FAS | Military Analysis | GAO |||| Index | Search |

Peace Operations: Update on the Situation in the Former Yugoslavia
(Briefing Report, 05/08/95, GAO/NSIAD-95-148BR).

Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided information on the
situation in the former Yugoslavia, focusing on: (1) progress in
resolving the conflict in Croatia and Bosnia; and (2) the United
Nations' effectiveness in carrying out Security Council mandates in
these countries.

GAO found that: (1) little progress has been made in resolving the
conflict in Croatia and Bosnia; (2) the Croatian Serbs still demand an
independent state within Croatia, and the recognized Croatian government
demands control of its occupied territory; (3) in Bosnia, the Serbs
control 70 percent of the territory and no territory has been returned
to the Bosnian government as proposed in the international peace plan;
(4) thousands of Bosnians have been killed since the conflict began,
widespread human rights violations have been committed, guilty parties
have not answered for their crimes, and fighting continues; (5) the
United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) has effectively carried out
mandates leading to lasting peace in the former Yugoslavia, however
UNPROFOR lost some credibility as a peacekeeping force after attacks
occurred there in April and December 1994; (6) UNPROFOR ineffectiveness
in deterring attacks nearly prevented Croatia from agreeing to United
Nations (UN) mandates and was due to its dependence on the cooperation
of warring parties and unwillingness to request air support; and (7)
some UN actions have been more effective, but if UNPROFOR withdraws from
the former Yugoslavia, many humanitarian efforts will be curtailed or

--------------------------- Indexing Terms -----------------------------

     TITLE:  Peace Operations: Update on the Situation in the Former 
      DATE:  05/08/95
   SUBJECT:  International organizations
             International relations
             Military intervention
             United Nations
             Federal aid to foreign countries
             International cooperation
             Political rights
IDENTIFIER:  Yugoslavia
             Bihac (Bosnia)
             Gorazde (Bosnia)
             Sarajevo (Bosnia)
* This file contains an ASCII representation of the text of a GAO        *
* report.  Delineations within the text indicating chapter titles,       *
* headings, and bullets are preserved.  Major divisions and subdivisions *
* of the text, such as Chapters, Sections, and Appendixes, are           *
* identified by double and single lines.  The numbers on the right end   *
* of these lines indicate the position of each of the subsections in the *
* document outline.  These numbers do NOT correspond with the page       *
* numbers of the printed product.                                        *
*                                                                        *
* No attempt has been made to display graphic images, although figure    *
* captions are reproduced. Tables are included, but may not resemble     *
* those in the printed version.                                          *
*                                                                        *
* A printed copy of this report may be obtained from the GAO Document    *
* Distribution Facility by calling (202) 512-6000, by faxing your        *
* request to (301) 258-4066, or by writing to P.O. Box 6015,             *
* Gaithersburg, MD 20884-6015. We are unable to accept electronic orders *
* for printed documents at this time.                                    *

================================================================ COVER

Briefing Report to the Majority Leader, U.S.  Senate

May 1995



Peace Operations

=============================================================== ABBREV

  CAS - Close air support
  CSCE - Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe
  ECOSOC - Economic and Social Council
  JNA - Yugoslav National Army
  KSA - Krajina Serb Army
  NATO - North Atlantic Treaty Organization
  PVO - Private Vountary Organizations
  UNCRO - United Nations Confidence Restoration Operation in Croatia
  UNPREDEP - United Nations Preventive Deployment Force
  UNHCR - United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
  UNPA - United Nations Protected Area
  UNPROFOR - United Nations Protection Force

=============================================================== LETTER


May 8, 1995

The Honorable Robert Dole
Majority Leader
United States Senate

Dear Senator Dole: 

As requested, we are providing you an update on the situation in the
former Yugoslavia.\1 Specifically, you asked us to assess (1)
progress in resolving the conflict in Croatia and Bosnia- Herzegovina
(hereafter referred to as Bosnia) and (2) the United Nation's
effectiveness in carrying out Security Council mandates in these
countries.  On April 3, 1995, we briefed your staff on the results of
our work.  This report presents the information provided at that

\1 This report follows up on some issues discussed in our 1994
report, Humanitarian Intervention:  Effectiveness of U.N.  Operations
in Bosnia (GAO/NSIAD-94-13BR, Apr.  13, 1994). 

------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :1

War began in the former Yugoslavia in June 1991, after two of its
republics--Slovenia and Croatia--declared their independence. 
Serbia, the largest republic of the former Yugoslavia and in control
of the Yugoslav National Army (JNA), forcibly tried to prevent the
other republics from becoming independent.  The JNA assisted the
Croatian Serbs and fought against the new Croatian government.  After
fierce fighting, Serbia and Croatia signed an unconditional
cease-fire in November 1991.  In February 1992, the U.N.  Security
Council established the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR)
and mandated it to help (1) supervise the withdrawal of the JNA and
demilitarize the areas in Croatia occupied by the Croatian Serbs, (2)
return the displaced who fled from their homes in these areas, and
(3) monitor human rights in these areas.  UNPROFOR in Croatia was
authorized primarily under Chapter VI of the U.N.  Charter, which
allows only peaceful means to carry out mandates. 

In March 1992, the Bosnians voted for independence, and fighting
broke out among the new Bosnian government and Bosnian Serbs who were
opposed to independence.  Bosnian Serbs quickly captured most of the

In June 1992, the United Nations and the United States recognized
Croatia and Bosnia as independent states.  The U.N.  Security Council
then extended UNPROFOR's mission to Bosnia, and over the past 3 years
has mandated UNPROFOR to (1) facilitate and protect the delivery of
humanitarian aid; (2) use necessary means, including air power from
regional organizations, to deter attacks against six safe areas
(i.e., areas, such as Sarajevo to be protected against armed attacks
and any other hostile actions); and (3) other actions to support an
environment leading to peace.  Most of UNPROFOR's activities in
Bosnia, such as deterring attacks on safe areas, are authorized under
Chapter VII of the U.N.  Charter, which allows forceful means to
carry out mandates. 

------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :2

Little progress has been made in resolving the major issues of
conflict in Croatia and Bosnia.  In Croatia, fundamental differences
divide the warring parties.  The Croatian Serbs still demand an
independent state within Croatia, and the internationally recognized
Croatian government demands control of its occupied territory.  The
Croatian Serbs still maintain an army with heavy weapons and fighter
planes and face the Croatian government along confrontation lines. 
In Bosnia, the Bosnian Serbs control 70 percent of the territory and
no territory has been returned to the Bosnian government, as proposed
in the international peace plan.\2 Moreover, many thousands of
Bosnians have been killed since the beginning of the conflict;\3
widespread human rights violations have been committed; and the
guilty parties have not answered for their crimes.  As of May 1995,
fighting continues in Bosnia. 

