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PREFACE
The Commission held a series of three public hearings on “Human Rights and the Process of NATO Enlargement” in anticipation of the summit of Heads of State and Governments of Member
States of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to be held in Madrid, Spain, on July 8 and 9, 1997. The hearings focused on implementation of commitments contained in the Helsinki Final Act and other documents of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) by those signa- tory countries invited to present testimony. The hearings were held under the Commission’s statutory mandate, contained in Public Law 94-304, “to monitor the acts of signatories which reflect compliance with or violation of the articles of the Final Act...with particular regard to provisions relating to Coop- eration in Humanitarian Fields.” The Commission also took into account numerous references to hu- man rights and OSCE commitments contained in NATO documents and U.S. law concerning enlarge- ment of the Alliance. The hearings provided a unique opportunity for prospective candidates for NATO membership to make statements on recent developments in their respective states, including their respect for OSCE norms and principles. Invitations were extended to ten OSCE states which have expressed a strong interest in NATO membership: Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia. An official representative from each of the countries testi- fied and responded to questions from Commissioners. A complete transcript of each of these hearings is included in this report. In addition, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia requested the inclusion of a statement on that country’s interest in joining NATO, which has been included.

The Commission convened these hearings with the aim of providing timely information to the American people, the Congress, the Executive Branch, and the international community on develop- ments in the countries under review, with particular emphasis on human rights, democracy, and the rule of law. 7

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The emergence of new democracies in Central and Eastern Europe and the demise of the Warsaw Pact created a security vacuum in the territory between the current eastern frontier of NATO and the Russian border. The first attempt to address the new security realities in the region occurred at the end of 1991 with the establishment of NATO’s North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) as a forum for the evolution of a new relationship based on constructive dialogue and cooperation. In early 1994, the Partnership for Peace (PfP) was launched with the aim of providing a practical program to trans- form the relationship between NATO and states participating in PfP, moving beyond dialogue and cooperation to forge a genuine security partnership. (All 27 states of the Partnership for Peace (PfP) are OSCE participating States.) Simultaneously, NATO began to consider the possibility of enlarging the Alliance. The result was the 1995 Study on NATO Enlargement which addressed practical steps and requirements candidates for membership would have to satisfy. In December 1996, NATO foreign ministers called for a NATO summit at which one or more countries that wanted to join NATO would be invited to begin accession negotiations. The U.S. Congress was instrumental in stimulating the debate through several legislative initia- tives. The NATO Participation Act of 1994 (PL 103-447) provided a reasonable framework for ad- dressing concerns about NATO enlargement, consistent with U.S. interests in ensuring stability in Europe. The law lists a variety of criteria, such as respect for democratic principles and human rights enshrined in the Helsinki Final Act, against which to evaluate the suitability of prospective candidates for NATO membership. The Act stipulates that participants in the PfP should be invited to become full NATO members if they... “remain committed to protecting the rights of all their citizens....” Under section 203, a program of assistance was established to provide designated emerging democracies with the tools necessary to facilitate their transition to full NATO membership. The NATO Enlargement Facilitation Act of 1996 (PL 104-208) included an unqualified state- ment that the protection and promotion of fundamental freedoms and human rights are integral aspects of genuine security. The law also makes clear that the human rights records of emerging democracies in Central and Eastern Europe interested in joining NATO should be evaluated in light of the obliga- tions and commitments of these countries under the U.N. Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and the Helsinki Final Act.

A brief implementation review, prepared by Commission staff, focusing on continued human rights concerns in each of these countries, as well as an overall assessment of their compliance with OSCE commitments, is included in this report. Necessarily, this implementation review focuses on compliance problems and does not attempt to present a full picture detailing the successes of each of these countries, or placing these events in their full context. This approach is taken because compli- ance obligations are absolute, not contextual or comparative, and compliance problems and their evalu- ation are the purpose of this review. Of the countries which participated in this series of hearings, most were viewed as having made significant progress in their compliance with their OSCE obligations. While it is understood that each country will negotiate accession separately and will be considered for membership on a case-by-case basis, support for an expanded NATO does not negate the fact that each of the countries considered for the expansion has residual problems with its transition to democracy. Commission staff will continue to monitor progress in addressing the concerns raised during the course of these hearings as each of the countries considered pursues full NATO membership. The Commission made repeated requests for an administration witness to present testimony on U.S. policy on the process of NATO enlargement. The lack of a timely response to these requests, 8

8 Page 9 10 5 together with the narrow time frame before the Madrid summit, forced the Commission to proceed without the benefit of hearing directly from the administration on this important foreign policy matter. Written materials provided by the administration are included in this report. A final section devoted to NATO policy includes the 1995 Study on NATO Enlargement, among other key Alliance documents.

