11 May 1999
(Amb. Vershbow welcomes Baltic support for European security) (2560) Bonn - The steps taken by Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania to support security and stability in Europe serve as evidence of their commitment to the values shared by the 19 members of NATO and have "not gone unnoticed" within the Alliance in its discussions of enlargement, according to the permanent U.S. representative on the North Atlantic Council, Alexander Vershbow. Contributions of peacekeeping troops in Bosnia and assistance for Kosovar refugees "are proof positive," he said, "for anyone who might question whether the Baltic states - today as Partners and some day as Allies - will be net contributors to the common good." Vershbow discussed the implications of NATO enlargement policies on the Baltics in an address May 7 at the Center for European Integration Studies. He stressed that the recent NATO Summit in Washington "gave a very strong endorsement" to further enlargement, and noted that the Summit communique referred to Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania by name. "I think that the governments of the three Baltic States should take particular satisfaction in these statements of Alliance policy." Vershbow added that membership will be considered "on its own merits," meaning that each Baltic country must undertake its own program of military reform and defense modernization to qualify as a credible NATO candidate. And while there is no guarantee that Summit leaders will issue membership invitations to any country when they meet again within a few years, he said, the Alliance is committed to "maintaining the momentum of the enlargement process." Several new initiatives - the Membership Action Plan, the Political-Military Framework, and the Operational Capabilities Concept - Vershbow explained, were designed to help those countries who are part of NATO's Partnership for Peace program and who want to become permanent members. He said they are intended to build strong candidacies by bringing aspiring members more closely into Alliance planning and operational processes and to help them become "net contributors to security" even before formal membership invitations are made. Vershbow also talked about NATO's continuing commitment to build a cooperative relationship with Russia, despite the current impasse over Kosovo. He said this is important for the Alliance, for Russia, and "perhaps most of all" for the Baltic states. Vershbow predicted that NATO's partnership with Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania will be one of "greater engagement, greater feedback, and greater practical cooperation," with a view toward helping them become real contributors to Euro-Atlantic security and thus "realistic candidates" for full membership. Following is a text of his remarks, as prepared for delivery: (Begin text) NATO AND THE BALTIC STATES: IMPLICATIONS OF ENLARGEMENT POLICIES Ambassador Alexander Vershbow, U.S. Permanent Representative on the North Atlantic Council Center for European Integration Studies Bonn, Germany May 7, 1999 With the Washington Summit now two weeks behind us, we not only have a lot of new grist for the conference mill, but we also have had a chance to get one or two night's sleep and to think through what we have just accomplished and where we go from here. Before I get into the details of the Washington decisions and what they mean, let me stress the continuity of the Alliance's enlargement policy. For the post five years, the gradual enlargement of NATO has been a strategic priority for the United States and for the Alliance as a whole. The reason is simple: Nearly all the countries of the Euro-Atlantic area now share with the West the common values of freedom, democracy, free markets, the rule of law, and the belief in peace and security for all. It is only natural that the key institutions which embody these values, and which have ensured security, prosperity, and democracy in the West for the past 50 years -- particularly NATO and the EU -- be opened up to welcome all of the democracies of Europe that share our values and can contribute to the common good. I'll let my colleagues on the panel address the issue of EU enlargement and focus my remarks on NATO -- particularly the Washington decisions and how they relate to enlargement and NATO's future relationship with the Baltic States. In short, this relationship will be one of greater engagement, greater feedback and greater practical cooperation -- all with a view toward helping Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania become real partners for NATO, real contributors to Euro-Atlantic security, and thus realistic candidates for NATO membership when the Alliance is again ready to enlarge. Concerning the Washington decisions, first, let me stress that the Washington Summit gave a very strong endorsement to the further enlargement of NATO. The participation of the three new allies -- and the commitment of all 19 allies to continuing the enlargement process -- delivered a clear message: Stalin's division of Europe is truly over. Continued enlargement is a key part of NATO's strategy for creating a democratic, prosperous and secure Europe in the next century. The Washington Summit Communique also referred to Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania by name and committed that, regardless of "geographic location," each and every candidate for NATO membership will be "considered on its own merits." I think that the governments of the three Baltic States should take particular satisfaction in these statements of Alliance policy. I should add that "considered on its own merits" has another implication: none of the three, Baltic states can count on gaining admission on the others' coat-tails: each country must undertake the serious work of military reform and defense modernization to qualify as a credible candidate. Summit leaders stated that they will review the process of enlargement at their next meeting, which they agreed will be held not later than 2002. This date was not meant to be read as a guarantee that new invitations will be issued to any particular candidate at that time. But it does show the Alliance is committed to maintaining the momentum of the enlargement process. I should point out that, while it may have attracted less notice, for the first time, enlargement is mentioned in the new Strategic Concept as an element of the Alliance's overall approach to security for the 21st century. Second, to put meat on the bones of their commitment to further enlargement Summit leaders agreed on a new "Membership Action Plan," or "MAP," in which NATO has commits to help aspiring members become the strongest possible candidates for joining the Alliance. The MAP builds on existing tools within Alliance-Partner relations, but puts them together in a more tailored and proactive framework to help those countries that seek to join NATO. -- Aspiring members will submit individual, national programs covering the political, economic, defense, resource, security, and legal aspects of their preparations for future membership. These will be far broader than the "Individual Partnership Program" (IPP) submissions currently provided to the Alliance. -- The Intensified Dialogue process, which until now had consisted mainly of high-level, set-piece statements, is being replaced with a focused and candid feedback mechanism, including both political and technical advice. Annual 19+1 meetings will provide an overall assessment -- across the full range of relevant issues -- of how a nation is doing in its efforts to meet the requirements of NATO membership. -- The Planning and Review Process (PARP) -- the PFP counterpart to NATO's defense planning process -- will be adapted for aspiring members to develop agreed planning targets for their force structures and capabilities that bear directly on requirements for potential membership, This will, in many respects, be similar to the work that Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic undertook after they received their membership invitations at the Madrid summit. -- The assistance clearinghouses will be adapted for aspiring members to help coordinate defense and military assistance by NATO and by individual Allies with the goal of supporting the aspiring member's own preparations for membership. Of course, the issuance of an actual membership invitation Will depend upon a political decision by the Allies that a nation's membership in NATO Will contribute to our overall security. But by giving aspiring members more feedback and guidance on their defense reforms and their modernization efforts, the MAP will help them present the strongest possible candidacies in the shortest possible time. I would add that these new NATO decisions build on the U.S.-Baltic cooperation set out in the Baltic Charter of January 1998. The United States remains committed to working together with the Baltic States -- bilaterally, multilaterally, and through NATO Alliance, As stated by Secretary Albright and Presidents Meri, Ulmanis, and Adamkus on the margins of the Washington Summit, our shared goal is "the full integration of each Baltic State into all European and transatlantic institutions, including NATO." Third, of direct relevance for the Baltic states and all Partner countries, Allied leaders agreed in Washington on a number of initiatives to strengthen the Partnership for Peace and further develop its operational aspects. As we have seen in Bosnia and in a number of aspects of the Kosovo crisis, when NATO acts to deal with instability outside its borders, it will usually seek the participation of non-Allies as contributors to NATO-led efforts. To facilitate this, Allied and Partner leaders endorsed a new "Political-Military Framework for Partner Involvement in NATO-led PFP Operations." Despite, its tongue-twisting title, the Pol-Mil Framework will be key to involving Partners more closely in future non-Article 5 missions. This will include engagement early in the planning stage, as well as participation in the command structure and political direction of a given operation. A further initiative, with the equally catchy title of "The Operational Capabilities concept," will be developed in detail over the next six months and set out day-to-day working relationships between NATO and Partner military form, By seeking to improve the interoperability and military effectiveness of Partner contributions to NATO-led Operations, the OCC will make it easier for Allies and Partners to take joint action when required. Together, these two initiatives -- the Pol-Mil Framework and the OCC -- can bring those Partners interested