at the front battle lines, the Army
needs air defense capabilities to detect and react to attacks by
hostile aircraft.  The Army plans to provide this capability through
the development, acquisition, and deployment of the FAAD C2I system. 
FAAD C2I, conceived in 1986 to counter the Warsaw Pact air threat
includes the FAAD C2I system and several air defense weapon systems. 
The Army has spent $516 million developing and producing the FAAD C2I
system and plans to spend another $586 million to complete
development and production.\2


--------------------
\2 The acquisition of the FAAD C2I system is broken into four blocks. 
The $516 million and $586 million are the development and production
costs for Blocks I and II.  The Army does not have a firm estimate
for either Block III, the objective system, or Block IV, a preplanned
improvement effort. 


   ARMY NEEDS TO UPDATE
   REQUIREMENTS
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :3

The massive Warsaw Pact air threat the FAAD C2I system was designed
to counter has changed to smaller, less capable regional threats.  In
addition, the weapon systems intended to work with the FAAD C2I
system have changed or been eliminated.  Nevertheless, the Army has
not updated the system's requirements.  While it did update
requirements for the forward area weapon systems, the Army plans to
rely on a COEA to update requirements for the C2I systems.  However,
the purpose of a COEA is to evaluate alternatives to meet recognized
defense needs, not to establish system requirements. 


      THREAT AND WEAPON SYSTEMS
      HAVE CHANGED DRAMATICALLY
---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :3.1

FAAD C2I system requirements most likely will change due to dramatic
differences in the threat it was intended to counter and the weapons
it was intended to work with.  With the dissolution of the Soviet
Union and breakup of the Warsaw Pact, the Defense Intelligence Agency
and the Army now believe the primary threat comes from various
regional hotbeds of conflict, such as Iraq or North Korea, which do
not have the air power of the former Soviet Union. 

Also, the FAAD C2I system was originally designed to counter the
numerous fixed-wing aircraft of the Warsaw Pact that constituted the
Cold War threat.  The Army's latest post-Cold War air defense
strategy for the forward area envisions Air Force fighter aircraft
countering the fast-moving fixed-wing threat, while the Army defends
against slow-moving helicopters and unmanned aerial vehicles.  The
diminished numbers and different types of aircraft the FAAD C2I
system is expected to counter raise questions about FAAD C2I system
requirements, such as the number of aircraft a sensor must be able to
track at one time or the range required to detect the aircraft. 
Figure 1 shows the change in the threat. 

   Figure 1:  Change in Forward
   Area Air Defense Threat

   (See figure in printed
   edition.)

The weapon systems intended to work with the FAAD C2I system also
have changed.  To date, the Army has fielded only one of the three
original planned weapons, the line-of-sight-rear (LOSR), the Avenger. 
This weapon was designed to use GBS data to protect rear assets
primarily from attacks by fixed-wing aircraft.  However, funds for
the Avenger were cut in the fiscal year 1995 budget planning efforts,
and the Army does not plan to buy additional Avengers after fiscal
year 1995.  Thus, the Army will possess only limited quantities of
this weapon system. 

The other two original weapons, the non-line-of-sight (NLOS) and
line-of-sight-forward (LOSF), were canceled because of cost concerns
and development problems.  The Army has not developed a replacement
for NLOS,\3 the fiber-optic guided missile, which was intended to
counter pop-up helicopters.  And instead of LOSF, the Air Defense
Antitank System, the Army has fielded the Bradley Stinger Fighting
Vehicle carrying teams of soldiers with shoulder-fired Stinger
missiles.  These are in addition to teams of foot soldiers equipped
with binoculars and shoulder-fired Stinger missiles that have always
been part of FAAD.  Figure 2 shows how the original weapon systems
concept has changed. 

   Figure 2:  FAAD Weapon Systems
   Have Changed

   (See figure in printed
   edition.)

These drastic changes raise serious concerns about whether the FAAD
C2I system requirements should remain unchanged.  Therefore, it may
be premature to commit to the planned development of sophisticated
software. 


