CHAPTER I
The NATO-Russia Charter
and the
Emerging Relationship
Dr. Constantine Menges: We have asked our participants to share their expertise on an issue that clearly is at a turning point in history. We can sense today that decisions are being made that are very important, and that reasonable people can view this issue in very different ways. It is a debate that in some sense may begin in the United States with this symposium and others.
Russia-NATO Relations as an Independent Subject
John Herbst
Deputy to the Ambassador-at-Large for the Newly Independent States
Perhaps the most important task we face in the post-Cold War world is to build a new European security structure. Our objective is the emergence of an undivided Europe with a security structure that reflects the interests of all with a stake in the continent. There are many elements to this, including such things as the evolution of the OSCE and the EU. But three elements have attracted particular attention: the adaptation of NATO, the enlargement of NATO, and the development of a NATO-Russian relationship.
I remember learning in International Relations 101 that perception in politics is reality. This may explain why observers tend to look at the development of NATO-Russian relations as a function of an enlarging NATO. That, however, is a perception, not fact nor analysis. In a post-Cold War world, there is no task more important than developing a new NATO-Russia relationship, whatever NATO's geographic parameters. Still, the impending NATO summit set for July in Madrid, during which countries will be invited to start negotiations for membership, has a tendency to concentrate attention on the NATO-Russian relationship.
There is, frankly, some nervousness in Western Europe regarding enlargement of NATO in the absence of an understanding with Moscow on NATO-Russia relations. The American position on this is clear: NATO enlargement and NATO adaptation is on course. The Madrid summit will extend the invitation to prospective new members. We would like to define the NATO-Russian relationship in parallel, but the one development is not contingent on the other, it is not hostage to the other.
We are quite active on the NATO-Russian front. I have been working on U.S.-Russian relations since August 1994. No issue has loomed higher on our agenda with Moscow than this one, and it clearly tops our agenda as we face this year. We are working this issue actively, both in bilateral channels and with all of our allies in NATO.
I believe the main outline of our approach is known to all, but let me go through it briefly.
First, there has been much talk about some kind of NATO-Russian document. Most people speak of a charter. The purpose of such a document or charter would be to formalize high-level NATO-Russian interaction. An important part of this would be the creation of some kind of consultative mechanism.
Moscow has understandably expressed concern about involvement in the decision-making process on issues affecting overall European security and Moscow's own specific interests. This is a sensitive and a difficult issue, but it is not one without precedent. In managing the problem in Bosnia, the workings of the contact group have been essential. This set the stage for Russian participation in IFOR, the peacekeeping group for Bosnia.
I would not want to make too much of this exact model. The workings of any consultative mechanism between NATO and Russia will have to be carefully considered and worked out. But I do make a great deal about the example of Russia and NATO working together on a process for solving a nearly intractable issue in the near-heart of Europe.
Moscow has also expressed concern about the implications of NATO enlargement for nuclear and conventional deployments in the countries that would enter NATO. The alliance addressed the nuclear concern last December through the enunciation of the so-called "three no's"; that is, that the alliance has no reasons, no intentions and no plan to deploy nuclear weapons in the new NATO member states.
We are soon to begin negotiations for the adaptation of the CFE or Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty. This treaty provides limits on the number of tanks, artillery and armored combat vehicles in Europe. We believe that these negotiations will be a way to promote mutual restraint and reductions based upon reciprocity in Europe; in other words, a legally binding way to address some of Russia's concerns.
There is a great deal of concern about Moscow's reaction to NATO enlargement. I will give here an American perception of how Russia is reacting to this whole process and to the development of a NATO-Russia relationship.
Russia has regularly and at the highest levels made known its opposition to enlargement. Perhaps the most spectacular instance was at the OSCE summit in December of 1994 in Budapest when President Yeltsin made that position absolutely clear. The latest examples have occurred just this past week. Chubais, the chief of staff to President Yeltsin, and Russian Prime Minister Chernomyrdin have both expressed or reiterated Russian opposition.
At the same time, Russia has indicated its interest in discussing the elements of a NATO-Russian relationship. Recall that I began by saying that the development of a NATO-Russian relationship is essential, regardless of what NATO is doing. This interest, though, is something that we sometimes hear more of and less of on the Russian part. For example, when Prime Minister Chernomyrdin spoke at the Lisbon OSCE summit this past December, he made clear Russia's interest in developing this relationship.
There have been moments, though, when we have seen less enthusiasm on Moscow's behalf for this. My judgment is that there is concern in Moscow that Russia not be too active and positive in developing this relationship, because it may quiet concerns in the West regarding enlargement. It is perfectly understandable that Russian policymakers do not want to be seen as acquiescing in any way in enlargement. As a consequence, we see a two-track Russian policy -- opposition to enlargement, yet development of the elements of a possible NATO-Russian understanding.
I am going through this in order to make a point that is paramount in the minds of the U.S. government; which is that developing the NATO-Russian relationship, and maintaining a close, positive U.S. relationship with Russia, is going to be something that requires very careful handling and will be something of a tough go this calendar year. I want to emphasize, though, that we are doing everything we can to make this possible. We are doing this, again, bilaterally as well through the alliance.
A couple of weeks ago, Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott went to Moscow to begin to talk about what might be in the cards for a summit meeting between President Clinton and President Yeltsin in the spring. This was perhaps the most important issue on the agenda, although not the only one.
