10 May 2000
(May 5: Vershbow on arms control, Chechnya, Kosovo, NATO) (7,300)
U.S. Ambassador to NATO Alexander Vershbow appeared on a Department of
State TV Interactive Dialogue Program devoted to NATO-Russian
relations May 5, speaking from NATO headquarters in Brussels with
journalists and other participants in Moscow, St. Petersburg and
Yekaterinburg.
Vershbow discussed next month's summit in Moscow between President
Clinton and Russian President Vladimir Putin, as well as efforts in
Brussels to rebuild the NATO-Russia relationship. Despite differences
over Kosovo and NATO enlargement, he said, "we're beginning to make
some progress."
"We believe it is in our common interest for Russia to be a full
participant in handling the problems of European security, and we are
very much committed to making that a reality," he added.
The ambassador responded to questions about a number of issues,
including:
-- NATO enlargement: "Tying the countries of Central and Eastern
Europe to a collective security and defense structure is the best
guarantee that there will never again be wars and instability in
Central Europe," Vershbow said, maintaining that "the enlargement of
NATO is in Russia's interest, even if Russia doesn't yet recognize
that fact."
He said NATO has resumed talks aimed at establishing a NATO
information center in Moscow, a center which he hopes will help dispel
some of the Cold War misconceptions of NATO still held by many
Russians.
-- Arms control: High on the summit agenda will be the question of
modifying the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM) to permit a
"very limited, modest" national missile defense system against
potential threats from "unpredictable" countries such as Iran and
North Korea, Vershbow said. "If we're going to have the ability to
prevent these countries from using these [inter-continental range]
missiles, either as weapons or as political levers, then we have to
work together.... We believe...there are ways to put restrictions on
the scale and the nature of a national missile defense system so that
it will not undermine the effectiveness of Russia's strategic nuclear
force."
On the reduction of U.S. and Russian nuclear arsenals, Vershbow said,
"START II is an excellent basis now to move on to even deeper
reductions in START III, and that will be part of the agenda for
Presidents Clinton and Putin when they meet next month."
-- Chechnya: Vershbow took issue with attempts to equate Russian
actions in Chechnya with NATO's actions in Kosovo. In Kosovo, he said,
"NATO used force basically to save a civilian population from the
destruction of the central power." That is not the case in Chechnya,
where "there has been massive destruction of civilian population
centers and large loss of life among the civilian population." He
added, "The means Russia is using in Chechnya are the wrong ones and
only laying the seed of a much more difficult and long-lasting crisis
in Russia's southern regions."
-- Kosovo: If Russia and NATO "had stayed together during the peace
negotiations" at Rambouillet, France, prior to the NATO air campaign,
Vershbow said, "we might have achieved a political settlement and
avoided the use of force.... Fortunately, we did come together again
in the final weeks of the air campaign. We joined our forces to
convince [Yugoslav] President Milosevic to accept the demands of the
international community. And, today, NATO and Russia are, of course,
working closely together to try to bring a lasting peace to all the
people of Kosovo."
Asked about the implications of NATO's air campaign for the concept of
national sovereignty, Vershbow replied, "We are not in any way
suggesting that that principle should be abandoned, but there are
exceptional circumstances in which sovereignty cannot be used as a
defense of flagrant violations of human rights. There is a point at
which the international community has to say this will not be
accepted; no matter what we believe in regarding sovereignty, we will
not allow the kind of genocidal activities that was unfolding in
Kosovo."
Following is a transcript of the program:
(begin transcript)
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DOS-TV INTERACTIVE DIALOGUE PROGRAM
NISNET
"NATO-RUSSIAN RELATIONS"
Friday, May 5, 2000
10:00 A.M. (EDT)
MR. FOUCHEUX: Welcome to Dialogue. I am Rick Foucheux.
Where does the Russia-NATO partnership stand today? We will join our
participants in Moscow, St. Petersburg and Yekaterinburg and our
honored guest at NATO Headquarters in Brussels, United States
Ambassador Alexander Vershbow, to discuss that very thing.
But before we go to Moscow, St. Petersburg and Yekaterinburg,
Ambassador Vershbow, welcome to the program. It is a pleasure to have
you with us once again and I would like to give you the opportunity to
get us started with some opening remarks, if you please.
AMBASSADOR VERSHBOW: Well, thank you very much, Rick. It is a great
personal and professional pleasure to have the opportunity to meet
with so many Russian colleagues simultaneously in Yekaterinburg, St.
