THURMOND: This morning, we have seven minutes allotted for each senator for the first round of questions and five minutes for the second round.
THURMOND: I know the senators may be interested in asking questions of our distinguished witnesses regarding the Chemical Weapons Convention which is coming before the Senate. However, because of the very important subject of this hearing, I hope we can all focus our attention and questions on the subject at hand.
Secretary Albright, last week, following his visit with Chancellor Kohl, President Yeltsin announced that agreement had been reached on the Russia-NATO charter and that it would be ready for signature on May the 27th in Paris. Is that, in fact, the case?
ALBRIGHT: Mr. Chairman, there has been no final decision on that. We are in the process of negotiating the elements of the Russia-NATO charter, and if in fact, it is ready, then we would be going to Paris to sign it. But at this stage, it is not ready.
Let me say that I am going to be going to Moscow to have some additional meetings on the subject probably next week -- we still have to set the date -- because there are elements of the agreement that are not yet decided upon.
But I think it's important for people to understand that the NATO-Russia charter is something that the United States wants as a way of getting Russia more involved generally in democratic and European systems. So we hope very much that we can come to an agreement, but it is not yet fully negotiated.
THURMOND: So NATO has not reached agreement with Russia?
ALBRIGHT: It has not, no.
THURMOND: Secretary Cohen, NATO's mission was a success. The Cold War is over. Eastern and Central Europe are free. The Soviet Union no longer exists, and Russia is not viewed as an adversary. Opponents of NATO enlargement believe that NATO should close its operation.
What are the United States' national security interests in insuring that NATO continues to exist as a military or political alliance?
COHEN: Well, Mr. Chairman, following the collapse of the Berlin Wall and the fall of the Soviet empire as such, there were some academicians who wrote articles -- quite controversial articles -- called "The End of History" that now that the Soviet Union no longer existed, that democratic capitalism would sweep across most of the world.
It proved to be a controversial concept because we know that it is not the end of history. It's the beginning of a new era. And as Secretary Albright and I have tried to indicate that we have the most militarily effective organization in the history of, certainly, of recent history, perhaps the entire world.
To eliminate this, to end this to me would be totally self- defeating. The enemy today is not the former Soviet Union. The enemy today is instability. The enemy today we can see taking place in countries like Albania, Bosnia, where you have ethnic rivalries, where you have religious confrontations, where you have desperate poverty, where you have centralized, controlled economies that are trying to transition to capitalism.
COHEN: All of that instability is something that we have to face. And if we have countries who have longed for participation in the kind of democratic ideals that we share, to make them part of NATO would stable -- would help stabilize the region and make peace and prosperity that much more secure.
So the notion that we can simply close down shop, I think, is foolhardy.
THURMOND: In your opinion, what is the threat now faced by NATO allies?
COHEN: The threat is instability. I think that the rise of regional tensions -- Secretary Albright talked about this -- just the very prospect of countries seeking to gain admission into NATO has brought historic agreements. Hungary and Romania and the Czech Republic -- all countries who are seeking to get in now, I think, are trying to cooperate, to gain admission, to turn to their democratic form of government, to have civilian control of their militaries, to basically aspire to the same democratic principles that those members in NATO currently have.
And so we're seeing remarkable efforts under way. We ought to try to consolidate those efforts by having them gain admission.
THURMOND: Secretary Albright, the president's report on NATO enlargement stated there was risk to delaying NATO enlargement beyond 1999, that candidate countries would question the resolve of the West, and possibly embark on less cooperative national security strategies.
A recent press report appears to be using that statement to blackmail the alliance. Are you at all concerned that countries not invited into NATO might pursue threatening or irresponsible military strategies?
ALBRIGHT: Mr. Chairman, I think that it's very important for everybody to understand that the accession to NATO by new members is something that has to be worked out very carefully, that we are looking at calendars ourselves, and are -- have not yet decided which of the countries that are aspiring to NATO membership will, in fact, be invited at Madrid.
But the countries -- all the countries -- that are under consideration are now members of the Partnership for Peace and have been, and we know will continue to be very cooperative, because this is to their advantage. They see themselves, through the Partnership for Peace, as part of a system of collective defense, and it provides them an avenue for helping in terms of dealing with common problems in Central and Eastern Europe.
I think we will plan, obviously, to work very closely with those countries that do not get in on the first go-round and will be working with them to assure their continued cooperation, because that is, frankly, what they want.
