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HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE PROCESS OF NATO ENLARGEMENT

HEARING

MAY 20, 1997

Commissioners present: Hon. Christopher H. Smith, Co-Chairman; Hon. Jon Christensen. Witnesses: H. E. Branislav Lichardus, Ambassador of the Slovak Republic; H. E. Györy Bánlaki, Ambassador of the Republic of Hungary; and H. E. Stefan Tafrov, Ambassador-at-Large of the Repub- lic of Bulgaria for NATO Accession.

OPENING STATEMENT OF CO-CHAIRMAN CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH

As the NATO summit in Madrid nears, I believe it is increasingly important that the United States clarify its position regarding the NATO process for accession by all states which meet the criteria. While those states which qualify should be invited in July to begin negotiation for accession, others need time to implement critical political reforms or time to allow courageous economic reforms to affect the system. In some cases, the political will to meet the criteria outlined in the NATO Enlargement Facilita- tion Act of 1996, which we passed, simply has not been harnessed. That will has not been demon- strated. The United States as a leader within NATO has a responsibility to formulate and enunciate a process so countries which need more time are assured of what prospects lie ahead.

Without a doubt, Hungary is one of the leading candidates for NATO membership with respect to meeting relevant criteria, including its OSCE human rights commitments. They have made tremen- dous progress in the post-Communist economic transition and lead the region in foreign investment. On the military front, Hungary has cooperated with NATO with respect to Bosnia, providing a staging post at Taszar base near its border with Croatia. Finally, Hungary has worked to improve relations with Romania and Slovakia, two neighbors with substantial Hungarian minorities. With respect to Slovakia, I remain committed to the goal of her integration into trans-Atlantic institutions. I believe a strong, democratic Slovakia in the heart of Europe is in the interest of the peoples of both countries. For that to happen, however, there must be credible evidence that meaningful reform is taking root in Slovakia. Unfortunately, we are seeing evidence that the positive and needed progress being 87

87 Page 88 89 84 made in a number of other East Central and countries—the Baltic States, Slovenia, and Romania all come to mind—is simply not being made in Slovakia. I hope that Prime Minister Meciar’s government will take concrete measures to restore interna- tional confidence in Slovakia’s democratization process. These are objectives which the people of Slovakia want and deserve, and are a prerequisite for membership in NATO. Finally, Bulgaria is currently in the midst of a critical period in her history but at the same time a hopeful period. Bulgaria has experienced dramatic change in the last 6 months. A severe economic crisis led to massive street protests in January which forced the ex-Communist Bulgarian Socialist Party to give up rule.

Pre-term elections were held just last month, which resulted in a decided victory for the reformist Union of Democratic Forces. The new, reform-minded parliament began work just two weeks ago, and a new government is about to be named, a government which I understand is committed to sweeping economic reform and to joining NATO and the EU. Bulgaria deserves our support in this difficult transition. I’d like to ask my good friend Mr. Christensen, distinguished member of the Helsinki Commis- sion, if he has any opening remarks at this time.

Mr. CHRISTENSEN. I do not.

Next we have Ambassador of Hungary, Györy Bánlaki, who is a graduate of the Woodrow Wil- son High School in Washington, D.C., attended his freshman year at Howard University, and earned a doctorate in economics in 1972. In 1981, he was at the U.S. Desk, later head of the U.S. Desk, First Secretary, Consul General, and then Ambassador for the Republic of Hungary to the United States of America here in Washington. 88

88 Page 89 90 85 He’s the founder and President of the Sawyer Miller Group, a Hungarian-American joint venture for strategic communications. We welcome him here as well. Ambassador Tafrov, the Bulgarian Ambassador-at-Large for NATO, between 1983 and 1987 worked as editor and head of the department at the ABC Literary Weekly and from ’87 to ’89 worked as the head of a department of a magazine known as Contemporary. Between 1990 and ’91, he was head of the International Information Department of the Democ- racy newspaper, head of the International Department of the Union of Democratic Forces, and the foreign political adviser to the President of Bulgaria, from 1991 to ’92 was First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, and since January of ’95, Ambassador Extraordinary to the Court of St. James; since mid March, Ambassador-at-Large for NATO. Ambassador Lichardus, would you begin? Again, we thank you for being here today. And the Commission awaits your testimony.

STATEMENT OF HIS EXCELLENCY BRANISLAV LICHARDUS, AMBASSADOR OF THE SLOVAK REPUBLIC

Amb. LICHARDUS. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Christensen, thank you for the invitation to testify before you concerning Slovakia’s readiness to join NATO.

We take this unprecedented event as a part of our ongoing dialogue with the United States on many aspects of changing post Cold War reality. Slovakia, as you know, is one of Europe’s youngest countries. During the recent past we have gone through two unique transformations. First, like the other countries asking for admittance into NATO, we have been transforming our- selves from a Communist system, to a free market, democratic society.

But, in addition to that complicated process, we have also gone through the creation of an entirely new governmental structure after the creation of an independent Slovak Republic in 1993, building our new institutions from scratch. I can assure you that democracy is alive and well in Slovakia, which is a parliamentary democ- racy, respecting human rights and freedoms. For one thing, we have had free and fair elections, which no international authority has ever questioned in terms of validity. While there have certainly been disagreements among various authorities, our courts, if neces- sary, have justly handled these disputes, and all parties have abided by their rulings.

I am most concerned by the misperceptions of Slovakia that I have read and heard since I arrived here in March of 1994. From these reports, one would get the impression that Slovakia is an oppressive state with no free speech and a nonexistent civil society. I am here to tell you that one must really stretch reality in order to arrive at those conclusions.

If you come to our capital, Bratislava, you will see about 15 daily newspapers sold at newsstands, of all political persuasions. These papers range from those which support the government to those which are adamantly opposed to it, and they exist with no restrictions. In fact, I would describe the print media in Slovakia as vibrant. 89

89 Page 90 91 86 In addition, there are 20 private radio stations throughout the country, which broadcast freely. There are two private television stations, and a proposal to privatize one of the state-owned stations is being considered. The growth of the involvement of our citizens in enthusiastically building the civil sphere has been a wonderful thing to observe. There are now over 12,000 citizen associations, 79 political parties, and over 500 trade union or employee organizations. Under communism, people had no true public life. Everything was part of the political establish- ment, no matter how minor it may have seemed. The growth of this space between the political and the private has been the greatest change. Mr. Chairman, I know that you have expressed concern over various developments in Slovakia, and I would like to address these concerns directly. At this point, however, I am pleased to inform you that recently—I would like to stress, and I think that this is very important information at this point— that recently it has been the prime minister who invited the ranking leader of the opposition to consider together the recommendations of the European Commission for refining our political system. In your statement on the floor; that is, there was the statement of the Chairman D’Amato, of the Senate last month, you claimed that Slovakia is, I quote, “showing signs of regression toward authori- tarian, if not totalitarian, relations between the state and its citizens.” Mr. Chairman, this statement disappoints me because of its extreme nature.

As one who has lived under totalitarianism, I can tell you that Slovakia is nowhere near such a state. I understand and recognize what it means to be an oppressed citizen, and such oppression is now gone from Slovak society. You have raised specifically the case of Frantisek Gaulieder, who was removed as an MP from our parliament after resigning from membership in his party. The differing interpretations as to whether this matter was handled appropriately under our new constitution is now before the Constitutional Court.

As I am certain you are aware, the constitution is not always perfectly clear about all matters even in well-established democracies. Our Constitutional Court in its short existence has already developed a reputation of independence and justice. It has ruled both in favor and against the government on many occasions. Everyone involved has complied with these rulings.

The next issue is the claim that there is a large increase in violence in Slovakia. Our newly formed police force is somewhat overburdened by the increase in crime and is trying to respond as quickly as possible. I am pleased to inform you that the Federal Bureau of Investigation has been helpful in providing our police force with advanced training.

Slovakia has also been overly criticized for its policies toward ethnic minorities. However, these policies have not been separated from recommendations and legislative initiatives in the international arena. The Slovak Republic has been visited by the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities, Mr. van der Stoel, on several occasions. As he concluded, there is no real threat to minorities in Slova- 90

90 Page 91 92 87 kia. My country was among the first states implementing the Council of Europe Framework Conven- tion on Protection of National Minorities. About 11 percent of the citizens in our country have Magyar ethnic backgrounds. In areas where there is a high concentration of ethnic Magyars, the Hungarian language is a valid language of instruc- tion at all levels of education. In those areas, official signs are in Hungarian and the Hungarian language is freely used through- out daily commerce. The one exception is that in all official business in which the government may or does take part, there must be a copy of legal documents in the Slovak language. This is important for legal consistency.

Since the first days following the revolution, the rights of minorities have been a primary con- cern. We will continue to do whatever is necessary to make certain that minorities in Slovakia are treated fairly. As a matter of fact, there is hardly another country in Europe which would treat ethnic minorities in such a generous way as traditions in our country imply. Hundreds of schools, dozens of churches, newspapers, theaters and cultural institutions speak for themselves. There is another ethnic group which deserves a special attention: Roma, or Gypsies. In many other European countries alike, this group poses a socioeconomic, rather than an ethnic, problem. The government has taken steps to ensure that access to education for all Roma begins at an early stage. I have some documents here to show you that we have books for Roma children for the first grade and for the next grade and that the Roma language is going to be established as one of the minority lan- guages used in Slovakia.