--------------------
\3 The Army is developing an Enhanced Fiber Optic Guided Missile
system as a part of its Rapid Force Projection Initiative.  This
system addresses a requirement similar to NLOS.  It plans to
demonstrate the missile system in an Advanced Concept Technology
Demonstration scheduled for 1997, and production may or may not be an
outcome of that demonstration, according to the Rapid Force
Projection Initiative Program Manager.  The Army does not currently
have plans to buy more of the systems than those acquired for the
demonstration. 


      ARMY HAS NOT UPDATED THE
      FAAD C2I SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS
---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :3.2

The Army has not responded to changes in the threat or weapon systems
by updating the FAAD C2I system requirements.  During our prior
review of the GBS, Army air defense school officials told us they
planned to reexamine the entire FAAD C2I system concept and recommend
solutions in a Division Air Defense Study.  However, the study,
conducted in 1993, focused on FAAD weapon system capabilities and did
not update the FAAD C2I system requirements. 

According to the Division Air Defense Study Director, the Army did
not assess the FAAD C2I system requirements in the study because of
time and resource constraints.  The study director and the FAAD C2I
system project manager stated they were relying on an upcoming FAAD
C2I system COEA to assess requirements.  However, according to DOD
Instruction 5000.2, the purpose of a COEA is not to establish or
reassess requirements, but to identify the advantages and
disadvantages of alternatives being considered to meet recognized
defense needs. 

A requirements study, on the other hand, would allow the Army to
reassess the FAAD C2I system requirements in view of threat and
weapon system changes.  DOD Instruction 5000.2 mandates updates to
system requirements at key decision points during development and
acquisition.  One major reason for documenting requirements is to
avoid premature commitment to a system-specific solution. 


   ARMY WAS NOT FOLLOWING DOD
   PROCUREMENT GUIDANCE
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :4

In the past, the Army has not always followed DOD guidance for
procuring systems, and there is some doubt it will adhere to that
guidance with the FAAD C2I system.  In 1993, we reported that the
Army was developing and planned to procure the GBS without a COEA to
determine its suitability and without completing operational testing. 
In response to that report, DOD said it expected the Army to complete
a COEA by December 1994.  DOD also delayed funding initial production
of the GBS for 1 year to allow time to complete initial operational
testing of the integrated system. 

At the time we began this review, the Army still planned to award a
low-rate production contract before either the COEA or testing were
completed.  In April 1994, during this review, the GBS product office
decided to delay awarding a $59-million low-rate production contract
from November 1994 to January 1995, just a few months prior to the
full-scale production decision planned for April 1995.  The award
would be based on a December 1994 low-rate initial production
decision to comply with DOD direction.  A COEA and operational
testing are expected to be completed in December 1994.  However, it
is still uncertain that the COEA and operational testing will remain
on schedule.  The COEA study plan, for example, was supposed to be
approved by the Army's Study Advisory Group by January 1994, but as
of June 1994, the Army had received only limited approval of the
plan.  Similarly, in the past the schedule for operational testing
has slipped. 

The Army does not have a COEA to support acquisition of the GBS,
although one is required at acquisition milestones.  The Army began a
COEA for the GBS in April 1990, but suspended it in March 1992
because of changes in the threat and weapon systems.  A Directorate
of Combat Developments, Army Air Defense Artillery School,
representative stated that a COEA for the GBS was not feasible until
future air defense needs are defined.  The Army expected air defense
needs would be updated in the Division Air Defense Study.  However,
as stated above, that did not happen. 


   ARMY CONTINUES TO ACQUIRE
   SYSTEM DESPITE CHANGES
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :5

Regardless of the diminished threat and changes to the weapon
systems, the Army is fielding Block I, an interim configuration of
the FAAD C2I system, to light and special divisions.  The full-scale
production decision is planned for April 1995 for the GBS and Block
II of the FAAD C2I system. 

Block I includes the computer hardware and basic software to
interface with an interim sensor to detect aircraft and transmit air
track data via an interim radio system.  In September 1993, the 101st
Airborne Division (Air Assault), Fort Campbell, Kentucky, accepted
the first Block I system.  The Army plans to field additional Block I
systems to the 10th Mountain and 2nd Infantry Divisions in fiscal
year 1995 and to the 82nd Airborne Division in fiscal year 1996,
according to program officials. 

