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MAY 31, 1997
10:20 A.M. EDT
The President: Thank you very much. Please be seated, relax. Thank you, General Christman, for those kind introductory remarks and for your truly extraordinary service to your nation throughout your military career. Here at West Point, and before, when we had more opportunities to work together on a daily basis, I have constantly admired your dedication and your ability.
General Reimer, Secretary West, Senator Reed, Chairman Gilman, Congressman Shimkus, Con- gresswoman Kelly, Congressman Sessions, former Congressman Bilbray, parents and families and friends of the cadets, and especially, to the Class of 1997, I extend my heartfelt congratulations. This has been a truly remarkable class. As General Christman said, you wrote an unparalleled record of academic achievement in the classroom. I congratulate you all, and particularly your number one honor graduate and valedictorian, Adam Ake. Congratulations to all of you on your accomplish- ments. (Applause.)
Now, General Christman also outlined the extraordinary accomplishments of your athletic teams, and he mentioned that I had the privilege of seeing Army win its first 10-win season in football and reclaim the Commander in Chief’s Trophy in Philadelphia. And he thanked me for that. But, actually, as a lifelong football fan, I deserve no thanks. It was a terrific game, and I’m quite sure it was the first time in the field of any endeavor of conflict where the Army defeated the Navy not on land, but on water. (Laughter and applause.)
I know that in spite of all of your achievements as a class and in teams, a few of you also upheld West Point’s enduring tradition of independence. It began in 1796 when President Adams’ War De- partment ordered the first classes in fortification. And the troops here thought they already knew all about that, so they burned the classroom to the ground, postponing the start of instruction by 5 years. (Laughter.) Today, I am reliably informed that though your spirits are equably high, your infractions are more modest. Therefore, I hereby exercise my prerogative to grant amnesty for minor offenses to the Corps of Cadets. (Applause.) The cheering was a little disconcerting—now, the operative word there was “minor.” (Laughter.)
Men and women of the Class of ’97, today you join the Long Gray Line, the Long Gray Line that stretches across two centuries of unstinting devotion to America and the freedom that is our greatest treasure. From the defense of Fort Erie in the War of 1812 to the fury of Antietam, from the trenches of Argonne to the Anzio in Okinawa, to Heartbreak Ridge, the Mekong Delta, the fiery dessert of the Gulf War, the officers of West Point have served and sacrificed for our nation. 144
144 Page 145 146 141 In just the 4 years since I last spoke here, your graduates have helped to restore democracy to Haiti, to save hundreds of thousands of lives from genocide and famine in Rwanda, to end the blood- shed in Bosnia. Throughout our history, whenever duty called, the men and women of West Point have never failed us. And I speak for all Americans when I say, I know you never will.
I’d like to say a special word of appreciation to West Point and a special word of congratulations to the students in this class from other countries. We welcome you here; we are proud to have you as a part of our military service tradition. And we wish you well as you go back home. We hope you, too, can advance freedom’s cause, for in the 21st century that is something we must do together.
Two days ago I returned from Europe on a mission to look back to one of the proudest chapters in America’s history and to look forward to the history we all will seek to shape for our children and grandchildren. This week is the 50th anniversary of the Marshall Plan, what Winston Churchill de- scribed as the most unsordid act in all history.
In 1947, Americans, exhausted by war and anxious to get on with their lives at home, were summoned to embrace another leadership role by a generation of remarkable leaders—General George Marshall, Senator Arthur Vandenberg, President Harry Truman—leaders who knew there could be no lasting peace and security for an America that withdrew behind its borders and withdrew from the world and its responsibilities. They provided the indispensable leadership to create the Marshall Plan, NATO, and the first global financial institutions. They, in effect, organized America and our allies to meet the challenges of their time—to build unparalleled prosperity, to stand firm against Soviet expan- sionism until the light of freedom shown all across Europe.
The second purpose of my journey was inextricably tied to the first. It was to look to the future, to the possibility of achieving what Marshall’s generation could only dream of—a democratic, peace- ful and undivided Europe for the first time in all of history; and to the necessity of America and its allies once again organizing ourselves to meet the challenges of our time, to secure peace and prosper- ity for the next 50 years and beyond. To build and secure a new Europe, peaceful, democratic and undivided at last, there must be a new NATO, with new missions, new members and new partners. We have been building that kind of NATO for the last 3 years with new partners in the Partnership for Peace and NATO’s first out-of-area mission in Bosnia. In Paris last week, we took another giant stride forward when Russia entered a new partnership with NATO, choosing cooperation over confrontation, as both sides affirmed that the world is different now. European security is no longer a zero-sum contest between Russia and NATO; but a cherished, common goal. In a little more than a month, I will join with other NATO leaders in Madrid to invite the first of Europe’s new democracies in Central and Eastern Europe to join our Alliance, with the consent of the Senate, by 1999—the 50th anniversary of NATO’s founding. I firmly believe NATO enlargement is in our national interests. But because it is not without cost and risk, it is appropriate to have an open, full, national discussion before proceeding. I want to further that discussion here today in no small measure because it is especially important to those of you in this class. For, after all, as the sentinels of our security in the years ahead, your work will be easier and safer if we do the right thing—and riskier and much more difficult if we do not. Europe’s fate and America’s future are joined. Twice in half a century, Americans have given their lives to defend liberty and peace in world wars that began in Europe. And we have stayed in 145
145 Page 146 147 142 Europe in very large numbers for a long time throughout the Cold War. Taking wise steps now to strengthen our common security when we have the opportunity to do so will help to build a future without the mistakes and the divisions of the past, and will enable us to organize ourselves to meet the new security challenges of the new century. In this task, NATO should be our sharpest sword and strongest shield. Some say we no longer need NATO because there is no powerful threat to our security now. I say there is no powerful threat in part because NATO is there. And enlargement will help make it stronger.