in membership much closer to Alliance processes and help them become net contributors to security even in advance of a formal invitation for membership. As with enlargement, these new elements -- substantially greater focus on crisis management and on working with partners -- are included in the new Strategic Concept, thus putting these new steps into the long-term, strategic perspective of how the 21st-century Alliance will work to enhance the overall security and stability of the Euro-Atlantic area. The emphasis on crisis management is particularly important for Partner countries because it means that instability in Europe outside NATO territory -- instability that affects Partners at least as much if not more than Allies -- will be a subject of NATO consultations, decision and action -- possibly even joint action together with Partners. In short, one of the results of the Washington Summit is that the NATO of the future is not merely the Alliance of 19 members, but rather -- to quote Secretary of Defense Cohen -- the core of a larger "cooperative security network" that links all of Europe's democracies in tackling the security problems of the entire continent. Fourth, the Washington Summit's strong reaffirmation of NATO's commitment to building a cooperative relationship with Russia is extremely important for all Partners, and perhaps most of all for the Baltic states. While Russia has no legitimate reason to be concerned over NATO's relations with the Baltic states -- and has no right of veto over any NATO decisions, membership or otherwise -- Russia remains a major factor in the strategic environment. Therefore, cooperative relations between NATO and Russia are very much in the interest of the Baltic states, and NATO-Russia friction -- never good for anyone -- is also not good for the Baltics. Summit leaders, looking beyond the current impasse over Kosovo, reaffirmed NATO's commitment to working with Russia as much as possible. In this regard, we hope that Russia's decision to suspend its participation in the NATO-Russia Joint Council will be reconsidered soon. The PJC made considerable progress in its first two years in developing concrete cooperation on a wide range of issues, from weapons of mass destruction to the Y2K problem. The PJC has been a valuable forum for consultation on the most sensitive issues, including Kosovo. We need the PJC even more when we have differences than when we agree, and we should use it to work together in achieving and implementing a just settlement in Kosovo. Renewing cooperation with Russia will be important for NATO, important for Russia, and important for the Baltic states as well. Fifth, and finally, the Summit showed NATO's remarkable resolve and solidarity in ending the humanitarian catastrophe in Kosovo and embarking on a long-term path toward bringing the Southeast European region into the European mainstream. This commitment is important not only for Southeast Europe, but for all the states of the Euro-Atlantic area -- because through it, NATO is demonstrating that it has the means and the will to act in defense of its common values when necessary. Indeed, Kosovo is a metaphor for many aspects of the 21st century Alliance launched at the Washington Summit. Kosovo highlights: the vital role of the Alliance in managing crises in Europe and on its periphery; the need to equip NATO forces with the military capabilities to project power and deal decisively with any adversary; the importance of partnership and cooperation with other European democracies to prevent the spread of instability and to facilitate joint action in crisis management; and the value of NATO's commitment to enlargement as an incentive for good behavior and cooperation with the Alliance. As Secretary Albright has said many times, Kosovo shows that, if we didn't have NATO to deal with major crises like Kosovo, we would have had to invent it. Thus the Summit decisions on Kosovo should be a signal to all that when NATO talks of strengthening security, prosperity, and democracy throughout the Euro-Atlantic region, these are not just empty words, but a real commitment backed up by real action. NATO has always stood for its shared values -- values shared by the Baltic states as well -- and its actions in Kosovo make clear that it will continue to do so. I should add that the steps taken by the Baltic states themselves to support Euro-Atlantic stability and security -- whether by assisting refugees from Kosovo or sending peacekeepers to Bosnia -- have not gone unnoticed. Quite the opposite. The efforts made by these three small states are evidence of their commitment to the shared values of our Alliance and to the solidarity of effort that is essential within NATO. They are proof positive for anyone who might question whether the Baltic states -- today as Partners and some day as Allies -- will be net contributors to the common good. To sum up, then, I think these Washington Summit decisions demonstrate that NATO has both the tools and the political will necessary to continue to play its unique role in supporting the security, prosperity and democracy of the Euro-Atlantic area -- through active management of crises where necessary, and through engagement and eventual enlargement to countries, like the Baltics, that share the values on which the Alliance is based. (end text)