UNPROFOR has been ineffective in carrying out mandates leading to
lasting peace in the former Yugoslavia.  In Croatia, UNPROFOR was
unable to demilitarize the territory controlled by the Croatian
Serbs, return displaced persons to their homes, or prevent the use of
Croatian territory for attacks on Bosnia.  In Bosnia, UNPROFOR made
an assertive stand with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
to protect Sarajevo in February 1994.  However, UNPROFOR lost
credibility as a peacekeeping force when it

  requested little NATO air support after Gorazde was attacked in
     April 1994, and Bosnian Serbs killed civilians, shelled the
     hospital, and took peacekeepers hostage and

  failed to deter attacks on the Bihac area in December 1994, when
     Bosnian and Croatian Serbs launched air and missile attacks on
     the area, wounded several U.N.  peacekeepers, and killed one. 

As a result of UNPROFOR's ineffectiveness, Croatia announced in
January 1995 that it would not agree to a renewal of UNPROFOR's
mandate.  Croatia only recently agreed to a new U.N.  mandate that
authorizes peacekeepers to monitor Croatia's international borders
and internal confrontation lines. 

UNPROFOR's limited effectiveness to deter attacks and provide
protection stems from an approach to peacekeeping that is dependent
on the consent and cooperation of the warring parties.  Although
UNPROFOR has authority to use force, it tries to negotiate when
attacked, and has called sparingly for NATO air support.  UNPROFOR
has requested NATO close air support five times for limited purposes
during attacks on U.N.  personnel and safe areas.  The effectiveness
of this approach has been minimal and the lack of consistent
assertive response to aggression has left UNPROFOR little

In some areas, U.N.  actions have been more effective.  The U.N. 
High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), in coordination with
UNPROFOR, international humanitarian organizations, and allied
operations, has provided food for thousands living in the region over
the past several winters.  For its part, UNPROFOR monitors the
situation on the ground, maintains roads, and escorts convoys to the
safe areas.  UNPROFOR previously escorted many aid convoys, but U.S. 
diplomatic initiatives helped bring about a Bosnian federation of
Muslims and Croats, which allows convoy deliveries to many parts of
Bosnia without protection.  UNPROFOR also operates Sarajevo airport
and undertakes confidence-building measures, such as joint patrols
and monitoring of cease-fires.  If UNPROFOR withdraws, UNHCR and some
other humanitarian organizations plan to continue providing aid, but
believe some activities will be curtailed if not halted. 

\2 The plan was proposed by the Contact Group, which is composed of
the United States, Russia, Germany, France, and England.  The plan
calls for 51 percent of Bosnia to be controlled by the Bosnian
Muslims and Croats and 49 percent controlled by the Bosnian Serbs. 
The Bosnian government has accepted the plan; the Bosnian Serbs have

\3 Estimates of those killed in Bosnia range from 250,000 (Country
Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1994, report submitted to the
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, and the House Committee on
International Relations by the Department of State in February 1995)
to 167,000 (Bosnian Institute of Public Health).  Other experts
estimate a lower number. 

------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :3

We obtained comments on a draft of this report from the U.S. 
Department of State, the U.S.  Mission to NATO, the U.N. 
Secretariat, and UNPROFOR.  The Department of State commented that
UNPROFOR would be more effective if member states provided more
resources for the operation.  UNPROFOR commented that it has proposed
actions that could improve its performance in safe areas.  These
include providing more troops for UNPROFOR to deter attacks, better
defining safe areas, and demilitarizing all warring parties in and
around the safe areas. 

Given the U.N.'s approach to peacekeeping--to fully rely on the
consent and cooperation of the parties--it is questionable that
further resources or a better definition of safe areas would improve
UNPROFOR's performance.  Moreover, there are many crises in the world
that compete for finite peacekeeping resources and UNPROFOR is the
largest peacekeeping operation in U.N.  history.  Member states have
thus far paid more than $3 billion in assessments for UNPROFOR,
provided billions more in voluntary contributions, provided 40,000
U.N.  troops, and committed NATO air power to the operation.  Under
current conditions and given UNPROFOR's lack of credible deterrent to
attacks, demilitarizing the safe areas does not seem to be practical. 
We have incorporated other comments in the report, as appropriate. 

------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :4

We had the full cooperation of the U.N.  Secretariat, UNPROFOR, and
UNHCR and were assisted by the U.S.  Departments of State and
Defense, the U.S.  Missions to the United Nations and NATO, and the
U.S.  Agency for International Development's Office of Foreign
Disaster Assistance. 

To review the status of peace efforts in the former Yugoslavia, we
conducted fieldwork in Bosnia and Croatia.  During our visit, we met
with senior officials of UNPROFOR and UNHCR and visited several
UNPROFOR troop contingents.  We also interviewed U.S.  officials in
both countries, including the U.S.  Ambassadors, the Commander of the
Joint Task Force Forward, and members of the U.S.  Agency for
International Development's Disaster Assistance Response Team.  We
also met with senior officials of both the Croatian and Bosnian
governments.  On three separate occasions we tried to interview
Bosnian and Croatian Serb officials but were unsuccessful.  To
analyze U.N.  operations, we obtained Security Council resolutions
and reports and documents from the U.N.  Secretariat, UNHCR, and
UNPROFOR.  We analyzed data from UNHCR's convoy database and reviewed
UNHCR situation reports.  To analyze air operations in the former
Yugoslavia, we analyzed data on air sorties and air strikes.  We also
discussed air operations and NATO decisions with the U.S.  Ambassador
to NATO, members of his senior staff, and other national
representatives to NATO in Brussels, Belgium.  In Naples, Italy, we
met with the Commander in Chief, Allied Forces South and his senior
staff and the Commander of the Joint Task Force, Provide Promise. 

Further information regarding U.N.  activities in the former
Yugoslavia and this report is in appendixes I-III.  Appendix I lists
all U.N.  Security Resolutions on the former Yugoslavia, as of April
15, 1995.  Appendix II provides information on peacekeeping
contingents; appendix III provides selected sources of information
used for this report. 

We conducted our work from December 1994 to May 1995 in accordance
with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :4.1

We are sending copies of this report to other appropriate
congressional committees; the U.N.  Secretariat; the Special
Representative of the Secretary-General of the Former Yugoslavia; the
Permanent Representative to NATO; the Secretaries of State and
Defense; and the Administrator, U.S.  Agency for International
Development.  Copies will also be made available to others upon

This report was prepared under the direction of Joseph E.  Kelley,
Director-in-Charge, International Affairs Issues, who can be reached
at (202) 512-4128 if you or your staff have any questions.  Other
major contributors to this report were Tet Miyabara, John E. 
Tschirhart, and Barry J.  Deewse. 

Sincerely yours,

Henry L.  Hinton, Jr.
Assistant Comptroller General

============================================================ Chapter I

   Figure 1:  Factional Control in
   the Former Yugoslavia

   (See figure in printed

Little change has taken place in the factional control of Bosnian and
Croatian territory since 1993.  Croatia remains divided between the
government and Croatian Serbs in the former U.N.  Protected Areas
(UNPA).\1 Croatia recently agreed to a new U.N.  operation, the U.N. 
Confidence Restoration Operation in Croatia (UNCRO).  However, the
Croatian Serbs have not agreed to the terms and remain mobilized. 