I believe we should take in new members to NATO for four reasons. First, it will strengthen our Alliance in meeting the security challenges of the 21st century, addressing conflicts that threaten the common peace of all. Consider Bosnia—already the Czech Republic, Poland, Romania, the Baltic nations and other Central and East European countries are contributing troops and bases to NATO’s peacekeeping mis- sion in Bosnia. We in the United States could not have deployed our troops to Bosnia as safely, smoothly and swiftly as we did without the help of Hungary and our staging ground at Taszar, which I personally visited. The new democracies we invite to join NATO are ready and able to share the burdens of defending freedom in no small measure because they know the cost of losing freedom.
Second, NATO enlargement will help to secure the historic gains of democracy in Europe. NATO can do for Europe’s East what it did for Europe’s West at the end of World War Ii —provide a secure climate where freedom, democracy and prosperity can flourish. Joining NATO once helped Italy, Germany and Spain to consolidate their democracies. Now the opening of NATO’s doors has led the Central and East European nations already— —to deepen democratic reform, to strengthen civilian control of their military, to open their economies. Membership and its future prospect will give them the confidence to stay the course. Third, enlarging NATO will encourage prospective members to resolve their differences peace- fully. We see all over the world the terrible curse of people who are imprisoned by their own ethnic, regional and nationalist hatreds, who rob themselves and their children of the lives they might have because of their primitive, destructive impulses that they cannot control.
When he signed the NATO Treaty in 1949, President Truman said that if NATO had simply existed in 1914 or 1939, it would have prevented the world wars that tore the world apart. The experi- ence of the last 50 years supports that view. NATO helped to reconcile age-old adversaries like France and Germany, now fast friends and allies; and clearly has reduced tensions between Greece and Turkey over all these decades. Already the very prospect of NATO membership has helped to convince coun- tries in Central and Eastern Europe to settle more than half a dozen border and ethnic disputes, any one of which could have led to future conflicts. That, in turn, makes it less likely that you will ever be called to fight in another war across the Atlantic. (Applause.)
Fourth, enlarging NATO, along with its Partnership for Peace with many other nations and its special agreement with Russia and its soon-to-be-signed partnership with Ukraine, will erase the arti- ficial line in Europe that Stalin drew, and bring Europe together in security, not keep it apart in insta- bility.
NATO expansion does not mean a differently divided Europe. It is part of unifying Europe. NATO’s first members should not be its last. NATO’s doors will remain open to all those willing and 146
146 Page 147 148 143 able to shoulder the responsibilities of membership, and we must continue to strengthen our partner- ships with non-members. Now, let me be clear to all of you, these benefits are not cost- or risk-free. Enlargement will require the United States to pay an estimated $200 million a year for the next decade. Our allies in Canada and Western Europe are prepared to do their part; so are NATO’s new members. So must we. More important, enlargement requires that we extend to new members our Alliance’s most sol- emn security pledge, to treat an attack against one as an attack against all. We have always made the pledge credible through the deployment of our troops and the deterrence of our nuclear weapons. In the years ahead, it means that you could be asked to put your lives on the line for a new NATO member, just as today you can be called upon to defend the freedom of our allies in Western Europe. In leading NATO over the past 3 years to open its doors to Europe’s new democracies, I weighed these costs very carefully. I concluded that the benefits of enlargement, strengthening NATO for the future, locking in democracy’s gains in Central and Eastern Europe, building stability across the Atlan- tic, uniting Europe, not dividing it—these gains decisively outweigh the burdens. The bottom line to me is clear: Expanding NATO will enhance our security. It is the right thing to do. We must not fail history’s challenge at this moment to build a Europe peaceful, democratic, and undivided, allied with us to face the new security threats of the new century. A Europe that will avoid repeating the darkest moments of the 20th century and fulfill the brilliant possibilities of the 21st.