Petersburg and Moscow.
My government, of course, is looking forward to a very serious and
important meeting of another kind, the summit meeting that will take
place in Moscow about a month from today. That meeting will offer
President Clinton the opportunity to engage with the new dynamic
leadership in Moscow led by President Putin.
During the visit last week by Foreign Minister Ivanov to Washington,
both sides agreed on the importance of continuing to work on the broad
range of issues on the US-Russian bilateral agenda, and certainly the
United States intends to continue its strong support for the reform
efforts of Russia and we will encourage the new administration in the
Kremlin to address the unfinished business of establishing a
functioning market economy. We will also urge the Russian leadership
to take the necessary steps to promote foreign investments and to
accelerate Russia's integration into the global economy.
And, of course, our two presidents will work very hard on the
important issues of further reductions in strategic nuclear arms
while, at the same time, trying to preserve and strengthen the
Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty in order to take into account the new
threats from the proliferation of ballistic missiles to unpredictable
countries like North Korea.
Now, my bosses in Washington, of course, will be the ones responsible
for the bilateral relationship in preparations for the summit. But
here in Brussels, we are focusing on rebuilding the NATO-Russia
relationship. The last year, of course, was a difficult one for NATO
and Russia. The Kosovo air campaign led Russia to suspend its dialogue
with the NATO alliance -- which was a big mistake, in our view. In
fact, if Russia and NATO had stayed together during the peace
negotiations at Rambouillet, we might have achieved a political
settlement and avoided the use of force.
But, unfortunately, NATO had no alternative but to act, and it did
have a serious impact on our relationship with Russia. Fortunately, we
did come together again in the final weeks of the air campaign. We
joined our forces to convince President Milosevic to accept the
demands of the international community. And, today, NATO and Russia
are, of course, working closely together to try to bring a lasting
peace to all the people of Kosovo in accordance with the UN Security
Council resolution.
We just, of course, have had a successful visit by our Secretary
General to Moscow in February, and since that time we have begun to
reestablish our dialogue on the broader range of issues, moving beyond
the restriction of the agenda to Kosovo which the Russian side had
demanded. And I think we recognize that it is in our mutual interest
to explore all the different issues of common concern.
I think it's a fact that, in the post-Cold War period, NATO and Russia
faced many of the same security challenges, such as weapons of mass
destruction, terrorism and regional conflicts, and the NATO-Russia
relationship provides us a framework in which we can tackle these
challenges together. And certainly we will succeed much more
effectively if we tackle these problems together.
So we're trying to build our cooperation step by step. Despite our
differences over Kosovo and over NATO enlargement, I think we're
beginning to make some progress. We hope to see Foreign Minister
Ivanov at the meeting of NATO foreign ministers in Florence at the end
of this month. And certainly for all the members of NATO, and
especially for the United States, we believe it is in our common
interest for Russia to be a full participant in handling the problems
of European security, and we are very much committed to making that a
reality.
So with that introduction, I am very happy to take some questions.
MR. FOUCHEUX: All right. We thank you once again, Ambassador Vershbow,
for being there for our program today. And now we join our guests in
Moscow, St. Petersburg and Yekaterinburg for their questions. We start
in Moscow. Please go ahead with your first question in Moscow.
PARTICIPANT: Mr. Ambassador, Vladimir Kulikov from the Interfax
Agency. From the point of view of the US side, could you tell us, is
it possible in the future that Russia would join NATO?
AMBASSADOR VERSHBOW: I think anything is possible in today's world. As
I said, NATO and Russia are trying to deal with many of the same
security problems, so if Russia were interested in joining and Russia
were prepared to shoulder the responsibilities of membership, someday
in the future I think Russian membership could be a possibility.
But this is probably a question more for tomorrow than today. I think
our immediate challenge is to try to build as much cooperation between
NATO and Russia as possible, and we'll see where the relationship
evolves. But I think that one should never exclude any possibilities
in today's security situation.
MR. FOUCHEUX: Thank you very much for that question, Moscow. Let's
move on now to St. Petersburg and your first question. Hello in St.
Petersburg.
PARTICIPANT: Hello, my name is -- (in Russian) -- from -- (inaudible)
-- and my question is to -- (inaudible) -- question. Before our
relations worsened because of Kosovo, the Partnership for Peace has
been developing quite well and then it was almost forgotten. What is
done now in practice to restore this program?
