04 June 1999
(Vershbow addresses American Chamber of Commerce in Brussels) (2890) Brussels -- NATO in the 21st century will maintain strong defense capabilities, despite the end of the Cold War and reduced military threats to its territory, because of the need to defend the alliance's shared values -- among them democracy, human rights and rule of law, says the chief U.S. NATO representative. Ambassador Alexander Vershbow, U.S. Permanent Representative on the North Atlantic Council, discussed NATO's future in remarks June 3 to the American Chamber of Commerce here. Vershbow noted that one of the priorities of NATO, as agreed at the recent NATO 50th anniversary summit in Washington in April, will be to bring more balance to the contributions that the members make to the alliance's military capabilities, through the Defense Capabilities Initiative. "The Kosovo crisis," he said, "has exposed the huge disparity between U.S. and European capabilities, and we hope that our European allies absorb this lesson by following through on the DCI." He said the NATO for the 21st century envisioned at the summit "turned out to be exactly the NATO we needed to deal with the crisis in Kosovo now, in the last year of the 20th century: an Alliance grounded in robust defense capabilities, equipped to deal with crises on Europe's periphery, and acting in partnership with non-NATO countries in defense of common values and interests." Following is the prepared text of Vershbow's remarks to the group: (begin text) NATO IN THE 21ST CENTURY Ambassador Alexander Vershbow U.S. Permanent Representative on the North Atlantic Council American Chamber of Commerce Brussels June 3, 1999 When most of us think of flexible, versatile, adaptable organizations, we usually think of companies and financial institutions like those represented here. Government organizations don't usually come to mind, and international organizations almost never come to mind. But let me introduce a radical idea today. I believe that the world's largest and most complex multinational security organization -- NATO -- has virtually reinvented itself in a few astonishing years NATO has been transformed from a closed, Cold War military alliance, focused almost exclusively on the territorial defense of its members, to an enlarged -- and enlarging -- security and political organization, possessing military capabilities from the lightest to the heaviest, ready to defend Allied territory and interests wherever members agree to act. The business analogy is limited, but you might say that NATO earned its living selling collective defense for 45 years. We still have the finest product on the market. But we have added something new to the inventory. NATO now provides security and stability within and beyond its borders. We are still de-bugging the new product, but the demand is tremendous, and the market is getting bigger and bigger. Now, this is partly tongue-in-cheek, but I do believe that NATO has achieved a stunning transformation over the past decade, establishing a new relevance for a new security environment that gives credence to the rhetoric that you so often hear: NATO will be around for another 50 years. The blueprint for the "New NATO" was set out at the Washington Summit in April, and I want to tell you about its main outlines. I also will say a few words about NATO's engagement in Kosovo. The two are fundamentally related. The NATO for the 2lst century that we had been planning to launch at the Summit turned out to be exactly the NATO we needed to deal with the crisis in Kosovo now, in the last year of the 20 century: an Alliance grounded in robust defense capabilities, equipped to deal with crises on Europe's periphery, and acting in partnership with non-NATO countries in defense of common values and interests. But before I delve deeper into the NATO of the 2lst century, let me say a few words about the strategic environment. First, as pundits are so fond of reminding us, the nature or the threats facing our societies has changed. Communism has been discredited, and the inane threat posed by Russia is to itself -- through economic collapse, autocratic leadership and corruption. The United States still has a vital interest in the security and stability of Europe, and we continue to take seriously our common commitment to the collective defense of our Allies -- including the three new members who joined in March. But the possibility that one of the Allies will be face large-scale aggression from without looks quite unlikely for the present. Today's Europe faces a different set of risks -- ethnic and regional conflict, weapons of mass destruction, terrorism, and so-called "asymmetric" threats like cyber-warfare. Second, the nature of U.S. relations with Europe has changed. All of you, of course, follow EU developments closely, and understand the significance of the march toward European political and economic integration. This is an historic process that the United States welcomes and supports wholeheartedly. We need a Europe that can be a genuine partner on the international stage -- even if, on some issues, we end up taking contrary positions. In the field of security and defense, Europe has declared its ambition to play a greater role relative to the United States -- to the point that there is talk of recruiting NATO's CEO to galvanize the effort. This ambition, however, has yet to be matched by a commitment to develop the requisite military capabilities (about which I will have more to say in a moment). This