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COUNTRY ANALYSES

A parliamentary election in October 1991 was won by the Union of Democratic Forces (UDF), a broad anti-Communist alliance, but its government fell from office in October 1992. A non-party government took over but never managed to have strong support within parliament and resigned in October 1994. Parliamentary elections were held in December 1994 with the ex-Communist Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP) obtaining a narrow majority, enabling it to form a government in January 1995. In November 1996 UDF presidential candidate Petar Stoyanov, a pro-market and pro-Western liberal defeated the ex-Communist candidate for this largely ceremonial post. After 30 days of mass protests fueled by economic hardship due to Socialist mismanagement of the economy, Stoyanov brokered an agreement among the political parties on February 4, 1997, for early general elections on April 19. An interim government led by Sofia mayor Stefan Sofiyanski took important steps to reform the economy. The UDF won the pre-term April elections with a 52% majority (BSP received 22% and three smaller parties surpassed the 4% threshold). The new UDF government, led by Prime Minister Kostov, was voted in on May 21. Both the election campaign and vote were free and fair, and the voting process was orderly and well-run. The new UDF government’s greatest challenge will be to improve the bleak, but recovering, economic situation by undertaking further strong economic reform measures to rehabilitate and re- structure the economy as well as serious efforts to combat corruption. Joining NATO and the EU are also priorities. A national consensus appears to exist on the need for sweeping reforms and a “reformist majority” exists in the new Bulgarian parliament. Human rights generally are respected in Bulgaria, but problems remain in some areas. The situation of minorities, especially ethnic Turks, has improved considerably since the fall of commu- nism. The Turks are represented in the parliament (through a largely ethnic Turkish party, now part of the Alliance for National Salvation, which received 7.6% of the vote), even though the July 1991 Bulgarian Constitution continues to prohibit political movements or parties based on ethnic or reli- gious affiliation. Most minorities are afforded significant opportunities to preserve and develop their cultures and identities. Macedonian groups, however, have occasionally been prevented from holding conferences, or have had their meetings broken up or materials confiscated.

Societal mistreatment of some minorities, especially the Roma, remains a serious problem. As in other Central and East European countries, Roma face high levels of discrimination—in the work- place, school and housing. According to various reports from human rights organizations, Romany street children are harassed, physically abused, and arbitrarily arrested and detained by security forces. Some are detained in labor education schools where living conditions are very poor. Another serious problem is use of unwarranted, and even lethal, force by police or security forces against criminal suspects or individuals in detention. Roma are disproportionately victims of police abuse. 20

20 Page 21 22 17 The Constitution provides for freedom of religion, and there are no legal restrictions on regis- tered religious groups. Most operate freely and openly. The requirement to register, though, has pre- sented a problem for some non-Eastern Orthodox churches (so-called “non-traditional” religious groups). The legal requirement that religious groups whose activities have a religious component register with the government has presented an obstacle to their activity—for example, the Jehovah’s Witnesses and the evangelical church, Word of Life, both of which have been denied registration. Occasionally the police have shut down meetings of unregistered religious groups. Furthermore, some of these groups have experienced difficulty in renting assembly halls or obtaining permits for outdoor assemblies. There have also been instances of harassment and even physical assault. The new government has indicated it intends to improve the situation for “non-traditional” religious groups and guarantee free- dom of religion to all Bulgarians. While an independent judiciary exists in Bulgaria and the Constitutional Court, in particular, has on occasion demonstrated its independence, the judiciary has significant funding, staffing and organizational difficulties which impede its effectiveness. Bulgaria has experienced and survived dramatic economic and political change in the last six months, testifying to its stable democratic framework. Reform efforts to date, including those under- taken by the caretaker government since February, promise change in the right direction, and Bulgaria’s new political leaders appear to have the political will and popular support to carry them through to success given enough time and encouragement. On the basis of the Helsinki Final Act and other OSCE documents, and with a particular focus on those provisions relating to human rights, democracy and the rule of law, Bulgaria is in substantial compliance. 21

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CZECH REPUBLIC

The Czech Republic, upon emerging as an independent state in 1993, implemented restrictive conditions for citizenship for former Czechoslovaks who were permanent residents on Czech territory at the time of the breakup of the country. As a consequence of this citizenship law, some former Czechoslovak citizens have been left stateless or with an unclear legal status; according to a recent report by Human Rights Watch/Helsinki, that group may include several hundred orphans. The citi- zenship law has been criticized at meetings of the Organization on Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). In particular, the Czech citizenship law attaches to past criminal acts a heavier penalty (i.e., loss of the option of Czech citizenship) than existed at the time that the crime was committed, in violation of international norms which prohibit the ex post facto increase of criminal penalties. More- over, the Czech Republic specifically agreed in the 1996 Programme of Action of the CIS Conference on Migration: “States shall ensure that, through the operation of national laws, all persons who were citizens of a predecessor state and who are permanently residing on the territory of a successor state, enjoy or be granted citizenship.” Although amended in April 1996, the Czech citizenship law fails to meet this standard.

