Index


Defense Inventory: DOD Could Improve Total Asset Visibility Initiative
With Results Act Framework (Letter Report, 04/12/99, GAO/NSIAD-99-40).

Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the Department of
Defense's (DOD) implementation of its Total Asset Visibility (TAV)
initiative, focusing on: (1) the difficulty in determining the status of
the initiative's implementation; (2) planning weaknesses that affect the
initiative's implementation; and (3) strategies for addressing those
weaknesses.

GAO noted that: (1) DOD lacks an adequate Departmentwide management
framework for providing information to clearly determine the progress
made in realizing TAV initiative goals; (2) while some component and
theater-specific asset tracking capabilities are reported to be
operating, Departmentwide information on progress in achieving TAV
initiative goals is minimal; (3) although implementing improved asset
visibility is a high-priority objective, DOD cannot clearly understand
the extent to which it is achieving the objectives of having timely,
accurate information on requisitions and assets and access to DOD
assets; (4) along with the unclear picture of the initiative's status,
planning is inadequate at the strategic and implementation levels; (5)
DOD does not have a Departmentwide TAV strategic plan to show how the
various TAV initiatives contribute to DOD's goals for the initiative;
(6) additionally, while DOD has an implementation plan, the plan has a
number of key weaknesses; (7) it does not describe how TAV will be
integrated into Department work processes to realize the goals set for
the TAV initiative; (8) as a result, there is confusion over who is to
use TAV and how it is to be used; (9) at some locations the system is
being installed but not used, according to a component manager; (10) the
plan also does not identify needed resources and does not address
Departmentwide problems with systems that are critical to the successful
implementation of the TAV initiative; (11) the initiative's
implementation problems have largely resulted from long-standing
management issues that have hindered other major management initiatives;
(12) these issues include cultural resistance to change, service
parochialism, the lack of outcome-oriented goals and performance
measures, and the lack of management accountability; (13) resistance to
changing from reliance on just-in-case inventory approaches to reliance
on just-in-time inventory is a significant challenge for DOD in its
approach to inventory management; and (14) this new way of doing
business requires timely and accurate information about quantities and
location of items and a willingness by the item holders to transfer them
to meet the priority needs of others.

--------------------------- Indexing Terms -----------------------------

 REPORTNUM:  NSIAD-99-40
     TITLE:  Defense Inventory: DOD Could Improve Total Asset Visibility 
             Initiative With Results Act Framework
      DATE:  04/12/99
   SUBJECT:  Military materiel
             Military inventories
             Spare parts
             Inventory control systems
             Internal controls
             Logistics
             Strategic planning
             Federal property management
             Data integrity
IDENTIFIER:  Y2K
             DOD Total Asset Visibility Initiative
             Army Total Asset Visibility System
             
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cover1+2.book GAO United States General Accounting Office

Report to Congressional Requesters

April 1999 DEFENSE INVENTORY

DOD Could Improve Total Asset Visibility Initiative With Results
Act Framework




GAO/NSIAD-99-40

  GAO/NSIAD-99-40

United States General Accounting Office Washington, D. C. 20548
Lett er

Page 1 GAO/NSIAD-99-40 Defense Inventory

GAO

National Security and International Affairs Division Lett er

B-278430 Letter April 12, 1999 The Honorable Christopher Shays
Chairman The Honorable Rod R. Blagojevich Ranking Minority Member
Subcommittee on National Security, Veterans Affairs, and
International Relations Committee on Government Reform House of
Representatives

During Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm the logistics
pipeline was clogged by thousands of duplicate requisitions and
inadequately identified cargo containers. Logisticians could not
find information about the status of requisitions, and the
contents of over half the 40,000 large containers of equipment
shipped in theater could not be readily identified. As a result,
the logistics presence was much larger than was needed; according
to the Army Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics, better
asset tracking could have saved $2 billion. In response to this
problem, the

Department of Defense (DOD) renewed its emphasis on implementing
the Total Asset Visibility (TAV) initiative 1 for tracking
equipment, supplies, and spare parts as well as requisitions on a
continuous basis.

DOD expects the TAV initiative to (1) resolve wartime logistics
management problems encountered in Operations Desert Shield and
Desert Storm and (2) improve its inventory management by
supporting transfers of assets within and across components. The
initiative is to cover all DOD assets including secondary
inventory 2 and ammunition that are in storage, in processing, and
in transit, along with accurate information on the status of
requisitions. The TAV initiative is expected to access information
from over 100 component logistics systems, including component TAV
systems such as the Army TAV, which are supplied data from many
other lower level systems. Although several target dates for
implementing TAV have been missed, DOD now expects to have timely
and

1 In commenting on a draft of this report, DOD officials stated
that TAV has been referred to as a program for convenience. In
view of DOD's comments, we modified our report to describe TAV as
an initiative, although TAV is described as a program in DOD's
Government Performance and Results Act Performance Plan for fiscal
year 2000 in the Secretary of Defense 1999 Annual Report to the
President

and the Congress. 2 Secondary inventory includes spare parts,
clothing, and medical supplies to support DOD operating forces
worldwide.

B-278430 Page 2 GAO/NSIAD-99-40 Defense Inventory

accurate intraservice and interservice information on and access
to 90 percent of its assets by 2000 and 100 percent of its assets
by 2004. As your Subcommittee requested, we reviewed DOD's
implementation of its TAV initiative. This review is one in a
series that we are doing to address high- risk inventory
management problems at DOD. 3 Specifically, this report discusses
(1) the difficulty in determining the status of the initiative's
implementation, (2) planning weaknesses that affect the
initiative's implementation, and (3) strategies for addressing
those weaknesses.

Results in Brief DOD lacks an adequate Departmentwide management
framework for providing information to clearly determine the
progress made in realizing

TAV initiative goals. While some component and theater- specific
asset tracking capabilities are reported to be operating,
Departmentwide information on progress in achieving TAV initiative
goals is minimal. Consequently, although implementing improved
asset visibility is a high priority objective, DOD cannot clearly
understand the extent to which it is achieving the objectives of
having timely, accurate information on requisitions and assets and
access to DOD assets. Along with the unclear picture of the
initiative's status, planning is inadequate at the strategic and
implementation levels. DOD does not have a Departmentwide TAV
strategic plan to show how the various TAV initiatives contribute
to DOD's goals for the initiative. Additionally, while DOD has an
implementation plan, the plan has a number of key

weaknesses. It does not describe how TAV will be integrated into
Department work processes to realize the goals set for the TAV
initiative. As a result, there is confusion over who is to use TAV
and how it is to be used. At some locations the system is being
installed but not used, according to a component manager. The plan
also does not identify needed resources and does not address
Departmentwide problems with systems that are critical to the
successful implementation of the TAV initiative. 3 In 1990, we
began a special effort to review and report on the federal program
areas that we identified as high risk because of vulnerabilities
to waste, fraud, abuse, and mismanagement. This effort, which was
supported by the Senate Committee on Government Affairs and the
House Committee on

Government Reform, brought a much- needed focus to problems that
were costing the government billions of dollars. We identified DOD
inventory management as high risk in our 1992, 1995, 1997, and
1999 high- risk reports.