This vision for a new Europe is central to our larger security strategy, which you will be called upon to implement and enforce. But our agenda must go beyond it because, with all of our power and wealth, we are living in a world in which increasingly our influence depends upon our recognizing that our future is interdependent with other nations, and we must work with them all across the globe; because we see the threats we face tomorrow will cross national boundaries. They are amplified by modern technology, communication, and travel. They must be faced by like-minded nations, working together. Whether we’re talking about terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, or environmental degradation.
Therefore, we must pursue five other objectives. First, we must build a community of Asia Pa- cific nations bound by a common commitment to stability and prosperity. We fought three wars in Asia in half a century; Asia’s stability affects our peace, and Asia’s explosive growth affects our prosperity. That’s why we’ve strengthened our security ties to Japan and Korea, why we now meet every year with the Asian Pacific leaders, why we must work with and not isolate ourselves from China. One of the great questions that will define the future for your generation of Americans is how China will define its own greatness as a nation. We have worked with China because we believe it is important to cooperate in ways that will shape the definition of that great nation in positive, not nega- tive, ways. We need not agree with China on all issues to maintain normal trade relations, but we do need normal trade relations to have a chance of eventually reaching agreement with China on matters of vital importance to America and the world.
Second, we are building coalitions across the world to confront these new security threats that know no borders: weapons proliferation, terrorism, drug trafficking, environmental degradation. We have to lead in constructing global arrangements that provide us the tools to deal with these common threats: the Chemical Weapons Convention, the Nonproliferation Treaty, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, and our efforts to further reduce nuclear weapons with Russia. 147
147 Page 148 149 144 Now our great task is also to build these kinds of arrangements fighting terrorism, drug traffick- ers and organized crime. Three weeks from now in Denver I will use the summit of the eight leading nations to press this agenda. The third thing we have to do is to build an open trading system. Our security is tied to the stake other nations have in the prosperity of staying free and open and working with others, not working against them. In no small measure because of the trade agreements we have negotiated, we have not only regained our position as the world’s number one exporter, we have increased our influence in ways that are good for our security. To continue that progress it is important that I have the authority to conclude smart, new market-opening agreements that every President in 20 years has had.
Some of our fellow Americans do not believe that the President should have this authority any- more; they believe that somehow the global economy presents a threat to us—but I believe it’s here to say, and I think the evidence is that Americans, just as we can have the world’s strongest and best military, we have the strongest and best economy in the world —the American people can out-work and out-compete anyone given a free and fair chance. (Applause.) Not only that, but this is about more than money and jobs. This is about security. The world, especially our democratic neighbors to the south of us, are looking to us. If we don’t build economic bridges to them, someone else will. We must make it clear that America supports free people and fair, open trade.
Fourth, we have to embrace our role as the decisive force for peace. You cannot and you should not go everywhere. But when our values and interests are at stake, our mission is crystal clear and achievable—America should stand with our allies around the world who seek to bring peace and pre- vent slaughter. From the Middle East to Bosnia, from Haiti to Northern Ireland, we have worked to contain conflict, to support peace, to give children a brighter future, and it has enhanced our security. Finally, we have to have the tools to do these jobs. Those are the most powerful and best-trained military in the world and a fully funded diplomacy to minimize the chances that military force will be necessary. The long-term defense plan we have just completed will increase your readiness, capabilities, and technological edge. In a world of persistent dangers, you must and you will be able to dominate the conflicts of the future as you did the battlefields of the past. Fifty-five years ago, in the early days of World War Ii, General George Marshall, the man we honored this week, spoke here at your commencement about the need to organize our nation for the ordeal of war. He said, we are determined that before the sun sets on this terrible struggle, our flag will be recognized as a symbol of freedom on the one hand and of overwhelming power on the other.
Today, our flag of freedom and power flies higher than ever, but because our nation stands at the pinnacle of its power, it also stands at the pinnacle of its responsibility. Therefore, as you carry our flag into this new era, we must organize ourselves to meet the challenges of the next 50 years. We must shape the peace for a new and better century about to dawn so that you can give your children and your grandchildren the America and the world they deserve. God bless you and God bless America. (Applause.) 148
By definition, my comments on NATO enlargement today will be preliminary. We have not yet chosen the first candidates for new membership. NATO’s discussions with Russia and other nations are not complete. But the outlines and direction of our policy are clear. There is growing, bipartisan interest in the Senate, of which Senator Lott’s NATO Observers Group is but further demonstration.
