Congressional Documents

COOPERATIVE NATO-RUSSIAN RELATIONS


Thomas Pickering

Under Secretary of State

Senate Foreign Relations Committee
October 30, 1997



Senator Hagel, members of the Committee:



I am pleased to have this opportunity to appear before you today.
These are truly historic hearings. They have begun the process of
advice and consent on the enlargement of NATO. They have accelerated
the national debate on this important initiative. Now, the fate of
NATO enlargement is in your hands, and those of the American public.
We welcome this because, as Secretary Albright said, we know that the
security commitment that NATO enlargement entails will only be
meaningful if it reflects the informed consent of the American people
and their representatives.


It is a special pleasure for me to come before you today to discuss
NATO's emerging relationship with Russia. Having spent the past 38
years in the Foreign Service, I witnessed and participated in the
remaking of U.S.-Soviet and later U.S.-Russian relations from the
confrontation of the Cold War to the new opportunities of cooperation
we have today. As Ambassador to the Russian Federation from 1993-1996,
I had the opportunity to meet the new leaders of this remarkable
country, and witness firsthand the salient changes that made such
cooperation possible, and [to] participate in some of the planning
which led to the Founding Act, the CFE negotiations and ABM/TMD and
START III talks.


In her testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee earlier
this month, Secretary Albright explained the rationale for NATO
enlargement and the reasons why we believe it is in our national
interest. Today I would like to tell you why we think a cooperative
NATO-Russian relationship is also in that national interest.


The challenge for the United States in relations between NATO and
Russia can be framed in four declarative sentences. First, it is in
the security interest of the U.S., NATO, and the states of Central
Europe to have constructive relations with Moscow, and to integrate a
democratic, peaceful Russia into the world community. Second, while
Russia's reforms have been impressive, Russia's future is not yet
certain, and in any case our interests and those of Russia sometimes
diverge. Third, the enlargement of NATO significantly advances U.S.
security interests. Fourth, Russia's leadership voices its opposition
to NATO enlargement. Today, I want to describe how we have framed our
policy in a way that takes account of each of these realities.


One of the greatest challenges of diplomacy is how a country
structures its relations with former adversaries. After World War I,
the United States and its allies failed that test -- and the tragic
results are well known. After the World War II, the United States and
its allies got it right -- and the re-integration of Germany and the
other Axis powers into the community of democracies and the West
stands as one of the great diplomatic accomplishments of this century.
Today there are few challenges more important than ensuring we
structure our relationship with the new Russia in a manner that serves
U.S. national interests and helps to promote U.S.-Russian cooperation.


Russia today is still in the throes of a titanic political struggle
over its future. We cannot be neutral by-standers in that struggle,
for its outcome is not predetermined, and American national interests
are at stake. Our goal, like that of many Russians, must be to see
Russia become a normal, modern state -- democratic in its governance;
abiding by the rule of law; market oriented and prosperous; at peace
with itself, with its neighbors, and with the rest of the world, and
playing its full constructive role in the world. Quite simply, we want
to see the ascendancy of Russian reformers, those who look outward and
forward rather than inward and backward. Ultimately, however, Russia's
future rests squarely and completely in the hands of the Russian
people.


A Russia that defines its national greatness in terms of the peace,
well-being, and accomplishments of its people is likely to be part of
the solution to Europe's and the world's problems. Conversely, a
Russia that defines its greatness at the expense of its own people or
its neighbors could be in the 21st century just as it was in the 20th
century -- a great problem for us and others. Our objective must be to
craft the political arrangements that help encourage Russia to pursue
the first path rather than the second.