Prime Minister Chernomyrdin will be here this week for conversations with the vice president. Again, this will be an important subject of their conversations.
German Chancellor Kohl was in Russia at the beginning of January. French President Chirac was there earlier this month. Again, this is maybe the most important subject of conversation. The head of NATO, Mr. Solana, was in Moscow last month. He will be going back again this month. Again, this was the principal subject of his conversation.
Our objective is to create an undivided Europe which takes into account the security interests of all. We believe this is consistent with a NATO that enlarges, but it also requires the development of a close NATO-Russian relationship. That is our objective.
Russia-NATO Military Cooperation
Ralph Cacci
Department of Defense, International Security Policy
Thanks to the Program on Transitions to Democracy for organizing this conference. It is very timely. I can tell you firsthand that it is an issue that we are spending a lot of time on in the Pentagon right now.
There is not much I can add to John Herbst's presentation on all the political aspects of this, so I will just say something on the U.S.-Russia military-to-military contacts.
The Defense Department has sought a cooperative relationship -- indeed, a partnership -- with the Russian military based on mutual respect and shared interest. Our policy is based on the iron logic that is accepted on both sides: that international stability requires the world's leading military powers to cooperate. We are convinced that U.S. and Russian interests will be served in this way.
The current defense dialogue with Russia started before the end of the Cold War -- in fact, in 1987 during the Washington summit when Soviet General Staff Chief Akhromeyev called on Secretary Carlucci. Carlucci later met with MOD Yazov three times in 1988. The military-to-military contacts program started two years later when Akhromeyev and Admiral Crowe agreed in July 1988. The second two-year program was agreed by General Moiseyev and Chairman Powell in the fall of 1990.
So, since these modest beginnings, and especially since 1991, the contacts have expanded steadily. We had 16 contacts in 1991, upwards of 90 in 1995, and over 100 in 1996. Nunn-Lugar funding has helped this increase.
Activities that we have conducted in 1996 have included SECDEF meetings with his MOD counterpart, a visit by senior military officers of both countries, Joint Staff and General Staff talks, exchanges of staff officers and specialists, and several combined exercises. The largest exercise in 1996 was Cooperation From The Sea, which was the third in a series of navy-marine-infantry disaster relief exercises that was held in Vladivostok.
There has been significant progress in this cooperation program. The best example is the U.S.-Russian interaction in IFOR and SFOR. The cooperation in Bosnia shows that it is realistic for U.S. and Russian forces to deploy together. Bosnia provides a valuable experience in working out mutually acceptable command structures and correcting incapabilities in operational procedures. I will note that the U.S. officers engaged were highly impressed with the quality and the performance of the Russian troops.
We want to see the NATO-Russian relationship evolve and move forward, regardless of the NATO enlargement debate, especially in the military-to-military area. We have put forward some new initiatives at jointly promoting success in Russian military reform. Specifically, the U.S. is going to share our ideas and experience, and we are waiting for the Russian side to decide what is best for their situation. Specifically, the Secretary of Defense has agreed with the Russian Minister of Defense that the U.S. Army will receive a Russian team to study how the U.S. noncommissioned officer system works so they can help reform their forces.
The Secretary of Defense and Minister of Defense Rodionov have also reached agreement on revived educational exchanges that have slowed down the past couple of years. The Russian armed forces will send a student to the U.S. Army Command General Staff College. The Russian Minister of Defense has requested slots in other schools and at the U.S. Marshall Center in Europe, and the U.S. Army will send an officer to the Russian Military Academy of the General Staff this fall.
The Department of Defense is looking to lend further impetus to the security and the defense relationship. We believe future cooperation can move ahead if it clearly serves the interests of both sides. We are looking for additional cooperative efforts that further Russian military reform, that further interoperability, and that reduce threats. In this instance, threat reduction is not only about reducing the nuclear threat, but also the unfavorable impressions.
The U.S. is interested in promoting cooperation between NATO and Russia so that the Russian military can observe firsthand how the NATO alliance is changing after the Cold War. For example, the U.S. nuclear stockpile in NATO is down by 90 percent over the last few years, and all ground-launched systems have been removed from Europe. On the conventional side, defense budgets and forces are sharply reduced, and mobilization times have been relaxed. For example, U.S. ground maneuver units in Europe have been reduced over 50 percent. In the current time, NATO is more focused on counterproliferation, peace operations and humanitarian relief.
An important reason for correcting these misapprehensions is the NATO-Russia special relationship being negotiated in the diplomatic channels. We believe these channels should have a military component. Military cooperation in this area is currently modest, and we are looking to expand it. Again some specific examples:
• NATO is ready to have Russian permanent liaison officers at Mons and at Norfolk at the major commands. We are waiting for Moscow to make the political decision to implement this proposal.
• We hope that Russia will become more involved in the Partnership for Peace to the degree of hosting exercises and participating in the planning to the degree commensurate with its role as a great power in Europe. Discussions of a NATO-Russia charter are a good place to explore possibilities for expanding cooperation, especially in the area of planning peacekeeping contingencies.
In addition to these formal discussions, NATO and Russian militaries have shown that they can work together at the practical and the concrete level.
In summary, the U.S. sees military cooperation between the United States and Russia as more than desirable; it is absolutely necessary. The U.S. and Russian military must work together. It is better for both countries and the world in general if this a cooperative relationship.