It is time to take our own dialogue to the next level, because if our policy is to succeed, it must have your support. As I thought about what to say here today, I must say I was tempted to follow the advice James Reston, the legendary New York Times reporter and columnist, offered after watching Secretary of State Dean Acheson bring the NATO treaty to the Senate in 1949. “There are many ways,” Reston wrote, “in which a Secretary of State can present a treaty to the Senate, but the best way is to tell the Senators everything. This astonishes them, then bores them stiff, and eventually minimizes the ordeal.” That advice notwithstanding, Mr. Chairman, I will summarize. Let me begin by explaining the fundamental goal of our policy. It is to build, for the very first time, a peaceful, democratic and undivided transatlantic community. It is to extend eastward the peace and prosperity that Western Europe has enjoyed for the last 50 years. In this way, America will gain strong new partners in security and trade. And we will gain confidence that our armed forces will not again be called upon to fight on European soil. Many organizations are doing their part to assure the prosperity and security of Europe. The European Union is expanding. The OSCE is promoting democracy and helping to resolve conflicts from the Caucasus to the Balkans. Many of the new market democracies are joining the World Trade Organization and the OECD.
But NATO is taking the lead, just as it has for the past half century. NATO is still the anchor of our engagement in Europe, the only organization in Europe with real military might, the only one capable of providing the confidence and security upon which our other goals depend. 149
149 Page 150 151 146 The debate about NATO enlargement is really a debate about NATO itself. It is about the value of maintaining alliances in times of peace and the value of our partnership with Europe. I am a diplomat. And I know that a diplomat’s best friend is effective military force and the credible possibility of its use. That has been the lesson of the Gulf War and Bosnia and all through history. And that is a lesson we must remember in Europe, where we will still face threats that only a collective defense organization can deter.
No alliance has ever been more successful in deterring aggression than NATO. During its first 50 years, NATO also provided the security shattered European economies needed to rebuild. It helped former adversaries reconcile, making European unity possible. It brought the former fascist nations, first Italy, then Germany, then Spain, back into the family of European democracies. It denationalized European defense. It stabilized relations between Greece and Turkey. All without firing a shot. NATO defines a community of interest that both preceded and outlasted the Cold War. That is why the United States, a united Germany and our other allies decided to preserve the alliance after the Berlin Wall fell. It is why neither we nor any current ally would even think about leaving NATO or settling for a watered down substitute, and why so many others now wish to join.
In 1998, the Senate and the parliaments of our allies will be asked to ratify enlargement. With your consent, the first new members will join by 1999. NATO enlargement involves the most solemn commitments one nation can make to another. Let me explain exactly why it is in our interest to do this. First, to protect against Europe’s next war. 150
150 Page 151 152 147 Three times in this century, American troops have had to go to Europe, in two hot wars and one cold war, to end conflicts that arose in Central and Eastern Europe. And yet, in the last half century, America has never been called upon to go to war to defend a treaty ally. We have learned that alliances make the threat of force more credible and therefore the use of force less likely—that by promising to fight if necessary, we can make it less necessary to fight. The United States has important security interests in Central and Eastern Europe. If there were a major threat to the peace and security of this region, there is already a high likelihood that we would decide to act, whether NATO enlarges or not. The point of NATO enlargement is to deter such a threat from ever arising.
The second reason is to defend Europe’s gains toward democracy, peace and integration. Just the prospect of enlargement has given central and Eastern Europe greater stability than it has seen in this century. Old disputes between Poland and Lithuania, Poland and Ukraine, Hungary and Romania, Italy and Slovenia, Germany and the Czech Republic are melting away as nations align themselves with NATO. Democratic reforms are advancing. Country after country has made sure soldiers take orders from civilians. These nations are fixing exactly the problems that could have led to future Bosnias.
NATO’s prospective members know that they will not have to go it alone if peace and security is threatened in their region. This gives them a reason to avoid destabilizing arms buildups. It means we can continue to cut conventional arms across Europe. It means confidence within the region will grow, allowing political and economic ties with Russia to improve, too.
The third reason, Mr. Chairman, as I suggested, is to right the wrongs of the past. If we don’t enlarge NATO, we will be validating the dividing line Stalin imposed in 1945 and that two generations of Americans and Europeans fought to overcome. That’s conscionable. With the Cold War over, there is no moral or strategic basis for saying to the American people: “we must be allied with Europe’s old democracies forever, but with Europe’s new democracies never.” That would create a permanent injustice, mocking a half century of sacrifices on both sides of the Iron Curtain. And it would create a permanent source of tension in the heart of Europe.
The final reason for enlargement is that it will strengthen NATO by adding capable new allies. Secretary Cohen can speak with greater authority about the military capabilities of NATO’s pro- spective members and their progress in meeting NATO’s standards. I want to stress that enlargement will strengthen the political and moral cohesion of the alliance. The nations we are considering for membership share our most fundamental values and aspira- tions for Europe and the world. Many shared risks with our soldiers in the Gulf War. Without hesita- tion, each provided troops to NATO in Bosnia; Hungary provided the bases from which NATO launched its mission and all these nations are with us in SFOR today. They are heeding our call to stop dealing with rogue states such as Iran and Iraq. And they have lent their support to the expansion of democratic principles and respect for human rights around the globe. 151
151 Page 152 153 148 The bottom line is, our future allies will bear the cost of defending freedom, because they know the price of losing freedom. Now it falls to us to decide whether the people who knocked the teeth out of totalitarianism in Europe and who helped to liberate us from the Cold War are worthy members of history’s greatest democratic alliance.
