Stockholm -- U.S. Ambassador to Sweden Lyndon Olson reviewed key U.S. initiatives with the Baltic and Northern European nations at a conference on Baltic security and cooperation here November 19.

One of the keys to U.S. strategy in the region, Olson said, is the Charter of Partnership between the United States and the three Baltic nations: Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania.

"The Baltic Charter is about the full integration of these three dynamic countries into European and trans-Atlantic institutions," he said. "Areas where we work together include furthering the integration of minorities in accordance with OSCE [Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe] standards, and the recent Latvian referendum was a successful test of our common efforts in that area."

On security matters, Olson restated President Clinton's earlier pledge that "NATO's door is and will remain open to every partner nation, and America is determined to create the conditions under which Estonia, Lithuania, and Latvia can one day walk through that door."

He added, "At the same time, the Charter does not contain pre-commitments. The Baltic states must, like all other NATO aspirants, meet the same high standards that NATO sets for all new members. But we want to help them become as strong as possible candidates for NATO membership. To that end, we expect to introduce additional, practical measures at the Washington Summit next April to underscore our commitment to the Open Door and the continuation of the NATO enlargement process."

Olson also stressed the U.S. interest in "Russia and its integration both into the overall Euro-Atlantic community and into this region in particular.... We want Russia to stop regarding the Baltic region as a pathway for invading armies or as a buffer zone. There are no longer any would-be aggressors to be rebuffed. Instead, we want Moscow to view these countries in what one might call Hanseatic terms, namely as a gateway outward to cooperate with the West."

"We and our European partners can help by involving Russia to the greatest extent possible in the political, commercial, environmental and other forms of collaboration developing among the states along the Baltic Sea littoral," he added.

Olson also discussed the Northern European Initiative, which "works to help build an economically and socially unified region -- including Northwestern Russia -- and make the region stronger and more stable through cooperation and cross-border ties. We want to help knit together private sector, governmental, and NGOs interested in the region."

Following is text of Olson's remarks:

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I'd like to welcome Senator Gordon Smith from the Senate Foreign Relations Committee as well as former National Security Advisor Zbigniew Bzrezinski, who have joined us from Washington for this important conference. We very much appreciate them taking the time from their very busy schedules to be with us in Stockholm. As many of you may know, Dr. Brzezinski is currently heading a Task Force on Northeastern Europe sponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations that is exploring ways in which the U.S. can expand its engagement in the region.

This conference has become an important annual event where policymakers and experts gather to discuss important issues and trends. The fact that it is hosted by an American Embassy in the region, and has attracted such high-level attendance, is testimony to the important stake the United States sees in regional developments and their impact on broader European and trans-Atlantic security.

I have often been asked why it is that the United States seems to be paying more attention to Northern Europe. Indeed, since I am the third American speaker you will hear today, you may already be asking yourselves the same question.

The answer is fairly simple. First, this is a region where things are happening and where one can see the contours of a new Europe and a new Euro-Atlantic community taking shape. It is an exciting region where things are happening, and it is returning to its historic roots as an open region with a prosperous, integrated economy. With the disappearance of the artificial divisions of the Cold War, the Baltic Sea is resuming its role as a regional unifier, rather than a divider. The old Hanseatic ideal of an open trading area can, once again, become the model for how the region can grow politically and economically.

Not only are people paying more attention to Northern Europe, but Northern Europeans are becoming more involved in the events on the continent and beyond their immediate borders as well. Countries in the region are actively involved in bringing peace to Bosnia. Over the last decade Denmark has become one of our key partners in cooperation in the Baltic Sea region and in expanding and reforming NATO. Norway has recently assumed the role of lead nation in the Kosovo Verification Mission. Finland has played a key role in developing the Northern Dimension of the European Union and will assume the EU Presidency late in 1999. Sweden is currently playing an active role in the UN Security Council.

For the United States these developments have brought new opportunities for U.S. policy that did not exist a short time ago. Our relations with many countries in the region are at an all-time high as we increasingly work together to address challenges in the region and beyond.

The second reason for increased U.S. interest in the region is that amidst these opportunities also lie some difficult challenges. One of those challenges regards the future security and the proper place of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania in Europe and the Euro-Atlantic community.

I am not revealing a state secret if I suggest that if one was asked a few years ago to draw up a short list of the toughest issues we thought we would face in European security, the Baltic issue would have been on that list. But one could now accurately sum up our attitude in the following way: The Baltic issue is a difficult piece on the European political landscape, but let's not put it in the "too-hard-to handle" category. Let's instead view it as an opportunity to show that our overall strategy and policy can work -- in this region as well as in the rest of Europe.

