STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE WALTER B. SLOCOMBE
UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY

TO THE SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE HEARING 
ON THE MILITARY IMPLICATIONS OF NATO'S STRATEGIC CONCEPT
Washington, DC 
October 28, 1999

Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee, I am honored to return to
this Committee to discuss NATO and the role that this vital
institution will play as we enter the next century.

1999 has been a watershed year for NATO. In the past year, NATO added
three new members, decisively met a strategic and humanitarian
challenge in Kosovo and continued to work to stabilize the Balkans,
began to build the relationship between NATO and the European Union
through the European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI), and
approved a new strategic concept, the subject of today's hearing.

My basic message this morning -- and the reason the United States
supported the development of an updated strategic concept at the April
NATO summit -- is that the United States has a vital interest in
insuring that NATO, the most successful and enduring multinational
alliance in history, continues to be a strong and effective instrument
of Atlantic security in the conditions we will face in the coming
years. The new strategic concept is a key means of serving that
interest, for it will help ensure NATO continues to be able to fulfill
its purpose -- serving as the principal foundation for collectively
protecting the security of its members in North America and Europe.
The document approved at the summit neither creates new obligations
nor changes NATO's historic purpose. What it does do is set forth a
framework for advancing that purpose in the new circumstances that
will exist in the coming years by insuring that NATO adapts to meet
the dramatically new conditions and challenges we face.

The strategic concept adopted this year was evolutionary, not
revolutionary. It did not change our commitment to collective defense,
instead we affirmed it. But we also recognized that effective
collective defense requires measures different from those designed in
the Cold War and its immediate aftermath. Accordingly, in the new
concept, we updated our assessment of the threats, and adapted our
philosophy of the capabilities and strategies needed to meet them.

The Function of the NATO Strategic Concept:

The Treaty requires that the North Atlantic Council -- the assembly of
representatives of all the allies -- and the Military Committee -- the
analogous body of allied military representatives "shall recommend
measures for the implementation" of the Treaty. NATO has had a
strategic concept document since the Alliance was established. Indeed,
according to Dean Acheson's memoirs, the first one was prepared in
response to U.S. congressional concern that there should be agreed
recommendations for an integrated defense before US support funds were
released. The 1999 strategic concept is the fifth NATO has adopted.

From the beginning, the function of the NATO strategic concept
documents has been to set the broad policy framework for NATO's work:
identifying the challenges and threats facing the alliance, outlining
the military and political strategy by which the alliance will meet
them, and laying down the general principles governing allied force
requirements and military planning. In short, the strategic concept
provides general political and military guidance to NATO planners so
that forces are properly equipped and structured to meet the
challenges that NATO might face.

That there have been periodic revisions to the strategic concept
reflects the fact that as the security situation in Europe has
changed, NATO has needed to adapt its plans and approaches to meet
those evolving challenges. That is what the 1999 version does -- adapt
NATO's strategies to the circumstances NATO is likely to face in the
coming years.

NATO's Purposes Unchanged:

The strategic concept is a means for the parties to achieve the goals
of the Washington Treaty. The successive strategic concepts have
simply laid out the current concept for implementing the Alliance's
enduring purposes, as set forth in the Treaty. NATO is not a static
organization. It remains vigilant against new threats, and the
strategic concept is an important element of the effort to identify
and plan for the most likely common threats to security. The Treaty,
not the new strategic concept or any of its predecessors, sets the
only legal obligations of the United States regarding NATO and
provides for these obligations to be "carried out in accordance with
(each ally's) respective constitutional processes."

While the context and challenges have changed, what has not changed
and certainly was not changed last April -- is the fact that NATO is
first and foremost a military alliance. Its core function is and will
remain, in the words of Article 3 of the Treaty, to "maintain and
develop (the allies') individual and collective capacity to resist
armed attack." For most of its history, the chief threat was direct
Soviet attack on the territory of members. That threat was addressed
by Article 5, the heart of the Treaty, which declares "The Parties
agree that an armed attack against one or more of them...shall be
considered an attack against them all" and that each ally will assist
those attacked by "such action as it deems necessary, including the
use of armed force."