AMBASSADOR VERSHBOW: Well, it is absolutely correct that Russia
suspended its participation in Partnership activities in connection
with the Kosovo air campaign -- and we regret that. In fact, Russia
did not, I think, explore the full potential of the Partnership for
Peace even before Kosovo. And we would hope that in the coming months
we can begin to develop a work program of military-to-military
activities -- both meetings, joint exercises, joint training programs
-- so that Russia can come to understand how NATO works and NATO can
have a better understanding of how Russia deals with today's security
challenges.
The Partnership for Peace has been an amazing success for all the
other participants in developing a kind of broad, all-European
coalition of nations who are prepared to deal with the threats to the
peace, wherever they occur. The fact that it's not just NATO but NATO
plus at least two dozen partner nations working together in Bosnia and
Kosovo, underscores just how successful the Partnership for Peace has
been. So Russia needs to look for more activism in exploiting the
possibilities of Partnership for Peace.
MR. FOUCHEUX: Thank you in St. Petersburg for that question. Now we
welcome our questioners who are standing by in Yekaterinburg. Go ahead
with your first question there, please.
PARTICIPANT: I'm Professor Mikhail Ingov from the Urals State
University. Mr. Ambassador, you took part in the planning of US policy
and NATO in Europe. I'm not sure that you're satisfied with the
results. And don't you think that the main problem is that the
founders of the so-called Yalta peace still have not admitted that the
post-war system of international relations is dead, and any attempts
to transform and adapt it were in vain?
Perhaps it would have made sense to conduct a global international
conference so that to develop new rules for international relations
and create a new system for regulating them; in other words, to
conduct a conference similar to the Versailles or Yalta or Pottsdam
conference.
Thank you.
AMBASSADOR VERSHBOW: Well, I don't think I fully agree with either
your assumptions or your recommendation, although I do think you're
right in saying that the post-war system is dead. But I think we have
made a lot of progress in the past ten or eleven years in creating a
new post-Cold War security system that moves away from the bipolar
system of the Cold War towards an inclusive and comprehensive
framework.
That's why we have been developing the Partnership for peace; that's
why we've been trying to strengthen the Organization for Security and
Cooperation in Europe, the OSCE, so that it can both help prevent
conflict and rebuild societies after conflicts have been solved. And
that's why, of course, we have been expanding NATO. We're trying to
extend the area of stability and prosperity that we have had in
Western Europe to the entire European continent.
So we have a system in the making which involves many different
institutions. Russia very much needs to be a part of the system. I
don't think we need a new conference to fully achieve the potential of
the system; I think we need action, we need better coordination of our
policies, and we need political vision on the part of all the members
of this community so that we don't allow issues like Kosovo to divide
us the next time around.
We can only solve our problems by working together, rather than in
competition.
MR. FOUCHEUX: And we thank you in Yekaterinburg. Now we return to
Moscow for more questions. Please go ahead once again in Moscow.
PARTICIPANT: (In Russian) -- Mr. Oksav. Mr. Ambassador, taking into
account the firm position of Russia on Kosovo and Chechnya and the
1972 ABM Treaty and the creation of the U.S. plans to create the
national anti-missile system, what principles can become the basis of
NATO's policy toward Russia? Thank you.
AMBASSADOR VERSHBOW: Well, we will, of course, inevitably have
differences with Russia. We're not naive to believe that we're going
to always agree on how to deal with problems, even if we agree in our
analysis of the problem. So the NATO-Russia relationship will have to
involve a mix of cooperation and joint action on the one hand, and
dialogue aimed at managing and limiting the effects of our differences
on the other hand.
But I think that Chechnya has been a tragic experience, not only in
terms of the terrible destruction that has occurred on the territory
of Chechnya and the enormous loss of life, both for the civilian
population and for Russian armed forces, but I think it has set back
our efforts to arrive at a common approach to dealing with other
crises in the future.
But we need to overcome that and we need also, of course, to find ways
to deal with some of the sources of the problem in Chechnya where we
do recognize Russia's concern, such as the international terrorism
that has been fueling some of the troubles in Chechnya.
When it comes to the ABM Treaty and our proposals for a system of
national missile defense, I think if we continue to discuss this issue
seriously, really try to understand one another's concerns, we will be
able to find a common ground. I think Russia knows as well as the
United States that the technology for long-range ballistic missiles is
spreading. As much as we have tried to prevent that, countries like
North Korea, Iran, are developing not only short-range but
inter-continental range missiles.
