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Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, as we approach the 50th anniversary Summit of NATO this weekend, I rise today to share with my colleagues my concerns about a key document that will be considered at this summit. It is entitled `Strategic Concept for NATO.'

Mr. President, I have been privileged to be in the Senate 21 years. Throughout those years of time, there has often been a need to speak on behalf of NATO in this Senate. I say humbly and most respectfully that I have been at the forefront of Senate support for NATO. I can remember the early years of my time in the Senate. There was Member after Member that assaulted the need for the United States to remain in NATO. `Let's cut back. Let's save the money. Let's bring our men and women home. We have done our job.' I was among that group that had the long-range vision for NATO. It must remain. It must be strong, and U.S. leadership in NATO is absolutely essential.

So the remarks that I contribute today, here on the floor, are the result of a series of consultations I have had with the administration, and I hope will be taken in a constructive light and not as an expression in any way of criticism of this great organization, NATO.

With that in mind, I wrote to the President of the United States on April 7 to urge him to initiate, among the other 18 nations and the heads of state and government of NATO, the thought that at this 50th summit we should not try and write the final draft of the `Strategic Concept.' I repeat, `the final draft.' Certainly at this important gathering, a draft should be considered. Maybe several drafts should be considered, but we should not etch in stone the final draft of the `Strategic Concept.' That document spells out the future strategy and mission of the alliance. It states the parameters by which the alliance decides whether it should or should not send forward military units to engage in operations, possibly combat operations.

Why do I take this position? Because the old `Strategic Concept,' enacted in 1991, was largely oriented towards the Soviet Union and the threats from the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact. So obviously it is time to change it. But it can remain in effect for an additional, brief period of perhaps 6 months so that we can evaluate the lessons learned from the Kosovo operation.

Periodically in the 50-year history of NATO, NATO has changed its mission statement, or `Strategic Concept.' But that can remain in effect for 8, 9 sometimes 10 years.

So this document to be revised at this summit could well control NATO operations for the next decade.

I do not see the urgency to put it, as I say, in stone at this time. The urgency is to consider it, to put out a draft, and let the nations of NATO and their respective legislators and the Congress of the United States consider those drafts and consider them--this is the key reason that I rise--`consider' them in the light of the lessons learned in Kosovo.

This 50th anniversary Summit is taking place against the background of perhaps the most serious conflict we have seen on the European continent--indeed, the most serious, in my judgment, since the conclusion of World War II. It is the first actual combat of a great magnitude in which NATO has been involved.

We are operating on what is known as the `consensus' of the 19 nations--any one of which has a veto power--directing the military operations, which are under the command of General Clark, the Supreme Allied Commander.

I am not here to in any way criticize these operations. But I will simply say, Mr. President, that there will be many, many lessons learned at such time as this operation--and the sooner the better--is concluded with NATO having succeeded in reaching the objectives that have been made very clear by the NATO alliance and addressed many times by our President, the Prime Minister of Great Britain, the Chancellor of Germany, and others.

Mr. President, the alliance must have time to evaluate the lessons learned from the Kosovo operations before, again I say, setting in stone for possibly the next decade documents which will guide future NATO military operations.

While everyone recognizes the `Strategic Concept' of 1991 must be updated, it has not impeded the current Kosovo operation. Indeed, this operation is going forward with that `Strategic Concept' still in place. So it could stay in place another 6 months.

That is the only period of time I am asking for--an additional 6 months before the `Strategic Concept' is finalized. A short delay has advantages, if for no other reason than to show respect for the Congress of the United States and the people of this country will have their own evaluation of how well the Kosovo operation went, what was done right and what could have been improved.

The Secretary of Defense, when he was before the Armed Services Committee last week, said in response to questioning, `We are guided by the consensus of the alliance.' We need all 19 voices to say yes. And then he made a very important addition, `Had we been there alone or with a coalition similar to what we had in 1991 in the Persian Gulf we might have done it another way.'

This is a lesson learned. We should not be allowed to deny to the Congress and to other legislatures the opportunity to study lessons learned and to make our contribution as a member nation to the future `Strategic Concept for NATO.'

As I speak today, the draft of the `Strategic Concept' continues to be reworked, during this very hour, by the staffs of the 19 nations before it will be submitted to the NATO heads of state this weekend at the summit. There are press reports today that key elements of the `Strategic Concept' might not be completed by the summit--due to be continued--because of disagreement among the allies. The key element there is the relationship between NATO and the United Nations--a very, very important relationship. At no time should the United Nations have a veto over a decision by the NATO powers to use force. That is this Senator's view.

