Index


Military Operations: Status of DOD's Efforts to Develop Future
Warfighting Capability (Letter Report, 03/31/99, GAO/NSIAD-99-64).

Pursuant to a legislative requirement, GAO provided information on the
Department of Defense's (DOD) efforts to develop future warfighting
capability, focusing on the: (1) status of DOD's efforts to implement
its joint experimentation program; (2) factors that GAO believes
contribute to the success of a joint experimentation program; and (3)
extent of DOD's support for future warfighting.

GAO noted that: (1) DOD is beginning to implement its future warfighting
vision and joint experimentation, both of which are formidable efforts;
(2) it has done a significant amount of work in establishing the
processes to implement both efforts, but it is too early to assess their
success; (3) Joint Vision (JV) 2010 is the conceptual template for
future joint warfighting; (4) to provide joint policy and guidance for
the implementation of JV 2010 in December 1998, the Joint Staff
published the Joint Vision Implementation Master Plan; (5) the Chairman,
Joint Chiefs of Staff, is responsible for JV 2010 implementation; (6)
the U.S. Atlantic Command (USACOM), designated by the Secretary of
Defense as the executive agent for joint experimentation, is responsible
for concept development, assessment, and experimentation within the
program to implement JV 2010; (7) USACOM's role as executive agent for
joint experimentation is less than a year old; (8) in that time, it has
developed a plan to implement its responsibilities, which includes a
detailed joint experimentation process and an organization to implement
it; (9) it also has developed its first Joint Experimentation Campaign
Plan (CPLAN), which identifies the first advanced warfighting concepts
and supporting experimentation events that will be undertaken during
fiscal years 1999-2001; (10) a key early element of its CPLAN is the
proof of process experiment, scheduled for completion in November 1999,
which will be used to validate the experimentation process; (11) USACOM
is still building its staff and the first experiment events are just
beginning; (12) because it takes time to staff a new organization,
USACOM officials report that in their first year of operation they have
not been able to do as much as they had hoped to do; (13) since
experiments are just beginning and the proof of process experiment will
not be completed until late 1999, necessary data will not be available
for at least a year for anyone to make a preliminary assessment of how
well the joint experimentation process is working in practice and for
several years to thoroughly assess whether joint experimentation is
achieving the results envisioned by the Secretary of Defense and
Congress; and (14) to aid the Senate Committee on Armed Services in its
oversight of joint experimentation in the interim, GAO has identified
what it believes are important initial factors in a successful joint
experimentation program.

--------------------------- Indexing Terms -----------------------------

 REPORTNUM:  NSIAD-99-64
     TITLE:  Military Operations: Status of DOD's Efforts to Develop 
             Future Warfighting Capability
      DATE:  03/31/99
   SUBJECT:  Defense operations
             Combat readiness
             Interagency relations
             Military training
             Defense capabilities
             Defense contingency planning
IDENTIFIER:  JCS Joint Vision 2010
             JCS Joint Vision Implementation Master Plan
             JCS Joint Experimentation Campaign Plan
             DOD Future Years Defense Program
             JCS Joint Experimentation Program
             JCS Unified Command Plan
             
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covers1-2.book GAO United States General Accounting Office

Report to the Chairman, Committee on Armed Services, U. S. Senate

March 1999 MILITARY OPERATIONS

Status of DOD's Efforts to Develop Future Warfighting Capability




GAO/NSIAD-99-64

  GAO/NSIAD-99-64

United States General Accounting Office Washington, D. C. 20548
Lett er

Page 1 GAO/NSIAD-99-64 Military Operations

GAO

National Security and International Affairs Division

B-280338 Letter March 31, 1999 The Honorable John Warner Chairman,
Committee on

Armed Services United States Senate

Dear Mr. Chairman: The Department of Defense (DOD) is implementing
a plan designed to meet the critical security challenges of the
future by transforming the Armed Forces into a joint force capable
of meeting the requirements of 21 st century operations. A key
element of achieving this transformation is the conduct of joint
warfighting experimentation, which involves assessing

joint warfighting concepts that could lead to changes to doctrine,
organization, training and education, materiel, leadership, and
personnel (DOTMLP). As agreed with your office, this letter
responds to the Senate Committee on Armed Services' report on the
fiscal year 1999 DOD Authorization Act and (1) describes the
status of DOD's efforts to implement its joint experimentation
program, (2) identifies some of the

factors that we believe contribute to the success of a joint
experimentation program, and (3) provides answers to the issues
posed in the report regarding the extent of DOD's support for
future warfighting.

Results in Brief DOD is beginning to implement its future
warfighting vision and joint experimentation, both of which are
formidable efforts. It has done a significant amount of work in
establishing the processes to implement both efforts, but it is
too early to assess their success. Joint Vision (JV) 2010 is the
conceptual template for future joint warfighting. To provide joint
policy and guidance for the implementation of JV 2010 in December
1998, the Joint Staff published the Joint Vision Implementation
Master Plan (JIMP). The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), is
responsible for JV 2010 implementation. The U. S. Atlantic Command
(USACOM), designated by the Secretary of Defense as executive
agent for joint experimentation, is responsible for concept
development, assessment, and experimentation

within the program to implement JV 2010. USACOM's role as
executive agent for joint experimentation is less than a year old.
In that time, it has developed a plan to implement its
responsibilities, which includes a detailed joint experimentation
process and an organization to implement it. It also has developed
its first Joint

B-280338 Page 2 GAO/NSIAD-99-64 Military Operations

Experimentation Campaign Plan (CPLAN), which identifies the first
advanced warfighting concepts and supporting experimentation
events that will be undertaken during fiscal years 1999- 2001. A
key early element of its CPLAN is the proof of process experiment,
scheduled for completion in November 1999, which will be used to
validate the experimentation process. USACOM is still building its
staff and the first experiment events are just beginning. Because
it takes time to staff a new organization, USACOM officials report
that in their first year of operation they have not been able to
do as much as they had hoped to do.

Since experiments are just beginning in 1999 and the proof of
process experiment will not be completed until late 1999,
necessary data will not be available for at least a year for
anyone to make a preliminary assessment of how well the joint
experimentation process is working in practice and for several
years to thoroughly assess whether joint experimentation is
achieving the results envisioned by the Secretary of Defense and
the Congress. To aid the Committee in its oversight of joint
experimentation in the interim, we have identified what we believe
are important initial factors in a successful joint
experimentation program. These factors include whether joint
experimentation is becoming institutionalized within DOD,

the extent to which joint experimentation includes exploring
changes in doctrine and organization as well as technology, and
the extent to which USACOM is establishing linkages with other DOD
organizations exploring future warfighting. This last factor is
particularly important since USACOM places heavy emphasis on
leveraging other DOD components' experimentation.

The Committee's report directed us to examine a number of issues
related to the extent of DOD's support for implementing JV 2010,
including the extent to which it is supported by the JIMP, the
Secretary of Defense's and CJCS's guidance on DOD priorities, and
the defense science and technology plans. Table 1 states the
issues and provides a summary of our responses. Our detailed
responses are in appendixes I through VI.

B-280338 Page 3 GAO/NSIAD-99-64 Military Operations

Table 1: JV 2010 and Joint Experimentation Issues and Our Answers

Source: GAO.

Issue Answer

Does the JIMP reflect a viable time line and adequate resources to
achieve the operational concepts of the vision by 2010 and
incorporate the operational challenges and desired force
characteristics described in the report of the National Defense
Panel (NDP); is funding for the execution of the JV 2010
assessment roadmaps adequately reflected in the Future Years
Defense Program (FYDP); and are service plans for experimentation
activities consistent with these roadmaps?

For the most part. The JIMP provides joint policy and guidance to
implement JV 2010. It does not nor was it intended, to discuss
time lines and resources. The JIMP describes the year 2010 as a
way point rather than an end point for achieving JV 2010
capabilities. The JIMP incorporates all of the NDP's operational
challenges and desired force characteristics. Responsibility for
the assessment roadmaps was transferred to USACOM as executive
agent for joint experimentation. The fiscal years 2000- 2005 FYDP
will contain funding for USACOM, whose planned experiments should
be consistent with the services' events since USACOM plans to
utilize them. (See app. I.) Is the plan for the development of
joint enablers adequate to implement the operational concepts of
JV 2010 by 2010? No, but it is a beginning. Joint enablers such as
command, control, communications, computers, intelligence,
surveillance, and

reconnaissance comprise over half of the JIMP's 72 desired
operational capabilities to implement JV 2010. USACOM's experiment
plan begins to address joint enablers but does not go beyond 2001.
(See app. II.)