The Czech Republic has actively sought to address the wrongs inflicted by prior regimes, includ- ing through the adoption of laws providing for the restitution of, or compensation for, the wrongful confiscation of property. While this is a laudable effort, the specific laws adopted by the Czech Repub- lic have proven problematic.

First, a restriction in the Czech 1991 restitution law (which governs claims arising from the Communist era) limits restitution to those who currently hold Czech citizenship. In practice, this provision (in combination with other citizenship laws) acts to discriminate, almost exclusively, against Czechs who obtained refuge—and citizenship—in the United States. Although the U.N. Human Rights Committee held, in 1995, that the citizenship restriction in the 1991 law is discriminatory and violates the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the Czech Government has not yet taken any measures to bring this law into conformity with the country’s international human rights obligations. Czech officials sometimes maintain that the citizenship exclusion is necessary to prevent restitu- tion to ethnic Germans expelled en masse, as alleged collaborators, at the end of World War II. This is a red herring. Current Czech law does not provide private property restitution for any confiscations which occurred between 1945 and 1948, the period of the German expulsion. Accordingly, even if the citizenship restriction were dropped, German expellees would still be excluded because of the tempo- 22

22 Page 23 24 19 ral restriction. Resolving the problems faced by Czech Americans should be a minor legislative draft- ing matter. A second problem in the area of property claims stems from the 1994 law adopted to address Nazi-era confiscations. In that case, the Ministry of Finance has created conditions for restitution or compensation that are not required by the law itself, requiring applicants to go through costly and time consuming litigation. The Ministry’s actions defeat the very purpose of the law and call into question the operation of the rule of law in the Czech Republic in this area. The Czech Republic continues to have a law that criminalizes defamation of the Republic or the President. Significantly, one of the trademarks of the former Communist regimes in Central and East- ern Europe and the former Soviet Union was the persistent application of criminal penalties like this one against those who had allegedly “slandered” the state; human rights monitors documented the cases of hundreds of people in many countries charged under such statutes who had done no more than question the system. President Havel, aware that this Communist-style law is incompatible with the Czech Republic’s international free speech obligations, has pardoned most (if not all) of those con- victed under it.

Many of the human rights problems experienced in the Czech Republic are effectively addressed through means available at the national or local (versus international) level, as is the case in most democracies. Such opportunities, though, have been hampered by an overcrowded court system where cases may linger for years. Moreover, the Czech courts have been slow to incorporate international human rights norms or principles in their decision making. Finally, in at least one significant case, a lower court refused to implement a decision of the Constitutional Court, which the Constitutional Court criticized as a subversion of the constitutional order. On the basis of the Helsinki Final Act and other OSCE documents, and with a particular focus on those provisions relating to human rights, democracy and the rule of law, the Czech Republic is in substantial compliance. 23

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ESTONIA

Following Estonia’s re-establishment of independence from the Soviet Union in 1991, the inter- national human rights organization Freedom House rated Estonia as only “partially free,” an indication of dissatisfaction with Estonia’s treatment of former Soviet citizens (particularly ethnic Russians, Ukrai- nians, and Jews) who lived in Estonia but were not eligible for citizenship since, among other factors, they did not speak Estonian. Many Non-citizens could not travel abroad because they did not possess aliens’ passports. The 1992–95 government delayed its decision on issuing aliens’ passports to those who were eligible for Russian citizenship. This policy, based on a provision of the 1993 Aliens Law, had the practical effect of “shoehorning” thousands of former Soviet citizens into Russian citizenship.

A centrist coalition elected in 1995 initiated a more liberal policy, and the government has begun issuing aliens’ passports, residence permits, and travel documents to legally resident non-citizens (i.e., those residing in the Estonian SSR prior to July 1990). The OSCE mission in Tallinn estimates that this process should be completed by summer 1997. In his testimony before the Commission , the Estonian Ambassador to the United States stated that “no one will be forced to take a citizenship they do not want,” a statement indicative of Tallinn’s desire to put the ethnic contentions—at least officially and legally—behind them and move ahead with European integration process. Democratic elections have been held since 1992 and suffrage has been expanded. Since 1993, non-citizens have been permitted to vote in municipal elections. Scandals and public exposure of malfeasance in office have forced some officeholders, including a former prime minister, to resign. Religious worship is unhindered. According to the law, religious organizations are required to register with the Ministry of Interior and a “Board of Religion.” In 1995, there was a contretemps between the Estonian Apostolic Orthodox Church—headquartered in Stockholm during the Soviet period—and the Russian Orthodox patriarchy in Moscow over the control of parishes. This was essen- tially an internal matter over hierarchical fealty and property, and not a human rights issue. Freedom of expression is respected. There is a wide spectrum of print periodical and electronic media.