And if we're going to have the ability to prevent these countries from
using these missiles, either as weapons or as political levers, then
we have to work together. And we believe that deploying a limited
defense of our homelands is part of the solution. We believe that a
limited defense will not undermine the ABM Treaty, that there are ways
to put restrictions on the scale and the nature of a national missile
defense system so that it will not undermine the effectiveness of
Russia's strategic nuclear force.
But that will be a big topic for our two presidents to tackle when
they meet in Moscow next month. But I believe that where there's a
will, there's a way, that we will find common ground.
PARTICIPANT: My name is Marion Duncan from -- (in Russian) --
Newspaper. You visited Moscow last November and you met with Russian
diplomats and military people and, in fact, I interviewed you. You
said that you didn't feel that they are going to restore full-scale
relationships with NATO, but very soon Russia's position changed
drastically after Mr. Robertson's visit to Moscow.
Why do you think this happened? Thank you.
AMBASSADOR VERSHBOW: Well, at least one very obvious change occurred
in Russia, namely you got a new president as of January of this year.
And it is clear to us that that was key to changing the dynamic of the
NATO-Russia relationship. It's our impression that President Putin
recognizes that it's in Russia's interest to find ways to engage with
NATO and to cooperate with NATO, even though we may disagree on many
important issues.
So it appears to have been, in large measure, his initiative that led
to the visit by Lord Robertson and to the reopening of our dialogue.
So there may have been other factors as well, including the success of
our cooperation on the ground in Kosovo, which may have given Russia a
greater sense that NATO was prepared to take its concerns seriously
and to shape the mission of our forces together through our permanent
joint council in Brussels.
So whatever the reason, we're very glad that the dialogue is resuming
and that we can now get down to serious business in tackling many of
the problems in addition to Kosovo that face all of our nations.
PARTICIPANT: Moscow -- (in Russian) -- Newspaper. I was present at the
signing of the Founding Act between Russia and NATO, and I understand
that you took part in developing that document. The representatives of
NATO at that time said that they did not intend to expand the alliance
to the Former Soviet Republics, which now became Independent States.
However, now US Defense Secretary Cohen, when he visited Georgia,
assured Georgia that it would be able to become NATO member. The same
was said during visits to the Baltic countries. Does it mean that from
1997 NATO policy and the US policy changed, and now Former Soviet
Republics may join NATO; this is no longer taboo?
AMBASSADOR VERSHBOW: Well, I'm afraid that your reading of the
historical record is not correct. We never gave any assurance that the
membership of any European democracy was excluded, and that includes
Russia itself, as I said in response to an earlier question. So it was
clear to President Yeltsin and to the Russian leadership at the time
that NATO was not abandoning its commitment to the continued openness
of the Alliance, which you must remember is set forth in the NATO
Treaty of 1949. This is not some new departure of recent years. NATO
always was open to any country prepared to share our values and
prepared to share the burden of dealing with the common defense.
Now, we know Russia doesn't like the prospect of Baltic states or any
other country in its neighborhood joining NATO, but we'll just have to
agree to disagree on that and try to create a world in which Russia's
concern is reduced. Russia should see today that Poland, Hungary and
the Czech Republic do not represent any threat to the security of
Russia; if anything, Russia's western frontiers are more secure today
as a result of the stability that NATO membership has brought to those
three countries. Russia has many more problems to its south, and I
think that the threatening character of NATO enlargement has been
grossly exaggerated in the Russian political debate.
But it will take time for us to come to a full agreement on that
score. In the meantime, we should build the NATO-Russia relationship
to insulate us from any shock that will come when NATO takes in new
members in the future.
PARTICIPANT: BBC Russian Service, Gokar Ovich. Mr. Ambassador, I would
like to ask you, during your visit to London -- his visit to London,
Mr. Putin said that the West does not hear Moscow when Moscow
expresses its vision of the Chechen problem. What do you think after
those intensified contacts between Putin and the West, including his
meeting with Blair and his upcoming meeting with Clinton? Could it
happen that the West will change its position with regard to the
Chechen problem?
Thank you.
AMBASSADOR VERSHBOW: Well, I think that we do hear Russia's arguments.
We do listen very carefully, and we don't disagree that there has been
a serious threat to Russia's internal security and stability in
Chechnya that has only grown worse in the last few years.