This objective is fully consistent with our policy of adding new
states to NATO. Indeed, the two complement each other. For example, I
know that many Senators are concerned about the costs of NATO
enlargement. One way to ensure that the costs remain low is to ensure
that Russia remains on track and continues on a cooperative course
with the rest of Europe. Conversely, as Secretary Albright said to
this committee earlier this month, "By engaging Russia and enlarging
NATO, we give Russia every incentive to deepen its commitment to
democracy and peaceful relations with neighbors, while closing the
avenue to more destructive alternatives." Thus, a cooperative and
functioning NATO-Russian relationship can become a pillar of stability
in the new Europe.


The importance of this objective is what led Presidents Ronald Reagan
and George Bush to reach out to the then-Soviet Union and later Russia
and to take the first steps in laying the foundation for a new
NATO-Russian relationship. Already at the Rome summit in 1991, NATO
declared that it no longer considered Russia a threat. It invited
Russia to be a part of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council. In
1994, NATO created the Partnership for Peace, and asked Russia to be a
part of that program as well -- an invitation that Russia ultimately
accepted. We also began so-called "16+1 conversations" with Russia and
other partner states which refers to the discussions between the 16
members of NATO, and other parties on a one-by-one basis.


The United States and NATO also consulted closely with Russia in
formulating our strategy to stop the war in Bosnia, and found a way
for our troops to work together to implement the Dayton Peace accords.
Today, American and Russian troops are working side-by-side in Bosnia
-- an arrangement that few of us would have believed possible a decade
ago. It is a unique arrangement in which Russian soldiers serve
side-by-side with NATO under American command.


The most important step in relations between NATO and Russia, however,
came on May 27 of this year, when President Clinton and the other NATO
leaders joined President Yeltsin in signing the NATO Russia Founding
Act. The Founding Act is a landmark document. It opens the door to a
new and constructive relationship between these two Cold War
adversaries. It sets out the principles of the relationship, describes
possible areas for consultation and cooperation, establishes a new
forum, the Permanent Joint Council (PJC), for discussions between the
Alliance and Moscow, and sets out a number of points regarding the
political-military aspects of the relationship.


In crafting the Founding Act, NATO structured its discussion with
Russia with extreme care. We declared at the outset that there were
some things we were willing to do, and some that we were not. We said
we were willing to create a document that would describe our new
relationship. We said we were willing to create a new consultative
forum. We said we would be willing to pursue adaptation of the Treaty
on Conventional Forces in Europe.


But we also had five red lines. We said Russia would have no veto over
NATO decisions, including its own enlargement. We said there would be
no delay in the enlargement process. We said we would not subordinate
NATO and the North Atlantic Council, its decisionmaking body, to any
other body or organization. We said we would not do anything that
would consign new NATO members to second-class status. We said that
the Act does not automatically exclude any qualified European state
from future consideration for NATO membership. As we have explained to
this Committee on previous occasions, the ultimate text of the
Founding Act stayed completely within these red lines.


Barely five months have passed since the Founding Act was signed. But
we have already seen some important steps to implement its provisions.
Most significantly, Russia is taking the PJC seriously, as is NATO. On
July 18, the PJC met for the first time in Brussels at the level of
permanent representatives. On September 26, Ambassador Albright and
her counterparts held the first ministerial-level meeting of the PJC
in New York. The most recent PJC meeting was held among PermReps on
October 24. In addition the PJC has adopted rules of procedure and a
work plan for the remainder of 1997 -- documents that have been shared
with the Committee and the Senate NATO Observer Group.


We have also made progress in implementing other parts of the Founding
Act. On October 20, the Russian Minister of Defense named General
Viktor Zavarzin as Russia's Military Representative to NATO. The
General is expected to assume his duties before the end of the year
and recently visited NATO with General Kvashnin, chief of the Russian
General Staff. In addition, at the most recent ambassadorial level
meeting of the NATO-Russia PJC, NATO and Russia agreed on steps to
implement the work program including holding experts talks on
peacekeeping.


