Russia, NATO, and the Future of U.S.-Chinese Relations*

Bruce Russett and Allan Stam

Political Science Department, Yale University

P.O. Box 208301

New Haven, CT 06520-8301

Email: or

* The authorship of this paper is equal. We thank Charles Hill, Paul Kennedy, Mark Lawrence, James Lindsay, William Odom, Jack Snyder, Celeste Wallander, H. Bradford Westerfield, and William Wohlforth for comments, without imputing to them any responsibility for our views.

© Copyright 1997 by Bruce Russett and Allan Stam

Russia, NATO, and the Future of U.S.-Chinese Relations

While it still must pass the United States Senate, the process of NATO expansion seems on track. For whatever combination of reasons--domestic politics, organizational inertia, or careful strategic analysis -- NATO expansion up to but not beyond the boundaries of the former Soviet Union looks close to being a done deal, and may, in fact, be unstoppable.(1)

In its current limited incarnation, however, it is an ill-considered and potentially regressive move. By limiting NATO expansion to small Eastern European states, NATO leaders preclude the alliance from developing the capabilities it will need to confront the coming security challenges of the 21st century.

Current plans for limited NATO expansion ignore the biggest future security problem for the West, which is not Russia itself, but the long-run possibility of a global power transition with China sometime in the next century. In this geostrategic scenario, Russia matters because of the potential power of a Russian-Chinese alliance. The need to prevent any such alignment should be central to all thinking about the future of NATO. In the short run, the problem of securing Russian respect for the boundaries of its neighbors in Eastern Europe is best managed within the context of NATO's proven capacity for reducing and resolving conflicts among its members, of whom Russia should be one.

Many of the standard objections to limited NATO expansion, without Russia -- laid out well by the 48 senior analysts in their June 26, 1997 statement, and others -- are persuasive.(2)

The Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland will add little to the material strength of NATO. Their population is just eight percent of NATO's, and their combined output measures less than three percent of NATO's GNP.(3)

While they would give NATO a geopolitical buffer against Russia, they do so only by adding a military commitment that would be extremely dangerous to keep.(4)

For small gain, limited expansion poses great risks. Whatever westerners may say, that kind of expansion is directed against at least a hypothetical danger from Russia. It has no compelling purpose otherwise.

If it is too late to re-examine the premise that NATO should expand, it is not too late to reconsider the plausibility of including Russia in the next round of NATO expansion. Current plans that exclude Russia make sense only in response to an active Russian danger. Russia at present, however, is militarily weak and politically unthreatening. The fragmentation of the Soviet Union caps Russia's potential power at a level far below that of the United States alone. Limited expansion of NATO does not increase the security of the western alliance and risks undoing much of the progress that has been made toward integrating Russia into the western political and economic system.(5)

Many Russians see an extended NATO as a direct threat against them. This threat risks reviving old Russian fears of the West, strengthening Russian militarists and nationalists and inducing greater instability in Russian domestic politics and foreign policy.

For the near future the potential risks associated with limited NATO expansion may appear tolerable. Right now, Russia can do little more than complain.(6)

Over time, strengthening the hands of Russian militarists and nationalists will produce intransigence on arms control issues, an increase in the resources Russia devotes to rebuilding its military capabilities and a turn of its diplomatic orientation in a hostile direction.(7)

A nationalist Russia will seek to re-impose its grip on Ukraine and the Baltic republics. Those moves will raise NATO's military and political costs of defending its new Visegrad members. Expanding NATO as currently planned may ultimately create from Russia a threat that is now absent.(8)

The best case future includes a hostile and isolated Russia. More plausible is a much worse outcome: an emergent alliance of Russia and China.(9)

Such an alliance would look very attractive to two big powers that saw themselves as excluded from a hegemonic western community. We can be satisfied only with a form of NATO expansion that ties Russia securely to the West.

Any defensive alliance serves two purposes. The first is to prevent an external power from trying to alter the international territorial status quo -- the second is to prevent any of the member states from wishing to do the same. From a cost-benefit perspective, it is not only about what the Russians might bring to NATO, but what NATO brings to the Russians, and what the Russians then do not bring to the Chinese. A future round of NATO expansion that fully incorporated Russia into NATO -- not just in a second class NATO-Russia Joint Council -- would eliminate Russian concern about western encirclement and address the long-term problem of growing Chinese power. It would allow Russia to become a normal democratic state within the EuroAtlantic community.(10)

That would firmly bind Russia's future to Western Europe's and ensure substantial global peace for the next century.

Russia's Options

From a geostrategic perspective, expanding NATO without Russia runs the risk of creating a severe security dilemma for both the East and the West.(11)

What are the choices available to a state faced with an alliance far stronger than it is or can hope to be?

One possible reaction is bandwagoning.(12)

A state may try to join in cooperation with those who might threaten it. This is, in essence, the policy that Mikhail Gorbachev began and is the policy that led to the end of the Cold War. To date, Boris Yeltsin and other Russian democrats have largely followed Gorbachev's precedent. Russian integration into NATO would be a giant step in that direction.

Russia's second option is to hide, or to withdraw into heavily-armed isolation greatly dependent on its nuclear weapons and rooted in a perception of being surrounded by potential enemies (Western, Islamic, Asian). A Russian xenophobia based in some degree on reality (many paranoids do have enemies), an economy once again autarkic and burdened by militarization, and the revival of autocratic government are surely not in Western interests. Nor are Russians likely to see it as a viable option for the long run.

If NATO will not take Russia in, their third choice, therefore, will be more attractive: to look eastward for a partner with whom to balance against the perceived growing threat from the West. Expanding NATO without Russia will lead to a Russo-Sino rapprochement and probably a formal military alliance. True, there is a long history of trouble in Russian-Chinese relations,(13)

and such an alliance would experience real friction; but it would not be a type of alliance without precedent. To protect their interests, states will find allies where they can and must. Russian leaders have never liked to face the possibility of adversaries on two fronts.(14)

It is naive to think they would not eventually (probably sooner) turn to China. Imagine Russia allied with a hugely populous partner, for whom Russian military technology represents the high end of what is available to the new partnership. A Russo-Sino alliance would vitiate the single most effective foreign policy initiative of the Cold War: Nixon's opening to China, a move that then deprived the Soviet Union of any hope of recovering its most powerful potential ally. Limited NATO expansion risks recreating the Cold War world of bipolarity that Nixon deftly managed to shatter.

Is such an alliance so implausible that the West can safely ignore its possibility? It would have big benefits for each side. For Russia, China's expanding economy and 1.2 billion people would provide a weighty counterbalance to NATO. For China, a Russian partner with 150 million people, great natural resources, and a GNP by some measures a third of China's, would be a big catch. Russia's military technology, while now largely inferior to that of the West, remains the most modern part of the Russian economy and has the potential to serve as a catalyst for future military developments in technology and doctrine. In virtually every category, Russia's capabilities are far superior to China's. From submarines, to communications, to missiles and aircraft, to nuclear weapons, the Russians have much to offer a large, newly modernizing and increasingly wealthy state. Easy access to Russian technology would quicken the pace of Chinese military modernization, at reduced cost. It would also reduce incentives for the continued contraction of Russia's military-industrial-complex.

Evidence for improved Chinese-Russian relations can already be found in arms sales and diplomatic efforts alike.(15)

China recently agreed to buy 72 advanced SU-27 fighter planes from Russia(16)

and build a production line in Shenyang to make more.(17)

A similar agreement on the SU-30 may be next, and Moscow recently announced a new sale of two advanced cruise missile warships.(18)

Perhaps even more unsettling is evidence pointing to renewed missile sales between the two countries.(19)

On the diplomatic front, Russia has been flirting with Beijing. In December 1996, President Yeltsin and Chinese Foreign Minister Li Peng announced a package of large troop cuts on their borders, trade agreements and further arms deals. The April 1997 meeting in Moscow between Yeltsin and Chinese President Jiang Zemin called for a "multipolar" world in contrast to a unipolar one where, in Yeltsin's terms, "someone else is going to dictate conditions."(20)

While disavowing any causal linkage from NATO expansion, Russian Defense Minister Igor Rodionov recently affirmed the development of neighborly relations with China, which "even bind Russia to strengthen relations of partnership also in the military sphere." A Russia-China partnership would place the destiny of much of the Eurasian landmass and the western Pacific in the hands of an anti-democratic alliance.(21)

This alliance would operate outside the structure of international law and the norms of universal human rights associated with Western democracies for the past two centuries.