Where we disagree is on the means that Russia has been using to solve
that problem. We think that they have been counterproductive and,
indeed, may be laying the basis for a much more prolonged and
difficult problem in the Northern Caucasus than otherwise would be the
case: First, the Russian forces, in our view, have gone beyond what
might be called proportionate use of force to deal with terrorists and
criminal activity, to cause significant damage to the cities and towns
of Chechnya and to the civilian population; created a huge number of
refugees, which are not being handled to this day in an adequate way;
plus, Russia has been unwilling to allow international organizations
to have access to Chechnya, both to see the situation and to handle
the humanitarian crisis. So we differ primarily on the means. We
believe a political solution is the only way out, that Moscow has to
find some way to establish a dialogue with political leaders in
Chechnya and find a way out of the destructive military conflict which
will only make matters worse, the longer that it continues.
So President Clinton will certainly want to hear what Mr. Putin has to
say, and we try to be sympathetic because of the terrorist threat,
because of the number of Russian citizens who have suffered at the
hands of some of the Chechen groups. But if this problem is going to
be solved in a definitive way, a political solution is the only way
forward.
MR. FOUCHEUX: All right, thank you in Moscow. And now we return once
again to St. Petersburg for another round of questions. Go ahead,
please, once again in St. Petersburg.
PARTICIPANT: (In Russian) -- newspaper. Against the background of NATO
action in Kosovo, the political dictionary now includes the concept of
humanitarian intervention. I have two questions. First, how do these
two things agree with one another -- humanitarian, which is like mercy
and so on -- and intervention, which looks more like violence?
And the second question is: What is the correlation between this
humanitarian intervention with the founding principles of
international law, including the right to sovereignty and territorial
integrity?
Thank you.
AMBASSADOR VERSHBOW: Well, I think you're correct in saying that there
is a new concept emerging in the language of international relations,
which is often called humanitarian intervention. I don't think that
this is so much a doctrine as an evolving approach to the new kinds of
problems that are emerging, and a response to some of the failures of
the international community in the past ten years to prevent terrible
human suffering, whether one speaks of Bosnia or Rwanda.
It's clear that the toolbox that has been in the hands of the
international community has not always been enough to deal with these
kinds of crises before hundreds of thousands of people have been
killed. So, in Kosovo, we faced a particularly complex challenge. Even
many months before the NATO military action, there were hundreds of
thousands of refugees who had been driven from their homes by the
paramilitary forces of President Milosevic. As the winter of 1998-1999
was approaching, many of these people risked dying from the cold in
the hills of Kosovo. At the same time, we also had a threat to the
peace and stability of the region because the conflict in Kosovo
threatened to spill over to Albania, to Macedonia, and indeed to the
wider Southeast European region.
These threats were recognized by Russia in several UN Security Council
resolutions, which called on both the Serbian side and the Kosovo
Albanian side to abandon the military approach and come to a political
solution. But when those warnings were not heeded, action was
necessary. The Rambouillet negotiations were the last attempt to solve
this by diplomacy but, regrettably, Russia did not agree with NATO on
the most indispensable part of a political solution; namely, an
international military force on the ground to prevent both sides from
starting the war again. And without Russian pressure, President
Milosevic did not see a need to negotiate, and NATO had no choice but
to use force.
So I think that intervention in this case was justified because we
saved hundreds of thousands of lives. We now have seen a million
refugees all come back voluntarily to their homes, and Kosovo is a
much more stable and secure place than it would have been if NATO had
not acted.
But these do raise questions regarding international law, which we
need to tackle together. It would have been much better if Russia had
joined with us and given explicit authority of the UN Security Council
for this operation. But because we could not agree and because the
consequences of inaction were so great, the 19 democracies that
represent NATO felt that they had to act -- and they did so
successfully.
But I think the lesson is let's stay together, including in the UN
Security Council in the future, and let's prevent these kinds of
crises from ever happening again so that we don't have to have
humanitarian intervention in the future.
One last point. I think this does indeed raise questions also for
traditional 19th century notions of state sovereignty. We are not in
any way suggesting that that principle should be abandoned, but there
are exceptional circumstances in which sovereignty cannot be used as a
defense of flagrant violations of human rights. There is a point at
which the international community has to say this will not be
accepted; no matter what we believe in regarding sovereignty, we will
not allow the kind of genocidal activities that was unfolding in
Kosovo.
PARTICIPANT: (In Russian) -- St. Petersburg. Could you tell us the
following? Right now, Russia is often criticized that it's time to
start political dialogue with Chechnya; however, not a single leader
of NATO countries specifies with whom can this dialogue start in
Chechnya because, right now, everybody follows the situation in
Chechnya attentively.