Block II, another interim system, is to build on the basic
capabilities in Block I, with the primary enhancements being improved
software and the GBS instead of the interim sensor.  The Army
considers Block III to be the objective FAAD C2I system with
sophisticated software and aircraft identification capabilities. 
Block IV is a preplanned product improvement to further enhance
communications and air battle management.  The Army has not
established firm cost estimates or timetables for Blocks III and IV. 


   RECOMMENDATION
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :6

Given the uncertainties that continue to surround the FAAD C2I system
acquisition, there is the potential for the Army to commit to an
unproven system that may not be justified.  Therefore, we recommend
that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of the Army to
defer any production and initial operational testing until the Army
(1) updates the requirements for both the GBS and FAAD C2I system and
(2) selects the best solution, based on a COEA, for satisfying the
updated requirements.  In addition, the Secretary of Defense should
direct the Secretary of the Army to cancel the planned low-rate
production decision because the full-scale production decision is
only a few months later and the Army's reason (training) for
initiating low-rate production is inconsistent with the purposes
specified in 10 U.S.C.  2400 for initiating low-rate initial
production.  This would allow more time to evaluate test results
before committing to production. 


   AGENCY COMMENTS AND OUR
   EVALUATION
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :7

While DOD agreed with much of the information in our report, it did
not agree with our recommendations.  DOD considers that the Army has
validated the requirements for the FAAD C2I system against the
current threat and changes in the air defense weapon systems.  It,
therefore, nonconcurred with our recommendation that the Army be
required to defer low-rate initial production and initial operational
testing until it has (1) updated the requirements for both the GBS
and FAAD C2I system and (2) selected the best solution, based on a
COEA, for satisfying those updated requirements.  DOD also noted that
the GBS is currently scheduled to undergo initial operational testing
in conjunction with the FAAD C2I system prior to the full-scale
production decision for both systems.  On this basis, DOD
nonconcurred with our recommendation that the Army be required to
complete initial operational testing of the selected system prior to
low-rate production. 

DOD stated that the Army revalidated the original FAAD C2I system
Block I and Block II (with the GBS) requirements with a "War Fighting
Lens Analysis," which is an internal Army array of weapon systems
needs and available funding.  In response to DOD's comments, we
examined the Army's "War Fighting Lens Analysis" and discussed it
with Army and DOD officials.  We found that while the "War Fighting
Lens Analysis" did revalidate the need for FAAD, it did not
revalidate or update the specific FAAD C2I system requirements.  DOD
also stated that the Division Air Defense Study validated the need
for a FAAD command and control system to support FAAD requirements in
the new post-Cold War environment.  It noted, however, that the
specific requirements for the system must be further defined. 
Therefore, while demonstrating a continued need for FAAD, the study
did not address the specific requirements for the FAAD C2I system
given the post-Cold War environment.  DOD also stated that it
believes that the COEA for the FAAD C2I system will provide an
analytical basis for updated requirements, at least for Block II for
the heavy division.  This position clearly demonstrates that the FAAD
C2I system requirements may have changed from the original
requirements because of changes in the threat and weapon systems.  It
also implies there is no current analytical basis or at least an
adequate analytical basis for the current FAAD C2I system
requirements. 

We believe this indicates that the Army and DOD have decided to
maintain the status quo rather than reanalyze and update the
definitive requirements that a post-Cold War air defense system
should satisfy.  Further, it seems inconceivable that the original
requirements, set in 1986 for a Cold War threat, have not changed in
some way because of (1) the current very different and diminished
threat and (2) the more limited set of weapon systems the FAAD C2I
system and GBS will work with.  But even when this issue is
realistically addressed, another issue remains and that is whether
DOD and the Army can afford the system given (1) reduced funding for
DOD and the services, (2) serious underfunding of DOD's own future
years defense program, and (3) a less costly sensor, the Light and
Special Division Interim Sensor, already in the field.  Also, relying
on a COEA that does not use analytically based, definitive
requirements could result in the Army prematurely committing to a
system-specific solution, which is contrary to DOD acquisition
guidance. 

Given these facts, we continue to believe that the Army has not
adequately updated the requirements for the FAAD C2I system and the
GBS to reflect changes in the threat and weapon systems to be
fielded.  We, therefore, believe that our recommendation on the
deferral of initial operational testing and production until updated
requirements are completed should still be implemented. 