Freedom of association and peaceful assembly is observed. Non-citizens may not join political parties, but are allowed to form associations. The right to form and join a labor union is provided for in the constitution. Freedom of movement is respected. Citizens and legal residents have the freedom to travel if they have valid travel documents. According to the State Department’s 1996 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, “some non-citizens complain of delays in obtaining travel documents.” In the case of the aliens’ passports, the country of entry must recognize the Estonian-issued aliens’ passport as valid.

Like other Central and East European countries, Estonia suffers many of the social consequences of the Communist period: violent crime, inadequate prison facilities, mistreatment of prisoners and detainees, and the use of excessive force by the police. “Police and corrections personnel continued to commit human rights abuses. . . the major human rights abuses continued to be mistreatment of prison- 24

24 Page 25 26 21 ers and detainees, and the use of excessive force by the police,” according to the State Department’s 1996 Country Reports. Due to the Soviet legacy, the legal system is not entirely developed. The civil and criminal code is under revision. In September 1995, Legal Chancellor Eerik-Juhan Truuvali criticized the low level of legal education among state officials, which, he contended, led to bureaucratic arbitrariness. How- ever, the judicial system went out of its way to extend legal protection and due process to Petr Rozhok, an ethnic Russian Zhirinovskyite and political activist who went to court to challenge his expulsion from Estonia for “anti-government agitation.” The court ruled in Rozhok’s favor and he was allowed to remain in Estonia. According to the law, members of national minorities enjoy equality before the law. A “Law on Cultural Autonomy” (going back to the 1920’s) provides government subsidies to cultural organiza- tions for national minorities. There are complaints by ethnic Russians that they suffer various forms of discrimination in day-to-day life. Much of this is related to employment situations that require Esto- nian language competency. Some observers maintain that the Estonian bureaucracy is unresponsive to both ethnic Estonians and Russians.

There are no limits on property ownership for citizens. Non-citizens may not own land per se, but may own private apartments or businesses. Freedom House now rates Estonia as “completely free.” On the basis of the Helsinki Final Act and other OSCE documents, and with a particular focus on those provisions relating to human rights, democracy and the rule of law, Estonia is in substantial compliance. 25

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HUNGARY

The country has received high marks for its human rights record, and the government generally respects human rights and civil liberties of its citizens. However, according to the 1996 State Depart- ment human rights report, the authorities do not ensure due process in all cases. Pre-trial detentions are limited to one year while criminal investigations are in progress, but may be extended indefinitely on the prosecutor’s motion with the judge’s concurrence. While this occurs infrequently, it appears to disproportionately affect Roma. Reportedly, Roma, too, are kept in pretrial detention more frequently and longer than non-Roma. There are ongoing instances of police harassment and abuse and beatings of criminal suspects, though internal police controls have been tightened. Roma and certain foreigners appear to be dispro- portionate victims of police ill-treatment. Hungary has an active and liberal policy with respect to minorities, and the 1993 law on ethnic and national minorities permits organized forms of limited self-government in areas where substantial numbers of minorities reside. Thirteen ethnic and national groups are accorded minority status and, with the exception of the Roma (the largest minority), enjoy significant opportunities to develop their identities. Since 1995, there exists a parliamentary Ombudsman for Ethnic and National minorities. As in other Central and East European countries, Roma (4-8 percent of the population) have suffered discrimination, abuse or physical attacks, including by police. The Hungarian Government, which has granted Roma extensive rights of political consultation, recognizes the need for social and educational policies to help them. The print media is independent, but the government still controls national TV and most radio stations, although there are plans to privatize portions of the electronic media.

Hungary’s parliament has approved a law creating a foundation to administer property confis- cated from Hungarian Jews during World War II and to oversee payments to survivors of the Holo- caust. The government is implementing a compensation program. The Hungarian Jewish Heritage Fund will pay out lifetime annuities worth $23.5 million to Hungarian survivors of the Holocaust, in addition to giving the fund real estate and valuable paintings. The Hungarian Government also re- cently approved an agreement with the Vatican on property restitution, agreeing to return to the Catho- lic Church substantial assets confiscated by the Communists. On the basis of the Helsinki Final Act and other OSCE documents, and with a particular focus on those provisions relating to human rights, democracy and the rule of law, Hungary is in substantial compliance. 26