My main concern is, to what extent does the draft `Strategic Concept' reflect the views expressed in a May 15, 1998, speech in Berlin that President Clinton made? I am addressing the draft being reworked against a background of a statement by the President of the United States a year ago. President Clinton stated:

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Yesterday's NATO guarded our borders against direct military invasion. Tomorrow's Alliance must continue to defend enlarged borders and defend against the threats to our security from beyond them [meaning borders]--the spread of weapons of mass destruction, ethnic violence, regional conflict.

That thought expresses a desire to broaden and go beyond the 1991 concept. Is that being worked in this final draft? I know not; collectively, we in this Chamber do not know.

Other administration officials, most notably the Secretary of State, Ms. Albright, have been outspoken in the belief that the revised `Strategic Concept' should place increased emphasis on NATO's future role in non-Article 5--she said `out of area'--threats to our `common interests,' threats such as Kosovo. The definition of these common interests and the various military missions NATO is prepared to undertake in defense of these interests will establish the foundation for NATO military operations, possibly for the next decade.

Against the backdrop of the uncertainties in Kosovo, NATO should pause, in this Senator's judgment--I repeat, take a breath, a long deep breath and pause--before rendering judgment on these important issues. Let us review, over the next 6 months, the lessons learned as a consequence of the Kosovo operation.

Unfortunately, the NATO summit will take place against the background of continuing, unfolding events relating to Kosovo which we cannot predict at this moment. The United States and our allies may have many lessons to be learned from Kosovo to assess as we look to NATO's future for the next decade and its military missions. That assessment must be a pivotal part of any new strategic concept. NATO is simply too important to the United States, to our allies in Europe, and indeed to those nations who seek admission to NATO. NATO is essential for the future of the European continent and our relationships with that continent.

We are just beginning to learn important lessons now in the Kosovo situation. For example, it is obvious to all that the U.S.

military is the primary source of attack aircraft. We are flying 60 percent of the missions of the high-performance aircraft. Most of the ordnance being used is high-tech, precision-guided ordnance, an arsenal of which the United States possesses in far greater numbers than the other nations of NATO. They simply do not have in their military inventories this equipment.

I add to that, the airlift; that is, the cargo planes that must put in place the necessary resupply, the necessary equipment; for example, the helicopters, the Apaches which are moving in at this very moment, to be positioned in Albania for future use in the Kosovo operation. The other nations simply do not have that airlift. They do not have the tanker aircraft. Airplanes going into Kosovo now take off from Italy or other places. They move in, they have to get refueled in most instances before the strikes, they are refueled coming out of the strikes, and indeed refueled over the area so they can remain over the target area. It is the U.S. tanker aircraft that are carrying on the greater proportion of that essential part of this mission. The other nations of NATO do not have in their inventories that equipment.

Until other nations do acquire or at least have in place firm contractual commitments to acquire such equipment, the United States will likely be the only source of that equipment for any future operation other than Kosovo. It is our taxpayers, it is our men and women of the Armed Forces, who support and maintain this equipment. As we write the future concept for operations in NATO, we have to recognize that much of the equipment for modern warfare is possessed by the United States. Are we ready to sign that in stone now, recognizing particularly that the new nations do not have that equipment? A lesson to be learned, a lesson to be thought through very carefully.

The American people will soon be asked to support an emergency supplemental budget request to pay for the costs of the Kosovo operation. Are Americans ready to sign up to a new strategic concept that could well commit the U.S. military to other such operations requiring the same type of weaponry?

There are other lessons to be learned. It is now becoming apparent that our military planners are being subjected to many levels of review--this is a consensus military operation by 19 nations--for it is a fact that NATO can only operate by consensus; 19 nations must agree before a military action can be taken. A single nation can stop the planners--indeed, even stop the operation.

The result can be a military planning operation of the `lowest common denominator.' Are we now making military decisions not on the basis of the professional military judgment or on the basis of what will be most effectively done to achieve our objectives on the battlefield but, rather, on what agreement we can get among the 19 nations to carry out the recommendations of the professional military? These are issues which are to be examined as lessons learned in the future of Kosovo.

On April 7 I wrote the President a letter expressing the various concerns that I have related here on the floor. The President responded to my letter, on April 14, indicating his position that, `the right course is to proceed with a revised `Strategic Concept' at this conference, and sign it into stone.

