Index

Conventional Arms Transfers: U.S. Efforts to Control the Availability of
Small Arms and Light Weapons (Letter Report, 07/18/2000,
GAO/NSIAD-00-141).

Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided information on
government to government transfers of U.S. small arms and light weapons,
focusing on: (1) U.S. government monitoring and reporting policies
regarding small arms and light weapons transfers; (2) the steps the U.S.
government is taking at the international level to address the
availability of small arms and light weapons; and (3) lessons identified
regarding weapon collection programs.

GAO noted that: (1) the U.S. government has guidance, procedures, and
regulations for monitoring and reporting U.S. conventional arms
transfers to foreign recipients, including small arms and light weapons;
(2) both the Department of State and Department of Defense (DOD) are
responsible for monitoring U.S. conventional arms transfers; (3) DOD has
the principal responsibility for monitoring government to government
arms transfers, while State licenses and monitors commercial arms
exports; (4) the Departments' monitoring activities include reviewing
proposed transfers to foreign recipients and verifying that recipients
of U.S. conventional arms receive and use these weapons as intended; (5)
State and DOD must notify Congress prior to conventional arms transfers,
if such transfers either meet or exceed specific dollar thresholds, and
provide an annual report on the aggregate dollar value and quantity of
all conventional arms that have already been transferred to recipients;
(6) in response to the international concern about the availability of
small arms and light weapons in areas of conflict, the U.S. government
has taken the lead in: (a) creating international standards for
governments to prevent illicit small arms transfers, including helping
to negotiate the first regional agreement designed to prevent and combat
illicit firearms trafficking in the the Western Hemisphere; (b)
establishing mechanisms to govern small arms transfers, such as
strengthening export control procedures and complying with arms
moratoriums; (c) developing diplomatic initiatives with other nations
and multilateral organizations, such as the United Nations and the
European Union's "Statement of Common Principles on Small Arms and Light
Weapons"; and (d) helping other nations to destroy their excess weapons
as the United States did in Liberia; (7) case studies of weapon
collection programs conducted in other countries, such as buyback
programs, have identified lessons that could be applied by governments
or nongovernmental and international groups to future programs' design;
and (8) although DOD officials recognize the need to incorporate these
factors into their weapon collection program, there currently is no
department guidance concerning how to implement these lessons within
Department-managed weapon collection programs.

--------------------------- Indexing Terms -----------------------------

 REPORTNUM:  NSIAD-00-141
     TITLE:  Conventional Arms Transfers: U.S. Efforts to Control the
	     Availability of Small Arms and Light Weapons
      DATE:  07/18/2000
   SUBJECT:  Federal aid to foreign countries
	     Foreign governments
	     International cooperation
	     Arms control agreements
	     Firearms
	     Reporting requirements
	     Internal controls
IDENTIFIER:  Haiti
	     Liberia
	     Panama
	     Army Operation Just Cause

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GAO/NSIAD-00-141

Appendix I: U.S. Small Arms and Light Weapons Transfers,
Fiscal Years 1996-98

24

Appendix II: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

26

Appendix III: Comments From the Department of Defense

29

Appendix IV: Comments From the Department of State

30

Table 1: Examples of Weapon Collection Programs Conducted
in Other Countries, 1995-99 17

Table 2: 14 Key Tasks for Implementing Weapon Collection
Programs 19

Table 3: Top 25 Recipients of U.S. Small Arms and Light Weapons Authorized
or Delivered for Fiscal Years 1996-98 25

Figure 1: Dollar Value of U.S. Small Arms and Light Weapons
Authorized or Delivered for Fiscal Years 1996-98 24

DOD Department of Defense

National Security and
International Affairs Division

B-285207

July 18, 2000

The Honorable Dianne Feinstein
United States Senate

Dear Senator Feinstein:

The widespread availability of small arms and light weapons in regions of
conflict1 is a matter of concern among governments and nongovernmental and
international organizations. Small arms include pistols, revolvers, and
machine guns, while light weapons include such items as grenade launchers
and man-portable missiles.2 Although it is impossible to estimate the
quantity of small arms and light weapons in circulation worldwide, the
international community believes that the availability of these relatively
inexpensive weapons contributes to regional instability, facilitates crime,
jeopardizes peacekeeping operations, and hinders economic development in
conflict areas. U.S. government policy objectives on U.S. conventional arms
transfers (that is, their sale, grant, lease, license, or loan through the
Departments of State and Defense) are designed to meet legitimate defense
needs of friends and allies, in support of U.S. national security and
foreign policy interests. The policy objectives are also aimed at
restraining arms transfers that may be destabilizing or threatening to
regional peace and security. You expressed concern about U.S. small arms and
light weapons transfers, both commercial and government to government, and
steps being taken by the U.S. government to reduce their availability in
areas of conflict.

As agreed with your office, this report provides information on (1) U.S.
government monitoring and reporting policies regarding small arms and light
weapons transfers, (2) the steps the U.S. government is taking at the
international level to address the availability of small arms and light
weapons, and (3) lessons identified regarding weapon collection programs.

To address the report's objectives, we obtained documents and information
from U.S. government agencies, such as the Departments of State, Defense,
and the Treasury; international organizations such as the United Nations;
and nongovernmental organizations such as the British American Security
Information Council, the Bonn International Centre for Conversion, the
Federation of American Scientists, Human Rights Watch, the International
Peace Research Institute, the Monterey Institute of International Studies,
and representatives of the firearms industry. We summarized data and other
information from weapon collection studies and conducted analysis of agency
reports submitted to Congress. In addition, a separate evaluation of the
Department of Defense post-delivery review process for foreign military
sales is being conducted to determine the sufficiency of the Department's
monitoring process.3 For a complete discussion of our scope and methodology,
see appendix II.

The U.S. government has guidance, procedures, and regulations for monitoring
and reporting U.S. conventional arms transfers to foreign recipients,
including small arms and light weapons. Both the Departments of State and
Defense are responsible for monitoring U.S. conventional arms transfers. The
Department of Defense has the principal responsibility for monitoring
government to government arms transfers, while the State Department licenses
and monitors commercial arms exports. The Departments' monitoring activities
include reviewing proposed transfers to foreign recipients (pre-delivery
checks) and verifying that recipients of U.S. conventional arms receive
and/or use these weapons as intended
(post-delivery checks). The Departments of State and Defense must notify
Congress prior to conventional arms transfers, if such transfers either meet
or exceed specific dollar thresholds, and provide an annual report on the
aggregate dollar value and quantity of all conventional arms that have
already been transferred to recipients.