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LATVIA

Democratic elections are held regularly. According to law, persons who remained active in the Communist Party after January 13, 1991 may not stand as candidates, but in at least one case, this provision has been disregarded. The democratic electoral system has not necessarily produced politi- cal stability or a functional legislature. Corruption in the government and society is widespread. Some cabinet ministers have been forced to resign for corruption or past KGB associations. The rule of law has been undermined on many occasions by officials in the Latvian Citizenship and Immigration Department (CID) who did not provide residence permits to eligible applicants who were entitled to them. Even where court rulings overturned negative decisions, the CID sometimes resisted complying. Personnel changes were made in the CID, and applicants for residence permission are now being more fairly treated. The State Department’s 1996 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices states , “ The Citizenship and Immigration Department continued to act arbitrarily in some cases concerning the residence status of non-citizens, although independent observers noted improved performance and a reduction in the number of complaints.”

Latvian law designates five “traditional” religious faiths. Religious education may be provided to students in public schools on a voluntary basis only by representatives of these five denominations. The Jehovah’s Witnesses have been denied registration in Latvia, and an appeal is still under review. After the widely reported death of a young Jehovah’s Witness whose religious beliefs affected her choice of medical treatment, there were attempts by legislators to prescribe fines for undefined “activi- ties” by unregistered religious organizations. The National Human Rights Office and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs pointed out that the provisions would violate international obligations in the field of religious freedom, and the parliament took no final action on this matter.

Within economic constraints, the press operates freely, publishing a wide range of viewpoints. There are considerable content restrictions on the electronic media. Freedom of association is respected. However, the Riga city council has on occasion attempted to limit demonstrations by non-citizen groups. Non-citizens are enjoined from forming political organi- zations. Freedom House now rates Estonia as “completely free.” On the basis of the Helsinki Final Act and other OSCE documents, and with a particular focus on those provisions relating to human rights, democracy and the rule of law, Latvia is in substantial compliance. 27

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LITHUANIA

Compared with Estonia and Latvia, Lithuania has a much smaller percentage of ethnic non- Lithuanians, mostly Poles and Russians (the pre-war Jewish community was nearly destroyed by the Nazis); anyone living legally in Lithuania in 1991 was granted citizenship, if he/she so desired. As a result, Lithuania has avoided much of the “ethnic” (actually, political) tension found in Estonia and Latvia. Democratic elections have been held regularly. Scandals and public exposure of malfeasance in office have forced some officeholders to resign.

Article 5 of the Law on Religious Communities and Associations mentions nine religious com- munities that have under the law been declared “traditional” and as such are eligible for governmental assistance: Latin Rite Catholics, Greek Rite Catholics, Evangelical Lutherans, Evangelical Reformed, Orthodox, Old Believers, Jews, Sunni Muslims, and Carats. There are no restrictions on the activities of other religious communities. Freedom of expression is protected, and there is a wide range of print media. Prior restraint over either print or broadcast media and restrictions on publication are prohibited, unless the government determines that national security is involved. Journalists working for the state-owned electronic media have in the past complained about pressure by superiors to avoid criticism of government policies in their television and radio reporting. Investigative journalists covering organized crime have been ha- rassed and received death threats from organized crime operatives. In 1993, a prominent journalist was killed in a gangland-style slaying. There are no limits on freedom of association, peaceful assembly, or movement, except that only citizens are permitted to establish political organizations. The Communist Party and other Soviet- associated groups are forbidden. Permission to hold public demonstrations is routinely granted within reasonable limits. Labor unions are permitted. According to the State Department’s 1996 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, the Lithuanian Workers Union has charged that management officials in some state enterprises has attempted to interfere with union organizing, at times dismissing trade union activists. Like its fellow Central and East European countries, Lithuania suffers many of the social conse- quences of the Communist period. Corruption and crime have been major problems. Police on occa- sion beat detainees and abuse detention laws. Hazing of recruits in the military is a serious problem. Police corruption is reportedly on the rise, and prison conditions remain poor. The 1996 Country Re- ports lists numerous instances of human rights abuse by police. The constitution provides defendants with the right to counsel. In practice the right to legal counsel is abridged by the shortage of trained advocates who find it difficult to cope with the large numbers of criminal cases brought before the courts. In order to deal with an outbreak of violent crime, 28

28 Page 29 30 25 parliament passed in 1993 a preventive detention law that allows the authorities to hold a suspected criminal for up to 2 months, as opposed to the earlier maximum of 72 hours prior to being brought before a judge. This law was amended in 1995 in an effort to avoid abuse. Private property is permitted and much state property has been privatized. Beside citizens of Lithuania, citizens of European Union and NATO nations are permitted to own land. However, some Lithuanian citizens claim that formerly nationalized real estate (land and buildings) is frequently not returned under various illegal pretexts, but rather is sold off as State-owned property.

