Contents

The push for Central Europe in NATO first 40

Yeltsin gives a “green light” to Central Europe – but then takes it back 42

The Partnership plan and the way out of the dilemma 43

Amplifying Partnership and clarifying its seriousness 44

The Push for Central Europe in NATO First

In 1992, sentiment gradually grew in Western leaderships in favor of bringing the Poles, Czechs and Hungarians into NATO. In 1993 this finally became a live political proposition in NATO circles. Something like a consensus was built around it. The old opponents of this were moved by growing fears that if NATO were left unchanged, it would soon be eliminated altogether. As a reasonable compromise, they allowed that it might be alright if the small Central European countries were let in. Such a modest expansion could even be accepted in some quarters without a basic change in strategic outlook, since it could be packaged in the old language of filling in the regional “balance of power.”

Such a repackaging was accomplished by three analysts at RAND, whose paper appeared (in shortened form) in the August 1993 Foreign Affairs. They proposed (1) early Central European membership in NATO, with a noncommital view to eventual Russian membership as well, (2) getting beyond dependence on unanimous consent in NATO in dealing with the fast-breaking crises of the post-cold war era, and (3) a new NATO Force Projection Command which, through peacekeeping and peacemaking in the East, would draw the East into the NATO military structure. Their slogan – that NATO must go “out of area or out of business” – did much to re-set the tone of discourse in NATO.

Senator Lugar gave a big push to the idea of rapid Central European entry into NATO, again with a door held open for eventual Ukrainian and Russian entry as well. Lugar had done much to save past Administrations from major foreign policy blunders; now he hoped to make Central European entry an actionable proposition at the January 1994 NATO summit. It was argued that this was the “last chance” for NATO, and if the opportunity for action at the January summit were lost, NATO might well collapse before there was another chance.

The mid-1993 edition of the present report strongly supported the initiative for Central European entry, but added that it would be necessary to place this is a context more inclusive of Russia if it were to succeed. Without a more definite emphasis on NATO being open also to Russia, it warned, the whole thing could end up being killed on the argument – no matter how mistaken or unjust – that it was anti-Russian:

The risk remains that, in trying to slip the Central Europeans through the door of NATO consensus, the whole thing could be whittled down so far that it would end up validating some of NATO’s old arguments against expansion – and then get killed for this very reason. Absent new procedures in NATO, expansion could still weaken NATO structurally; absent steps to prepare for Russian membership, it could still alienate Russia. It is all the more important, therefore, to make plans for placing a Central European entry in a sound context.

In the event this prediction proved all too true. The plan for Central European membership was often presented as an explicit challenge to the supposedly “Russia Firster” view of the Administration. The actual “Russia Firsters” replied in kind, calling the whole idea “anti-Russian.” With the two sides embroiled in a destructive polemic, a consensus in favor of action was far from emerging. The division of the Easterners (and of their supporters in the West) against one another, which had been spawned by the failure of the West to engage the democratizing East through real aid and through NATO, was taking its deadly toll. It threatened to prevent the necessary coalitions from being made and to defeat the efforts that were finally being made in the West to correct the mistakes of 1989 to 1991.

Yeltsin gives a “green light” to Central Europe – but then takes it back

On August 25, 1993, out of the blue, Yeltsin announced in Warsaw and Prague that it was alright with Russia if the Central Europeans joined NATO. This gave the idea of extension of NATO new hope. For the first time ever, it came close to garnering the amount of Western support that would have been needed for carrying through with it.