NATO Enlargement without Russia:
A Mistake on Four Counts
Honorable Yuli Vorontsov
Ambassador of the Russian Federation to the United States
I like the title of our symposium here: NATO and Russia. It would have been much better if that kind of topic had been discussed before the decision was made to enlarge NATO.
When the decision was originally floated, I came to the State Department and had a long talk with the then assistant secretary of state, Mr. Holbrooke. I said, "Have you thought about Russia while you were putting forward this idea of enlargement of NATO?" And his answer was very honest. He said, "No, not at all; you have nothing to do with that." "Aha," I said, "that is very interesting, and what about an invitation for Russia to join the enlarged NATO?" He said, "Anybody but Russia! No."
That was a nice beginning of our conversations about enlargement of NATO in the State Department and later on in the corridors of power in Washington. And from all quarters I received that kind of answer: "Anyone but Russia. Not you!"
That was quite an interesting experience after a very good beginning. Russia and NATO, can they cooperate? Of course they can. We have demonstrated that while joining the Partnership for Peace program. We said that is a good idea. We worked out that thick document of our partnership with NATO. We really thought that it was going to be a partnership, and we really thought that there was going to be cooperation with NATO and so on. But then somebody invented this bright idea: instead of partnership, have an enlargement of NATO. And that is a different story. That is quite a different story. It was a jolt to all of us, especially with this "anybody but Russia" in that combination.
I would say we consider the whole idea of enlargement of NATO as an idea which is wrong. It is wrong on several counts.
1. First, historically. It is the wrong idea historically. It is absolutely the wrong time to do this. Fifty years ago when NATO was conceived, it was justified. The fear of Western Europe was a justified fear. At that time we really had in Central and Eastern Europe a big concentration of the Soviet Russian forces with an offensive strike capability. That has its own explanation, its own rationale. It was the answer to the American nuclear monopoly.
In Russia at that time, in the Soviet Union, they had been afraid that the Americans might strike first with nuclear weapons. Just to forestall this, the idea was to keep that concentration of armored divisions which could strike fast in the center of Europe and the west of Europe just as a precautionary warning: "You drop nuclear bombs on our heads in Russia; we go through Western Europe, to Paris and Madrid and Lisbon. That is our reply to your attack in case you decide to attack."
That was really an offensive capability of the Soviet Union of that time. What is more, that was a concentration of several armored divisions with a complete autonomous capability of fighting. They had everything at their disposal. If the Soviet Union was destroyed, they were able still to fight and go forward. Everybody knew about this, and the Western countries knew about this, and the idea was they were afraid. What if Russia -- the Soviet Union at that time -- strikes first? They created NATO. That was the justification.
But what is the situation now? What can be comparable now to the situation of 1949? Nothing. The situation in Europe is completely changed. Soviet forces have been withdrawn by the Russian Federation from Central and Eastern Europe, from Ukraine completely, from the Baltic republics completely. The armed forces of Russia have been downsized to 1.5 million, which roughly is comparable to what you have in the United States. Together with NATO you have far, far more forces and striking capability now than Russia has.
So then the question is: Why NATO? The first question: Why do you still keep NATO? And then the second question: Why enlarge it? And we have not found a reasonable explanation to that. We have not heard a reasonable explanation for that. We have heard that this is a bright idea, but why is it a bright idea?
2. It is wrong philosophically. It means we are moving into the 21st century and the new millennium on the tanks again. You are starting this kind of a march in the next century on the tanks, and unfortunately, we will follow. We will follow. We will build more tanks and this and that, and we will be sitting on the tanks. Who needs this? Philosophically, why now?
On one occasion I heard a British diplomat explaining that NATO is all about values, Western values. That is why NATO. I asked him at a big gathering like this one: What about values that we Russians have accepted now? Those are Western values, common values nowadays. So why NATO and why the enlargement of NATO? We have democracy. We are building democracy further. We have a multi-party system, parliamentary elections, presidential elections. We have a market economy now, which is faltering for the moment because it is very difficult to put the whole country on a new set of values. It is extremely difficult, but we will do it. So what about the values? What is the difference in values now? It is not an explanation of why the enlargement of NATO.
So this strikes us something which is very wrong for going into the new century on the democratic basis in Europe now. All the countries are democratic -- besides maybe Yugoslavia, Serbia that is to say, but they will be soon also on the democratic set of values. It is obvious now. But why then these divisions? And why do you think that the values in the West are different from the values in the east of Europe now?
3. It is wrong politically -- next count. And it is dead wrong politically so far as the situation in Russia is concerned. You were not thinking about Russia while floating the idea of expansion of NATO, obviously. Otherwise, you could have easily calculated what it will do to our very, very young democracy in Russia, this putting of countries back on tanks.
Who will gain in Russia? Yes, we have had very serious demonstrations that the country wants to go the democratic way during the last presidential elections, but you should remember there were 40 million votes for President Yeltsin and 30 million votes for Zyuganov, the Communist leader. You want to help Zyuganov? You want to help super-patriots like Zhirinovsky? It is easy for them now to say: "There is a threat from the West. Look what is happening there. What are they suggesting? What kind of a road do they show to us to follow?" And they will appeal to President Yeltsin, saying, "Those are your friends; what are they doing to you? Why are your friends doing that to you?" What is the answer to that?