DOD stated that it wanted to initiate low-rate production to procure
limited numbers of the GBS to support training needs.  However,
providing for training needs is not one of the three purposes
specified in 10 U.S.C.  2400 for initiating low-rate initial
production.  These purposes are (1) to provide production configured
or representative articles for operational test and evaluation, (2)
establish an initial production base for the system, and (3) permit
an orderly increase in the production rate for the system sufficient
to lead to full-rate production upon the successful completion of
operational test and evaluation.  However, the GBS low-rate initial
production decision would not appear to be required for any of these
reasons because the Army already has representative items for test,
and the system is composed of nondevelopmental items already in
production.  Therefore, low-rate production for testing articles, an
initial production base, or ramping up would not appear to be needed. 

DOD also noted that the full-scale production decision for the
systems is now scheduled for April 1995, just 4 months after the
December 1994 low-rate production decision.  Given this change in
schedule and the rationale for low-rate production, we have changed
our recommendation to include eliminating the low-rate production
decision from the Army's acquisition plan. 

DOD's comments and our responses are in appendix I. 


   SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :8

To determine whether the Army has updated the FAAD C2I system
requirements for the post-Cold War era, we reviewed DOD and Army
documents, including the Air Capabilities Study and the Division Air
Defense Study, which redefined the air threat to the forward area and
the concept for air defense in the post-Cold War era.  Also, we were
briefed by the Defense Intelligence Agency on the post-Cold War
threat to the forward area of the battlefield.  In addition, we
examined Army plans for an upcoming FAAD C2I COEA and reviewed DOD
and Army acquisition policy and guidance for system requirements and
COEAs. 

Because the FAAD C2I system is dependent upon integration with the
FAAD weapon systems, we also monitored the progress and problems of
programs, such as the Avenger and the Bradley Stinger Fighting
Vehicle weapon systems. 

We obtained information and held discussions with officials in the
following organizations in Huntsville, Alabama: 

  Air Defense Command and Control Systems Project Office;

  FAADS Sensors Product Office;

  FAADS Project Office;

Intelligence and Security Directorate, U.S.  Army Missile Command;
and

  Research, Development, and Engineering Center, U.S.  Army Missile
     Command. 


We also obtained information and held discussions with officials at
the

  Defense Intelligence Agency, Washington, D.C.;

  U.S.  Army Air Defense Artillery School, Fort Bliss, Texas;

  Headquarters, Department of Defense, Arlington, Virginia;

  Headquarters, Department of the Army, Arlington, Virginia;

  101st Airborne (Air Assault) Division, Fort Campbell, Kentucky; and

  U.S.  Army Training and Doctrine Command, Fort Monroe, Virginia. 

We performed our review from July 1993 through August 1994 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 


---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :8.1

We are sending copies of this report to the Director, Office of
Management and Budget; the Secretaries of Defense and the Army; and
other interested parties.  We will make copies available to others
upon request. 

Please contact me at (202) 512-4841 if you or your staff have any
questions concerning this report.  Major contributors to this report
are listed in appendix II. 

Louis J.  Rodrigues
Director, Systems Development
 and Production Issues




(See figure in printed edition.)Appendix I
COMMENTS FROM THE DEPARTMENT OF
DEFENSE
============================================================== Letter 



(See figure in printed edition.)

See comment 7. 



(See figure in printed edition.)



(See figure in printed edition.)



(See figure in printed edition.)



(See figure in printed edition.)



(See figure in printed edition.)



(See figure in printed edition.)



(See figure in printed edition.)



(See figure in printed edition.)



(See figure in printed edition.)

See comment 2. 



(See figure in printed edition.)



(See figure in printed edition.)


The following are GAO's comments on the Department of Defense's (DOD)
letter dated August 18, 1994. 