Therefore, I ask unanimous consent to print in the Record the exchange of letters; my letter sent to the President and his response.

There being no objection, the letters were ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:
U.S. SENATE,

Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC, April 7, 1999.

The President,
The White House,
Washington, DC.

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Dear Mr. President: The Administration, in consultation with our NATO allies, is now finalizing various documents to be submitted to the Heads of State for ratification at the upcoming 50th anniversary NATO Summit to be held in Washington later this month. A key decision, in my view the most important one, is the revision of the Strategic Concept for the future--perhaps a decade--that will guide NATO in its decision making process regarding the deployment of military forces.

I am recommending, Mr. President, that a draft form of this document be reviewed by the principals, but not finalized, at this 50th anniversary Summit. Given the events in Kosovo, a new Strategic Concept for NATO--the document that spells out the future strategy and mission of the Alliance--should not be written `in stone' at this time. Instead, NATO leaders should issue a draft Strategic Concept at the Summit, which would be subject to further comment and study for a period of approximately six months. Thereafter, a final document should be adopted.

NATO is by far the most successful military alliance in contemporary history. It was the deciding factor in avoiding widespread conflict in Europe throughout the Cold War. Subsequent to that tense period of history, NATO was, again, the deciding factor in bringing about an end to hostilities in Bosnia, and thereafter providing the security essential to allow Bosnia to achieve the modest gains we have seen in the reconstruction of the economic, political and security base of that nation.

Now NATO is engaged in combating the widespread evils of Milosevic and his Serbian followers in Kosovo.

I visited Kosovo and Macedonia last September and witnessed Milosevic's repression of the Kosovar Albanians. Thereafter, I spoke in the Senate on the essential need for a stabilizing military force in Kosovo to allow the various international humanitarian organizations to assist the people of Kosovo--many then refugees in their own land, forced into the hills and mountains by brutal Serb attacks. Since then, I have consistently been supportive of NATO military action against Milosevic.

Unfortunately, it is now likely that the NATO Summit will take place against the background of continuing, unfolding events relating to Kosovo. At this time, no predictions can be made as to a resolution.

We are just beginning to learn important lessons from the Kosovo conflict. Each day is a new chapter. For example, NATO planners and many in the Administration, and in Congress, have long been aware of the disparities in military capabilities and equipment between the United States and our allies. Now, the military operation against Yugoslavia has made the American people equally aware and concerned about these disparities. The U.S. has been providing the greatest proportion of attack aircraft capable of delivering precision-guided munitions. Further, the United States is providing the preponderance of airlift to deliver both military assets (such as the critically needed Apache helicopters and support equipment) and humanitarian relief supplies, the delivery of which are now in competition with each other.

Until other NATO nations acquire, or at least have in place firm commitments to acquire, comparable military capabilities, the United States will continually be called on to carry the greatest share of the military responsibilities for such `out of area' operations in the future. This issue must be addressed, and the Congress consulted and the American people informed.

It is my understanding that the draft Strategic Concept currently under consideration by NATO specifically addresses NATO strategy for non-Article 5, `out of area' threats to our common interests--threats such as Bosnia and Kosovo. According to Secretary Albright in a December 8, 1998 statement to the North Atlantic Council, `The new Strategic Concept must find the right balance between affirming the centrality of Article V collective defense missions and ensuring that the fundamental tasks of the Alliance are intimately related to the broader defense of our common interests.' Is this the type of broad commitment to be accepted in final form, just weeks away at the 50th anniversary Summit?

During the Senate's debate on the Resolution of Ratification regarding NATO expansion, the Senate addressed this issue by adopting a very important amendment put forth by Senator Kyl. But this was before the events in Kosovo. The lessons of Kosovo could even change this position.

The intent of this letter is to give you my personal view that a `final' decision by NATO on the Strategic concept should not be taken--risked--against the uncertainties emanating from the Kosovo situation.

The U.S. and our allies will have many `lessons learned' to assess as a pivotal part of the future Strategic Concept. Bosnia and Kosovo have been NATO's first forays into aggressive military operations. As of this writing, the Kosovo situation is having a destabilizing effect of the few gains made to date in Bosnia. This combined situation must be carefully assessed and evaluated before the U.S. and our allies sign on a new Strategic Concept for the next decade of NATO.

A brief period for study and reflection by ourselves as well as our Allies would be prudent. NATO is too vital for the future of Europe and American leadership.