I always say to my American friends: In politics you should learn to play chess. You should always think what kind of move the other guy will make when you move the pawn from this square to another square. In chess you have to look three, four moves ahead -- your own and the other guy's moves. You will understand better if you know how to play chess. It is still my advice. Start playing chess, really. It will be much, much better for everybody.
4. Then, practically. It is wrong from the practical point of view. It is the wrong move. It will entail tremendous military expenditures for sure. For the three new countries that you have selected as new members of the alliance, you will have to pay. They will not pay. They have nothing to pay with, by the way, for militarization in the NATO type. Or for unification of weapons and equipment that will be used. The United States will pay, or maybe some Western allies of yours. But you are the richest, and everybody will be looking in your direction.
It is not surprising that the Congress ordered a special study on how much the cost will be for the United States for the enlargement of NATO. The preliminary figures are from $20 billion to $60 billion. I do not know whether they will be ready to pay this. Or maybe the Pentagon will pay it. They have a large budget; maybe they will do it from their own budget. Who knows?
But practically it is wrong. Sometimes I tell my American friends, "You have now a very nice military machine in NATO; its main cambered tank is polished, oiled, everything fits perfectly. And now for this tank which has eight wheels on the left side, eight wheels on the right side -- 16 wheels -- you will add three more wheels. On which side will you add three more wheels? On the left or on the right? And how will the tank move after that? Sideways or what? Really, it is even from that practical point of view that there is something wrong. But that is for you to decide, of course, whether you like it or not.
I would say that movement of NATO forces close to the Russian borders is generally being considered by all politically forces in Russia as a threat. You can ask anybody there. Do not just ask Communists, we know what they all say; ask liberals, ask democrats, ask young and ask old, and nobody in Russia is applauding this move, because everybody is afraid it is going to be a military threat.
It is not so difficult to calculate what it will do to our countries economically. It will deprive us of money for the further economic reforms. The military immediately will demand more money for additions to their military machine, which is now in very good shape by the way, but they will demand more tanks, more this, more that, more forces to put on the possible routes of NATO invasion. That will be the psychology of the military if they have the other side preparing and moving something made of armor and steel and what-not closer to you. You have to be prepared. You have to put something there, even theoretically. So their demand will be more of weaponry and all that. That will mean again militarization of our country.
Why you want us to go into this we do not understand. Really there is no explanation. More militarization, more power to the military, and maybe less democracy. And who knows, maybe you will be breeding a dictator, a military dictator, through these moves of yours. So again, play chess. Think what the other moves will be, not only yours.
You made the first moves that "It's great; let's have these countries because they wish so much, let's have them within NATO." And you stopped thinking after that what that will entail.
I think a Russian proverb is absolutely correct here. We have a very old Russian proverb: "Before cutting, measure seven times, and after seven times, then you cut." You have not measured even once. But we still have time. Start measuring. Thank you.
Structuring a NATO-Russia Partnership
Hon. Jurgen Chrobog
Ambassador of the Federal Republic of Germany to the United States
I understand the reasoning of Ambassador Vorontsov. Rather than try to give an answer to all the questions he has raised, I will try to say something different: to explain why we do everything to make it more easy for Russia to accept what we are doing. That is something we have to think about now.
Whenever I come to the United States and address the question of NATO expansion, I never know which direction I face. There are people supporting NATO expansion who blame Germany because they think we are slowing down the process. Other people who oppose NATO expansion tell us "You, the Germans, started the whole business." I think we are in a middle position, and it might be that the middle position is not always the wrong one.
This distinguished audience deserves the most serious answer, so I will readily admit that Germany has played a major role both in advancing the enlargement of NATO and in taking Russia's concerns seriously. The reason for this is very simple: It is in Germany's own strategic interest to take both the interests of its immediate eastern neighbors and those of Russia into account. We very firmly believe that the future of our country lies in the integration to a democratic and prosperous Europe. That is why we support both the extension of the Western European and Transatlantic Zone of Stability to the east and the inclusion of Russia in Europe.
I differ with Mr. Vorontsov regarding the contention that Russia did not play any role at the very beginning when we started the discussion. You had a high priority in the thinking of the Germany government. It was the German chancellor who always made very clear that the whole process can only develop in a framework, in a climate of transparency and of confidence. And we did all that we could do over the last few months to make it easier for you, especially through this time when your president was ill.
I would like to underscore that we share all the strategic aims of our NATO partners, but I would still argue that they have a special meaning for my country. Germany is the only NATO country that is at the same time a Central European country, and secondly, the relationship between Germany and Russia has a significance for Europe far beyond its bilateral dimensions, and especially for Germany. Today's Russia has confidence in today's Germany, and we are in a position to reassure Russia of its place in Europe.
We should not neglect one other side of our discussion. Every coin has two sides. One side is NATO expansion; the other side is the integration process in Europe. Here NATO expansion becomes a different logic, because I strongly believe the more we integrate Europe, the more logical it becomes if we all share the same alliances. Sometimes we had a difficult task in the United States to make this point, and we might have a difficult task in Russia to make this point, too.
We understand, and you mentioned it, that Russia, too, has domestic politics. We have to get used to this idea because it is a new idea for all of us, but we have to be aware of this phenomenon.