Lithuanian citizens enjoy equal rights under the law regardless of their ethnic, cultural, linguistic and religious identity. There have been complaints, however, by ethnic Poles that they experienced discrimination in property privatization (in 1993 the Lithuanian Prime Minister admitted to some prob- lems in this area). Ethnic Poles also complained about the redistricting of an ethnically Polish suburb of Vilnius into the city limits. A suggestion by the Minister of Education in early 1997 to abolish Polish-language instruction in Polish-majority public schools was vigorously rejected by the prime minister. Rehabilitation of Stalin-era political prisoners led to reports in 1991 that some persons alleged to have been involved in World War II war crimes during the Nazi occupation had benefited from this rehabilitation. Many Holocaust survivors maintain that—due to negligence, incompetence, or indiffer- ence—certain people suspected of having committed atrocities against the Jews were rehabilitated.

A small Jewish community exists, largely in main cities. Jewish leaders have called on officials to provide better police protection for Jewish cemeteries in Kaunas, Vilnius, and Klaipeda, which have been subject to sporadic vandalism and pilferage. On the basis of the Helsinki Final Act and other OSCE documents, and with a particular focus on those provisions relating to human rights, democracy and the rule of law, Lithuania is in substantial compliance. 29

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MACEDONIA

The introduction of political pluralism in 1990 and the establishment of effective independence the following year has led to an increase in the respect shown by Macedonian authorities for human rights and fundamental freedoms. However, progress has been slow, and problems remain. For ex- ample, while there is substantial independence and freedom of expression evident in the media, much of it remains under government control and is generally perceived to be sympathetic to the govern- ment. In addition, law enforcement personnel generally operate within their legal constraints, but po- lice officers have been reported occasionally to delay the initiation of court proceedings and access to an attorney for some persons taken into custody. Excessive use of force has also been reported in making arrests. Macedonia’s citizenship law is among the most restrictive in Central and Eastern Europe. While the country has been independent for a little more than half a decade, a 15-year residency requirement effectively denies citizenship to those who had been legally residing in the Republic at the time inde- pendence was declared. This requirement has especially affected the Albanian population, some of which moved to Macedonia from Kosovo and other parts of the former Yugoslavia prior to the breakup of that federation.

Macedonia’s population includes a substantial number of minorities. The Albanian community, representing 22.9 percent of the population, is by far the largest of these minorities, followed by a Turkish community representing 4 percent of the population, and Roma and Serbs each representing over 2 percent. Macedonian authorities have gone far in responding to minority concerns, including substantial educational opportunities for Albanians in their own language. Coalition governments have been formed with ethnically based, Albanian political parties. At the same time, Albanians are underrepresented in government administration at all levels, especially in the police force, even in areas where their ethnic group predominates. Albanians are represented in the military in close propor- tion to their share of the population as a whole, but are less represented among the officer corps. While Albanian activists allege official discrimination, Macedonian authorities respond that qualified per- sons for police or other official duties are difficult to find. Minorities seek even greater educational opportunities in their own language—in the case of the Turks even though they do not use that lan- guage at home themselves—but the government counters that they are not bound to provide any addi- tional opportunities and that economic constraints make such opportunities virtually impossible any- way. Albanians and Turks engage in some private education of their youth, which is tolerated by the authorities but does not have an appropriately sound legal basis. 30

30 Page 31 32 27 A greater problem for Macedonia than the actual denial of rights is the existence of nationalist Macedonian and Albanian parties, which make exaggerated complaints and excessive demands. While Macedonian nationalists protest even modest measures to assist minorities, Albanian nationalists call for various forms of regional autonomy that would, in effect, turn the country into a federal state. Moderate Macedonian and Albanian leaders have control of the government and cooperate in seeking the fullest integration of all groups in the country, but nationalists hold enough support among the population to limit progress. The resulting polarization and tension, more than actual denials of human rights, endangers Macedonia’s social stability.

Macedonia held its first multi-party elections in November 1990, and its second such elections— the first time as an independent state—in October 1994. In both cases, the will of the people was reflected in the results, although the lack of stronger democratic development and careless organiza- tion detracted from the quality of the electoral process. Government leaders sometimes seem resistant to democratic development, either due to a lack of understanding, a desire to maintain power, or a concern that such development under existing economic and social constraints could be destabilizing. The judicial system does seem to operate independently and under the guidance of concepts character- izing the rule of law.