THURMOND: Secretary Cohen, during Secretary Albright's visit to Europe in February, she proposed the idea of developing a joint U.S.- Russia brigade. I understand that she actually meant a joint NATO- Russia brigade. I assume that you're involved in the discussions on the specifics of this proposal.
Could you describe for the committee the status of this concept and what would this brigade do and who would be in command and where would such a brigade be deployed?
COHEN: I can't speak on behalf of Secretary Albright other than to say I believed that Secretary Albright was putting out a series of notional concepts of ways in which the United States, NATO and Russia could build upon the experience that we've had in Bosnia.
It was not something that was offered in any concrete fashion, but really a reaching out to the Russians to say, is there a way we can build upon our very favorable experience that we've had in Bosnia? But it was not a concept that we intended to put forth formally, but simply an idea that needed to be fleshed out at some time in the future if at all possible.
So it was not something that was considered to be a structured proposal, but rather simply exploring ways in which we could build a better relationship with the Russians.
ALBRIGHT: Can I follow up, Mr. Chairman, on that subject?
First of all, I think it's very important for everyone to understand that our movement on enlarging NATO or NATO-Russia charter discussions all take place within a very well-coordinated interagency process.
ALBRIGHT: I think it's one of the most remarkable exercises in terms of how we move into a new era, not only in terms of how we're dealing with new questions of policy, but in the way that we all work together. And I think that we are all very happy and satisfied with that cooperation. My own explanation of what it is I said was that it is important for us to think creatively about different ways that we could work with Russia. And as Secretary Cohen said, it was just one of concepts to be considered, nothing concrete, but I think to allow people to think a little bit about the possibilities that are there and again build on a Bosnia experience.
THURMOND: This now completes the first round. We will now begin the second round, and we're going to confine that to four minutes.
Madame Secretary, NATO has vastly reduced its nuclear posture and the role of nuclear weapons in the alliance strategy. Russia has not reduced its reliance on nuclear weapons. In fact, while over 80 percent of NATO's sub-strategic forces have been reduced, Russia has made no similar reduction. And to the best of our knowledge, its nuclear forces far outnumber those remaining by the alliance.
Is there, or has there been, any discussion among the NATO allies about further reducing NATO nuclear forces? What efforts are under way to assure reciprocal reductions in Russian nuclear forces? And if so, are the discussions on reducing NATO nuclear forces an effort to placate the Russian government?
ALBRIGHT: Sir, one of our major concerns, obviously, continues to be the reduction of nuclear forces throughout. We have, first of all, as far as NATO nuclear doctrine is concerned, all we have done is restate our nuclear posture, and that is that we have no intention -- no reason, intention or plan to station nuclear forces in the newly -- in the countries that might in fact become new members of NATO.
We have -- we spent a great deal of time in Helsinki and other places, talking about the importance of moving forward, the Russians ratifying START II and moving forward in START III negotiations. So we are on the case in terms of making sure that there is a systematic reduction of nuclear forces.
COHEN: Mr. Chairman, let me add that the United States and NATO is fully capable of deterring any consideration of an attack by Russia. We have a strong deterrent posture, and we have a capability to carry out the missions under the SyOP. So there's been no diminution or reduction in our capability.
THURMOND: Secretary Cohen, NATO's collective defense arrangements represent a concrete expression of the allies' commitment to maintain and develop their individual and collective capacities to resist armed attack. New members of the alliance must be prepared to share the role, risk, responsibilities, benefits, and burdens of common security and collective defense.
They will also be expected to subscribe to a line of strategy as described in the strategic concept, and in subsequent, many serious statements.
Lastly, an important element of new members' contributions will be a commitment to integrate and standardize their military structures with the command structure of NATO.
How will potential new members contribute to NATO's collective defense?
COHEN: Well, the new members who are admitted have to downsize their current militaries. They have to restructure them. They have to upgrade their infrastructure. They have to have interoperability with NATO equipment as such.
This will take some period of time. It's not going to happen overnight, as I indicated in my opening statement. We're looking at a period of roughly between 1997. And once this process is under way, we would expect the first group to come into NATO enlargement to be completed -- at least, the decision-making part of it -- by the end of the year, in which then the ratification process would be completed next year, at the end of 1998, so at the beginning of 1999, roughly a period of ten years before there is full, mature capability on the part of the new members coming in. So it's going to take some time.
But it also has to take, as you've outlined in your question, a commitment on the part of these new members to carry out these _[0mresponsibilities, and that's something that is a precondition to their admission into NATO itself.