Thus, I would not describe this policy, especially in recent years, as inactive. I hope that their distinct culture will become better known to a wider audience. Last year, for example, I had the privilege of opening an exhibition of Roma children artistic creations in Palm Beach, Florida. The travelling exhibition of truly magnificent young artists from Slovakia came to Florida via Japan, India, and Austria. It impressed me as well as eager buyers, who were bidding well over 500 U.S. dollars for individual pieces. One of those pictures is in our confer- ence room at the embassy. I welcome you to have a look at it. I would also like to mention three periodicals and a live theatre group, which is unique to Central and Eastern Europe, the only one I think in Central and Eastern Europe. Another two theaters are in Russia. Through government labor offices, there are retraining and educational programs offered to those who are unemployed or less skilled. Success of these programs, however, depends also on the attitudes of the Roma people themselves. This is one of the problems. The Office of Legal Protection for Ethnic Minorities in Kosice funded through the EU PHARE program, among other things, monitors violence against minorities and provides legal services and protection. I mentioned this institution because over the past few years, the emergence of skinheads and other racist groups have troubled many countries in our region. In Slovakia, some of these groups have clashed with the Roma community. 91

91 Page 92 93 88 As opposed to what has been reported, the government has acted against such behavior, and those who have been caught have been sent to prison. While they do exist, these hate crimes are actually rather infrequent. But our government is sensitive to the problem and denounces such acts. In conclusion, I am honored to declare that the officially voiced, officially voiced, orientation of the Slovak government in the sphere of European security is characterized by striving to obtain mem- bership in NATO and the European Union. If Slovakia is left out of the first round of NATO expansion, it will create an uneven degree of security in Central and Eastern Europe. This will not contribute to regional stability and will consider- ably extend the border of NATO new members with non-NATO countries. At the same time, it will disturb the territorial coherence of the Alliance.

Our civilian-controlled military is as updated and as reformed as those of other leading candi- dates for entry. And, despite reports to the contrary, our public supports Slovakia’s potential member- ship. Polls have consistently shown a majority of Slovak citizens want to enter NATO. We even have a group of citizens who have organized a “Race for NATO,” in which young people of Slovakia bike, run, and walk across our country to educate the public and rally support for NATO membership. Mr. Chairman, we believe that the process of NATO expansion will remain open and Slovakia will continue to work towards more secure, more stable and more prosperous Europe.

Thank you for your attention.

Many members and many people know the unique nature of this Commission is that every 2 years the baton of leadership shifts from Senate to House, House to Senate. I was Chairman for the last 2 years, and now Mr. D’Amato is serving as Chair, and I serve as Co-Chair. So he will join us momen- tarily.

Mr. Ambassador, please make your presentation now?

STATEMENT OF HIS EXCELLENCY GYÖRY BÁNLAKI, AMBASSADOR OF THE REPUBLIC OF HUNGARY

Amb. BÁNLAKI. Mr. Co-Chairman, Mr. Christensen, I am pleased and honored to have this op- portunity to speak about the issues of human rights in Hungary in the context of our aspirations to join the North Atlantic Alliance. It is a distinct privilege to do so before the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, a well-known and widely respected body of the United States Congress, which, ever since its inception has shown a great interest in the progress of Central and Eastern Europe, a region that due to historic 92

92 Page 93 94 89 imperatives and not to its own choice had for a long time found itself on the wrong side of the great divide between freedom and authoritarianism. Having endured alien ideologies forced upon us and outright foreign occupation, Hungary, along with other nations of this region, is now free again to choose the path of her future development. We have unequivocally made our choice by deciding to seek to join the integration structures of the West- ern community.

On the other hand, both NATO and the European Union, the two most important of these institu- tions, have committed themselves to enlarge so that they could embrace the new or reborn democracies of Central and Eastern Europe, including Hungary. A nation that has recently celebrated the 1,100th anniversary of its presence in the heart of Eu- rope, Hungary has played a unique role in the gradual disintegration and eventual collapse of commu- nism. In 1956, its desperate revolt against foreign occupation and the inhuman practices of dictatorship turned into a national revolution and a brief but bloody struggle for independence, civil liberties, and human rights. The resistance of the Hungarians was eventually crushed by tanks. Hundreds were executed, and hundreds of thousands left the country. But, through their sacrifices, they put the first nail into the coffin of communism. That hard-earned status allowed Hungary to be at the cutting edge of reform in Central and East- ern Europe, relentlessly widening the constraints and loosening the straitjacket of Communist ideol- ogy, providing a continuous erosive and fermentation process. In 1989, Hungary once again set an example by dismantling the Iron Curtain and then allowing East Germans to flee to the West, a step that launched a process and unleashed forces that led to the fall of the Berlin Wall in a mere ten weeks. Ever since the first free elections in Hungary in the Spring of 1990, much attention has been focused on the issues of human rights. True, it did not have to start building a network of laws and institutions from scratch as certain elements of human rights protection had already been grudgingly introduced in the period of the gradual dismantling of one-party rule. Yet it fell to the new National Assembly to do the arduous work of establishing a complete system of legislative acts aimed at human rights protection, setting up a structure to deal with any possible attempt of rights violations and allo- cating the funds necessary to make this system work. Hungary now has a stable and well-functioning parliamentary system that has been proven to be an effective and powerful legislative branch of government. It has full control over the executive branch, and, together with the very influential and vocal constitutional court, ensures that all principles of democracy are strictly adhered to and that a system of checks and balances has evolved.

It is a testimony to Hungary’s political stability that elections have been held in the time frames set by the respective laws, with no need to hold by-elections and with a high-level participation of the electorate. The parties represented in the National Assembly cover the whole traditional mainstream politi- cal spectrum. However, it is worth mentioning that no extremist political grouping, either from the right or the left, were able to gain a single seat in the National Assembly either in 1990 or ’94. 93

93 Page 94 95 90 Merely nominal in the years of dictatorship, local government has developed into a strong inde- pendent system of political institutions. Hungary has consciously put a premium on strengthening these structures so as to reinforce the concept of citizen participation in decision-making, one of the basic principles on which a genuine civic society can be based.

Hungary’s printed media is fully privatized, free of any government control or unlawful outside influence. At the same time, it is fully aware of the responsibility to prevent the publication of things that could be seen as offensive to ethnic or religious groups and to human dignity. The electronic media’s privatization continues, and very soon there will be more private national and local TV and radio stations fiercely competing for the attention of the public.

Hungary is home to several hundreds of thousands of people belonging to various ethnic commu- nities: Germans, Slovaks, Romanians, Serbs, Croats, and so on. The laws adopted by the National Assembly reflect the strong dedication and full determination of the country to offer them as many opportunities to develop their respective cultures and national identities as possible. When needed, extra measures of protection for their specific interests have also been introduced. Soon, each of the 13 individually recognized larger ethnic groups will have their own freely elected special representatives in the National Assembly. In addition to that a parliamentary ombuds- man for ethnic and national minorities has already been quite active in drawing the attention of the Assembly to the concerns of these groups.

Special measures have been, shall be, and will be taken to improve the situation of Hungary’s sizable Roma population. Divided into distinct subgroups, they experience many problems of adjust- ment into Hungary’s rapidly developing free market economy. It has been established as one of the greatest tasks of the government to support the development and to broaden the opportunities of this community, the members of which struggle with past underde- velopment, vestiges of discrimination, remnants of mistrust, and an often self-destructive attitude to the prevalent values of society.

The government has taken a firm stand against any form of bias or discrimination against the Roma, has encouraged initiatives to strengthen mutual tolerance, has introduced a series of measures to defend them from the fallout of economic restructuring, and to help them maintain their valuable ethnic heritage, an important element of Hungary’s culture and civilization. The introduction and elec- tion of Roma self-governments across the county served this purpose. There are no legal impediments to Roma aspirations. The challenge is to fill the possibilities and opportunities offered by the legal framework with substance.

Hungary has taken decisive steps to overcome the tragic legacy of the Holocaust. A number of laws on compensation were adopted and implemented, and it has been tried to offer at least a partial compensation for the suffering that the victims of the Holocaust or their relatives had to endure. Recently, the government, after lengthy negotiations with the various national and international organizations representing the interests of Jewish communities, set up a public foundation with the sole aim of compensation of Jewish communal property lost prior to and during Hungary’s occupation 94

94 Page 95 96 91 by the Nazis. It has been hailed as the most comprehensive act of communal property restitution in the whole of our broader region. At present, Hungary is proud to have the largest, most vibrant, and active Jewish community in Central and Eastern Europe, a community that is now going through a true cultural and religious revival and revitalization. Mr. Chairman, let me mention here that last week Hungary has also concluded what we regard a major agreement with the Vatican on the restitution of important and large-scale assets to the church that had been confiscated earlier to the tune of the value of $820 million. Beyond the internal and international efforts, Hungary attaches great significance to the respect for human rights in other regions of the world.