Are the fielding of advanced technologies, the preparation of
forces, and the funding support for the joint experimentation plan
reflected in the Defense Planning Guidance for fiscal years 2000
through 2005 and the subsequent budget and planning review process

documents? They are not reflected in most recent documents but are
expected to be reflected in future documents. While the defense
guidance contains considerable discussion of JV 2010, it and
associated budget and planning review process products mostly make
limited or no mention of joint experimentation or the fielding of
advanced technology and preparation of forces for the joint
experimentation

plan. This is partly due to these documents preceding the joint
experimentation program. They are expected to discuss joint
experimentation in 1999. There is no complete picture of funding
support for joint experimentation, JV 2010, and defense
transformation activities. (See app. III.)

What are the views in the modeling and simulation community as to
the capability and limitations of existing and developing models
and simulations to support the joint experimentation process?

The ability to model or simulate important elements of future
warfighting is not within DOD's current capability. It may be a
decade or more before such capabilities exist. (See app. IV.)

Do the Defense Science and Technology Strategy, the Basic Research
Plan, the Defense Technology Area Plan, and the Joint Warfighting
Science and Technology Plan synchronize the fielding of advanced
technologies across the services to support the

development of joint capabilities? To a great extent. The plans
are linked to each other. We found almost all of the key future
technology needs for the Army and Navy reflected in these plans.
(See app. V.)

How does USACOM's charter compare to the Joint Forces Command
recommended by the NDP and what is USACOM's capability to
implement its charter? While the charter establishing USACOM as
executive agent for joint

experimentation did not address any of the NDP recommendations
regarding the framework for a Joint Forces Command, USACOM's Joint
Experimentation Implementation Plan (IPLAN) followed the framework
for 10 of the 17 recommendations and part of an 11 th
recommendation. USACOM has established a joint

experimentation process and is beginning to implement it. (See
app. VI.)

B-280338 Page 4 GAO/NSIAD-99-64 Military Operations

Background On May 1, 1996, the CJCS approved a document entitled
Joint Vision 2010. This document responded to a recommendation in
the Commission on

Roles and Missions' May 1995 report that the CJCS propose a joint
warfighting vision to help guide service force development
efforts. It, along with future concepts documents, is to guide
joint warfighting experimentation. JV 2010 describes how
technological innovations and information superiority will allow
the services to use four new operational concepts dominant
maneuver, precision engagement, full dimensional

protection, and focused logistics in future conflicts. The synergy
of these new concepts is described as defining the end state of
the vision full spectrum dominance, the ability to dominate the
full range of military operations from humanitarian assistance,
through peace operations, up to

and into the highest intensity conflict. The Joint Staff is
responsible for overseeing JV 2010 implementation. To provide
further guidance for achieving future joint warfighting
capabilities, in December 1998 the Joint Staff published the JIMP.
On May 15, 1998, the Secretary of Defense chartered USACOM to
serve as the DOD executive agent for joint experimentation,
effective October 1, 1998, and directed the development of an
implementation plan. As

executive agent, USACOM is to plan, conduct, and assess joint
experiments, synchronize service experimentation efforts, and
provide best value- added recommendations for changes to DOTMLP
based on the

results of those experiments. The charter made USACOM responsible
for concept development, assessment, and experimentation within
the CJCS program to implement JV 2010 and future warfighting
visions.

USACOM Is Making Progress in Establishing a Joint

Experimentation Program

USACOM has had to perform three critical tasks concurrently to
meet its responsibilities as executive agent for joint
experimentation create a joint experimentation capability, develop
a joint experimentation plan, and

execute the plan. In anticipation of, and to accomplish, this
mission, it began working on the preparation phase in April 1998,
with the establishment of the joint experimentation concept team.
This team developed the IPLAN and the joint experimentation
process, and on September 1, 1998, this team became the USACOM
Joint Experimentation (J9) Directorate. Both the organization and
the process will evolve as the joint experimentation program
matures.

USACOM has taken a number of steps to implement its joint
experimentation responsibilities. In addition to developing the
IPLAN and

B-280338 Page 5 GAO/NSIAD-99-64 Military Operations

the joint experimentation process, it has identified resource
requirements, completed the first CPLAN, and begun preparation for
the first experiments.

The Joint Experimentation Process

The IPLAN, dated July 14, 1998, documents USACOM's concept for
executing its mission. It establishes an eight- element
experimentation process and describes how USACOM will task
organize to accomplish the mission (see table 2).

Table 2: Elements of the Joint Experimentation Process

Source: USACOM's IPLAN.

Element Description

Concept development Assimilates strategic guidance and other
inputs from the combatant commanders, services, non- DOD agencies,
private sector, and others. From this compilation of information,
the J9 Directorate refines and further develops concepts for joint
experimentation. Campaign planning Develops a multiyear CPLAN
detailing a series of experiments addressing each of

the concepts selected for experimentation. Experimentation plan
development Each concept approved for experimentation will be
fully developed in a white paper

describing the concept and desired capabilities in sufficient
detail for implementation by the warfighter. The paper also will
contain the experimental hypotheses for defining the objectives
for each experiment event, which provide the basis for the
experimentation plan. Experimentation plans will identify events
required to assess the concept and provide the information
required to select, design, schedule, and develop the events to be
executed.

Experiment design Experiment management plans are developed for
events identified in the experiment plans. The management plan may
include measures of effectiveness and performance, a data
collection plan, an analysis plan, and a modeling and simulation
plan. Experiment objectives are defined and experiments,
demonstrations, and

exercises being conducted throughout DOD are examined to determine
the extent to which they can be leveraged to support USACOM's
experiment objectives. Experiment preparation Establishes the
experiment control cell and develops the experiment training,

support, and technical support plans. Experiment conduct The
hypothesis testing and data generation portion of the process.
Assessment Data collected is analyzed in accordance with the
analysis plan and results in two major outputs: (1) an initial
after action report and (2) a final report based on more

extensive analysis of the data with conclusions and
recommendations. Integration Examines the results of all
experiments pertaining to a given concept, as well as information
available from other sources, and draws conclusions about the
utility of the concept and the value- added to joint operations.
After extensive review, these

conclusions become recommendations for new DOTMLP actions required
to implement the concept.

B-280338 Page 6 GAO/NSIAD-99-64 Military Operations

Resource Requirements USACOM has identified its resource
requirements, both for personnel and funding, and it is
anticipating rapid personnel growth over a 3- year period.

In November 1998, the USACOM J9 Directorate had 27 military and
civilian personnel. 1 It had a staffing goal of 127 military and
DOD civilian personnel by September 1999, but it now expects to
have 58 people, including

30 military personnel, by that date. By October 2001, USACOM
officials told us that their goal is to have staffing of 161
personnel, including 126 military and DOD civilian personnel and
35 reimbursable personnel from other organizations. The Office of
the Secretary of Defense has

authorized the 126 military and DOD civilian personnel for both
fiscal years 2000 and 2001. The reimbursable personnel do not
require Office of the Secretary of Defense authorization. USACOM
officials told us that because it takes time to staff a new
organization, in their first year of operation they

have not been able to do as much as they had hoped to do. Because
joint experimentation is a new mission, it was not included in the
President's fiscal year 1999 budget or the FYDP, so DOD
transferred funds from other accounts. USACOM requested $41
million for the J9 Directorate in fiscal year 1999 and DOD agreed
to fund $30 million. 2 Initially, $14.1 million was provided to
USACOM, of which it has actually received $12.48 million. USACOM
officials believe that this amount is sufficient to last until
March 1999. The balance is to come from a $16- million

reprogramming action approved by DOD and expected to be submitted
to the Congress in early 1999. USACOM officials told us that they
expect to receive those funds in April 1999. In addition, DOD has
included $350 million for joint experimentation for fiscal years
2000- 2005 in the FYDP. Joint Staff officials told us that
additional funding may be added in fiscal years 2004 and 2005 to
fund an additional joint experiment in each of those years.

In April 1999, USACOM will lease a commercial building that is
currently under construction to house its joint experimentation
personnel and battle laboratory. Long- range plans include
repairing an existing Navy- owned

facility on Naval Air Station Norfolk as a permanent location for
the J9 Directorate, with a planned occupancy date in fiscal year
2001. 1 The J9 Directorate was augmented by about 50 reservist and
contractor personnel who are available for varying periods of
time. 2 Current resource estimates include funds for initial
experimentation efforts, operation and

maintenance funding, facilities for operations, contractor
support, communications and information systems, and
experimentation forces and logistics support.