As NATO and Russia deepen their record of consultation and cooperation
in the PJC, in Bosnia, and in other ways, our own government continues
to support Russia's reforms and to pursue important issues with Russia
in other ways as well. We are continuing our efforts to achieve mutual
and balanced reductions in both our countries' nuclear arsenals. Both
countries have ratified the START I Treaty and are implementing its
reductions in arms levels. We are looking forward to Russian
ratification of START II -- a Treaty we have already ratified -- and
President Yeltsin and his advisers have begun making serious efforts
to obtain the approval of the Russian Duma. And at the Helsinki Summit
in March, President Yeltsin and President Clinton agreed that we will
begin work on a START III Treaty as soon as START II has entered into
force, so that we can make even deeper reductions in both countries'
strategic stockpiles. At Helsinki we agreed that START III would be
focused on reducing warheads to levels between 2000 and 2500 on each
side.


We also have continued efforts with Russia on conventional arms
reductions in Europe. Along with 28 other states, we are pursuing a
major adaptation of the Conventional Force in Europe Treaty, and in
July, all 30 states parties signed a Decision on Basic Elements for
Treaty Adaptation that can help us achieve that goal.


We also have deepened our cooperation with Russia and have worked to
integrate Russia more fully into world economic institutions -- into
the Paris Club as a creditor country and the World Trade Organization
on terms normally applicable to newly acceding members. The regular
discussions between Vice President Gore and Prime Minister
Chernomyrdin have produced important agreements concerning cooperation
on energy and the environment as well as in seven other areas of
significant cooperation from agriculture and health to defense
conversion. And through the Gore-Chernomyrdin process and other
bilateral discussions, we have raised our concerns with Russia about
its relations with Iran, arms control and other security issues.


Those are the steps we have taken to build the new relationship
between NATO and Russia. This relationship is based on shared
principles and shared interests. It is a relationship that holds great
promise for us and all of Europe, as Russia continues in joining us in
making the PJC a constructive forum focused on problem-solving. This
new relationship is also a two-way street. Don't forget: while the
Russians can propose raising issues in the PJC that they are concerned
about, so can we. And we will. It is also not a process that can spin
out of our control, or out of NATO's control. Every item on the PJC
agenda must be agreed to by consensus. That means we do not have to
agree to discuss of any issue that we think would be inappropriate or
harmful to our interests or NATO's.


I know that there are two major concerns about the direction of our
policy on NATO-Russian relations. One concern is that, despite the
Founding Act and the PJC, NATO enlargement will leave Russia isolated,
strengthen Russian hardliners who stress that isolation, undermine
Russian reform, and doom prospects for security cooperation,
especially arms control. This would be a serious problem, if it proved
correct, for one of our goals is to integrate a democratic Russia into
the new Europe.


But a fair reading of recent events suggests that NATO enlargement is
not having this impact on Russia and its policies. Over the past 18
months, precisely when NATO enlargement has been a salient part of our
agenda, Russian reform and security cooperation have moved forward,
not backward. To cite a few examples, during this period, President
Yeltsin was re-elected. He elevated reformers within his government.
He appointed a new defense minister who supports START II and is
actively working for its ratification. As I noted earlier, President
Yeltsin agreed to negotiate a START III treaty as soon as START II
enters into force. He signed the Founding Act. We have made progress
on CFE. And Russia has made positive steps in its relations with
Ukraine. This track record does not support the hypothesis that
Russian reform or reformers and security cooperation will inevitably
suffer as a result of NATO enlargement.


Russia has pursued these steps because they are in its own interest.
We should also understand that the broad Russian public is not well
informed on NATO and does not consider NATO to be the key threat to
their future. They are far more concerned about other issues, from
wages and pensions to corruption and crime. That is why I am persuaded
that we must continue to pursue both NATO enlargement and a steadily
more constructive relationship with Russia, that they are not
incompatible and that they are in the long-term interests of both NATO
and Russia in producing stability, prosperity and cooperation in
Europe.