Hungary has been a co-sponsor of many U.N. resolutions and other initiatives in this field. As a practical example, Hungary, in cooperation with the U.N. High Commission for Refugees, has pro- vided shelter for thousands of refugees of the tragic war in the former Yugoslavia. Changes of Hungary’s borders in the 20th century have turned about one-third of those with a Hungarian mother tongue into citizens of other countries.

Since 1945, Hungary has never raised any territorial claims against any of its neighbors. The commitment not to do so has been strengthened in numerous international documents, such as the Helsinki Final Act and most recently in the bilateral treaties signed and ratified with Ukraine, Slova- kia, and Romania.

These treaties reinforce the notion that Hungary sincerely seeks a historical reconciliation with the peoples of the neighboring countries and wants the ethnic Hungarians living in them to stay loyal citizens of their respective countries, hoping for them to be given all the opportunities to exercise their rights, use their language, protect their heritage and culture, and maintain cross-border contacts.

This attitude has been well-received by Hungary’s neighbors, and we have experienced a wel- come development in our bilateral relations with these countries, especially with Romania. Mr. Chairman, in my presentation, I have focused primarily, as you requested, on the human rights dimension of our aspiration to join NATO. Let me make a brief passing reference to other important developments. A tough, responsible economic stabilization program introduced 2 years ago has finally created a promising and realistic base for further sustainable growth.

Our two-way trade with the United States has reached a billion dollars. U.S. investment in Hun- gary is more than $5.5 billion. Our bilateral security relationship has seen unprecedented growth. American AWACS aircraft up in Hungarian air space for years, thousands and thousands of men and women of the U.S. military having served or gone through the Taszar logistics and staging base in Southwestern Hungary, visits by more than 50 American military delegations led by a two-star general or higher or by an equivalent within one year, and an FBI Academy in Budapest are the highlights of this growth. 95

95 Page 96 97 92 Mr. Chairman, we are fully aware of the fact that the transformation of our country, although we did it ourselves, could not have been possible had it not been for the steadfast support and assistance of our many friends in the West, especially in the United States. This is why, ending my introductory presentation, I would like to express my appreciation and gratitude to you not only for your honoring interest in and attention toward Hungary’s progress but also for the help that the American people, the U.S. Congress, this Commission, in particular, and the administration have been rendering to Hungary, a country that is determined and committed to turn its close strategic partnership with the United States into a genuine alliance based on the values, interests and objectives that our two nations have come to share.

Thank you.

Of course, the government now has done an absolute 180 degree turn, and they have a freely elected and a very progressive government in place. But, during the dictatorship of Ceausescu, we, in a bipartisan way, always spoke out very vigorously on behalf of the Hungarians who were repressed in Romania.

I invite our third and final witness this morning, Ambassador Tafrov of Bulgaria.

STATEMENT OF HIS EXCELLENCY STEFAN TAFROV OF THE REPUBLIC OF BULGARIA, AMBASSADOR AT LARGE FOR NATO ACCESSION

Amb. TAFROV. Thank you, Mr. Co-Chairman. Mr. Co-Chairman and Mr. Christensen, I am greatly honored to meet this distinguished Commis- sion and to inform you of the foreign and security policy agenda of my government and to discuss with you the major issues concerning Bulgaria’s membership in the North Atlantic Alliance. First, I would like to inform you of the prompt and significant progress achieved by the Bulgarian democracy in implementing the reformist agenda steered by President Stoyanov and his caretaker government. In an amazingly short time, we were able to reverse the extremely negative course of economic developments and to deal effectively with the most urgent problems. There are already encouraging signs of economic and financial stabilization of strongly reduced inflation and strengthen- ing of the national currency.

Privatization and structural reform are well on track. Active preparation is underway to establish without unnecessary delay a currency board. The standby agreement reached with the IMF and the successful meeting with the G-24 held in Brussels provide additional reassurance of the international support for the reforms.

These encouraging results met the support of the nation in the general elections held on April 19. These elections, held, as previous ones, in full accordance with the high OSCE standards, confirmed that democracy and the rule of law in Bulgaria are firmly based and functioning and changes in the 96

96 Page 97 98 93 country are irreversible. As you are aware, the United Democratic Forces (UDF)received the absolute majority of seats in the newly elected parliament, gaining 52 percent of the national vote, thus provid- ing for the establishment of a strong executive in Bulgaria. In fact, the government, the new govern- ment, is going to be voted by our parliament tomorrow.

Thus, the unity of purpose, represented by the president, the new reformist parliamentary major- ity, and the government, will be an important pillar and guarantee for the stable course and the Atlantic choice. The new parliament started its work with a general agreement on united parliamentary action on several major issues. In a declaration on national salvation offered by the UDF coalition and approved on May 8th, after several rounds of consultations among all parliamentary forces, the National Assem- bly endorsed the basic principles to lead the country out of the current economic crisis.

A major issue in the Declaration is the parliamentary support for Bulgaria’s foreign policy steps towards an early full membership in NATO. In this context, I would like to stress that the decision to apply for membership in the North Atlantic Alliance was not a goal in itself. It was embodiment of shared values and an inextricable part of the policy towards genuine reform. The accession to the European Union and NATO will be an efficient instrument for the modern- ization of the country. Indeed, the speedup of market reforms and the search for stable security are only two sides of the coin. The progress towards an early NATO membership will enhance a more favorable climate for economic reform, trade, and investment, and will help our record of positive achievements continue to grow. I would like to emphasize this on the very eve of the 50th anniversary of the far-reaching Marshall Plan, from which we were forcefully excluded.

The very prospect of joining the Euro-Atlantic institutions has been an essential driving force for the implementation of the reforms in Bulgaria and one of the main incentives for Bulgaria’s construc- tive foreign policy over the last 7 years. Bulgaria is looking forward to the bold and responsible decisions to be taken at the Madrid Sum- mit and is ready to contribute to the success of NATO enlargement.

The committed effort of Bulgaria to join the Alliance at an early stage and the favorable response by our Western partners and future allies gives us every reason to expect equal treatment and equal starting opportunities alongside other prospective members. Bulgaria is prepared to assume all obliga- tions and enjoy all rights under the Washington treaty.

The membership in the Alliance will not only provide a reliable source of guarantees for Bulgaria’s national security but will also enhance its capabilities to contribute to the stability and security in the region. Over the last 7 years, the climate of religious and ethnic tolerance in Bulgaria has been praised internationally. With its policy of good neighboring and balanced relations with all countries in the region, Bulgaria is already a net producer of regional stability and security. It has no territorial, border, 97

97 Page 98 99 94 ethnic, or religious disputes with any of them. I would like to mention, in particular the excellent ties with Greece and Turkey, including in the field of security and defense. Building on this positive record and in full compatibility with the regional initiatives of the U.S. government, Southeastern Europe Cooperative Initiative, and the European Union, Bulgaria will con- tinue to promote its initiatives for stability, security, and cooperation in Southeastern Europe con- ceived as an additional vehicle for the effective involvement of the country and whole region in the European and Euro-Atlantic integration. Another important development in this ongoing process will be the regional meeting of defense ministers to be hosted by Bulgaria later this year. We are glad that the U.S. Department of Defense and NATO will be actively involved in the planning and the proceedings of this meeting. We are convinced that the early accession of Bulgaria to the Alliance would further strengthen the security and stability in Southeastern Europe and NATO’s southern flank.

Geostrategically, the enlargement to the Alliance to the Southeast would link the northern flank to the southern one, giving the latter additional guarantees against latent risks. It would certainly contribute to the greater coherence of the Euro-Atlantic security and defense area and for an appropriate balance in the policies and priorities of the transformed Alliance. It would assure the safety of trans-regional infrastructure and energy systems. It is important, therefore, to provide for a geographically balanced approach to NATO enlarge- ment which would contribute to a more equal level of security and stability in different regions, thus minimizing the risk of new dividing lines or gray zones on the continent. In this context, we believe that the security of NATO and indeed all of Europe would only benefit from an equal treatment of applicant countries from the Black Sea region.

The defense potential of Bulgaria, according to our assumptions, provides appropriate basis for self-sustained capabilities. And, thus, the country would be a real net contributor to the Alliance’s collective defense. We have developed a positive record of committed involvement in peacekeeping, which we will further enhance. The participation in IFOR and SFOR as well as the forthcoming Bulgarian contribu- tion to the international effort to restore stability in Albania are a tangible proof of our readiness to contribute to the allied efforts in securing peace and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area.