In Bosnia, Bosnian Serbs still control about 70 percent of the
territory and the Bosnian government enclaves of Bihac, Gorazde,
Srebrenica, and Sarajevo are still isolated and cut off from Central
Bosnia.  Bosnian Muslims and Croats agreed to form a federation,
following diplomatic initiatives by the United States in March 1994. 
Although there has not been full cooperation within the federation,
it has allowed the relatively unobstructed delivery of humanitarian
assistance to Central Bosnia and other locations.  (We will discuss
the federation later.) In December 1994, the Bosnian government and
Bosnian Serbs agreed to a cessation of hostilities but an extension
was not agreed to.  As of May 1995, conflict in Bihac, increasing
violations in Sarajevo, new offensives around Tuzla, and shelling in
the other safe areas were taking place. 

\1 The term UNPA was dropped in the new U.N.  mandate for Croatia
because it implied a special status for this part of Croatia. 

---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter I:1

   (See figure in printed

As of mid-April 1995, 12 U.N.  Security Council Resolutions focussed
on Croatia.  These mandates are authorized primarily under Chapter VI
of the U.N.  Charter, although the United Nations Protection Force
(UNPROFOR) received Chapter VII authority to protect itself and
ensure its own freedom of movement.  The mandates were primarily to
implement a U.N.  peace plan designed to end the conflict in Croatia. 
Under this peace plan, UNPROFOR's mandate was to

  verify the withdrawal of the Yugoslav National Army (JNA) from

  ensure the demilitarization of the UNPAs and protect persons in
     them from fear of armed attack,

  help ensure respect by the local police for the human rights of
     UNPA residents, and

  facilitate the safe and secure return of displaced persons to their
     homes in the UNPAs. 

UNPROFOR was also to monitor and verify compliance with the March 29,
1994, cease-fire agreement between the government and Croatian Serb

On March 31, 1995, the U.N.  Security Council replaced UNPROFOR with
a new mission, UNCRO.  Under the mandate, UNCRO forces will be
deployed to monitor Croatia's international borders with Bosnia and
the former Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro); UNCRO will
also monitor the cease-fire within Croatia. 

---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter I:2

   (See figure in printed

Overall, 20 Security Council Resolutions focus on Bosnia and 11 are
authorized under Chapter VII.  In November 1991, the U.N. 
Secretary-General designated UNHCR the lead agency for humanitarian
relief in the former Yugoslavia.  One of UNHCR's major
responsibilities is to manage an extensive logistics and distribution
network to move food and other relief supplies to persons affected by
the conflict.  UNHCR maintains large warehouses and arranges convoys
to transport aid to those in need. 

As fighting shifted from Croatia to Bosnia in early 1992, the
Security Council extended UNPROFOR's mandate to Bosnia.  The first
task given UNPROFOR in that country was to ensure the security of the
Sarajevo airport.  UNPROFOR was to help unload humanitarian cargo at
the airport and to ensure the safe movement of aid and relief
workers.  UNPROFOR's humanitarian role in Bosnia was expanded in late
summer 1992 when it was mandated to protect UNHCR convoys.  UNPROFOR
was explicitly authorized to use force in situations where armed
people attempted to prevent the U.N.  from carrying out its mandates. 

In June 1993, UNPROFOR was mandated to deter attacks against six safe
areas in Bosnia--Sarajevo, Bihac, Gorazde, Tuzla, Srebrenica, and
Zepa.  These enclaves were surrounded by Bosnian Serb forces.  The
safe areas were to be "free from armed attacks" and UNPROFOR was
authorized under Chapter VII of the U.N.  Charter to take necessary
measures to ensure this, including the use of air power provided by
regional organizations or member states. 

---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter I:3

   (See figure in printed

\a Total assessments for UNPROFOR thru March 31, 1995. 

\b Total estimated U.S.  assessments fiscal years 1992-1995. 

\c Estimated U.S.  assessment for fiscal year 1995. 

\d Includes U.N.  troops civilian police and UNPROFOR civilians. 
This total does not include all U.N.  workers, such as UNCR staff. 

The U.N.'s mission in the former Yugoslavia is by far the largest in
its history, authorized in 70 Security Council resolutions, of which
38 are authorized under Chapter VII of the U.N.  Charter. 
Thirty-five resolutions apply generally to the former Yugoslavia, 20
focus primarily on Bosnia,
12 focus on Croatia, and 3 apply to Macedonia.  The 44,000 staff in
UNPROFOR exceeds that of any other U.N.  peace operation.  UNPROFOR
has about 37,000 troops, 4,600 civilians, and 1,500 civilian police
and military observers.  U.N.  member states have been assessed more
than $3.3 billion for UNPROFOR as of March 31, 1995.  Separate budget
estimates for UNCRO and UNPROFOR were not available at the time of
our review. 

Total U.S.  government costs for operations in the former Yugoslavia
are estimated to be $2.5 billion for fiscal years 1992 through 1995. 
Assessments for UNPROFOR were about $1.1 billion and the costs of
humanitarian assistance and air operations such as enforcing the
no-fly zone over Bosnia were an additional $1.4 billion.  The
estimated U.S.  assessment for UNPROFOR for fiscal year 1995 is $506

The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees' (UNHCR) activities
in the former Yugoslavia have also been unparalleled in U.N.  history
in terms of size, breadth, and hazards encountered.  It has spent
over $1.0 billion in the former Yugoslavia.  At the end of 1994,
about 740 of its staff or about 15 percent were working in this
region.  At the start of 1995, it was providing food aid for over 2.2
million people in all parts of the former Yugoslavia. 

By April 1995, UNPROFOR forces had suffered 1,382 casualties, 155 of
them fatal.  Over 560 of the casualties were war-related, with mines,
shelling, and direct fire each accounting for about one-third of this
number.  Thirteen UNHCR staff have been killed, including several
convoy drivers. 

=========================================================== Chapter II

--------------------------------------------------------- Chapter II:1

   (See figure in printed

The JNA officially withdrew from Croatia in 1991.  But according to
the Croatian government, the JNA only partially withdrew.  In a
December 1994 report, the U.N.  Commission of Experts on the former
Yugoslavia found that the JNA transferred massive amounts of weapons
to Croatian Serbs to help them form an army.  Also, many JNA soldiers
remained in the former UNPAs and reconstituted themselves as part of
the new Croatian Serb army--formally called the Krajina Serb Army

Although given mandates to help demilitarize the UNPAs and return
displaced persons to them, UNPROFOR was not able to disarm the KSA. 
The KSA initially placed heavy weapons in UNPROFOR storage depots,
but the KSA later broke into these sites and reclaimed their weapons,
partially in response to Croatian government initiatives in January
1993.  As of May 1995, troop movements by both the KSA and the
Croatian government were occurring in the former UNPAs.  Because of
potential fighting, UNPROFOR has returned very few of the estimated
360,000 to 450,000 refugees and displaced persons.  According to the
U.N.  Secretary-General, present conditions do not permit voluntary
return of displaced persons. 

In 1994, UNPROFOR in Croatia emphasized monitoring the cease-fire
agreement.  To accomplish this, it interposed its forces between the
KSA and the Croatian government in a 2-kilometerwide, 740- kilometer
long buffer zone and established about 300 observation and control
posts.  However, the number of cease-fire violations steadily
increased from 70 on October 1, 1994, to 212 on March 1, 1995. 
UNPROFOR was especially concerned about the number of serious
violations by Croatian Serbs involving the use of heavy weapons.  In
addition, a growing number of UNPROFOR vehicles were hijacked at
gunpoint within the UNPAs. 