B-278430 Page 3 GAO/NSIAD-99-40 Defense Inventory

The initiative's implementation problems have largely resulted
from long- standing management issues that have hindered other
major management initiatives. These issues include cultural
resistance to change, service parochialism, the lack of outcome-
oriented goals and performance measures, and the lack of
management accountability. Resistance to

changing from reliance on just- in- case inventory approaches to
reliance on just- in- time inventory is a significant challenge
for DOD in its approach to inventory management. This new way of
doing business requires timely and accurate information about
quantities and locations of items and a willingness by the item
holders to transfer them to meet the priority needs

of others. To improve Department management and implementation of
the TAV initiative, we are recommending that the Secretary of
Defense develop a Departmentwide strategic plan and associated
component implementation plans that would be based on the outcome-
oriented principles of the Government Performance and Results Act
of 1993 (the Results Act) and the Clinger- Cohen Act of 1996.

Background The Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Logistics) is
responsible for the Departmentwide TAV initiative, and the
Director, Defense Logistics Agency

(DLA), is charged as Executive Agent to coordinate asset tracking
initiatives across the services and DOD. 4 The 1996 DOD- wide TAV
implementation plan used for implementing TAV sets out initiative
goals such as providing the capability to identify the location
and status of assets and requisitions Departmentwide. The Joint
TAV Office is responsible for

providing useful data on assets to customers across the services.
Two service components have formal TAV programs (the Army and the
Navy), and other components are working to support the
Departmentwide TAV initiative. (See app. III for detailed
information on the roles and efforts of TAV offices.)

TAV has been cited in several Department planning documents as a
critical initiative for improving logistics. The TAV initiative is
cited as a requirement for satisfying the needs of logistics
customers and fundamental to realizing the logistics vision in the
1998 DOD Logistics Strategic Plan. The TAV initiative is cited in
DOD's Quadrennial Defense

4 DLA's role as Executive Agent was transferred from the Army
Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics on June 1, 1998.

B-278430 Page 4 GAO/NSIAD-99-40 Defense Inventory

Review report for supporting logistics improvements. It is also
referred to in the 1997 Defense Reform Initiative Report as
committing DOD to provide total visibility of equipment, supplies,
and spare parts on a continuous basis. In asset management plans,
such as DOD's 1998 Logistics Strategic Plan and in Joint Vision
2010 (DOD's blueprint for future joint operations), TAV is
identified as an enabling technology to support deployable supply
and maintenance information systems. The TAV initiative is also
prominent

in DOD's 1998 Annual Report to the President and the Congress, and
the Results Act Performance Plan in the 1999 Annual Report sets a
goal of 90- percent visibility of and access to DOD materiel
assets by 2000 while resupplying deployed troops and, at the same
time, reducing the average order to receipt time of assets by 50
percent. This plan is required by the Results Act, which states
that agencies' performance plans should generally include (1)
performance goals; (2) an expression of the goals in an objective,
quantifiable, and measurable form; (3) a description of the

operational processes, skills, and technology and the resources
required; (4) performance indicators; (5) a basis for comparing
actual results with the performance goals; and (6) a description
of the means used to verify and validate measured values.
Initiative Status in

Realizing TAV Goals is Not Clear

While DOD has established some general measures for determining
the status of TAV implementation, these measures do not account
for critical elements needed to realize most TAV initiative goals.
Additionally, the

established measures are vague and provide only general indicators
of the progress that is being made. Further, data collected for
those measures that were established have a number of weaknesses
and are likely not good

indicators of progress toward meeting Department goals set for
TAV. As a consequence there is insufficient data to precisely
determine the status of the TAV initiative's progress toward
meeting its Departmentwide goals.

The current overall goals of the TAV initiative are to provide (1)
timely and accurate information on the location, condition, and
identity of equipment and supplies at any point from asset origin
to final destination, as well as the location of military
personnel and units, and (2) the ability to use this information
to improve the Department's logistics practices. To accomplish
these high- level Departmentwide goals, the 1996 TAV

implementation plan sets forth a number of areas TAV needed to
address, including (1) the tracking of requisitions; (2) the
ability to locate assets in process, in storage, and in transit;
and (3) improvement to logistics management within theaters of
operation. However, the plan did not identify specific ways to
measure the progress being made or to determine

B-278430 Page 5 GAO/NSIAD-99-40 Defense Inventory

the status of efforts to realize the overall TAV goals and the
areas that needed to be addressed. Current Department baselines
for assessing the status of the TAV initiative meeting Department
goals do not account for the full range of targets defined in the
1996 TAV implementation plan. For the TAV initiative, DOD is not,
on a Departmentwide basis, measuring progress or determining the
status of most of the areas the 1996 TAV implementation plan was
to

address; areas not measured include the tracking of requisitions,
assets in process and in transit, and the improvement of logistics
management within theaters of operation. However, DOD officials
have stated that progress was being made in these areas. Also, for
the TAV initiative on a Departmentwide basis, DOD has reported
that inventory managers were able to track 94 percent of their
secondary inventories in storage and had the capability to access
80 percent of those assets. These results were reported as a
National Performance Review (NPR) performance indicator to support
streamlining the DOD infrastructure in DOD's Results Act
Performance Plan for fiscal year 2000. However, these measures not
only

exclude those inventories in process and in transit (stated goals
of the TAV initiative) but also do not account for critical
initiative elements such as the timeliness and accuracy of the
data. Components are also inconsistent in setting baselines for
measuring progress toward improving the

management of assets in storage. Components defined their own
baselines by selecting in- storage inventories for measuring
progress toward realizing TAV goals, and the in- storage
inventories they selected varied by component, which made overall
measurement of progress meaningless. For example, contrary to
Department TAV goals, major quantities of in- storage inventory
handled by weapons system managers were not included in one
component's computation. While the Department could provide
examples of activities that supported TAV initiative goals and
objectives, it was unable to aggregate component results in
measures that show progress toward meeting TAV initiative goals.