   GAO COMMENTS
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :9

1.  Our concern is that the requirements for the forward area air
defense (FAAD) command, control, and intelligence (C2I) system,
including the ground-based sensor (GBS), have not been updated.  As
stated in our report, the Army planned such a requirements update in
the Division Air Defense Study.  However, the study did not
specifically address FAAD C2I; it focused on the weapon system
capabilities.  In response to DOD's comments, we examined the Army's
"War Fighting Lens Analysis" and discussed it with Army and DOD
officials.  We found that while the "War Fighting Lens Analysis" did
revalidate the need for FAAD, it did not revalidate or update the
specific FAAD C2I system requirements.  Also, the upgrade of the
Required Operational Capability into an Operational Requirements
Document is essentially a format conversion and does not update
requirements.  The fact that the requirements outlined in the
original requirements document were not changed is discussed in DOD's
response to Finding C.  Further, in a January 4, 1993, memorandum,
DOD told the Army that it was concerned about requirements.  For
example, DOD stated, "The demise of the Warsaw Pact may have a
significant impact on the performance needed in a FAAD C2I system . 
.  .  .  However, the requirements have not yet been updated." The
appropriate time to update the requirements would have been during
the Division Air Defense Study.  But, as mentioned in our report,
this was not done. 

2.  We agree that a good cost and operational effectiveness analysis
(COEA) can be used to show the value that good target
detection/communications provide to the FAAD C2I system.  However, as
stated in our report, the purpose of a COEA is to evaluate
alternatives to meet established requirements, which DOD Instruction
5000.2 requires to be updated at key decision points during
development and acquisition.  DOD Instruction 5000.2 further states
that one of the major intents for documenting requirements is to
avoid premature commitment to a system-specific solution.  We
recognize that the COEA guidance provided by DOD provides for
analysis of alternatives.  However, these alternatives are different
variations of using the GBS and the Light and Special Division
Interim Sensor (LSDIS).  Our point is that the Army needs to develop
and update an analytically based list of definitive requirements that
a post-Cold War air defense system should have.  Relying on a COEA
without updated requirements could result in the Army prematurely
committing to a system-specific solution. 

3.  As discussed above, the Army has not updated FAAD C2I system
requirements.  However, it seems inconceivable that the original
requirements, set in 1986 for a Cold War threat, would not have
changed in some way because of (1) the current very different and
diminished threat and (2) the more limited set of weapon systems the
FAAD C2I system will work with.  Even so, DOD was not able to provide
us with an analysis supporting its position that the requirements
remain the same.  Also, as previously mentioned, this was not done in
the Division Air Defense Study. 

We agree that the threat has changed, and the change should have
influenced sensor requirements.  We would have expected the Division
Air Defense Study to have considered these changes and their
influence on FAAD C2I system requirements in an analytical framework. 
However, this was not done.  DOD's comment that the GBS is the system
being developed to meet these requirements is specifically what DOD
guidance is seeking to prohibit when it states that the services
should document requirements to avoid premature commitment to a
system-specific solution. 

4.  DOD's comment again assumes the GBS is the solution without an
analytical basis.  For example, if the Avenger is now required to be
more maneuverable, analysis might reveal that a more maneuverable,
less sophisticated air defense system meets current requirements. 
Planned enhancements to the Bradley Stinger Fighting Vehicle are
currently unfunded. 

5.  We recognize that the Army has already invested in and developed
software for the FAAD C2I system; these are sunk costs and efforts. 
However, a COEA performed using properly updated system requirements
may identify more cost-effective alternatives than the currently
selected FAAD C2I system.  Additionally, DOD's comment about the
unacceptable alternative of going back to binoculars and voice radio
for air defense implies that there are only two possible outcomes to
the COEA process and completely disregards the existence of the LSDIS
and other available sensors. 

6.  We disagree that the Division Air Defense Study "fully considered
and found essential" the Block I and II requirements and resulting
capabilities.  However, the study, conducted in 1993, focused on FAAD
weapon systems capabilities and did not update the FAAD C2I system
requirements.  According to the Division Air Defense Study Director,
the Army did not assess the FAAD C2I system requirements in the study
because of time and resource constraints.  The study director and
FAAD C2I system project manager stated they were relying on an
upcoming FAAD C2I COEA to assess requirements.  However, according to
DOD Instruction 5000.2, the purpose of a COEA is not to establish or
reassess requirements, but to identify the advantages and
disadvantages of alternatives being considered to meet recognized
defense needs.  In all analyses, the study assumed the existence of
the objective FAAD C2I system.  Perhaps this was good enough to
establish the need for some sort of automated command and control
system, but, in our opinion, it was not sufficient for drawing
conclusions regarding specific requirements for that system. 