The Croatian government and the Croatian Serbs reached an economic
agreement in December 1994 and it has produced tangible results.  The
Zagreb-Belgrade highway was opened on December 21, 1994, in two
sectors of the former UNPAs, with UNPROFOR forces providing security
along part of the route.  Traffic quickly rose from under 1,000
vehicles per day in late December to over 5,000 by mid-January 1995. 
However, progress to implement the agreement slowed after Croatia
announced it would no longer accept UNPROFOR's mandate. 

--------------------------------------------------------- Chapter II:2

   (See figure in printed

The failure to achieve the goals of the original peace plan led the
President of Croatia to announce the termination of UNPROFOR's
presence in Croatia as of March 31, 1995.  According to Croatia's
Foreign Ministry, UNPROFOR's presence was a buffer that effectively
established a sovereign state in the UNPAs for the Croatian Serbs. 
Moreover, since sections of the UNPAs are adjacent to the highway
along Croatia's Dalmatian coast, Croatian Serbs could close the
highway and cut Croatia off from its coast. 

Croatia also acted to terminate UNPROFOR's presence because UNPROFOR
did not stop violations of Croatia's international borders from the
UNPAs.  For example, in November 1994, Croatian Serbs launched air,
missile, and ground attacks from the UNPAs into Bihac in Bosnia.  On
March 10 and 11, 1995, Croatian Serbs removed heavy weapons from a
storage site in the sector east UNPA, crossed into Serbia with the
weapons, and then reentered the UNPA farther north.  According to the
U.N.  Under Secretary- General for Peacekeeping Operations, this was
a violation of Croatia's international borders and was reported to
the Security Council.  Overall, UNPROFOR has not emphasized control
of Croatia's international borders.  Most UNPROFOR troops in Croatia
are deployed well within Croatia as a buffer between Croatian
government and Croatian Serb forces.  U.N.  reports further show that
the UNPROFOR observers are frequently denied access to the
international borders and cannot monitor them. 

After considerable pressure from U.S.  officials, who were concerned
that a termination of UNPROFOR would lead to war, the Croatian
government agreed to permit U.N.  forces in Croatia under a new
mandate.  On March 31, 1995, the U.N.  Security Council approved a
new mandate for Croatia and a new mission, UNCRO.  UNCRO will monitor
Croatia's international borders with Bosnia and the former Republic
of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) as well as continue monitoring
the internal cease-fire line.  The concept of U.N.  Protected Areas
has been dropped from the new mandate.  UNCRO forces will monitor and
report on the crossing of military personnel, equipment, supplies,
and weapons at 25 border posts.  In addition, it will continue to
facilitate the delivery of humanitarian aid through Croatia into
Bosnia.  Overall force levels for UNCRO will be reduced from the
roughly 12,000 troops currently deployed to about 8,750.  However, as
of early May 1995, neither the Croatian government nor the Croatian
Serbs had agreed to specific terms of UNCRO's deployment. 

--------------------------------------------------------- Chapter II:3

   (See figure in printed

Since April 1992, an estimated 10,000 residents of Sarajevo have been
killed and nearly 60,000 wounded.  This total includes over 1,500
children killed and nearly 15,000 wounded according to a report by
the U.N.  Commission of Experts on the former Yugoslavia.  Because of
attacks on civilians, the U.N.  Security Council designated Sarajevo
and five other locations safe areas, "free from armed attacks and any
other hostile acts."

On February 5, 1994, 68 civilians were killed and 142 wounded by a
mortar round fired at the central market in Sarajevo.  This followed
a similar attack a day earlier in the suburbs of Sarajevo where 10
people were killed and 18 injured.  Responding to these attacks, the
U.N.  Secretary-General asked the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO) for air strikes to lift the siege of Sarajevo.  On February 9,
NATO issued an ultimatum to Bosnian Serb forces to withdraw their
heavy weapons 20 kilometers from the center of Sarajevo or place them
under UNPROFOR control within 10 days, or they would be subject to
air strikes.  The Security Council broadly supported the ultimatum as
a key effort to achieve a negotiated settlement of the conflict. 

In the face of NATO's threat, the Bosnian Serbs agreed to withdraw
their heavy weapons within 2 days.  By the evening of the deadline
set by NATO, the United Nations reported that the Bosnian Serbs had
substantially complied with the ultimatum.  Some heavy weapons had
not been withdrawn beyond the 20-kilometer zone, but UNPROFOR planned
to monitor them in place.  As a result of these actions, no air
strikes were carried out. 

Following the assertive response by NATO and UNPROFOR, the siege of
Sarajevo was lifted, and the United States was able to initiate
discussions for a federation of Bosnian Muslims and Croats.  A
framework for the federation was signed in Washington in March 1994
and constitutional arrangements were agreed to in May 1994.  The
agreement called for federal units with equal rights and
responsibilities, and also envisioned that areas with a majority of
Serb residents would ultimately join the federation after peaceful
negotiations.  Although the federation has not yet resulted in the
political reintegration of all communities, humanitarian aid passes
relatively unobstructed through territory under federation control. 

--------------------------------------------------------- Chapter II:4

   (See figure in printed

At the end of March 1994, Bosnian Serb forces launched an infantry
and artillery offensive against the Gorazde enclave.  The city of
Gorazde was subject to intermittent shelling and sniper fire by the
Bosnian Serb Army, resulting in a steady stream of casualties and
injuries.  Attacks became more serious with the Serb offensive of
March 28 and 29, which involved artillery, tanks, and infantry.  No
distinction was made between military and civilian targets.  Serb
shelling also caused damage to the U.N.  refugee center and U.N. 
equipment.  The Bosnian Serb Army steadily invaded the safe area from
all sides; numerous villages were destroyed and burned and their
inhabitants killed or driven out.  The city's hospital was reported
to be overcrowded, understaffed, unsanitary, and the frequent target
of shelling.  Evacuation of urgent medical cases was rarely
permitted.  During this time period, the local population staged a
protest against UNPROFOR's inaction UNHCR communications staff were
concerned that reports did not portray the seriousness of the

On April 6, 1994, the Security Council demanded that the Bosnian
Serbs cease their attack.  Subsequently, UNPROFOR asked NATO for air
support to protect several endangered U.N.  military observers in
Gorazde.  In response, NATO aircraft bombed Serb positions on April
10 and 11 and destroyed a tank shelling Gorazde.  However, heavy
shelling of Gorazde continued.  Over the next few days, Bosnian Serbs
tested UNPROFOR's will by taking hostages--at one point removing 16
peacekeepers from their posts--targeting the city, wounding several
U.N.  personnel, and killing two.  Further air support was not
requested until April 22.  On that date, the North Atlantic Council
of NATO authorized air strikes against Bosnian Serb targets and
issued an ultimatum establishing (1) a 3-kilometer exclusion zone
from which Bosnian Serb military forces were to pull back and (2) a
20-kilometer zone from which Bosnian Serb heavy weapons were to be
withdrawn.  Air strikes did not take place because UNPROFOR reported
that Serb forces had withdrawn their heavy weapons from the
20-kilometer zone.  However, some Serb soldiers with small arms
remained within the 3-kilometer zone after the date of the ultimatum. 