The President and I believe that some are now ready, willing and able and we trust the Senate will agree.
Some people say that enlargement will simply create a new line of division in Europe, leaving the most insecure countries out. But we have taken a range of steps to avoid that outcome. We have made it clear that NATO’s first new members will not be the last and that the door to future membership must not be slammed in the face of countries that are not yet ready. NATO is also launching a number of internal reforms and strengthening its Partnership for Peace, so that whenever the allies act our Partners will be able to act with us. And we are creating an Atlantic Partnership Council, composed of NATO’s allies and the members of the Partnership for Peace, so that every new democracy, whether it joins NATO sooner, later or not at all, will have a say in Europe’s future. This approach has the support of our partners, from the Baltic states, to Poland to Ukraine. We have made a particular effort to reach out to Ukraine. We are working towards signing a NATO-Ukraine document and seek to strengthen NATO’s practical cooperation with Ukraine, to sup- port the new Polish-Ukrainian peacekeeping battalion, to bolster military reform, to enhance interoperability with NATO, and to encourage Ukraine’s cooperation with its neighbors.
There are only two possible alternatives to this overall strategy. We could freeze Europe’s Cold War division. Or we could create a lowest common denominator NATO that includes everyone and imposes obligations on no one. Both of these alternatives are unacceptable. It is far better to invite the strongest candidates to join now, while keeping the door open to every democracy that can shoulder the responsibilities of membership. We should also remember that when NATO was created in 1949, important countries such as Germany, Greece and Turkey were not included. Yet NATO left no doubt that it had a direct and material interest in their security—and not coincidentally, just a month after the NATO treaty was signed, the Berlin blockade was lifted. NATO’s area of concern has always been wider than its area of membership and it always will be. Others suggest that if we want to integrate Europe’s new democracies, then the European Union or NATO’s Partnership for Peace can do the job alone. Frankly, I think it is patronizing to assume all these proud nations will just accept partial membership in Western institutions because they happen to sit on the wrong side of an outdated dividing line. Why should they settle for second class citizenship if they are ready to make a first class contribution? 152
152 Page 153 154 149 EU expansion is vital. But the security NATO provides has always been critical to the prosperity the EU promises. EU expansion will also require new members to make vast adjustments in their regulatory policies. If NATO can proceed now, why wait until, say, tomato farmers in Central and Eastern Europe start using the right kinds of pesticides? And as the EU expands, only NATO can make sure that a united Europe maintains its strongest link to America. As for the Partnership for Peace, it has indeed been a great success and it will remain critical. But we should remember that many nations have embraced the Partnership both to develop lasting ties with NATO and to prepare for eventual membership. The idea that NATO can remain as it is forever, while the Central and East Europeans happily participate in the Partnership for Peace forever, with no pros- pect of joining the alliance, is a fantasy. A final criticism we often hear is that we do not need to bother with NATO at all because there is no military threat in Europe. In fact, due largely to Bosnia, more Europeans have died in violent conflict in the last 5 years than in the previous 45. So I cannot be complacent. At the same time, with our leadership strong, Bosnia now being stabilized, Russia engaging with NATO and nuclear arms reductions moving forward, I can understand why some people don’t see a threat right now. It is because our policy is working. Mr. Chairman, if you don’t see smoke, that is no reason to stop paying for fire insurance. Like any good insurance policy, NATO enlargement will certainly carry costs. Those costs are outlined in the report we presented to the Congress in February. Secretary Cohen will talk more about the military costs and there will also be a small cost to the NATO civil budget, although it is not possible to estimate the precise amount at this time. As Secretary of State, I am equally concerned about the costs of a decision not to enlarge. NATO would be stuck in the past, risking irrelevance, even dissolution. Our leadership in Eu- rope will be compromised and relations with our traditional allies would deteriorate.
It might be said, rightly or wrongly, that we blocked the aspirations of NATO’s would-be allies solely because Russia objected. Confidence would crumble in Central and Eastern Europe, leading to a search for security by other means, including arms buildups and increased tensions between neigh- bors. The worst elements in Russia would be encouraged, secure in their view that Europe can be divided into new spheres of influence and that confrontation with the West pays off. There would be little chance of building a constructive partnership between Russia and NATO.
This means that we must appreciate the remarkable distance that Russia has traveled since it rejected communism, as well as our own interest in seeing Russia play an important role in Europe— 153
153 Page 154 155 150 as a great power, and no longer an imperial power. We must recognize that Russia has made a choice for democracy and markets and defied the most dire predictions about its evolution. Some, given the history, object to the very idea of Russian cooperation with the alliance. But we, given the history, understand that Russia’s willingness to work with NATO is an opportunity to be seized, not a reason to hide the silverware. One are where we are cooperating is our effort to adapt the Conventional Forces in Europe treaty. NATO’s CFE proposal responds to the remarkable changes in European security since the treaty was signed in 1990. It calls for significant reductions in the number of conventional weapons permitted in the Atlantic-to-the-Urals region, consistent with NATO’s continuing security requirements. It can en- sure there is no destabilizing concentration of military equipment anywhere in Europe. And it makes clear that the specter of NATO tanks and artillery advancing to Russia’s borders is not real.