Speaking in Vilnius in July 1997, Secretary Albright underscored this when she spoke of the Baltic issue as a litmus test of our ability to create a Europe without dividing lines, in which the old zero-sum logic of the Cold War would be replaced by a new win-win philosophy. At that time she said, "Perhaps no part of Europe has suffered more from the old pattern of geopolitics than the Baltic states. And no part of Europe will benefit more if we are successful in overcoming these old patterns and replace them with new habits of cooperation."

How is the U.S. going to implement these policy goals? A key to our strategy is, of course, the Charter of Partnership between the United States and Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. The Baltic Charter is about the full integration of these three dynamic countries into European and trans-Atlantic institutions, and it creates structures to help make that happen. Areas where we work together include furthering the integration of minorities in accordance with OSCE [Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe] standards, and the recent Latvian referendum was a successful test of our common efforts in that area. The Baltic Charter is also about promoting Baltic integration into the WTO and EU, and we are pleased by the strides taken by Latvia and Estonia to move towards membership in those institutions.

The Charter makes clear that the Baltics will not be excluded or discriminated against because of geography or history and the injustices of the past, and that includes NATO enlargement. The touchstone of our policy is President Clinton's pledge earlier this year that "NATO's door is and will remain open to every partner nation, and America is determined to create the conditions under which Estonia, Lithuania, and Latvia can one day walk through that door." No one has a veto on Baltic NATO membership.

At the same time, the Charter does not contain pre-commitments. The Baltic states must, like all other NATO aspirants, meet the same high standards that NATO sets for all new members. But we want to help them become as strong as possible candidates for NATO membership. To that end, we expect to introduce additional, practical measures at the Washington Summit next April to underscore our commitment to the Open Door and the continuation of the NATO enlargement process.

The third reason for our interest in Northern Europe is the policy challenge we face concerning Russia and its integration both into the overall Euro-Atlantic community and into this region in particular. Secretary Albright also said in Vilnius last year that the "quest for security in Europe is not a zero-sum game, in which Central Europe must lose if Russia gains, and Russia must lose if Central Europe gains." She said then -- and I would like to repeat this here today -- that we would do "everything we can to ensure that no new lines are drawn across [the European] continent -- not between NATO's first new members and the Baltic states, and not between the Baltic states and [their] neighbors to the east, including Russia."

We are serious when we speak of creating a win-win situation. Promoting Russia's integration in regional cooperation is both essential and commonsensical to the success of our regional strategy. If Russia smoothly integrates with this region, it is more likely to integrate smoothly with the rest of Europe. But if Russia fails -- or refuses -- to build strong ties based on mutual respect and mutual benefit with this strategically and economically vital region, it will be much harder for Russia to find its place within the new Europe. Deputy Secretary Strobe Talbott has stated on several occasions that, while we recognize that the Russians harbor anxieties about the Baltics fulfilling their legitimate aspirations to join institutions such as NATO, we also believe that it is in Moscow's own interest to get over this particular hang-up. We want Russia to stop regarding the Baltic region as a pathway for invading armies or as a buffer zone. There are no longer any would-be aggressors to be rebuffed. Instead, we want Moscow to view these countries in what one might call Hanseatic terms, namely as a gateway outward to cooperate with the West.

Russia will have to make that psychological adjustment itself, in keeping with its own evolving concept of its national interests. But we and our European partners can help by involving Russia to the greatest extent possible in the political, commercial, environmental and other forms of collaboration developing among the states along the Baltic Sea littoral. This is a unique region with unique advantages to make Russia's integration with the West work. Many of the Nordic countries in the region enjoy excellent ties with the U.S. and also good ties with Russia, and there are an increasing number of regional and sub-regional institutions where Russia is already fully present.

The Northern European Initiative (NEI)

To promote those policy goals, we have developed a regional policy -- the Northern European Initiative, or "NEI" -- that adapts to recent changes and capitalizes on new opportunities and addresses new challenges. It was first presented by Assistant Secretary Marc Grossman in Bergen in September 1997. It works to help build an economically and socially unified region -- including Northwestern Russia -- and make the region stronger and more stable through cooperation and cross-border ties. We want to help knit together private sector, governmental, and NGOs interested in the region.