However, Yeltsin’s announcement ran contrary to his brief, and was sharply criticized back in Russia. The military newspaper Red Star complained that, while NATO was supposedly trying to integrate its former enemies, “analysis of the policy being pursued by the Atlanticists gives grounds to assert that this integration is in actual fact far more akin to differentiation.” On September 10 the Ostankina-ITA TV news program “Novosti” – the main source of daily news for most Russians – reviewed the efforts of the Central Europeans to join NATO, and then wrapped up with a wistful comment: “After the failure of the August putsch, there was talk of Russia itself joining NATO.” The Moscow News warned that the expansion of NATO into Central Europe alone would leave Russia more isolated, while bringing into NATO more peoples with scores to settle with Russia. “In order to avoid this and to consolidate its security, Russia must insist on its admission to the North Atlantic alliance simultaneously with Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic.”

In September Yeltsin sent a letter to the Western governments that partly retracted his former go-ahead to Central Europe. The letter was somewhat misleadingly described in the West as “opposing the expansion of NATO.” The letter actually said that the Central Europeans should not be let into NATO or promised NATO membership before Russia is, or else the result would be to isolate Russia and drive it away from the West. To be sure, as long as NATO itself wasn’t in a mood to admit Russia outright, this meant that the process of expansion would have to be gradual. Besides, Russia itself was no longer in a mood to join immediately; although Russia could move back to Atlanticism if NATO made clear that membership for Russia was a live option and thereby finally validated the approach of the Russian Atlanticists.

The Western interpretation of Yeltsin’s letter tended to ignore the idea of Russian membership and to emphasize the conflict between Russia and Eastern Europe. This seemed to kill the whole project. Expansion of NATO was offensive to Russia, it was said; therefore expansion of NATO could not be done. The doors of NATO were rapidly slamming shut on the Central Europeans.

The Partnership plan and the way out of the dilemma

Fortunately, some plans had meanwhile been developed in the U.S. Government, to place the idea of NATO expansion in a sounder context with greater emphasis on openness to Russia. This is what salvaged the project from its seeming death at the hands of the Yeltsin letter. In October the Clinton Administration came forward with its draft plan for a NATO “Partnership” arrangement for all willing NACC countries, with a goal of eventual membership for all of them. Yeltsin welcomed this plan enthusiastically. It was adopted by NATO at its January 1994 Summit. With it, the expansion of NATO was finally underway.

How the Partnership could work in dealing with relations between Eastern Europe and Russia may be seen from a vignette over Poland. Poland’s only complaint about Partnership was that it was too little. Then it was told that Partnership could mean letting Russian troops back into Poland for joint maneuvers. Polish officials bit their tongues but still said, Yes. This is as it ought to be: Poland will get increased protection from the West in case Russia goes off the deep end, but at the same time Russia should get increased access to its former allies so that it will not feel so sharply that it has lost them and will be less prone to go off the deep end. In ways like this, multiplied a thousandfold, the Easterners can be brought back to a convergence of perspectives with one another and with the West.

This does not mean that everyone must join NATO at exactly the same moment or that Russia has a veto. What it does mean is that the goal of Russian membership must be put up front seriously as a living option for Russia if anyone is to get in at all.

The “Central Europe First” proposal was a necessary stage of the process of opening up NATO. It got the proposal for NATO expansion taken seriously for the first time in NATO circles. When Yeltsin cleared the idea in August, it brought the proposal near to the critical mass needed for getting something done in NATO. Then, when Yeltsin half-retracted, it was impossible for NATO circles to retreat all the way back to doing nothing. Thus the Partnership plan.

Many “Central Europe Firsters” were bitter about the Partnership plan. They had put together a coalition for change, and they felt betrayed. They blamed the “Russia Firsters” for having killed their plan, even though their plan had never really been on the verge of success except briefly by grace of Yeltsin. Their alternative to Partnership – which was for NATO to lay down criteria and timetables for membership – would actually have targetted membership only for the Central Europeans and only around the year 2000. As Madeleine Albright told the Central Europeans, this would have added a new rigidities that could actually delay their membership. Nevertheless the perception was spread that Partnership necessarily meant delay and that criteria and timetables would mean a “fast track.”

Actually the Partnership plan needed to be amplified, not undermined. The Central Europeans themselves made a number of suggestions for amplifying it. Fortunately the plan is by its very nature open to amplification.

