The spirit of democracy means, above all, liberty of
choice for human beings. Respect for others will and
habits, tenacity and hard work in searching for happiness,
arduous respect and defence of individual freedoms should
be also added. Extending these features to the scale of
human society means recognising the principles of
plurality of opinions and the freedom to express them,
respect for democratically-elected institutions, the market
economy, as well as displaying responsible behaviour in the
international arena, etc. Considered from the
intellectual, moral or emotional point of view, democracy,
in both its individual and collective forms, is the main
engine of the eternal human striving for justice and
prosperity.
It is the Rapporteur's firm conviction that all of these
features can be found in the fabric of NATO. It is an
Alliance which unites nations faithful to democracy as a
system and in which the consensus principle reflects not
only freedom of choice but also equality and respect for
others will. It is an Alliance whose functioning serves to
defend, enhance and demand more democracy. It is an
Alliance which could exist only based on the bedrock of
democracy, and extending it means enlarging the scope of
democracy. It is an Alliance which ensures, of course, the
collective defence or common security of its members, but
first of all it implies the certitude of existing
democracy.
Entering such an Alliance means undertaking that
certitude and being a contributor to the development of
this remarkable achievement of human civilisation: liberal
democracy.
In the aftermath of the breakdown of communism in
Eastern Europe in 1989 and subsequently the implosion of
the former Soviet Union in 1991, the geopolitical landscape
in Europe has considerably changed. Thus, the withdrawal of
Soviet occupation forces from the former socialist states
and the dissolution of the Warsaw Treaty Organisation have
created a new geopolitical situation in Eastern Europe.
Westward of this region there is a powerful Alliance which
has proved its cohesion during the Cold War era facing the
threat of communist expansion. In the East resides a vast
area of turbulence which evolved in the processes of the
Soviet Union's disintegration, and of state-building in the
newly-independent republics. Moreover, in this area the new
democracies have embarked upon a huge transformation
process, not experienced historically up to now, of
destroying communist structures and creating new ones in
the political, economic and social domains.
The process of confidence-building between the West and
the emerging European democracies evolved steadily and
vigorously after the 1989 revolutions. The Rapporteur
believes it is time to proclaim that the rite of passage
binding the imposed, undemocratic past of the Central
European nations to the foreseeable democratic future has a
lot of importance. The terms Go quickly or go slowly
do not automatically promise rapid or smooth success. The
results appear among many complications, some of them
infectious, like the intolerant fear and suspicion towards
the "new strangers" and/or "old predators". On the
contrary, democracy and free initiative remain, above all
their imperfections, too peaceful and beautiful to be
wasted in undeserved nostalgia and blind regrets.
In this moment, for the entire Central and Eastern
European region the need for a security umbrella in order
to ensure stability and the fluency of the transitional
process has become imperative. The only solution is NATO
membership, the Western Alliance itself striving to
redefine itself and determine new roles and strategies.
It is beyond question that after enlargement NATO will
continue the process of reform begun several years ago.
This transformation was needed by NATO in order to
accommodate itself to the changing circumstances of the
post-Cold War era, to avoid the fate of the WTO doomed to
dissolve itself in 1991. Consequently, in NATO's life
intervened changes in strategy-conducting out-of-area
operations like the current one in Bosnia-Herzegovina, in
the organisation of its forces - planning the formation of
the Combined Joint Task Forces, or in the relations with
former enemies that have become present-day partners -
setting up the North Atlantic Co-operation Council and the
Partnership for Peace. In the aftermath of enlargement
obviously this transformation process will keep going and
presumably it will develop more rapidly in order to absorb
new members without weakening the Alliance. It can be said
that this absorption has already begun with the candidate
states having to reach interoperability and standardisation
objectives and being periodically checked on in this
respect.
The opinion of the candidate states in Central Europe is
that the transformation of NATO must proceed along with the
overall strategy of the Alliance becoming the main
political and military instrument for ensuring security in
Europe. This task means shaping new political bodies for
coping with the challenges of the future (and having more
than twenty full-fledged members, security treaties with
Russia and possibly with Ukraine), reorganising the command
structures in order to face new military threats (local
conflicts, intra-state crises, etc), and preparing military
forces able to act instantly and effectively in any
emergency situation, even in a distant corner of Europe.