For example, DOD officials recognized that providing inventory
managers the capability to redistribute assets using the TAV
system was more important than only tracking assets, and
components had examples of how

they had redistributed some assets using TAV. However, there were
no measures of how the TAV system was being used to support asset
redistributions, and components lacked such measures. Agency
officials

stated that each component has the capability to redistribute
assets within its own component and that the components were
working jointly to use TAV to move toward redistributing assets
across components. However,

B-278430 Page 6 GAO/NSIAD-99-40 Defense Inventory

agency officials could not provide reports or information
indicating how TAV system benefits were being measured or reported
within components. Weaknesses in

Planning Have Hindered TAV Implementation

Prior DOD efforts designed to achieve TAV have not been realized,
and the TAV initiative continues to experience delays. Planning
for the TAV initiative was inadequate at both the strategic and
implementation levels. DOD did not develop a strategic plan for
the TAV initiative, and although two implementation plans have
been developed, with the most current being approved in 1996, they
do not address all the planning elements that are necessary for
ensuring the timely completion of the TAV initiative. DOD
recognized the need for a TAV strategic plan and issued a Joint
TAV

strategic plan dated January 1999. However, the plan focuses only
on TAV information- sharing within theaters of operation rather
than on ensuring that components are meeting Department goals set
for the TAV initiative, such as reducing the logistics presence in
theaters of operation and inventory levels in component supply
depots. Since a Departmentwide strategic plan did not exist at the
time of our review, we focused our review of planning efforts on
DOD's 1996 implementation plan.

DOD Did Not Realize Its Goals in Prior TAV Efforts

The TAV initiative has evolved from other DOD attempts to improve
visibility over its assets, in recognition that such visibility is
the foundation for improving inventory management and other
logistics functions. In 1972, DOD set a goal to improve visibility
over its inventories by 1980, but it did not achieve that goal.
Later, during the Persian Gulf War, DOD's

problems with inventory management were highlighted when thousands
of duplicate orders were placed because operational units had
inadequate visibility over the status of their requisitions, and
large amounts of material shipped to the theater were unavailable
to U. S. forces because the location

of the material was unknown. As a result of the Persian Gulf War
logistics problems, in 1992 DOD again started developing an
initiative to improve asset visibility. This initiative's goal was
to have total asset visibility by 1995, but this attempt was also
unsuccessful. A new plan to realize TAV

was started in 1995; the plan was approved by the Under Secretary
of Defense (Acquisition and Technology) in May 1996. See appendix
IV for a list of Department attempts to improve asset visibility
since 1972.

Implementation Plan Lacks Key Elements

The implementation plan approved in 1996 is not a broadly focused
Departmentwide plan for the TAV initiative. This most current

B-278430 Page 7 GAO/NSIAD-99-40 Defense Inventory

implementation plan does not address the integration of TAV in
component work processes, describe resource requirements, or
describe how systems issues will be addressed. DOD Lacks a Plan
for Guiding the Integration of TAV Into Work Processes

Critical elements describing how the TAV initiative will be used
are lacking in the TAV implementation plan. The TAV plan does not
set forth how the system will be used by the components in their
day- to- day work processes, financial reporting, and the sharing
of assets among commands and

components. The TAV implementation plan does not describe how the
TAV system will be integrated into components' work processes to
support DOD's inventory management improvement targets, such as
reducing inventory levels and minimizing the logistics presence in
theaters of operation by providing more accurate information about
inventory levels. Component TAV officials expressed concern that
the 1996 TAV plan does not satisfactorily define users or user
requirements and does not describe why users need

the system to include the information. For example, one component
official stated that the TAV capability was installed at some
sites to support theater operations, but it was not clear how the
system was to be used after it had been installed. As a result,
according to this official, the capability was not used. Component
managers also stated that the plan should clearly define the
information that is to be made available to the user, why the
information is needed, how it should be used, and how often it
should be updated. Further, personnel at the March 1998 TAV users'
conference stated that DOD needs to develop user requirements,
clarify those requirements, and tie those requirements to the data
that is being requested from the components. The plan also does
not set forth how TAV systems will integrate with and/ or

support other management information systems, such as financial
management systems and reporting. Accurate reporting of inventory
assets has been a long- standing problem for DOD, and data from
TAV

systems could be used to support reporting systems in the
Department. DOD will overlook an opportunity to address financial
reporting requirements if it implements a TAV system without
addressing financial reporting requirements, such as accounting
for assets on ships. 5 Aligning

5 Navy Financial Management: Improved Management of Operating
Materials and Supplies Could Yield Significant Savings (GAO/AIMD-
96-94, Aug. 16, 1996) and Financial Reporting: DOD's Fiscal Year
1996 Financial Statements Inventory Reporting Does Not Meet
Standards (GAO/AIMD-98-16, Dec. 24, 1997).

B-278430 Page 8 GAO/NSIAD-99-40 Defense Inventory

financial systems is required and a critical element in accounting
for operating material and supplies. Such requirements have not
been defined in the current TAV plan, nor have they been agreed to
by components.

Further, the plan does not set forth how TAV systems would be used
to support the sharing of assets within component commands and/ or
among components, even though asset sharing is an overall goal of
the initiative. Some supporting component systems have been
aligned to support limited

asset transfers among components, and a procedure for managing
reparable item transfers has been approved by relevant DOD
organizations. However, DOD components have not made all
componentwide system changes necessary so that TAV will support
the improved management of all inventory items, including
ammunition and medical supplies, and they had no clear time line
for making those changes. Resource Requirements Are Not Identified

The implementation plan does not provide an overall estimate of
the funding necessary to accomplish TAV- related projects. Funding
for the TAV initiative is contained in the components' and the
Joint TAV Office's budgets. However, there is no estimate of the
total resources expended

thus far or future funding requirements. Without an estimate of
required funding, it is impossible for DOD to determine the
priority the components are giving to TAV requirements or how
those requirements rank in relation to other funding priorities
within the components' budgets.

According to agency officials, the components were giving
important TAV- related work (such as maintenance on systems that
support TAV) lower priority than other competing initiatives
within components. For example, components are responsible for
ensuring that information on their assets at lower level inventory
sites is timely and accurate and that appropriate changes are made
to systems to enable the provision of asset information to the TAV
system. According to the Department's TAV implementation plan,
this requirement was originally scheduled to be met

by March 1997; however, the completion date of this important
element of TAV is currently not clear. Although some systems
maintenance, such as Year 2000 concerns, merits a high priority in
Department resource allocations, component officials stated that
funding commitments have slipped because component commands gave a
lower priority to needed TAV system modifications, thus delaying
the input of information into the TAV system. While these
decisions may well have been appropriate, DOD managers lacked the
information to understand how these priority decisions would
ultimately affect TAV implementation. According to one component
official, unless funds are provided specifically to support each

B-278430 Page 9 GAO/NSIAD-99-40 Defense Inventory

component's part in the TAV initiative, the Departmentwide TAV
effort may fail because the components are giving funding priority
to their own initiatives.

Departmentwide Systems Issues Are Not Addressed The 1996 TAV
implementation plan does not address how several key

Departmentwide systems issues will be addressed as they relate to
the TAV initiative. These issues relate to data quality, systems
security, and the Year 2000 problem. 6 While we recognize that
responsibility for resolving these

issues is outside of the TAV initiative management's
responsibility (which is monitoring progress with Departmentwide
TAV requirements and coordinating action with relevant
components), we believe the plan should indicate how DOD will
address problems that can affect the success of the initiative.