Respect for basic human rights plays a fundamental role in advancing genuine security and stabil- ity and, as such, must be an integral aspect of the expansion process. The human rights record of prospective candidates for NATO membership deserves close scrutiny. None of the countries seeking NATO membership, including those considered to be leading contenders, is without problems. Further progress is expected in these and other OSCE states with the aim of advancing genuine peace and security in Europe through respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms.

Conclusions

The Commission staff finds that most of the countries which participated in these hearings were in substantial compliance with international standards relating to human rights, democracy and the rule of law, as reflected in the Helsinki Final Act and other OSCE documents. Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania and Slovenia are in substantial com- pliance, while Slovakia and Macedonia are not. In the lead up to the Madrid summit, it is critically important that the NATO Member States construct—and prepare for agreement at the summit—a clear process for accession to NATO by pro- spective countries. Emerging democracies not receiving negotiation invitations from the Madrid sum- mit must be assured that there is a transparent, fair, and objective process for them to follow leading to accession talks as soon as they meet the criteria for membership, such as those set forth in the NATO Participation Act of 1994 and the NATO Enlargement Facilitation Act of 1996. 9

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OVERVIEW

INTRODUCTION

The North Atlantic Treaty of April 1949, also known as the Washington Treaty, brought into being an alliance of independent countries with a common interest in maintaining peace and defending their freedom through political solidarity and adequate military defense to deter and, if necessary, repel all possible forms of aggression against them. At the heart of the Treaty is Article V which notes that “an armed attack against one or more [allies] shall be considered an attack against them all.” The original NATO countries were the United States, Canada, Belgium, France, Luxembourg, the Nether- lands, the United Kingdom, Denmark, Iceland, Italy, Norway, and Portugal. In 1952, Greece and Tur- key acceded to the Treaty. The Federal Republic of Germany joined the Alliance in 1955 and, in 1982, Spain became a member. The process of internal and external adaptation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was initiated by the 16 leaders of the Alliance at their summit meeting in Brussels in January 1994. The goal of adaptation is to enhance stability in Central and Eastern Europe following the demise of the Warsaw Pact and the breakup of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. Further impetus was given to the process when the NATO leaders, in December 1994, decided to undertake a study of the issues of enlargement. The NATO Enlargement Study issued in September 1995 contains general criteria, in- cluding democratic structures, a free market economy, a respect for human rights, etc. The study does not name prospective members. New members must accept a full range of responsibilities, such as building a military able to contribute to collective defense. In general, allied states support enlargement but wish to expand NATO without antagonizing or isolating Russia. The allies wish to assure that enlargement will not dilute the political like-mindedness or military effectiveness of the Alliance. Some allies express a reluctance to assume costs for expan- sion of the Alliance.

THE CONGRESS

Congressional supporters of enlargement believe that some Central and East European countries have made substantial progress towards democracy, and that NATO membership would consolidate that progress and fill the security vacuum between Western Europe and Russia. Opponents contend that NATO’s future is not clear, that admitting new states could weaken the alliance’s core mission of collective defense, and that expansion could fuel nationalistic tendencies and instability in Russia. Congress has played an active and generally supportive role in the debate over enlargement of the Alliance. On June 4, 1996, identical bills (H.R. 3564 and S. 1830) calling for NATO enlargement were introduced in the House and Senate. The bills stated that the United States has important security interests in Central and Eastern Europe that could be served by enlargement; named Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary as the most qualified early candidates for NATO membership; authorized greater defense assistance to these three countries, and prospectively to other states in the region; endorsed Partnership for Peace as a successful program; named other Central and East European coun- tries as having made important progress towards eventual qualification for membership; and called for a cooperative relationship with Russia. The legislation did not include a date by which enlargement should occur. In July 1996, the Administration dropped its opposition to H.R. 3564. The Senate bill added Slovenia as a country having made significant steps towards qualifying for NATO membership. 10