During the next few weeks, these forces harassed and obstructed
UNPROFOR convoys and humanitarian aid deliveries, detained UNPROFOR
forces, and stole UNPROFOR weapons and equipment.  U.S.  Agency for
International Development officials visiting the enclave in July
noted that the Serbs still maintained a presence within the 3
kilometer zone, having simply changed their military uniforms for
police or civilian attire. 

--------------------------------------------------------- Chapter II:5

   (See figure in printed

The northwest Bosnian enclave of Bihac was declared a safe area by
the Security Council in May 1993.  In October 1993 an opposition
Bosnian Muslim leader declared Bihac to be autonomous from the
Sarajevo government.  Fighting broke out between forces loyal to the
Bihac leader and the Bosnian government, with the rebel forces
finally defeated in August 1994.  Government forces then began an
offensive against Bosnian Serb forces surrounding Bihac, but were
forced back into Bihac in September 1994. 

In early November 1994, Serbs from within Croatia launched missile
and air strikes on the Bihac pocket.  Bosnian Serbs and the rebel
Muslim forces attacked the Bihac pocket from Croatia.  During an
attack on November 18, these forces used napalm and cluster bombs,
which the Security Council noted was "in clear violation of Bihac's
status as a safe area." The air attacks from Croatia led the Security
Council to authorize the use of NATO air power on targets in Croatia. 
Shortly thereafter, NATO aircraft struck Ubdina airfield in Croatia,
damaging only the runway at UNPROFOR's request.  However, the
military advance of the Bosnian Serbs continued, with the assistance
of the Croatian Serbs.  NATO informed UNPROFOR it was prepared to use
wider air strikes upon request, but UNPROFOR did not request them,
choosing instead to negotiate a possible cease-fire.  During this
period, UNPROFOR personnel throughout Bosnia were being taken
hostage.  On successive days in early December, Bosnian Serb forces
detained or held hostage between 316 and 439 UNPROFOR personnel. 

By early December the borders of the enclave had been infiltrated
everywhere, and the towns surrounding Bihac had fallen to the Bosnian
Serb Army.  Shelling of the center of Bihac occurred daily and by
mid-December, a large part of Bihac lacked water.  Access for
humanitarian convoys was almost impossible.  The UNPROFOR troop
contingent in the Bihac pocket lacked food and did not have fuel to
fully move around the area.  On December 12, 1994, some of the
contingent was attacked; five peacekeepers were wounded and one was
killed.  This contingent had deployed to Bihac in June as a
replacement for another contingent and was not fully equipped. 
According to UNPROFOR's Deputy Operations Commander, only about
one-quarter of the unit had rifles.  UNPROFOR had planned to send the
remaining weapons and equipment by convoy.  But Bosnian Serbs
obstructed UNPROFOR convoys and would not allow the equipment to be
delivered.  On December 16, UNHCR reports characterized the situation
in Bihac as a siege, with UNHCR and UNPROFOR officials virtual
hostages.  The city of Bihac did not fall, however, and in late
December 1994, a cease-fire agreement was signed for all of Bosnia. 
Nonetheless, UNPROFOR and humanitarian aid convoys were still
obstructed.  According to U.N.  reports, fighting continues in Bihac
as of May 1995. 

--------------------------------------------------------- Chapter II:6

   (See figure in printed

The full magnitude of human rights violations in the former
Yugoslavia from 1991-94 is unknown because the United Nations and
other organizations do not have access to all areas.  However, the
Chairman, Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, testified
that "Despite the absence of a smoking gun, like the files left by
the Nazis documenting the Holocaust, what has happened in Bosnia is
genocide."\2 He also provided some indication of the magnitude of
violations in Bosnia and Croatia--151 mass graves with 5 to 3,000
bodies in each, over
20,000 rape victims, and over 50,000 torture victims.  During our
work, we saw destroyed hospitals and schools in Bihac and bombed
residences and buildings in Sarajevo.  We also saw extensive tracts
of burned and bombed housing in the protected areas in Croatia. 
According to victims and U.N.  officials, many Croatians living in
the former protected areas were killed and others had their homes

In November 1994, the United Nations reported that widespread
violations of human rights in areas controlled by Bosnian Serb
authorities continued.  These violations included the displacement,
murder, beating, torture, and rape of Bosnian Muslim and Croats in
areas such as Banja Luka, Prijedor, and Bijeljina.  A Human Rights
Watch report documented similar violations in other locations in
Northern Bosnia and said that "non-Serbs have been murdered with
impunity." Witnesses to the crimes stated that those committing the
crimes were often dressed in uniforms belonging to the Bosnian Serb
army, military police, or civilian police.  In December 1994, the
U.N.  Commission of Experts on the former Yugoslavia reported on the
killing of civilians, mass gravesites, rapes, torture, ethnic
cleansing, and prison camps.  The Commission concluded that all
parties had committed grave breaches of international humanitarian
law.  But most violations were committed by Serbs against Bosnian
Muslims.  Croats were the second largest group of victims.  Serbs
were also victims, but to a much lesser extent than the others.  The
Commission also said the chain of command in committing the crimes
was blurred, but "the absence of preventive action by military
commanders and other purposeful omissions .  .  .  creates a clear
basis for command responsibility."\3

In February 1995, the International War Crimes Tribunal for the
former Yugoslavia issued its first three indictments naming 22 people
for genocide in death camps run by Bosnian Serbs.  In April 1995, the
Special Prosecutor named Bosnian Serb leaders as suspects in an
investigation of war crime. 

\2 "Statement of the Honorable Christopher H.  Smith," Chairman,
Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe," at the Hearing on
the UN, NATO, and the Former Yugoslavia, April 6, 1995. 

\3 Final Report of the United Nations Commission of Experts
Established Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 780 (U.N. 
Security Council, S/1994/674/Add.2, Vol I, December 28, 1994). 

--------------------------------------------------------- Chapter II:7

   (See figure in printed

Although unable to bring lasting peace to Bosnia and Croatia, U.N. 
actions have provided vital humanitarian assistance.  Over the past
three winters, UNHCR has led efforts by national governments, other
U.N.  agencies, and nongovernmental humanitarian organizations to
deliver vital food aid, particularly in Bosnia.  In 1994, about
356,000 metric tons of food, or about

85 percent of their estimated food requirements, were delivered to
Bosnians.  However, the success rate was not uniform to all parts of
the country or at all times of the year.  For example, Bihac received
only 33 percent of its estimated food requirements in 1994, with no
food delivered in November 1994.  Bihac has an estimated population
of 180,000 to 205,000.  The eastern enclaves (Gorazde, Zepa, and
Srebrenica), received 65 percent of food requirements; these safe
areas have an estimated population of 104,000. 