7.  DOD's position that ".  .  .  the [Division Air Defense] study
director did not concentrate on validating requirements for the
Forward Area Air Defense Command and Control System as, in fact, it
was planned to do this during the DOD directed cost and operational
effectiveness analysis," contradicts DOD's position in its response
to Finding B that the purpose of a COEA is not to establish system
requirements.  DOD asserts that FAAD C2I system requirements have
been updated.  DOD, on the other hand, states that the COEA, ".  .  . 
will provide an analytical basis for updated requirements .  .  ."
(see p.  17, para.  2), implying that requirements have not been
updated. 

8.  As an indication that DOD has not managed the program as
effectively as possible, we noted that a January 4, 1993, memorandum
from the DOD to the Army stated that the influence of a reduction in
the threat and FAAD C2I requirements needed to be studied.  However,
this was not done.  As a second example, in an October 13, 1993,
letter from DOD to GAO, DOD said that it would defer the initial
production decision for the GBS to allow time for sufficient test and
evaluation of the integrated system.  However, the Army is now
planning to make a low-rate initial production decision before the
results from the integrated tests are completed and evaluated.  Also,
DOD's assertion that the Army is managing the program in accordance
with DOD guidance is contradicted by the fact that the Army is
planning for low-rate production for a reason clearly not within the
purposes given for initiating low-rate production in 10 U.S.C.  2400. 
Additionally, the COEA, the initial operational test and evaluation,
and the Defense Acquisition Board meeting have all slipped, lending
credence to our concerns about the uncertainty that future efforts
will remain on schedule. 

9.  We did recognize the initial fielding of a Block I system.  Our
point is that the Army continues to acquire a system without
definitizing requirements.  Also, the DOD contradicted itself by
asserting that the schedule for a full-scale production decision--
the milestone III decision--in April 1995 provides time for the Army
to "update requirements." This indicates that requirements have not
yet been updated.  We agree that a requirements update, along with
the COEA, should be accomplished prior to the full-scale production
decision. 

10.  We continue to believe that the Army needs to establish
definitive requirements for the FAAD C2I system, including the GBS,
before proceeding with acquisition.  We believe, and we have stated
in the report and in comments above, that a systematic analysis of
requirements is essential to the acquisition of this system. 

11.  We have changed our report and recommendation to reflect DOD's
comments that the low-rate initial production decision is now
scheduled for December 1, 1994, and a full-scale production decision
is scheduled for April 1995.  Given these changes and potential
problems with meeting the revised milestones, we have changed our
recommendation to state that the low-rate initial production decision
should be deleted entirely, and DOD and the Army should wait for the
full-scale production decision, a delay of a few months. 

DOD stated that it wanted to begin low-rate initial production to
procure limited numbers of the GBS to support training needs. 
However, providing for training needs is not one of the three
purposes specified in 10 U.S.C.  2400 for initiating low-rate initial
production.  The three purposes are (1) to provide production
configured or representative articles for operational test and
evaluation, (2) establish an initial production base for the system,
and (3) permit an orderly increase in the production rate for the
system sufficient to lead to full-rate production upon the successful
completion of operational test and evaluation.  The GBS low-rate
initial production decision will not meet any of these criteria
because the Army already has representative items for test.  Also,
the system is composed of nondevelopmental items already in
production.  Therefore, deleting low-rate initial production will not
hurt development of the system.  Also, the Army does have the LSDIS
and other sensors. 


MAJOR CONTRIBUTORS TO THIS REPORT
========================================================== Appendix II


   NATIONAL SECURITY AND
   INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS DIVISION,
   WASHINGTON, D.C. 
-------------------------------------------------------- Appendix II:1

Bruce H.  Thomas


   NEW YORK REGIONAL OFFICE
-------------------------------------------------------- Appendix II:2

William L.  Wright


   ATLANTA REGIONAL OFFICE
-------------------------------------------------------- Appendix II:3

Allan C.  Richardson
Erin B.  Baker
Pamela A.  Scott