Macedonia did not seek Yugoslavia’s breakup, and moved toward independence only when the federation of six republics and two provinces had effectively disintegrated. While Macedonian nation- alists may have done so, Macedonian officials have not supported policies which threaten neighboring countries. In the case of Greece, which claimed otherwise and imposed an economic embargo on Macedonia in 1994 as a result, Macedonia generally expressed a willingness to talk and address those concerns that were found to be legitimate. An October 1995 agreement settled most differences be- tween the two countries, and Greece acquiesced to Macedonia’s becoming a full member of the OSCE. Macedonia’s adherence to OSCE principles and provisions has increased in recent years, despite adverse economic conditions and regional instability. Especially considering its ethnic make-up and history of warfare rather than independent statehood, the country probably deserves more credit than it receives.

On the basis of the Helsinki Final Act and other OSCE documents, and with a particular focus on those provisions relating to human rights, democracy and the rule of law, Macedonia at present still falls somewhat short of sufficient compliance.The situation could improve quickly, but it will require increased effort not only on the part of Macedonian authorities but of opposition parties and society as a whole. 31

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POLAND

Poland was the only Communist country in the region to have a mass movement of dissent. That is, while a small elite publicly opposed communism in other countries in the region, a large segment of the adult population in Poland openly and actively opposed the prevailing regime. Not surpris- ingly, Poland was the first country in the region to achieve (in 1989) a negotiated transition of power from a Communist to non-Communist government. Poland’s broadly based civil society, with its roots in the Solidarity movement, has facilitated the consolidation of democracy. Poland enjoys free and fair elections, an independent judiciary, and an active political opposition. The rule of law is respected and a long-envisioned overhaul of the constitution has been approved by the voters.

By and large, human rights are respected and, most importantly, the full panoply of domestic human rights machinery (e.g., a Civil Rights Ombudsperson, recourse to the courts, political pressure exerted through the Parliament) has proved adequate, in most instances, to resolve problems that may arise.

There is, however, one peculiar area where Poland’s otherwise sterling record is tarnished: since 1989, each post-Communist government has failed to remove a Communist-era criminal defa- mation law. Under this law, acts which “publicly insult, ridicule, and deride the Polish nation, the Polish Republic, its political system, or its principal organs are punishable by between 6 months and 8 years of imprisonment”; prison terms of up to 10 years are provided for those who commit these acts in print or through the mass media. This law impermissibly restricts free speech in violation of Poland’s international human rights obligations. Significantly, one of the trademarks of the former Communist regimes in Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union was the persistent application of criminal penalties like this one against those who had allegedly “slandered” the state; human rights monitors documented the cases of hundreds of people in many countries charged under such statutes who had done no more than question the system. It is especially odd that Poland has failed to remove this last vestige of the Communist era. As a practical matter, the law does little actually to protect Poland, as few cases have been prosecuted under the law and each recourse to the law only generated a stream of international criticism. On the basis of the Helsinki Final Act and other OSCE documents, and with a particular focus on those provisions relating to human rights, democracy and the rule of law, Poland is in substantial compliance. 32

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ROMANIA

Romania is a constitutional republic with a multiparty system and a directly elected president as chief of state. Romanians held their third national elections in November 1996, and rejected ex–Com- munist Ion Iliescu and his Party of Social Democracy of Romania (PDSR), which had ruled the coun- try continuously since the 1989 revolution. President Constantinescu leads a coalition of former oppo- sition parties known as the Democratic Convention (CDR). The CDR and its allies also swept the parliamentary races putting that institution under the control of a left–right–center “coalition of coali- tions,” and earlier in the year also scored major victories throughout the country in local elections. Significantly, the Democratic Union of Hungarians (UDMR), representing Romania’s 1.7 million eth- nic Hungarians, participates in the new coalition government at the cabinet level. Consistent with his campaign pledges, the President has made a public accounting for the bloody events of 1989 and 1990 and economic and institutional reform, especially a war against corruption, his main priorities. Constantinescu and his coalition lost no time in crafting a tough series of new economic measures geared toward solidifying macroeconomic reforms, expediting privatization and expanding invest- ment. The government engaged the IMF in new negotiations, based on its reform package, and as a result, the IMF released funds which had been withheld due to the previous government’s intransi- gence toward privatization and other market reforms. The new government has eliminated selected subsidies and undertaken reform of the central banking system. Two stock exchanges are rapidly ex- panding. Human rights are generally respected in Romania although problems persist in some areas. The Constitution of Romania provides for freedom of expression and prohibits censorship. Romanian citi- zens have access to several hundred daily and weekly newspapers as well as an array of private radio and television stations. Nevertheless, Romania retains criminal defamation laws, under which several prominent journalists have been convicted of libel of government officials and sentenced to prison terms. While those convicted were later pardoned—by former President Iliescu and President Con- stantinescu—the restrictive penal code provision remains in force. The constitution provides for religious freedom and the government does not generally impede the observance of religious belief. According to the State Departmen’s 1996 Country Reports on Hu- man Rights Practices, Romania recognizes 15 religions whose clergy may receive state financial sup- port and has licensed 385 other faiths, organizations and foundations as religious associations entitling them to exemption from income and customs taxes. However, these religious associations may not found churches and are not permitted to perform rites of baptism, marriage, or burial. Several religious organizations, including Jehovah’s Witnesses, have made credible allegations of harassment by gov- ernment officials who have impeded their proselytizing and worship. A recent incident involving at- tacks against a group of Baptist worshipers in rural Romania drew immediate condemnation by Presi- dent Constantinescu and an investigation of the incident. Constantinescu also convened a meeting of representatives of all faiths in Bucharest in an effort to encourage dialogue and prevent such incidents in the future. 33