The 1996 TAV implementation plan describes data integrity as
critical to the success of the initiative. The Defense In- transit
Visibility Integration Plan, a part of the TAV initiative, also
describes data quality and timeliness as a challenge in providing
adequate information on in- transit assets. Data quality problems
remain unresolved in TAV supporting systems. At a March

1998 TAV conference, TAV users reported that they lacked
confidence in TAV data and recommended that Departmentwide TAV
managers develop procedures to measure data accuracy and to
provide such procedures to TAV users. Department TAV officials
said that while they were considering the development of a data
quality monitoring process, they would continue to rely on the
components to ensure that data is of sufficient quality for TAV
system users. Only the Army had implemented a data quality
monitoring process for its TAV data sources, in response to
concerns raised by users of Army asset data. Improving data
quality is particularly important to TAV

initiative users because they will be relying on this data to
redistribute assets from one location to another. Departmentwide
and component TAV initiatives were to be supplied data from many
component logistics systems from worldwide DOD locations. Security
is another major issue for TAV users and data providers. We
reported previously that DOD information indicated that hackers
had gained access to its computer systems in 65 percent of 250,000
hacker 6 The Year 2000 computer systems problem results from the
inability of computer programs to interpret

the correct century at the Year 2000 from a date that has only the
last two digits to indicate the year.

B-278430 Page 10 GAO/NSIAD-99-40 Defense Inventory

attacks in 1995. 7 These attacks included logistics systems that
feed data to TAV systems. While DOD has taken some steps to
address problems with systems security, its 1996 TAV plan does not
include an approach or strategy for protecting computer systems
that could be vulnerable to data loss, destruction, or unwanted
browsing. The TAV system uses approaches that have known
vulnerabilities, such as Internet- based applications. Users

and TAV initiative managers have expressed concerns about possible
breaches to security in TAV systems. Through security breaches,
unauthorized users could gain access to critical aspects of
component activities such as the type, quantity, and condition of
weapon systems and ammunition in component locations. Moreover,
DOD has not defined in its plan what information will be
classified or how it will be restricted from unauthorized users.
While we believe that creation of a systems security initiative
only for TAV would not be appropriate, TAV plans should describe

how components such as the Defense Information Systems Agency will
address and resolve these TAV- related security problems and
provide time frames for addressing and resolving them. Agency
officials have stated that the Year 2000 problem is serious, and
they agreed that the problem is not addressed in TAV plans. For
one element of the TAV initiative the Joint TAV initiative DOD
developed a draft Joint

TAV Year 2000 Contingency Plan dated January 29, 1999. However,
the plan does not provide assurance that interim plans have been
developed in the event of a problem with critical systems. For
example, the plan states that Army TAV is the only TAV source for
information on Army retail stocks;

however, the plan does not describe any alternative plans for
obtaining information on Army retail stocks. We have reported that
interim plans are particularly important if an initiative such as
TAV depends on the successful operation of other systems. 8 The
TAV system will access information from over 100 component
logistics systems, which are built on many other lower- level
systems. If a number of these systems were disabled by Year 2000
problems, the scope of information available in the TAV system
could be dramatically affected. For example, according to an

Air Force official, if the two automated systems containing most
of the Air Force's asset information were to cease operations, the
Air Force would still be able to track its assets through its
lower level systems, but the TAV 7 Information Security: Computer
Attacks at Department of Defense Pose Increasing Risks (GAO/AIMD-
96-84, May 22, 1996).

8 Logistics Planning: Opportunities for Enhancing DOD's Logistics
Strategic Plan (GAO/NSIAD-97-28, Dec. 18, 1996).

B-278430 Page 11 GAO/NSIAD-99-40 Defense Inventory

system would lose track of the assets. Air Force supply
inventories were valued at over $27 billion as of September 30,
1997. 9 In prior work, we have reported that DOD lacks key
management and oversight controls to enforce good management
practices, direct resources, and establish a complete picture of
its progress with fixing systems. We have also pointed out that
DOD lacks assurance that components will be prepared should their
systems miss the Year 2000 deadline or fail unexpectedly in
operations. 10 While DOD has since taken action to better address
the Year 2000 challenge, the TAV implementation plan does not
describe how the initiative will ensure that component systems
will be Year 2000 compliant and describe alternatives for
operating

the TAV system in the event of a component system failure.
Strategies for Addressing Initiative Weaknesses

Our prior high- risk reports indicate that key underlying causes
of inventory management problems have not been effectively
addressed in the past. These causes include cultural resistance to
change and service parochialism, the lack of outcome- oriented
goals and performance measures, and the lack of management
accountability for correcting problems and for following through
to confirm performance results. These problems are the underlying
causes of the TAV initiative management weaknesses. The Results
Act offers a model for responding to the serious

systemic challenges to realizing the goals that DOD set for the
TAV initiative. The act provides DOD a framework for management
that includes developing clear goals and performance measures for
the TAV

initiative that would show components' progress in realizing the
culture changes necessary to support TAV goals. Components'
involvement in a Departmentwide TAV strategic plan, along with
measures to determine components' support for initiative goals,
should improve accountability and cause components to better work
together to meet the TAV initiative goals. The Clinger- Cohen Act,
which emphasizes the need to analyze

information technology investments, can also help the Department
to assess whether TAV technology investments are commensurate with
the benefits that will be gained.

9 DOD's Materiel and Distribution Management Fact Book (fiscal
year 1997). 10 Defense Computers: Year 2000 Computer Problems
Threaten DOD Operations (GAO/AIMD-98-72, Apr. 30, 1998).

B-278430 Page 12 GAO/NSIAD-99-40 Defense Inventory

Resistance to Change Limits Progress

As we noted in a prior report describing attempts to make
Departmentwide changes in asset management practices, 11 cultural
resistance to change and service parochialism have contributed to
the difficulty of implementing corrective actions to improve DOD
systems that are at risk. We pointed out that DOD believed that it
was better to overbuy items (just in case) than to manage with the
amount of stock needed (just in time). As a result of this
attitude and other inventory management weaknesses, DOD has
acquired and held too much inventory. This resistance, along with
a reluctance to share assets across components and a lack of an
appropriate system

infrastructure to support and track such transfers, is a major
cause of DOD's problems in realizing its Departmentwide TAV
initiative goals. Initiative and component managers cited the lack
of willingness to transfer assets across the Department as a major
obstacle to improving inventory management practices. They noted
that this problem had led to conflicts about the sharing of data
and providing funding to ensure that quality data was supplied to
the Departmentwide TAV initiative. According to TAV
representatives, components have been reluctant to transfer assets
to the maximum extent and to make necessary policy and system
changes because they had purchased assets with their funds, and
their managers perceive such assets as belonging to the purchasing
DOD component

rather than the Department as a whole. In prior work, we obtained
views from experts in the academic field and officials from nine
large private sector companies that were concerned about inventory
management. 12 These experts indicated that a combination of many
techniques is needed to bring about successful cultural change,
but two are of prime importance. These techniques are