As far as a charter with Russia is concerned, I will, unfortunately, not be able to go into great detail. This is a matter for negotiations with Russia right now, and let me also emphasize that these negotiations are on our side conducted by General Secretary Solana. But just let me make a few points.
We do not see such a charter as a mere by-product of NATO enlargement. It has to be able to stand on its own and work independently of NATO decisions on NATO enlargement. There is, of course, a connection. NATO is pursuing a parallel but complementary strategy. NATO is reaching out to its eastern neighbors, and this reaching out takes different shapes, not least because our partners in Central and Eastern Europe are different.
The NATO-Russia charter will only be one element in developing and reenforcing our links with Russia. Other important elements are: the provisions of the CFE Treaty; the second point, let's not touch upon the ABM Treaty, a very important issue here in the United States these days; thirdly, creating a further mechanism for consultations with Russia; and, finally, partnership with Russia has to go beyond matters of security and defense. We also have to develop our political and economic ties with Russia.
All this should add up to one clear message to Russia: "You are a European country; you are part of Europe."
NATO and Russia as the two essential parties in European security
Honorable William Howard Taft IV
Former United States Ambassador to NATO and former Deputy Secretary of Defense
I would suggest a few things about how to approach the subject of NATO and Russia, just as my own perspective.
For 300 years, the constructive participation of Russia in the European security system has been a challenge and an essential achievement of success in that venture. It is still a challenge, but it must still be achieved. There will not be, and there has never been for 300 years, a peaceful security structure in Europe that has not accommodated Russia, which is to say has not provided fully equally security for Russia as for all of the other members of Europe.
So this is not a new challenge. It is not a new problem. But it is one of the most important ones, if not the most important one, that European security has ever posed and still poses.
For almost 100 years, the engagement of the United States in European security has been essential for the success of European stability and peace. The instrument for the last 50 years of that has been NATO, and the fundamental purpose of NATO has been to bring about the engagement of the United States. From that has followed the security of all of the members of the alliance. That also remains essential and must not be changed.
It is essential that also we not change the character of NATO so that it will not continue to pull in the United States to perform that fundamental task that it has which contributes to European security. That is why the relationship between NATO on the one hand and Russia on the other is the critical relationship that needs to be addressed.
Who is exactly in NATO besides the United States actually, it seems to me, is not of critical importance, except -- and I think Secretary Holbrooke in his discussion with Ambassador Vorontsov was typically candid and honest -- that NATO will not be the NATO that brings in the United States to Europe in the way that it needs to if Russia is in it, and it will not be the NATO that will work to assure the U.S. engagement there.
At the same time, if there are some additional members that want to be in, frankly, it seems to me it is not anywhere near as major a factor as being sure the United States is in and being sure that Russia's security interests are taken care of. It does not really rise to the same level. Some people want to be in. I think they should be in. I completely agree with the administration's policy that it would be a tragedy to have the linkage of this issue, which should be a no-brainer for people, to what is a continuing challenge and a continuing struggle to work out.
What should be involved in the NATO-Russia relationship? Just a few of the items that are already there will serve to illustrate how important this is.
The only fault that I would find with the administration, if any -- and I am pretty much in line with where they are as of now -- is that they should have been working on this even harder. I know they were working hard, of course. But let me say simply, and easily as one out of power can say, that they should have been working more successfully to bring about that relationship with Russia over the last four years that they have had that time to build it.
It should have, first of all, obviously involved an arrangement for political cooperation in which there would be an agreement that the alliance and Russia are the central components in the European security system and that they will address together the security challenges to that system and work out policies to deal with them. To some degree this is being done, as we can see in Bosnia and here and there informally. It should be an institutionalized, normal aspect of relations.
There should be a discussion of individual security policies, the alliance's in full transparency, and Russia's. There should be a discussion of arms control agreements in the nuclear field -- still as bilateral negotiations since the British and French do not wish directly to participate, but NATO always informed -- and on the conventional side, a rearrangement of the CFE to meet the legitimate concerns that were not met in the original agreement or even in the update of it. It is good to see that that is underway.
There should always be discussions of military doctrine, and I think this is a particularly important matter. Some of the reports that I have heard recently are cause for real alarm that in Russia there is some thought being given to going back to a big nuclear reliance for deterrence and much less capability on the conventional side. We need immediately to address what our military doctrine is, what theirs is, and to scotch this idea where essentially Russia would become a mirror of where NATO was in the 1950s -- a very dangerous posture for them and for us. That is a very high item on the agenda.
Peacekeeping operations/cooperation is another one; and finally, cooperation in the development of arms. Here I would part company with Ambassador Chrobog. I would put ABM on the list of things that we actually ought to be developing together. Here Russia has the capability to contribute a great deal along with the United States for addressing the new nuclear situation that we face around the world. There are also opportunities on the conventional side.
This is a long menu. All together, it would contribute to building that relationship between Russia and NATO, on which there is not the slightest doubt in my mind that the security of Europe and the world depend.
Expansion is Bad for NATO
Honorable Philip Merrill
Former Assistant Secretary General of NATO
A few weeks ago a Russian friend, the editor of Moscow News, told me a joke. It was 2010, and Russians were hearing about a NATO intelligence report. The report was very simple -- the Russians have a sense of humor similar to Americans; it had one sentence: "There were no clashes today on the German-Chinese border." That is a Russian joke, not an American joke.
