Brigadier General Gary M. Rubus,
deputy director for international negotiations
Joint Chiefs of Staff.
29 April 1997
Senate Foreign Relations Committee
Thank you, Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the Committee, for inviting me here today. I am pleased to have this opportunity to discuss the CFE Flank Agreement.
THE FLANK AGREEMENT IN THE OVERALL TREATY CONTEXT
The agreement you are considering today ensures the continued integrity and effectiveness of the CFE treaty, which has made an important contribution to U.S. and Allied military security. CFE resulted in the reduction of over 50,000 items of heavy military equipment, including tanks, armored combat vehicles, artillery, combat aircraft, and attack helicopters, held by NATO and the former Warsaw Pact between the Atlantic and the Ural mountains. These reductions redressed a destabilizing imbalance in conventional forces that was the principal U.S. and Allied military concern in Europe during the Cold War.
With the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and growing ties between NATO and its former adversaries, CFE remains relevant, because it ensures that today's stable military balance will be maintained. CFE thus permits our armed forces and those of our allies to meet regional security commitments at lower force levels. The Flank Agreement does not change total national entitlements for CFE equipment or the overall military balance established by the treaty.
THE FLANK AGREEMENT -- BACKGROUND
As you know, Russia claimed that the provisions of the CFE treaty limiting military equipment in the flank zone did not allow Russia to meet its post-Cold War security needs. Specifically, Russia claimed that the treaty prevented adequate force deployment in the North Caucasus Military Region. Russia was particularly concerned about armored combat vehicles or ACVs. Ukraine claimed that the treaty's limits were unduly restrictive and costly to implement, because they would require the construction of new facilities to accommodate equipment removed from the flank zone.
NATO allies did not accept all of the claims about the flank limits, particularly the amount of equipment Russia said it needed there. The Alliance, along with other parties to the treaty, did recognize, however, that significant changes in political borders and, in particular, the low Russian ACV limit, did raise reasonable concerns about the flank provisions of the CFE treaty, which needed to be addressed.
KEY PROVISIONS OF THE FLANK AGREEMENT
The resulting Flank Agreement has three principal elements: First, is the "map realignment." This removes certain territory from the flank zone. Within this smaller realigned flank zone, the treaty flank limits will apply. Second, there are ceilings on the areas removed from the original flank region as a result of the map realignment. Third, there are additional transparency measures applied to the flank zone and those areas removed from the flank zone. Under the Flank Agreement, Russia must lower its force levels in the region, so that its equipment holdings in the old and new flank zones meet all CFE obligations by May 31, 1999.
MILITARY ASSESSMENT
From a military perspective, it is useful to compare what is permitted in the original flank zone now and what would be permitted under the Flank Agreement. Most important, the Flank Agreement would retain the current treaty limits, albeit in a smaller flank area. However, the Flank Agreement would permit Russia to retain more equipment in the areas comprising the revised flank zone and the territories removed than the original CFE treaty permitted. In assessing the military implications of this change, you must consider not only amount of equipment, but the readiness of forces and the military geography of the region. In our assessment, this change in what Russia is permitted to place in the region does not represent a destabilizing change in the military balance in the flank zone.
The most sensitive region is the area retained in the smaller, revised flank zone because it is closest to our NATO allies, Norway and Turkey. In that area the flank limits in the treaty will continue to apply, that is, 1300 tanks (700 in active units and 600 in storage), 1680 artillery pieces (1280 active units and 400 in storage), and 1380 ACVs (580 in active units and 800 in storage). The Flank Agreement will be fully implemented on May 31, 1999. Until then, Russia has made a unilateral commitment in the Flank Agreement not to exceed the levels it had in the original flank zone on May 31, 1996, the date the Agreement was provisionally applied. By the implementation date of May 31, 1999, Russia must be in full compliance with the limits on equipment for both the revised flank zone and the areas removed from it through the map realignment.
Ukraine has fewer entitlements in the flank zone, totaling 680 battle tanks, 350 armored combat vehicles, and 890 artillery pieces, with sub-limits on active and stored equipment. Within Ukraine's new reduced flank area, those limitations remain. In addition, Ukraine is allowed 400 tanks, 400 combat vehicles, and 350 artillery pieces in the Odessa oblast, now removed from the flank zone. These are not destabilizing changes.
The sub-ceilings on armored combat vehicles in areas removed from the flank zone and the additional transparency measures in the Flank Agreement provide significant safeguards. The sub-ceilings on ACVs preclude excessive concentrations in any one area removed from the zone. Five of the areas removed from the flank zone have a sub-ceiling. These areas consist of one Russian administrative region, or oblast, in the northern flank area and, in the southern area, two oblasts and one area comprising part of an oblast. Ukraine's Odessa oblast, which, as I mentioned, would be removed from its flank zone, has a similar sub-ceiling. The sub-ceiling in the Pskov area opposite the Baltic states does not alter the relative military weakness of those states, but it does, for the first time, place limits on the amount of equipment that can be placed near those states.
To monitor more closely force levels in the flank zone, additional transparency measures have been agreed, and have been provisionally applied since May 31, 1996. First, the areas removed from the Russian flank zone are subject to up to ten supplemental declared site inspections. These do not count against the annual quota of 51 inspections Russia is currently obliged to accept in the entire CFE area, including the flanks. Ukraine's Odessa oblast is subject to one additional annual inspection.
The original Russian flank zone is subject to semi-annual data exchanges, rather than the annual exchanges that apply to the rest of the CFE area. One area, a repair depot, contains a large concentration of treaty-limited equipment, primarily ACVs. It will be subject to data exchanges every three months. Ukraine, within its Odessa oblast, will report changes of more than five percent in the treaty limited equipment levels of its units. The original obligation was to report 10 percent changes.
OVERALL ASSESSMENT AND CONCLUSION
In the judgment of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Flank Agreement is militarily sound. It preserves the CFE treaty and its contribution to U.S. and Allied military security. The additional flexibility permitted Russia in the flank zone does not allow a destabilizing new concentration of forces on the flanks of Norway, Turkey and other states in that area. Moreover, the agreement includes significant new safeguards, including greater transparency and new constraints on flank deployment.
The agreement reflects careful review by U.S. and Allied military staffs, who were involved throughout the negotiating process. The governments of the NATO flank states, who are the most immediately affected, have made it clear that they support the agreement. Signature by all 16 NATO members reflects a common judgment that the Flank Agreement is in the security interests of the Alliance now and in the future.