A critical part of our approach to adapt the CFE is timely Senate approval of the “Flank Docu- ment” to which all 30 CFE states agreed on May 31,1996. This agreement addresses concerns raised by Russia and Ukraine about the impact of the treaty’s equipment limits in the CFE “flank” zone, while applying new constraints and special transparency measures as added assurance against excessive force concentrations. The flank document is a balanced agreement that serves U.S. interests. To enter into force, all 30 states party must formally approve the Flank Document by May 15, 1997. If it does not enter into force by then, this valuable and sensible agreement will be put at risk, and the prospects for successful CFE adaptation would diminish. In the past few months, NATO has also been discussing the terms of a charter that will institution- alize its practical cooperation with Russia. At the Helsinki summit, Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin outlined the possibilities of such a partnership. We will be able to act together with Russia to fight proliferation, to keep nuclear arsenals safe and to respond to humanitarian crises and threats to peace. We will build on the cooperation our troops forged in Bosnia, making sure it lasts long after the last foreign soldier leaves that country. A joint NATO-Russia Council will give Russia a voice, but not a veto—a chance to work in partnership with NATO, not within NATO. Both sides will retain complete freedom of action when we can’t agree. President Clinton has been absolutely clear with President Yeltsin about the lines we will not cross and the barriers we will not build as we construct the NATO-Russia partnership.
First, NATO enlargement will go forward with no delay. Second, no European nation will be excluded from consideration. Third, NATO’s new members will enjoy the full benefits of membership. Fourth, the new NATO-Russia Joint Council will be a forum for consultation, cooperation and, where possible, joint action. It will not have the power to dilute, delay or block NATO decisions, nor will it supplant NATO’s North Atlantic Council. It will grow in importance only to the extent Russia uses it constructively. 154
154 Page 155 156 151 Finally, NATO will continue to evolve, but its core function of collective defense will be main- tained and enhanced, and the qualities that have made it the most successful alliance in history will be preserved. As you know, Russia would also like us to make absolute commitments in the charter about the deployment of nuclear and conventional forces on the territory of new members. But we will not compromise on this issue. All we have done, and all we will do, is to restate unilaterally existing NATO policy: that in the current and foreseeable security environment, we have no plan, no need, and no intention to station nuclear weapons in the new member countries, nor do we contemplate permanently stationing substan- tial combat forces. The only binding limits on conventional forces in Europe will be set as we adapt the CFE treaty, with Central and East European countries and all the other signatories at the table. Let me also stress that the point of the NATO-Russia agreement is not to convince Russia to agree to NATO enlargement. We do not need Russia to agree to enlargement. The point is to advance a goal that is worthwhile in its own right: our interest in promoting the integration of a democratic Russia and acting together to meet the challenges of the next century.
I do not expect the Russian government to change its mind about NATO’s plans to take in new members. We must face this fact squarely, but we should also recognize it for what it is: an issue of perception, not of military reality. NATO poses no danger to Russia, just as Russia poses no danger to NATO. We do no favor to Russia’s democrats to suggest otherwise.
The fate of Russian democracy is certainly not at stake in NATO’s decisions on enlargement. Russia’s future as a free and prosperous nation will depend upon the ability of its leaders and people to build an open society, to defeat crime and corruption, to spark economic growth and spread its ben- efits. The Russian people know that their future will be written in Moscow, in Irkutsk, in Novgorod, and not at NATO headquarters in Brussels. The truth is, the quest for freedom and security in Europe is not a zero sum game, in which Russia must lose if Central and Eastern Europe gains, and Central and Eastern Europe must lose if Russia gains. Such thinking has imposed enormous human and economic costs during the last 50 years, and we have a responsibility as well as an opportunity to transcend it.
In this new Europe, the United States and Western Europe have a chance to gain new allies and partners who can and will contribute to our common security. The people of Central and Eastern Europe have a chance to see the erasure of a Cold War dividing line that has cut them off from the European mainstream. The people of Russia have a chance to achieve the deepest and most genuine integration with the West that their nation has ever enjoyed. Twice in this century, Mr. Chairman, we have faced the challenge, in the aftermath of war, to bring together that kind of Europe. We had the opportunity after World War I, but too many, in the United States and elsewhere, lacked the vision. After World War II, there was no shortage of vision, but across half of Europe the opportunity was denied.