I am here to speak in direct opposition to the expansion of NATO, to say this is a very bad idea whose time most people seem to think has come. I hope not. Our real object -- that is, the object of the United States and Western Europe in the world -- is to integrate Russia and China into the community of civilized nations and to deal with weapons of mass destruction in the hands of Third World crazies.
Does enlarging NATO or signing a charter with Russia advance this cause, or does it retard it? I would say it retards it.
This cause -- the cause of integrating Russia and China into the community of civilized nations -- is retarded by a policy of expanding NATO because it gives arguments, legitimate arguments, to the most xenophobic elements inside Russia. There is simply no reason for us to do this. It is a bad political choice.
Such a policy also imperils the independence of the Ukraine. This is of great interest to the United States, because Ukraine as a separate country, fully independent, provides a division of Russia should things go badly there. If we press the expansion of NATO, which puts us right up against the Ukrainian border, we inevitably help those forces inside Russia which wish to reincorporate Ukraine into the Russian blanket.
I do favor and incorporate virtually everything said by my friend and colleague, William Taft, about promoting a strong relationship with the Russians. We have no argument with them. They are not threatening to invade Western Europe. They are not threatening to interrupt our oil supply in the Persian Gulf. They are not projecting power in the Third World. The Cold War is over. We are not at war with them.
If we invite them into NATO Headquarters as a NATO participant, then there is no longer a military alliance -- for the very simple reason that there is no point in encryption or C3 any of the other things that make a modern military force work in what I shall call the new information technologies. These are technologies that go back hundreds of years in terms of secrecy of communications, technologies you saw exercised in the Gulf War. Why bother with them? We can just use a regular telephone system if we are going to have Russians -- or, for that matter, other Eastern Europeans -- inside NATO Headquarters. On the other hand, if they are not going to be incorporated somehow inside the NATO environment, then obviously from their point of view, being of but not in Europe -- like the United States is of but not in Europe -- they are the enemy, and they will start to react in ways that an enemy begins to react. So either way it is not a good idea.
There is no reason for a charter with Russia. What we need is cooperation with Russia on a multiplicity of issues, which for sake of time I incorporate by extension everything that Will Taft has said, and particularly focus on defensive technologies and on dealing with Third World crazies.
There is an argument for maintaining NATO, however, and that is to take a victory. In the half of my life when I am not in government service I am a businessman. I am not against taking a profit. I consider it taking a profit to have the fact that our traditional friends in Western Europe, meaning the five big countries of Western Europe, Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Spain -- cannot even think about fighting with one another. I think that is a profit for the Russians also, as well as for us. Why can they not think about fighting? Because we have an integrated command-and-control structure and an at least half-integrated defense industrial base. Nobody would even think about a re-nationalization of defense of an individual country because the command structure and the defense production structures are integrated. I like that profit. I am willing to take it. I think the Russians will be happier if we keep it than if we did not have it. Who wants to go back to the pre-World War I scenario? So, if we cannot move forward and we cannot move backwards, we stay where we are -- at very much reduced levels of military forces in Europe, but maintaining integration.
It is fair to say to the Russians that we wish to keep our powder dry, but at a distance, just in case in the far away future they should once again become a threat. But that is not likely to happen any time soon. A revolution has taken place that is comparable to the end of an empire like the Ottoman Empire or the Byzantine Empire or the Roman Empire. It will take the Russians 50 to 100 years to build what we would call a free society, and there are going to be steps forward and steps back. Our interest is in helping them build a market economy, a free society, a representative government, a rule of law, a hard currency, a respect for human rights, and a sense of internal checks and balances in a pluralistic society. I cannot see that expanding NATO helps in any of these dimensions. I can see lots of places where we may disagree with the Russians on varying regional issues, but I see no reason why we should not cooperate with them on the principal issues facing the world, where our interests overlap. There is no historic argument between Russia and the United States, except for the last several decades. It does not go back into the 19th century and the 18th century and the 17th century and so forth and so forth and so forth, thinking here in dynastic terms.
Let me also say that, from the U.S. point of view, we should not make guarantees that we are not prepared to keep. We should not be involved in the ethnic, linguistic and national arguments in the wake of this collapse of empire that are inevitable in Eastern Europe. The three great bugaboos of civilization are race, religion and language, and the collapse of an empire like the Soviet empire is going to let those forces loose. Are we prepared to extend a U.S. nuclear guarantee to western Moldova? To Estonia? To Latvia? To Romania? Are we going to distinguish between new members and those we already have? The NATO guarantee is an "all for one and one for all" guarantee. With all due respect to the Eastern European ambassadors sitting here, the United States does really not seek the support of their militaries to protect freedom in the world. We may seek to cooperate with them in specific places as we cooperated with 38 nations in the Gulf, but we do not necessarily need the support of Eastern European countries. What they want is our guarantee against Russia.
Finally let me say that the reason Western Europeans are so swept with this idea is because it does not really have any significant meaning. The Eastern Europeans have pointed out that the central issue for them is to be integrated into the community of civilized nations of Western Europe. But that is exactly what the French and the Germans and the Spanish and even the British are trying to avoid in every economic term possible. They do not wish to integrate these economies. They do not wish inexpensive Eastern European labor to have access to the markets of Western Europe. It is easier for them to say, "Let them join with the United States, and we will make a guarantee and put them into NATO and we do not have to do anything that affects our own people's economies or farm price supports." I do not say we are innocent ourselves on these grounds. I simply say that this is an interest of Western nations. To put it aphoristically, it is easy to talk about NATO expansion, but not so easy to talk about eating into the markets of French farmers.