Without prejudging the decisions to be taken in Madrid, we expect from the Summit a clear and firm commitment that the Alliance will remain open and that the first invitations are only the begin- ning of the process, which should continue without undue delay. This commitment could find an expression in the establishment of a clearly defined timetable and procedures for further enlargement. It makes sense to expect further invitations to be extended imme- diately after the conclusion of accession negotiations with the first countries invited or after their actually joining the Alliance in 1999 at the latest. 98

98 Page 99 100 95 The Madrid Declaration could also contain a recognition of the efforts made by applicant coun- tries and an invitation for their continued active participation in the process of enlargement through intensive dialogue, including at 16 plus 1, leading to accession. Bulgaria looks forward to an early follow-up of the intensified dialogue, which should have a pre- accession agenda and focus on the preparation for membership, gradually assuming elements of acces- sion negotiations. The process might involve periodic assessment and relevant guidance on the prepa- ration effort. This would provide for the enlargement to be a continuous stream process, rather than a sequence of waves or groups of new members. Transparency and predictability should remain among the main principles of the enlargement, including in the decision-making process within the Alliance and in consultations with countries out- side the Alliance. We welcome the recent agreement on a NATO-Russia document to establish a strategic partner- ship. We are convinced that NATO enlargement will ultimately contribute to democratic Russia’s security by projecting stability and underpinning democratic reforms to the East. In order to become an important element of the new European architecture, NATO relations with Russia should take into account the legitimate concerns of all European countries.

We expect that these relations will be as transparent as the NATO enlargement itself. In any event, the forthcoming and any later enlargement of NATO should be excluded from the agreement and future consultation with Russia. Bulgaria is firmly set to develop mutually beneficial relations with Russia on the basis of sover- eign equality, including an open and constructive dialogue on European security.

Bulgaria should not be regarded as a country that for cultural, historical, or economic reasons was destined to be part of the Russian sphere of influence. Ever since the restoration of Bulgaria’s indepen- dence in 1878, the history of the Bulgarian-Russian relations has been multilayered and contradictory. One of the aspects of the forced Sovietization of Bulgaria between 1944 and 1989 was the inven- tion of a real mythology about the so-called peculiar nature of the ties between Bulgaria and Russia.

We are encouraged by the recent statements made by Russian leaders concerning Bulgaria’s sovereign will to seek membership in NATO in the sense that this fact should not affect adversely the overall development of our bilateral ties. This statement has been supported so far by the practice, and we consider it a realistic one.

We also welcome the steady development of a special relationship between the Alliance and Ukraine. Developing mutually beneficent economic and political ties with Ukraine is high on Bulgaria’s foreign policy agenda. Bulgaria is firmly committed to assume the responsibility and its share of the costs of the mem- bership in the Alliance. As President Stoyanov stated in his address to the nation, while membership in NATO will not be cost-free, the burden of remaining outside the Alliance will be much higher, if not unbearable. We understand that security does have a cost and are determined to provide for the neces- sary investment. 99

99 Page 100 101 96 As an important part of the democratic reform, we have undertaken significant steps towards the establishment of civilian control over the armed forces based upon a legal framework and increased transparency within the defense establishment. This major effort still has to be completed. Work has already started in order to review the legal basis for the defense and the armed forces, the national security and defense policy, and the existing practices.

The preparation for an early accession to the Alliance is a truly national effort and it enjoys the active support by the Bulgarian public. I would like to mention, in particular, the valuable contribution of the Atlantic Club of Bulgaria, which will host this October the General Assembly of the Atlantic Treaty Association.

May I avail of this opportunity to extend to you, Mr. Chairman, and to the distinguished members of this Commission an invitation to attend this important meeting. Thank you very much for your attention.

Yet, the more this Commission looks into the process, it seems as if many of the countries in question are left out of the process. There is no process with real predictability. The process seems to be not unlike what will happen in a few hours when the Federal Reserve Board Chairman meets to discuss what the short-term rates will be. There’s mystery and a lot of intrigue about how one really gets into NATO. And, if you could, if you would like to comment on the process, how well you think your country is doing, particularly as it relates to because you did address many of the human rights questions that we asked you to address this issue of civilian and democratic control, whether or not your parliaments will have adequate checks and balances on what the military provides.

One of the hallmarks of this nation is that the Executive Branch proposes a budget, and yet we have the ability to go through line after line after line of the defense and every other budget. There is oversight and also more eyes and ears focusing on each line item. Please touch on that, if you will? And, Ambassador Tafrov, especially, since many of the old guard are still ,or are in the process of being phased out, please address these issues because civilian control has to be a big issue in your country?

100 Page 101 102 97 We realize that, as some other candidate countries, we have a lot of work to do still in this field. We are aware of that. We have plans with our NATO allies, including the United States, to get some technical assistance in helping us to train more civilian people in being able to help us in this. Also, over the last 7 years, a number of our militaries have been trained in the NATO countries, including in this country. The wish of President Stoyanov certainly and also of the new government is to promote these officers in higher positions so that they bring the new NATO culture to the high military ranks.

I must say that our militaries by tradition are really very professional, very neutral. We are very satisfied with their performance over the last 7 years. They are highly professional, very loyal to the democratic institutions. We have no fears of any kind regarding them. The new thing which is going to be introduced by the new government is more transparency in the budgeting process of the military budget, of course, because the whole process of the budget will be overhauled, including the military one. It is one of the improvements we are looking for. So as far as military reform is concerned, special attention will be given. In short, special atten- tion is going to be given by the new government, which is now being formed.

Mr. SMITH. Mr. Ambassador?

July 8th and 9th the first round members shall be issued invitations to start accession negotiations, probably sometime in September. The talks are expected to conclude by or before Christmas. Then the lengthy process of ratification follows. Thus, we have every hope and confidence that on a very symbolic day, for several reasons, April 4th, 1999, Hungary will become a full member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

The reason I’m mentioning April 4th as a symbolic date, by coincidence, this used to be the national day of pre-’89 Hungary designating, depending on the angle, the liberation of Hungary from Nazi occupation or occupation by the Soviets. Whichever way you look at it, April 4th has been this day for decades. I think it will be highly appropriate and symbolic, if on that date in 1999 we do become members. It will have signified this once-in-a-lifetime of a nation opportunity of renewal and a fresh start and the change. In terms of the civilian control aspect, I think we have made the necessary transformations to meet the criteria. It is a lengthy process. Civilian experts on military affairs or new high-level military officers in large numbers are very difficult to produce, but we have achieved quite a few things in the past few years. 101

101 Page 102 103 98 Something like 27 generals have been retired in the last 2 years. At the moment, seven of the top ten soldiers in Hungary are graduates of Western high-level military institutions. It just so happens that the number one military leader, the top man, is a graduate of Army War College in Carlisle. His deputy, the number two, is a graduate of National Defense University, Washington, D.C.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you.

The second amendment will be about the bilateral treaty with Hungary. We consider this treaty as an important factor of stability in Central and Eastern Europe. We are closely cooperating with Hun- gary on the implementation of this document. The group of experts has had already several sessions on that matter. We probably will have four committees in order to implement this treaty, which was the first of its kind in Europe.

And now concerning our military preparedness for NATO membership, I must stress that our military activities are unequivocally praised by the United States and also by NATO in Brussels. Civilian control of the military is established by the CONSTITUTION. Minister of Defense is a civilian person as well as his deputy. The Slovak parliament exercises supervision and control of the military budget and military doctrines through Defense and Security Committee. The committee has 12 members, 7 from the coalition, 5 from the opposition.

Our activities in the Partnership for Peace Program are really very extensive. I would like to say, for example, that the North Atlantic Council approved the Individual Partnership Program of Slovakia in NATO in 1995. In 1996, we participated in 225 events, including seminars and 6 military exercises, which in- cluded 3 command staff exercises and 2 field exercises. Some of them took place also on the territory of Slovakia. We were the first country to pass the Partnership for Peace Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), which provides a mechanism for sending Slovak troops abroad and stationing, for instance, of foreign troops in Slovakia for military exercises. I would like to say that we are part of a peacekeeping force in former Yugoslavia. We are in the very sensitive place of Eastern Slavonia. We will supervise the events that we expect will happen in that very hot territory. 102

102 Page 103 104 99 Also, I would like to mention the Mil-To-Mil and PfP [Military to Military and Partnership for Peace] Programs. Slovakia has established close ties with the National Guard of Indiana. In 1996, the National Guard organized 20 out of 66 events and plans for 1997 include another 86 events. Slovakia has concluded agreements on military cooperation with all neighboring countries: Aus- tria, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Poland, and Ukraine; seven NATO members: U.S.A., Canada, Belgium, France, U.K., Netherlands, and Germany. The plan for 1997 is to sign agreements with Portugal, Spain, Italy, Greece, Turkey, Denmark, and Norway.

Our 1997 defense budget represents 7.17 percent of the total state budget and 2.6 percent of GDP. What we are paying for PfP Program is approximately four percent of our total military spending. Now, inter-operability of the Slovak Armed Forces—we cannot afford to buy new equipment right now. But we have equipped our MIG-29s with IFF [Identification Friend or Foe] system and avionics according to ICAO standards at a very high cost. Plans for 1997 call for the same upgrade in eight additional jets, and in MI-24 choppers.

Now, very briefly, military cooperation between Slovakia and the United States. On September 23, 1996, the Slovak Minister of Defense and representative of the U.S. Embassy opened the Consoli- dated Military Assistance Office (CMAO) in Bratislava. So, American soldiers are on our territory, despite the existence of number three question in our forthcoming referendum.