NATO enlargement is not only a question of decision for
the members of the Alliance or of political will of the
leadership in the new democracies of Central Europe, but
also a request of the public opinion in the candidate
countries. Recent polls developed in these countries have
shown that public opinion acts for continuously shaping the
above-mentioned political will and concomitantly acts like
a surveyor of the attitude of the political establishment
in this regard. Figures show between almost 45% in the
Slovak Republic and more than 80% in Romania or Poland in
favour of full-fledged NATO membership. This trend has two
remarkable features for the region as a whole. Firstly, the
public opinion s trend of being favourable to NATO has
remained unchanged in the last years, in spite of the
twists of high politics in the international system (the
fierce opposition of Russia and the efforts of the West to
comply with it). Secondly, in all these polls the number of
"Yeses" for NATO membership is invariably higher among the
young people. This feature is a reason of hope and
confidence: hope for fulfilling the task of joining NATO,
and confidence that the future of these countries will not
accept hegemony, spheres of influence or other evils of the
distant as well as recent past. It is a tremendous task of
the new elites of the emerging democracies in Central
Europe to capitalise on this orientation of the young
generation to attain the aim of being a part of the world
of stability and prosperity. Needless to say, the
convictions of the younger generation will shape the future
of these countries and will have more and more weight in
elections, that is, in rejecting the conservative,
reactionary forces. Furthermore, we can hardly accept that
for these young people the reason for saying Yes to NATO is
"fear of Russia".
Among the new elites of the emerging democracies in
Central Europe there is a firm conviction that only through
NATO membership is it possible to overcome quickly the
burden of transition and to ensure the future of democracy
in their countries. Positive economic consequences could be
expected also from the very fact of NATO enlargement in the
countries of Central Europe. Beyond the climate of security
and stability which is beneficial for pursuing growing
economic activity, foreign investment would discover the
region as one of the surest places in the world, and that
will speed up the transition, economic recovery and
take-off of the countries. This way the consolidation of
democracy would be easier and faster. As a matter of fact
that conviction reflects the mood of public opinion,
fulfilling the requirement of political consensus between
leadership and society.
The origins for this firm belief are obvious.
Firstly, the fear of the "fall back to the past" - the
eventual recovery of the conservative political forces -
induces the necessity of finding a shelter for avoiding the
nightmare. Secondly, NATO membership is seen not only as a
security umbrella, but in some cases, first and foremost,
as a tool for modernisation of the entire society, meaning
in fact brotherhood with the most developed nations of the
world. Thirdly, from a historical point of view this
important step is destined to unite these countries with
the West and to ensure that such a liaison is on the path
of no return. Last, but not least, there is a process of
maintenance of stability and prosperity all over Europe,
which is claiming NATO membership of these countries, and
this continental-wide interest is clearly realised.
Seizing upon this demonstrable truth, the whole
request of NATO enlargement is made legitimate and
reasonable.
The presence on the continent of American interests
and forces is essential for the successful development of
the process and, concomitantly, for the maintenance of the
Alliance itself. As was demonstrated three times in this
century - during WWI, WWII and the Cold War - the American
physical presence has been crucial for the security of
Europe, for avoiding the hegemony of a single power which
would have endangered the stability of the Northern
hemisphere. This lesson of the past has been assimilated on
both sides of the Atlantic and, consequently, the presence
of US troops on the soil of the Old world has become a
natural thing for the long-term future. The new democracies
learned this lesson rapidly and they became the most vocal
supporters of the ongoing presence of the USA on the
continent. Logically, the NATO membership candidate states
must favour such a reality due to the fact that, otherwise,
the Alliance itself would become irrelevant. The new
democracies could not ask to become fully-fledged members
without assuming that this multilateral body is a
quintessential vehicle of US interests and presence in
Europe. This logic is leading us to affirm that, in this
regard, the new democracies are the best allies of the
United States in Europe without being, of course, the
enemies of a European identity in security and foreign
policy matters. The Rapporteur does not see any potential
risk of dissension and overlapping of powers since the EU
security structure represents the "European pillar of
NATO".
Another essential prerequisite for NATO enlargement is
to be fully aware that Russia has been and will continue to
be a sine qua non part of the European architecture of
security. Beginning with the Congress of Vienna in 1815,
Russia is a constitutive part of Europe and nothing could
be done on the continent without it in terms of security.
As we all know, Russia is strongly opposing NATO
enlargement, albeit being at the same time a participant in
the Partnership for Peace Programme.
By opposing NATO enlargement, Russia is, in a way,
opposing Europe. Recently, a conference was held in
Moscow, co-organised by American and Russian political
institutions, to discuss the "old divisions and the new
bridges" between the Central European states and Russia.