10 Page 11 12 7 Other countries mentioned as deserving support as they pursue membership were Slovakia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Bulgaria, Albania, Moldova, and Ukraine. On September 30, 1996, the President signed into law the Omnibus Appropriations bill (P.L. 104- 208); which contains the compromise version of H.R. 3564 and S. 1830. The FY1997 Defense Authorization Act contained an amendment, offered by former Senator Sam Nunn and others, requiring a study of the financial costs and strategic implications of enlargement by the Administration. The study was issued on February 26, 1997.

RELATED LEGISLATION INTRODUCED IN 105TH CONGRESS

H.Con.Res. 10 (Solomon) A concurrent resolution recommending the integration of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

S.Con.Res. 5 (Roth): A concurrent resolution expressing the sense of Congress that the extension of membership in the North Atlantic Treaty of 1949 to certain democracies of Central and Eastern Europe is essential to the consolidation of enduring peace and stability in Europe.

H.Con.Res. 53 (Solomon) A concurrent resolution encouraging and expediting the integration of Romania at the earliest stage into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).

H.R.1431 (Gilman) A bill to ensure that the enlargement of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) proceeds in a manner consistent with United States interests, to strengthen relations between the United States and Russia, to preserve the prerogatives of the Congress with respect to certain arms control agreements, and for other purposes.

S.Con.Res. 29 (Gorton) A concurrent resolution recommending the integration of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

THE ADMINISTRATION

The Clinton administration proposed expansion of the Alliance at the December 1994 NATO summit. Administration officials believe a range of U.S. interests could be protected by expansion, including the strengthening of nations that share the U.S. belief in democracy; the development of free-market economies open to U.S. investment and trade; the securing of allies willing to share in cooperative efforts on a range of global issues, and preservation of a Europe free of the domination of any one power.

The Administration has opposed setting explicit criteria for new members. Determining which countries may enter the Alliance is solely in the hands of current members; establishing such criteria, it is argued, would provide candidate states with standards on which they might campaign for member- ship, and the allies wish to avoid such a process. Nonetheless, very general guidelines have been mentioned by the President. He has said that “countries with repressive political systems, countries with designs on their neighbors, countries with militaries unchecked by civilian control or with closed economic systems need not apply.” 11

11 Page 12 13 8 Administration officials oppose either a timetable for expansion or naming most likely candi- dates. Privately, they acknowledge that Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic are the likely first candidates for membership; and some include Slovenia on the list. On October 22, 1996, President Clinton called for the admittance to NATO of new members by 1999. It was the first time that the Administration set a deadline for enlargement. The President promised that the alliance’s mutual secu- rity guarantee would apply to new members.

PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE

The Administration’s Partnership for Peace (PfP) program was adopted at the January 10-11, 1994, NATO summit. PfP provides a framework for NATO’s evaluation of states considered to be candidates for alliance membership. PfP is intended to assist a state to establish civilian control over its military, develop “transparent” defense budgets that outline military capabilities to its public and to its neighbors, learn new military doctrine, and work with NATO states to develop specific capabilities, such as peacekeeping. Since 1994, many PfP states have held joint training exercises with NATO states. Each of the current 27 PfP countries is also a member of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). (See list of PfP countries on page 221.)

COSTS

An April 1995 RAND study estimated that NATO expansion to include the Visegrad states [Po- land, Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia] would require $10-50 billion over ten years, or as much as $100 billion or more should more vigorous measures be necessary to develop a strong defense posture. In March 1996, the Congressional Budget Office issued a report assessing costs of enlarge- ment under five possible options. Costs at the low end would be $60.6 billion, with the U.S. share being $4.8 billion, and at the high end $125 billion, with the U.S. share being $18.9 billion.