33 Page 34 35 30 Romania’s largest and most vocal minority is its 1.7 million ethnic Hungarians who, along with the very small Jewish community (less than 15,000) are frequently the targets of extremist rhetoric from the Party of Romanian National Unity (PUNR) and the fringe press. The Hungarian minority party, the UDMR, holds 40 seats in Parliament and a cabinet post. In 1996, Romania signed and ratified a bilateral treaty with Hungary to increase cooperation between the two countries. A similar treaty with Ukraine was recently signed, and both of these documents specifically state the parties’ intention to guarantee protection of minority rights. As in many European countries, the Romany population continues to be marginalized and dis- criminated against in housing, education and employment. Sporadic violence against Romany com- munities continues, and this group is significantly more likely to suffer harassment by police and physical abuse while in custody. Several criminal cases involving attacks against Roma remain stalled in the courts. The Constantinescu government is attempting to engage the leaders of the Roma commu- nities in developing new programs to increase tolerance and improve educational and economic oppor- tunities for Roma. Since emerging from the brutal Ceausescu dictatorship in 1989, Romania has enacted a demo- cratic constitution, ratified all international agreements concerning respect for human rights and taken concrete steps to consolidate democracy and a market economy. While some of these efforts, particu- larly on the economic front, stalled under the administration of former Communist Ion Iliescu, they have moved into a “fast–forward” mode under the administration of President Constantinescu and the Democratic Convention. There is every indication that these efforts will continue and expand. Perhaps no other country in Central or East European has come so far in such a brief period of time as Romania. The events of the past 7 months in Romania compel, at a minimum, a “fresh look” at her eligibility for NATO membership. If Romania is not invited to begin negotiations for accession at the Madrid sum- mit, it is incumbent upon NATO to define clearly the parameters and prospective timetable for future accession and to take steps to strongly support continued economic reform and strengthening of demo- cratic institutions in Romania.

On the basis of the Helsinki Final Act and other OSCE documents, and with a particular focus on those provisions relating to human rights, democracy and the rule of law, Romania is in substantial compliance. 34

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SLOVAKIA

Moreover, the ruling coalition parties have used their control of the parliament to maintain a monopoly on virtually every aspect of governance. Most significantly, opposition parties have been precluded from any meaningful participation in the state board which governs media activities (which is appointed by the parliament); the National Property Fund (which oversees privatization); or the parliamentary bodies responsible for oversight of the security forces. There has been an alarming coincidence between opposition to the government and victimization by unsolved violent crime. For example, since 1995, the son of President Kovac (who is a critic of Prime Minister Meciar) was kidnaped; a witness who may have had evidence linking that crime to the government was subsequently murdered; and four key opposition parliamentarians have been attacked or had bombs explode at their homes. At least two prominent journalists who have been critical of Prime Minister Meciar have also been beaten.

The failure of the police and security apparatus in Slovakia to investigate and prosecute effec- tively violent attacks on opposition leaders or journalists has led to suspicions that these attacks were orchestrated by elements within the government who are not being held accountable before the law for their actions. 35

35 Page 36 37 32 Two recent, high profile events also illustrate the threat to the rule of law in Slovakia. First, in November 1996, a member of the Slovakian Parliament, Frantisek Gaulieder was stripped of his par- liamentary mandate after resigning from the Prime Minister’s party. Gaulieder has alleged that falsi- fied documents were used against him; after his removal, a bomb was set off at his home. Second, in May 1997, the Ministry of Interior prevented a referendum from being held, violating Slovakia’s con- stitutional provisions governing such referenda and denying the people of Slovakia a chance to have their views heard. This serious disregard for the rule of law suggests the ruling coalition may be be- coming desperate in its bid to hold onto power.