UNPROFOR has an important role in ensuring the delivery of aid, but
the overall benefit provided by UNPROFOR varies.  In 1994, about 77
percent of the aid convoys in Bosnia were successful.  However, on
routes where UNPROFOR escorts were needed and provided, such as the
safe areas, the success rate was much lower.  For example, in 1994,
the convoy success rate to Bihac was 44 percent and to the eastern
enclaves it was 62 percent.  Overall, 59 percent of convoys to the
safe areas were successful.  Although UNPROFOR escorts do not ensure
successful aid deliveries, UNHCR officials said escorts to Bihac,
Sarajevo, and the enclaves are essential.  Without UNPROFOR escorts,
convoy drivers would refuse to deliver aid to safe areas.  By
contrast, some local UNHCR officials noted that UNPROFOR escorts are
considered by Bosnian Serbs to be a provocation. 

UNPROFOR contributes to humanitarian aid efforts in other ways.  In
many parts of Bosnia, UNPROFOR provides engineering assistance, such
as opening up new routes, maintaining existing roads in the harsh
climate, and repairing bridges.  In some cases, UNPROFOR has loaned
fuel to UNHCR when there were fuel delivery problems in Bosnia. 
UNPROFOR also provides information to UNHCR on route conditions and
potential fighting.  Finally, UNPROFOR operates and provides security
at Sarajevo airport.  Over
55,000 metric tons of aid were delivered there in 1994, more than
twice the amount coming into the city by land routes.  According to
the chief of UNHCR's Sarajevo office, it would be virtually
impossible to provide aid to Sarajevo without UNPROFOR's services. 

UNHCR has indicated that despite UNPROFOR's importance to its
humanitarian mission, it intends to continue operations in Bosnia if
UNPROFOR withdraws.  At the same time, it recognizes that the level
of fighting and tension could jeopardize or halt the delivery of aid
to Sarajevo, Bihac, and the eastern enclaves. 

--------------------------------------------------------- Chapter II:8

   (See figure in printed

In Bosnia and Croatia, UNPROFOR has undertaken specific measures to
build confidence among the parties.  It monitored the cease-fire
between Bosnian Muslim and Croat forces and participated in local
security monitoring when requested by the parties, such as 24-hour
patrols in a Croat community in Zenica and joint patrols with local
Croat and Bosnian police to deter banditry on roads near Vitez. 
Throughout the two countries, UNPROFOR also monitors fragile
cease-fires and observes movements of forces.  UNPROFOR has also
fostered discussions among local political leaders, some of which
have led to agreements to allow greater freedom of movement for
people and goods or to permit improvements to local water, telephone,
sewer, gas, and power utilities.  Some meetings of local civil and
military leaders are chaired by UNPROFOR and allow these officials to
discuss matters of mutual concern. 

Public transport through the region has improved as UNPROFOR provides
security to rail passengers and a new public bus system that is
operating in most of the Federation territory.  UNPROFOR has also
been involved in infrastructure improvements, such as repairing
numerous damaged and destroyed bridges, with a focus on routes used
by aid convoys or which link the two communities. 

========================================================== Chapter III

-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter III:1

   (See figure in printed

According to U.N.  Secretary-General reports, UNPROFOR has been
guided by the U.N.  doctrine of peacekeeping, which relies on all
parties' consent and cooperation to implement Security Council
resolutions.  This approach has limited UNPROFOR's effectiveness. 
For example, although UNPROFOR has Chapter VII authority to ensure
its freedom of movement, all vehicles obtain movement clearance from
the warring factions before driving from one area to another.  Also,
UNPROFOR does not challenge roadblocks that prevent the delivery of
aid or even the resupply of its own troops, as in Bihac.  Relying on
the parties' consent has also hampered deployment.  For example,
Bosnian Serbs have influenced which troop contingents are stationed
along confrontation lines.  According to the former U.N.  Commander
in Bosnia, the Bosnian Serbs clearly stated which national troop
contingents were acceptable, and which were not.  UNPROFOR's Bosnia
Chief of Operations said these views, as well as the preferences of
the other warring parties, must be considered in UNPROFOR deployment
and, as a result, the force is not as effectively used as it could

According to the Secretary-General, UNPROFOR must also remain
strictly neutral in carrying out its mandate.  UNPROFOR's
interpretation of neutrality has led it to restrict air power in
response to attacks on peacekeepers and on safe areas.  The UNPROFOR
Commander in Bosnia said more assertive action to protect and deter
attacks would make UNPROFOR appear to take the side of the party
under attack.  This has led to relatively ineffectual use of air
power.  Air support in Gorazde and Bihac was minimal even when
civilians living in safe areas were being killed.  After attacks on
U.N.  peacekeepers in Gorazde, Bihac, and Sarajevo, UNPROFOR
sparingly called for air support and only against the specific
violating weapon. 

Finally, UNPROFOR's staff structure reflects the doctrine of
peacekeeping.  The staff consists of 37,000 troops.  But UNPROFOR
also consists of
2,600 local civilian staff, 2,000 international staff such as public
affairs and information officers, 800 civilian police, and 700
military observers.  These personnel are unarmed, many work
throughout Croatia and Bosnia, and many are periodically taken
hostage.  The Secretary-General cites the vulnerability of these
personnel as a reason to act only with the consent of the warring
parties.  He said UNPROFOR's mandate is peacekeeping; aggressive
action would be a fundamental shift from the logic of peacekeeping
and would entail unacceptable risks to the mission. 

-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter III:2

   (See figure in printed

NATO operates three air missions in Bosnia.  In April 1993, NATO
began to independently enforce a "no-fly" zone over Bosnian airspace,
under U.N.  Security Council Resolution 843.  In August 1993, NATO
agreed to provide close air support (CAS) for UNPROFOR.  NATO
provides CAS only at U.N.  request and targets specific military
weapons attacking UNPROFOR personnel.  In August 1993, NATO also
agreed to support UNPROFOR with air strikes to deter attacks on safe
areas.  Unlike CAS, air strikes could be used more broadly as a
deterrent.  Authorization for air strikes is dual-key--requiring both
NATO and U.N.  approval.\4

As of March 1995, NATO had conducted over 17,000 sorties related to
air strikes or CAS.  However, only four air strikes had been formally
authorized and five CAS operations requested.\5

According to NATO officials, the 17,000 sorties did not necessarily
respond to formal UNPROFOR requests, but were flown under NATO
initiatives.  In this regard, NATO has encouraged more assertive use
of air power.  For example, NATO typically has aircraft patrolling on
a regular basis so it can respond quickly to formal U.N.  requests. 
In November 1994, NATO urged a more assertive use of air power to
deter attacks on Bihac.  After NATO aircraft were targeted by
Croatian Serb missiles, NATO began reconnaissance for expanded
operations.  UNPROFOR, however, requested NATO to cease
reconnaissance, temporarily halt the air interdiction over much of
Bosnia, and halt further air strikes. 