How to Avoid the Dangers of a Russia-China Alliance

China, not Russia, presents the only remaining long-term credible potential threat to western (and global) peace and security. This is not said to impute particular intentions or malice to China's people or to its current leadership. Nor does it imply that the Chinese government's intentions are fundamentally more than defensive, to secure a territorial integrity that includes but does not exceed historic Chinese regional claims. Rather, it is stated simply to recognize what diplomats and scholars have long understood. The period of transition from one great power system leader to another is marked by tremendous potential for instability and cataclysmic conflict, as a potential challenger catches up to and ultimately surpasses the power base of the previously dominant state. If the rising power is dissatisfied with its place in the international system, war between the system leader and the challenger may well result.(22)

Germany's ambitions earlier in this century illustrate but by no means exhaust the list of challenges. Moreover, the dangers exist even when the challenger does not espouse a particularly aggressive or expansionist ideology. The fears, uncertainties and potential miscalculations of each other's intentions and capabilities provide danger enough. Experience suggests two essential and complementary strategies for managing the approaching dangers of Western-Sino military and economic parity.

One way is to prevent the rising state from being able to approach the dominant state's power. A preponderance of power concentrated in the hands of the system leader will often deter the initiation of overt conflict. Deterrence can work in the short run, so long as the capabilities of the dominant alliance continue to exceed the rising state's by a considerable margin. But a pure deterrence strategy, emphasizing counter-threat and military containment, can intensify conflicts and increase the challenger's commitment eventually to achieve its own dominance.(23)

Deterrence cannot be relied on indefinitely, and so long as it is practiced can become a self-defeating strategy. It can, however, buy valuable time, during which other means of ensuring the peace can be brought to bear.

The second way is to ensure that the rising power and the dominant power have few quarrels over the nature of the international order and the distribution of goods therein. This kind of transition occurred when the United States passed Great Britain as a world power. America did not fundamentally oppose the system that Britain had put in place. In turn, Britain was not willing to fight to oppose the marginal changes to the international system that resulted from subsequent U.S. leadership. Both states shared (and continue to share) many common interests and values, and both British and American leaders made a deliberate decision to strengthen Anglo-American ties.(24)

Integrating Russia into NATO provides time and means to guard against the rising power of China in the short run. In the longer run, it creates a mechanism and a model by which China can, over time, become fully integrated into the international system, allowing the future rising power to be accommodated without cataclysmic conflict.

The one factor that most constrains a state's potential power is its population. With but 150 million people, Russia is a fragment of its former self. Even a reconstituted Soviet Union, somehow developing economically to the point at which it might approach parity with the West, could pose no fundamental danger to NATO's roughly 700 million people. Russia is not today, nor could it be in the future, a threat to the demographic and economic preponderance of the West. China, however, is another matter. An economically growing China, with 1.2 billion citizens, is the only single country that could pose a threat to the future security and prosperity of the NATO countries.

Expanding NATO to include the Visegrad countries and Russia would produce a population base of more than 900 million people. More important, the combined wealth and technological superiority of the alliance would significantly postpone the day of reckoning with China's overtaking of the West. China can only achieve geostrategic parity by growing its economy to the point at which its income approaches that of the West, a development that is simply impossible in the near term. Even in the longer future, if the Chinese economy were to grow at 8 percent a year while the expanded NATO's grew at only 2 percent per year, it would take nearly until the year 2030 to reach parity with the West.(25)

There is no historical precedent Ð Japan included Ð for a long-sustained growth rate as high as 8 percent.(26)

Nor is there much chance that China could maintain that rate with growing environmental problems(27)

and, as its technological gap with the West narrowed, with less room for catching up simply by copying western goods and services. Given an expanded NATO's power preponderance, a growing mercantilist China(28)

would find it very hard to develop the military or economic capabilities needed to challenge America and NATO for system leadership, by force or beggar-thy-neighbor policies.

Incorporating Russia into NATO would improve the short-run position of the West, postponing the time of China's transition to military-economic parity with the West. As for potential Chinese fears, the Chinese have their deterrents against Russian or western aggression. An invasion and occupation of China's vast territory and population is unimaginable, particularly by a NATO limited to a defense-orientation. China also possesses the world's third largest nuclear deterrent force. In this scenario, both sides would have ample time to develop a long-term solution to the parity problem, which will require a convergence of both preferences and interests.

Why Not Bring Russia In?

There are some standard objections to admitting Russia to NATO, which we list and then rebut. Carefully considered, the logic behind the argument to admit Russia is compelling, and far outweighs the concerns.


1. The Russian military establishment is too degraded to meet NATO countries' high standards. Thus, the costs of bringing Russia's military up to NATO's level are too high and the potential benefits too low. Russia's population and GNP more closely resemble Brazil's than that of a nation that could threaten or substantially contribute to one of the most powerful, stable and enduring alliances in history.(29)

2. Even if the Russians were allowed into the alliance, we could not trust them to behave as loyal members. NATO members must be able to depend on each other to meet their commitments during potential crises. NATO cannot rely on the Russians because their only real interest lies in blocking NATO's expansion, not in actually joining an alliance that would compromise their sovereignty and military secrecy.(30)

3. Russia's economy is insufficiently market oriented and too corrupt to provide a match with the West. Nor is Russia's political system sufficiently democratic, stable, or even governable to provide any meaningful contribution to the NATO's overall security.


1. Costs and benefits. Yes, today the Russian military is in bad shape. The Red Army's poor performance in Chechnya does not presage a serious Russian threat to NATO now or in the reasonable future. Nor does it provide a basis for confidence that Russia will be able to meet the high military standards necessary for incorporation into NATO. Nevertheless, in the history of admissions to NATO (Greece, Turkey, Spain) the yardstick correctly applied was not the standard of a state's existing military capability. Rather, it was the potential of that state once integrated into the alliance, for a range of political as well as military contributions. On the ground of potential, Russia rates highly.

Russia -- our greatest former threat -- over time can contribute greatly to the overall security of NATO. The equation of Russia with Brazil misses one big point. Russia possesses something quite significant that Brazil does not: its own high technology military industrial complex with associated research and development potential, waiting for the opportunity to be exploited again as it was during the Cold War.

Estimates of the costs of integrating the proposed new Eastern European members of NATO vary wildly, for political as well as technical reasons. The RAND Corporation study put the price at approximately $42 billion over ten years. This is the cost for upgrading their forces and readying NATO for rapid deployment to their territory in a crisis, but without stationing NATO troops there otherwise.(31)

The Defense Department's estimate for the most comparable upgrading is a little lower: $35 billion over 12 years, whereas the Congressional Budget Office's closest option comes in much higher, at $61 billion. For the sake of an illustration, let us take the DOD figure. Suppose that for Russia, with two-and-half times as many people, the cost of upgrading Russian systems to bring them into line with NATO standards were as much as $100 billion. (This is probably too high, since increased costs for NATO rapid deployment would not be proportional.) While that is a significant sum, in the context of Reagan's historic $4 trillion arms buildup it would represent a tremendous bargain, far more than the return from bringing in just the East Europeans. Those states have no indigenous aircraft industry, no submarine manufacturing industry, no nuclear weapons, no ability to make a self-sustainable contribution to their defense and security obligations. Moreover, since the Russian military needs a retrofit anyway, the Russians will pay part of the cost.