In response to the international concern about the availability of small
arms and light weapons in areas of conflict, the U.S. government has taken
the lead in (1) creating international standards for governments to prevent
illicit small arms transfers, including helping to negotiate the first
regional agreement designed to prevent and combat illicit firearms
trafficking in the Western Hemisphere, (2) establishing mechanisms to govern
small arms transfers, such as strengthening export control procedures and
complying with arms moratoriums, (3) developing diplomatic initiatives with
other nations and multilateral organizations, such as the United Nations and
the European Union's "Statement of Common Principles on Small Arms and Light
Weapons," and (4) helping other nations to destroy their excess weapons as
the United States did in Liberia.

Case studies of weapon collection programs conducted in other countries,
such as "buyback" programs, have identified lessons that could be applied by
governments or nongovernmental and international groups to future programs'
design. According to experts, these case studies show that a failure to
adopt a comprehensive approach, including setting realistic goals and
providing appropriate incentives, results in programs encountering
implementation problems. Although Department of Defense officials recognize
the need to incorporate these factors into their weapon collection programs,
there currently is no department guidance concerning how to implement these
lessons within Department-managed weapon collection programs.

This report recommends that the Department of Defense develop guidance,
based on a comprehensive approach, for conducting future weapon collection
programs. In written comments on a draft of this report, the Department
generally agreed with the report's content and recommendation.

According to a variety of government, international, and nongovernmental
sources,4 over the past few years there has been an increase in the
availability, accumulation, and uncontrolled transfer of small arms and
light weapons. Although no universally accepted definition of small arms and
light weapons currently exists, most experts agree that small arms are those
weapons manufactured to military specifications and designed for use by one
person (such as an AK-47 rifle), whereas light weapons are those used by
several persons working as a crew (such as a man-portable missile system).
Small arms and light weapons are readily available, cheap to acquire, and
need minimal maintenance and training to operate. Moreover, the number and
type of small arms and light weapons available, even within regions of
conflict, are unknown.

A 1997 U.N. report states that the excessive and destabilizing accumulation
and transfer of small arms and light weapons are closely related to the
increased incidence of internal conflicts and high levels of crime and
violence.5 Since 1989, Africa has experienced more armed conflict than any
other continent and is perhaps the region most affected by small arms and
light weapons proliferation, according to the U.S. State Department.
According to the U.N. report, ineffective governmental control, open
borders, and the lack of resources and information inhibit the region's
ability to contend with the small arms problem. Also, in Eastern Europe, the
collapse of the former Soviet Union has led to the greater availability of
small arms and light weapons outside of government control. In 1998, the
Secretary of State stated that the uncontrolled flow of arms, ammunition,
and explosives into tense areas of the world, particularly Africa, is a
serious international problem and called for greater global efforts to
restrain transfers of these items to regions of conflict.

The U.S. Conventional Arms Transfer Policy announced in February 1995
advocates promoting restraint, both by the United States and other
suppliers, in transfers of conventional weapons that may be destabilizing or
dangerous to international peace. At the same time, it provides for
transfers that meet legitimate defense requirements of U.S. friends and
allies, in support of U.S. national security and foreign policy interests.

Both direct commercial sales and government-to-government U.S. conventional
arms transfers are controlled under U.S. law. The Arms Export Control Act6
and the Foreign Assistance Act 7 establish licensing, monitoring, and
reporting requirements for U.S. conventional arms transfers, which include
small arms and light weapons. Under the authority of the Arms Export Control
Act, the State Department, through its Office of Defense Trade Controls,
issues export licenses for the commercial sale of munitions items.8 This act
also permits the Department of Defense (DOD) to transfer U.S. defense
articles, services, and training to eligible foreign governments through its
Foreign Military Sales program.

For fiscal years 1996 through 1998,9 the United States authorized or
delivered $3.7 billion in small arms and light weapons to 154 nations
through direct commercial sales; foreign military sales; or other transfers,
including grants and "drawdowns" from Department of Defense stocks.10 In
keeping with its conventional arms policy, the United States transferred
most of its small arms and light weapons to its friends and allies,
including Egypt, Germany, Israel, Japan, Saudi Arabia, Taiwan, and the
United Kingdom. Such transfers ranged from ammunition and small caliber
handguns to machine guns and Stinger missiles. (See app. I for more details
on U.S. small arms and light weapons transfers for fiscal years 1996-98.)
The United States is a major supplier of all types of conventional arms
worldwide, according to government and nongovernmental sources. Most
government and nongovernmental officials with whom we spoke, however,
indicated that American small arms found in regions of conflict were
primarily acquired illicitly or recycled from U.S. involvement in war, such
as Vietnam.

Light Weapons Transfers

The U.S. government has guidance, procedures, and regulations for monitoring
and reporting U.S. conventional arms transfers to foreign recipients,
including small arms and light weapons. Both the Departments of State and
Defense are responsible for monitoring U.S. conventional arms transfers. The
Department of Defense has the principal responsibility for monitoring
government-to-government arms transfers, while the State Department licenses
and monitors commercial arms exports.11 The Departments' monitoring
activities include reviewing proposed transfers to foreign recipients
(pre-delivery checks) and verifying that recipients of U.S. conventional
arms receive and/or use these weapons as intended
(post-delivery checks). The Departments of State and Defense must notify
Congress prior to conventional arms transfers, if such transfers either meet
or exceed specific dollar thresholds, and provide an annual report on the
aggregate dollar value and quantity of all conventional arms that have
already been transferred to recipients. Congress may not receive prior
notification of small arms and light weapons transfers if their dollar
values are lower than the established notification thresholds. In addition,
the legislation does not require the executive branch to specifically
identify which transfers include items classified as small arms and light
weapons.

Consistent with requirements in law, the State Department conducts
monitoring of commercial weapon transfers to recipients of concern12 in
order to deter and detect violations of law. Specifically, under its "Blue
Lantern" program, the State Department conducts pre- and post-delivery
checks. State's program, as implemented by its Office of Defense Trade
Controls, applies 20 specific criteria or "flags" to determine when the need
for "end-use monitoring" (either or both pre- and post-delivery review) is
needed. These criteria reflect concerns about (1) a customer (for example,
the customer or purchasing agent is reluctant to provide foreign end-use or
end-user information); (2) an end-user (for example, the requested equipment
does not match the known requirements or current inventory of the foreign
end-user); or (3) a shipment (for example, a private intermediary is
involved in the export, particularly in sales involving major weapon
systems, end-user, or shipper activities). In general, State Department
officials, who specialize in certain commodities and have developed an
institutional knowledge of firms and types of transactions that may be
suspicious or in violation of U.S. export law, initiate "Blue Lantern"
requests. These requests are generally used to verify end-users and are
implemented by State and other officials at U.S. embassies.

