Bringing Eastern Europe and
Russia into NATO

Changes that will be needed when NATO is enlarged
Mission and structure of an Extended NATO
Scenarios and contingency plans
Transitional steps

COMMITTEE ON EASTERN EUROPE AND RUSSIA IN NATO

APRIL 1994

Note to the reader.

The first edition of this report was released in 1992, to fill in for the absence of planning in NATO on the issue of expansion. Revised releases were constantly prepared in light of developments until April 1994. After that, NATO began developing plans of its own on expansion, and CEERN turned toward brief criticisms, corrections and suggestions on the NATO plans, along with its own summary draft of an optimal plan. The work done in the present, thorough planning document provides background for CEERN's more recent papers.

This report was prepared to encourage policy discussion and advance the process of policy planning. It is not a statement of CEERN policy.

CEERN
COMMITTEE ON EASTERN
EUROPE AND RUSSIA IN NATO
1613 Fifth Street N.W., Washington, D.C. 20001
telephone (703) 521-5759 fax (202) 462-4816
Russia: General Geliy Batenin (Adviser to Defense and Foreign Ministries)
U.K.: Alan Lee Williams OBE (Director, Atlantic Council), Ambassador Adam Watson
U.S.: William E. Colby (Former Director, CIA), Ira L. Straus, Edward Teller, Mihajlo Mihajlov
CONTENTS


(Part 1)
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 1
Policy Recommendations 1
Summary of Structural Aspects and Options 2
PART A
WHY AN EXPANDED NATO? 4
The Historic Opportunity 5


(Part 2)
The continuing purpose of NATO; the value of an Extended NATO 7
Why be involved in Europe? Why is it in America’s interest? 7
Why add the Easterners as allies? 10
Expansion of NATO as a basis for successful Democratization in the East 11
Why keep NATO at all if “the enemy” is inside it? 14
NATO’s origins and functions: far more than a cold war instrument 15


(Part 3)
New functions made possible by an Extended NATO 18
The basic and permanent purpose of NATO 20
An enforcer arm for the UN and CSCE 21
Collective Security and Collective Defense 22
The ultimate extent of NATO 23
Should NATO be renegotiated and reconstituted from bottom up? 27
Minimal and Optimal Goal. Danger or Opportunity? 28


(Part 4)
The Eastern efforts to join NATO and the emerging Western response 31
A positive learning curve in NATO, 1985-1988; a step backward in 1989 32
Legacy of the Bush years: a U.S. goal of the East in NATO 34
The old consultationist ideology and the new needs since 1989 35
“Cognitive dissonance” in the West 36


(Part 5)
The push for Central Europe in NATO first 40
Yeltsin gives a “green light” to Central Europe – but then takes it back 42
The Partnership plan and the way out of the dilemma 43
Amplifying Partnership and clarifying its seriousness 44


(Part 6)
PART B
PLANS AND SCENARIOS 47
BASIC STRUCTURE
I. A plural structure for an Extended NATO: a convergent, not seamless, web 48
II. The command areas in an extended NATO 50
Potential command arrangements for Russian forces in NATO 51
A common strategic space: reconciling the Russian military to democracy 53


(Part 7)
FUNCTIONAL AREAS OF COOPERATION 55
III. Nuclear controls and reductions 55
A multilateral nuclear force 55
COCOM 57
Arms sales and technology exchange 57
Intelligence cooperation 59
IV. Nuclear and environmental clean-up 60
V. Economid aid 62


(Part 8)
VI. What role for NATO in ethnic and border disputes? 65
VII. A dignified role for the Russian military 69
VIII. National interests in getting an Extended NATO 71
IX. Burden sharing 73
X. A sliding scale of entry into NATO: different levels, different paces? 75


(Part 9)
XI. Decision-making with more members 79
NATO’s decision-making needs in the new, more fluid era. CJTFs? 82
The options 84


(Part 10)
The optimal option on decision-making 87
What weighting of voting? Balances to protect each nation 90
An interim practical solution 93
Two immediate policies 95


(Part 11)
XII. Are the Eastern Europeans and Russians fit yet to join NATO? Are they
ready? Do they meet NATO standards? 96
A Mutual Defense Organization, not a Club 96
Commitments, not Criteria (Goodpaster) 97
The Litany of Excessive Criteria 98
1. “Reliable Partners” 98
2. “Democratic Standards” 100
“The Democracy” and the responsibilities of power 102
Defense potential against a renewed Russian threat 103
3. Civilian control 105
4. Stable international relations 106
5. Technical standards 106
What to do with Membership Criteria? 107


(Part 12)
XIII. Cultural aspects 108
XIV. Why formal Membership matters. Status is substance. 111
XV. Transitional steps 112
Uses and abuses of transitions 112
Informal steps 115
Full Membership 116
Associate Memberships 117
A menu of short-term steps 117
A Committee on Extension of NATO Membership 118
The main step forward at this time 119