Although the costs cannot be ignored, the potential gains from Russian integration should not be ignored either. A major benefit from integrating Russia into NATO would be the reduced burden of acquiring information through covert means. How much have we paid in the past and are we planning to pay in the future to get information on Russian intentions and capabilities covertly? To be able to integrate Russian nuclear weapons into NATO's nuclear command and control system would alone be worth the price. One of the greatest fears about Russia concerns the loss of control of its nuclear weapons. Admitting it into NATO provides the means to control its fissile materials more directly than by buying up excess warheads or trusting the Russians to convert surplus plutonium to reactor fuel. By contrast, leaving Russia out encourages its continued reliance on nuclear deterrence, maintaining thousands of warheads on alert and immensely complicating all high-priority arms control efforts to reduce nuclear weaponry.(32)

2. Trust and murky motives. Why was France brought into the Quintuple Alliance in 1818?(33)

Did we trust the Germans 40 years ago? One of the principal reasons for bringing West Germany into NATO in 1955 was fear of revived and unconstrained German nationalism. In Lord Ismay's phrase, Germany belonged in NATO to "keep the Germans down" as well as to "keep the Russians out." The allies recognized that the best way to contain German expansionism was to include the Germans in security structures, not to exclude them.(34)

Similar concerns brought West Germany into the whole range of European institutions, led to Gorbachev's acceptance of a United Germany in NATO, (35)

and continue to motivate French and German policy today. These same motivations should hold toward Russia. We should bring the Russians in precisely because we do not fully trust their intentions. Integrating Russian and NATO military forces will require a convergence of doctrine, command, training, and equipment. (For example, NATO aircraft have IFF -- identify friend or foe -- devices to prevent them from firing on one another.) This integration of standards and equipment will require and create a level of openness impossible to obtain otherwise. Openness exposes secrets, creating conditions in which no hidden preparations, as those for Barbarosa in 1941, are possible. A large-scale German surprise attack on any current NATO member is simply inconceivable today. Much of the explanation lies in changed German intentions. But in no small part, our dismissal of such a scenario stems from the openness that NATO provides, and in the institutional binding of Germany to Europe and the United States, including the unified NATO command. Military integration into NATO will become a guarantee of effective civilian control of the Russian military.(36)

Will Russia simply obstruct NATO's now relatively smooth operations and sow seeds of dissent among the alliance members? There are real conflicts of interest within the alliance, but NATO has a decent record of accomplishment of handling them. Consider the seemingly intractable dispute between Greece and Turkey. Although NATO has not been able to resolve all their problems, NATO's conflict-resolution techniques -- a combination of mediation (as by Cyrus Vance and NATO Secretary-General Manlio Brosio in 1967) and deterrence -- have kept them from going to war.(37)

Without NATO, they probably would have done so by now. Fears of conflict within NATO should not preclude the expansion of one of the few organizations that truly can make a difference in solving the thorniest security dilemma the major powers will face in the coming century.

Do the Russians really want to come in? Although in 1991 Boris Yeltsin repeatedly requested NATO admission for Russia, (38)

maybe they would not be serious. Joining NATO imposes significant constraints on a state's ability to exercise privacy rights and sovereignty. While the loss of autonomy for NATO members does not match that embodied in the EU, Russian entry into NATO would bring a substantial loss of control. Indeed, that would be part of NATO's motivation in inviting the Russians.

Russia could decline the invitation just as it declined Marshall Plan aid following the Second World War. However, if it does refuse a sincere offer, it will be by its own choice, not by way of NATO exclusion.(39)

This should defuse many Russian objections, and hence reduce the political backlash in Russia to the then remaining more limited expansion of NATO. A refusal to accept an offer of NATO membership would be a useful early indicator of the future direction of Russian foreign policy, making limited NATO expansion more justifiable.

Alternatively, Russia could accept the offer but not in good faith. What happens if NATO lets the Russians in and the expanded partnership does not work as hoped for? Alternatively, what if the two cultures are so great that they cannot be bridged by intrusive NATO institutions? Certainly, the Russians would have learned a lot about Western military doctrine and weapons. Nevertheless, the West will have learned a great deal about the Russians' command postures and intentions as well.

Or Russia might join, even intending to stay, but then throw sand in NATO's gears, with the alliance losing much of its capacity for joint action in situations such as seen in Bosnia of late. In this scenario, the Russians could effectively veto NATO actions, or otherwise make trouble and obstruct NATO's already limited capacity for out-of-area operations. Even in this admittedly dismal situation, Russia would not and could not pose a credible threat to NATO's security. It would chiefly limit NATO proactive offensive capacity, a risk worth taking by an alliance whose principal purpose is providing for the common defense of its members. Nor would a continuation of a security frontier in Europe--like the Cold War's, only farther east--exist to feed irrational fears and resentments within Russia's borders.

Ultimately none of these objections carries much weight. If the Russians do prove obstructive, NATO would simply become a defense-only alliance, albeit one still serving to protect its members from attacks both from the outside and from each other. Ironically, this scenario produces a new NATO, which is, in the end, what it has claimed to be from the outset. NATO efforts at proactive out-of-area cooperation are already tenuous. More than ever, NATO will have evolved into a transparent defensive alliance with little offensive capacity, a collection of states that pose no aggressive threat to anyone. It will, however, have evolved into a structure that can both inwardly and outwardly guarantee the borders of its members. Indeed, it should include a general guarantee of borders in Eastern Europe, avoiding the mistake of the Locarno treaties of 1925.(40)

By creating a division of labor, pushing states to pursue technical specialization and military comparative advantage, NATO hampers its members (other than the United States) from acting alone. NATO provides powerful restraints on adventurism by its members.

Furthermore, cooperation of the sort NATO demands of its members has already begun to grow in many non-military areas between Russia and current NATO members.(41)

The United States is risking the lives of its astronauts in cooperative aerospace projects. Russian rockets will launch critical components of the planned space station. NATO expansion would merely extend the type of cooperation already underway between the Russian space agency and NASA. Civilian firms also are cooperating in joint ventures that require exchange of technology and human resources.(42)

Boeing technology and equipment will be used on Russian and Ukrainian rockets to launch communications satellites.(43)

Allied Signal has established two joint ventures, to design and manufacture avionics and landing systems for Russian built aircraft and a software development center in Zhukovsky.(44)

Additional partnerships are in progress for cooperative development of environmental controls, auxiliary power, fluid systems and engines.

3. Political and economic institutions. Fears of political instability in Russia are not unfounded Ð but limited NATO expansion will exacerbate the conditions that generate those fears. Rather than increase the risks of political instability, rising ultra-nationalism, and the general decline of democratic institutions, including Russia in NATO as a full partner would tend to defuse the aura of external threat that strengthens the hands of the radical conservatives in Russia. It would also eliminate the greatest external threat the Russian military can point to in the internal battles for budgetary and political influence.

Concerns about Russia's economic instability should not preclude consideration of her suitability as an alliance partner. Although most NATO members have been free market democracies, Portugal joined under the Salazar dictatorship and neither Greece nor Turkey was expelled during its periods of military rule.(45)

NATO does not maintain the very high admission standard for democracy and free markets that we associate with the European Union. Russian democracy and free-market economics are surely as well developed as those of Romania, where hopes for inclusion in the next round of NATO expansion are being fanned. If we expect the Russians to continue to develop open political and economic institutions we must address their security fears. In the long run, the best way to promote sustainable democracy is to integrate Russia into some Western institutions, NATO in particular, with the prospect of further integration when its democracy becomes firmly established. Including Russia follows directly from Secretary Albright's characterization of more limited expansion, when she declared, "The purpose of NATO enlargement is to do for Europe's east what NATO did 50 years ago for Europe's west: to integrate new democracies, defeat old hatreds, provide confidence in economic recovery and deter conflict."(46)

Russian entry into NATO will not and cannot happen immediately. As with various steps of European integration, it will take years of preparation.(47)

The point is to start that process now, with a firm commitment and a credible timetable. If the United States wishes to remain the leader of NATO, this is the issue on which to exercise leadership and persuade reluctant Europeans. Bringing Russia into NATO would finally complete what Tsar Peter the Great and other westernizers aimed to do from the eighteenth century onward: integrate Russia with the West, to their mutual benefit. It would bring security and enhanced stability at a lower cost than would bringing Russia into the EU, and more directly addresses concern over the rising power of the military within Russia.

The Chinese Reaction to Russia in NATO?

Both the United States and the Soviet Union exacerbated the Cold War conflict by being insensitive to the fears of the other. Would our proposal simply create a replay of the old Cold War, albeit one with a new, potentially more powerful, adversary? It should not, and need not. Any coming confrontation with China will be fundamentally different from the old ideological conflict between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. During the Cold War, U.S.-Soviet ideological differences made conflict virtually inevitable, as the two systems not only differed in their domestic and world-views, but also were fundamentally opposed to the continued existence of the opposition. Leninist doctrine, which provided the theoretical underpinnings of the Soviet system, was based on a revolutionary world ideology Ð despite its rejection of Leon Trotsky's overt call for world revolution.(48)

The endgame in the Leninist framework was to be world revolution driven by inevitable class struggle amongst a growing urban proletariat. The communist system would win out in the end in part because Lenin and his followers argued that the Soviet state had laid claim to the superior economic system.