So what do you think? Who is the person with whom we can start the
dialogue in Chechnya, be it a person or some kind of an organization?
AMBASSADOR VERSHBOW: I think it's not for me, particularly from where
I sit and not being an expert on all the different political and
military players in Chechnya, to nominate anyone as the negotiating
partner for the Russian Federation. This is, as Russia insists, an
internal problem, and Russia, as the central power, should be actively
trying to find interlocutors in Chechnya who are prepared to negotiate
in good faith, to come to an agreement that will address Russia's
concerns about future terrorist and criminal activity, and permit
thereby the end of the war and the rebuilding of the shattered society
of Chechnya.
I cannot believe that there are not moderate figures still there who
could become the legitimate and accepted representatives of the
Chechen people. But if the conflict goes on much longer, of course,
there is a danger that Russia will alienate the entire population of
Chechnya, making a political solution close to impossible. So the
longer this goes on, as I said, the more difficult it will be to solve
in a long-lasting way. But it's up to Russia, having commenced these
military operations and as the leader of the country, to find the
appropriate negotiating partners.
PARTICIPANT: (In Russian) -- Newspaper. General Clark, when he left
his post of Supreme Commander, said that the influence and weight of
each NATO participant is in proportion to the power and contribution
and efforts that it contributes. Now, how does this statement
correlate with the principle of equal rights for all members of NATO,
and how was this principle carried out during Kosovo operations?
AMBASSADOR VERSHBOW: Well, I hesitate to interpret what was on the
mind of General Clark when he made that statement, but I think it's an
obvious fact that different countries have greater or lesser influence
on the world stage, and that includes within the framework of the NATO
Alliance. But when it comes down to taking decisions in NATO, all 19
members are equal; everyone has a veto because NATO only acts on the
basis of consensus, and therefore even Luxembourg or Iceland can stand
in the way of NATO doing anything if they feel strongly about it and
choose to block a consensus.
So I think that, because of this rule, NATO does indeed serve as a
basis for bringing the different views, the different interests of its
member states together so that we can always reach consensus when we
need to. And that was the case in Kosovo where each of the members had
their own perspective; they had their own domestic pressures and
constraints; they had their own constitutional limitations; they had
their own parliamentary considerations; but, nevertheless, because of
the gravity of the crisis in Kosovo, the members were able to find a
consensus on threatening and then using military force to deal with
this serious threat to peace and to human rights in Southeastern
Europe.
But all the members had a voice in arriving at this consensus. And the
military sometimes complains that, because of the need for consensus,
sometimes the military was put under overly restrictive limitations on
how to prosecute the military campaign. But in my view, that's the
necessary price of doing business, because to have 19 democratic
nations together in support of an action is better than for any one
nation to act alone.
PARTICIPANT: This is -- (in Russian) -- again. Could you tell me, in
'98 I was in Brussels at the NATO headquarters, and almost everybody I
talked to said that the building was built in '67 and it's too small
for the needs for its mission, and even it's more difficult to accept
new members because of the insufficient facilities. And somebody said
that the new headquarters would be built.
Now, any changes from '98, and are you going to have a housewarming
party anytime soon?
AMBASSADOR VERSHBOW: Well, thanks for an easy question. It is
certainly true that the headquarters that we occupy is increasingly
bursting at the seams, and it is decaying. It was intended only to be
a temporary headquarters when NATO was asked to move from France to
Belgium in the 1960s. I think it was only intended to be used for five
or six years, and we've been in here for over 30.
So we did, at the summit meeting in Washington last April, take a
decision at the level of our heads of state and government to build a
new headquarters. We are now trying to figure out how to do that in
practice, and I don't expect still to be the Ambassador when the new
building is built. I probably won't be here even when they dig the
foundation. I think it'll take six or seven years before a new NATO
headquarters is built, but we're trying to think ahead, both for the
admission of future members and the inclusion within our headquarters
of all of our partners, including Russia, so that we can build the
ever-closer security framework, security family, that is essential if
we're going to succeed in achieving a truly stable, secure and
democratic Europe.
So Russia will have offices in the new headquarters, but I'm not going
to be here to see them move in.
MR. FOUCHEUX: We thank you for those questions in St. Petersburg.
Let's move along once again now to Yekaterinburg for their questions.
Go ahead once again in Yekaterinburg.
PARTICIPANT: (In Russian) -- Urals (in Russian) -- military news. Mr.
Ambassador, US-NATO-Russia relationships had a lot of ups and downs.
On the one hand, we had joint exercises for platoons and so on. On the
other hand, we saw this expansion of NATO eastward and the statements
by many politicians about this creation of a strong group, power
point, in Belarus and so on.
Now, what do you think Russia and NATO can do, first of all, to remove
these contradictions on a short-term basis, and what can we do on a
long-term basis to improve the relationship?
AMBASSADOR VERSHBOW: Well, I'm not sure I would call them
contradictions, at least not from the NATO point of view. We believe
that the continued enlargement of the Alliance over the next years --
which will be a gradual, step-by-step process -- is not in any way
incompatible with a cooperative relationship with Russia.
As I said earlier, tying the countries of Central and Eastern Europe
to a collective security and collective defense structure is the best
guarantee that there will never again be wars and instability in
Central Europe which, of course, has been where two world wars and a
Cold War were fought. So at the end of the day, the enlargement of
NATO is in Russia's interest, even if Russia doesn't yet recognize
that fact.
But part of our challenge here in the NATO-Russia Joint Council is to
explain our perspectives and try to narrow our differences and, maybe
in the longer term, eliminate those differences. At the same time, we
do have to discuss problems that we see -- and you mentioned the
Russian-Belarusian union. That's not, in and of itself, something that
is necessarily seen by us as a threat, but we need to know more about
whether it is going to become a military bloc, whether it's going to
involve the deployment westward of additional troops, as President
Lukashenko has suggested. I know Russian spokesmen have denied that,
and that was reassuring. But NATO, of course, in enlarging has decided
not to station any new ground troops on the territory of the new
members, and so it would be hard to understand why Russia would see a
need to move additional troops into Belarus.
So these are the kinds of issues we should be discussing openly,
frankly, in our dialogue here in Brussels and at the highest levels
when our leaders get together. I think the real solution is, of
course, to find more areas where NATO and Russia can do things
together, where we can jointly address and solve problems. I think
that our experience in Bosnia and Kosovo is a good foundation, where
our troops are getting along in an excellent way on the ground. We
really have lived up to the slogan of "One Mission, One Force," even
though Russia is not formally integrated into the NATO command in
Kosovo.
So if we can look for other areas such as dealing with proliferation
of weapons of mass destruction, maybe even dealing with the
proliferation of missiles through some kind of cooperation, in early
warning of attack, or in the longer-term defense against tactical
ballistic missiles, all of these could be ways to demonstrate to one
another that we are becoming genuine partners and that the competition
of the past is truly behind us.
PARTICIPANT: (In Russian) -- from the Urals State Technical
University. Mr. Ambassador, the sociological surveys demonstrate that
the improvement or worsening of relations between Russia and NATO
impact young people's values in our countries. Now, in that
connection, how would you explain the difference between the
assessments of NATO actions in Kosovo and Russia's actions in
Chechnya, which is basically the territory of the Russian Federation?
Thank you.
AMBASSADOR VERSHBOW: I'm glad you asked that question because I think
there are often incorrect parallels drawn between the two situations.
I think that, of course, we did have at the start some similarities in
terms of a local insurgency resisting the rule of central authorities.
But in Kosovo, of course, we've had a situation in which for ten years
the central authorities in Belgrade denied the people of Kosovo the
autonomy and self-government that they were allowed under the old
Yugoslav constitution, and were the victims of a concerted campaign of
ethnic discrimination and, in some cases, violence, which only
escalated as the 1990s unfolds. So the Kosovo Liberation Army was
really created by President Milosevic as a result of his brutal and
repressive policy.
Chechnya -- I think you can explain better than I the roots of the
conflict there, so I won't say that. But in terms of the military
campaigns that have been carried out, there are some big differences.
In Kosovo, NATO was extremely careful to avoid hitting civilian
targets; in fact, the air campaign went on as long as it did because
of our scrupulous care in choosing targets and minimizing damage to
civilians. In Chechnya, to our regret, there has been massive
destruction of civilian population centers and large loss of life
among the civilian population.
In the case of Kosovo, of course, we only used force after exhausting
all possible political and diplomatic means of a solution. And I'm not
sure Russia, after the first Chechen war, really did enough to promote
a lasting political solution in Chechnya, and it's making that same
mistake again, as I said in response to an earlier question. So, in
Kosovo, NATO used force basically to save a civilian population from
the destruction of the central power. That, I'm afraid, is not what's
happening in Chechnya. And therefore we feel quite convinced that we
did the right thing, but we remain convinced that the means Russia is
using in Chechnya are the wrong ones and only laying the seed of a
much more difficult and long-lasting crisis in Russia's southern
regions.
PARTICIPANT: (In Russian) -- State TV and Radio. Mr. Ambassador, it is
well known what Russia's position is with respect to the expansion
eastward, and you know that many Russians view NATO in a negative
light. Is it possible to expect the leaders of NATO to do any steps,
to take any steps, to change the image, the reputation, of NATO?
AMBASSADOR VERSHBOW: The answer to that is very much yes, a very
strong yes. We think that there is a very severe lack of understanding
of what NATO is today. I think many Russians still think of NATO as
the NATO of the Cold War, but I think if one goes back and looks at
the last ten years, one can see that NATO has gone through an
extraordinary and unprecedented process of transformation. One could
even call it a metamorphosis from a Cold War alliance into an
inclusive collective security structure.
Collective defense is still the fundamental mission of NATO. We still
are committed to defend the territory of our members, but NATO now is
the nucleus of a cooperative security structure that aims to bring all
the democracies of Europe into cooperation to solve problems together.
So we would like to expand understanding of what's often called "the
new NATO" in Russia. Before Kosovo, we were talking about establishing
a NATO information center in Moscow, and we have resumed talks on that
and we hope that agreement can be reached soon on establishing such a
center. This will permit Russians to hear directly from
representatives of NATO; for NATO to organize exchanges, both to NATO
countries, to NATO headquarters, and of NATO representatives,
parliamentarians, to the Russian Federation.
I think the more that we can establish dialogue and an exchange of
views, the more some of these Cold War misconceptions of NATO will
disappear. So I urge all of you to come to NATO headquarters and find
out for yourselves how things have changed and how we're trying to
develop the NATO-Russia relationship as a central part of NATO's
mission for the future.
PARTICIPANT: (In Russian) -- TV company. Thank you for this invitation
to come to the headquarters in Brussels. I have this question. The
Russian Duma ratified START II Treaty and some thing of this really
undermines the security of the country, its ability to defend itself.
What would you say to these people, and how the US anti-missile system
is going to be developing in the future?
AMBASSADOR VERSHBOW: Well, we strongly believe that the ratification
and implementation of START II is in Russia's interest and in the
United States' interest. I think we both can maintain our security at
much lower levels of nuclear forces. START II provides for significant
reduction in both of our arsenals; and, indeed, because of Russia's
more difficult economic circumstances, Russia probably would not have
been able to maintain the force level of START I, whereas the United
States was required by law to keep its forces at that level until you
ratified START II. So I think you've done yourself a good service by
ratifying START II.
I would mention also that within the details of the START II agreement
are very important provisions that strengthen the stability of the
strategic nuclear balance between Russia and the United States. The
most important of these is the elimination of the multiple-warhead
missiles, or the land-based multiple-warhead missiles, which have had
the greatest potential for at least a theoretical first strike against
the other side. So START II is an excellent basis now to move on to
even deeper reductions in START III, and that will be part of the
agenda for Presidents Clinton and Putin when they meet next month.
We believe that our plans for national missile defense are also
compatible both with START II and with a future START III agreement.
We certainly believe that the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty of 1972 is
still an important foundation for our strategic relationship, but that
treaty is almost 30 years old and the strategic environment has
changed significantly, most importantly because long-range missiles
are now coming into the hands of unpredictable countries like North
Korea and Iran.
So we believe that we can modify the ABM Treaty to permit very
limited, modest defenses against these kinds of threats without in any
way altering the stability of the US-Russian nuclear balance. So you
can have START III and you can have national missile defense, and we
will be both better off if we do that.
MR. FOUCHEUX: Ambassador, I'm sorry to interrupt you in mid-thought
there. We have to make room on the satellite for another program. Our
thanks to our participants in Moscow, St. Petersburg and Yekaterinburg
for joining us today, and the Honorable Ambassador Vershbow for
joining us today from NATO in Brussels.
In Washington, I'm Rick Foucheux for Dialogue. Have a good day, and
thank you for watching.
(end transcript)
(Distributed by the Office of International Information Programs, U.S.
Department of State. Web site: http://usinfo.state.gov)