So to summarize. I do not think that NATO expansion is a good idea. I do think that cooperation with Russia in every dimension is a very good idea. I think there is a long agenda for that cooperation, but I will leave that for another exposition and another symposium.
Discussion
NATO as a Hedge between Russia and Germany?
Q SEAN KAY, Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University: I would like to ask the Russian ambassador, could you not find an analytical argument in which you see NATO enlargement doing the traditional things that were spoken of with the Americans and Germans and the Russian hedge? And do you see convergence, potentially, of interest there in which you have a NATO enlargement not as a hedge against Russia, but rather as a hedge between these two traditional great powers that have had this historical long-term confrontation over that region.
AMB. VORONTSOV: First of all, we see no danger from Germany, and we do not need any hedges now between us. We had a terrible history, it is true, of clashes and wars and annihilation of millions of people. That is in the past, and we are not bringing it now into the future. We have a good relationship with Germany. No military threat from Germany. No military threat of Russia towards Germany. So we do not need any kind of a device to keep Germans down or something like that. That is not our idea. It has been discussed in NATO. I know that was so in 1949. The Americans in, this is fine. We have nothing against Americans being in. We understand their tremendous role in the world and in Europe. So let them be in. We do not understand why it should be done, the whole thing now, militarily, through more military equipment, moving tanks to other destinations and all that. That we do not understand, and that we will never accept.
EU Expansion and NATO Expansion
AMB. BANLAKI of Hungary: I rise only because, in regard of Mr. Merrill's comments, I would have to say that, what you say about the intentions of Western Europeans and the European Union -- that they do not want to integrate our countries -- is not true. We have received unconditional and very, very firm commitments about that. Having said that, I do not want to underestimate the difficulties and the problems and the heights we have to negotiate in the accession talks. But to say that they do not want it and they will not do it -- this is manifestly against every indication we have received from them.
I would ask you a question. You can take it philosophically if you like. If you feel that the accession of Spain to NATO has expanded the zone of stability in Europe and it has made a better place out of Europe and the world where very strong American interests are there, why would the integration of Poland not have the same effect?
MR. MERRILL: I think the answer is very simple, and it goes to Will Taft's point. That is, that one additional country is something one cannot argue about. It is a question of how many additional countries. You have an instrument in which 16 nations vote by -- each has a veto. If you take this to 19 nations, perhaps we can get along with it. But what about 20 or 21 or 22 or 23? And who is outside the line? The Spain accession was part of the de-accession of Franco, and it took place in a different era and a different time. Now the interests of Central Europe are much more in economic integration into Western Europe. But were I a Hungarian or a Pole or a Czech, I would say I want to be in NATO, too. And I would say the same thing were I a Latvian or a Lithuanian. The question is, how many such can you take in? One? Yes. Two, three, four, five, six? It changes the character of the instrument.
MR. TAFT: Phil was so nice in agreeing with most of the things that I said that I feel badly about this, but I do want to be clear that we do disagree on the question of the additional members. I do not believe this is a question which should be linked with the Russian partnership or which rises to the level of importance of the Russian partnership. But I do believe it should occur for the three countries certainly and for some others and that there is absolutely no reason why it has to interfere with the relationship being built with Russia, and neither Russians nor NATO people should allow it to.
MR. HERBST: I would like to make one point, because it was stated that the U.S. position is that Russia will not be a member of NATO. In fact, the United States' position is that NATO is not closed to any nation in Europe. I cannot speak for former Assistant Secretary Holbrooke, who is as irrepressible a personality as the United States government has ever seen, but U.S. policy is as I have just stated it, and it has been repeated at the highest levels, both privately and publicly.
DR. MENGES: Thank you, Mr. Herbst. That is a very important clarification.
Keeping Germans Down and Russians Out?
Q: I would like to ask a question to the three countries concerned. Lord Ismay, one of the founding fathers of NATO, said that the objective of NATO is to keep the Russians out, the Americans in, and Germans down. Now we are in the post-Cold War era. I was wondering if there are still some reasons, if the Russians are out of it, to keep the Americans in Europe and perhaps the Germans within levels that are acceptable to the West in terms of their mighty economy.
AMB. CHROBOG: I do not think so. Firstly, Germany has no other wish than being integrated in a broader Europe. Secondly, NATO expansion is an open process. And, thirdly, to come back to what the Hungarian ambassador just said, it is completely wrong to think that there is no willingness on the European side to further integrate other European countries. We have a clear agreement with prospective membership for future members, Hungary and others. Twelve new member states are just waiting. We are hoping to open the negotiations at the end of this year or the beginning of next year, parallel by the way to the NATO extension process. There should not be any doubt about that. Therefore, what you said is really wrong.
MR. HERBST: I would make it more general, that we believe that NATO has a critical role to play in Europe, that the enlargement of NATO will, in fact, expand the zone of stability in Europe, that it is critically important also to develop the NATO-Russian relationship because we want to have an undivided Europe.