The ideological foundations of the Chinese system do not carry those ambitions. Mao Zedong's ideological goals were fundamentally local; driven not by an ever-expanding world-wide urban revolution that could spread from one city to another like wildfire before a strong wind, but by his vision of a rural revolution. Moreover, today's Chinese leaders have largely abandoned Marxist economics, and in an attempt to modernize rapidly, vigorously embrace capitalism and more open markets. In China we are left not with an expansionist regime driven by an ideology fundamentally opposed to the continued existence of the West, but rather, we confront a growing power governed by what is essentially a variant of Asian authoritarianism. The Asian authoritarian model does pose an ideological challenge to Western liberalism, and to some provides an attractive organizing principle for the relationship between economics and politics.(49)

It does not, however, carry a fundamentally subversive and mutually exclusive ideological appeal, as did the old Marxism/Leninism.(50)

Consider how states gauge or measure success in the international arena. For the Soviet Union, success was a new communist country. Not so for contemporary China, where Mao's communist ideology is no longer at its core. Today, the Chinese gauge success by making money and increasing their influence abroad. Of course, we should not discount the antagonism of a hegemonic democratic ideology and an expanding authoritarian ideology.(51)

Democracies prefer to be surrounded by other democracies in an inherently peaceful relationship. The western democracies should continue to engage China on human rights and democracy, not abandoning their many advocates within China. Those advocates will in time, gain influence. Nevertheless, democracies also are accustomed to surviving in relationships with non-aggressive autocracies. Economic insularity today is much more difficult for both democracies and autocracies to sustain.

Confronted with a growing NATO, China will have the same three basic options as Russia does:

China could try balancing. Fear of Russian balancing behavior drives our willingness to have Russia join NATO. For those in China who wish to balance against the western alliance, if NATO follows our prescriptions it will have taken China's obvious partner, Russia.(52)

China might conceivably attempt to balance by striking an accord with India or Japan. These developments are largely unthreatening in the former case, and implausible in both cases. India has long been China's greatest regional rival. A Sino-Indian alliance would totally reverse those countries' traditional geopolitical strategy Ð without bringing China the advanced industrial and technological support it needs.(53)

While a Russia outside of NATO can threaten to balance by allying with a stronger state, China has no such options, save possibly for a deal with Japan. Moreover, it is difficult to see Japan, evermore integrated economically and institutionally with the West, as throwing its weight to the Chinese side. If Japan is to line up with anyone, Chinese economic and military growth could eventually bring the Japanese into a closer arrangement with NATO.(54)

Chinese balancing against an expanding NATO is very unlikely to work.

Some Chinese efforts to expand regionally, against weaker neighbors, are likely regardless of whether Russia joins NATO. Threats to nearby Pacific islands, including Taiwan, are to be expected.(55)

For these, deterrence based on a stable overall military balance, coupled with the carrots of engagement with the West and respect for China's ability to defend its existing territorial integrity, are the proper counters. The original NATO members would not be much involved, nor do they posses the capacity or physical proximity needed to have much influence over Pacific Rim affairs. Russia, however, could be an invaluable NATO member in this regard, given its geographic proximity, naval and military bases in the Far East, and potentially respectable military capabilities.(56)

Denying these potentially valuable strategic assets to China will help restrain it.(57)

The inclusion of Russia would make NATO the first truly global alliance.(58)

Both northern oceans would have a NATO state on each side, with a stable Europe as the keystone. Articles 5 and 6 of the NATO treaty exclude Asia from those regions in which an armed attack against any member "shall be considered an attack against them all." While this could be amended, an amendment could be seen as a provocation to China. It is already understood that common action may occur elsewhere, outside the narrow boundaries of the North Atlantic Ocean, if unanimously approved as a Combined Joint Task Force operation.

Beijing's next possible response to Russia's entering NATO could be hiding, or pursuing an isolationist policy. A Chinese foreign policy stance of armed political, if not economic, isolationism would pose real difficulties for the United States and NATO. Moreover, in the short run this may be the most likely policy reaction to a broad expansion of NATO. Yet, this would not necessarily lead to very bad results Ð to the contrary, it solves the thorniest dilemmas of the coming global power transition. An isolationist China would confront an intractable political predicament. The new leaders in China face a series of political challenges and tradeoffs that they will be forced to confront in the near future. These choices will be impelled by the high and competing costs associated with military modernization, the economic and technical difficulties associated with rapid economic modernization, and the problems of maintaining an autarchic regime in the face of a growing middle class. In the emerging global economy with its constant competitive pressures, the challenge of attempting to grow the Chinese economy while simultaneously expanding its immediate military base may prove intractable. Unlike the current Russian leaders who have so far survived a near-stagnant economy, the legitimacy of the Chinese rulers depends almost entirely on their continued ability to deliver rapid growth.

If China aspired to match the western alliance in military power and economic capacity, armed isolation would be very costly. Chinese leaders would have to devote proportionally more resources to the military than does the United States and NATO. While the data are imprecise at best, the following numbers are reasonable within a rough magnitude. China's military expenditures in 1995 amounted to 2.3 percent of its GNP; its per capita expenditure was a paltry $53. The United States spent 3.8 percent of its GNP on the military.(59)

The U.S. GNP alone is more than two-and-half times China's. China would have to spend 10 percent of its GNP on defense to match the American level, and nearly 18 percent to keep pace with the combined capabilities of all of NATO with Russia and the other new members. Although the Chinese army is potentially huge, the Gulf War in 1991 demonstrated that sheer numbers no longer carry the same weight in conventional war that they did during the Korean War, which was the last large scale direct conflict between China and the West.(60)

China's military is now in far worse shape even than the Soviet Union's was before its collapse. To try to catch up to and match the West's overwhelming capability, China would be forced into either of two courses of action:

If the Chinese decided to be isolationist and to rely principally on domestic investment, they would likely have to choose between the military and domestic consumption or investment.(61)

Given the growing strains on China's internal stability, diverting significant resources to the military is not a viable alternative if the Chinese truly hope to achieve strategic parity with the West. The Soviet Union's history suggests what would happen to a China that tried simultaneously to catch up militarily, satisfy growing civilian consumer expectations, and sustain the economic growth-rate needed to bring itself up to par with a far richer western alliance.

Alternatively, China might turn to outside sources of direct investment, as is its current policy. Doing so could free up domestic capital to be invested in the military, but this policy also serves western interests. An economy sufficiently robust to be able to support high levels of military investment clearly would be dependent on western investment. (China already receives more than a third of all foreign investment in manufacturing in developing countries.) From the perspective of NATO Ð an alliance seeking both global stability and the maintenance of the global territorial status quo Ð that would be a good thing. All else being equal, economically interdependent states are more likely than others to live in peace with each other.(62)

Would western investment keep flowing to a hostile China?(63)

Marx long ago claimed that the capitalists would end up making the rope with which to hang themselves. Of late, European firms have demonstrated great willingness to invest in potentially unstable areas of the world.(64)

However, they do so at a price to the investment recipient. Bellicose states and political adversaries pay a high cost for the foreign capital they import. Investors put a higher discount on politically risky investments, with demands for higher interest rates and expected profits. Such penalties will raise the costs to China to develop its military or grow its economy at a pace sufficient to allow it to catch up with the West. Therefore the Chinese become bound by strong incentives to maintain stability and to keep sending reassuring signals to western investors.

The Chinese dilemma is this: If they do not want to be dependent on western investment, then they cannot afford the military needed to confront the West. If they do rely on western investment to be able to divert domestic capital to support the military, then they become, over time, interdependent with the West. Already China's dependence on foreign trade and dependence, and its eagerness to participate in multilateral international organizations like the WTO, put it on a path of cooperative relationships that will be strongly resistant to reversal. Such growing interdependence reduces the likelihood that it will choose a confrontational military and foreign policy.

China's final alternative in the face of the expanded NATO would be to bandwagon, or to join the growing alliance and bind its security interests with those of former adversaries. The Chinese have bandwagoned in the past. They turned west with the Nixon initiatives, although the United States at the time anchored the dominant pole in the international system. In doing so, the Chinese did not simply balance power, nor strictly balance against an immediate military-security threat either.(65)

The Chinese leaders could have interpreted western outposts around China Ð South Korea, South Vietnam, Taiwan, SEATO Ð as being fully as threatening as their Soviet neighbor was. Instead, they saw improved relations with the United States as the key to building their economic and long-term military security. China bandwagoned west in a way that presaged the Soviet bandwagoning that ended the Cold War.