B-280338 Page 7 GAO/NSIAD-99-64 Military Operations

The CPLAN The first CPLAN, known as CPLAN 99, was submitted by
USACOM for CJCS approval in December 1998, with CJCS review
expected in late February or early March 1999. It covers fiscal
years 1999- 2001. The second CPLAN, which is to cover a 6- year
period, is scheduled to be issued in spring 1999. CPLAN 99
identified the first group of advanced warfighting concepts to be
studied in the joint experimentation program. These concepts were
selected through the concept development process described in the
IPLAN experimentation process. Concept development and selection
for CPLAN 99 began with a concept development workshop and a
review of concept papers from various sources. Rating the concepts
as to their suitability, feasibility, appropriateness, and
acceptability, the workshop attendees identified eight concepts as
having the greatest potential for early

experimentation. The eight concepts are:  attack operations
against critical mobile targets,  future collaborative information
environment,  common relevant operational picture,  interoperable
combat identification,  adaptive joint command and control,  joint
contingency force operations,  focused logistics: enabling early
decisive operations, and  surveillance and fires from space.

USACOM will use three types of events to assess concepts. These
are (1) USACOM- generated events; (2) major- leveraged events
where USACOM plays a major role in previously scheduled events of
a combatant commander, service, or agency, including adding
components to the experiment to meet USACOM's experiment needs;
and (3) minor- leveraged

events where USACOM plays a reduced role in previously scheduled
events of a combatant commander, service, or agency, which does
not involve adding any components to the experiment. To leverage
previously scheduled experiment events, USACOM has begun to
establish linkages with the services, the defense agencies, and
the national laboratories on future warfighting efforts. It has
had discussions with the Army Training and Doctrine Command, the
Navy's Maritime Battle Center, the Air Force's Expeditionary Force
Experiment group, the Marine

Corps Warfighting Laboratory, the Defense Advanced Research
Projects Agency, and national laboratories such as Los Alamos
National Laboratory. We gathered information using a data
collection instrument from

B-280338 Page 8 GAO/NSIAD-99-64 Military Operations

14 organizations across the services, combatant commands, and
national laboratories about their future warfighting efforts and
relationships with USACOM. Nine of the 14 organizations said that
a linkage had been established with USACOM. For example, the U. S.
Central Command, the Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory, and the
Army's Battle Laboratory

Integration, Technology, and Concepts Division reported that they
have had direct contact with the J9 Directorate. Three of the
remaining five organizations anticipate establishing linkages with
USACOM in the near future.

USACOM provided us with a list of 88 experiment events to be
conducted over the next 3 years. Experiment events are focused on
three different time phases near-, mid-, and far- term. According
to the CPLAN, the near- term phase, which covers the next 6 years,
focuses on improving current capabilities; the mid- term phase,
which is the 4 to 18- year period from now, focuses on achieving
JV 2010 operational capabilities, and the far- term phase, which
is the 15- to 25- year period from now, focuses on developing
revolutionary concepts. The most detailed planning for the 88
experiment events has been for those that address the mid- term
phase. A total of 42 mid- term- oriented experiments are detailed
in a synchronization matrix that identifies each event, the fiscal
year and quarter when it is scheduled to be conducted, and the
advanced warfighting concepts to be assessed. The matrix will be
updated as new experiments are identified. There is no similar
matrix for the other 46 events.

The first leveraged experiment events will involve face- to- face
contacts with the service sponsor to arrange for USACOM
participation. The first agreement has been reached with the
Navy's Maritime Battle Center for the Center to identify the
contribution that Fleet Battle Experiment Echo can make to USACOM
joint experimentation goals and to design a coordination process
to allow USACOM to leverage off service experiments. The agreement
calls for the Center to provide a report on both the coordination
process and the results of the fleet battle experiment.

A key part of the first year's experimentation, designed to
validate organizational structure and relationships and resource
requirements, is the proof of process experiment that USACOM has
selected. It is scheduled to be conducted between July 15 and
August 15, 1999. The data analysis is scheduled to occur from
August 15 through November 15, 1999. The final report is scheduled
for completion on November 30, 1999.

B-280338 Page 9 GAO/NSIAD-99-64 Military Operations

To address the far- term phase of joint experimentation, USACOM
hosted a futures program workshop with representatives from DOD,
the services, government, industry, and academia to identify
potential concepts for future evaluation. Using a construct based
on descriptions of views of the future, attendees looked for
common concepts or capabilities that would

be needed by future warfighters to meet multiple scenarios. The
attendees identified the following eight areas for focus as far-
term concepts.  Mastery of information  Bio- centric operations
and counters  Space operations  Organizing for military operations
Weapons of mass effects  Operational and strategic sanctuaries
Autonomous operations  Global power projection

Some Important Initial Factors of a Successful Joint
Experimentation Program

Because actual experiments are just beginning and the proof of
process experiment will not be completed before November 1999, we
believe that a preliminary assessment of how well the joint
experimentation process is working cannot be made by anyone before
early in the year 2000 because the necessary data will not be
available for at least a year. Since the final

phase of the joint experimentation process leading to
recommendations for changes to DOTMLP involves examining the
results of all experiments pertaining to a given concept, we
further believe that it will require several years to conduct
enough experiments to thoroughly assess whether joint
experimentation is achieving the results envisioned by the
Secretary of Defense and the Congress. To aid the Committee in its
oversight of joint

experimentation in the interim, we have identified several initial
factors that we believe are important to successful joint
experimentation. We chose these initial factors based on a
synthesis of (1) our review of various

documents related to defense transformation and joint
experimentation; (2) the sense of the Congress and the reporting
requirements regarding joint experimentation contained in the
fiscal year 1999 DOD Authorization Act; and (3) discussions with
officials involved in joint experimentation, including those at
USACOM, a member of the NDP, and those at think tank
organizations. The initial factors we have identified and, where

appropriate, a brief description of how each factor could be
assessed, are as follows. We recognize that a certain amount of
trial and error is to be expected because DOD has not conducted a
joint experimentation program

before.

B-280338 Page 10 GAO/NSIAD-99-64 Military Operations

Institutionalizing the Program

The Joint Experimentation Program is less than a year old. The
fiscal year 1999 DOD Authorization Act includes the finding that
it is essential that an energetic and innovative organization be
established in DOD with the authority to design and implement a
process of joint experimentation.

The JIMP states that near- term (1999- 2000) objectives that
support the goals of JV 2010 implementation include establishing
and institutionalizing the process for joint experimentation and
identifying and institutionalizing the process of resourcing JV
2010 assessments. According to senior USACOM officials involved in
the joint experimentation program, the program is not yet
institutionalized, that is, permanent. A number of actions have
been and are being taken that should help institutionalize the
program. Completed actions include the requirement for an annual
report to the Congress on joint experimentation, the creation of
USACOM's J9

Joint Experimentation Directorate, the validation of over 100
positions for the directorate, the development of a joint
experimentation process, and the inclusion of the joint
experimentation program in DOD's long- term budget projections. A
planned action is to include USACOM's joint

experimentation responsibilities in the next revision to the
Unified Command Plan. 3 Short Versus Mid- and

Far- Term Focus for Experimentation

The allocation of resources among the near-, mid-, and far- term
phases of experimentation can have an important influence on the
program's success in developing new warfighting capabilities.
USACOM plans to use about 20 percent of its fiscal year 1999
resources for near- term experimentation, about 75 percent for
mid- term experimentation, and about 5 percent for far- term
experimentation. Other organizations, such as the combatant
commands and the services, already focus on meeting short- term
needs and improving current capabilities. We discussed this matter
with the Director of the Joint Staff's Directorate for Operational
Plans and Interoperability, which is the executive agent and
primary Joint Staff proponent for JV 2010 implementation and
systems integration. The

Director said that while in the future it might be good to focus
on the far term, not all of the problems from the Gulf War have
been fixed. He also said that there is a need for a mid- term
focus for a while and to show some concrete results. As USACOM
makes resource allocations for subsequent years, there should be a
full dialogue among USACOM, the Joint Staff, the

3 This document sets basic guidance to all unified combatant
commanders and establishes their missions, responsibilities, and
force structure.