(1) top management's commitment and support for desired values and
beliefs and (2) training to convey desired values and beliefs and
develop the skills needed to implement them. The TAV
implementation plan does not describe how these elements will be
addressed to achieve the needed

changes. In addition, developing and implementing appropriate
performance measures as a means to support needed cultural change,
such as the dollar values of interdepartmental asset transfers,
would create the 11 Organizational Culture: Use of Training to
Help Change DOD Inventory Management Culture (GAO/NSIAD-94-193,
Aug. 30, 1994). 12 Organizational Culture: Techniques Companies
Use to Perpetuate or Change Beliefs and Values (GAO/NSIAD-92-105,
Feb. 27, 1992).

B-278430 Page 13 GAO/NSIAD-99-40 Defense Inventory

needed framework for tracking progress in diminishing components'
parochialism.

Results Act and ClingerCohen Act Can Provide a Useful Management
Framework for Change

DOD recognized that it was crucial to have outcome- oriented
strategic and performance plans to guide implementation of the TAV
initiative and help overcome major inventory management problems.
In its 1998 Logistics Strategic Plan, the Deputy Under Secretary
of Defense (Logistics) stated that executive agents and related
components must develop and submit strategic and supporting plans
for logistics areas under their responsibility and that the plans'
content and format were to be governed by Results Act provisions.
However, this has not yet been accomplished for the TAV

initiative. DOD lacks a Departmentwide strategic plan with clear,
outcome- oriented goals and performance measures to guide
implementation of the TAV initiative. The 1998 Logistics Strategic
Plan guidance required that executive agents

develop plans to include actions to be taken, completion dates,
and resource requirements to satisfy Results Act requirements.
These principles reflect the outcome- oriented principles of the
Results Act, which

the Congress anticipated would be institutionalized and practiced
at all organizational levels in federal agencies. Outcome-
oriented principles include (1) establishing broad general
initiative goals and quantifiable, measurable, outcome- oriented
performance goals and related measures; (2) developing strategies
for achieving the goals, including strategies for overcoming or
mitigating major impediments to goal achievement; (3) ensuring
that goals at lower organizational levels align with and support
broad initiative goals; and (4) identifying the resources that
will be required to achieve goals. Such an approach could
determine component progress with culture change by measuring
inter- component asset sharing. Such an approach could also
mitigate component parochialism and make the best use of
Department resources.

DOD does not routinely link its performance measures to specific
organizational units or individuals that have sufficient
flexibility, discretion, and authority to accomplish desired
results. In commenting on

a draft of this report, DOD stated that TAV should not be managed
as a stand- alone initiative. This position is inconsistent with
its descriptions of the TAV initiative in DOD documents such as
its Results Act reports to the

President and the Congress, the 1998 Logistics Strategic Plan, and
the Defense Reform Initiative. Furthermore, such a position has
resulted in little centralized direction to move components toward
meeting

B-278430 Page 14 GAO/NSIAD-99-40 Defense Inventory

Department goals set for the TAV initiative. We found no outcome-
oriented goals or performance measures assigned to specific
components to measure their progress in using the TAV capability.
The lack of performance measures deters accountability for
components. Improved accountability would help guarantee that
component efforts remain

focused on supporting Department goals set for the TAV initiative.
Without clear, hierarchically linked goals and performance
measures that are supported by components, DOD cannot adequately
motivate components to better work together to meet Departmentwide
TAV goals. We found, for example, that components were developing
and implementing their own TAV capabilities, but they believed
that they owned the assets, and they would remain reluctant to
transfer assets to other components unless DOD transferred
ownership to a central DOD authority. The Results Act, with its
strategic planning and reporting requirements,

provides a framework for improving the management of the TAV
initiative. Considering the significance of DOD's problems in
improving its asset management through the TAV initiative, we
believe modeling TAV planning against Results Act requirements
would improve the chances of successful implementation of the
initiative. Furthermore, TAV initiative component accountability
and performance

would be improved by following Clinger- Cohen Act elements calling
for investment analyses that focus on Department goals set for the
TAV initiative. Although the TAV implementation plan states that
an economic analysis of initiative costs and benefits would be
done, the TAV initiative

lacked investment analyses that are needed to support financial
decisions and establish performance goals for investing in the TAV
initiative. The Clinger- Cohen Act of 1996 requires performance-
based and results- oriented decision- making for all major
investments in information technology. The act requires agencies
to establish goals for improving efficiency through the effective
use of information technology and to develop performance measures
to assess how well information technology investments support
agency initiatives. The act also requires that major systems
development initiatives have investment analyses. Conclusions It
is uncertain whether DOD will ultimately achieve its TAV
initiative goals. While DOD has achieved some successes through
its current effort, it has

minimal information for assessing the initiative's status overall,
and the effort is weakened by inadequate strategic and
implementation planning. Many of the initiative's problems have
resulted from long- standing

B-278430 Page 15 GAO/NSIAD-99-40 Defense Inventory

management challenges that DOD encounters as it works to implement
new initiatives that span components. These challenges include
cultural resistance to change and service parochialism, the lack
of outcome- oriented goals and performance measures, and the lack
of management accountability. The Results Act and the Clinger-
Cohen Act provide effective guidance for developing clear goals
and performance measures that are linked to and supported by
components and would allow

DOD to address these challenges. Such an approach is also required
in DOD's 1998 Logistics Strategic Plan for initiatives such as
TAV. Recommendations We recommend that the Secretary of Defense
direct that actions be taken to develop a Departmentwide TAV
strategic plan and associated component implementation plans based
on the outcome- oriented management principles embodied in the
Results Act and the Clinger- Cohen Act; such plans must be agreed
to and supported by relevant components. Specifically, all plans
should

 describe a complete management structure and officials (including
component officials) that will be accountable for ensuring the
timely success of the TAV initiative;  describe how the initiative
will be incorporated into DOD work

processes in support of DOD's TAV performance goals and how
appropriate training will be put in place to support the new work
processes and the related cultural change that must be made to
support Departmentwide asset sharing;

 identify complete resource requirements for implementing the TAV
initiative and include related investment analyses that show how
the major information technology investments will support TAV
initiative goals;  identify how Departmentwide systems issues that
affect implementation of TAV will be addressed; and

 establish outcome- oriented TAV initiative goals and performance
measures for all relevant components and closely link the measures
to improvement targets established in documents such as DOD's
Logistics Strategic Plan and the Results Act Performance Plan in
the Annual Report to the President and the Congress.