With kind regards, I am

Respectfully,

John Warner,
Chairman.

The White House,
Washington, DC, April 14, 1999.

Hon. John W. Warner,
Chairman, Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate, Washington, DC.

Dear Mr. Chairman: Thank you for your thoughtful letter on the upcoming NATO summit and the revised Strategic Concept. I appreciate your attention to these important issues, and I agree strongly with your view that NATO's continued vitality is essential to safeguarding American and European security.

I have thought carefully about your proposal to delay agreement on the revised Strategic Concept in light of NATO's military operations in Kosovo. While I share your deep concern about the situation in Kosovo and the devastating effects of Serb atrocities, I am convinced that the right course is to proceed with a revised Strategic Concept that will make NATO even more effective in addressing regional and ethnic conflict of this very sort. Our operations in Kosovo have demonstrated the crucial importance of NATO being prepared for the full spectrum of military operations--a preparedness the revised Strategic Concept will help ensure.

The Strategic Concept will reaffirm NATO's core mission of collective defense, while also making the adaptations needed to deal with threats such as the regional conflicts we have seen in Bosnia and Kosovo as well as the evolving risks posed by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. It will also help ensure greater interoperability among allied forces and an increased European contribution to our shared security. The Strategic Concept will not contain new commitments or obligations for the United States but rather will underscore NATO's enduring purposes outlined in the 1949 North Atlantic Treaty. It will also recognize the need for adapted capabilities in the face of changed circumstances. This approach is fully consistent with the Kyl Amendment, which called for a strong reaffirmation of collective defense as well as a recognition of new security challenges.

The upcoming summit offers a historic opportunity to strengthen the NATO Alliance and ensure that it remains as effective in the future as it has been over the past fifty years. While the situation in Kosovo has presented difficult challenges, I am confident that NATO resolve in the face of this tyranny will bring a successful conclusion.

Your support for the NATO Alliance and for our policy in Kosovo has been indispensable. I look forward to working closely with you in the coming days to ensure that the summit is an overwhelming success.

Sincerely,
Bill Clinton.

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Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I address the Senate today because I have done my very best as one Senator to bring this to the attention of our President, and hopefully, through this floor speech, to the attention of the other heads of state and government who will come to Washington. Again, I continue to urge my plea not to put this `Strategic Concept' in final form in this forthcoming Summit. I encourage my colleagues who may share my views on this critical issue to likewise speak out before it is too late, in an effort to prevent a rush to judgment on NATO's future. NATO is simply too important to our national security to do any less.

On a related issue, I am distressed to hear statements by my colleagues, and some in the administration, which tie NATO's future to a successful--I repeat successful--outcome in Kosovo. I personally support the objectives that have been stated time and time again by the NATO ministers, and indeed our President, our Secretaries of State and Defense. We all know we have to create a situation so the refugees can be returned. We know we have to have in place a military force, the composition of which I think should be flexible. It does not have to be all United States--absolutely not. Maybe other nations not in NATO will join. We need flexibility there to allow these people to return in a secure environment and to have a measure of self-government, of autonomy. They deserve no less. Those are the basics.

But to say unless everything we lay down today has succeeded, we have success and we have victory, and if we do not achieve it, it is the end of NATO--I urge my colleagues not to make such a statement. NATO must go on. NATO must go on and survive the Kosovo operation. It is the responsibility of those of us here in the Senate, of the President of the United States, and the other heads of state and government to make certain that is achieved, because we know not at this moment what the outcome will be in Kosovo. Yes, we have to achieve the basic goals, but in my humble judgment, diplomacy will reenter at some point. So I suggest we pledge ourselves to the future of NATO and be more cautious in our statements.

Kosovo-like operations are not NATO's reason for being. They are `out-of-area' operations that NATO does if it can. We should not be making pronouncements on NATO's future based on the outcome of these `out-of-area' operations.

This alliance has withstood the test of time for 50 years. It has exceeded the expectations of those minds that gathered 50 years ago to conceive it. It is the most significant military alliance in the history of mankind, and it has to continue to be for the future.

Mr. President, I thank my colleagues for their patience in allowing me to deliver these remarks, and I yield the floor.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Vermont.

Mr. JEFFORDS. Mr. President, what is the pending business?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. We are in morning business.

Mr. JEFFORDS. Mr. President, I believe under the special order, the conference report on the Ed-Flex bill should be brought forward at this time.

END