B-280338 Page 11 GAO/NSIAD-99-64 Military Operations

Office of the Secretary of Defense, and the Congress regarding the
focus of USACOM's efforts, particularly whether they should
include near- term experimentation.

Assessing Organizational Structures and Operational Concepts,
Creating Common Scenarios, and

Using Realistic Adversaries in Experiments

The fiscal year 1999 DOD Authorization Act contains both a sense
of the Congress and an annual reporting requirement for joint
warfighting experimentation. The sense of the Congress noted the
importance of assessing the effectiveness of current and new
organizational structures, operational concepts, and technologies
in addressing expected early 21 st century operational challenges
as well as developing scenarios and measures of effectiveness and
using realistic adversaries in experiments, called red teaming. It
stated that the commander responsible for joint warfighting
experimentation should have the authority to integrate and test
the system and concepts that result from warfighting
experimentation

conducted by the armed services and defense agencies. In the
annual reporting requirement, the Congress directed that the
report include any recommendations the commander responsible for
such experimentation considers appropriate regarding, among other
things, changes in organizational structure, operational concepts,
or joint doctrine.

USACOM's charter and IPLAN call for USACOM to recommend new DOTMLP
to the CJCS and the Joint Requirements Oversight Council. Because
recommendations regarding DOTMLP are the last step in the joint
experimentation process and actual experimentation is just
beginning, it will be several years before all experiments
relating to a given concept are

complete and the results are available. A necessary step is to
assure that experimentation includes new organizational structures
and operational concepts. Whether experiments examine
organizational structures and operational challenges, as well as
technology, can be ascertained by examining the hypotheses and
designs of specific experiment events. In

the longer term, it will be possible to assess the extent to which
USACOM recommends changes in organizational structure, operational
concepts, and joint doctrine and how the Joint Staff reacts to the
recommendations.

USACOM has identified a number of experiment events that it
believes address the eight advanced warfighting concepts mentioned
previously as having the greatest potential for early
experimentation. Each of the military services is exploring
concepts for future warfighting that could serve as a basis for
joint experimentation. Some of the leveraged events USACOM
identified involve service future warfighting concepts such as the

Army After Next wargame. By examining service and USACOM

B-280338 Page 12 GAO/NSIAD-99-64 Military Operations

experimentation plans and events, it will be possible to compare
the concepts being assessed by the services and USACOM to
determine the extent to which the joint experimentation program
tests service concepts.

The battle laboratories, research laboratories, and other service
organizations we contacted believe that USACOM should provide a
common set of experimentation concepts and/ or scenarios while
leaving leeway to pursue independent scenarios. The combatant
commands we contacted believe that Commanders in Chief should be
free to set scenarios, although one combatant command believes
that USACOM should provide an overview of the future security
environment. Examining the details of individual experiments will
provide an early indication of the extent to which the services,
defense agencies, and combatant commands are using common
scenarios and measures of effectiveness in their participation in
joint experimentation.

The importance of red teams in experimentation was identified as
important by people with whom we discussed benchmarks of joint
experimentation progress. Red teams should be allowed to try all
constructive and reasonable ways of foiling the experiment's goal
or objective. Nothing should be considered "off the table" and
thinking asymmetrically or "out of the box" should be strongly
encouraged and rewarded. Otherwise the experiments may not
generate valid results. The extent to which red teaming is being
used should be apparent by examining the specifics of individual
experiments.

Linkages to the Services A successful joint experimentation
program should include linkages to all DOD components
experimenting with future warfighting concepts and technologies as
well as non- DOD components, such as the national laboratories.
USACOM plans to rely heavily on leveraging other DOD components'
warfighting experiments. USACOM has begun to establish such
linkages. As part of these linkages, the components must be
willing to allow USACOM to add experimentation elements to their
experiments and

exercises so that USACOM can leverage them to support its joint
experimentation plan. Because planning an experiment can require
considerable lead- time, USACOM and the components need to allow
sufficient time to add elements to the experiment or exercise. Our
queries of 14 DOD components involved with future warfighting
found that they were amenable to USACOM participation, and all
noted that if adding experiment elements results in increased
funding and/ or resource needs, than USACOM must be prepared to
provide them. Consequently,

B-280338 Page 13 GAO/NSIAD-99-64 Military Operations

USACOM's budget should include funding for USACOM- generated
experiments as well as for leveraging others' experiments. An
examination of events USACOM has decided to leverage, discussions
with USACOM and the services, and an analysis of USACOM's J9
Directorate's budget should provide insight into the extent to
which USACOM is leveraging service and

other DOD activities. Ability to Systematically Capture Experiment
Data

Because of the emphasis on leveraged experimentation events,
USACOM will need to establish a mechanism to systematically
capture leveraged experiment results. USACOM officials agree with
the need for such a mechanism and, in October 1998, were beginning
to examine how to create one. One objective of the J9 assessment
division is database management, which includes capturing
experiment results. Examining experiment plans and the actual
experiments should indicate how well USACOM is capturing

data from leveraged events. Feedback to the Defense Research
Community

The science and technology community will play an essential role
in providing new technologies that will affect future warfighting,
sometimes described as technology push. Likewise, warfighting
organizations can provide guidance to the science and technology
community about technological improvements that they would find
most helpful, sometimes described as technology pull. Therefore, a
communication mechanism,

including a feedback loop, is essential between the science and
technology community and the Joint Staff, USACOM, and warfighters.
The CPLAN states that joint experimentation has the potential to
shape the science and technology community's efforts and will
provide for successful integration of innovative technologies into
tomorrow's battlefield. USACOM's joint experimentation insights
should be one of the many factors that help decide future science
and technology priorities. A periodic examination of experiment
outcomes and discussion with the defense research community should
provide insight into the extent to which USACOM is providing

feedback. Role of Modeling and Simulation

USACOM's charter states that joint warfighting experiments may
include modeling and simulation. The IPLAN states that modeling
and simulation will be used throughout the experimentation
process, including to conduct predictive analyses for developing
plans for individual experiments and to assist planners in
identifying problem areas. However, according to DOD modeling and
simulation officials, the ability to model or simulate

B-280338 Page 14 GAO/NSIAD-99-64 Military Operations

important warfighting elements, such as information operations, is
not well understood or within DOD's current technological
capabilities. These capabilities may not be achievable in full for
a decade or more, and developing them will require significant
basic research. USACOM, in conjunction with the Joint Staff, has
produced a database tool to help with, among other things,
refining concepts and developing hypotheses and measures of merit
and performance. USACOM reports that this tool has

become a living document that is supporting modeling and
simulation within joint experimentation. Agency Comments and Our
Evaluation

In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD concurred with
the report, stating that it is a fair and accurate assessment of
DOD's current and projected efforts to develop future joint
warfighting capabilities. DOD also stated that we have identified
three key factors that are important to a

successful joint experimentation program institutionalization of
joint experimentation within DOD, the extent to which joint
experimentation includes exploring changes in doctrine and
organization as well as technology, and the extent to which USACOM
is establishing linkages with

other DOD organizations exploring future warfighting and agreed
that these three factors are key to successful joint
experimentation. Appendix VII contains the full text of DOD's
comments.

Scope and Methodology To address the issues directed by the
Committee's report, including the

extent to which the JIMP, defense guidance, the FYDP, modeling and
simulation, and DOD's science and technology efforts support the
development of future warfighting capabilities and joint
experimentation, we reviewed the JIMP, the FYDP, defense guidance,
and the NDP report, among other documents. We compared these
documents to one another to assess their support for JV 2010 and
joint experimentation and talked with Joint Staff, USACOM, and
service officials. We also reviewed a number of

documents relating to the defense science and technology program
and compared these to service identified technology needs to
assess how the science and technology program supports the
synchronizing of advanced technologies and the development of
joint capabilities. We also talked with DOD and service officials
involved in modeling and simulation to ascertain their views as to
the state of modeling and simulation capability to support the
joint experimentation process.

B-280338 Page 15 GAO/NSIAD-99-64 Military Operations

To assess the status of joint experimentation, we talked with
officials of USACOM's Joint Experimentation Directorate, the
Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, the services,
the combatant commands, and the defense agencies, a member of the
NDP, and contractors involved in the joint experimentation
program. We reviewed key documents involving joint
experimentation, specifically the USACOM charter, the IPLAN, and
the CPLAN. We developed a series of questions regarding joint
experimentation and USACOM's role that we electronically provided
to a number of DOD components and tabulated their responses.