Now, the last thing I would like to mention is that under the CFE, Slovakia delivered on its pledge to reduce its military forces to a level required by the treaty. We have now 40,607 troops and 11,000 civilian employees. Slovakia has established an exchange of classified military information with the U.S. It is based on the “General Agreement on Security of Military Information,” which was signed by the U.S. Secre- tary of Defense William Perry and his Slovak counterpart, J. Sitek.

Amb. LICHARDUS. Yes.

Amb. BÁNLAKI. The constitution does not require any such thing.

Mr. SMITH. Let me ask, Ambassador Lichardus, regarding your proposed referendum. Of the questions, the third has to do with the stationing of nuclear weapons, which is likely to elicit a “no” vote from the people. 103

103 Page 104 105 100 As I think you know, standard NATO practice is not to put nuclear warheads or nuclear devices in new countries that become part of NATO. That question is coupled with a question regarding the stationing of foreign troops on your territory. The first question on the referendum is very direct: Should Slovakia join NATO? The other two are likely I think to elicit a “no,” which could send a confusing message to NATO itself and to other countries that are concerned about NATO enlargement.

There are, as a matter of fact, four questions, the first one: NATO, yes or no? According to the polls, we expect that the majority will vote for NATO. Then there are two additional questions, the first one concerning the nuclear arms. This is unpre- dictable. The third one, which is not vaguely established, is the question of military forces on our territory. The question does not define what kind of military forces, but we believe that the answer to that question probably will be positive.

As a matter of fact, the parliament passed a resolution suggesting to the people of Slovakia: Vote for the membership in NATO. There are a lot of activities on TV, radio, in the media and so on which try to explain to our population that NATO is probably the only future for us when we speak not only about security but also about a prevention of conflicts, genuine conflicts, in Europe or probably unpre- dictable conflicts, which may arise from the fact that the arms of mass destruction may be in the hands of some irresponsible governments, NATO should protect us against terrorism, should protect us against mafias, and so on and so on.

Amb. BÁNLAKI. No. I put it in quite a different context. Of those who have an opinion and who would go to vote, two-thirds support it. And, as a background, let me explain. I referred in my statement to 1956. If you recall, in 1956, neutrality—which 40 some years ago in the framework of the Alliance systems and the Cold War, neutrality was the major foreign political demand of that revolution. So there is a lingering, if very outdated, notion that neutrality is something good coupled with the fact that if you look with Hungarian man of the street eyes at a neutral country, Switzerland or Austria, it is also coupled with prosperity. But whatever neutrality might mean in 1997, it is quite another thing. So I would attribute it to the transformation process and an education process. The communication strategy, just as we have initi- ated it on the European Union, on accession will have been very soon underway. I’m sure that by the time this comes, by the time it is explained that in a security alliance system your defense expenditures are lower than if you are outside and all the facts are known, NATO mem- bership will be very widely accepted and supported. There has been an initiative by an extreme left wing party to have a referendum on this subject, but the overwhelming position of all parliamentary 104

104 Page 105 106 101 parties on this was that you can genuinely ask a question only when you know what is involved, when you do have an invitation, and when you know what is how much and what the specifics are. So thinking of the seven-party consensus in parliament—and I don’t want to mention this in a light tone, but this is probably the only issue in the sphere of politics in which the seven parties can form a consensus—they are in consensus on support for NATO enlargement. Very recently, a delegation of the seven parliamentary caucus leaders of the parties headed by the speaker of the house went to Brussels and manifested their support.

So, whatever the outcome of the 1998 elections and whatever combination of a coalition will become the government, support for NATO is strong. Let me just mention for the record as I had the opportunity to introduce him to you at the begin- ning of this session that the parliamentary leader and the majority leader of the Hungarian parliament, Mr. Szekeres, is here in this chamber with us.

The Socialist Party, which is the ex-Communist party, holds the view that a referendum should be held, but it won’t happen because it’s a minority view. And the Socialist Party itself is divided over the NATO membership. There are Socialists who are for, and there are Socialists who are reluctant. But it’s largely a minority view. Now, the free and fair elections were held also on this subject. Bulgarians indicated very clearly what their preference was. So there is a consensus in society about our candidacy.

There have been a number of opposition political party leaders and journalists who have been victims of violent crimes. It seems very little has been done to resolve those crimes. They often are dismissed based on lack of evidence. There seems to be a pattern that we have observed. 105

105 Page 106 107 102 The murder of Robert Remias in April of 1996 was something that we were all very concerned about in terms of political violence. One of the things that we are looking for and I think the people intimately involved with the NATO process is a whole sense of reconciliation and tolerance, with a capital “T.” My question is: Could you speak to this issue? What is the government trying to do to mitigate these problems?

So I would like to assure you, Mr. Chairman, that this process was launched in Slovakia. And I personally feel that it will continue as we have our vision of NATO membership in the future and certainly the membership in the European Union. We are aware of the fact that political criteria for the European Union not differ from the criteria for the membership in NATO.

Now, concerning issues of violence, it is true that there is violence in Slovakia but probably not very much different from other countries in the region or some other countries anywhere in the world. There are still some unexplained problems with Remias, Kovac, Jr. I would like to inform you that all these cases have not been closed and that the government, for example, offered a reward, one million Slovak crowns, to find people responsible for the death of Remius. So I certainly believe that sometimes it may take time to solve some criminal problems. You have the same experience in your country. This is a worldwide experience.

And, in the meantime, there is a space for speculations. Such speculations are going on, unfortu- nately, also in our country. But also I would like to focus your attention at the fact that probably when speaking about vio- lence toward the people in the opposition, you should take into account that there is sometimes vio- lence also against the people in the coalition. So both, let’s say, political personalities on both sides are sometimes the target of violence.

Now, for example, the President of our constitutional court also received some letters, threaten- ing letters. In his statement, he said, “During my 4 years as the President of the Constitutional Court, I have not observed any serious objections which should disqualify me or the Slovak Constitutional Court. I do not know what attacks Mr. Senator”—he addresses the floor statement of Senator D’Amato— “is thinking about. If Mr. Senator is thinking about some anonymous threats towards me, they have been investigated by the police in accordance with appropriate laws.” So I would like to express my personal view that this is going to be under control in the future as well. And now, when speaking about the media, I wouldn’t say that there is violence against journal- ists. It’s true that several journalists left the daily Slovenska Republika. Other journalists, who worked 106

106 Page 107 108 103 for Navodna Obroda—another one of the newspapers—were not dismissed, but they left due to some personal changes—you may know the Navodna Obroda— was purchased by a concerned Steel Mill Kosice Holding that changed the working environment. Some of the journalists decided to quit. Also the information regarding accreditation to the Government Press Office. You recall that the office revoked accreditation to four journalists for four days. But after some discussion, it was decided to remedy it. I’m sure that the situation will not repeat itself.

Amb. TAFROV. First Deputy.

Amb. TAFROV. I think it should have said, rather, special. We have been having these last several decades, we Bulgarians, the reputation of the closest satellite to the Soviet Union. We don’t like this reputation. What I’m saying there is that it is a mythology which was created on purpose by the Bulgarian Communist s and, of course, with the Soviets in order to legitimate this status quo under communism.

Russia is a very important country. And, of course, we enjoy very good bilateral relations, as you know. We were encouraged by the reaction from the Russians when we decided to join NATO, which was generally mild. They understand that they can’t stop us. It’s a choice. It’s a fundamental choice we have made. And, in fact, as President Stoyanov put it, it will go only to improve our bilateral relations with Russia because it is going to make them much clearer, much more predictable. It’s already happening, I must say. 107

107 Page 108 109 104 So the Bulgarian-Russian relations in the future will only be improved by a Bulgarian member- ship in NATO.

Unless you fight corruption, you can’t get foreign investors. It’s as simple as that. One of the main objectives of my government is to promote foreign investment to the country because we don’t have foreign investment. We can’t expect prosperity for our people. So corruption is very high on the agenda of the government. And, as you may see from the declaration—I have a parliamentary declaration which was voted a week ago—it is one of the main points. Fighting organized crime, fighting corruption is very high on the agenda. That’s where Bulgar- ians will judge the success or the failure of the government in its actions.

Mr. CHRISTENSEN. What steps are you taking right now to rebuild the banking system in Bul- garia?

Mr. CHRISTENSEN. Mr. Ambassador Lichardus, I’m new on this Committee. So I’ve been rather quiet in terms of just listening to the testimony of the former speakers we’ve had over the last two or three weeks. And as a new member on this Committee, I’ve had an opportunity to listen to the ambassadors from the Baltic States. Last week we had an opportunity to hear from the Romanian ambassador. Today I had an opportunity to hear your testimony. As a new person on this Committee, I have to say there is a dramatic difference from where some of the other ambassadors’ testimony has been in terms of moving the country forward in terms of 108

108 Page 109 110 105 NATO expansion and the opportunity to join the NATO versus what I’ve heard and what I’ve seen from other testimony concerning Slovakia. What are the prospects for a change now? You’ve stated that there are things occurring in there, but how are we going to move Slovakia forward given its current head of state and the current govern- ment? What’s your proposal? How are we going to keep up with Romania and the Czech Republic and some of your neighbors around your borders?