The central issue of the conference quickly became NATO
enlargement, and it appeared that the representatives from
the United States along with Poland, Romania, Hungary,
Czech Republic and Slovakia voiced a united message in
order to convince a resolutely opposing attitude of the
Russian colleagues. We did not use words to conceal
thoughts rather than express them because we felt there
that our future was at present rather unsettled.
It is necessary to explain and persuade Moscow that
NATO enlargement is in Russia's interest as well - for the
contribution it makes to spreading democracy and stability
to the borders of Russia - and that Russia's opposition is
projecting a new division of Europe which could harm
especially the promoter of such a division. One powerful
argument in convincing Russia is to clearly point out the
fact that without Russia - or, moreover, against it - a
viable European security architecture would be impossible
to build.
Is it possible to extend NATO eastward and
concomitantly preserve Russia as a major actor in European
security? This is a question that has to be answered not
only by
the West but by the new democracies of Central Europe as
well.
It was pointed out both in the West and in the
candidate countries that Russia has no right of VETO upon
NATO enlargement, and by opposing this process it isolates
itself from Europe, dividing again the continent and
triggering a "cold peace". Recently, during the visit of
the Russian Foreign Minister to countries of Central Europe
this stance was promoted courageously by the latter. But at
the same time in these countries there is a strong
conviction that Russia could not be excluded from Europe,
that it is necessary to undertake wise steps in order to
ensure Russia's presence in the new security architecture
of the continent. This conviction comes from many centuries
of historical experience which has made clear the fact that
it is better having Russia inside rather than outside
Europe. On the same lines of thought, different authorities
of NATO or political personalities in the West have
expressed their concerns as regards leaving Russia outside
the process of managing security on the continent, and they
have underlined the idea that a treaty between this huge
country and NATO has become a necessity.
When the challenge is to establish a NATO-Russia
partnership, talk is about co- operation and not
interference. Preaching this co-operation means increasing
the efficiency of security efforts through the common-sense
use of the resources of both sides. It seems that for
Russia it is still hard to accept, and yet how comforting
should be the gradual realisation that the universal enemy
might become at last a friend.
Two remarks should be made regarding the NATO-Russia
treaty. Firstly, due to both Russian claims of its
traditional interests in Central Europe and the fact that
this treaty is destined to smooth Moscow s hostility to
NATO enlargement in that area, we consider that in one way
or another the candidate countries should have a place at
the negotiating table of that treaty. That very fact would
articulate more clearly their desire to join NATO and
similarly would persuade Russia that NATO enlargement is
not a joint hostile move of the Western and Central
European countries. Secondly, a treaty with Russia is not
enough for European security. The stance of Ukraine in
these matters is of critical importance due to its location
and size and generally due to its geopolitical
significance. The Rapporteur believes that having Ukraine
as a major actor of the European security system is of
equal importance to including Russia. Consequently, a
peculiar liaison between NATO and Ukraine (a treaty?) is
necessary for promoting NATO enlargement and avoiding new
division lines on the continent.
Another consideration is that by convincing Russia
that NATO enlargement is in its own interest too it would
equally be obliged to stop promoting its own model of
European security: namely to base the new security
architecture on the OSCE, subordinating other institutions
- including NATO and the Tashkent Treaty - to this body,
and to form a Security Council in Europe shaped on the same
pattern as the UN Security Council or on the Contact Group
for former Yugoslavia.
As we all know, a large debate has developed around
the order of admission of the candidate states in the
Alliance. Here there are various points of departure: the
geopolitical necessity of separating Germany and Russia,
such that avoiding the roots of future conflicts in the
region implies the admission of the Visegrad group
countries in the first wave; the principle of territorial
continuity requires firstly Czech and Polish adherence,
albeit Hungary and the Slovak Republic being connected in
the case that the previous two would not be members, with
the questionable neutrality of Austria and rather
impossible neutrality of Romania under some strain from the
ambivalence of the Bulgarian attitude; to overcome the
hostility of Russia, enlargement should be limited to the
Czech Republic, as only this country is within the range of
1,500 km away from Russia's border, as admitted recently by
Moscow; various political lobbies in the US Congress
support an order of admission strongly related to the
ethnic constituencies in that country; etc.
Contrary to the wave theory - validated indeed by the
September 1995 official "Study on NATO Enlargement"
(chapter VI) - is the bloc admission of all former WTO
members from Central Europe. Here we encounter a strange
question: Does this theory actually represent a veto upon
NATO enlargement? To answer this question, we should take
into account the hopes and fears of the candidate states:
the hopes of all these countries for reaching earlier the
benefits of NATO membership, fears that the first wave will
be the last one. Of course, we cannot exclude a hidden
reason behind this theory, but primarily it reflects the
will of the new democracies to enter faster under the
security umbrella that would protect them from Russian
neo-imperialism.