We performed our review between May and December 1998 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.

We are providing copies of this report to Senator Robert C. Byrd,
Senator Pete V. Domenici, Senator Daniel K. Inouye, Senator Frank
R. Lautenberg, Senator Joseph I. Lieberman, Senator Ted Stevens,
and Senator Fred Thompson, and to Representative Rod R.
Blagojevich, Representative Dan Burton, Representative John R.
Kasich, Representative Jerry Lewis, Representative John P. Murtha,
Representative David R. Obey, Representative Christopher Shays,
Representative Henry A. Waxman, and

Representative C. W. Bill Young in their capacities as Chair or
Ranking Minority Member of Senate and House Committees and
Subcommittees. We are also sending copies of this report to the
Honorable William Cohen,

Secretary of Defense; the Honorable Louis Caldera, Secretary of
the Army; the Honorable Richard Danzig, Secretary of the Navy; the
Honorable F. W. Peters, Acting Secretary of the Air Force; and the
Honorable Jacob Lew, Director, Office of Management and Budget.
Copies will also be made available to others upon request.

B-280338 Page 16 GAO/NSIAD-99-64 Military Operations

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please
contact me at (202) 512- 4300. The major contributors to this
report were Steve Sternlieb, Assistant Director, Joe Dewechter,
evaluator- in- charge, Connie Sawyer, senior evaluator, Dale
Wineholt, evaluator, and Elizabeth Ryan, evaluator.

Sincerely yours, Henry L. Hinton, Jr. Assistant Comptroller
General

Page 17 GAO/NSIAD-99-64 Military Operations

Page 18 GAO/NSIAD-99-64 Military Operations

Contents Letter 1 Appendix I Joint Vision Implementation Master
Plan Provides Guidance

22 Appendix II Joint Enablers Are Beginning to Be Addressed

26 Appendix III Defense Guidance and Associated Budget and
Planning Review Process Expected to Address Joint Experimentation
in 1999

27 Appendix IV Modeling and Simulation for Joint Experimentation
Could Take Years to Develop

30

Contents Page 19 GAO/NSIAD-99-64 Military Operations

Appendix V Science and Technology Plans Are Interrelated and
Support Future Warfighting

Technology Needs 32

Appendix VI IPLAN Meets the Spirit of Many of the NDP
Recommendations for a Joint Forces Command

36 Appendix VII Comments From the Department of Defense

39 Tables Table 1: JV 2010 and Joint Experimentation Issues and
Our

Answers 3 Table 2: Elements of the Joint Experimentation Process 5
Table V. 1: JV 2010- Related Defense Technology Objectives

Funding in Fiscal Year 1999 34 Table VI. 1: Comparison of the NDP
Recommendations and

USACOM IPLAN 37

Contents Page 20 GAO/NSIAD-99-64 Military Operations Abbreviations

BRP Basic Research Plan C4ISR command, control, communications,
computers,

intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance CJCS Chairman, Joint
Chiefs of Staff CPLAN Joint Experimentation Campaign Plan DOD
Department of Defense DOTMLP doctrine, organization, training and
education,

materiel, leadership, and personnel DTAP Defense Technology Area
Plan FYDP Future Years Defense Program IPLAN Joint Experimentation
Implementation Plan JIMP Joint Vision Implementation Master Plan
JV Joint Vision JWARS Joint Warfare System JWSTP Joint Warfighting
Science and Technology Plan NDP National Defense Planel USACOM
United States Atlantic Command

Page 21 GAO/NSIAD-99-64 Military Operations

Page 22 GAO/NSIAD-99-64 Military Operations

Appendix I Joint Vision Implementation Master Plan Provides
Guidance Appendi x I

Joint Vision (JV) 2010 is the conceptual template for future joint
warfighting and expresses how technological innovations and
information superiority will enable the vision's operational
concepts. The Joint Vision Implementation Master Plan's (JIMP)
stated purpose is to provide joint policy and guidance for
implementing JV 2010 and subsequent Chairman, Joint Chiefs of
Staff (CJCS) joint vision documents. The Joint Staff delayed
publishing the JIMP for over a year because Joint Staff officials
said it was difficult to obtain concurrence from all of the
services, unified commands, and defense agencies involved. The
JIMP contains guidance on the implementation process, project
management, and long- range planning;

defines roles and responsibilities; and identifies 72 desired
operational capabilities. The JIMP Was Not Intended to Contain
Resources or Time Lines

The JIMP was not intended to, nor does it, identify the resources
needed to implement JV 2010. Instead, it states that initial
start- up funding will be provided by retargeting Joint Staff
resources and reprogramming Department of Defense (DOD) resources.
Joint Vision implementation funds will then be delineated in
future DOD budgets. Planned funding was discussed earlier in this
report.

The JIMP was also not intended to, nor does it, contain a time
line for implementing JV 2010's new operational concepts.
Specifically, the JIMP states that development of a long- range
planning process for JV 2010 implementation recognizes that the
year 2010 is a way point, not an end point. The long- range
planning process is described as helping to focus available time
and resources to ensure integrated joint operational capability
development. In the July 1996 JV 2010, CJCS referred several times
to implementing and/ or needing the JV 2010 operational
capabilities

by 2010. In addition, the U. S. Atlantic Command's (USACOM) July
1998 Joint Experimentation Implementation Plan (IPLAN) states that
the end result of the joint experimentation process will be the
development of sustained, continuous operational innovations and
the realization of desired operational capabilities that meet the
full spectrum of joint operational requirements in the year 2010
and beyond. Since then, the

Joint Staff has shifted from describing 2010 as a date by which it
seeks to achieve desired operational capabilities to a way point
on the path to achieving them. The JIMP also states that the
development, assessment, and integration of emerging concepts and
capabilities are a continuous, never ending journey of discovery.

Appendix I Joint Vision Implementation Master Plan Provides
Guidance

Page 23 GAO/NSIAD-99-64 Military Operations

In commenting on a draft of this report, the Joint Staff stated
that it adopted the concept that the year 2010 is a way point, not
an end point, to recognize a continual process that explores and
develops a capabilities- based force for the future (2010 and
beyond). The Joint Staff further stated that developing a
capabilities- based force must be an open- ended process and that
the journey concept does not indicate a lack of resolve to achieve
the vision described in JV 2010 by the year 2010 but a
determination to build a permanently viable force.

We believe that the CJCS' goal of achieving JV 2010 capabilities
by the year 2010 is important because a specific time goal is
quantifiable and provides a basis for measuring progress against
the goal. A time goal also can be a motivational tool that
challenges the leadership to quickly improve

capabilities as opposed to getting there when they get there. In
addition, setting a common goal for all entities involved in
developing future warfighting capabilities has merit because it
helps those entities to act synergistically, as opposed to one
service, for example, implementing new capabilities by 2007 and
another service implementing them by 2012. A time goal also would
help DOD assess its progress toward meeting the goal of exploiting
the revolution in military affairs that it set in response to the

requirements of the Government Performance and Results Act of
1993. The JIMP Incorporated All of the National Defense Panel
Operational Challenges and Desired Force Characteristics

The Congress authorized establishment of the National Defense
Panel (NDP) in the Defense Authorization Act of 1997. The NDP
began its work on February 2, 1997, and, in December 1997, issued
its report entitled

Transforming Defense - National Security in the 21st Century. The
report focused on the long- term issues facing U. S. defense and
national security and recommended an immediate transformation
strategy to meet the challenges of the 21 st century. The NDP
believes the challenges of the 21 st century will be
quantitatively and qualitatively different from those of the Cold
War and will require fundamental change to national security
institutions, military strategy, and defense posture by 2020.

The NDP report identified six operational challenges that the U.
S. military must meet in the 21 st century, and the JIMP
incorporated all of them. The six operational challenges are
project military power,  deter and manage weapons of mass
destruction,  maintain U. S. information superiority,  maintain U.
S. lead in space,

Appendix I Joint Vision Implementation Master Plan Provides
Guidance

Page 24 GAO/NSIAD-99-64 Military Operations

 prepare for urban operations, and  meet transnational challenges.

The NDP report also identified 10 desired force characteristics on
which the U. S. military should place far greater emphasis in the
21 st century, and the JIMP incorporated all of them. The desired
force characteristics are  systems architectures,  information
system protection,  information operations,  automation,  small
logistics footprint,  mobility,  stealth,  speed,  increased
operational and strike ranges, and  precision strike.