Rather than create new institutions, the NEI works largely through well-functioning, existing institutions. Our contributions of material support, expertise, and diplomatic influence bring unique "value added" to regional efforts. I'll talk briefly about the NEI's three tracks which deal with the Baltics, Nordic states, and Russia.

The first part of NEI is the "Baltic Track." The Administration outlined what we are doing with the Baltics to Senator Smith's European Subcommittee last July and, I should add, the strong bi-partisan support in our Congress has been the key to much of what we have achieved here.

The key to the Baltic track is the Charter of Partnership, signed in Washington in January, which provides a roadmap and created the Baltic Partnership Commission. Since then we have made a solid start, and I have provided you with a handout that outlines our achievements.

On the political front, we have worked jointly and with the private sector to consolidate the transition to democracy by supporting the development of civil societies, including the integration of Russian minorities in accordance with OSCE norms. We are following through with programs on the ground to help Russian speakers prepare for naturalization. We will also be supporting the new Riga graduate law school, which is being created by several member states of the Council of Baltic Sea States and will be open to citizens of all three states, including their ethnic minorities.

The Charter of Partnership's economic aspect includes bilateral working groups, which met for the first time this year. We set priorities in energy, telecommunications, transportation and the environment, and we are now following up. The first Partnership meeting in Riga in July also included a private sector component that identified 12 specific recommendations for improving the business and investment climate in the three states.

A key to our economic strategy is to support the efforts of the three to join the World Trade Organization and the European Union. We are very pleased that Latvia will finalize its WTO membership in the coming months, and we would like Estonia and Lithuania to be ready to join sooner rather than later.

The Partnership's security dimension is, as I have mentioned, a top priority for the United States. Earlier this year we completed a baseline study of the defense needs of each of the Baltic states. The studies identified current weaknesses, and set priorities for developing force modernization plans that will allow them to develop small, but modern and capable, militaries that are NATO-compatible. Each state is currently incorporating many of the details into their own defense planning and priorities.

We are also working through regional groups like the Baltic Security Assistance Group (BALTSEA) to coordinate donor assistance, and we are supporting the Baltic Battalion (BaltBat), the Baltic Airspace Management Regime (BaltNet), the Baltic Squadron (Baltron), and the Baltic Defense College to help these three countries make a concrete contribution to their own national defense, as well as broader European security.

In short, we are helping the Baltic states prepare themselves to become the strongest possible candidates for NATO admission. They have already shown by some actions, like the deployments to the Balkans, that they are becoming "producers" of regional security, rather than simply security "consumers."

The NEI's "Nordic Track" coordinates our efforts to work with Nordic partners, including governments, NGOs and businesses, to promote regional integration and prosperity, and to combat transnational problems. The six areas we are now focusing on include:

-- Law Enforcement: U.S. authorities are working with the Council of Baltic Sea States Task Force on Organized Crime at the operational level to combat international crime.

-- The Environment: Examples of our cooperation includes the Baltics/Great Lakes twinning project, funded by the U.S., which provides technical help to regional states on marine issues.

-- Energy: We have established a task force to study ways to increase power generation efficiency and safety.

-- Public Health: We are focusing especially on working with NGOs and international organizations.

-- Strengthening civil society, such as our cooperation with Sweden on the new Riga Law School, and

-- Business Promotion.

The NEI's "Russia Track" is essential while being the most challenging. We would like to see Russia participate as fully as possible given its economic downturn. Trade between Russia and the region has already diminished since August, and growth in the Baltic states will be lower. Russia is, at least temporarily, less able to cooperate economically, and the private sector, cross-border cooperation that is central to knitting Northwest Russia with the Baltic states will be more limited.

Despite these economic and financial issues, we want to step up our NEI engagement with Russia in areas were cooperation already exists. Current programs include the Murmansk Cask project to produce a prototype interim storage cask for nuclear fuel in the Kola Peninsula. We have contributed $500,000 to this project, and it has also attracted equivalent contributions from Norway, Sweden and Finland. We have also made important steps in cooperating with Russia on organized crime, including drug trafficking and other cross border issues. We are also active in disease control programs and are working through both governments and NGOs on fighting tuberculosis and AIDS, and are beginning a regional initiative on women's concerns, including violence against women and trafficking in women and children.

Working through these three tracks -- Baltic, Nordic and Russian -- we believe we can further regional integration and demonstrate to Russia that greater regional integration helps all parties.

Thank you. I look forward to answering your questions.

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