AMB. VORONTSOV: If Russia is out, to our people -- and for those who will not believe me, I invite you to come to Russia and speak to as many people as you want -- if we are out from NATO, that means NATO is anti-Russian. Period. Give me arguments that it is not so, and then I will use these arguments in conversations with our people in Russia. Up until now, we were not able to beat that argument there. "They say they don't want us there? That means they are anti-Russian." Period. What are the arguments?
When Did the Enlargement Policy Begin?
Q My name is Pembrose. According to what Mr. Holbrooke told Ambassador Vorontsov two or three years ago, do you think on the Western side there was a misreading in the beginning of the whole situation? And when did the perspective switch to NATO enlargement? Because two years ago everybody was talking about EU as being the main mechanism for integration in Europe. When did the U.S. and the West European countries switch to NATO instead of EU?
MR. HERBST: The United States has been intensively engaging Russia, intensively engaging the alliance, on the NATO-Russian relationship, certainly for the last two and a half, if not three years. I would not speak of any great fork in the road where we suddenly began to head in a new direction. There may be a perception that there has been more attention over the last year or so, but this goes back well into the summer of 1994, if not earlier.
AMB. VORONTSOV: 1994, right, summer of '94. That was a sudden decision of the Western countries.
MR. HERBST: I used that term precisely because that is when I returned to this part of the world from the Middle East. But I know that, when I arrived, this was high, if not the highest item, on the agenda.
AMB. VORONTSOV: Right. Suddenly. It sprang up suddenly. Out of Partnership for Peace, then suddenly this idea came up.
MR. HERBST: But the commitment to enlargement, I know that we were talking about this at the beginning of '94, if not earlier.
AMB. VORONTSOV: About September of '94 that idea was put forward.
Russian in Isolation between NATO and Asia?
Q I am from Russia. I have a question for William Taft. I would like to ask you, do you see any correlation between the NATO enlargement on the one side and the American concern about a potential threat from China? Maybe it is a way to channel the potential expansion of China to the north. Because history --
MR. TAFT: I haven't seen this connection --
Q I would like to make some things clear, because we are Russians. We have a certain experience, and we remember before World War II some conditions of the United States and the West toward Russia, and we received the German aggression towards the East. From our point of view, now Russia is excluded from the club, from NATO. We are excluded in Asia from any alliance; we are an outsider in Asia. What does it mean for us?
MR. TAFT: Let me --
Q A new system of alliance is created in Europe. A new system is created in Asia. What about Russia? In both cases, Russia is excluded. What does it mean for us?
MR. TAFT: Let me just say a word on both of those fronts, the Eastern and the Western fronts.
On the Western front, I think Russia is included as an essential element in the important club, which is the club which has a stake in European security. That is the club. One component of that is Russia. Another component of that is NATO. Those are the two main components. There are some others which are smaller. But Russia is included in that security structure, and it should participate in a partnership with NATO to build it. It is a full member.
In the Asian context, a little farther afield, I strongly support the engagement of Russia in the Pacific world, the Pacific Rim, APEC, the security issues that are being dealt with over there -- Japan, Korea, China, the United States. They have a very important role to play, and I hope that they will play it more strongly than they have over the recent years when they have been rather distracted with internal problems. But I think there is some sign they are re-engaging in those issues, and I hope they will. I think they could be helpful.
AMB. VORONTSOV: That is a new definition of inclusion. "Included." Through a dividing line, we are included. On one side, it is NATO; on the other side, it is Russia. And we are included. It is a dividing line then. You put the dividing line here and now, on one side and on the other side.
MR. TAFT: You are included in the essential construction of European security, the European community.
Q Yes, and we are Asians.
DR. MENGES: I might say the next panel will discuss the issue of Russian membership in NATO, and I think there will be some interesting presentations.
NATO and OSCE
Q Ambassador Vorontsov, I have listened to your views, which were a very good exposition of Russian fears and concerns. But something struck me when you were talking about the tanks and you were saying that NATO tanks are going to roll up to Russia's border. As far as I know, you do not have, except in Kaliningrad oblast, any common frontier with NATO. So you are maybe subconsciously still talking about the Soviet Union's expansion.
AMB. VORONTSOV: We are very conscious about our friends in Ukraine, which, by the way, is also against enlargement of NATO. But that is their business. I was talking about tanks rolling in the direction of our border.
It is not only NATO which exists in Europe. There are other organizations. OSCE is not a military bloc; that is true. NATO is a military bloc, military and political. So we say let's concentrate on the Organization on Cooperation and Security in Europe.
Q But how do we get it away from just being a talk show and actually being an organization that is able to do things?
AMB. VORONTSOV: The others may be talking. We are submitting proposals there. They are on the table.
Russian Countermeasures
Q If no alternatives are put forth and NATO goes ahead with the enlargement, what do you foresee as the first formal step Russia might take to counteract that enlargement?
AMB. VORONTSOV: If it includes full-fledged military movement of NATO -- bases, aerodromes, airfields and all that -- then we will do something like that. Our military is working already on that. They will bring closer to the border of Russia with the Western countries their planes, their bases, their tanks, maybe concentrate tactical nuclear weapons there, to counter that possibility. And that means the beginning of a new cold war. No other way.
Q What about in terms of building alliances?
AMB. VORONTSOV: We do not have alliances now, but we feel strong enough to counter the possible threat, nuclear-wise.