After the Cold War, direct invasion is much less likely, but less
direct threats remain and have, if anything, grown, and it is both
appropriate and necessary that the alliance adapt accordingly. During
the Cold War, NATO focused on Article 5 threats, an attack on the
territory of a member, because that was what threatened the alliance.
This is much less likely now. Therefore, in our strategic concept,
since 1991 NATO has looked at non-Article 5 threats as the most
pressing. That focus, however, is fully consistent with the Treaty.
For the authors of the Treaty did not confine the alliance only to
responding to direct invasion of allied territory. Instead, the Treaty
recognizes that challenges other than direct attack can also threaten
the security of members and provides, in Article 4, for the parties to
consult whenever any of the parties judges that the territorial
integrity, political independence, or security, of any ally is
threatened. Indeed, historically, it has been the U.S. that has
emphasized that NATO must concern itself with "out of area" threats,
as well as direct defense of NATO territory.

No New U.S. Obligations:

The strategic concept does not create new obligations beyond those
stated in the Treaty or commit the U.S. to take any particular action.

The strategic concept is a policy document, not a legal one. The
planning for which it provides is a prudent military activity and
implies no obligation to employ the plans that result.

As has always been the case, actual decisions on NATO action are not
automatic -- and certainly not embedded in the strategic concept
document -- but rather are taken at the time and by consensus among
all allies. Indeed, the Treaty explicitly declares that its provisions
will be "carried out by the Parties in accordance with their
respective constitutional processes."

NATO remains an organization of sovereign nation states, and no member
can be compelled to participate in a military operation that it does
not support.

If a crisis arises that might be thought to call for a NATO response,
the United States will be as free as it would be without the strategic
concept to decide whether or not to support or join in NATO action.
What the strategic concept does is increase the chances that if the
United States does want NATO to act, the Alliance will be ready to do
so effectively.

The 1991 Strategic Concept:

The first NATO strategic concept was agreed to in 1950; the concept
document has been revised in 1957, 1968, 1991, and again this year.
Only the last two have been public documents; the previous ones were
classified.

The successive revisions have adapted the means for carrying out the
Alliance's purposes to changing conditions. The evolutionary and
adaptive character of the strategic concept document is clear from
considering the 1991 document, because, although much of the 1991
strategic concept is now badly outdated, the key changes in the 1999
strategic concept were foreshadowed in 1991. As the Soviet Empire
dissolved, NATO moved away from the forward deployed, fixed, defenses
against direct Soviet attack that it had sustained during the Cold
War, and adopted a reinforcement strategy that relied on mobility and
flexibility and anticipated threats from regional conflicts and
weapons of mass destruction delivered by terrorists, or rogue states.

The 1991 strategic concept stated:

The primary role of Alliance military forces, to guarantee the
security and territorial integrity of member states, remains
unchanged. But this role must take account of the new strategic
environment, in which a single massive and global threat has given way
to diverse and multi-directional risks. (Paragraph 4.)

It declared that "NATO must be capable of responding to such risks if
stability in Europe and the security of the Alliance members are to be
preserved." (Paragraph 8.)

The 1991 strategic concept also stated:

Risks to Allied security are less likely to result from calculated
aggression against the territory of the Allies, but rather from the
adverse consequences of instabilities that may arise from the serious
economic, social and political difficulties, including ethnic
rivalries and territorial disputes, which are faced by many countries
in central and eastern Europe. (Paragraph 9.)

It explicitly stated that "Further adaptation will be made to the
extent necessary." (Paragraph 6.)

The 1999 Strategic Concept:

The 1999 strategic concept builds on the 1991 document, eliminating
obsolete references to balancing the power of the Soviet Union and
sharpening the focus on the new tasks already identified in 1991. The
strategic concept maintains the commitment of the Alliance to achieve
a credible capability for collective self-defense as a core mission,
but it also lays out a strategy for meeting other challenges. This
ensures that NATO has the means, as well as the doctrine, to deal with
the full range of security challenges.

The basic content of the 1999 strategic concept is simply summarized:

-- Recognition that, although the general security of the
Euro-Atlantic region has improved and large-scale conventional
aggression against allied territory is highly unlikely (though not to
be discounted entirely), uncertainties and risks remain, including
instability and crises on the periphery of the alliance arising from
ethnic rivalries, territorial disputes, and internal crises; the
proliferation of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons and the
means to deliver them; terrorism; potential disruption of vital
resources; and uncontrolled movements of people in response to
humanitarian and other crises.

-- Acknowledgment that, besides armed attack on allied territory, the
Alliance must take account of the broader global context in which new
threats exist and employ alliance consultation and coordination to
meet them.

