Contents

Plans and Scenarios

BASIC STRUCTURE

I. A plural structure for an Extended NATO: a convergent, not seamless, web 48

II. The command areas in an extended NATO 50

Potential command arrangements for Russian forces in NATO 51

A common strategic space: reconciling the Russian military to democracy 53

PART B

PLANS AND SCENARIOS

– Where there is a will there is a way.

– Where there is a way there is a will.

Show me not the problem, show me the solution.

“The adjustment effort needed for integrating Russia into NATO will be substantial, but this move offers enormous advantages to the West... Isn’t that what the most powerful alliance in the world should be about, facing the greatest global challenges? Tilting at windmills is not an adequate occupation.”

– Igor Khripunov (then First Secretary, Russian Embassy to U.S.), in Defense News, June 15-21, 1992

I. A Plural Structure for an Extended NATO:

a convergent web, not a seamless web

An Extended NATO should be conceived as a diversified structure, with a core structure and add-on structures, interfacing commitments, and transitional processes to gradually roll all the parts into a cohesive whole. The web of an Extended NATO would be convergent but far from seamless.

The reason for having new diversified structures in NATO is so that the Eastern countries can be incorporated into it in an historically relevant timeframe without detracting from what is valuable in existing NATO arrangements. This “pluralism” of structures need not itself detract from the cohesiveness of NATO. Nor need it be permanent. But it is necessary for a transitional period.

The prospective new members have diverse hopes and problems in relation to NATO. They need a managed transition into NATO, through membership commitments and guarantees; it would be simplistic to expect them first to complete all the transitions on their own, and only afterwards join NATO. The two processes need to be interactive not separate. This means that members will have diverse relations to NATO for some time, i.e. a plurality of transitional structures will be unavoidable.

It takes a bit of imagination to see this. Special arrangements for new members should be pictured as “additions” tacked onto the existing core of the alliance. The existing Integrated Command for the old members of NATO need not be changed by this; the relations of the newly entering countries, even if much weaker, would be add-ons to that core not subtractions from it. The Article V commitment to mutual defense among the old members need not be touched; if commitments to some of the new members are weaker, this is still an add-on to the existing core not a subtraction from it.

Failure to see this has led to a fear that NATO would be “diluted” by expansion. It is true that expansion could in theory be done on terms that dilute NATO, but the old NATO countries probably would never agree to such terms. A use of a plurality of arrangements, leaving the existing core intact or changing it only in ways that streamline and strengthen it, is the natural course for protection against dilution. NACC is an example of such an add-on, although it is itself extremely diluted: it represents only the first stage in conceptualizing how add-ons can be made without damage to the core.

The goal should be to use a plurality of intra-NATO arrangements in order to structure the transitions of the various parties in a convergent direction, so that they lead from the present separateness of arrangements toward an eventual regularized common arrangement. If the Eastern countries were instead kept outside of NATO in order to spare NATO the plurality, the result would be to lose most of the capacity to structure the relation toward convergence. Alternatively, if the Eastern countries were brought in immediately on uniform alliance terms, the result might be to water down those terms. Plurality in transitional arrangements is needed in order to maintain NATO’s existing strengths even while making full use of these strengths to organize a convergence of the East into the system.

The key to convergence is the use of transitional arrangements after the achievement of a formal status of Member or Associate Member, not just beforehand. Many of the transitions can be written into the very protocols of membership, thereby making the plan of convergence a formal commitment. Other transitions, even if not included in the Membership commitment, nevertheless would benefit from the mere fact of a formal Membership commitment to one another having been made. This commitment, coupled with a modicum of common institutions and a core group of countries among whom the common institutions and commitments work deeply, would provide a powerful “force field” to favor convergence. It would be somewhat like the attractive influence that NATO already exerts, but much more powerful, because the status of being a Member would provide positive roles to be played, and would remove many of the centrifugal nationalist pressures and roles.

When the initial terms of entry are being negotiated, the aim should be to get a “sufficient” set of “starter” common structures and commitments to give a fair assurance that the subsequent processes will be convergent. While some skill will be needed to juggle all the convergent processes, the main thing needed will be a powerful will to convergence. Fortunately this will exists in the Eastern countries: among the Eastern democrats, both the head and the heart believe in the necessity of the deepest possible integration with the West. It is in the Western countries that the will is not strong. The will to convergence would be reinforced, not diluted, by the addition of the Easterners as Members of the Alliance.