If Russia is to be kept out of NATO for fear of antagonizing China, much the same logic would stop NATO expansion into Eastern Europe for fear of antagonizing Russia. Rather, if a first round of NATO expansion is to occur, it should be as the first step toward one last big cycle of bandwagoning. NATO would then expand to include a democratizing Russia. Until China is also ready to join, it is important that NATO not gratuitously threaten Chinese security. The Chinese leaders should be encouraged to see their security vested in a policy of increasing political and economic openness.(66)

China should be engaged in an ever-deepening network of international organizations and economic interdependence.(67)

Ultimately, a great alliance might come to include all but the rogue states. In a sense, that would be the end of international political history. Perhaps Francis Fukuyama called it one move too soon, with not quite enough attention to geostrategic matters. Such an alliance would constitute a triumph both of western ideology and of western power and organization.

A New Future for NATO

NATO exists to provide for the security of its members. For that purpose, considerable benefits accrue to current NATO members by extending an offer of membership to Russia. Such an offer would integrate a potentially threatening state into NATO, and increase the overall power base of the alliance. For Russia, the new NATO would provide security assurances on its western front, and deterrent power vis-a-vis its eastern front. Membership criteria should be, on both political and economic grounds, similar to those required for membership in the EU. But rather than raising the bar to such heights as to preclude marginal states from joining the new NATO, the membership hurdle should be set just a notch lower than the stringent conditions for the EU.

It is far easier for states to reform their economies and polities in the absence of security concerns than when faced with powerful and potentially bellicose neighbors. Integration into the NATO alliance provides stability to a state's domestic political regime, and external security that allows it to focus on the tough job of political and economic development. NATO supplies greater physical security for all its members by integrating them into the full NATO system. Key is the integration of command, doctrine, training and equipment. The NATO system is much more than just a traditional alliance Ð it creates common expectations and notions of defense versus offense, and common beliefs in the stability of the interstate system. That means integration and interdependence in the broadest possible sense Ð ideological, institutional, and economic.

The bigger the alliance becomes, the less is the burden on any single state and the greater the security it provides.(68)

If smaller states "cheat" on defense expenditures Ð as some did and do in NATO past and present(69)

Ð those states will then become even less able to mount any serious threat on their own. This potential demilitarization would provide a downward spiral of the security fears of neighboring states. Why should not other states, such as Japan, Korea, and ultimately China be attracted to this, and be welcome?

Wider NATO expansion will and must proceed slowly. Japan is clearly a potential member, a future outcome to be encouraged. Nevertheless, Japanese domestic politics are not ready, and for now, Japan's ties to the other industrial countries are strong enough to allow NATO membership to remain a low priority.(70)

Rapid global NATO expansion would only feed historically well-founded Chinese fears of encirclement and Western imperialism. The challenge of managing the peaceful power transition that China may present is long-term problem, one that does not require a current policy of "containing" China. Engagement with China, by America and Japan, is much to be preferred.

Recall the potential gains and losses from each of the three big options for NATO:

1. The alliance could avoid any expansion that would weaken the Russian democrats. If the democrats do win, Russia's threat to European security would be reduced, though in itself this does nothing to address the thornier and larger China problem. The possible downside, instability from leaving the Visegrad states insufficiently attached to the West, is not attractive. Hence, some form of limited NATO expansion has its advocates.(71)

2. Limited expansion has a possible greater upside, but damages the prospects for Russian democrats. Most likely, we would wind up with some gain from Eastern Europe being integrated into the rest of Europe, but at the price of a nationalist Russia turning to China. In the global geostrategic net, this is the worst possible outcome. The United States and its current NATO partners constitute a status quo alliance with every incentive to avoid great losses. Their goal should be to preserve their dominant global position as long as possible. They should not choose a policy that runs the very real and very large risk of creating a powerful opposing coalition.

3. Expansion with Russia also may carry some losses as well as gains. On the downside, however, even with Russia hamstringing NATO in many respects, Russia would still be in a security system for moderating conflicts within the NATO alliance. With Russia no longer a potential ally of China, large net gains accrue to the west.

Within an enlarged NATO, western ideological and institutional principles will lie at the core of world organization, even more than now. In effect, a continually expanding NATO provides an essential supplement to the United Nations, one with military teeth and an organizational structure to support them. It is a multilateral structure, in which American leadership is strong but tempered by common perceptions and the experience of negotiated cooperation.

If NATO chooses to include Russia, the very enemy it was created to guard against, what is the potential limit to NATO's expansion? NATO should, in time, welcome all states which meet certain criteria of economic and political stability. Potential members should be well into the democratization process, avoiding instability and any consequent tendency toward external disputation.(72)

Democratic states have less internal violence and civil war than do other states,(73)

and once established, democratic regimes become permanent if the democracies are also reasonably wealthy.(74)

New NATO recruits would have to do what Germany, Japan and now Eastern Europe did to enter the western alliance: grow their economies and reform their politics. This is the kind of post-Cold War security system worth striving for. NATO should expand to include anyone who meets the criteria, most certainly including Asians, and especially the Chinese.


1. For a discussion of Russian views of the inevitability of limited NATO expansion, see "Russia, NATO Agree on Act Formalizing Relations," The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press, Vol. 49, No. 20 (June 18, 1997), pp. 1-5. Also, Carroll J. Doherty, "Pact with Russia Eases Way for NATO Expansion," Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, Vol. 55, No. 20 (May 17, 1997), p. 1149. An earlier piece discussing the likely Russian reaction is Matthew Evangelista, "NATO Stay Away from My Door," The Nation, Vol. 260, No. 22 (June 5, 1995), pp.795-96. Also see John Borawski, "Partnership for Peace and Beyond," International Affairs, Vol. 71, No. 2 (April 1995), pp. 233-37.


2. For one of the more persuasive presentations of the opposition to NATO Expansion, see Michael Mandelbaum, "Preserving the New Peace: The Case Against NATO Expansion," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 74, No. 3 (May-June 1995), pp. 9-13. A more comprehensive review of the general issue of expansion is Richard L. Kugler, Enlarging NATO: The Russia Factor (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 1996). Other recent discussions of the potential flaws in the expansion argument include Karl-Heinz Kamp, "The Folly of Rapid NATO Expansion," Foreign Policy, No. 98 (Spring 1995), p. 116-31; Michael E. Brown, "The Flawed Logic of NATO Expansion," Survival, Vol. 37, No. 1 (Spring 1995), p. 34-52; Jonathan Dean, "The NATO Mistake: Expansion for All the Wrong Reasons," Washington Monthly, Vol. 29, No. 7 (July-August 1997), p. 35-38; Michael McGwire, NATO Expansion and European Security (London: Brasseys, 1997); Berthold Meyer, NATO-Enlargement: Path to Unity or to a New Division of Europe (Frankfurt am Main: Die Stiftung, 1995).


3. These and other demographic and economic data come from the 1997 CIA World Fact Book available online at:


4. Perhaps most unsettling is the potential for trouble between Belarus and Poland. See Ted Galen Carpenter and Andrew Stone, "NATO Expansion Flashpoint No. 1: The Border Between Poland and Belarus," CATO Institute Foreign Policy Briefing, No. 44, (Washington, DC: September 1997); also Paul Kennedy, "Let's See the Pentagon's Plan for Defending Poland," Los Angeles Times, May 16, 1997.


5. William Potter, "Unsafe at Any Speed," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 53, No. 3 (May-June 1997), pp. 25-27). For a more technical military perspective, see Editorial, "NATO Should Back Off Expansion," Aviation Week & Space Technology, Vol. 146, No. 1 (January 6, 1997), p. 70. Also Jonathan Dean, "No NATO Expansion Now," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 52, No. 3 (May-June 1996), p. 18-19) and Anatol Lieven, "A New Iron Curtain," The Atlantic Monthly, Vol. 277, No. 1 (January 1996), pp. 20-24.


6. Recent complaints include Alexei K Pushkov, "Don't Isolate Us: A Russian View of NATO Expansion," The National Interest, No. 47 (Spring 1997), pp. 58-62, and David A.V. Fischer and William C. Potter, "NATO Expansion: The March of Folly," Moscow News, No. 14 (April 11, 1996), p..5.


7. A relatively early argument to this effect was Owen Harries, "The Collapse of the `West'," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 72, No. 4 (September/October 1993), pp. 41-53.