A 1996 amendment to the Arms Export Control Act13 established a program that
requires, to the extent practicable, monitoring of U.S. arms transfers by
providing "reasonable assurance" that recipients comply with U.S. government
export control requirements regarding the use, transfer, and security of
defense articles and services. As a result of the amendment, DOD reviewed
State's "Blue Lantern" standards and determined that it had equivalent
pre-delivery controls in place.

DOD, however, concluded that additional standards were needed to monitor
government-to-government transfers after their delivery. Consequently, DOD
established five additional conditions to be used as standards for
conducting post-delivery checks in its December 1996
end-use monitoring guidance. The additional standards call for conducting
post-delivery reviews when (1) there is an indication that a recipient
country has violated section 3 of the Arms Export Control Act14 (for
example, a retransfer of U.S.-provided defense items took place without U.S.
government permission); (2) a recipient country develops substantial defense
or other ties with countries whose interests are not compatible with those
of the United States; (3) significant and unusual political or military
upheaval is impending or has occurred in a recipient country;
(4) countries unfriendly to the United States in the recipient's region are
illicitly seeking U.S. equipment or support items of the type held by the
end-user; or (5) substantial problems or weaknesses are found during a
security survey of the recipient country conducted for a General Security of
Military Information Agreement.15 The one condition that requires DOD to
conduct a mandatory post-delivery check occurs when the State Department
reports to Congress a possible end-use or transfer violation under section 3
of the Arms Export Control Act. If one or more of the five conditions are
suspected to have occurred, then DOD's Security Assistance Offices16 located
at U.S. embassies overseas are to conduct a post-delivery check.

Independent of these five standards, DOD through its Security Assistance
Offices, conducts end-use checks of man-portable missile systems because DOD
has a special requirement to monitor transfers of these systems.
Man-portable missile systems include Stinger missiles and are considered
light weapons.17 In addition, the Security Assistance Offices conduct
end-use checks of items transferred under the State Department's
International Narcotics Control Program. Such items include small arms and
light weapons.

Under section 655 of the Foreign Assistance Act, as amended,18 the
Departments of State and Defense are to submit an annual report to Congress
on the aggregate dollar value and quantity of all defense articles and
services, and military education and training authorized by the United
States to other countries. Prior to the enactment of a 1999 law, State's
reporting on direct commercial sales of conventional arms reflected only
authorized exports, not actual shipments, whereas DOD provided actual
delivery information on the sale, grant, or drawdown of such weapons to
Congress. The Foreign Relations Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 2000 and
200119 mandates that exporters now provide shipment information to the State
Department for inclusion in its reports.

Under section 36 of the Arms Export Control Act, DOD is required to notify
Congress about sales of major defense equipment,20 defense articles,21 or
services22 to foreign countries and international organizations, when those
sales exceed certain cost thresholds.23 Similarly, the State Department must
notify Congress of any license to export major defense equipment, defense
articles or services the cost of which exceeds established thresholds.24
Congressional notification requirements established under this section
rarely capture small arms and light weapons transfers, as few have large
enough dollar values to trigger the notification requirements. However,
there are exceptions. When some transfers of small arms and light weapons,
such as Tow and Stinger missile systems, fall within the range of the
established notification dollar values, then Congress is notified of such
transfers.

Under section 3 of the Arms Export Control Act, if the President (through
the State Department) makes a determination that a possible end-use or
transfer violation may have occurred, he must then provide a report to
Congress. Between June 1975 and January 1999, 39 reports based on possible
section 3 violations were provided to Congress, including
7 involving small arms and light weapons. These seven reports cover eight
small arms cases. In all eight cases, recipient countries failed to receive
approval from the United States before transferring small arms-related
defense articles to third parties. Of the eight cases, four provided an
explanation of how such violations were resolved, while the remaining four
failed to indicate the final outcomes.

2001--Reporting Requirements

The Foreign Relations Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 2000 and 2001
mandates and requests additional reporting requirements for small arms and
light weapons transfers and modifies current reporting on conventional
weapons transfers. Specifically, the law requires the Secretary of State to
submit a detailed report to Congress on various aspects of small arms
proliferation by May 2000 and requests a report to Congress on the U.S. arms
licensing process, including data on small arms licenses. To date, neither
report has been submitted to Congress, but State has prepared a draft for
the required report on small arms proliferation. Another provision of the
law now requires exporters to report all shipment information to State for
all items on the U.S. Munitions List (which include small arms and light
weapons) 15 days after their export. Prior to the enactment of this law,
State's reporting on direct commercial sales reflected only authorized
exports, not actual shipments of items on the munitions list, as did DOD's
reports to Congress. This new reporting provision is designed to address
that problem.

The United States has developed an initiative intended to help promote
security in regions of conflict. This initiative includes efforts to reduce
illicit sales of small arms and light weapons; to improve, among other
factors, the legal transparency (openness) of sales; to establish diplomatic
initiatives; and to provide resources for weapon destruction programs.

The U.S. initiative on small arms and light weapons is intended to help
promote security in regions of conflict and close down illicit arms markets.
Accordingly, the executive branch approach encompasses a number of
wide-ranging measures to address the illicit transfers of small arms to
regions of conflict. The Chairman of the executive branch interagency
working group on small arms and firearms issues25 summarized the U.S.
government's initiative as four overarching steps, including the following:

 Creating international standards to control illicit trafficking in small
arms. The Organization of American States' 1997 Convention Against the
Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms26 is designed to
prevent, combat, and eradicate illicit trafficking in firearms, ammunition,
and explosives in the Western Hemisphere. The United States played a
leadership role in negotiating the convention, the first regional agreement
to address the small arms issue. By the end of calendar year 2000, the
United States hopes to have completed a global protocol that would build
upon and globalize the standards set forth in the Organization of American
States' Convention. Examples of such standards include (1) establishing
licensing regimes, where needed;
(2) developing common weapons marking and tracing practices; and
(3) encouraging more transparent or open arms transfer practices.