B-278430 Page 16 GAO/NSIAD-99-40 Defense Inventory

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation

In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD agreed with our
recommendation to follow the principles embodied in the Results
Act and the Clinger- Cohen Act 13 regarding the TAV initiative.
However, DOD did not describe what action it planned to take on
our recommendation to develop a Departmentwide TAV strategic plan
to guide component implementation plans using the Results Act
framework. DOD's comments are included in their entirety as
appendix I.

DOD stated that it has not created a formal Departmentwide TAV
program but that better asset management will be attained by each
component through improvement to its business and inventory
systems and databases.

DOD stated that it plans to ensure that each component addresses
increased asset visibility as part of its overall logistics supply
chain modernization, but in the context of improved inventory
management practices. DOD also stated that to the extent that the
modernization of

inventory management practices requires information technology
investments, DOD will adhere to the principles of the Clinger-
Cohen Act and that the appropriate management structures are in
place for implementation. DOD also stated that it plans to
continue to monitor progress in achieving the TAV goals in the
Results Act Annual Performance Plan for fiscal year 2000 as part
of its overall acquisition reform initiative.

DOD officials stated that TAV has been referred to as a program
for convenience. Although TAV is described as a program in the
Department's Results Act Performance Plan for fiscal year 2000 in
its 1999 Annual Report to the President and the Congress, we
modified our report to reflect DOD's

comments and now describe TAV as an initiative. Given the
Department's approach to managing the TAV initiative, it is
unclear how the goals, objectives, and time lines described in
major Department documents such as its Results Act Performance
Plan for the

year 2000 will be met. Currently, components lack plans that
explain how they would integrate TAV into their work processes to
support transfers of assets to other components, and they did not
provide time frames for realizing the goals set for TAV in
Department planning documents. Therefore, we continue to believe
that the Secretary of Defense should

develop a Departmentwide strategic plan and associated component
13 The Department refers to the Clinger- Cohen Act as the
Information Technology Management Reform Act (ITMRA). The ITMRA
was later renamed the Clinger- Cohen Act to honor the principals
of the ITMRA.

B-278430 Page 17 GAO/NSIAD-99-40 Defense Inventory

implementation plans based on the principles embodied in the
Results Act and the Clinger- Cohen Act.

Appendix II describes our objectives, scope, and methodology for
this report. Appendix III describes the TAV initiatives and
programs under way in various components. Appendix IV describes
Department plans that have been made to support asset- tracking
efforts, with cited completion dates. Unless you publicly announce
its contents earlier, we plan no further

distribution of this report until 10 days after its issue date. At
that time, we will send copies of this report to Senator Pete V.
Domenici, Senator Daniel K. Inouye, Senator Frank R. Lautenberg,
Senator Carl Levin, Senator Joseph I. Lieberman, Senator Ted
Stevens, Senator Fred Thompson, and Senator John Warner and to
Representative Dan Burton, Representative John R. Kasich,
Representative Jerry Lewis, Representative John P. Murtha,
Representative David Obey, Representative Ike Skelton,
Representative Floyd Spence, Representative John M. Spratt, Jr.,
Representative Henry A. Waxman, and Representative C. W. Bill
Young in their capacities as Chair or Ranking Minority Member of
Senate and House Committees and

Subcommittees. We are also sending copies of this report to the
Honorable William S. Cohen, Secretary of Defense; the Honorable
Louis Caldera, Secretary of the Army; the Honorable Richard
Danzig, Secretary of the Navy; General Charles C. Krulak,
Commandant of the Marine Corps; F. Whitten Peters, Acting
Secretary of the Air Force; Air Force General Charles Robertson,
Commander in Chief, U. S. Transportation Command;

Army Lieutenant General Henry T. Glisson, Director, DLA; and the
Honorable Jacob J. Lew, Director, Office of Management and Budget.
Copies will also be made available to others upon request.

B-278430 Page 18 GAO/NSIAD-99-40 Defense Inventory

Please contact me at (202) 512- 8412 if you or your staff have any
questions about this report. The major contributors to this report
are listed in appendix V. Sincerely yours,

David R. Warren Director Defense Management Issues

B-278430 Page 19 GAO/NSIAD-99-40 Defense Inventory

Page 20 GAO/NSIAD-99-40 Defense Inventory

Contents Letter 1 Appendix I Comments From the Department of
Defense

22 Appendix II Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

25 Appendix III TAV Initiatives Across DOD

27 Appendix IV History of Department Plans to Realize TAV

31 Appendix V Major Contributors to This Report

33 Related GAO Products 35 Figures Figure III. 1: Departmentwide
TAV Organization 27

Contents Page 21 GAO/NSIAD-99-40 Defense Inventory Abbreviations

DLA Defense Logistics Agency DOD Department of Defense NPR
National Performance Review TAV Total Asset Visibility

Page 22 GAO/NSIAD-99-40 Defense Inventory

Appendix I Comments From the Department of Defense Appendi x I

Appendix I Comments From the Department of Defense

Page 23 GAO/NSIAD-99-40 Defense Inventory

Appendix I Comments From the Department of Defense

Page 24 GAO/NSIAD-99-40 Defense Inventory

Now on pp. 3, 15.

Page 25 GAO/NSIAD-99-40 Defense Inventory

Appendix II Objectives, Scope, and Methodology Appendi x I I

As your Subcommittee requested, we reviewed the Department of
Defense's (DOD) implementation of its Total Asset Visibility (TAV)
initiative. Specifically, we reviewed (1) the difficulty in
determining the status of the initiative's implementation, (2)
planning weaknesses that are affecting initiative implementation,
and (3) strategies for addressing those weaknesses.

We interviewed and reviewed documents from DOD officials and
contractors that are implementing TAV across DOD and within the
military components; officials that are implementing initiatives
supporting TAV; and officials responsible for logistics
modernization initiatives within the military components.
Additionally, we reviewed progress reports and

briefings on TAV implementation and other related information. We
did not independently verify the accuracy of this information. We
also did not validate the actual fielding of the TAV capability in
theaters of operation as described by agency officials for this
report. However, we observed demonstrations of the Joint TAV, the
Army, and the Navy TAV capabilities. We also attended portions of
the 5- day TAV users' conference held at the Xerox Document
University in Virginia in March 1998.