Amb. LICHARDUS. So, first of all, I would like to stress when speaking about military prepared- ness, Slovakia is prepared for the membership.

Mr. CHRISTENSEN. I’m sorry.

One of the reasons for that was that some investors, especially from Western countries, from the United States and so on, thought that the political situation was instable or that there was an not atmo- sphere for investing in Slovakia. But now—

109 Page 110 111 106 Mr. CHRISTENSEN. Do you really think that Slovakia has made the same advances towards de- mocratization as the Czech Republic or Romania or Bulgaria or even Hungary?

Mr. CHRISTENSEN. You may be on the right track, but answer my question. Are you along down the track as far as your neighboring countries in your opinion?

Mr. CHRISTENSEN. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador.

Part of our concern is that so far we’re not sure what happens. Where is the Round 2? When does that take place, after 1999 or what? NATO has been largely silent on what it will prescribe for the future. Mr. Ambassador?

110 Page 111 112 107 Frankly, the fact of an exclusion of Bulgaria, a durable exclusion of Bulgaria, from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization is going to have a very negative impact on the process, on the reform process, in Bulgaria at a crucial moment for us. It is in a way for Bulgaria now or never. I mean, the success of the reform is at stake, really.

We don’t want, however, to exaggerate these fears because Bulgaria will be democratic, a demo- cratic country, whatever happens, because it is for the sake of—because it is the choice we made. But we still need a stable framework for this development. We are a small country in a troublesome region. We have also the feeling that over these last 7 years after the fall of the Berlin Wall, with our behavior in Southeastern Europe, it has contributed to meet NATO purposes, which is to stabilize the region. We were part of the coalition during the Gulf War. We respected the embargo against former Yugoslavia, by the way, losing a lot of money because of that because we were physically cut off from the rest of Europe. You have just to look at the map and see that we were really physically cut off. But, nevertheless, we stuck to that line because it was the only way to behave.

So we have the feeling that we enjoy excellent bilateral relations with our NATO members, equally good relations with Greece and Turkey, including in the military sphere. And, Mr. Co-Chairman, I must say that, regarding our neighbors, a process has been underway over these 7 years with historical reconciliation with them, which can be compared with what hap- pened between countries like, for instance, France and Germany after World War II. War is not any longer a thinkable instrument of resolving differences between Bulgaria and its neighbors. We live in what is called a security community in real life. So a NATO membership will only just institutionalize this actual situation. So the answer is yes, not including Bulgaria in the foreseeable future will have adverse conse- quences for my country. We are a country which may be one of the countries which lost the most after Yalta. At that point our economy and our society were at least as advanced—it is a country with roughly the same size in population like Greece. We traditionally compare, we have always compared, ourselves with Greece. Now we are behind Greece economically and in other terms, and it is due to the fact that we were on the wrong side after Yalta. It was not our own choice. We were simply occupied by the Soviet troops, and Greece didn’t have that. If there was a gray zone in the Southern Balkans, I can tell you it will be much less easy to stabilize the whole region. It’s obvious for everybody. From purely a geographic or a strategical point of view, you need to connect the Southern flank, which is very important, with the rest of the Alliance. And, of course, you have the country which is bordering the two actual NATO members with Bulgaria. So it makes sense also from that point of view. So we have a number of arguments.

If you allow me one other last, but not least, important point, we are at pride with our record as far as tolerance vis-a-vis national minorities is concerned. 111

111 Page 112 113 108 We are at the end of the day the country, European country, which along with a country like Denmark saved its Jews from deportation during the World War II. It is one of our brightest pages of our recent history. The Bulgarians saved 50,000 Bulgarian Jews from that deportation. The whole nation stood against the intent of the Germans to deport them to Auschwitz.

And when the Communist regime during its last years started a campaign against the Bulgarian citizens of Turkish origin, the disgust of the Bulgarians vis-a-vis this policy was such that we reacted very, very strongly. And the first thing to do after the fall of the dictator in ’89 was to restore the rights of the Bulgarian Turks.

I must say that we are one of the very good examples in the region in dealing with ethnic minori- ties in times when elsewhere there was ethnic cleansing. So we have provided a very, very positive example. We are very proud with that, and our fellow citizens of Turkish origin are very active, very well- integrated in our national life, including the political life of the country.

So we are proud with our record in that sphere. We believe we have already contributed to this and give examples to others.

But, having said that, it would not and could not change the fundamentals of our commitment to the values we have talked about, which we do, not for the sake of NATO, but for the sake of our future and our vision for Hungary’s development and modernization for the next century. So basically no change would come aside from possible internal political reverberations as inevi- table, but it would not change our commitment to the same values. It would not change the interest that we hold as a nation. It would not change the common goals that we, as I said, share. Perhaps to illustrate the thinking, again, as I said, aside from deep personal dissatisfaction and also possibly being fired if this happens but also I think of our OECD membership, which I think is a major landmark for Hungary’s aspiration to be included in the family of nations of Western democ- racy, that process perhaps illustrates how it has happened.

The Czech Republic became the first from the region to be admitted in January last year. I would have liked to see us being the first and not our Czech friends. But it did not make us turn our backs on OECD. 112

112 Page 113 114 109 We were told what items were still missing, what we had to do. We saw that this is a transparent process. And in 4 months’ time we became members. At that time I’m sure our Polish friends would have liked to see themselves first or second and not ourselves, but they also were told what criteria are yet to be done. And they became members of OECD in a few months’ time, the end of the summer.

Perhaps one brief thought, how to put all of this in perspective, what is going on in all of our countries. Just think how many books have been written on how to make socialism out of capitalism. It started with Karl Marx and went down all the way. You can fill libraries with it. Not a single book has ever been written about how to make capitalism out of socialism. Why? Probably because it was not anticipated. So the pages of that book are being written today in Hungary, in Slovakia, in Bulgaria, and all the region.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you.

As far as I know, the government declared, our Minister of Foreign Affairs declared, that we will try to persuade our Allies to be eligible for NATO in the future. And I would also like to say something about a statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which objected to a recently emerging foreign and domestic speculation that nonacceptance of Slova- 113

113 Page 114 115 110 kia into NATO will result in worsening of bilateral relations with its neighbors; in particular, with Hungary, or will negatively influence the rights of Hungarian national minority in Slovakia. It is not going to happen in Slovakia.

On religious freedom, which has always been something that the Commission has been very, very articulate and, I think, aggressive on throughout the many years that this Commission has been in place, there is a concern.

Is there any review underway to eliminate registration altogether so that the government doesn’t approve or disapprove the registration based on its acceptance of their philosophy?

114 Page 115 116 111 under communism, religion was considered something wrong. And, of course, there is a lot of work to do to educate people in religion, in understanding religion, in knowing more about religion. And, by the way, as one of the most important items of the problems of the new government is introduce religious education in the schools. It means not education in a given religion but to educate people about the different religions, to get to understand them better, which will, of course, improve dramatically the situation hopefully.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you very much. I’d like to thank again our three distinguished ambassadors for your testimony. It is very helpful for this Commission to hear from you directly. We will continue this dialogue through staff and through ourselves, members of the Commission and the ambassadors. I thank you very, very much.

This hearing on NATO enlargement is adjourned. (Whereupon, the foregoing matter was concluded at 11:59 a.m.) 115

115 Page 116 117 112

STATEMENT SUBMITTED BY THE HONORABLE ALFONSE D’AMATO

HEARING ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE PROCESS OF NATO ENLARGEMENT

MAY 20, 1997

We have invited an official representative of each state to present their government’s position to the Commission to help meet the Commission’s responsibility to the Congress and the American people to oversee implementation of the Helsinki Accords and subsequent Helsinki (OSCE) process docu- ments, with a particular emphasis on human rights and humanitarian affairs. Congress and NATO have both recognized the significance of candidate states’ compliance with OSCE principles in various official documents.

The Commission’s approach to this series of hearings is intended to focus specifically on how well these candidate states have implemented OSCE agreements and complied with OSCE principles. We will ask questions relating to other areas of candidate states’ policies and conduct that have been identified as critical to acceptance into NATO, but we are not competing with the committees having legislative jurisdiction in these areas, who will examine those issues more thoroughly and with greater expertise.

As I said at our earlier hearings, I am a supporter of NATO enlargement. I think that, in principle, every candidate state should be included in NATO when they meet the standards for accession. I do not believe that NATO enlargement should end with the Madrid announcement of the states invited to participate in accession negotiations.

I believe that it is very important that the United States, and our NATO allies, make very clear to those states not invited to join in the first round that the door is not closed, that the process has not ended, and that we and our allies encourage them to press ahead to meet the standards so that they can join when they are ready.