The plurality of structures would not be entirely new to the alliance. NATO is already a highly diversified structure. American forces became a part of the Allied Command in Europe (ACE) on unique terms. The same applies to German forces. The other members’ forces all joined on more or less the same overall terms, but in virtually every case some unique dispensations had to be made. ACE is at one and the same time a common structure and a patchwork quilt of special arrangements. It is far from being a seamless web. It could never have come into existence if it had been a seamless web. Nor could it have survived unless it had the flexibility to make new dispensations. If this diversity has caused any dilution, it has not been great, and it has been mostly from later special dispensations, for example letting France withdraw from the Integrated Command, or letting members tack anti-nuclear riders onto any NATO presence in their country. Initial special dispensations for entry cannot weaken the elements of common structure; rather, by definition, they add more forces and capabilities to the common structure on uniquely delimited terms.

However, the new diversities in NATO would exceed its old ones. For this reason, most of them should be only transitional. A fairly simple, cohesive goal is needed for popular comprehension. Fortunately both the goal and the path to it can be summarized in one simple phrase: integration of military forces and strategic commitments of the industrial democracies into a permanent organized partnership.

II. The Command Areas in an Extended NATO

“For a time, there might be a new NATO configuration with two ‘wings’ – the United States and Russia each having its security arrangements with non-member countries (like Japan and the CIS) – and the center held by Europe.”

– Igor Khripunov, in Defense News, June 15-21, 1992

If an extended NATO were to build on present arrangements, there would be two main possibilities for organizing its command areas:

1. Put the new members in the Command area of the SACEUR. Eastern Europe would gladly agree to this. Russia probably would not agree, even if it would really be in its true interest to do so. This brings us to ...

2. Have two new Command areas:

a. Russia and those CIS States that agree to be included with it (perhaps called “SACCIS”).

b. Eastern and Central Europe (perhaps called “SACECE”). Ukraine and the Baltic states would insist on joining this area, not SACCIS.

The second option is the more realistic. De facto, its two new Command areas are already emerging – but outside of NATO.

Most of the CIS is closely linked to the Russian military. On the other hand, in Central Europe, the Baltics and Ukraine there is a growing network of defense discussions and links. The topic of a defensive alliance has been raised several times; the Poles and Ukrainians in particular have called for this in view of the fact that NATO was not opening its doors. The fact of exclusion from NATO has forced the East-Central Europeans to come together – but forced them to do it in a mostly informal, fearful, negativistic, anti-Russian spirit. These emergent Command areas would finally be able to congeal in a formal and constructive manner if they were brought within NATO.

Inclusion of new Command areas in NATO would create a need for an overarching Allied Coordinating Command, encompassing all the Command areas – SACEUR, SACLANT, CINCHAN, NORAD, and the new Eastern areas. The Allied Coordinating Command could begin with marginal authority, but with provision to review it after, say, 5 years with a view to transforming it by stages into a true Common Command for all the NATO Command Areas. If, as recently proposed, there were a NATO Force Projection Command with a Rapid Reaction corps for East Central Europe, this could serve as a supplementary link between the old and new territorial command areas. It could also serve as a transitional step, linking the emerging command areas with NATO and preparing NATO to accept their formal incorporation.

Potential Command Arrangements for Russian Forces in NATO

Several models exist for the relation between NATO and the command of the armed forces of member nations:

1. The German model (full integration of the national forces under the NATO Integrated Command).

2. The French model (no integration – the worst choice; France gets away with it by freeloading on the better behavior of the other members).

3. The model of the other European countries (commitment of most forces to come under NATO command in wartime; an important but limited NATO role in planning for them and training them in peacetime).

4. The American model (close integration with NATO of the minority of U.S. forces that is in Europe, by having the SACEUR also as their national Commander; a looser commitment to NATO of many of forces stationed inside the U.S.).

Models 2-4 are looser than the German model, and have been adequate for nations that are not viewed as threatening by other NATO member countries. But Russia, like Germany, has a severe problem of being viewed as threatening by its neighbors. It needs stronger medicine – something closer to the German model. The more Russia’s forces can be integrated within supranational NATO structures, the less Russia’s neighbors would have cause to fear it, and the easier it would be for Russia to do what it wants to do, namely, rebuild close cooperative relations with its neighbors.

The full German model would be ideal but utopian for Russia (unless most of the Western countries were willing to adopt it at the same time). Model 1 has served Germany very well, enabling it to play a major military role without inspiring any military fear in its Western neighbors, but it grew out of a bargain for recreating a German army after it had been crushed in 1945. In late 1991, Russia was in a mood for going farther in this direction than the West imagined, but the off-putting delays have taken a toll on Russia’s mood. Even in the best of moods, Russia is not likely to go all the way to Model 1; at least not in the absence of a willingness in the West to do likewise.