Amplifying Partnership and clarifying its seriousness

The first step was to clarify that the Partnership plan really did include the goal of membership for the Partner countries. This was done at the January 1994 NATO Summit. This was the most important thing. Once the goal is established for the organization, it becomes a responsibility of its members and staffers to channel their thoughtlines into figuring out how to realize the goal of expansion of NATO, not – as was previously the case – how to obstruct it.

NATO now needs to make the goal of membership a more serious part of its business, by embedding the Partnership program within a context of timely movement toward this goal. Only thus can the Easterners be given confidence that their efforts and expenses in the Partnership program will lead to meaningful results and commitments, not just to a glorified NACC. Absent such confidence, the Easterners, including Ukraine and the Baltics, will continue to feel insecure and pressed to toy with alternative security perspectives: either an anti-Russian alliance of their own, or else submission to Russian pressures. Leaving the Easterners to respond on their own in these ways would be the worst way to damage relations with Russia.

If the goal of expansion of membership should now serve as a guidpost for NATO thinking and planning, the next step, logically, is to proceed with this thinking and planning – not only through studies such as the present one, but by establishing on the intergovernmental level a process through which the present and prospective members can work out together the specifics of extension of membership.

In other words, the next step is for NATO to establish – whether as a part of the Partnership plan or as a parallel track alongside it – a Committee on Extension of NATO Membership.

The Central Europeans want the goal of membership to be made a concrete commitment; this is why they wanted NATO to lay down specific criteria and timetables, even at the cost of extra rigidities and delays. Instead, the flexible, sensible criterion of Article 10 of the North Atlantic Treaty – that the existing allies can add new European members whenever they decide that this would be in the interest of their own security and principles – has been preserved intact. In a sense, the establishment of the goal of membership for the Easterners means that the allies have already decided, in principle, that extension of membership to the new democracies would indeed further their own security and principles – decided in principle, that is, pending the actual working out of specific forms for new Memberships so that they definitely would add to Atlantic security and principles.

The decision-in-principle having been made, all that really remains to make the goal of membership concrete is to make that effort to work out the specifics of the new Memberships. In order to set that effort concretely in motion, what is needed is simply to set up a sound procedure for working out the specifics.

That is what a Committee on Extension of NATO Membership, consisting of all the Partner countries, would do. It would take the discussion beyond the back-and-forth of the old NATO allies, where there has been a tendency to settle differences by externalizing them at the expense of the Easterners, and place it instead in a more balanced and realistic framework of people seriously interested in doing a deal together and finding a way to make it work. It would consider: the content of membership protocols, full and associate memberships, standards for new members, changes needed in NATO itself, and transitional tasks both before and after membership. Part B Section XV below elaborates on how it could be set up.

There is no inherent obstacle that need delay the setting up of such a Committee; it can be done just as soon as people see that it is the logical next step. Upon the completion of its work, the ground would be prepared for moving directly on to negotiation of the actual protocols for admission of new Full and Associate Members.

The present study provides a draft of the working out of the specifics. This should not be imagined to be a substitute for the actual process itself of working it out on the intergovernmental level. It is meant rather to help clarify for the reader what would have to be considered in a procedure for working out the specifics, and how the specifics could be successfully worked out in the here and now.

Far-reaching changes are not self-implementing. To achieve them, one must (a) adopt the goal, as was done in January 1994, (b) create processes which encourage the forces and actors to converge on the goal, such as the Partnership exercises and a Committee on Expansion of NATO, and (c) develop a concrete version of the goal which encourages the processes to converge on a high common denominator rather than a low or inadequate common denominator.

An adequate concrete version of the goal does not arise spontaneously. It requires an effort at conceptualization. That effort is undertaken in the remainder of this paper. It must be left to the reader to adapt it according to need, and then to face the most important question of all: the question of initiative and leadership in implementation.