We are realists. We know that Russian opposition to NATO enlargement
is real. But we must see it for what it is -- a product of
misperceptions about NATO's true purpose and a token of outdated
Soviet thinking about former satellites in Central Europe. Instead of
changing our policy to accommodate these outdated fears, we need to
encourage the new Russia's more modern aspirations. This means we
should be Russia's steadfast champion whenever it seeks to define its
greatness by joining rule-based organizations, opening its markets or
by participating constructively in regional or world affairs. But when
some Russian leaders suggest that a larger NATO is a threat, we must
say that this is false and base our policies on what we know to be
true.


If the first group of critics worry that we have not done enough to
promote cooperation with Russia, a second group of critics worries
that we have done too much. I know that former Secretary of State
Kissinger testified before you this morning. Dr. Kissinger, along with
others, has charged that the Founding Act and the PJC give Russia too
much influence over NATO decisionmaking.


I am a great admirer of Dr. Kissinger, and once had the privilege of
serving as his special assistant. But on this one, as I have told him,
I respectfully disagree with his judgment. I believe Secretary
Albright has described cogently and carefully the limitations on any
potential jeopardy regarding our consultations with Russia and that
this is the correct model for the future.


We designed the Founding Act and the PJC to protect NATO's independent
decisionmaking authority, and we succeeded. The PJC has no role in
NATO's internal decisionmaking -- none. It gives Russia a voice, but
not a veto. The North Atlantic Council remains NATO's sole and supreme
decisionmaking body. The Founding Act imposed no restrictions on
NATO's military doctrine, strategy, or deployments. The unilateral
statements of NATO's military policy are just that -- unilateral
statements of policy that NATO had previously adopted outside the
context of NATO-Russian discussions. The Founding Act in no way works
to the detriment of NATO's new members. They will come into the
Alliance the way all the other allies did -- as full and first class
members.


It also is just not true that the U.S. and NATO created the Founding
Act and PJC as compensation to Russia, or as concessions in exchange
for their acquiescence to NATO enlargement. Rather, our goal has been
to find ways to work together with Russia in spite of our disagreement
on NATO enlargement. We insisted that every provision of the Founding
Act had to meet this test: Does it make sense on its own in terms of
American interests? Our answer is "yes."


These are the two schools of criticism we hear most often regarding
NATO-Russian relations. They come at this question from quite
different perspectives. But there is one point on which they sometimes
converge. Both camps often charge that we are ducking the issue of
Russia or being disingenuous about our motives. People in both camps
often ask me a simple question: "Isn't NATO enlargement ultimately
about Russia? Isn't it premised on a real or potential Russian
threat?" The question is important, because it goes to the core of our
fundamental intentions in pursuing the Alliance's enlargement and this
new relationship with Russia.


Let me be clear. For the reasons I have listed, our policy is to
engage Russia and to maximize the likelihood that this country will
stay on the path of democratic development. But, as the Secretary said
before the Senate Appropriations Committee last week, none of us in
the State Department has a crystal ball. And one contingency that the
Alliance must be able to respond to -- even though we see it as
unlikely and are working hard to make it even less likely -- is the
possibility that Russia could abandon democracy and return to old,
threatening patterns of behavior.


That, however, is not the only reason, or even the primary reason, to
enlarge the Alliance, and it is a mistake to assume that this is the
unspoken single premise guiding our policy. NATO does not need an
enemy. It has enduring purposes: deterring future threats; keeping the
U.S. engaged in Europe; ensuring that Europe's security policies
remain cooperative rather than competitive; and providing a collective
defense capability for a range of future contingencies.


That's precisely why we are pursuing both NATO's enlargement and a
cooperative NATO-Russia relationship, and why both of them serve our
interests. What we are asking you and your Senate colleagues to ratify
is not a policy of NATO enlargement instead of a positive relationship
with Russia, but NATO enlargement together with a positive
relationship with Russia. We are committed to pursuing both, and we
believe our policy is already showing positive and reassuring results.


Thank you.



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