-- Reaffirmation of the enduring purpose of safeguarding allies'
security by both political and military means, and of fundamental NATO
principals of the transatlantic link, mutual commitment and
cooperation, and the indivisibility of security.

-- Identification of NATO's fundamental security tasks as the means of
achieving the Alliance's essential purpose: security, consultation,
and the ability to deter and defend against any threat of aggression
against any ally.

-- Adaptation of two new fundamental tasks to enhance security and
stability, one by partnership with nations in the region outside the
alliance, and the other by readiness to contribute -- on a
case-by-case basis -- to crisis prevention and crisis management,
including crisis response operations. These tasks rest on the
principle that by dealing with crises at an early stage it is more
likely that risks can be kept low and at a distance.

-- Specification of an approach to security in the coming century,
comprising preservation of the transatlantic link; maintenance of
military capabilities for the full range of foreseeable circumstances
from direct territorial defense to conflict prevention and crisis
response; the development within NATO of a European Security and
Defense Identity that will allow the European allies to assume greater
responsibilities; partnership, cooperation and dialogue with NATO's
neighbors; openness to new members willing and able to assume the
responsibilities of the alliance; and the role for arms control,
disarmament and non-proliferation measures.

-- Establishment of guidelines for the Alliance's forces, to insure
that the Alliance will maintain the necessary military capabilities to
accomplish the full range of its missions. Among the elements
required:

-- Ability to conduct a successful Article 5 defense against a direct
attack on any ally.

-- Ability to contribute to crisis prevention and crisis response
operations.

-- Maintaining the principle of shared burdens, including by the
presence of U.S. conventional and nuclear forces in Europe and by
measures, including ESDI, whereby the European allies can enhance
their contributions.

-- Maintenance and modernization of the essential tools of collective
defense, including the integrated military structure, collective force
and operational planning, promotion of interoperability, and other
concrete measures for common defense.

-- Continued deployment of an appropriate mix of conventional and
nuclear forces, recognizing that nuclear forces retain a key role in
deterrence, though greatly reduced numerically and in NATO's reliance
on them.

-- Cooperation with partner countries, including Russia and Ukraine,
as well as Mediterranean nations.

-- Establishment of key force planning guidelines, to insure that
alliance forces are adequate in strength and capabilities to deter and
counter aggression and respond to crises, including beyond the
Alliance's territory. The concept document lays out principles for
force size, geographical distribution, command structure, maintenance
of the nuclear elements of NATO's posture, and a range of specific
required operational capabilities. Importantly, these reflect the
urgent need to improve readiness, deployability, effective C3
engagement capability, sustainability and survivability (including
against WMD or terrorist threats).

The strategic concept states the obvious point that NATO's crises
response activity must be consistent with international law, but
significantly, does not suggest that NATO must have permission from
the United Nations or any other outside body before it can act.

Thus, the strategic concept document gives the Alliance a framework on
which to base its planning efforts so that it is better prepared to
respond to new challenges in the future.

Compatibility with U.S. requirements:

The strategic concept closely parallels US doctrine and US policy
regarding what NATO needs to be prepared to do. In particular, the
focus on the need to improve NATO forces' mobility, effective
engagement, survivability, effective C3 and sustainability tracks
exactly with the Defense Capabilities Initiative advanced by the
United States. The reaffirmation that nuclear weapons retain a
critical, though relatively reduced, role in NATO doctrine was a major
U.S. goal.

The provisions dealing with the European Security and Defense Identity
reflect both our support for a greater European contribution to
collective defense and our recognition of the legitimacy of European
desires for a European capacity to act where NATO is not engaged
militarily and our concern that this increased European focus on and
capability for defense be fully consistent with and supportive of NATO
and U.S. interests and equities.

Crisis Response Capabilities:

Finally, the parts of the strategic concept having to do with crisis
response operations match US interests. While capability for Article 5
territorial defense must be maintained -- and the strategic concept
provides for this -- the fact is that other challenges are more likely
under current and reasonably foreseeable conditions. An alliance that
attempted to stay focused only on Article 5 defense would not be
fulfilling its purpose or serving our interests, because it would be
an alliance leaving unaddressed most of the range of relevant threats.