We must, with our allies, establish a clearly defined process for achieving membership. If we don’t, we run the risk of cutting the legs out from under the reform movements just now taking control of some of the eastern European countries that have failed to reform their political, military, and economic systems fast enough to meet NATO member country standards. These reform governments must be given a clear, strong signal that when they meet the standards, they will be allowed to join. 116

116 Page 117 118 113 We must not create in eastern Europe a gray zone between NATO and Russia where the old “spheres of influence” and “balance of power politics” could give rise to lasting political instability, poverty, and isolation. Also, this means that any NATO - Russia “charter” must not create a group of “second class” NATO members whose security guarantees are diluted and undermined.

While we will ask direct questions concerning OSCE compliance and implementation during the course of this morning’s hearing, and these questions may address some matters that are sensitive and sometimes controversial in the domestic politics of your countries, this does not mean that we are critical of your bids to join NATO. It does mean that we are very serious about candidate states actually meeting the established standards, including their OSCE commitments. I am personally a supporter of including each of your countries in NATO. I think that Hungary, Bulgaria, and Slovakia should each be included in NATO when each country meets the standards for membership. Hungary is universally, and I think, correctly considered to be an automatic candidate for a first round invitation to join NATO. Hungary has met the conditions for membership, and through her association with the NATO efforts in Bosnia, both IFOR and SFOR, and her participation in the Part- nership for Peace program, is clearly capable of making an immediate contribution to the security of the other members of NATO. Bulgaria and Slovakia are each in different situations that I will discuss in more detail later in this statement.

This morning, you each have the opportunity to explain to this Commission, to Congress, and to the American people why your country should be invited to join NATO. We are very interested in hearing these explanations directly from official representatives of candidate countries. I want to re-emphasize what I said at our earlier hearings, addressing the question of Russia and her security concerns. NATO enlargement does not threaten Russia’s security. An eastern Europe without NATO would threaten Russia’s security. Last Friday, the North Atlantic Council gave its approval to the Founding Act on Mutual Rela- tions, Cooperation and Security Between NATO and The Russian Federation, which was negotiated between the NATO Secretary General Javier Solana and the Foreign Minister of the Russian Federa- tion, Mr.Yevgeni Primakov. This Founding Act will be formally signed by the Secretary General of NATO and Heads of State and Government of NATO and Russia in Paris on May 27, 1997. Agreement on the Founding Act marks a level of formal acceptance by Russia of NATO enlarge- ment. It does not mean that all Russian policy makers or opinion leaders agree with NATO enlarge- ment. It is a major step forward on a job that is not yet complete. Disagreement in Russia over NATO enlargement appears to be in part based upon political op- portunism by nationalists and Communists nostalgic for the Soviet Union. It also appears to be based upon the fact that a significant number of nationalists and Communists do not yet accept the idea that Russia’s future lies in becoming an integrated member of the European and Western community of nations at the end of Russia’s present reform process. It also means that these same groups do not accept democracy, capitalism, or human rights as we understand them as the direction in which Russia’s internal development and international relations should follow. 117

117 Page 118 119 114 Until these significant dissenting forces in Russia come to believe that NATO is not a threat to Russia, we will have work to do. Also, the security guarantees that go with NATO membership will continue to be important.

However, for the long term, perhaps the best part of this enlargement process is not the military security guarantees that go with it to successful candidate states, but the leverage that the enlargement process exerts for basic changes in each candidate state that will result in better, safer, and more prosperous lives for each of their citizens.

One of the countries whose Ambassador appears before us today is proof of the effectiveness of this leverage. Last year, Bulgaria had a government composed of former Communists and had not begun to undertake necessary reforms. The Commission was very skeptical about Bulgaria’s candi- dacy for NATO membership.

Then, this spring, Bulgaria had a national election, and is establishing a pro-reform democratic government. That government plans to embark on a crash program of privatization and reform intended to address the shortcomings we felt would prevent Bulgarian accession to NATO. This is a significant fact, but it is not enough to include Bulgaria in the first group of states to join NATO. We first need to see this reform program make concrete progress. However, I strongly urge the United States and our NATO allies to make certain that there is a clear process for Bulgaria to follow for early NATO membership. I believe that Bulgaria’s reform efforts promise change in the right direction and Bulgaria’s new political leaders have the political will and popular support to carry them through to success given enough time and encouragement.

Unfortunately, the same cannot be said about Slovakia. We all had high hopes that Slovakia’s government would prepare that country to join NATO in the first round. In fact, when NATO enlarge- ment was first seriously discussed, Slovakia was frequently mentioned as a likely candidate for early admission. However, Slovakia is alone among those states that might have been seriously considered for membership in showing problems in the human rights and democratization areas that more than justify waiting to see which direction Slovakia turns—towards democracy, freedom, free enterprise, and integration into European and Western institutions on the basis of shared values and aspirations, or toward ethnically based nationalism and a combination of thinly veiled authoritarianism and statism that is unacceptable to us and our allies. Without going into detail, the problems include the unsolved kidnaping of President Kovac’s son; the equally unsolved murder of Robert Remais, a potentially key witness in that case; the illegitimate stripping of his seat in parliament from a dissident deputy; the unsolved bombing of that deputy’s house; the expulsion from media organizations of persons who did not agree with the government’s official line; limitations on minority cultures and languages that particularly adversely affect the Hun- garian and Romani minorities; and unexplained and unsolved beatings of leading figures in the politi- cal opposition. These factors taken together have caused the Commission to write to Prime Minister Meciar concerning political violence and the need to resolve these cases fairly and quickly; to speak out on the floor about the situation in Slovakia, and to do a variety of other things to focus public attention on the problems in Slovakia. Until these problems are solved, we plan to press ahead with our public diplo- macy on behalf of the human rights of Slovakia’s people, working to assure them of the same future of 118

118 Page 119 120 115 freedom, prosperity, security, and respect for their individual rights that awaits those states who are more advanced in their reform efforts. Now, I will turn to my distinguished Co-Chairman, Congressman Chris Smith of New Jersey, for any remarks that he might wish to make. 119

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STATEMENT SUBMITTED BY THE HONORABLE STENY H. HOYER

HEARING ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE PROCESS OF NATO ENLARGEMENT

MAY 20, 1997

Last week President Clinton announced the conclusion of an agreement between the NATO Alliance and the Russian Federation. This historic agreement marks the beginning of a fundamentally new relationship between NATO and Russia, and defines the goals and mechanism of consultation and cooperation which will be undertaken. I believe this is a step in the right direction. Russia, whether or not she eventually applies for NATO membership, must be engaged and informed regarding the en- largement process. Russia must not, however, hold sway over Alliance decisions regarding admission of new members, and this is clearly stated in the new agreement. Accession to NATO is not an end in itself, but rather part of a larger, long-term process which, for those countries involved, includes accession to European and other international organizations as well. All of the countries which have expressed an interest in being considered for accession to NATO are participating States of the Organization for Security and cooperation in Europe, the OSCE. Each candidate comes to the NATO table as an equal. Each will set its own timetable and make its own arguments for accession based on its unique circumstances. Each prospective member has a great deal to contribute to the future success of the Alliance. I believe is important to point out that, having made the decision to expand, NATO is indeed looking for significant contributions from all new members, regardless of when they join—there will be no two-tiered or second class status. Mr. Chairman, I believe the end result of this process is a “win-win” outcome for all of us. NATO enlargement is not only good for the United States and its NATO allies, but it is equally good for all prospective members, as well as for those countries who choose not to join. The positive societal and economic changes that will emerge in each country as the process moves forward will create a safer and more prosperous environment for all of our citizens. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, I look forward to the testimony of our distinguished witnesses. 120

120 Page 121 122 117

STATEMENT SUBMITTED BY AMBASSADOR OF THE SLOVAK REPUBLIC,

H.E. BRANISLAV LICHARDUS

MAY 20, 1997

I can assure you that democracy is alive and well in Slovakia, which is a parliamentary democ- racy, respecting human rights and freedoms. For one thing, we have had free and fair elections which no international authority has ever questioned in terms of validity. While there have certainly been disagreements among various authorities, our courts, if necessary, have justly handled these disputes, and all parties have abided by their rulings. I am most concerned by the misperceptions of Slovakia that I have read and heard since I arrived here in March of 1994. From these reports, one would get the impression that Slovakia is an oppressive state with no free speech and a non-existent civil society. I am here to tell you that one must really stretch reality in order to arrive at those conclusions.

If you come to our capital, Bratislava, you will see about fifteen daily newspapers sold at news- stands, of all political persuasions. These papers range from those which support the government to those which are adamantly opposed to it, and they exist with no restrictions. In fact, I would describe the print media in Slovakia as “vibrant.” In addition, there are 20 private radio stations throughout the country which broadcast freely. There are two private television stations and a proposal to privatize one of the state-owned stations is being considered.