8. The following review many of the current views about the possible evolution of Russian views towards the U.S. and NATO: Alexander Yanov, "Russian Liberals and NATO." Moscow News (January 30, 1997), pp. 1-2; Alexei Arbatov, "Eurasia Letter: A Russian-U.S. Security Agenda," Foreign Policy, No. 104 (Fall 1996), pp. 102-17; James Kitfield, "A Larger NATO Means Bigger Headaches?" National Journal, Vol. 29, No. 29 (July 19, 1997), pp. 1467-9; Pushkov, "Don't Isolate Us."


9. There have been recent proclamations along these lines. Among them are Zhang Baoxiang, "NATO-Russia Talks over Expansion Remain Deadlocked," Beijing Review, Vol. 40, No. 6 (February 10, 1997), p. 8 and Nigel Holloway and Charles Bickers, "China's Buying Binge in Moscow's Armory," World Press Review, Vol. 44, No. 6 (June 1997), pp. 10-11. For a more traditional grand strategy view, see Zbigniew Brzezinski, "Geopolitical Pivot Points," The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 19, No. 4 (Autumn 1996), pp. 209-16.


10. James E. Goodby, Europe Undivided: The New Logic of Peace in U.S.-Russian Relations (Washington, DC: U. S. Institute of Peace Press, 1998). Leaders of the Democratic Choice of Party in the Duma have formed a deputies group called "For the Atlantic Union." Ria Novosti, May 28, 1997.


11. See Jack Snyder, "Averting Anarchy in the New Europe," International Security, Vol. 14, No. 4 (Spring 1990), pp. 5-41 and Thomas Christensen and Jack Snyder, "Chain Gangs and Passed Bucks: Predicting Alliance Patterns in Multipolarity," International Organization, Vol. 44, No. 2 (Spring 1990), pp. 137-68. Jack Snyder, "Russian Backwardness and the Future of Europe," Daedalus, Vol. 123, No. 2 (Spring 1994), pp. 179-202, discusses emerging trends in Russia and their consequences for European Security. Stephen Walt, The Origin of Alliances (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1987), is a standard citation on alliance politics.


12. Randall L. Schweller addresses strategies for manipulating balancing versus bandwagoning behavior in "Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing the Revisionist State Back In," International Security, Vol. 19, No. 1 (Summer 1994), pp. 72-107.


13. Sergei Repko, "We'll Never Be Allies." The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press, Vol. 48, No. 30 (August 21, 1996), pp. 21-22.


14. Frank Ching, "Sino-Russian Pact a Good Sign," Far Eastern Economic Review, Vol. 159, No. 21 (May 23, 1996), p. 40(1).


15. "Yeltsin, China's Jiang Call for 'Multipolar' World," The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press, Vol. 49, No. 17 (May 28 1997), pp. 1-5, and Nigel Holloway, "Brothers in Arms: The U.S. Worries about Sino-Russian Military Cooperation," Far Eastern Economic Review, Vol. 160, No. 11 (March 13, 1997), pp. 20-21.


16. Patrick E. Tyler writes of a supposedly secret deal to modernize Chinese Air Force with SU-27 fighter planes, "China To Buy 72 Advanced Fighter Planes from Russia," The New York Times, Vol. 145 (February 7, 1996), p. A3(N), A3(L), col. 1.


17. Aleksandr Koretsky points this out in, "China Will Build Russian Planes Itself," The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press, Vol. 48, No. 8, (March 20, 1996), pp. 23-24, and David Fulghum addresses the issue of production rights for SU-27 fighters in, "China Buys SU-27 Rights from Russia," Aviation Week & Space Technology, Vol. 144, No. 7 (February 12, 1996), p. 60. Russia, for the first time since the 1960s is ready to export of military high technologies to China. This assumes great significance since the SU-27 is a transcontinental fighter and Moscow could come within its firing range.


18. Holloway and Bickers, "China's Buying Binge".


19. Ukraine or Russia may sell SS-18s to China according to Steven Erlanger, "U.S. Warns Three Nations on Missile Technology Sale: Is China Seeking Soviet Rocket Secrets?" The New York Times, Vol. 145 (May 22, 1996), p. A9(N), A4(L), col. 5. This development is particularly dangerous given recent Chinese statements about developing regional deterrent strategies based on nuclear weapons systems they do not currently posses. See Alastair Iain Johnston, "China's New "Old Thinking: The Concept of Limited Deterrence," International Security, Vol. 20, No. 3 (Winter 1995), pp. 5-42. For a more optimistic view see Banning Garrett and Bonnie S. Glaser, "Chinese Perspectives on Nuclear Arms Control," International Security, Vol. 20, No. 3 (Winter 1995), pp. 43-78.


20. From "Joint statement by the People's Republic of China and the Russian Federation," Beijing Review, Vol. 39, No. 20 (May 13, 1996), pp. 6-8. See also, Pavel Shinkarenko and Tatyana Malkina, "Yeltsin Visit Marks Closer Russia-China Ties," The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press, Vol. 48, No. 17 (May 22, 1996), pp. 6-9.


21. Discussed by Alexander Zhilin, "Rodionov to NATO: Don't Bait a Wounded Bear," Moscow News, No. 51 (December 26, 1996), pp. 1-2.


22. For the earliest discussions of this idea see A.F.K. Organski, World Politics (New York: Knopf, 1958). More recent treatments include Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981); A.F.K. Organski and Jacek Kugler, The War Ledger (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980). Tests of the underlying propositions include: Henk Houweling and Jan Siccama, "Power Transitions as a Cause of War," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 32, No. 1 (1988), pp. 87-102; Woosang Kim and James D Morrow, "When do Power Shifts Lead to War?" American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 36, No. 4 (1992), pp. 896-922; Jacek Kugler and A.F.K. Organski, "The Power Transition: A Retrospective and Prospective Evaluation," in Manus I. Midlarsky, editor, Handbook of War Studies (Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1989). Further empirical studies and a recent review of the literature can be found in Douglas Lemke and Jacek Kugler, eds., Parity and War (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1996).


23. For a discussion of what works and what does not in deterrence situations, see Paul Huth and Bruce Russett, "General Deterrence Between Enduring Rivals: Testing Three Competing Models," American Political Science Review, Vol. 87, No. 1 (March 1993), pp. 61-73.


24. C.S. Campbell, From Revolution to Rapprochement: The United States and Great Britain, 1783-1900, (New York: Wiley, 1974); Bradford Perkins, The Great Rapprochement: England and the United States, 1985-1914, (New York: Atheneum, 1968); Stephen R. Rock, Why Peace Breaks Out: Great Power Rapprochement in Historical Perspective, (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1989), ch. 2.


25. These estimates are at purchasing power parity; calculations based on exchange rates would put the Chinese economy much smaller.


26. Eva Paus presents a skeptical view of the notion that economic liberalism can provide for long term high-speed expansion in "Economic Growth Through Neoliberal Restructuring? Insights from the Chilean Experience," Journal of the Developing Areas, Vol. 29, No. 1 (October 1994), p. 31-56.


27. Vaclav Smil, "China's Environment and Security: Simple Myths and Complex Realities," SAIS Review, Vol. 17, No. 1 (Winter-Spring 1997), pp. 107-26 lays out China's current and coming environmental woes. Trish Saywell, "Fishing for Trouble: Asia's Fish Stocks are Dwindling Because of Over-Exploitation and Pollution," Far Eastern Economic Review, Vol. 160, No. 11 (March 13, 1997), pp. 50-2, addresses the problem of dwindling food stocks in the face of rapid expansion in. As fleets compete for catches, the region may be heading into an era of fish wars. Wen-Yuan Niu and William Harris, "China: The Forecast of Its Environmental Situation in the 21st Century," Journal of Environmental Management, Vol. 47, No. 2 (June 1996), pp. 101-15, addresses China's coming environmental constraints.


28. Pete Engardio discusses China's mercantilist tendencies in, "Global Tremors from an Unruly Giant," Business Week, No. 3465 (March 4 1996), pp. 59-62.


29. For views that discuss the dilapidated core of the Russian army, see Victor Loshak, "Army Bigger Threat Than NATO," Moscow News (February 13, 1997), p. 2, and Chen Yurong, "Russia Distances Itself from the West," Beijing Review, Vol. 38, No. 14-15 (April 3, 1995), pp. 22-5.


30. For specific and more general arguments that expansion increases demands more than the offsetting gains, see James Kitfield, "A Larger NATO Means Bigger Headaches?" in Kenneth W. Thompson, ed., NATO and the Changing World Order: An Appraisal by Scholars and Policymaker (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1996).