The US has a strong interest in improving Alliance capabilities to
deal with the newer challenges of crisis response. The Kosovo
operation highlighted shortcomings in this regard. The strategic
concept formally establishes a NATO requirement to prepare to meet
these needs and set up a framework of priorities for doing so. Better
European capabilities means a greater potential to contribute when
crisis response is required in our common interest, and therefore a
lesser burden on U.S. forces. Far from increasing U.S. military
requirements, implementation of the program of force improvements laid
out in the strategic concept and the Defense Capabilities Initiative,
would tend to ease those requirements.

Of course, to recognize that NATO faces these challenges and should be
prepared to meet them is not to say in advance that NATO should
necessarily respond to any particular crisis by deploying military
forces. The requirement for consensus for any NATO military operation
continues to apply fully to crisis response operations. We were
successful in making clear that it is the alliance, and not any other
body -- the U.N., OSCE, PJC or whatever -- whose decision is required.
And that such a decision would be taken by consensus of all NATO
allies -- including, of course, the United States -- to approve any
military action by the Alliance. The strategic concept establishes a
path whereby when a consensus, including the United States, for action
exists, NATO will be better able to carry out the mission.

Senate Conditions Met:

Condition (1) (A) of the resolution of ratification of the Protocols
to the North Atlantic Treaty of 1949 on the Accession of Poland,
Hungary and the Czech Republic lists ten principles to guide the
revision of the 1991 strategic concept of NATO. The United States
successfully ensured these principals were maintained in the updated
strategic concept. The principles are summarized below together with
quotations from selected sources to indicate how they are reflected in
the 1999 strategic concept and related areas.

(i) NATO is first and foremost a military alliance.

The 1999 revision of the strategic concept, paragraph 6, reads:

"NATO's essential and enduring purpose, set out in the Washington
Treaty, is to safeguard the freedom and security of all its members by
political and military means."

Also, paragraph 24 of the 1999 concept reads:

"Any armed attack on the territory of the Allies, from whatever
direction, would be covered by Articles 5 and 6 of the Washington
Treaty."

The revised concept, paragraph 4 notes:

The Alliance "must safeguard common security interests... It must
maintain collective defense and reinforce the transatlantic link... It
must, above all, maintain the political will and military means
required...." (Emphasis added.)

(ii) NATO serves as the principal foundation for collectively
defending the security interests of its members against external
threats.

One of the fundamental tasks of NATO, as specified in the 1991
strategic concept and included in the 1999 revision, is:

"To deter and defend against any threat of aggression against any NATO
member state as provided for in Articles 5 and 6 of the Washington
Treaty."

Also, the revised concept, paragraph 25, notes:

"NATO remains the essential forum for consultation among the Allies
and the forum for agreement on policies bearing on the security and
defence commitments of its members under the Washington Treaty."'

(iii) Strong U.S. leadership of NATO promotes and protects US vital
national security interests.

NATO's 50th Anniversary Summit was held in Washington.

Most of the initiatives for the Summit were proposed by the U.S.,
including a defense capabilities initiative (DCI), a weapons of mass
destruction (WMD) initiative, a Membership Action Plan (MAP), and
enhanced Partnership arrangements.

(iv) The U.S. maintains its leadership role by stationing U.S. forces
in Europe, providing commanders for key NATO commands, and through the
presence of U.S. nuclear forces in Europe.

U.S. forces remain in Europe, General Clark is SACEUR, and U.S.
nuclear weapons are dedicated to SACEUR. The United States has also
demonstrated leadership in NATO's efforts to stabilize the Balkans.

(v) NATO members will face common threats to their security,
including:

(I) potential re-emergence of a hegemonic power.

The 1999 revision of the strategic concept, paragraph 20, reads:

"Notwithstanding...the fact that large-scale conventional aggression
against the Alliance is highly unlikely, the possibility of such a
threat emerging over the longer term exists."

Paragraph 53f goes on to state: "(T)he Alliance must be able to build
up larger forces, both in response to any fundamental changes in the
security environment and for limited requirements, by reinforcement,
by mobilising reserves, or by reconstitution forces when necessary."

(II) rogue states and non-state actors with NBC weapons and delivery
means.

The revised strategic concept, paragraph 21, reads:

"The existence of powerful nuclear forces outside the Alliance also
constitutes a significant factor which the Alliance has to take into
account..."

In addition, paragraph 22 of the 1999 revision reads:

"The proliferation of NBC weapons and their means of delivery remains
a matter of serious concern.... Some states, including on NATO's
periphery and in other regions, sell or acquire or try to acquire NBC
weapons and delivery means.... Non-state actors have shown the
potential to create and use some of these weapons."