We interviewed officials and gathered relevant documentation for
our review at the following locations:

 Joint TAV Office within the Office of the Deputy Under Secretary
of Defense (Logistics), Alexandria, Virginia;  Navy TAV initiative
within the Office of the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for
Logistics, Supply Programs and Policy Division, Arlington,
Virginia;

 Army TAV initiative within the Army's Office of the Deputy Chief
of Staff for Logistics, Logistics Integration Agency, Alexandria,
Virginia;  Army TAV System Development Group, Logistics Support
Activity, Huntsville, Alabama;  Navy TAV Systems Development
Group, Naval Inventory Control Point,

Mechanicsburg, Pennsylvania;  Transportation Command Directorate
of Operations and Logistics, Scott Air Force Base, Illinois;
Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) Office of Materiel Management and
the

Air Force Supply, Fuels, and Procurement Division, Fort Belvoir,
Virginia; and  Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Washington, D.
C.

Appendix II Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

Page 26 GAO/NSIAD-99-40 Defense Inventory

To identify strategies for improving the TAV initiative's
implementation, we reviewed and analyzed DOD and component
strategic and implementation plans maintained in the Joint TAV
Office, the U. S. Transportation Command, and the military
components. In analyzing the plans, we applied fundamental
strategic planning practices identified in our prior work on this
topic, including our prior reports that addressed the
implementation of strategic management processes in government
agencies, including approaches to the Results Act. DOD recognizes
the need for a TAV

strategic plan and finalized a Joint TAV plan in January 1999.
However, since the Joint TAV strategic plan was oriented on
theater asset visibility, we focused our review of planning
efforts on DOD's 1996 implementation plan, which claimed to be a
Departmentwide TAV implementation plan.

We conducted our work between July 1997 and January 1999 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.

Page 27 GAO/NSIAD-99-40 Defense Inventory

Appendix III TAV Initiatives Across DOD Appendi x I I I

The Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Logistics) is responsible
for the TAV initiative. The Director, DLA, is the Executive Agent
charged with coordinating asset- tracking initiatives across the
services and DOD. The Executive Agent role was transferred to the
DLA Director from the Army

Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics effective June 1, 1998. The
transfer was done, according to the Acting Deputy Under Secretary
of Defense (Logistics), because DLA was better positioned to
create work processes and supporting systems that meet DOD
logistics requirements. The Executive Agent is supported by a
Joint TAV Office, which is led by a Director and supported by
representatives from each major component.

The Joint TAV Office monitors execution of the TAV implementation
plan and advises key component executives on the implementation
status.

Figure III. 1: Departmentwide TAV Organization

Source: DOD. Deputy Under Secretary

of Defense (Logistics) Deputy Under Secretary

of Defense (Logistics) Army Army Marine

Corps Marine

Corps Navy Navy Air Force Air

Force DLA DLA TRANSCOM TRANSCOM Director, Defense Logistics
Agency, Executive Agent

Director, Defense Logistics Agency, Executive Agent

Director, Joint TAV Office

Director, Joint TAV Office

Appendix III TAV Initiatives Across DOD

Page 28 GAO/NSIAD-99-40 Defense Inventory

Several related initiatives and programs support the development
of TAV across the Department. The Army TAV program is led by the
Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics, and the Navy TAV program
is led by the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Logistics.
According to TAV officials, each component is also working with
the Joint TAV Office to facilitate access to assets for
Departmentwide use. The Departmentwide TAV initiative is supported
by a number of component efforts. Those major efforts are

described in the following sections. Joint Total Asset Visibility

The Joint TAV program is led by the Joint TAV Office. The Office
is to provide users with timely and accurate information on the
location, status, and identity of units, personnel, equipment, and
supplies. The Office's role is to obtain access to data from
component systems, convert the data into useful information, and
present the information to customers across all components. The
Office's program involves major subinitiatives for tracking the
status of personnel, medical assets, ammunition, and supplies.

Global Transportation Network

The Global Transportation Network is led by the U. S.
Transportation Command. The network is the principal tool for
tracking DOD's in- transit assets. It provides the ability to
track the identity, status, and location of

DOD unit and nonunit cargo, passengers, patients, forces, and
military and commercial airlift, sealift, and surface assets from
origin to destination during peace, contingencies, and war. The
network is to collect, integrate, and distribute transportation
information to commanders in chief, the services, and other DOD
customers, giving visibility of a requirement when it is initiated
and providing continuous visibility as it moves through the

transportation system. Automatic Identification Technology

The automatic identification technology effort is led by DLA. The
effort involves using many technologies, including bar codes,
magnetic stripes, integrated circuit boards, optical memory cards,
radio frequency identification tags, and orbiting satellites, to
track the location of assets. The effort also includes the
hardware and software required to read information from the
technologies and integrate that information with other logistics
data.

Appendix III TAV Initiatives Across DOD

Page 29 GAO/NSIAD-99-40 Defense Inventory

Army Total Asset Visibility

The Army TAV capability is an automated tool that is managed by
the Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics. It is designed to improve
the ability of soldiers, logisticians, and managers to obtain and
act on the information about the location, quantity, condition,
and movement of assets through the Army logistics pipeline.
Fielding of the tool, completed in 1996, provides visibility of 99
percent of Army inventories across all classes of supply,
according to the Army. Prototypes of the tool were used in
Somalia,

Rwanda, and Haiti and were also being used to support military
operations in Bosnia. According to the Army, some of the key
benefits of the tool include easier distribution of assets,
reduced inventories and receipt processing times, and fewer
duplicate requisitions due to improved asset

tracking. Navy Total Asset Visibility

The Navy TAV program is led by the Deputy Chief of Naval
Operations for Logistics. In 1992, the Navy piloted TAV through
its Virtual Master Stock Item Record Program. This program
consolidated Navy assets into one database that enabled item
managers to use and redistribute assets efficiently. The Navy
later partnered with DLA to provide the Agency

access to Navy assets. The program is designed to provide the Navy
the ability to track and access primarily secondary inventory,
including ammunition. According to the Navy, it has targeted
numerous TAV capabilities, including visibility of assets on ships
and inventory control point/ defense reutilization and marketing
service linkage to assets

categorized for disposal. Air Force Total Asset Visibility

The Air Force TAV efforts are coordinated through the Air Force
Supply, Fuels, and Procurement Division and involve refining its
two servicewide asset visibility systems dealing with wholesale
and retail assets. The Air Force also redistributes excess
consumable assets both internally and to other services within the
same theater of operation. According to the Air Force, it has
visibility and access to Air Force- managed assets at its

wholesale and retail activities and at repair contractor
facilities and storage distribution points.

Marine Corps Total Asset Visibility

The Marine Corps TAV effort is led by the Installations and
Logistics Department. The Corps is creating a logistics
information data warehouse to share data and provide an overall
TAV capability within the Corps. The

Appendix III TAV Initiatives Across DOD

Page 30 GAO/NSIAD-99-40 Defense Inventory

Marine Corps describes in its fiscal year 1998 Installations and
Logistics Campaign Plan the concepts for acquiring TAV
capabilities in the future. TAV is also a required operational
capability within the Marine Corps Master Plan.