 Establishing mechanisms to govern small arms transfers. The United States
is encouraging other governments to strengthen export control procedures and
enforcement for arms transfers and to comply with international arms
moratoriums and embargoes. For instance, the United States wants other
governments to be more transparent or open in monitoring and reporting their
small arms exports so that baseline data can be collected to estimate small
arms transfers worldwide. Another example is to have governments review all
transfers and not approve transfers of weapons to conflict areas, such as
the U.S. government does in the cases of Angola, the Democratic Republic of
the Congo, Ethiopia, and Eritrea.27

 Establishing diplomatic initiatives. The United States is working with
multilateral organizations and other nations (such as the United Nations,
the Organization of American States, the European Union, the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in
Europe, the Wassenaar Arrangement,28 various African regional organizations,
and Norway) to help address the proliferation of small arms. For example, in
December 1999, the United States and the European Union released a statement
of "common principles" in which they pledged to observe restraint in their
export policies and harmonize their export policies and procedures governing
small arms. Both agree that a comprehensive approach--incorporating law
enforcement, arms control, and security--is needed to address the small arms
issue and recognize the importance of effective national controls for arms
brokering and transparency measures with regard to small arms transfers.

 Providing resources to help other countries destroy their excess weapons.
According to State Department officials, providing such assistance can play
an important role in securing peace in regions of conflict. To this end, the
U.S. government has already provided experts and monies to destroy small
arms and light weapons in Liberia, Haiti, and the former Yugoslavia. For
example, in Liberia, the U.S. government, along with other nations, provided
$300,000 to help destroy some 18,000 weapons, including light mortars,
grenades, and ammunition. To assist other states in weapon destruction
projects, the State Department has requested $4.8 million in funding as part
of its budget request for fiscal year 2001, but the request has not yet been
funded.

The Secretary of State has said that although the United States is
undertaking these measures to address the availability of small arms and
light weapons in regions of conflict, the international community must
develop an integrated and comprehensive response.29 Consensus appears to be
emerging within the international community over the causes and multifaceted
impact of uncontrolled small arms and light weapons transfers and over
responses needed, yet unresolved issues both at the domestic and
international levels can hinder the achievement of U.S. goals. For example,
government, nongovernment, and international sources have identified these
problems:

 Definitional disagreements make consensus difficult concerning which types
of arms to control. Differences exist between the terms "small arms and
light weapons" and "firearms." The U.N. definition focuses on those weapons
manufactured to military specifications and designed for personal use or use
by several persons. The Organization of American States' definition of
"firearms" is broader and refers to any barreled weapons that will or is
designed to or may be readily converted to expel a bullet or projectile by
the action of an explosive. This distinction between small arms and firearms
also exists within the U.S. government.30

 The unknown scope of both legal and illicit small arms transfers makes
designing effective responses difficult. Only limited transparency or
openness exists over legal transfers.31 According to government and
nongovernment experts, increased openness is crucial for governments to
monitor small arms exports and establish baseline estimates.

 While the United States helped to negotiate the Organization of American
States' Convention, the first regional agreement to address the small arms
and light weapons proliferation issue, the United States and other major
signatories have not yet ratified the agreement.32 Progress in reaching
future agreements also involves resolving differences among foreign
governments and nongovernmental organizations concerning the degree of
regulation required for small arms transfers. Some supplier nations,
particularly China, Russia, certain Eastern European states, and the U.S.
domestic firearms industry and sporting organizations, have expressed
concerns that restrictions not be overly stringent. In contrast, countries
such as Canada and Norway and nongovernmental organizations involved with
humanitarian and arms control issues are concerned that proposed measures
will not be stringent enough.

There have been a number of weapon collection programs implemented in
various countries. Table 1 contains a listing of weapon collection programs
that have been conducted in other countries. These programs are viewed as a
way in which governments, communities, and individuals can reduce illegal
and surplus weapons. Through such collection efforts, individuals and groups
are encouraged to turn in weapons, usually for noncash incentives or,
sometimes, for money. Local and national governments, nongovernmental
groups, international groups, and the U.S. military in a variety of
situations, including U.N. peacekeeping operations in Africa and Central
America, and post-conflict situations in Panama and Haiti, have organized
and conducted weapon collection programs. Judging the success of weapon
collection programs is difficult and controversial because of the lack of
knowledge about the total number of weapons available and the appropriate
collection goal. According to State Department officials, experts involved
with buyback programs admit that while such programs have symbolic value,
they are not an especially effective or robust means of recovering weapons.
Nevertheless, countries believe that the symbolic aspect of weapon buyback
programs warrants their continuation.

(Continued From Previous Page)

  Country       Sponsor              Date          Incentives      Weapons
                                                    offered      collected

 Russia     Tatar           September 1995         Cash        No information
            government                                         available

 PhilippinesPhilippine Army April 1996             Cash        81 high-powered
                                                               war materials
                                                   New         200,000
 Iran       Iranian         September 1996         firearms    unregistered
            government
                                                   permits     weapons

 Lesotho    Lesotho         October 1996           Amnesty     No information
            government                                         available

 Colombia   Colombian       December 1996          Food        250 weapons
            government                             vouchers

 Taiwan     Taiwanese       February 1997          Amnesty     780 weapons
            police
                                                               100,400 rifles;
                                                               253,000
 Croatia    United Nations  February 1997          Cash        antitank
            peacekeepers
                                                               launchers;
                                                               6,271 grenades
                                                               Over 400 small
 Myanmar    Myanmar         February 1997          Amnesty     and heavy
            government
                                                               weapons
            Christian                                          800 guns and
 Mozambique Council of      March 1997             Goods and   24,000
            Mozambique                             tools       armaments

            Patriotic       March 1997 (Second     Vouchers    Over 3,000 in
 El SalvadorMovement        phase of program       redeemable  1996; Over
            Against Crime   started in 1996)       for goods   2,000 weapons
                                                   and food    in 1997
 Dominican  Dominican                                          No information
 Republic   government      April 1997             Amnesty     available
                                                               7,963 rifles
                                                               and machine
 Croatia    United Nations                                     guns; 1,922
 −    Transnational                                      antitank rocket
 Eastern    Administration  August 1997            Cash        launchers,
 Slovenia   in Eastern                                         cannons, and
            Slovenia                                           surface-to-air
                                                               missile
                                                               launchers
                                                               Over 5,000
 Albania    Albanian        August−September Amnesty     weapons; 3,289
            government      1997
                                                               grenades

 Australia  Australian      September 1997         Cash        600,000
            government                                         firearms
 Central    Central African
 African    Republic        October 1997           Amnesty     1,372 light and
 Republic   government                                         heavy weapons
            Patriotic
            Movement                                           Since 1996,
            Against         February 1998                      6,634 arms
                                                               including
 El SalvadorDelinquency     (continuation of       Food        pistols,
            with assistance program started in     coupons
            from the        1996)                              rifles, and
            Organization of                                    explosives
            American States                                    collected
            Nicaraguan
            government with
 Nicaragua  support from    April 1998             Land        No information
            France, Canada,                                    available
            and Sweden
                                                               6,000 small
 Albania    United Nations  January 1999           Development arms; 100 tons
                                                   projects
                                                               of ammunition

Sources: GAO summary of information obtained from the Monterey Institute of
International Studies, the Institute for Security Studies, the United
Nations, the Bonn International Centre for Conversion, and the British
American Security Information Council.

Experts from a variety of nongovernmental and international organizations33
who have implemented and studied weapon collection programs in various
countries have identified a number of lessons that could be learned from
their experiences. For example, case studies of weapon collection programs
demonstrate that a comprehensive approach, one that considers multiple
factors (such as the economic, social, and cultural background of the area),
and employs a number of key tasks such as (1) determining appropriate
incentives and (2) establishing program goals and objectives tailored to the
specific case, is essential. The experts who have studied weapon collection
programs have concluded that, without such a comprehensive approach, weapon
collection programs could encounter problems that might otherwise be
avoided. These lessons have been compiled in a guide for small arms and
light weapons collection, entitled Tackling Small Arms and Light Weapons: A
Practical Guide for Collection and Destruction.34 Table 2 summarizes 14 key
tasks that these experts have concluded need to be considered when setting
up a weapon collection program.

(Continued From Previous Page)

              Task                               Description
                                  The current economic, social,
                                  psychological, and cultural conditions in
                                  which weapons will be exchanged need to
                                  be assessed to determine whether it is
                                  feasible to implement a weapon collection
                                  program. Consideration should be given to
 Conducting a feasibility         factors such as community demographics,
 assessment                       economic factors, levels of crime and
                                  violence, quality of law enforcement and
                                  judicial systems, the specific types of
                                  weapons causing the problem and the
                                  sources of supply, and the laws that
                                  govern the possession and use of small
                                  arms.
                                  Realistic goals must be established at
                                  the outset so everyone is clear as to the
                                  objectives and for evaluation of the
                                  project. Selecting program objectives can
                                  be affected by several factors. First,
 Establishing program goals and   various parties may agree to support the
 objectives                       program in pursuit of different
                                  objectives. Second, objectives that
                                  participants say they are pursuing may be
                                  quite different from what they really
                                  hope to achieve. Third, objectives may be
                                  directly or indirectly related to weapons
                                  collection.
                                  To increase the likelihood that the
                                  program will accomplish its primary goals
 Integrating the weapon           and objectives, they should be integrated
 collection program with other    and coordinated with other programs that
 programs                         address not only reducing the number and
                                  visibility of weapons but also the larger
                                  aims of human security and development.
                                  One of the keys to a successful weapon
                                  collection program is providing the
                                  appropriate incentives for those citizens
                                  who will voluntarily turn in their
                                  weapons. They must be incentives that do
 Choosing appropriate incentives  not detract from the program's goals or
                                  create additional problems. Examples
                                  include vouchers for food, clothing, and
                                  other goods needed by the population;
                                  tools for trades or agriculture; and
                                  cash.
                                  A weapon collection program can be
                                  organized in any number of ways,
                                  including (1) local government in
                                  collaboration with local civil society
                                  groups including the private sector; (2)
 Organizing a weapon collection   local civil society groups with the
 program                          assistance of local and/or national
                                  governments, especially the police or
                                  military to receive and destroy weapons;
                                  and (3) national government in
                                  collaboration with civil society groups-
                                  local, national, or international.
                                  It is necessary to understand the current
                                  laws and regulations in the area where
                                  the weapon collection program is to be
                                  conducted. In some countries or
                                  provinces, providing an amnesty requires
 Considering legal factors        amending existing statutes or even
                                  constitutions. In others, carrying
                                  firearms in public may be prohibited, and
                                  regulations must be amended or suspended
                                  to allow people to participate in the
                                  program.
                                  Based on the feasibility assessment and
                                  program objectives, planners must decide
                                  which types of weapons can and should be
                                  turned in. Factors to be considered are
 Establishing the types of        the weapons' lethality or
 weapons to be collected          destructiveness, their perceived
                                  proliferation or pervasiveness, the risk
                                  of improper use or harm to untargeted
                                  people or objects, and the specific
                                  individuals or groups that are supposed
                                  to hand in weaponry.
                                  Weapon collection programs are most
                                  likely to succeed when they enjoy strong
                                  support across the political spectrum.
                                  Depending on the size, scale, and
                                  geographic scope of a specific program,
 Obtaining funding and support    resources are needed for compensating
                                  staff; renting facilities; arranging
                                  transportation, incentives, publicity,
                                  and promotion; and providing storage. In
                                  many cases, resources are obtained from a
                                  mix of cash and material contributions or
                                  offset by volunteers.
                                  A clear delineation of the area of the
                                  weapon collection program is critical.
                                  Making clear who is in charge and who is
                                  eligible to participate will avoid
                                  problems of intermediaries and weapons
                                  traders coming to the program from
 Selecting an appropriate         outside the community. The site for a
 location                         program should most often be a location
                                  other than a military base or police
                                  station. Especially in communities where
                                  the police are not trusted and/or for
                                  those programs that hope to collect
                                  illegal weapons, alternate venues are
                                  preferable.
                                  The duration of a weapon collection
                                  program is dependent on many factors,
                                  including the amount of funds raised, the
                                  size of the program, the expectations of
                                  organizers, and the logistical realities.
                                  Programs can range from 1 day to 1 year
 Determining the length and       or more. Sometimes these programs are
 timing                           annual events. Timing is important,
                                  because most weapon collection programs
                                  occurred in post-conflict situations such
                                  as in Haiti and Panama or after a
                                  shocking incident involving the use of
                                  weapons. There should be a clear
                                  deadline.
                                  Publicity is key to maximizing the number
                                  of participants and therefore the number
                                  and types of weapons turned in. This is
                                  especially true for programs in which one
                                  of the primary objectives is to increase
                                  awareness regarding gun violence and
 Attracting publicity             mishaps due to improperly stored or
                                  secured firearms in the home. All types
                                  of media-print, television, radio, and
                                  Internet (if existing and appropriate) -
                                  should be utilized, with the focus on
                                  that forum to which the majority of the
                                  people in the community have access.
                                  Even when the types of weapons to be
                                  accepted in a particular program are
                                  established, care should be taken to make
 Developing weapon turn-in        sure that all weapons are operable and
 procedures                       unloaded. Even in the case of amnesty and
                                  anonymity, serial numbers should be
                                  recorded before destruction. A qualified
                                  technical person should be present at all
                                  times.
                                  In many instances, weapon collection
                                  programs include a destruction component
                                  to dispose of the weapons collected. This
                                  can be done to prevent the weapons turned
 Establishing destruction plans   in from recirculating and to provide
 and process                      evidence of this to the program
                                  participants and collaborators. A program
                                  can handle the destruction of weapons in
                                  a variety of ways. In all cases, the
                                  weapon should be documented as to type,
                                  serial number, condition, etc.
                                  By their nature, weapon collection
                                  programs are very high profile and can be
                                  controversial. The citizens of the
                                  community, the governments involved, and
                                  the sponsors and funders will all demand
 Evaluating the program           to know the results of the program.
                                  Therefore, the evaluation component of
                                  the program must be part of the initial
                                  plan. In this section of the plan,
                                  documentation is developed for both
                                  auditing and evaluation purposes.

Source: Tackling Small Arms and Light Weapons: A Practical Guide for
Collection and Destruction (Program on Security and Development by the
Monterey Institute of International Studies and the Bonn International
Centre for Conversion, Feb. 2000).

DOD, through the U.S. Army, has conducted weapon collection programs in
Panama and Haiti. During Operation JUST CAUSE in Panama in 1989 and 1990,
the U.S. Army used a "money for weapons" incentive designed to affect the
confiscation of unauthorized weapons. Over 10,000 rifles, shotguns, pistols,
and grenades were turned in at a cost of over $1 million. According to army
after-action reports, however, commanders in the field believed the buyback
program had limited success because the local civilian population was
already turning in large numbers of weapons before the program went into
effect. Afterwards, the local population turned in a few weapons at a time
in order to collect more reward money. Commanders also felt that many of the
weapons turned in were not the type of weapons that they were seeking. The
after-action report on the Panama operation recommended that in future
weapon collection efforts, more consideration should be given to whether a
money for weapons program is actually feasible.

The U.S. Army's experience in Haiti was similar to its experience in Panama.
U.S. Army commanders who were involved with the planning and execution of
the gun buyback program during the 1994-95 Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY in
Haiti told us that the program was ineffective. The goals of the program
were to (1) reduce the number of weapons,
(2) promote stability, and (3) provide monetary incentives to Haitian
citizens who supported the program. According to the after-action report on
the Haiti operation, a total of 9,915 items, including 3,389 weapons, were
purchased by the United States at a total cost of $1.8 million. U.S. Army
commanders have said the program was a "dismal failure" in reducing the
number of weapons and achieving a secure and stable environment. The weapons
turned in were old and unusable and not the type of weapons that could be
used against U.S. and other multinational forces. U.S. Army commanders have
identified several sources for the shortfalls in the program. First, there
were no initial goals for the number of arms to collect. Second, while
information provided by higher headquarters indicated there were large
numbers of weapons in the military and civilian population, such a level of
weapons was not seen. Finally, no assessment of the social, cultural, and
political environment was done prior to the inception of the buyback
program. According to U.S. Army commanders, a weapon buyback effort should
be considered only after the ground commander does such an assessment to
determine the program's feasibility or is provided reliable current
assessments from higher headquarters. They suggested that a 30- to 60-day
evaluation period would be appropriate to determine whether a weapon buyback
program would be viable.

DOD has recognized the need to incorporate lessons it has identified into
its weapon collection or buyback programs. U.S. Army commanders and other
Army officials who were involved with weapon collection programs in Panama
and Haiti concluded that a comprehensive approach looking at a variety of
economic, social, and cultural factors is needed for the conduct of a
successful weapon collection program. Specific factors the commanders and
officials identified to help assure a successful weapon collection program
include (1) conducting a feasibility assessment,
(2) setting realistic goals for each program, and (3) providing appropriate
incentives. Current U.S. military doctrine or field manuals provide no
guidance in this area. The U.S. Army Center for Lessons Learned proposed
that doctrine and procedures be incorporated into DOD guidance for weapon
collection programs; however, DOD has no immediate plans to do so.

Current U.S. military doctrine and field manuals provide no guidance on
conducting weapon collection programs. Based on the experiences of the U.S.
Army in conducting buyback programs in Panama and Haiti and the studies
conducted of weapon collection programs worldwide, DOD lacks procedures for
conducting such programs in post-conflict areas.

To more effectively conduct weapon collection programs in the future, we
recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct that guidance, based on a
comprehensive assessment and approach, be developed for implementing weapon
collection programs.

In written comments on a draft of this report, the Defense Security
Cooperation Agency of the Department of Defense generally agreed with the
report's content and recommendation. The agency stated it would examine the
requirement for involvement in weapon collection programs and promulgate
guidance as appropriate. The Bureau of International Narcotics and Law
Enforcement Affairs, Department of State, also provided written comments and
generally agreed with the contents of the report. Department of Defense and
State written comments are reprinted in their entirety as appendixes III and
IV, respectively. The Department of the Treasury chose not to provide
comments on the report. The Customs Service, the Department of Defense, and
the Department of State provided technical comments that were incorporated
as appropriate.

We are sending copies of this report to interested congressional committees
and the Honorable William S. Cohen, Secretary of Defense; the Honorable
Madeline K. Albright, Secretary of State; the Honorable Lawrence H. Summers,
Secretary of the Treasury; and Raymond W. Kelly, Commissioner of the U.S.
Customs Service. Copies will be made available to others upon request.

If you have any questions concerning this report, please call me at
(202) 512-4128 or Boris L. Kachura, Assistant Director, at (202) 512-3161.

Sincerely yours,
Harold J. Johnson, Associate Director
International Relations and Trade Issues

U.S. Small Arms and Light Weapons Transfers, Fiscal Years 1996-98

For fiscal years 1996 through 1998, the United States authorized or
delivered35 $3.7 billion in small arms and light weapons to 154 nations
through direct commercial sales, foreign military sales, or other transfers,
including grants and drawdowns. Consistent with its arms policy, the United
States transferred most of these items to its friends and allies including
Egypt, Germany, Israel, Japan, Saudi Arabia, Taiwan, and the United Kingdom.
Such small arms and light weapons transfers ranged from ammunition and small
caliber handguns to machine guns and Stinger missiles. Figure 1 shows the
dollar values for direct commercial sales and foreign military sales,
including grants and drawdowns, of small arms and light weapons for fiscal
years 1996-98. Tables 3 illustrates the top 25 recipient countries (based on
the dollar value) of U.S. small arms and light weapons transfers (authorized
direct commercial sales and delivered foreign military sales combined) for
fiscal years 1996-98.

Dollars in millions

Source: GAO summary and analysis of data provided by the Departments of
Defense and State.