Service and USACOM Plans Are Consistent Assessment roadmaps, which
are plans describing the events required to

achieve desired operational capabilities, are contained in the
Joint Experimentation Campaign Plan (CPLAN). Originally, the Joint
Staff had planned to publish an assessment roadmap for each
desired operational capability. Joint Staff officials said that
the roadmaps were to cover the first 3 years of JV 2010
implementation rather than serve as roadmaps ending with
achievement of the desired operational capabilities. According to
the Joint Staff, the roadmaps were originally intended as tools
for the Joint Staff JV 2010 coordinating authorities to use in
assessing concepts and capabilities within their assigned areas. 1
The designation of USACOM as the executive agent for joint
experimentation, however, transferred

much of the assessment role from the coordinating authorities to
USACOM. The Joint Staff told us that USACOM, in collaboration with
the coordinating authorities, services, and combatant commands,
will develop

experimentation plans that meet the intent of the assessment
roadmaps. USACOM's first CPLAN identifies experiment events that
are to take place over the next 3 years, through fiscal year 2001,
to address new joint

1 Coordinating authorities are parts of Joint Staff organizations,
such as the Logistics Directorate, designated as responsible for
participating with USACOM in joint experimentation and monitoring
progress in support of CJCS oversight.

Appendix I Joint Vision Implementation Master Plan Provides
Guidance

Page 25 GAO/NSIAD-99-64 Military Operations

warfighting concepts and further achievement of the JIMP's desired
operational capabilities. With the transfer of responsibility for
assessment roadmaps to USACOM,

the development of the first CPLAN, and USACOM's plans to leverage
previously scheduled experimentation, service and USACOM plans for
experimentation should be consistent. Our review of 42
experimentation

events for fiscal years 1999- 2001 shows that 37 are leveraged
events being conducted by the services, the combatant commands,
and the Joint Staff. To help guide USACOM's selection of
experiments for the CPLAN, the Joint Staff identified what it
considered to be the six most important 21 st century challenges,
according to a Joint Staff official. These are all three
information superiority challenges (battlespace awareness,
information transport and processing, and information operations);
joint command and control; combat identification; and joint
theater logistics management. The initial eight concepts chosen by
USACOM for joint experimentation

reflected five of these six challenges.

Page 26 GAO/NSIAD-99-64 Military Operations

Appendix II Joint Enablers Are Beginning to Be Addressed Appendi x
I I

Joint enablers are military capabilities, such as command,
control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance,
and reconnaissance (C4ISR), logistics, force protection, and
others that allow the military to integrate its operations. The
JIMP makes extensive reference to them through its desired
operational capabilities. Of the

72 desired operational capabilities the Joint Staff identified to
implement JV 2010, 38, according to our analysis, directly relate
to joint enablers. Of these 38, 9 relate to command and control,
such as situational awareness; 10 relate to focused logistics,
such as providing unimpeded access to operational and logistical
information for all who need it; and 19 relate to

information superiority, such as information transport and
processing, battlespace awareness, and information operations. In
addition to the 38, 12 other desired operational capabilities
relate to full dimensional protection, such as early detection,
identification, and dissemination of air

and missile threats, which also could be considered joint
enablers. USACOM's CPLAN begins to address joint enablers in that
it addresses five of the six most important challenges identified
by the Joint Staff, which

involve some of these types of enablers. Because the current CPLAN
does not go beyond 2001, we could not evaluate the adequacy of
plans to 2010. We previously reported that DOD faces many
challenges in achieving its information superiority goals and
objectives and may need many years of concerted effort to reach
them. 1 We reported that for over 30 years (since 1967) DOD has
been trying to establish some form of DOD- wide C4ISR
architecture. The most important component, which defines the

information needs that are the basis for setting system standards
and acquiring and protecting systems, has not been completed.
Meanwhile, DOD has been developing a number of critical C4ISR
systems and information assurance measures without the benefit of
a completed and approved architecture. Enforcing compliance with
the architecture will be an important factor in achieving
information superiority. However, we

found that DOD has had difficulty in achieving compliance with
related C4ISR policies and decisions.

1 Defense Information Superiority: Progress Made, but Significant
Challenges Remain GAO/ NSIAD/ AIMD- 98- 257, Aug. 31, 1998).

Page 27 GAO/NSIAD-99-64 Military Operations

Appendix III Defense Guidance and Associated Budget and Planning
Review Process Expected to Address Joint Experimentation in 1999
Appendi x I I I

The Secretary of Defense issues guidance annually on the goals,
priorities, and objectives for the services and DOD components,
called the Defense Planning Guidance. The current defense
guidance, issued in April 1998, preceded the Secretary of
Defense's charter designating USACOM as executive agent for joint
experimentation. Therefore, it makes no mention of who will
conduct such experimentation and contains no directives regarding
the fielding of advanced technology and preparation of forces for

the joint experimentation plan. However, the current guidance
emphasizes the importance of transforming U. S. military forces
and contains an extensive discussion of JV 2010 and its
operational concepts. The guidance was accompanied by the
Secretary of Defense's message that described it as aiding the
transformation of U. S. forces by serving as a central reference
for the joint implementation of the revolution in military
affairs. The message also stated that the guidance initiates a
series of analytical efforts

to support the deliberation of DOD's senior leadership council on
matters pertaining to the revolution in military affairs and to
provide the basis for future years' planning and programming
guidance. The Current Guidance Does Not Link Planning and
Programming Guidance

The defense guidance is divided into two main sections. A strategy
section outlines the defense strategy upon which DOD plans and
programs will continue to be based. This section states that DOD's
commitment to prepare now for an uncertain future includes
pursuing a focused

modernization effort that replaces aging systems and incorporates
cutting- edge technologies and continues to exploit the revolution
in military affairs. A guidance section identifies key planning
and programming priorities necessary to execute the defense
strategy. Within the guidance section, there is planning and
programming guidance.

Planning guidance sets broad objectives within a program area,
such as modernization. Programming guidance contains specific
directives as to actions the military services and agencies are to
take, such as the number and types of weapon platforms to be
procured and the period over which the procurement is to take
place. The guidance section includes a section entitled Prepare: A
Transformation

Strategy that discusses the revolution in military affairs and JV
2010, describing JV 2010 as providing the conceptual framework for
developing the innovative operational concepts, advanced
technologies, organizational architectures, and doctrine required
to meet a range of security challenges in the early part of the 21
st century. This section also states that JV 2010

concepts and capabilities will be explored through information
superiority experiments and a series of progressively advanced
joint warfighting

Appendix III Defense Guidance and Associated Budget and Planning
Review Process Expected to Address Joint Experimentation in 1999

Page 28 GAO/NSIAD-99-64 Military Operations

experiments. The guidance section also includes a section entitled
Prepare: Modernization that includes a discussion of each of the
operational concepts of JV 2010, which includes planning and
programming guidance sections. However, there appears to be no
clear connection between the planning and programming guidance
sections. For example, the planning guidance on dominant maneuver,
one of JV 2010's operational concepts, states that there are two
key objectives for developing dominant maneuver capabilities.
These objectives are that

forces be (1) lighter, more lethal, and less dependent on
logistics tails and (2) sufficiently versatile to, among other
things, sustain a high operating tempo. The programming guidance
section directs the acquisition of specific weapons systems but
makes no mention of what steps are to be

taken to meet the objectives described in the planning guidance
section. The programming guidance section also does not link the
directed acquisitions to the JV 2010 operational concepts or joint
experimentation.