The limited use of air power stems from a difference in mission
between the United Nations and NATO.  According to NATO and U.N. 
documents and officials, the U.N.  believes that the robust use of
air power is inconsistent with ensuring the cooperation of all
parties.  NATO believes sufficient air power should be used to
accomplish the mission of deterring attacks on U.N.  personnel and
safe areas.  Thus NATO has insisted that UNPROFOR provide pilots with
several targets of military significance, whereas UNPROFOR insists on
symbolic targets to send a political message.  NATO has also
disagreed with UNPROFOR on policy regarding tactical warning.  NATO
insists that tactical warnings of air strikes should not be provided
because it endangers pilots and compromises the mission.  UNPROFOR
insists on having contact with all parties and believes that general
warnings of air strikes must be given.  Based on these different
approaches, NATO military officials think air strikes in the former
Yugoslavia lack credible deterrent. 

\4 Once air strikes are approved, the operational keys are delegated
to the Secretary- General's Special Representative for the former
Yugoslavia, and the Commander in Chief, NATO's Southern Command. 

\5 Air strikes were against Serbian targets near Sarajevo, and
against a Croatian Serb airfield that was use to launch against
attacks the Bihac pocket in late 1994. 

-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter III:3

   (See figure in printed

As with other peacekeeping missions, UNPROFOR's command and control
hampers operations.\6 For example, in 1994, a troop contingent was
requested to deploy to Mostar where intense fighting was taking
place.  According to the troop contingent, it had discretion in
carrying out this order and decided not to deploy immediately.  The
issue was not resolved and the Security Council and the troop
contingent's government exchanged letters over the issue.  According
to the Chief of Operations in the Bosnia Command, the inability to
effectively deploy and move troops poses a problem in a war
environment.  Currently, UNPROFOR informally asks troop contingent
commanders their views on redeploying or changing the contingent's
operation.  The contingent commander will then contact his capital
and ask for advice.  If the response is positive, the U.N. 
Commander, Bosnia, will formally order the redeployment. 

As of April 1995, 28 nations contributed U.N.  troop contingents for
the former Yugoslavia; and differences in their readiness posed a
problem.  Some contingents, for example, arrived without needed
equipment, supplies, or maintenance capabilities.  According to
UNPROFOR officials, one contingent initially arrived without sleeping
bags, flak jackets, or winter clothing.  Others arrived without
vehicles and armored personnel carriers.  These troops could not be
deployed in Bosnia without transport equipment and had to remain in
Croatia while awaiting donated equipment.  The troop contingent in
Bihac in December 1994, deployed without weapons and basic equipment
for each soldier.  When Bihac came under siege, U.N.  convoys could
not deliver the equipment to the contingent. 

UNPROFOR's troop strength is less than that authorized by the
Security Council.  As of April 1995, its actual strength of nearly
39,000 was almost 6,000 short of authorized levels.  Most of this
shortfall is in logistics and support troops.  According to the
UNPROFOR Commander, even authorized troop levels are insufficient to
carry out UNPROFOR's mandate.  However, given the peacekeeping
approach underlying U.N.  operations in the former Yugoslavia, the
U.N.  belief that assertive action could compromise its neutrality,
and a desire to negotiate a solution, it is an open question how
greater troop strength would change UNPROFOR's approach. 

\6 For a discussion of weaknesses in command and control, see Peace
Operations:  Information on U.S.  and U.N.  Activities
(GAO/NSIAD-95-102BR, February 1995); U.N.  Peacekeeping:  Lessons
Learned in Recent Missions (GAO/NSIAD-94-9, Dec.  1993). 

-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter III:4

   (See figure in printed

Both UNPROFOR and NATO have begun to plan for a possible withdrawal
of UNPROFOR forces from all or parts of the former Yugoslavia. 
Initial withdrawal plans centered on Bosnia, reflecting intensified
fighting and frustration with the lack of progress on a peace
agreement.  Planning also focussed on a possible UNPROFOR withdrawal
from Croatia. 

Most planning was based on a contingency of a hostile withdrawal,
since UNPROFOR personnel had periodically been taken hostage during
air strikes.  Moreover, UNPROFOR weapons and equipment would be
valuable to all sides, and during withdrawal, the parties might try
to seize the equipment.  Although not finalized or approved, draft
NATO withdrawal plans have been completed.  NATO involvement would
only occur at the request of the United Nations.  Estimates are that
NATO would have to provide seven to nine brigades. 

But major issues remain undecided.  For example, decisions about the
command and control of a U.N.-NATO withdrawal above theater level,
have not been fully agreed upon.  This issue is complicated by the
presence of non-NATO forces in UNPROFOR, and humanitarian workers,
U.N.  military observers, and civilian police throughout Croatia and
Bosnia.  In addition, various NATO nations have differing views on
the mix of NATO-U.N.  funding that would finance the withdrawal.  The
cost and duration of a withdrawal would be strongly influenced by
whether its nature is benign or hostile and how much equipment is

The United States has agreed in principle to assist NATO in an
UNPROFOR withdrawal, pending congressional consultation. 

=========================================================== Appendix I

Resoluti                                                                  U.N.
on                                                                        Charte
number    Date      Area    Purpose                                       r
--------  --------  ------  --------------------------------------------  ------
713       9/25/91   FY      Weapons embargo against all former            VII

721       11/27/    FY      Preliminaries to establishing UNPROFOR        VI

724       12/15/    FY      Establishes sanctions Committee               VII

727       1/8/92    C       Deployment of 50 liaison officers             VI

740       2/7/92    C       Increases in liaison officers                 VI

743       2/21/92   C       Establishes UNPROFOR                          VI

749       4/7/92    C       Authorizes full deployment of UNPROFOR        VI

752       5/15/92   B       Demands all cease fighting in Bosnia          VI

753       5/18/92   C       Admits Croatia to the U.N.                    VI

754       5/18/92   FY      Admits Slovenia to the U.N.                   VI

755       5/20/92   B       Admits Bosnia to the U.N.                     VI

757       5/30/92   FY      Imposes sanctions on Serbia and Montenegro    VII

758       6/8/92    B       Authorizes UNPROFOR deployment to Sarajevo    VI

760       6/18/92   FY      Exempts humanitarian aid from sanctions       VII

761       6/29/92   B       Additional UNPROFOR deployment to Sarajevo;   VI
                            mandate to ensure security of airport

762       6/30/92   C       Additional UNPROFOR mandate in Croatia "pink  VI

764       7/13/92   B       UNPROFOR reinforcements in Sarajevo           VI

769       8/7/92    C       Enlarges UNPROFOR mandate in Croatia to       VI
                            perform customs functions

770       8/13/92   B       Asks member states to facilitate delivery of  VII
                            humanitarian aid in Bosnia

771       8/13/92   B       Demands unimpeded access for humanitarian     VII

776       9/14/92   B       Enlarges UNPROFOR mandate to protect          VI
                            humanitarian convoys in Bosnia

777       9/19/92   FY      Federal Republic of Yugoslavia no longer      VI
                            U.N. member

779       10/6/92   C       Enlarges UNPROFOR mandate in Croatia --       VI
                            Prevlaka peninsula

780       10/6/92   FY      Establishes war crimes commission             VI

781       10/9/92   B       Bosnia no-fly zone                            VI

786       11/10/    B       Enlarges UNPROFOR mandate to authorize and    VI
          92                monitor flights into Bosnia