 Recipient country     Total     Authorized direct Delivered foreign
                                 commercial sales   military sales
 Japan             $621,377,579  $621,377,579      0
 United Kingdom    548,267,268   548,201,182       $66,086
 Israel            257,053,723   234,983,364       22,070,359
 Germany           247,643,469   247,387,806       255,663
 Saudi Arabia      167,679,235   154,967,890       12,711,345
 Norway            122,101,526   122,101,526       0
 Sweden            105,013,927   105,013,927       0
 Taiwan            100,158,877   68,818,003        31,340,874
 Belgium           96,580,420    96,580,420        0
 Egypt             90,073,176    33,607,413        56,465,763
 Australia         84,573,761    84,548,707        25,054
 Switzerland       81,398,677    81,398,677        0
 Venezuela         76,311,076    76,311,076        0
 South Korea       73,163,814    73,142,502        21,312
 France            70,382,532    70,382,532        0
 Italy             70,036,440    69,843,769        192,671
 Philippines       68,535,982    66,353,287        2,182,695
 Thailand          64,224,312    61,065,684        3,158,628
 Turkey            59,746,809    52,349,950        7,396,859
 Netherlands       58,447,275    52,780,257        5,667,018
 Mexico            48,749,506    48,749,506        0
 Spain             47,858,498    46,652,154        1,206,344
 Argentina         47,065,049    47,028,839        36,210
 Greece            41,260,888    34,086,501        7,174,387
 Brazil            33,487,195    26,461,544        7,025,651

Source: GAO summary and analysis of data provided by the Departments of
Defense and State.

Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

At the request of Senator Diane Feinstein, we obtained information on
(1) U.S. government monitoring and reporting policies regarding small arms
and light weapons transfers, (2) the steps the U.S. government is taking at
the international level to address the availability of small arms and light
weapons, and (3) lessons identified regarding weapon collection programs.

To obtain information on how the U.S. government monitors small arms and
light weapons transfers, we reviewed legislation, including the Foreign
Assistance Act, Arms Export Control Act, and applicable U.S. regulations and
guidance. We interviewed officials from the Department of the Treasury,
including the U.S. Customs Service, and visited the Bureau of Alcohol,
Tobacco, and Firearms' Gun Tracing Center in West Virginia. We met with
officials and obtained documents from the Department of State, specifically
the Office of Defense Trade Controls that implements State's "Blue Lantern"
end-use monitoring program. Specifically, we obtained data on pre- and
post-delivery checks for small arms and light weapons transfers conducted
under the Blue Lantern program for fiscal years 1997-99. We also met with
officials and obtained documents from the Defense Department's Defense
Security Cooperation Agency, which is responsible for the Department's
end-use monitoring program. Through the Defense Security Cooperation Agency,
we queried Security Assistance Offices at 22 U.S. posts overseas via the
Internet to obtain information on the extent of their end-use monitoring
activities and procedures for government to government transfers of small
arms and light weapons. Specifically, we contacted the posts in Bolivia,
Brazil, Denmark, the Dominican Republic, Egypt, Estonia, Germany, Greece,
Guinea-Bissau, Israel, Italy, Japan, Korea, Latvia, Lithuania, Morocco, the
Netherlands, Oman, Switzerland, Taiwan, Thailand, and Turkey. We selected
the posts in those countries that were the recipients of U.S. small arms and
light weapons transfers for fiscal years 1996-98. We received written
responses from all of the posts contacted except for Morocco.

To identify executive branch reporting requirements for small arms and light
weapons, we reviewed legislation including the Foreign Assistance Act, the
Arms Export Control Act, and the Foreign Relations Authorization Act for
Fiscal Years 2000 and 2001. We obtained and reviewed various documents,
including reports and notification letters from the State Department and the
Department of Defense that are required under the Arms Export Control Act
and the Foreign Assistance Act. For fiscal years 1996 through 1998, we
compiled our own database for U.S. transfers (authorized and delivered) of
small arms and light weapons based on State and Department of Defense
reports, required under section 655 of the Foreign Assistance Act, and other
documents. In compiling the database of U.S. small arms and light weapons
transfers, we defined small arms and light weapons primarily based on the
United Nations' definition. State and Defense officials, however, provided
us with separate, detailed lists of those items that each defines as small
arms and light weapons.

To determine what is known about the extent of small arms and light weapons
transfers and the steps the U.S. government is taking to address such
transfers, we met with and acquired information from various international,
governmental, and nongovernmental officials from the United Nations; the
Departments of Defense, State, and the Treasury; the Central Intelligence
Agency; the Federation of American Scientists; Human Rights Watch; the
British American Security Information Council; the Monterey Institute of
International Studies; the International Peace Research Institute; the
Institute for Research on Small Arms in International Security; and
representatives of the firearms industry and lobby. We also attended
periodic meetings between the State Department and the nongovernmental
organizations on the issue of small arms and light weapons transfers and
U.S. efforts to address the issue. To obtain information on the extent of
small arms and light weapons transfers worldwide, we obtained and reviewed
documents from the Bonn International Centre for Conversion, the
International Action Network on Small Arms, the Norwegian Initiative on Arms
Transfers, the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, the
Institute for Security Studies, and the Red Cross. We also interviewed
officials and collected information on U.S. efforts to address small arms
transfers from the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, the Bureau of
International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, and the Interagency
Working Group on Small Arms and Light Weapons within the State Department;
and the Treasury Department, including the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and
Firearms and the U.S. Customs Service.

To obtain information on "lessons learned" regarding weapon collection and
"buyback" programs, we focused on (1) reviewing numerous written studies on
weapon collection programs conducted in other countries and in the United
States, (2) meeting with and interviewing acknowledged experts in the area,
and (3) acquiring information from knowledge centers on the issue. We met
with and interviewed officials from the National Defense University and the
Departments of Defense and State. We attended a September 1999 conference on
the policies and practices of small arms and light weapons disarmament
sponsored by the Fafo Institute of Applied Social Science, in Montreal,
Canada. At this conference, we met with and interviewed experts involved
with weapon collection efforts in Mozambique, El Salvador, Albania, and
Sierra Leone. We also traveled to Fort Bragg, North Carolina, to meet with
U.S. Army Special Operation Command officers who were involved with the U.S.
buyback programs in Haiti. In addition, we spoke with officials from the
U.S. Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Command at Fort Bragg and the
Center for Lessons Learned and the Combat Studies Institute, U.S. Army
Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. We also
reviewed written after-action and historical reports on Operation JUST CAUSE
in Panama and Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY in Haiti.

We performed our work from January 1999 through May 2000 in accordance with
generally accepted government auditing standards.