Today we have the vision and the opportunity to build a Europe in which every nation is free and every free nation is our partner. With continued bipartisan support from the Senate and from the American people, I am confident that this is the Europe our children and grandchildren will know. 155
RELEASED BY THE BUREAU OF EUROPEAN AND CANADIAN AFFAIRS,
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, FEBRUARY 24, 1997
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has declared its intent again to admit new mem- bers. At a summit in Madrid this coming July, NATO’s 16 heads of state and government plan to invite specific states from among the new democracies of Central and Eastern Europe to start accession talks to join the Alliance. President Clinton and NATO have stressed their support for admitting the first new members by 1999 as part of a broad strategy to foster a peaceful, undivided and democratic Europe. This report, submitted to Congress pursuant to Section 1048 of the Fiscal Year 1997 Defense Authorization Act, describes the rationale, benefits, costs and other considerations related to NATO’s enlargement.
This report also reflects the administration’s commitment to work closely and in a bipartisan manner with Congress as it pursues this policy. Adding new members to NATO requires ratification by the United States Senate and requires both chambers of Congress to approve the resources needed to implement this initiative. If the security guarantees that will be extended to the new members are to be meaningful, they must represent an expression of informed national will. It is therefore essential that NATO enlargement proceed with the active participation and support of the American people and their representatives of both parties in Congress. The major conclusions of this report include: NATO enlargement contributes to the broader goal of a peaceful, undivided and democratic Eu- rope. NATO enlargement is one part of a much broader, post-Cold War strategy to help create a peace- ful, undivided and democratic Europe. That strategy has included many other elements: support for German unification; assistance to foster reforms in Russia, Ukraine and other new independent states; negotiation and adaptation of the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty; and the evolution and strength- ening of European security and economic institutions, including the European Union, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the Council of Europe and the Western European Union. NATO enlargement is also part of a much broader series of steps to adapt NATO to the post-Cold War security environment, including adaptation of NATO strategy, strategic concept, command arrange- ments and force posture, and its willingness to carry out new missions beyond NATO’s territory, as it has in Bosnia. As part of this broad series of steps, NATO enlargement aims to help the United States and Europe erase outdated Cold War lines and strengthen shared security into the next century.
Enlargement will yield benefits for the United States, NATO and Europe. Adding Central and East European states to the Alliance will: foster democratic reforms and stability throughout Europe; give NATO a stronger collective defense capability; improve relations among the region’s states; improve burden-sharing within NATO; improve general security that will benefit Russian security and the security of other former Soviet states by improving general European stability; create a better environment for trade, investment and economic growth in Central and Eastern Europe; and help all of Europe become a stronger partner for the United States in political, economic and security affairs. As President Clinton has said, in this way, “NATO can do for Europe’s East what it did for Europe’s West: 156
156 Page 157 158 153 prevent a return to local rivalries, strengthen democracy against future threats and create the conditions for prosperity to flourish.” NATO enlargement carries costs. Security is not free. The United States and its allies will, by enlargement, extend solemn security guarantees to additional nations, and NATO members must pro- vide the capability to back them up. Enlargement will not, however, require a change in NATO’s military doctrine, which has already shifted from positional defense against an identified enemy to a capacity for flexible deployment to areas of need. Because the United States already has the world’s pre-eminent deployment capability, and substantial forces forward deployed in Europe, there will be no need for additional U.S. forces. Current European NATO members are already investing in im- proved capabilities to operate beyond their border, and Central and East European states, including likely new members, are likewise investing in modernizing and restructuring their forces. These ef- forts have already begun and would continue whether or not NATO adds members.