787       11/16/    FY      Restricts transshipments                      VII

795       12/11/    M       UNPROFOR deployment to Macedonia              VI

798       12/18/    B       Condemnation of war crimes                    VI

802       1/25/93   C       Demands cessation of attacks on UNPROFOR and  VI
                            end of cease-fire violations

807       2/19/93   FY      Demands respect for UNPROFOR's security and   VII
                            extends mandate until 3/3/93

808       2/22/93   FY      Establishes war crimes tribunal               VI

815       3/30/93   FY      Extends UNPROFOR mandate until 6/30/93        VII

816       3/31/93   B       Authorization to enforce no-fly zone          VII

817       4/7/93    M       Admits Macedonia to the U.N.                  VI

819       4/16/93   B       Designates Srebrenica as safe area            VII

820       4/17/93   FY      Strengthens embargo on Serbia and Montenegro  VII

821       4/28/93   FY      Excludes Serbia and Montenegro from ECOSOC    VI

824       5/6/93    B       Designates six safe areas in Bosnia           VII

827       5/25/93   FY      Establishes International War Crimes          VII

836       6/4/93    B       Enlarges UNPROFOR mandate to deter attacks    VII
                            on safe areas

838       6/10/93   B       Requests report on deploying monitors on      VII
                            Bosnia's borders

842       6/18/93   M       Authorizes U.S. to deploy in Macedonia        VI

843       6/18/93   FY      Requests to examine financial impact of       VI

844       6/18/93   FY      Authorizes reinforcement of UNPROFOR          VII

845       6/18/93   M       Urges Greece and Macedonia reach settlement   VI

847       6/30/93   FY      Extends UNPROFOR mandate until 9/30/93        VII

855       8/9/93    FY      Calls for continuation of CSCE missions in    VI
                            Serbia and Montenegro

857       8/20/93   FY      Candidates for judges of War Crimes Tribunal  VI

859       8/24/93   B       Calls for cease-fire                          VII

869       9/30/93   FY      Extends UNPROFOR mandate until 10/1/93        VII

870       10/1/93   FY      Extends UNPROFOR mandate until 10/5/93        VII

871       10/5/93   FY      Extends UNPROFOR mandate until 3/31/94        VII

877       10/21/    FY      Appoints international tribunal prosecutor    VI

900       3/4/94    B       Appoints Special Coordinator for Sarajevo     VII

908       3/31/94   FY      Extends UNPROFOR mandate until 9/30/94        VII

913       4/22/94   FY      Demands immediate release of U.N. personnel   VII

914       4/27/94   FY      Increases UNPROFOR personnel by 6,550         VII

936       7/8/94    FY      Appoints prosecutor of international          VII

941       9/23/94   B       Condemns Bosnian Serb ethnic cleansing        VII

942       9/23/94   B       Imposes economic sanctions on Bosnian Serbs   VII

943       9/29/94   FY      Lifts some sanctions against Serbia and       VII

947       9/30/94   FY      Extends UNPROFOR mandate until 3/31/95        VII

958       11/19/    C       Extends air strike authority to Croatia       VII

959       11/19/    C       Clarifies safe area regime                    VII

967       12/14/    FY      Permits Serbs to export diphtheria serum      VII

970       1/12/95   FY      Continues suspensions of some sanctions       VII
                            against Serbia and Montenegro

981       3/31/95   C       Establishes UNCRO mission for Croatia         VII

982       3/31/95   B       Extends UNPROFOR mandate until 11/30/95 but   VII
                            only for Bosnia

983       3/31/95   M       Establishes UNPREDEP mission for Macedonia    VI

B = Bosnia
C = Croatia
M = Macedonia
FY = Former Yugoslavia Areas

MARCH 1995)
========================================================== Appendix II

Country                Croatia    Bosnia         a     Total
--------------------  --------  --------  --------  ========
France                     843     3,781               4,624
Jordan                   3,283       100               3,383
United Kingdom                     3,155               3,155
Pakistan                           2,983               2,983
Canada                   1,218       820               2,038
Netherlands                148     1,482               1,630
Malaysia                           1,545               1,545
Turkey                             1,469               1,469
Spain                              1,372               1,372
Russia                     856       472               1,328
Bangladesh                         1,238               1,238
Denmark                    953       280               1,233
Sweden                     128     1,030               1,158
Poland                   1,141                         1,141
Ukraine                    555       460               1,015
Kenya                      974                           974
Czech Republic             957                           957
Nepal                      898                           898
Belgium                    769       100                 869
Argentina                  862                           862
United States              299                 540       839
Norway                     111       636                 747
Slovakia                   567                           567
Nordic                                         556       556
Egypt                                418                 418
New Zealand                          249                 249
Indonesia                  220                           220
Finland                     43                            43
Subtotal                14,825    21,590     1,096    37,511
Hdqs. units                                              404
Total troop strength                                  37,915

========================================================= Appendix III

1. U.N.  Headquarters
   Security Council resolutions, Secretary-General Reports,
   International Conference on Former Yugoslavia
   reports, Commission on Human Rights reports
   Special Assistant to the Under Secretary-General for
   Peacekeeping; Director and military briefers, U.N.  Situation

   Situation reports, U.N.  military observer reports
   Special Representative of the Secretary-General
   Force Commanders, UNPROFOR and B-H Command
   U.N.  Special Coordinator for Sarajevo
   Chief, Civilian Affairs
   Deputy Chief Inspector, Civilian Police
   Chief Military Observer
   Chief of Staff, Logistics
   Other military and civilian officers at UNPROFOR Headquarters,
   B-H Command, Sarajevo, Sector North, and troop contingents

   Field situation reports, field office responses of UNPROFOR
   Chief of Mission, Bosnia
   Head of Office, Sarajevo
   Field staff in various locations

   U.S.  Ambassador to NATO
   Deputy Permanent Representatives to NATO of Turkey, United
   Kingdom, and France
   Commander in Chief, Allied Forces, Southern Europe
   Senior and other staff, Allied Forces, Southern Europe

5.   Department of Defense
   Commander in Chief, Allied Forces Southern Europe
   Commander, Allied Air Forces Southern Europe
   Deputy Commander in Charge, United States European
   Commander, Joint Task Force, Provide Promise
   Commander, Joint Task Force Forward
   Briefing slides on U.S.  and U.N.  operations in the former
   Reports and studies on peace operations

6. Department of State, U.S.  Mission to the United Nations, and
   for International Development
  Cables, reports
  U.S.  Ambassador and the Deputy Chief of Mission to Bosnia
  U.S.  Ambassador and the Deputy Chief of Mission to Croatia
   Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, International Organization
   Director, Office of Peacekeeping and Peace Enforcement

7. Statistical Information
   Budget data on U.S., UNPROFOR, and UNHCR actions in the former
   UNPROFOR casualities and causes
   Cease-fire violation analyses
   Chronolonogy of CAS and air strikes
   Convoy success rates
   Days Sarajevo airport closed
 UNPROFOR deployment and troop numbers
   Monthly food distribution reports
  Sorties flown related to Deny Flight
   Sorties flown related to CAS and air strikes
   U.N.  personnel detained during selected time periods