Comments From the Department of Defense

Comments From the Department of State

(711407)

Figure 1: Dollar Value of U.S. Small Arms and Light Weapons
Authorized or Delivered for Fiscal Years 1996-98 24

Table 1: Examples of Weapon Collection Programs Conducted
in Other Countries, 1995-99 17

Table 2: 14 Key Tasks for Implementing Weapon Collection
Programs 19

Table 3: Top 25 Recipients of U.S. Small Arms and Light Weapons Authorized
or Delivered for Fiscal Years 1996-98 25
  

1. Regions of conflict and post-conflict include such areas as sub-Saharan
Africa, the Balkans, and Central America.

2. For the purposes of our review, we are using the United Nations'
definition of small arms and light weapons. Small arms are those weapons
manufactured to military specifications and designed for use by one person,
whereas light weapons are those used by several persons working as a crew.
Ammunition and explosives needed for small arms and light weapons are also
included in the definition.

3. At the request of the Chairman, House Committee on International
Relations, we are currently examining the Defense Department's end-use
monitoring program for all U.S. government-to-government conventional arms
transfers and expect to issue our report in late August 2000.

4. These sources include statements and documents obtained from officials at
U.S. agencies such as the Departments of State and the Treasury,
international organizations such as the United Nations, and various
nongovernmental organizations such as the British American Security
Information Council, the Bonn International Centre for Conversion, the
Federation of American Scientists, Human Rights Watch, the International
Peace Research Institute, the Monterey Institute of International Studies,
and others including representatives from the firearms industry and related
organizations.

5. Report of the Panel of Government Experts on Small Arms as requested by
the U.N. General Assembly and issued in August 1997.

6. 22 U.S.C. section 2751.

7. 22 U.S.C. section 2151.

8. Munitions items are those designed, developed, configured, adapted, or
modified solely for military applications.

9. At the time of our review, complete fiscal year 1999 data was not
available.

10. If the President determines that an emergency exists that cannot be met
under the Arms Export Control Act or any other authority, then he may direct
the drawdown of U.S. defense articles, services, or training from DOD
stocks. 22 U.S.C. section 2318

11. Also, the Commerce Department licenses and monitors most dual-use
items--those items with both civilian and military uses.

12. Recipients of concern include governments, suppliers, individuals, and
so forth, whose cases are suspicious prior to the issuance of an export
license or have a need to establish proof of appropriate end-use.

13. Section 40A of the Arms Export Control Act was added by section 150 of
Public
Law 104-164 (110 Stat. 1436), codified at 22 U.S.C. section 2785.

14. Under section 3, when the President (through the State Department) makes
a determination that a possible end-use or retransfer violation may have
occurred, he must then promptly provide a report to Congress. 22 U.S.C.
section 2753(c)(2).

15. To assure that the recipient government will protect classified military
information in a manner equivalent to that provided by the United States
itself, a General Security of Military Information Agreement is signed
between the United States and the recipient country.

16. Security Assistance Offices are located at U.S. embassies overseas and
are responsible for end-use monitoring of U.S.-origin defense equipment and
services. Such offices include all DOD personnel located in a foreign
country with responsibilities for administering security assistance
management functions.

17. According to DOD's Defense Security Cooperation Agency, a worldwide
baseline inventory, completed in December 1999, accounted for most, but not
all, of the missiles and identified security concerns at some locations. DOD
is investigating to reconcile these discrepancies.

18. 22 U.S.C. section 2415.

19. The full name of the act is the Admiral James W. Nance and Meg Donovan
Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 2000 and 2001, Public Law
106-113, App. G, 113 Stat. 1501A-405.

20. The Arms Export Control Act defines "major defense equipment" as any
item of significant military equipment on the U.S. Munitions List having a
nonrecurring research and development cost of more than $50 million, or a
total production cost of more than
$200 million. 22 U.S.C. section 2794(6).

21. The Arms Export Control Act defines "defense article" broadly as
including weapons, weapons systems, munitions or other implements of war;
items used for the purposes of making military sales; items necessary for
manufacturing, producing, or using any defense article; and any component or
part of any defense article described. 22 U.S.C. section 2794(3).

22. The Arms Export Control Act defines "defense service" as generally
including any service, inspection, or technical or other assistance used for
making military sales. 22 U.S.C. section 2794(4).

23. The cost thresholds are: for an offer to sell major defense equipment,
$1 million, and before an offer for sale is made, $14 million. For defense
articles or services, $50 million before an offer for sale is made. 22
U.S.C. section 2776(a) and (b)(1).

24. For licenses to export major defense equipment, $14 million; for defense
articles or services, $50 million. 22 U.S.C. section 2776(c).

25. This interagency working group consists of representatives from a number
of U.S. government agencies, including the State Department, DOD, and the
Treasury.

26. In November 1997, the General Assembly of the Organization of American
States adopted the Inter-American Convention Against the Illicit
Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Ammunition, Explosives, and
Other Related Materials.

27. In response to the problem of small arms trafficking in Africa, the
United States also provided technical assistance to the small arms
moratorium on the import, export, and manufacturing of small arms in West
Africa.

28. The Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls and Conventional Arms and
Dual-Use Goods and Technologies is comprised of 33 member states who seek,
through their national policies, to ensure that arms transfers of these
items do not contribute to the development or enhancement of military
capabilities that undermine these goals.

29. Remarks of U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, made before the
United Nations in September 1999.

30. While DOD has compiled a specific listing of items it defines as small
arms and light weapons, the State Department and the U.S. law enforcement
community (that is, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms) apply the
broader definition of firearms.

31. The United States publicly reports detailed information on its transfers
of conventional arms that include small arms and light weapons, through the
Departments of Defense and State. The governments of Canada, the
Netherlands, Norway, South Africa, Sweden, and the United Kingdom have begun
providing limited data on their small arms shipments.

32. The President transmitted the Convention to the Senate in April 1998.

33. Our sources include experts from the Bonn International Centre for
Conversion, the Institute for Security Studies, the Monterey Institute of
International Studies, the United Nations, and the British American Security
Information Council.

34. This is a joint publication of the Program on Security and Development
at the Monterey Institute of International Studies and the Bonn
International Centre for Conversion, February 2000.

35. Authorized refers to the approved licenses for direct commercial sales
approved by the State Department and delivered refers to the actual
deliveries provided by the Defense Department through foreign military
sales. As discussed earlier in the report, the Foreign Relations and
Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 2000 and 2001 addresses this reporting
difference between the Departments by mandating that exporters now provide
actual shipment information to the Department of State.
*** End of document. ***