31. Charles T. Kelley, Admitting New Members: Can NATO Afford the Costs? (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1995); Ronald D. Asmus, Richard L. Kugler, and Stephen F. Larrabee, "What Will NATO Enlargement Cost?" Survival, Vol. 38, No. 3 (Fall 1996), pp. 5-26. On the DOD estimates, see Paul Mann, "Clinton, Senate Duel over NATO Expansion," Aviation Week & Space Technology, Vol. 147, No. 2 (July 14, 1997), pp. 38-39. A comparison of the three estimates is Steven Erlanger, "A War of Numbers Emerges Over Cost of Enlarging NATO," New York Times (October 13, 1997), p. A1 (col. 6).


32. Stansfield Turner, Caging the Nuclear Genie: An American Challenge for Global Security (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1997).


33. Paul W. Schroeder, The Transformation of European Politics, 1763-1848 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994).


34. Helpful reviews of the initial phases of NATO development include Stephen J. Artner, A Change of Course: The West German Social Democrats and NATO, 1957-1961 (Westport, CT: Greendwood Press, 1985). A nice review of the social changes in Germany at the relevant timeis William Park, Defending the West : A History of NATO (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1986). Also John Baylis, The Diplomacy of Pragmatism: Britain and the Formation of NATO, 1942-1949 (Hampshire: Macmillan, 1992), and Emil J. Kirchner and James Sperling, The Federal Republic of Germany and NATO: 40 Years After (London: Macmillan, 1992).


35. Philip Zelikow and Condoleeza Rice, Germany Unified and Europe Transformed: A Study in Statecraft (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1995); Charles S. Maier, The Crisis of Communism and the Collapse of East Germany (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997), chaps. 5-6.


36. Barry Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain and Germany between the World Wars (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1984) provides a helpful exposition of the importance of civil control of military organizations. For a discussion of how the Soviet's viewed US policies, see Jonathan Samuel Lockwood, The Soviet View of U.S. Strategic Doctrine: Implications for Decision Making (New Brunswick: Transaction Books, 1983).


37. Thomas Ehrlich, Cyprus 1958-1967: International Crises and the Role of Law (Oxford: Osford University Press, 1974); Kyriacos C. Markides, The Rise and Fall of the Cyprus Republic (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1977); Brian Mandell, "The Cyprus Conflict: Explaining Resistance to Resolution," in Norma Salem, ed., Cyprus: A Regional Conflict and its Resolution (New York: St. Martin's, 1992).


38. Yeltsin insisted it was inevitable that East and Western Europe be more unified, and predicted that NATO will evolve into a single armed force for one free Europe. See "Military Alliances: Russia Wants to Join NATO," The Current Digest of the Soviet Press, Vol. 43, No. 52 (Jan 29 1992), p. 19, and "Military alliances: From Cold War to Security," The Current Digest of the Soviet Press. Vol. 43, No. 51 (January 22, 1992), pp. 21-2.


39. Many in the United States viewed this as a clear signal of future Soviet intentions. See John Lewis Gaddis, We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997). As we know from the debate about the origins of the Cold War, intentions are very important but extremely difficult to divine.


40. William R. Keylor, The Twentieth Century World: An International History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996, third ed., chap. 3).


41. For a discussion of US and Russian space issues, and in particular the financial issues involving the Mir space station see Craig Covault, "Mir Assembly Nears Finale," Aviation Week & Space Technology, Vol. 144, No. 18 (April 29, 1996), p. 29-30; Andrew Lawler, "Russian Deal Bolsters the Space Station - at a Price," Science, Vol. 271, No. 5250 (February 9, 1996), p. 753-54); Tony Reichhardt, "US Deal Buys into Mir to Keep Russia On Board International Station Project," Nature, Vol. 379, No. 6565 (February 8, 1996, p. 476-77.


42. On cooperation between Lockheed and the Russian firm, NPO, see James R. Asher, "Lockheed Martin Buys Russian Rocket Engines," Aviation Week & Space Technology, Vol. 146, No. 26 (June 23, 1997), p. 24-25. See also William Scott, "Lockheed Martin, Energomash Development of RD-180 on Track," Aviation Week & Space Technology, Vol. 146, No. 14 (April 7, 1997), p. 40-41. Scott notes that this particular project is coming in on time and under budget, unlike many of the governmental programs such as the European space station and the Mir project.


43. Craig Covault addresses some of the lingering concerns over this type of cooperation in, "Zenit Explosion Hits Military, Civil Projects," Aviation Week & Space Technology, Vol. 146, No. 22 (May 26, 1997), p. 34.


44. For information on the joint agreement with Russian Institute to supple electronic systems for aircraft, see "Allied-Signal's Russian Deal," New York Times, Vol. 142 (October 13, 1992), p. C5(N), col. 3, and "Russian Zhukovsky Facility Shows Flight Test Diversity," Aviation Week & Space Technology, Vol. 138, No. 24 (June 14 1993), pp. 66-67.


45. On Portugal's role in NATO see S. J. Bosgra, Portugal and NATO (Amsterdam: Angola Committee, 1969) and for a review of Greece and Turkey's entry and subsequent crises Parker T. Hart, Two NATO Allies at the Threshold of War: Cyprus, a Firsthand Account of Crisis Management, 1965-1968 (Durham: Duke University Press, 1990).


46. Secretary Albright's comments reflect her Senate testimony on Apr. 23, 1997 and her House comments, Mar. 5, 1997. See Madeleine Albright and David Obey, "Does NATO Enlargement Serve U.S. Interests?" CQ Researcher, Vol. 7, No. 19 (May 16 1997), p. 449.


47. A volume that addresses some of the early integration issues in the context of German reunification and Russian democratization is Vladimir Baranovsky and Hans-Joachim Spanger eds., In From the Cold : Germany, Russia, and the Future of Europe (Boulder: Westview, 1992).


48. Gaddis, We Now Know.


49. Kishore Mahbubani, "The Dangers of Decadence: What the Rest Can Teach the West," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 72, No. 4 (September/October 1993), pp. 10-14.


50. For a pessimistic view, see Samuel Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996), and for a more optimistic one Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (New York: Free Press, 1992).


51. Paul Monk, "China's Power Trip," Far Eastern Economic Review March 21, 1996, Vol. 159, No. 12, p. 28.


52. Alexandr Chudodeyev, Pavel Felgengauer and Vladimir Abarinov, Russian political analysts debate the possibility of an alliance between China and Russia, since the Chinese political climate has changed considerably following the death of Deng Xiaoping in "Taiwan Crisis and Russian-Chinese Ties," The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press, Vol. 48, No. 11 (April 10, 1996), pp. 10-12.


53. Shireen Hunter, "Forging Chains Across Eurasia," The World Today, Vol. 52, No. 12 (December 1996), p. 313-16, addresses this somewhat outrageous possibility.


54. U.S. government estimates put China's military spending as exceeding Japan's for more than a decade. U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1996 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1997). In an interview, Chen Jian, spokesman for the Chinese Foreign Ministry, highlighted the tension between Japan and China by noting that Japan decided to stop aid to China for the rest of the 1995 fiscal year because it opposed Chinese nuclear testing programs. Cited in "News Briefing by the Chinese Foreign Ministry," Beijing Review, Vol. 38, No. 38, September 18, 1995), p. 9.


55. A novel view of future security concerns in Asia is Sheldon Simon, "Alternative Visions of Security in Northeast Asia," Journal of Northeast Asian Studies, Vol. 15, No. 3 (Fall 1996), p. 77-99. For a more traditional perspective, see Michael Mandelbaum, ed., The Strategic Quadrangle: Japan, China, Russia and the United States in East Asia (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1995). Denny Roy, "Hegemon on the Horizon? China's Threat to East Asian Security." International Security, Vol. 19, No. 1 (Summer 1994), p. 149-68, reviews growing fears of increasing Chinese power in East Asia. See also June Teufel Dreyer, "Regional Security Issues Ð Contemporary China: The Consequences of Change," Journal of International Affairs, Vol. .49, No. 2 (Winter 1996), pp. 391-411; Aaron Friedberg, "Ripe for Rivalry: Prospects for Peace in a Multipolar Asia," International Security, Vol. 18, No. 3 (Winter 1993/94), pp. 5-33; and Richard Betts, "Wealth, Power, and Instability: East Asia and the United States after the Cold War," International Security, Vol. 18, No. 4 (Winter 1993/94), pp. 34-77.