Defense Logistics Agency TAV

The Defense Logistics Agency coordinates TAV efforts through its
Office of Materiel Management. The Agency uses data generated by
some component facilities to support its lateral redistribution
and procurement offset initiatives by providing its item managers
access to these cross

component asset- tracking capabilities. DLA is also the Executive
Agent for the Joint TAV initiative and the Department's overall
automated identification technology effort.

Page 31 GAO/NSIAD-99-40 Defense Inventory

Appendix IV History of Department Plans to Realize TAV Appe ndi x
I V

Obtaining total asset visibility has been a DOD goal since at
least 1972. Attempts at reaching this goal have repeatedly failed
and deadlines have slipped. In 1972 DOD expected to implement an
early version of TAV by

1980, but did not. DOD again developed a plan in 1992 with the
target of realizing TAV by 1995; this attempt at TAV was again not
fulfilled. The current plan the May 1996 Defense TAV
Implementation Plan contains completion dates for several project
elements but no target date for achieving total asset visibility.
However, the 1998 DOD Logistics Strategic Plan does state that
timely, accurate information for 90 percent of Department assets
would be available on the TAV system by 2000 and for

100 percent of Department assets by 2004. a DOD Regulation 4140.1-
R, chapter 4, Asset Management.

Name/ date of plan Plan objectives Target completion date
Logistics Systems Plan (1972) Eliminate unnecessary duplication of
inventories and establish common use of inventories wherever
operationally acceptable and economically beneficial. Material
managers will exercise the capability to effectively and
comprehensively track and control inventories. These changes were
to be realized through improvements to interservicing and materiel
management planning.

1980 DOD Total Asset Visibility Plan (1992) Provide managers the
capability to have access to and act on timely and accurate
information about the location, quantity, condition, movement, and
status of DOD materiel assets.

1995 DOD TAV Implementation Plan (1996)

Expands the scope of the 1992 plan to include personnel and
medical inventories, but the core targets for asset tracking
remained the same. No clear completion date 1998 DOD Logistics
Strategic Plan Meet total asset tracking requirements established
in DOD regulation on asset

management. a 2004

Appendix IV History of Department Plans to Realize TAV

Page 32 GAO/NSIAD-99-40 Defense Inventory

Page 33 GAO/NSIAD-99-40 Defense Inventory

Appendix V Major Contributors to This Report Appe ndi x V

National Security and International Affairs Division, Washington,
D. C.

Charles I. Patton, Jr. Lawson (Rick) Gist, Jr. B. Scott Pettis
Robert R. Poetta Leo G. Clarke III Kenneth Knouse James Murphy F.
Earl Morrison

Appendix V Major Contributors to This Report

Page 34 GAO/NSIAD-99-40 Defense Inventory

Page 35 GAO/NSIAD-99-40 Defense Inventory

Related GAO Products Appendi x VI

Navy Inventory Management: Improvements Needed to Prevent Excess
Purchases (GAO/NSIAD-98-86, Apr. 30, 1998). Defense Computers:
Year 2000 Computer Problems Threaten DOD Operations (GAO/AIMD-98-
72, Apr. 30, 1998).

Department of Defense: Financial Audits Highlight Continuing
Challenges to Correct Serious Financial Management Problems
(GAO/T-AIMD-98-158, Apr. 16, 1998). Inventory Management: DOD Can
Build on Progress by Using Best Practices for Reparable Parts
(GAO/NSIAD-98-97, Feb. 27, 1998).

Managing for Results: Agencies' Annual Performance Plans Can Help
Address Strategic Planning Challenges (GAO/GGD-98-44, Jan. 30,
1998).

Army Logistics System: Opportunities to Improve the Accuracy of
the Army's Major Equipment Item System (GAO/AIMD-98-17, Jan. 23,
1998). Defense Inventory Management: Expanding Use of Best
Practices for Hardware Items Can Reduce Logistics Costs
(GAO/NSIAD-98-47, Jan. 20, 1998).

Financial Reporting: DOD's Fiscal Year 1996 Financial Statements
Inventory Reporting Does Not Meet Standards (GAO/AIMD-98-16, Dec.
24, 1997). Defense Inventory: Inadequate Controls Over Air Force
Suspended Stocks (GAO/NSIAD-98-29, Dec. 22, 1997).

Defense IRM: Poor Implementation of Management Controls Has Put
Migration Strategy at Risk (GAO/AIMD-98-5, Oct. 20, 1997). Defense
Inventory: Management of Surplus Usable Aircraft Parts Can Be
Improved (GAO/NSIAD-98-7, Oct. 2, 1997). Managing for Results:
Critical Issues for Improving Federal Agencies' Strategic Plans
(GAO/GGD-97-180, Sept. 16, 1997).

Defense Computers: Improvements to DOD Systems Inventory Needed
for Year 2000 Effort (GAO/AIMD-97-112, Aug. 13, 1997).

Page 36 GAO/NSIAD-99-40 Defense Inventory

Defense Computers: DFAS Faces Challenges in Solving the Year 2000
Problem (GAO/AIMD-97-117, Aug. 11, 1997). DOD's Draft Strategic
Plan (GAO/NSIAD-97-219R, Aug. 5, 1997). Inventory Management: The
Army Could Reduce Logistics Costs for Aviation Parts by Adopting
Best Practices (GAO/NSIAD-97-82, Apr. 15, 1997).

Defense Logistics: Much of the Inventory Exceeds Current Needs
(GAO/NSIAD-97-71, Feb. 28, 1997). High- Risk Series: Defense
Inventory Management (GAO/HR-97-5, Feb. 1997).

DOD's GPRA Implementation (GAO/ NSIAD/ GGD- 97- 65R, Jan. 31,
1997). Defense Inventory: Spare and Repair Parts Inventory Costs
Can Be Reduced (GAO/NSIAD-97-47, Jan. 17, 1997).

Logistics Planning: Opportunities for Enhancing DOD's Logistics
Strategic Plan (GAO/NSIAD-97-28, Dec. 18, 1996).

Defense IRM: Critical Risks Facing New Material Management
Strategy (GAO/AIMD-96-109, Sept. 6, 1996). Navy Financial
Management: Improved Management of Operating Materials and
Supplies Could Yield Significant Savings (GAO/AIMD-96-94, Aug. 16,
1996).

Inventory Management: Adopting Best Practices Could Enhance Navy
Efforts to Achieve Efficiencies and Savings (GAO/NSIAD-96-156,
July 12, 1996).

Management Reform: Completion Status of Agency Actions Under the
National Performance Review (GAO/GGD-96-94, June 12, 1996).

Defense Logistics: Requirement Determinations for Aviation Spare
Parts Need to Be Improved (GAO/NSIAD-96-70, Mar. 19, 1996).

Managing for Results: Achieving GPRA's Objectives Requires Strong
Congressional Role (GAO/T-GGD-96-79, Mar. 6, 1996).

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