The growth of the involvement of our citizens in enthusiastically building the civil sphere has been a wonderful thing to observe. There are now over 12 thousand citizen-associations, 79 political parties, and over 500 trade-union or employee organizations. Under communism people had no true public life. Everything was part of the political establishment, no matter how minor it may have seemed. The growth of this space between the political and the private has been the greatest change. Mr. Chairman, I know that you have expressed concern over various developments in Slovakia, and I would like to address these concerns directly. In your statement on the floor of the Senate last month, you claimed that Slovakia is, I quote, “showing signs of regression toward authoritarian, if not totalitarian relations between the state and its citizens.” Mr. Chairman, this statement disappoints me because of its extreme nature. As one who has lived under totalitarianism, I can tell you that Slovakia is nowhere near such a state. I understand and recognize what it means to be an oppressed citizen, and such oppression is now gone from Slovak society. At present, I am pleased to inform you that the Prime Minister has invited the ranking leader of the opposition to consider together the recommenda- tions of the European Commission for refining our political system. 121

121 Page 122 123 118 You have raised specifically the case of Frantisek Gaulieder. He was removed as an MP from our parliament after resigning from membership in his party and after a simple majority vote in the parlia- ment based on the letter of his resignation. The differing interpretations as to whether this matter was handled appropriately under our new constitution, is now before the Constitutional Court. As I am certain you are aware, The Constitution is not always perfectly clear about all matters even in well established democracies. Our Constitutional Court, in its short existence, has already developed a reputation of independence and justice. It has ruled both in favor and against the government on many occasions. Everyone involved has complied with these rulings.

The next issue is the claim that there is a large increase in violence in Slovakia. Our newly- formed police force is somewhat overburdened by the increase in crime and is trying to respond as quickly as possible. And I am pleased to inform you that the Federal Bureau of Investigation has been helpful in providing our police force with advanced training.

Slovakia has also been overly criticized for its policies toward ethnic minorities. However, these policies have not been separated from recommendations and legislative initiatives in the international arena. The Slovak Republic has been visited by the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities, Mr. van der Stoel on several occasions. As he concluded, there is no real threat to minorities in Slova- kia. My country was among the first states implementing the Council of Europe Framework Conven- tion on Protection of National Minorities.

The bilateral treaty with Hungary ratified in 1996 has laid a solid foundation for broader Slovak– Hungarian cooperation. The parties to the treaty have decided to establish joint committees to deal with specific issues of mutual cooperation. The Slovak Republic has submitted to the Hungarian party an analysis of the living conditions of the Magyar national minority in Slovakia. This document is considered to be a starting point for the bilateral dialogue. Hungary is expected to provide a corre- sponding document on the situation of the Slovak minority there.

About eleven percent of the citizens in our country are of Magyar origin. In areas where there is a high concentration of ethnic Magyars, the Hungarian language is a valid language of instruction at all levels of education. In those areas, official signs are in Hungarian and the Hungarian language is freely used throughout daily commerce. The one exception is that in all official business in which the govern- ment may or does take part, there must be a copy of legal documents in the Slovak language. This is important for legal consistency.

Since the first days following the revolution, the rights of minorities have been a primary con- cern. We will continue to do whatever is necessary to make certain that minorities in Slovakia are treated fairly. As a matter of fact, there is hardly another country in Europe which would treat ethnic minorities in such a generous way as traditions in our country imply—hundreds of schools, dozens of churches, newspapers, theaters and cultural institutions speak for themselves. Jewish culture after years of silence and neglect has been revived again. The Slovak Republic was one of the first countries in CEE to adopt comprehensive legislation regarding restitution of Jewish property. The Act on Moderation of Property Injustices Towards Churches and Religious Communi- ties was adopted by the Slovak parliament in 1993. Actually, the first act of this kind came just before Christmas of 1990, only a month after the fall of communism when the Slovak Parliament passed a resolution in which its members apologized officially for injustices committed against Jews and Carpathian Germans in World War II. 122

122 Page 123 124 119 In his recent trip to Slovakia in April of 1997, the Commissioner of the U.S. Commission for the Preservation of America´s Heritage Abroad, Mr. I. Stolberg, stated that the future of Jewish heritage and culture in Slovakia is solely in the hands of the community there and abroad. In 1994, the Museum of Jewish Culture opened in Bratislava, publishing a specialized journal “Acta Judaica Slovaca”. In 1996 a new Institute of Judaism was opened at Comenius University in Bratislava. There is another ethnic group which deserves special attention—Roma (Gypsies). In Slovakia, as in many other European countries, the status of this group represents a socio-economic rather than an ethnic problem. The government has taken steps to ensure that access to education for all Roma begins at an early stage.

Thus, I would not describe Slovakia´s policy toward Roma, especially in recent years, as “inac- tive”. I hope that their distinct culture will become better known to a wider audience. Last year for example, I had the privilege of opening an exhibition of Roma children´s artistic creations in Palm Beach, Florida. The travelling exhibition of truly magnificent young artists from Slovakia impressed me, as well as the eager buyers, who were bidding well over 500 USD for individual pieces. The Roma language is cultivated in three periodicals and a live theater group, Romathan, which is unique to Central and Eastern Europe. Through government labor offices there are retraining and educational programs offered to those who are unemployed and less skilled. Success of these pro- grams, however, depends also on the attitudes of the Roma people themselves. We encourage wide participation in these programs and hope that they will succeed to the benefit of their recipients. The Office of Legal Protection for Ethnic Minorities in Košice funded through the EU PHARE program monitors violence against minorities and provides legal services and protection. I mentioned this institution because over the past few years, emergence of skinheads and other racist groups has troubled many countries in our region. In Slovakia, some of these groups have clashed with the Roma community. In contrast to what has been reported, the government has acted against such behavior, and those who have been caught have been punished. While they do exist, these hate crimes are rather infrequent. Nevertheless, our government is sensitive to the problem and denounces such acts. In conclusion, I am honored to declare that the officially stated policy of the Slovak government in the sphere of European security is characterized by a clear intention to obtain membership in NATO and the European Union. If the Slovak Republic is left out of the first round of NATO expansion, it will create an uneven degree of security in Central and Eastern Europe. This will not contribute to regional stability and will considerably extend the border of new NATO members with non NATO countries. At the same time, it will disturb the territorial coherence of the Alliance.

Our military is civilian controlled and has been extensively updated and reformed. Slovakia is a very active participant in military cooperation programs such as partnership for Peace as well as inter- national peacekeeping. And, despite reports to the contrary, our public supports Slovakia’s potential membership in NATO. Polls have consistently shown that a majority of Slovak citizens support this idea. We even have a group of citizens who have organized a “Race for NATO” in which young people of Slovakia bike, run and walk across our country to educate the public and rally support for NATO membership. Mr. Chairman, we believe that the process of NATO expansion will remain open and that Slova- kia will continue to work towards a more secure, more stable and more prosperous Europe. Thank you. 123

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POSITION OF THE SLOVAK MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

CONCERNING THE ISSUES RAISED BY

THE U.S. COMMISSION FOR COOPERATION AND SECURITY IN EUROPE

WASHINGTON, MAY 20, 1997

The developments in the Slovak Republic are fully comparable with other countries in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) and in some respects have put Slovakia among the leaders of the region (GDP growth, inflation). The 1996 Human Rights Report of the U.S. Department of State on Slovakia, while pointing out some imperfections, states that “the Government generally respected most of the human rights of its citizens”. These reports were quite similar in nature when evaluating the situation in a few other CEE countries. However, they have not received as much attention from the U.S. OSCE Commission as shown by the strongly worded statements about Slovakia issued by the Commission´s Chairman in April of 1997.

Reports of political violence in Slovakia have focused disproportionately on cases involving fig- ures tied to the political opposition. It is necessary to emphasize that there are several other cases of violence which remain unsolved than just those mentioned in the statement of the Chairman of the OSCE Commission. To illustrate this reality we want to point out attacks carried out against coalition deputies, K. Konarik, A. Matejka and J. Slota. We consider it unfair that some cases receive all the attention (M. Kováè Jr., R. Remiáš, F. Gaulieder, M. Toman) and some others, against people who happened to be members of the opposition, do not. Yet all the cases have not been closed. In recent years the police and judicial system in the region of CEE have had to face increased levels of criminal activity. Coping with this tide poses a great challenge and danger to any democratic society. The issue of violence is a very disturbing one to all Slovaks. It is in the highest interest of the Government of the Slovak Republic to bring the perpetrators of these crimes to justice. Financial rewards for information leading to successful solution of the most serious cases have been offered by the government (100,000 Slovak Crowns in Mr. Gaulieder´s case and 1 million in the cases of Mr. Remiáš and the murder of a policeman in Ilina). Receiving death threats and bomb attack warnings is hardly unique to Slovakia. Slovak institu- tions treat these matters seriously and appropriately. In 1996 there were 663 telephone calls threaten- ing death or a bomb attack and among their subjects were political leaders, MPs, judges, policemen and other publicly active persons regardless of their political persuasions. Addressing this topic, Mr. Milan Èiè, President of the Constitutional Court, has stated that “...during my 4 years as the President of the Constitutional Court, I have not observed any serious objections which should disqualify me or the Slovak Constitutional Court. I do not know what attacks Senator (d´Amato) is thinking about. If the Senator is thinking about some anonymous threats towards me, they have been investigated by the police in accordance with appropriate laws.” 124

124 Page 125 126 121 Removal of Mr. Gaulieder from the Parliament was decided by the vote of a simple majority in the parliament based on the letter in which Mr. Gaulieder announced his resignation. The legal frame- work and procedure were based on following provisions: