04 November 1999
("Time for Russia to turn the page and resume cooperation") (4,400)
U.S. Ambassador to NATO Alexander Vershbow, in what he called a
"brutally frank" address at the Moscow State Institute for
International Relations October 28, outlined the present uneasy state
of NATO-Russia relations, criticized Russia for many of its actions
during the Kosovo crisis, and called on Russia "to view NATO and its
offers of cooperation not through the prism of the past, but in the
light of the new possibilities a changing world presents us."
For NATO's part, he added, "we are ready to listen to Russia's side of
the argument."
Vershbow outlined the goals and attributes of NATO today, noting that
"the only reference to Russia in our new Strategic Concept is in the
context of cooperation and partnership."
The Kosovo crisis, he said, "showed how important it is to strengthen
NATO's partnership with Russia. That partnership was important in
early efforts to manage the Kosovo crisis and was even more important
at the end in solving it. However, the NATO-Russia relationship broke
down at the height of the conflict."
Outlining the basis for NATO's actions against Kosovo -- UN Security
Council Resolution 1199, which Russia supported -- Vershbow observed
that "Russia hampered efforts to find a political solution at the
Rambouillet and Paris negotiations, leaving no alternative but the use
of force."
Russia also made the mistake, he maintained, of suspending
consultations in the Permanent Joint Council (PJC) as soon as the NATO
air campaign began, shutting off "an important channel through which
we could have explained our respective positions and perhaps found
ways to cooperate in finding an early solution to the crisis."
Although Russia "did decide to join with us in finding a solution
through the mechanism of the G-8," and thus helped "restore the UN
Security Council to the role it should have been playing all along,"
Vershbow said, "NATO-Russia cooperation is still running on only one
cylinder. Russia insists that PJC can only address Kosovo, and has
frozen other aspects of our work under the Founding Act."
Vershbow said NATO believes partnership has to be "a two-way street,"
and that NATO is "upholding its side of the bargain" in Kosovo and is
prepared to engage on other issues whenever Russia is ready. "We
believe it is time for Russia to turn the page and resume cooperation
on other issues where there is a common interest."
Some of those issues, Vershbow said, include: military strategies and
doctrines so as "to dispel misperceptions"; preventing proliferation
of weapons of mass destruction; theater missile defense against rogue
states; regional security problems in areas such as Southeastern
Europe and the Caucasus; arms control; military and political
interoperability during peace support operations; military-industrial
cooperation; and the retraining of retired Russian military officers.
He praised the "excellent" cooperation in Kosovo between NATO and
Russian military forces on the ground, noting "it is clear that our
forces are working closely together with the same mission, the same
rules of engagement, and the same commitment to an even-handed
application of the UNSC resolution."
Vershbow also discussed the results of the previous day's PJC meeting
to discuss NATO-Russian cooperation in Kosovo. "In contrast to the
first two meetings (which I have frequently compared to a visit to the
dentist, Dr. Kislyak), this meeting led to positive conclusions," he
said. "NATO and Russia agreed on how their respective KFOR forces
should manage many of the sensitive issues that remain in implementing
the peace in Kosovo... We still have our differences, but our
cooperation in Kosovo is on the right track. Therefore, we believe it
is time for Russia to turn the page and resume cooperation on other
issues where there is a common interest."
While acknowledging that many people in Russia and in NATO countries
are skeptical about what can be gained through NATO-Russia cooperation
and partnership, Vershbow said that "for me and all my colleagues on
the North Atlantic Council, there is nothing that matters more than
getting our relationship with Russia right."
Following is the text of his remarks:
(begin text)
Ambassador Alexander Vershbow
U.S. Permanent Representative on the North Atlantic Council
NATO-RUSSIA: PROMISE OF PARTNERSHIP OR PROBLEMS?
Remarks at the Moscow State Institute for International Relations
(MGIMO)
Moscow, Russia
October 28, 1999
It's my professional and personal pleasure to be here today and to
address this conference. In my diplomatic career, I have had the good
fortune to work on key questions in our relations with the Soviet
Union -- and now Russia -- in Washington, Moscow, Geneva, London, and
now for a second time at NATO. These times have been among the most
challenging and rewarding of my government service.
In recent months, Russians have been debating their country's
relations with the West in general, and with the United States and
NATO in particular. After Kosovo, many have questioned whether Russia
has in any way profited from those relations. For our part, in the
United States and at NATO, we have been engaging in a similar review
of our interaction with Russia. It seems that many in Russia believe
that, by continuing the "pretense of partnership" with NATO, Russia
gains nothing. Many in NATO countries have asked the same question,
wondering why it is in NATO's interests to cooperate with Russia. Some
in the West have gone so far as to ask: "Does Russia matter any more?"
Let me say that, for me and all my colleagues on the North Atlantic
Council, there is nothing that matters more than getting our
relationship with Russia right.
For that to happen, much remains to be done in terms of better
explaining the benefits for Russia of partnership with NATO.
Unfortunately, the discussions -- both here and in NATO -- are often
reduced to simple catch-phrases or slogans. They focus on the
instantaneous, on quick tabulations of short-term benefits, as if the
relationship were a zero-sum game. People often do not make the effort
to consider the long-term benefits to both Russia and NATO from
working together.
Today I want to be brutally frank, since I know that you will show no
mercy to me when we get to the discussion period. I want to put the
present state of NATO-Russia relations in context and point out
possible areas where cooperation would serve Russia's interests as
well as NATO's. I don't expect to change your minds about NATO. But I
do want you to understand how NATO approaches the objective of
enhancing stability and security throughout Europe, which should be
the guiding principle for the NATO-Russia partnership. To do this, I
think it's worth giving a summary of what NATO is today. I would like
to separate fact from fiction and reality from propaganda, because I
don't think people in Russia have an accurate understanding of what
NATO is all about.
NATO has changed dramatically since the fall of the Berlin wall ten
years ago, adding new missions and members, and a new focus on
partnership and cooperation. NATO has played an active part in
promoting the integration of Europe and the construction of a
pan-European security system, in tandem with the OSCE, European Union
and other institutions. It was the fact of this change that led
President Yeltsin to sign the NATO-Russia Founding Act in June 1997,
notwithstanding our clear differences over NATO enlargement. President
Yeltsin wasn't wrong, nor was the State Duma, in endorsing the
Founding Act. And despite what you may think, NATO hasn't changed its
stripes since 1997. The new NATO unveiled at the 50th Anniversary
Summit in Washington in April -- and the NATO that acted in Kosovo --
is the same new NATO that has been taking shape over the past decade.
What are the main attributes of the new NATO? NATO's first mission is
still collective defense, but the Alliance is no longer oriented
toward meeting a single large-scale threat. No ally today views Russia
as an aggressive or threatening military power. Indeed, the only
reference to Russia in our new Strategic Concept is in the context of
cooperation and partnership. Without diminishing the importance of
defense of Allies' territory, NATO's new Strategic Concept now puts
equal emphasis on defense of common interests and common values. This
is nothing new: the original purpose of the Alliance set forth in the
Washington Treaty in 1949 was to promote the peace and security of the
North Atlantic area.
The new Strategic Concept seeks to promote this goal in several ways:
the first is by "projecting" stability outward through preventive
diplomacy, military-to-military cooperation, political consultations
and other partnership activities. Our aim is to contribute to wider
efforts -- including those of the European Union, OSCE and the Council
of Europe -- to encourage the peaceful settlement of disputes, and the
consolidation of democracy and economic reform. The premise is that
democracy is the best guarantee against instability and conflict in
today's Europe, and the foundation for prosperity and integration.
These goals reflect the essence of the Partnership for Peace and the
Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, and they constitute the rationale
for NATO enlargement: to do for Europe's East what NATO -- together
with the Marshall Plan -- did for Western Europe in the post-War
period.
The new Strategic Concept also puts increased emphasis on NATO's role
in managing crises and restoring peace and stability when preventive
measures fail. This is what NATO has been doing in Bosnia since 1995
and is now the core of the KFOR mission in Kosovo. At the Washington
Summit a key decision was taken that peacekeeping and crisis
management should not be only NATO's affair. Rather, the rule, and not
the exception, should be to act with partners wherever possible. Those
who contribute to NATO-led military operations should have a real
voice in the planning and conduct of peacekeeping operations. At the
same time, we are working to increase the ability of NATO and partner
forces to operate together in peace support operations.
In addition to crisis management and a "more operational" Partnership
for Peace, the new Strategic Concept looks ahead to the new kinds of
threats that are emerging -- that do not respect international
boundaries. Here of course the list is now familiar: weapons of mass
destruction, proliferation of ballistic missile technology, terrorism,
and other "asymmetric threats" by non-state actors to the very fabric
of our civil societies. These are threats that, by their very nature,
affect Russia and NATO -- all the countries in between -- to an equal
degree. They are prime material for NATO-Russia cooperation, as I will
explain later.
A lot of the work now going on at NATO relates to equipping the
Alliance (and its partners) to deal with the threats and challenges of
the 21st century. They include a Defense Capabilities Initiative,
efforts to strengthen the European Security and Defense Identity, and
the establishment of a Weapons of Mass Destruction Center. I would be
happy to expand on these initiatives during the discussion period.
At the Washington Summit, NATO also took two other initiatives which
are aimed at strengthening stability and security in the 21st century.
One is a Southeast European Initiative (SEI) aimed at fostering closer
security cooperation to prevent future crises there. NATO's SEI will
reinforce the political and economic initiatives being pursued within
the EU's Stability Pact.
Finally, at the Washington Summit, NATO made clear that the
evolutionary enlargement of the Alliance will continue. To this end we
adopted a Membership Action Plan aimed at better preparing candidates
for the obligations and requirements of NATO membership, so that they
will be able to present the strongest possible case for admission when
NATO has its next summit in late 2001 or 2002. We reaffirmed that no
European democracy will be excluded from consideration by reason of
geography, while stressing that a country's admission to NATO must
contribute to the overall security of the Euro-Atlantic area.
From NATO's perspective, the importance of all of this work was not
called into question, but rather was confirmed by the Kosovo crisis:
-- Kosovo showed that it is important for NATO to have the capacity to
address regional threats to security and stability through more
effective crisis management and peacekeeping tools.
-- Kosovo showed that it is essential for the European nations to
assume greater military and political responsibility within the
Alliance. This means closing the gap in advanced capabilities that
only the U.S. and 1 to 2 other allies possess, and increasing their
ability to deploy and sustain peacekeeping forces away from their
territory for extended periods of time, whether under NATO or EU
command.
-- Kosovo showed the importance of strengthening the Partnership for
Peace, since it was key to isolating Milosevic and thwarting his
campaign of mass murder and forcible expulsion of more than a million
Kosovar Albanians.
-- Kosovo highlighted the urgency of efforts by NATO and other
institutions to stabilize Southeastern Europe, so as to prevent future
crises and to accelerate the integration of that region into the wider
Euro-Atlantic family.
-- Kosovo showed the importance of preparing not just for the last
war, but for the next. This means coming to grips with new threats
like the weapons of mass destruction and proliferation of ballistic
missiles. (We would not have been well prepared if Milosevic's threats
to use chemical weapons had been carried out.)
-- Finally, Kosovo showed how important it is to strengthen NATO's
partnership with Russia. That partnership was important in early
efforts to manage the Kosovo crisis and was even more important at the
end in solving it. However, the NATO-Russia relationship broke down at
the height of the conflict.
It is that subject to which I would like to turn next: Why did the
NATO-Russia partnership fail to deliver when it was subjected to its
most severe test?
Many Russians believe that NATO was to blame, that NATO violated the
UN Charter and the NATO-Russia Founding Act. You will not be surprised
that we and our Allies reject both of these accusations. We believe
that NATO acted in support of goals that were laid down in UN Security
Council Resolution 1199, a resolution supported by Russia in the fall
of 1998. That resolution labeled the Kosovo crisis a threat to the
peace and security of the region. It invoked Chapter 7 of the UN
Charter and demanded an end to the repression by FRY [Federal Republic
of Yugoslavia] forces and the growing humanitarian crisis. It called
on both sides to refrain from violence and find a peaceful solution
that would restore autonomy to Kosovo. The problem, from our
perspective, is that Russia did not then live up to its responsibility
as a UN Security Council member in following through on these demands.
Russia hampered efforts to find a political solution at the
Rambouillet and Paris negotiations, leaving no alternative but the use
of force.
Let us recall what happened after the January massacre by FRY forces
in Racak, which was the catalyst for more decisive action. Russia and
the major NATO powers joined together at the Contact Group meeting in
London on January 29 to give the parties what was effectively an
ultimatum, summoning them to negotiations at Rambouillet. NATO in its
turn made clear that it was prepared to use force if the parties did
not accept a peaceful solution along the lines set forth by the
Contact Group, based on the clear threat to the peace and stability of
the region and the escalating humanitarian crisis. NATO also made
clear that no solution would be viable without an international
military presence on the ground.
Here is where Russia, in our view, made a fateful mistake. It took
Milosevic's side in arguing that no international military force was
required to enforce a political settlement. This went against all the
evidence accumulated in the wake of the agreements brokered by Richard
Holbrooke in October. Those agreements, enforced only by civilian
verifiers and a NATO air verification regime, proved to be ineffective
in deterring President Milosevic from continuing with his brutal
campaign of repression and ethnic cleansing. Nor did those agreements
constrain the Kosovo Liberation Army from continuing its provocative
military actions. Rather than accepting these lessons, however, Russia
only supported half a peace at Rambouillet -- a political framework
for Kosovo autonomy inside the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY)
without the means to enforce it.
Had Russia put more pressure on Serbian negotiators at Rambouillet, it
is possible that we might have been able to achieve a peaceful
solution without the use of force. Moreover, the FRY would have had a
better deal: instead of seeing Kosovo become an international
protectorate under the control of the UN, the FRY could have continued
to play a role in administering Kosovo; instead of zero FRY military
and police forces in Kosovo, there could have been 5,000 VJ and MUP
forces still performing security functions in Kosovo; and instead of
massive destruction to Serbia's military forces and infrastructure,
Milosevic could have spared his people their fourth defeat in ten
years, increased economic disintegration, and international isolation.
Unfortunately, Russia also made a mistake, in our view, in suspending
consultations in the Permanent Joint Council (PJC) as soon as the NATO
air campaign began. Although the PJC was intended to be an all-weather
institution, Russia shut off an important channel through which we
could have explained our respective positions and perhaps found ways
to cooperate in finding an early solution to the crisis.
In the end Russia did decide to join with us in finding a solution
through the mechanism of the G-8. Victor Chernomyrdin, working with
Strobe Talbott and later with Finnish President Ahtisaari, helped
convince Milosevic to accept the terms set forth by the G-8, NATO and
the European Union. Through this effort, Russia helped restore the UN
Security Council to the role it should have been playing all along.
Russia joined with us to draft UNSC resolution 1244 which laid the
basis for the military and civilian presences in Kosovo.
We Americans often cite Shakespeare's adage that "all's well that ends
well." But unfortunately, NATO-Russia cooperation is still running on
only one cylinder: Russia insists that PJC can only address Kosovo,
and has frozen other aspects of our work under the Founding Act. From
the NATO perspective, partnership has to be a two-way street. NATO is
upholding its side of the bargain in Kosovo and is prepared to engage
with Russia on other issues whenever Russia is ready.
In Kosovo, cooperation between our military forces on the ground is
excellent. I was in Pristina last Friday and also had the opportunity
to visit the Russian battalion in Kosovska Kamenica during a trip to
Kosovo in August. It is clear that our forces are working closely
together with the same mission, the same rules of engagement, and the
same commitment to an even-handed application of the UNSC resolution.
Yesterday we had our third PJC meeting to discuss our cooperation in
Kosovo. In contrast to the first two meetings (which I have frequently
compared to a visit to the dentist, Dr. Kislyak), this meeting led to
positive conclusions. NATO and Russia agreed on how their respective
KFOR forces should manage many of the sensitive issues that remain in
implementing the peace in Kosovo. These include how to protect the
civilian population and promote a multi-ethnic Kosovo; how to
encourage more Serbs to return to Kosovo and to create acceptable
conditions for those who remain; how to enforce the demilitarization
of the KLA and ensure that the now Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC)
engages exclusively in civilian activities; how to control Kosovo's
borders more effectively against arms and narcotics smuggling, as well
as infiltration by illegal Serb paramilitaries and trouble-makers of
all kinds. We still have our differences, but our cooperation in
Kosovo is on the right track. Therefore, we believe it is time for
Russia to turn the page and resume cooperation on other issues where
there is a common interest.
There is a long list of important issues where NATO and Russia, by
working together, could produce real benefits for their mutual
security:
-- We need to discuss our respective military strategies and doctrines
to dispel misperceptions and identify the common challenges with which
we will both have to deal in the 21st century. NATO's new Strategic
Concept, as I have explained, is aimed at dealing with emerging risks
that also confront Russia as we enter the 21st century. Moreover, our
strategy is premised on cooperation and preventive action wherever
possible. While Russia's new military doctrine has too many echoes of
the Cold War, in our view, it also highlights many of the same risks.
-- More specifically, NATO and Russia should work together to prevent
the further proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and share
information that could help in the fight against international
terrorism.
-- In the longer term, NATO and Russia could collaborate in meeting
the common threats posed by the proliferation of ballistic missile
technology, including shared early warning and, perhaps, cooperative
efforts in the area of theater missile defense against "rogue" states
(within the framework of an adapted ABM Treaty).
-- We should intensify our common efforts to address regional security
problems where we both have a stake, such as Southeastern Europe and
the Caucasus. In this regard, we hope Russia will rejoin the
Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, where many of the other concerned
states are engaged in consultations on regional questions.
-- NATO and Russia should explore ways to strengthen arms control
agreements and develop additional confidence building measures that
could complement the adaptation of the CFE Treaty.
-- We should discuss ways to improve the capacity of our forces to
operate together in peace support operations, both in terms of
military interoperability and the political aspects. (One gap in
Russian capabilities identified by the NATO commanders in Kosovo is in
the area of civil affairs -- how to build public support and
cooperation with the international community.)
-- NATO and Russia should explore the potential for
military-industrial cooperation in the coming years. For example, NATO
nations are now looking at options to increase their strategic airlift
to support future peace-support operations. The Russian aviation
industry may have a role to play.
-- NATO nations have experience to share with Russia in the retraining
of retired military officers and other personnel dislocated by the
downsizing of our military forces - programs that could be of tangible
help to Russian economic development.
I hope you would agree that this is a potentially rich work program
for NATO-Russia cooperation. Indeed, I would submit that there are too
many areas of common interest for Russia and NATO not to work together
in the future. We need to develop what Allies call the "habits of
cooperation" that enable us to see problems through each others' eyes
and to act together to address them. The Founding Act sets forth a
broad agenda and allows for joint action and even joint decisions when
we see eye-to-eye. We need to get back to business and find as many
areas as possible for joint action.
Now I do not want to sound over-optimistic. We will continue to have
differences, including on such issues as Chechnya. We support the
territorial integrity of the Russian Federation, and don't dispute
Russia's right to take appropriate military action against terrorists.
However, the spread of violence in the region runs counter to
everyone's interests -- except those who rely on violence to achieve
their political ends. Russia's last war in Chechnya in 1994-1996
demonstrated there cannot be a purely military solution to the
problem. There must be a vigorous and conscientious effort to engage
regional leaders in a political dialogue. All parties should avoid
indiscriminate or disproportionate use of force that would harm
innocent civilians. Moreover, in defending its own territory, Russia
should take special care to respect the security concerns and
independence of neighboring states, especially Georgia and Azerbaijan.
We hope that Chechnya does not become an obstacle to achieving
positive results from the upcoming OSCE [Organization for Security and
Cooperation] Summit in Istanbul.
To conclude, I think it is fair to say that our common efforts to
build a Europe that is undivided, free and democratic are still a
"work in progress" ten years after the end of the Cold War. It has
taken courage by the people and leaders of Russia and all the other
post-Communist states to press for change. Some countries have
experienced both successes and failures -- Russia among them -- and
this is true of Russia's relations with NATO. Nevertheless, the pluses
in my mind outweigh the minuses. We have made progress in arms
control, and we are working together, on the ground in the Balkans, to
bring lasting peace to Bosnia and Kosovo. These are remarkable
accomplishments, but the potential of the NATO-Russia Founding Act has
yet to be fulfilled.
In the coming years Russia will face many choices, with implications
for Europe, the United States and NATO. While it might not be the
easiest decision to take at the present moment, we firmly believe that
Russia's long-term interests lie in working more closely with NATO. To
make real progress, there obviously has to be better understanding of
the other side's perspective. In Russia, there needs to be a greater
willingness to view NATO and its offers of cooperation not through the
prism of the past, but in the light of the new possibilities a
changing world presents us. For our part, we are ready to listen to
Russia's side of the argument.
(end text)
(Distributed by the Office of International Information Programs, U.S.
Department of State)