The CJCS's 1998 Program Recommendations and Assessment Do Not
Address

Joint Experimentation According to Joint Staff officials, neither
the Chairman's program

recommendations nor the Chairman's program assessment addresses
advanced technology and preparation of forces in terms of joint
experimentation. The program recommendations are issued in
February of

each year and contain the Chairman's views on what should be
included in the guidance. When the program recommendation was
issued in February 1998, the Joint Experimentation Plan Report and
the USACOM charter had not been formalized. The program assessment
provides the Chairman's assessment of the extent to which the
services and other DOD components conform to the priorities
established in the defense guidance and is issued each August.
Joint Staff officials said that the August 1998 program assessment
does not address joint experimentation and that the defense
guidance is the best place to look for such discussion. Since
USACOM had been selected as the joint experimentation executive
agent at that point, the program assessment could have, if the
Chairman wished, made some comment on joint experimentation.
Senior USACOM officials involved in the joint experimentation
program believe that joint experimentation was not addressed in
August 1998 because USACOM's charter was new and

because of the Chairman's desire to wait for USACOM to complete
its IPLAN, USACOM's staffing request to be evaluated at the Joint
Staff, and the Defense Resources Board to act. These officials
anticipate a major change in the 1999 program recommendations and
assessment. The Director of the Joint Staff's Directorate for
Operational Plans and

Interoperability, which is the executive agent and primary Joint
Staff proponent for JV 2010 implementation and systems
integration, also

Appendix III Defense Guidance and Associated Budget and Planning
Review Process Expected to Address Joint Experimentation in 1999

Page 29 GAO/NSIAD-99-64 Military Operations

expects to see a change in the program recommendations and
assessment in 1999. There is No Complete Funding Picture for
Defense Transformation

In December 1998, the Office of the Secretary of Defense provided
USACOM with a joint experimentation program element in the Future
Years Defense Program (FYDP), which contains $350 million in
funding for the period fiscal years 2000- 2005. This funding
should appear in the FYDP

that DOD will submit in fiscal year 1999. Prior to December 1998,
in examining the FYDP submitted in fiscal year 1998, we found few
clearly identifiable joint experimentation program elements. The
Office of the Secretary of Defense also attempted to identify the
programs and resources devoted to defense transformation
activities, which include joint experimentation, but abandoned the
effort due to

definitional problems as to what constituted transformation.
However, funding was identified in some instances, such as
advanced concept technology demonstrations and service battle
laboratories, while activities were identified in other instances
with no associated funding. At this point, there is no complete
picture of defense transformation- related funding.

Page 30 GAO/MSIAD-99-64 Military Operations

Appendix IV Modeling and Simulation for Joint Experimentation
Could Take Years to Develop Appe ndi x I V

Many DOD components and national organizations have modeling and
simulation capabilities. However, most of these models are
predominantly based on force- on- force assessments and attrition
warfare concepts that date from the Cold War. The Office of the
Secretary of Defense and the

services are updating current modeling and simulation capabilities
and developing new ones that reflect current and future
warfighting. The Joint Staff and USACOM plan to use these new
capabilities, which are in varying

stages of development, to help implement JV 2010 and joint
experimentation. According to the Defense Modeling and Simulation
Office, the ability to model or simulate important warfighting
elements, such as command and control, operations other than war,
information operations, and human/ group behavior representation,
is not well understood or within DOD's current technological
capabilities. These capabilities may not be fully achieved for a
decade or more and will require significant basic research effort
to establish an acceptable degree of confidence in their utility.
The ability to model or simulate warfighting that occurs 10 or
more years in the future is not comfortably within the current
capabilities of

models and simulations across the diverse alternative futures that
USACOM may need to address.

The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology
will, through DOD's Executive Council for Modeling and Simulation
and the Defense Modeling and Simulation Office, advise and assist
USACOM and work to develop necessary modeling and simulation
support for joint experimentation, including promulgating modeling
and simulation policy, initiatives, and guidance to maximize
efficiency and effectiveness by

promoting cooperation among DOD components. The Defense Modeling
and Simulation Office took advantage of our modeling and
simulation meetings by inviting the services, which have most of
the capability, to attend each other's meetings with us so that
they could learn about each other's capabilities and efforts.

The Office of the Secretary of Defense is developing a new
analytic model called the Joint Warfare System (JWARS), which is
to be a state- of- the art, constructive simulation that provides
a multisided and balanced representation of joint theater warfare.
JWARS is to have four applications: force assessment, planning and
execution, system effectiveness and trade- off studies, and
concept and doctrine development and assessment. JWARS' limited
initial operational capability is scheduled for March 2000,

Appendix IV Modeling and Simulation for Joint Experimentation
Could Take Years to Develop

Page 31 GAO/MSIAD-99-64 Military Operations

full initial operational capability is scheduled for May 2001, and
full operational capability is scheduled for fiscal year 2002. At
our August 1998 meeting with the JWARS Director, there was limited
awareness of JV 2010 and joint experimentation, even though the
JWARS model is planned to have important applications that could
be helpful to both efforts. He said that joint experimentation was
not identified in the JWARS operational requirements document as
an objective. He also said that JWARS would not be an ideal tool
for joint experimentation because it may require higher resolution
than JWARS may be able to provide. After further deliberation, in
a subsequent document provided to us by the

JWARS Office, the Director stated that JWARS would assist JV 2010
implementation by providing a vehicle to assess current and future
military capabilities within JV 2010's four operational concepts
and to represent and assist in defining these operational
concepts. He also identified several ways that JWARS can
contribute to joint experimentation.

USACOM Studied How to Use Modeling and Simulation USACOM studied
the best ways to use modeling and simulation in joint
experimentation and has developed a database tool to assist with
the joint modeling and simulation effort. Joint experimentation is
to rely heavily on

simulations to support concept development and the conduct of
experiments, initially using existing legacy simulation systems.
USACOM intends to use existing simulation capabilities to the
maximum extent possible, commercially lease additional capability
when required, and develop systems only when there are no other
means of meeting the requirement. As joint experimentation matures
and concepts and capabilities that cannot be supported by legacy
systems are identified,

USACOM will identify requirements for future simulation
technologies and recommend that its Joint Training and Analysis
Simulation Center integrate them into proposals for developing
future simulations.

Page 32 GAO/NSIAD-99-64 Military Operations

Appendix V Science and Technology Plans Are Interrelated and
Support Future Warfighting Technology Needs Appe ndi x V

The Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Science & Technology),
within the Office of the Director, Defense Research and
Engineering, plays a key role in the science and technology
strategic planning process. Critical to the process is a series of
interrelated documents- the Defense Science and Technology
Strategy, the Basic Research Plan (BRP), the Joint Warfighting
Science and Technology Plan (JWSTP), and the Defense Technology
Area Plan (DTAP). These documents are linked not only by the
process but by the people who prepare them.

The Defense Science and Technology Strategy guides DOD's science
and technology program and, in turn, is supported by the BRP, the
DTAP, and the JWSTP. The science and technology program includes
identifying current and emerging technology candidates for the
development of joint capabilities. These science and technology
documents present the vision, strategy, plan, and objectives for
the defense science and technology planners, programmers, and
performers. The BRP provides overall guidance for basic research,
presenting the objectives and investment

strategy for DOD- sponsored basic research performed by
universities, industry, and service laboratories. The DTAP
presents the objectives and applied research and advanced
technology development investment strategy for technologies
critical to DOD acquisition plans, service warfighter
capabilities, and the JWSTP. The DTAP takes a perspective across
the service and defense agency efforts, thereby charting the total
DOD investment for a given technology, and documents the focus,
content,

and principal objectives of the overall DOD science and technology
efforts. The objectives are expressed in the form of Defense
Technology Objectives. The BRP and the DTAP lay out broad
technology objectives and provide support for achieving priority
far- term, joint warfighting capabilities.

The JWSTP provides a joint perspective across the applied research
and advanced technology development plans of the services and
defense agencies. According to the Deputy Under Secretary of
Defense (Science & Technology), that organization, in
collaboration with the Joint Staff, combatant Commanders in Chief,
the services, and the defense agencies, publishes the JWSTP, in
part, to ensure that DOD's science and technology program supports
achievement of near- and mid- term joint warfighting capabilities.
The JWSTP contains roadmaps for 11 Joint Warfighting

Capabilities Objectives, which support achieving the operational
concepts of JV 2010 and other critical capabilities for
maintaining the warfighting advantage of U. S. forces. Each year,
the Joint Requirements Oversight Council reviews and validates
these objectives. Each objective roadmap

Appendix V Science and Technology Plans Are Interrelated and
Support Future Warfighting Technology Needs

Page 33 GAO/NSIAD-99-64 Military Operations

identifies specific technology advancements that will be developed
or demonstrated and the anticipated date when the technology will
be available. These specific technology advancements are described
in a published volume of Defense Technology Objectives that
provides detailed information about Advanced Technology
Demonstrations and Advanced Concept Technology Demonstrations.