(III) threats of a wider nature, including disruption of the flow of
vital resources and other possible transnational threats.

The 1999 revision of the strategic concept, paragraph 24, reads:

"Alliance security interests can be affected by other risks of a wider
nature, including acts of terrorism, sabotage and organized crime, and
by the disruption of the flow of vital resources. The uncontrolled
movement of large numbers of people, particularly as a result of armed
conflicts, can also pose problems for security and stability affecting
the Alliance."

(IV) conflict stemming from ethnic and religious enmity, the revival
of historic disputes, or the actions of undemocratic leaders.

The 1999 revision of the strategic concept, paragraph 20, reads:

"Some countries...face serious economic, social and political
difficulties. Ethnic and religious rivalries, territorial disputes,
inadequate or failed efforts at reform, the abuse of human rights, and
the dissolution of states can lead to local and even regional
instability. The resulting tensions could lead to crises affecting
Euro-Atlantic stability, to human suffering, and to armed conflicts.
Such conflicts could affect the security of the Alliance by spilling
over into neighboring countries, including NATO countries..."

(vi) ...a credible capability for collective self-defense...remains
the core mission of NATO.

The 1999 revision of the strategic concept, paragraph 53 (d), reads:

" ...overall, the Alliance will, in both the near and long term and
for the full range of its missions, require essential operational
capabilities such as an effective engagement capability; deployability
and mobility; survivability of forces and infrastructure; and
sustainability; incorporating logistics and force rotation....
Sufficient capabilities in the areas of command, control and
communications as well as intelligence and surveillance will serve as
necessary force multipliers."

As noted in Secretary Cohen's letter to Chairman Warner on March 24,
1999:

" ...to ensure that the Alliance has the means, as well as the
doctrine, to deal with the full range of possible challenges, the
United States has pushed forward in NATO a Defense Capabilities
Initiative to improve the Alliance's capabilities for mobility,
precision engagement, sustainability, and survivability."

(vii) Capacity to respond to common threats.... This will require that
NATO members possess national military capabilities to rapidly deploy
forces over long distances, sustain operations for extended periods of
time, and operate jointly with the U.S....

Paragraph 52 of the concept states:

"The size, readiness, availability and deployment of the Alliance's
military forces will reflect its commitment to collective defense and
to conduct crisis response operations, sometimes at short notice,
distant from their home stations, including beyond the Allies'
territory.... Alliance forces must be adequate in strength and
capabilities to deter and counter aggression against any Ally. They
must be interoperable and have appropriate doctrines and technologies.
They must be held at the required readiness and deployability, and be
capable of military success in a wide range of complex joint and
combined operations, which may also include Partners and other
non-NATO nations."

(viii) The Integrated Military Structure of NATO underpins NATO's
effectiveness as a military alliance.

Paragraph 53c states:

"NATO's command structure will be able to undertake command and
control of the full range of the Alliance's military missions
including through the use of deployable combined and joint HQs, in
particular CJTF headquarters, to command and control multinational and
multiservice forces."

(ix) Nuclear weapons will continue to make an essential contribution
to deterring aggression.

NATO's nuclear posture, as stated in the 1991 strategic concept, will
remain unchanged. (Paragraphs 62-64 of the' 1999 revision.)

(x) Burdensharing.

The 1999 revision, paragraph 4, notes, the Alliance must "ensure a
balance that allows the European Allies to assume greater
responsibility."

Conclusion:

The strong leadership role that the United States plays continues to
promote and protect the vital national security interests of the
United States, for we have an interest in peace, stability, and
security in Europe. Most of the initiatives for the Summit were
proposed by the United States, including the defense capabilities
initiative (DCI), a weapons of mass destruction initiative, and a
membership action plan to help prepare nations that aspire to
membership -- and the key elements of the updated strategic concept.

The strategic concept document approved last April meets all the
conditions the Senate set forth in its resolution of ratification
regarding the admission of Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic. It
provides NATO with the tools to anticipate threats and to plan how to
respond to those threats. The obligations of the Treaty have not
changed. What has changed is the threats that NATO will likely face.

In sum, because the Treaty identifies no enemy and protects the
sovereignty of member states it is flexible enough to adjust to any
security challenges. As Dean Acheson testified in 1949, "The central
idea of the treaty is not a static one..." This flexibility has been
fundamental to NATO's success, and will allow the organization to
remain the dominant force for stability through the next century.