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Operation Desert Storm:
Evaluation of the Air Campaign
(Letter Report, 06/12/97, GAO/NSIAD-97-134)


BASIC STRUCTURE OF THE IRAQI INTEGRATED AIR DEFENSE SYSTEM

Appendix VI



The country was divided into four sectors, each controlled by a
sector operations center and each reporting directly to the national
air defense operations center (ADOC) in Baghdad.  The integrated air
defense system was highly centralized, [DELETED].  Each SOC
transmitted data back to intercept operations centers, which in turn
controlled SAM batteries and fighter aircraft at air bases. 

There were [DELETED] IOCs across the four sectors in Iraq feeding
data to individual SOCs.  Each IOC was optimized to direct either SAM
or fighter aircraft against incoming enemy aircraft.  Each IOC was
connected to observer and early warning area reporting posts (RP)
[DELETED]. 

Figure VI.1 shows the four IADS sectors in Iraq, the Kuwait sector,
the RPs, IOCs, SOCs, ADOC, and the communication lines among these
components. 

There were about 500 radars located at approximately 100 sites,
[DELETED].\1

[DELETED]\2

   Figure VI.1:  The Iraqi Air
   Defense Network

   (See figure in printed
   edition.)

[FIGURE DELETED]

Source:  [DELETED]


--------------------
\1 GWAPS, vol.  II, pt.  I (Secret), p.  83. 

\2 SPEAR (Secret), December 1990, p.  3-11. 


   EVIDENCE ON IADS CAPABILITIES
-------------------------------------------------------- Appendix VI:1


      IADS COULD ONLY TRACK A
      LIMITED NUMBER OF THREATS
------------------------------------------------------ Appendix VI:1.1

Despite the numerous components of the IADS, its actual operating
capabilities were quite limited.  The system was designed to counter
comparatively limited threats from Israel and Iran, with each SOC
capable of tracking [DELETED].  While sufficient against an attack
from either regional opponent, the system was inadequate to cope with
a force of hundreds of aircraft and unmanned aerial decoys. 
[DELETED]\3


--------------------
\3 SPEAR (Secret), December 1990, p.  3-25.  Similarly, DIA reported
that the IADS "could track only a limited number of threats and was
[DELETED]." DIA, BDA Highlights (March 22, 1991), p.  26. 


      IADS DESIGN MADE THE SYSTEM
      EASY TO DISRUPT
------------------------------------------------------ Appendix VI:1.2

[DELETED]


      IADS DESIGN WAS KNOWN IN
      DETAIL TO U.S.  INTELLIGENCE
------------------------------------------------------ Appendix VI:1.3

Another advantage that the coalition had in attacking the IADS is
that all internal designs of the KARI computer system that controlled
it [DELETED].\4 [DELETED]


--------------------
\4 USAF, History of the Strategic Air Campaign:  Operation Desert
Storm (Secret), p.  258. 


      IRAQI SAMS WERE OLD OR
      LIMITED IN CAPABILITY
------------------------------------------------------ Appendix VI:1.4

Some key Iraqi antiair weapons were either quite old, well understood
by U.S.  intelligence, or limited in range and capability.  SAMs with
the greatest range, SA-2s and SA-3s, had been deployed 30 years
earlier, putting them at the end of their operational lifespan. 
Moreover, both the USAF and other coalition air forces had long
established countermeasures to these systems. 

[DELETED]

The four types of SAMs just discussed--SA-2s, SA-3s, SA-6s, and
SA-8s--along with Roland, were those that entirely comprised the SAM
defenses of the five most heavily defended areas of Iraq:  Baghdad,
Basrah, Tallil/Jalibah, H-2 and H-3 airfields, and Mosul/Kirkuk. 
[DELETED]


      AAA GUNS WERE NOT
      RADAR-GUIDED
------------------------------------------------------ Appendix VI:1.5

While linked to the IADS, AAA guns were mostly unguided and used in
barrage-style firing against attacking aircraft.  Still, even
unguided barrage-style AAA remained a considerable threat to
attacking aircraft required to fly above 12,000 feet for most of the
war. 


      THE IRAQI AIR FORCE FAILED
      TO PLAY A ROLE
------------------------------------------------------ Appendix VI:1.6

With a substantial portion of the Iraqi air force destroyed,
inactive, or fleeing to Iran early in the campaign, the threat was
severely reduced since part of the effectiveness of the IADS depended
on vectoring its fighters to attacking aircraft.