The Administration’s February 1997 Report to Congress estimated that the cost of admitting four (unnamed) members would be $27-35 billion between 1997-2009. The emphasis for prospective new members would be on enhancing “interoperability” (such as developing air defense and command- and-control compatible with those of current NATO members, and training on the alliance’s opera- tional concepts), modernizing and downsizing their militaries, and upgrading facilities such as air- fields and roads for receiving reinforcements from current member states. Over 12 years, the estimated annual costs to the United States would be $150-200 million; $800-1000 million to new member states; and $600-800 million to the other current members.

NATO-RUSSIA CHARTER

Discussion of NATO expansion has caused a strong negative response from Moscow. On Octo- ber 25, 1996, the Duma passed a resolution opposing enlargement by a vote of 307-0. Russian officials often contend that the “Two plus Four Treaty” of 1991 that united Germany prohibits the expansion of NATO beyond their border on the east. The Treaty does not in fact contain such language, nor imply such an agreement. In March 1996, Russian Foreign Minister Primakov offered this “compromise”: the Alliance might expand, he said, if neither nuclear nor conventional forces of current members, nor NATO HQ were stationed on new members’ soil. NATO Secretary General Solana quickly rejected the “Primakov compromise” as an infringement of the sovereignty of candidate states.

On September 6, 1996, former Secretary Christopher endorsed a French plan for negotiating a “charter” between NATO and Russia. The charter was to establish institutional means for consultation 12

12 Page 13 14 9 with Russia over European security issues, but would give Russia a “voice, not a veto” in NATO councils. At the U.S.–Russia summit of March 1997, Russia dropped a demand that a charter be a legally binding document; instead, any such document will be a “political” document. U.S. officials opposed a legally binding document because it would have given Moscow leverage to demand consultation on issues that NATO members might wish to decide among themselves. In addition, some Administration officials may have preferred to avoid Senate scrutiny of such a document in the process of treaty approval. The U.S.-Russia joint statement agreed at the Helsinki summit stated that “the NATO-Rus- sia relationship would include consultation and, to the maximum extent possible where appropriate, joint decision-making and action on security issues of common concern.”

A “Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between NATO and the Rus- sian Federation” was signed by all current NATO members in Paris on May 27, 1997. The Act defines the goals and mechanism of consultation, cooperation, joint decision-making and any joint action that will constitute the core of the mutual relations between NATO and Russia.

UKRAINE

Discussions between the Alliance and Ukraine produced the “Charter on a Distinctive Partner- ship between the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and Ukraine” which was initialled on May 29, 1997, and is expected to be signed at the July NATO summit in Madrid. The Charter provides the framework for further consultation and cooperation between NATO and Ukraine, carrying the partner- ship forward to a qualitatively new level.

THE MADRID SUMMIT

The Final Communique, of the December 10, 1996, NATO Ministerial recommended that Heads of Government of NATO states invite “one or more” candidate states to the July 8-9, 1997, NATO summit in Madrid to discuss the beginning of accession negotiations. It also noted NATO has “no intention, no plan, and no reason to deploy nuclear weapons on the territory of new members....” A key factor in the length of the negotiations with prospective new members could be the readiness of current member states’ parliaments and populations to accept the inherent strategic responsibilities of admit- ting new members. Administration officials state that there is an “emerging consensus” among current NATO members on prospective candidates, but concede that not every current member is fully ready to move forward to enlargement. The Administration wishes to admit new members by the 50th anni- versary of NATO’s founding on April 4, 1999.

MECHANICS OF ENLARGEMENT

Intensive accession negotiations between the Alliance and those countries named in Madrid will be undertaken. The result will be an amendment to the 1949 North Atlantic Treaty containing the names of proposed new member states agreed to on the basis of consensus in Brussels. The parliaments in each of the NATO capitals will then be called upon to ratify the amendment. In the United States, the Senate would be asked to give its advice and consent. During consideration of the original 1949 Treaty, the President made a commitment to the Senate that the admission of new members to the Alliance would be subject to a two-thirds vote. The document taken up by the Senate could be a single paper with the name(s) of proposed new members or individual papers with names for each country proposed for membership. When the Senate took up the candidacy of Greece and Turkey in the early 1950’s, a single paper with both names was considered. 13