The Rapporteur would advance some reasons to induce
the members of the Alliance to avoid a discriminatory NATO
enlargement. Firstly, mention should be made of the huge
frustration that would be felt by public opinion within
those countries left apart. There is a large expectation
horizon among the public opinion in the new democracies
concerning NATO enlargement, especially among the young
(recent Gallup polls showed that, for example, in Romania
95% of the population is in favour of adherence to the
Alliance). This feeling of frustration will surely produce
political consequences that would strengthen the
conservative appeal, inventing and exploiting the theme of
a new Western treason (a new Yalta). The freezing of the
spring could be predicted, that is, the freezing of the
political, economic and social transformations triggered in
1989-1990. Secondly, geopolitically NATO enlargement
without including Romania, for example, would preserve the
Russian, at least, droit de regard over the Black Sea and
would jeopardise the new course not only in Romania, but
also, and especially, in the Ukraine. Maintaining this
"aquatorium" outside the larger international context would
reduce it to a neo-"red" Black Sea.
Moreover, and more importantly, the selective
enlargement of NATO would produce, for the first time in
modern history, a division of Central Europe and, thus,
endanger the security of the whole continent. Europe could
not afford the division of its central region in terms of
security without producing a long-lasting division and
reviving spheres of influence.
This potential division would also rob the new elite
countries left apart - political, military and managerial -
of their identities. The overall process of modernisation
would be jeopardised. We could witness the revival of the
confrontational way of thinking. It is, therefore,
absolutely necessary to avoid the emergence of a "no man's
land" in Central Europe which would invariably gravitate
eastward in the end. In short, partial, limited NATO
enlargement in Central and Eastern Europe and generating
liberal democracy are at irrevocable odds.
Here the Rapporteur would like to make some
reflections regarding the specific situation of Romania
facing these two theories of admission. Why is Bucharest
assiduously asking to be included in the first wave of NATO
enlargement? What are the Romanian assets in this respect?
It is not only that Romania is arduously seeking to be
among the first who will join NATO - and she behaved
accordingly in 1994 as the first to join the Partnership
for Peace - but she expresses confidence in reaching this
aim. This behaviour derives from the unmistakable feeling
that time is running out, since Russia will recover before
the second NATO enlargement wave can take place. At this
point it is worth mentioning the Russian political and
diplomatic offensive against NATO enlargement. Also of
importance is the feeling that being left for the second
wave means being condemned to a possible VETO submitted by
a country which entered the first wave. This feeling cannot
be understood without profound appreciation for the history
of the region, a history of waves of hate and contest, of
cycles of war and peace which disappear only when democracy
is truly reigning in all of these countries. The Rapporteur
expressed his opinion on the subject during the debate
which took place in Budapest at the Spring Session of our
Assembly last year, after the address of the Hungarian
Prime Minister Gyula Horn: "Romania and Hungary are set to
become NATO members simultaneously". It is the firm
conviction of Romania that she can be a real security
generator on the continent and that she will belong to the
privileged group of countries that will form the first wave
of NATO enlargement. The recent signing and expected
ratification of the Treaty between Romania and Hungary is
another argument for the simultaneous admission of both
countries into NATO. Separating them again for the purposes
of NATO membership would drive a new wedge between them and
defeat the very purposes of the historic Treaty they just
signed after five years of painstaking efforts.
Romania has important trumps on which her requests are
founded. Strategically, Romania undoubtedly has the stature
of the pivotal state in the region, forming a stronghold of
stability in the huge space between the Baltic and the
Black Seas. Romania also has an important economic,
demographic, and other potential, second only to Poland. In
Central Europe, it is beyond any doubt that Romania is
needed by NATO to extend stability and security further to
the East, and Romania risks becoming the first target of
retaliatory measures by the party/parties opposing NATO
enlargement. Politically, Romania could be a link between
the enlarged NATO and the geopolitical area of the former
Soviet Union in the new security architecture of the
Eurasian space. Finally, - belonging to both Central
Europe and South-Eastern Europe - Romania links the flanks
of the region between the Baltic and the Aegean Seas and
between the Black and the Adriatic Seas. As the conflict in
ex-Yugoslavia has shown, any policy of containment of
would-be conflicts in this region is out of the question
without Romania.
Romania is a part of the new direction international
politics took after the downfall of communism. Namely, the
Rapporteur is referring to the open and democratic mutual
understanding among the nations and countries and the
respect for partners, irrespective of their power status or
military forces. Romania is striving incessantly for
adhering to the democratic, developed and prosperous world,
and therein lies the fundamental reason why Bucharest is
asking for non-selective NATO enlargement and is rejecting
neutrality and the theory of Alliance admission waves.
The so-called neutrality solution, in fact vested
isolation and suspicion, does not indicate the necessary
guarantees for maintaining it while assuming that Romania
could alone pretend to be neutral. In other words,
according to this view we expect to get guarantees all the
same for our national security but to give nothing in
return, which is not realistic.
The Rapporteur wishes to present two perspectives
concerning the wave admission theory. Firstly, accepting it
would mean agreeing to enlarge the gap between the
countries of the primary wave and the others due to the
dynamic of this process. Now, the differences among various
candidates are negligible but, in a wave admission context
case, such differences would develop dramatically and
jeopardise the overall process of enlargement. In such a
case, for the Romanian nation the well known legend of
Dracula would acquire dramatic new connotations. The
non-admission into NATO in the first wave would be a sort
of "Draculisation" of Romania in the eyes of its nation.
In view of the coming elections this year, as a
presidential candidate, the Rapporteur would like to turn
to the task of enhancing the authority of Romania's
aspiration to NATO membership through its internal
democratic development. After the December 1989 Revolution
Romanians felt a sense of triumph: freedom was at last in
their hands, not only in their hearts. Freedom paved,
immediately and without hesitation, the road to democracy.
The paradox inherent in democracy, however, is that it must
create and depend on citizens who are free, autonomous and
self-reliant - qualities which were the most endangered and
repressed under communist rule.
How modern Pericles' summary of the qualities
necessary for a democratic statesman suddenly appeared: to
know what must be done and to be able to explain it; to
love one's country and to be incorruptible". These same
qualities are needed by the leaders of our own fragile and
emerging democracy.
Undefeated traits of mentality and residual elements
of so-called real socialism should not interfere with the
newly-planted roots of democratic society. While too many
people are still suffering as much, and sometimes more, as
they suffered in the previous regime, the Rapporteur can
see only one way of maintaining the positive accelerating
dynamics needed: raise hope in the hearts of those who lost
it too quickly in the period following the successful
anti-Communist revolution. Designing and building a new
and normal society is Romania's paramount vision beyond the
necessary and tenacious efforts devoted to controlling the
multiple uncertainties which inevitably accompany the
transition process.
For too many years Romanians were excluded from the
area of democracy. Even without knowing exactly how
beneficial they were, Romanians lost the main opportunities
offered to the free countries by the great economic, social
and technological changes which took place in the West.
Uniting their destiny with that of the Western European
countries is their goal. Nothing can guarantee Romania's
success save their own will and national effort. Such
efforts will, however, come to naught without NATO's
enlightened solidarity.
To conclude this paper devoted to Central Europe's new
democracies' perceptions concerning NATO enlargement, the
Rapporteur would like to single out two key words. They
spring largely from his analysis of Romania's situation in
this respect, but he is convinced that they can be applied
also to other candidates accordingly.
Bitterness will cover the dreaded non-enlargement of
NATO towards Central Europe. The Alliance s inability or
unwillingness to expand eastwards will seal the fate of the
new democracies, deflecting them from the way of unending
effort in completing economic transition and avoiding
authoritarian, or even totalitarian, temptations. Without a
firm umbrella of security, the new democracies may fail to
reach economic prosperity as a bedrock for democracy, thus
inviting ancient expansionist dreams always present in the
region. Needless to say, in such a case the security of the
entire continent would be jeopardised, with Central Europe
being connected equally to both parts of Europe and
creating a new division line within it.
Failure is the key word for delaying NATO enlargement.
Since in this way the transition inside the new democracies
and, implicitly, the suffering of the population will be
expanded in time, dashing the expectations fostered by the
crush of communism, and will also affect Western Europe.
The Western democratic vision for a more stable and
prosperous world is becoming reality through tireless
regular efforts of the leaders and nations of the emerging
European democracies working more and more within the
Euro-Atlantic institutions. The Rapporteur reflects that
the words of P.D.James about love fit well with the reborn
passion and devotion for democracy of the new European
leaders: "The moment of (their) affirmation had been both
a fulfilment and a promise, not the end of searching but
the beginning of discovery".