Costs to the United States will be modest. The Department of Defense has estimated both the direct enlargement costs (e.g., for interoperability between the forces of current and new members and for extending NATO’s integrated command, communications and air defense surveillance systems) and the costs of force improvements already being pursued by existing and new members which will also contribute to carrying out NATO’s missions in an enlarged alliance. The direct enlargement costs are estimated to average $700-900 million annually, for a total of around $9-12 billion between 1997 and 2009, the have reached a “mature capability” as discussed later in this report. The U.S. share of these costs, chiefly for our share of the NATO budgets for direct enlargement costs, would largely be incurred in the ten years following formal accession in 1999, and would average about $150-200 million annually during that period. The estimated costs for new members associated with restructur- ing their forces are estimated to be about $800 million-$1 billion annually, while those for improve- ments of our NATO Allies’ regional reinforcement capabilities are estimated at $600-800 million annually—respectively $10-13 billion and $8-10 billion over 1997-2009. These costs, in accordance with longstanding NATO financial principles, would be borne by those nations. The United States would share in these costs only to the extent the U.S., with Congressional approval, may chose to continue or expand the current modest assistance being provided to the military modernization of the new democracies of Central and Eastern Europe. There are greater costs and risks to not enlarging NATO on the current schedule. The security of Europe has been a vital interest of the United States throughout this century, and it remains so, includ- ing for the new democracies to the east. If we fail to seize this historical opportunity to help integrate, consolidate and stabilize Central and Eastern Europe, we would risk a much higher price later. The most efficient and cost-effective way to guarantee stability in Europe is to do so collectively with our European partners, old and new, through NATO. Alliances save money. Collective defense is both cheaper and stronger than national defense. A decision to defer enlargement, much less to withhold it altogether, would send the message to Central and Eastern Europe that their future does not lie with NATO and the West. It would falsely validate the old divisions of the Cold War. The resulting sense of isolation and vulnerability would be destabilizing in the region and would encourage nationalist and disruptive forces throughout Europe. NATO would remain stuck in the past, in danger of irrelevance, while the U.S. would be seen as inconstant and unreliable in its leadership and withdrawing from its responsibilities in Europe and the world. The United States and NATO are committed to constructive relations with Russia. The United States and its NATO Allies are committed to building a strategic partnership with a democratic Russia; indeed, that effort and NATO enlargement are both part of the same enterprise of building a peaceful, undivided and democratic Europe. While many Russian leaders have expressed opposition to NATO 157
157 Page 158 159 154 enlargement, this initiative can serve Russia’s own long-term security interests by fostering stability to its west. The United States and NATO already have worked with Russia on specific tasks, including the peace process and military operation in Bosnia. Parallel to NATO enlargement, the United States and NATO have proposed a series of initiatives, including a NATO-Russia Charter and a permanent consultative mechanism, in order to ensure that Russia plays an active part in efforts to build a new Europe even as NATO enlargement proceeds.
In summary, the addition of new members to NATO will strengthen the Alliance, contribute to a stronger and more peaceful Europe and benefit American security interests. It is one of the President’s highest priorities for American foreign policy. 158
The NATO Alliance, reformed and enlarged to meet the security challenges of the 21st century, is a key element in the New Atlantic Community that Secretary Christopher described on September 6 in Stuttgart. The U.S. has led the way in building a new NATO by giving the Alliance capabilities for new missions; opening NATO’s doors to Europe’s emerging democracies; and forging a strong, coop- erative relationship between NATO and Russia. At the January 1994 Brussels summit, President Clinton initiated a process of NATO external and internal adaptation. This process will reach new milestones at the July 1997 summit. The U.S. expects the summit to agree on NATO’s internal reforms, launch enlargement negotiations with one or more countries, and deepen NATO’s partnership with Russia and other European states.
Circumstances have already forced NATO to demonstrate its new capability, and the Alliance has proved its mettle. Bosnia encapsulates the new kind of challenge. IFOR has been a brilliant response, and the new NATO-led Stabilization Force—SFOR—is con- tinuing to secure the peace. Under the NATO umbrella, Allies and former adversaries have joined together to conduct the most important and successful peacekeeping operation since World War II.
NATO experts are working on detailed terms through which NATO assets, such as logistics or headquarters units, could be made available to the WEU on a case-by-case basis, as well as the appro- priate command arrangements to support and conduct operations under WEU leadership. When ready, these arrangements will allow Europeans and the WEU to conduct security operations by drawing upon some of the Alliance’s unique military assets. 159
159 Page 160 161 156 The Berlin Ministerial also agreed on the concept of Combined Joint Task Forces-CJTF-which is being developed in more detail by NATO’s Military Committee. When implemented, this concept will provide the Alliance with more flexible and mobile forces and headquarters elements to be used, for example, in WEU-led operations or in missions including non-NATO countries.
In September 1996, then-Secretary Christopher called for creation of an Atlantic Partnership Council-APC-to serve as a forum for consultations and cooperation between Allies and Partners on such issues as peacekeeping, peace enforcement, humanitarian and search and rescue missions, and PfP exercises. The APC will become a vital organ of Allied-Partner relations, giving Partners a greater voice in political consultation and planning of joint military activities. While PfP assists prospective members, it has become an institution in its own right which builds permanent cooperation among a large number of Partner states.
At the December 1996 NAC, the Ministers called for a NATO summit to be held in July in Madrid. At that summit, one or more countries that want to join NATO will be invited to begin acces- sion negotiations, with actual membership targeted for 1999—NATO’s 50th anniversary. The U.S. has consistently stated that the first accession will not be the last and that the door to membership will remain open. NATO enlargement is not directed against anyone, and it will not create new dividing lines. It will advance the security of everyone-NATO’s old members, new members, and non-members alike. Enlargement will not be free of cost for the U.S. and current Allies or for new members, who must demonstrate that they are willing and able to shoulder the burdens and responsibilities of membership.
160 Page 161 162 157 ments that permit NATO and Russia to consult broadly and act jointly when possible to meet new security challenges. NATO Secretary-General Solana is leading the efforts to develop this relation- ship. Also, an independent, democratic, and stable Ukraine is another essential element of the New Atlantic Community. The U.S. is developing its own strategic partnership with Ukraine and supports the Alliance’s efforts to enhance the NATO-Ukraine relationship. 161