In practice the arrangement for command of Russian forces would surely be a unique combination of elements from the above four models. The question is: what kind of combination, and how integrationist would it be?

Some Siberian command areas might be only loosely associated with NATO, like the internal U.S. command areas of U.S. forces. Most CIS command areas might have a SACEUR-type structure, with a Russian Commander-in-Chief and non-Russian deputies; if they were included in NATO, there should be Western deputies as well. Some Russian forces might be in multinational NATO units. Some Russian units for peacekeeping in the Balkans might be placed under an Eastern-Central European Commander.

The Western interest – like the true Russian national interest (but not the nationalist interest) – is for this combination to be as far along the integrationist scale as possible. This result will not be achieved by a mere mechanical admission into NATO. The West will need to be imaginative in suggesting ways for the NATO Command system to be extended eastward; that is, it will need to consider new models and innovative combinations of the previous models for possible application eastward. (And it will need to make an effort to be responsive to innovative suggestions coming from the East on this subject, rather than being off-putting or superior.) Here are some features that might be considered as part of a NATO command arrangement for Russia:

— In a “SACCIS,” a Russian commander-in-chief might have Western deputies as well as CIS deputies, in outlying subcommands as well as the center. If Western deputies played a visible role in SACCIS, this would help reassure the small CIS nations that Russia would not ride roughshod over them.

— SACEUR might have Russian deputies as well as Western deputies. So might the East-Central European commander.

— Increases in supranational NATO control over the forces of Western nations might be “traded” for increases in supranational NATO control over Russian forces. A greater NATO role in NORAD might be traded for a greater NATO role in intra-Russian and Siberian command arrangements.

— A greater role for Western deputies in Russian command structures might be “traded” for a greater role for Russian deputies in Western command structures.

— Joint brigades of Russian and American forces might be formed.

— Western leaders can put more public emphasis on the integrative role that NATO has played within the West – pacifying Franco-German relations, underpinning the growth of the European Community – and less on NATO’s role in defending against external threats. It can take steps to deepen NATO’s internal integrative role. By forming multinational units, NATO is already taking a step in this direction. When it starts negotiating for integration of Russian forces into NATO, the West might realize that it will need to go much further in this direction if it is to be able to integrate Russia deeply into NATO and yet spare Russia the sort of “singularity” that Germany has suffered. It may require decades to equalize the supranational coverage of NATO, but this goal should be agreed in principle not later than the negotiations with Russia.

Regaining a common strategic space through NATO; reconciling the Russian military to democracy

If all the states in the former USSR and Warsaw Pact joined NATO on a basis of a significant degree of integration into the NATO Command, this would reconstruct a common strategic space among them, albeit under conditions in which Russia could not dominate the others. For Russia, this would be a way of rejoining its former subject peoples, on the other side of the strategic fence.

This would be reassuring for the Russian military, helping to reconcile it to the loss of imperial control over these territories. It would show it that a secure integrative relation might yet be achieved with these territories, and that in losing the power to dictate to them Russia had not lost them to enemy powers or to irredeemably hostile nationalisms. Also, by relieving Russia’s neighbors of their fear of Russian power, integration into NATO would enable cooperation to resume more smoothly in other sectors, such as trade, transport, minority rights, and citizenship – which is what Russia wants in order to restore some of the former transparency of borders and take the heat out of border disputes. If there were still a residual feeling of loss in Russia over the end of empire, this would be compensated by a feeling of great gain – inclusion of the West as an ally of Russia – and of becoming an integral part of a more powerful force than ever before.

Reconciling the Russian military is important for stabilizing democracy in Russia and avoiding coups. Early membership in NATO could help much in this regard, in the ways indicated above. Further: it would call a halt to the disastrous cycle of narrowing of strategic perspectives and of disintegration on ever-narrower fault lines.

The more planning the Russian military does together with the West and the more it sees its interests linked with those of the West, the less likely it will be to contemplate a coup. (This is intuited by the Communists who are still hoping for a coup: Pravda published a letter saying that membership in NATO would place a seal of irreversibility on the bourgeois counterrevolution.) The more NATO involvement there is on the ground in Russia in matters of oversight of armaments reductions, conversion, military training and military planning, the more difficult it will be to plan a coup secretly and coherently.

The extension of the integrated NATO Command to the East may itself be the best security against multiplication of ethnic conflicts, border disputes, violence in the break-up of the imperial army, and turf fights over nuclear weapons. This means that it is a mistake when Westerners urge the East to solve its ethnic, political and military problems first, and join NATO later; a more practical order would be the other way around. The mistake is not only in logic; it is having the most severe consequences in the proliferation of new conflicts.