56. Audrey Kurth Cronin and Patrick M. Cronin, "The Realistic Engagement of China," The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 19, No. 1 (Winter 1996), p. 141-70, argues that multilateral containment and engagement will be the only way to manage relations with China in the future Ð their key point being that not only the US, but other states as well will have to cooperate in order to prevent future East Asian regional spats from flaring into potentially global crises.


57. Recent problems controlling technology transfers to China highlight the difficulties that the US will face if it tries to forge ahead alone in its containment policy towards China. For discussion of these problems see Nigel Holloway, "Playing for Keeps," Far Eastern Economic Review, Vol. 159, No. 6 (February 8, 1996), pp. 14-16." China bought hi-tech American machine tools, ostensibly for civilian use. Instead, it sent them to a weapons factory - exposing U.S. export controls as ineffective.


58. Karl Kaiser discusses the future of NATO in the context of a European only alliance in, "Reforming NATO," Foreign Policy, No. 103 (Summer 1996), pp. 128-43. David P. Calleo addresses the cost for the US of going it alone into the future in, "Can the United States Afford the New World Order?" SAIS Review, Vol. 12, No. 2 (Summer/Fall 1992), p. 23-33, in Ted Galen Carpenter, ed., The Future of NATO (London: Frank Cass, 1995), the various authors debate what a new future NATO might look like. S. Victor Papacosma and Mary Ann Heiss debate whether NATO should continue into the future in their edited volume, NATO in the Post-Cold War Era: Does it Have a Future? (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995).


59. U.S.A.C.D.A., World Military Expenditures. These estimates are at purchasing power parity rather than at current exchange rates, which would put the Chinese economy much smaller.


60. Stephen Biddle, "Victory Misunderstood: What the Gulf War Tells Us About the Future of Conflict," International Security, Vol. 21, No. 2 (Fall 1996), pp. 139-79, argues that a powerful interaction between a major skill imbalance and new technology caused the radical difference between the rate of casualties of Iraqi and Coalition forces in the Gulf War. He points out that technology alone is not sufficient to guarantee victory, but that the combination of technological superiority and high skill levels will likely create stunning defeats for unprepared states.


61. The idea that there is a tradeoff between goods for domestic consumption and military security is frequently referred to simplistically as the guns versus butter choice. In actuality, the consequences are often complex, indirect, and vary over time and country. Nevertheless, "The price of national vigilance will have to be paid somehow. It may be paid by foregoing current consumption, by depleting past savings, or by mortgaging future economic growth." Michael D. Ward, David R. Davis and Steve Chan, "Military Spending and Economic Growth in Taiwan," Armed Forces & Society, Vol. 19, No. 4 (Summer 1993), pp. 533-50; quoted p. 547. More generally, see Michael D. Ward, David R. Davis and Corey L. Lofdahl, "A Century of Tradeoffs: Defense and Growth in Japan and the United States," International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 39, No. 1 (March 1995), pp. 27-50, and Steve Chan, "Grasping the Peace Dividend: Some Propositions on the Conversion of Swords into Plowshares," Mershon International Review, Vol. 39, Supplement No. 1 (April 1995), pp. 53-95.


62. John Oneal and Bruce Russett, "The Classical Liberals Were Right: Democracy, Interdependence, and Conflict, 1950-1985," International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 41,No. 2 (June 1997), pp. 267-93; Bruce Russett, John R. Oneal, and David Davis, "The Third Leg of the Kantian Tripod for Peace: International Organizations and Militarized Disputes," International Organization, Vol. 52, No. X (forthcoming 1998). World War I is commonly identified as a counter-example on economic interdependence. But if, as is suggested in the cited articles, the likelihood of war between two states rises with geographic contiguity, a deterrence situation of power balance rather than dominance, a conflict of alliance ties, autocratic governments in one or both states, and a thin or absent network of international organizations, all these other influences were present in 1914, leaving trade alone as a conflict-mitigating force.


63. Peter Nolan, "Large Firms and Industrial Reform in Former Planned Economies: The Case of China," Cambridge Journal of Economics, Vol. 20, No. 1 (January 1996), pp. 1-28, argues that China cannot have it allÐ economic gains, political autocracy and a huge army.


64. Alan George notes the movement by the British and French to renew investing in Iraqi oil industry in "All Eyes On the Market," The Middle East, No. 245 (May 1995), p. 17-18. American moves to limit investment in Iran have drawn criticism from German and French firms, and efforts to lift or circumvent sanctions on both Iraq and Iran.


65. Tan Qingshan, The Making of U.S. China Policy: From Normalization to the Post-Cold War Era (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1992.)


66. Zbigniew Brzezinski, "Geopolitical Pivot Points," The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 19, No. 4 (Autumn 1996), p. 209-16, argues that China should be treated with the same great power respect that the Soviet Union was accorded during the Cold War. On the potential reaction to various U.S. policies directed towards China see David Shambaugh, "Containment or Engagement of China? Calculating Beijing's Responses," International Security, Vol. 21, No. 2 (Fall 1996), pp. 180-209.


67. An argument for just this sort of engagement policy is Gerald Segal, "East Asia and the "Constrainment" of China," International Security, Vol. 20, No. 4 (Spring 1996), p. 107-35.


68. The common starting point in this literature is Mancur Olson's The Logic of Collective Action : Public Goods and the Theory of Groups (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971). For more recent treatments of collective action in NATO, see John R. Oneal, "The Theory of Collective Action and Burden Sharing in NATO," International Organization, Vol. .44, No. 3 (Summer 1990), pp. 379-402, and Todd Sandler, "The Economic Theory of Alliances: A Survey," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 37, No. 4 (September 1993), pp. 446-83. .


69. John A. C. Conybeare, "The Portfolio Benefits of Free Riding in Military Alliances." International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 38, No. 3 (September 1994), p. 405-19. See also John R. Oneal and Paul F. Diehl, "The Theory of Collective Action and NATO Defense Burdens: New Empirical Tests," Political Research Quarterly, Vol. 47, No. 2 (June 1994), p. 373-96, and James C. Murdoch and Todd Sandler, "NATO Burden Sharing and the Forces of Change: Further Observations," International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 35, No. 1 (March 1991), p. 109-14.


70. In a recent interview, Japanese Prime Minister Morihiro Hosokawa argues that there is no present need for a NATO-like security organization in currently needed in North-Asia. Nayan Chanda, "The View From Japan," Far Eastern Economic Review, Vol. 156, No. 48 (December 2, 1993), p. 14.


71. William E. Odom, "NATO's Expansion: Why the Critics Are Wrong," The National Interest, No. 39 (Spring 1995), p. 38-49; Gerald B. Solomon, "Prizes and Pitfalls of NATO's Enlargement," ORBIS, Vol. 41, No. 2 (Spring 1997), p. 209-22; Strobe Talbott, "The Case for Expanding NATO," Time, Vol. 150, No. 2 (July 14 1997), p. 60; Jeffrey Simon, "Does Eastern Europe Belong In NATO?" ORBIS, Vol. 37, No. 1 (Winter 1993), p. 21-35; Karsten D. Voigt, "NATO Enlargement: A Holistic Approach for the Future," SAIS Review, Vol. 15, No. 2 (Summer/Fall 1995), p. 121-37; Jeremy D. Rosner, "NATO Enlargement's American Hurdle: The Perils of Misjudging Our Political Will," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 75, No. 4 (July/August 1996), pp. 9--16.


72. Whether democratization raises the likelihood of interstate war is hotly disputed. The positive case is well made by Edward D. Mansfield and Jack Snyder, "Democratization and the Danger of War," International Security, Vol. 20, No. 1 ( Summer 1995), pp. 5-38. Challenges, rebuttals, and counter-rebuttals include the correspondence in International Security, Vol. 20, No. 4 (Spring 1996), pp. 176-207, the exchange between Mansfield and Snyder and William R. Thompson and Richard Tucker, Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 41, No. 3 (June 1997), pp. 428-54 and pp. 457-77, and Zeev Maoz, "Realist and Cultural Critiques of the Democratic Peace: A Theoretical and Empirical Re-assessment," International Interactions, Vol. 24 (forthcoming 1998).


73. Matthew Krain, "State-Sponsored Mass Murder: The Onset and Severity of Genocides and Politicides," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 41, No.3 (June 1997), pp. 331-60; R. J. Rummel, Power Kills: Democracy as a Method of Nonviolence (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction, 1997).


74. Adam Przeworski and Fernando Limongi, "Modernization: Theories and Facts," World Politics, Vol. 49, No. 2 (January 1997), pp. 155-83.