The rhetoric of government officials towards ethnic minorities has been characterized by hostility and intolerance. Although the OSCE High Commissioner for National Minorities has recommended that Slova- kia adopt an omnibus minority language law to fill gaps or resolve ambiguities in the existing laws and reassure the nervous minority communities, government officials—notwithstanding their assurances that they would do so—have taken no concrete steps toward this goal. On the contrary, some Slovak political leaders from the coalition parties have made racist remarks about Hungarians and Roma, only fueling the insecurity of these groups. The government has also adopted laws or implemented practices such as banning the playing of non-Slovak national anthems and barring the issuance of report cards in the Hungarian lan- guage which appear specifically designed to harass the Hungarian minority. While overshadowed by the increasing negative developments in Slovakia, there are some posi- tive aspects which bear consideration.

First and most importantly, Slovakia has, in the past 2 years, witnessed the emergence of a genu- ine civil society: people from all walks of life are willing to engage in some aspect of public life. This has been manifested through the birth or development of non-governmental organizations, trade unions, and community-based groups dealing with the environment, health care issues, education and job training and human rights. Although the government has been resistant to change from below and a recently passed law on foundations clearly limits such grassroots organizations, further democratic reform in Slovakia would be unlikely without the existence of such groups. Second, although the ruling coalition’s policies toward minorities have been marked by intoler- ance, opposition political parties that are predominantly ethnic Slovak have refused to be drawn into ethnic nationalism of the kind that has engulfed some other post-Communist countries. Although these parties’ cooperation with the ethnic Hungarian opposition parties may not be a basis on which coali- tions are built, there is clearly a sufficient basis for a normal working relationship. Accordingly, the so- called “ethnic” problems in Slovakia are by no means intractable (or, for that matter, even really ethnic) but reflect, in fact, the shortcomings of democratic reform experienced by all citizens of the country.

Finally, the Slovak Constitutional Court has served, on many occasions, to ensure that interna- tional norms have been respected in Slovakia. It is well regarded both in and outside of the country and has been perceived as fair and constructive. Unfortunately, the Court is overburdened by the high volume of cases generated by controversies involving the government or ruling coalition; most re- cently, the government failed to respect the Court’s rulings regarding the above-mentioned referen- dum. Some members of the Constitutional Court have received death threats.

On the basis of the Helsinki Final Act and other OSCE documents, and with a particular focus on those provisions relating to human rights, democracy and the rule of law, Slovakia is not in substantial compliance. 36

36 Page 37 38 33

SLOVENIA

Freedom of religion is respected for all faiths and denominations. There are about 16,000 refugees in Slovenia from Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, with few complaints about their treatment by the authorities. There have been some neo-fascist expressions of hatred, for example in the songs of rock groups, but they seem very isolated and generally unpopular. Though vulnerable to political pressure, the media is free, albeit with some indications of self- censorship lingering from the more restrictive Yugoslav period.

The judicial branch of government acts independently, and the police and armed forces all are under civilian control. Slovenia held the first multi-party elections in the former Yugoslavia in April 1990, which were free and fair and resulted in the Communists losing control of government. The third and most recent set of elections, in November 1996, were very competitive, to the point that building a ruling coalition became a difficult process. It appears as if none of the major political parties would want significantly to alter the country’s course. The President, Milan Kucan, and Prime Minister, Janez Drnovsek, were high-ranking members of Slovenia’s old League of Communists who have maintained genuine popu- larity in the era of political pluralism. Slovenia’s quest for NATO membership has been hampered not by its record on human rights and democratization, but by its association with the former Yugoslavia. Many criticized its unilateral 37

37 Page 38 39 34 decision to declare independence in 1991 as irresponsible—even if understandable and confirmed by referendum—since the collapse of the Yugoslav federation was correctly predicted to precipitate a conflict in which innocent parties would be the primary victims. Defenders of Slovenia’s action point to Serbia’s dominance of federal power and desire to centralize the Yugoslav state.

Slovenia’s decision, however, cannot excuse those persons who are responsible for aggression and massive human rights violations elsewhere. Moreover, the international community’s inability, especially in the OSCE, to define adequately the Helsinki principle regarding the equal rights of peoples, including their right to self-determination, makes it difficult to criticize Slovenia on these grounds.

Once recognized as an independent state in 1992, border questions were raised by Italy for some time, and small differences over the establishment of what is now an international border with Croatia remain. Larger issues of Yugoslav succession persist, including the division of assets and debts, al- though Slovenia unilaterally accepted what it considered its share of the debt in order to gain access to international financial institutions. Slovenian officials argue that their country can serve as a model for other former Yugoslav republics desiring NATO membership, and that, more importantly, to exclude an otherwise qualified candidate on the basis of its past association with the former Yugoslavia alone would send a dangerous message to the countries of the Balkans.

In conclusion, Slovenia’s record of compliance with OSCE principles and provisions has been good, and for a sufficiently long period of time that there is no reason to believe this will change. On the basis of the Helsinki Final Act and other OSCE documents, and with a particular focus on those provisions relating to human rights, democracy and the rule of law, Slovenia is in substantial compliance. 38