The Process for Developing the Science and Technology Plans

The process for developing the various plans involves a number of
interrelated participants from the Directorate for Defense
Research and Engineering, the services, and the defense agencies,
with the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Science & Technology)
being responsible for the overall direction, quality, and content
of the DOD Science and Technology Program. The BRP is developed,
coordinated, and implemented through the Basic Research Panel,
which includes members from the Office of the Deputy Under
Secretary of Defense (Science & Technology), the services, and the
defense agencies. The BRP is linked with the DTAP and the JWSTP in
several ways. One is through scientific planning groups for each
of 10 technical disciplines, such as mathematics and computer
science,

physics, and chemistry. The 10 scientific planning groups are
comprised of and have the active participation of both the service
laboratories and the warfighters. The JWSTP is developed by Joint
Warfighting Capability Objectives panels, one for each of the 11
objectives, with participation from warfighters, the services, the
defense agencies, the Joint Staff, and the Office of the Deputy

Under Secretary of Defense (Science & Technology). The DTAP is
developed by DTAP panels, one for each of the 11 technology areas,
with participation from service and defense agency technical
specialists. There is overlap between representatives on the Joint
Warfighting Capability Objectives and DTAP panels, according to
Defense Research and Engineering officials, and consequent overlap
between defense

technology objectives in the DTAP and the JWSTP. Technology Area
Reviews and Assessments are held for each of the 11 DTAP
technology areas, the basic research area, and manufacturing
technology program to provide an independent assessment of the
science and technology program by world class experts in their
fields.

Appendix V Science and Technology Plans Are Interrelated and
Support Future Warfighting Technology Needs

Page 34 GAO/NSIAD-99-64 Military Operations

JV 2010- Related Defense Technology Objectives Funding Totals $766
Million in Fiscal Year 1999

The JWSTP contains $766 million in fiscal year 1999 funding
planned for JV 2010- related defense technology objectives. Table
V. 1 shows a breakout of the funds by category.

Table V. 1: JV 2010- Related Defense Technology Objectives Funding
in Fiscal Year 1999

The Army's and the Navy's Future Warfighting Technology Needs
Could Almost Always Be Identified in Science and Technology

Plans The services and the defense agencies develop their own
science and

technology plans with input and guidance from the Deputy Under
Secretary of Defense (Science & Technology) 's plans, and we found
that the Army's and the Navy's future technology needs were
adequately reflected in the

plans. For example, in the Army's future warfighting effort, the
Army After Next, it identified a short list of desired
technologies. We compared the technology short list with the
Army's science and technology plan and the Deputy Under Secretary
of Defense (Science & Technology) 's plans and

found that the Army's plan almost always contained planned efforts
addressing the technology needs to some degree, which could also
be traced through the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Science &
Technology) 's plans. We had difficulty doing our comparison
because the technology short list frequently provided a general
technology heading under which any number of efforts may fall.

The Navy has also identified a future Navy capability options list
of desired technologies to support the future Navy and Marine
Corps. These technology needs almost always appeared to be
addressed in the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Science &
Technology) 's plans. However, as we found with the Army, the
Navy's list frequently provided a general technology heading under
which any number of efforts may fall, making it difficult to
determine the extent to which these science and technology

efforts support the JV 2010 operational concepts.

Dollars in millions Category Amount

Dominant maneuver $257 Precision engagement 81 Full dimensional
protection 181 Focused logistics 85 Information superiority 162

Total $766

Appendix V Science and Technology Plans Are Interrelated and
Support Future Warfighting Technology Needs

Page 35 GAO/NSIAD-99-64 Military Operations

The Air Force reports that its strategic plan provides
authoritative direction for planners at all Air Force levels,
including tailoring capabilities that meet JV 2010. The Air Force
has a list of six high- priority areas: space superiority,
flexible strike, information dominance, aircraft sustainment,

agile combat support, and training for warfighting. However, a
senior science and technology official in Air Force headquarters
stated that JV 2010 technology needs must be clarified to allow
direct linkage with science and technology efforts.

Page 36 GAO/NSIAD-99-64 Military Operations

Appendix VI IPLAN Meets the Spirit of Many of the NDP
Recommendations for a Joint Forces Command Appe ndi x VI

The NDP made 17 recommendations regarding the framework for a
Joint Forces Command, but the Secretary of Defense did not
establish it; instead, he made USACOM executive agent for joint
experimentation. Therefore, we concluded that the USACOM charter
did not address any of the recommendations. We also compared the
NDP recommendations to USACOM's IPLAN to assess if it met the
spirit of the recommendations. In our opinion, USACOM's IPLAN met
the spirit or framework for 10 of the

17 NDP recommendations and part of an 11 th recommendation. Table
VI. 1 compares the NDP recommendations and the USACOM IPLAN.

Appendix VI IPLAN Meets the Spirit of Many of the NDP
Recommendations for a Joint Forces Command

Page 37 GAO/NSIAD-99-64 Military Operations

Table VI. 1: Comparison of the NDP Recommendations and USACOM
IPLAN NDP report recommendation IPLAN response

Create a Joint Forces Command responsible for driving the
transformation process of U. S. forces. Yes, in the form of the
USACOM J9 Directorate for joint

experimentation. Eliminate USACOM. No. Create a Joint Forces
Command with appropriate resources. Yes, USACOM, like any major
command, requests

resources. USACOM has been authorized both personnel and budgetary
resources for joint experimentation. Create a Joint Forces Command
with appropriate requirement authorities. No. Create a Joint
Forces Command that formulates challenging scenarios. Yes. Create
a Joint Forces Command that conducts regular field exercises under
the aegis of a Joint Battle Laboratory. Yes.

Create a Joint Forces Command responsible for conducting joint
experimentation. Yes. DOD designated USACOM as executive agent for
joint experimentation. Create a Joint Forces Command that ensures
forces possess the appropriate cultural and political awareness of
the specific regions to which they will be

deployed. No.

Create a Joint Forces Command responsible for developing and
validating joint doctrine for the approval of the Joint Chiefs.
Yes for developing joint doctrine; no for validating it. Create a
Joint Forces Commander with Major Force Program 11- type authority
to ensure the ability to support the experimentation program. No.
Appoint a Joint Forces Commander who would submit an annual report
to the Secretary of Defense detailing the conduct of joint
exercises, including their number, forces involved, the
operational challenges they faced, the

exercise results, and the effect of the exercise on the
transformation process, to include recommended changes in force
structure, doctrine, and resource allocation. Yes.

Create a Joint Forces Command that would have exercises based on
the emerging challenges of 2010- 2020 that would take place at
joint training centers.

No, the location of training exercises is not yet known. Have
exercises that would use scenarios developed by a Joint Concept
Development Center. Yes.

Have a Joint Concept Development Center that would monitor
exercises, determine measures of effectiveness, and evaluate the
adequacy of current analytic methodologies, models, and
simulations. Yes. Make maximum use of service battle laboratories.
Yes. Have Joint Warfare Centers: the Joint Warfighting Center, the
Joint C4ISR Battle Center, the Joint Warfare Analysis Center, the
Joint Command and

Control Warfare Center, and the Joint Doctrine Center that would
report to the Joint Forces Commander; assist in the development of
new strategies and task force objectives; establish desired
outcomes, measures of effectiveness, and analysis of
experimentation results; and develop follow- on experiments.

Yes. Create a Joint Forces Command responsible for all joint
modeling and simulation. No.

Appendix VI IPLAN Meets the Spirit of Many of the NDP
Recommendations for a Joint Forces Command

Page 38 GAO/NSIAD-99-64 Military Operations

USACOM's Ability to Meet Its Charter USACOM has taken a number of
steps to implement its charter, which are

described in the body of this report. These steps include
developing a joint experimentation process, identifying resource
requirements, and developing an IPLAN and the first CPLAN. USACOM
has developed an eight- element joint experimentation process that
begins with concept development and ends with integration,
resulting in recommendations for

new DOTMLP actions that are required to implement the concept and
the first joint experiments are to begin in 1999.

Page 39 GAO/NSIAD-99-64 Military Operations

Appendix VII Comments From the Department of Defense Appe ndi x VI
I

Appendix VII Comments From the Department of Defense

Page 40 GAO/NSIAD-99-64 Military Operations (701138) Let t er

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Contents Page 45 GAO/NSIAD-99-25 Relative Risk Implementation

Tables Table 1: JV 2010 and Joint Experimentation Issues and Our
Answers 3

Table 2: Elements of the Joint Experimentation Process 5 Table V.
1: JV 2010- Related Defense Technology Objectives

Funding in Fiscal Year 1999 34 Table VI. 1: Comparison of the NDP
Recommendations and

USACOM IPLAN 37

*** End of document. ***