brings me to the third change in international circumstances that will affect NATO's future: the nature of warfare is different now from what it was in 1949. With a few exceptions, Allies haven't had to defend their own soil since the Second World War. The military conflicts Allies have engaged in over the past 50 years, directly or indirectly -- Korea, Suez, Algeria, Rhodesia, Vietnam, Central America, Afghanistan, Somalia, Iraq, now the Balkans -- have been largely about threats to our interests, not our territory. The experiences of the U.S. in Vietnam, our first televised war, showed just how difficult it can be to sustain a military engagement abroad, especially when casualties mount. Most Americans have raised their thresholds for defining our vital foreign interests. Allied publics insist that political and diplomatic options be tried and tried again, before any consideration is given to using force. But now, on NATO's southern flank, a conflict is occurring that has challenged almost all our concepts of non-violent crisis response. I'm speaking, of course, about Kosovo, where Serb soldiers, police and paramilitaries are waging a systematic campaign of terror, murder and rape against Kosovo's Albanian population. The objective is to drive hundreds of thousands into exile in order to create a new ethnic reality on the ground. This is the second time in a decade that NATO -- and the United States have faced Milosevic's contempt for international norms, even for the laws of war. The Balkans have been a crucial, and at times, bitter test for NATO. In the early years of the decade, a reluctant United States encouraged a European-led approach to the Bosnian crisis that only triggered a series of political and military failures, while the violence and suffering continued unchecked. By 1995, the European Community, CSCE and United Nations had all tried and failed, and NATO itself was torn apart over what to do next. This prompted President Clinton, in the summer of 1995, to launch a major U.S. initiative, linked to NATO air power, to end the conflict. Fortunately, NATO rallied to the challenge, leading to the Dayton Accords and the deployment of NATO's first peacekeeping force, IFOR. This resilience and commitment to stability beyond NATO's borders showed that the Alliance was on the road to something new. When the Kosovo crisis erupted early last year, the Alliance agreed from the outset on a collective response. We supported diplomatic efforts while initiating contingency planning for military intervention. Last fall, the credible threat of NATO air strikes together with U.S. diplomacy brought a temporary respite. But by the beginning of this year, Milosevic had trampled on his own commitments, and a humanitarian disaster was beginning to unfold, as hundreds of thousands of Albanians fled their homes. In refusing to negotiate at Rambouillet, Milosevic made clear that he was not really interested in a political solution, but was committed to changing the ethnic map by force. Supported by the International Community, NATO commenced an air campaign aimed at thwarting -- or reversing -- his plans. NATO laid down five non-negotiable conditions for ending the bombing conditions which were repeated by the EU, the U.N. Secretary General and, in general form, by the G8 countries, including Russia. NATO's resolve to get all Serb forces out and all the Kosovar refugees back in has stunned Milosevic. The air effort has taken longer than we had hoped and hasn't been problem-free. But we are grinding the Serb war and repression machine into the ground, and the Allies are more committed than ever to see the operation through. As the air campaign has intensified, diplomatic efforts have also accelerated to secure Milosevic's acceptance of NATO's terms. Anything less would mean only a temporary lull and would fail to achieve our most critical objective, getting all the refugees home in safety, protected by an international security force with NATO at its core. Like you, we are all eagerly awaiting the results of the visit to Belgrade by Russian envoy Chernomyrdin and Finnish President Ahtisaari, who is speaking for the EU and NATO position. Six weeks ago, with the Kosovo crisis in full thunder, we convened the NATO 50th Anniversary Summit in Washington. We asked ourselves some tough questions. For instance, "Without a serious enemy, why maintain a strong defense?" The answer is simple. Our shared values -- democracy, the rule of law, civilian control over military structures, respect for human rights -- are themselves every bit as much worth defending as is our territory. NATO's ability to back its political and moral authority with military might allowed us to defend our common values and protect peace and prosperity in Western Europe for 50 years. At the Washington Summit in April, leaders approved a blueprint for NATO in the 2lst century, called the Strategic Concept. This document reaffirmed collective defense as NATO's fundamental reason for being, but also recognized that NATO's military might could and should be brought to bear when the stability, security and values of the Euro-Atlantic community came under threat, even if NATO territory is not at risk. Thus they defined crisis management as a second fundamental task for the Alliance. It is worth mentioning that the Strategic Concept, in raising the profile of crisis management, made explicit the need for Allied governments and military planners to ensure that our forces are more mobile, sustainable, and flexible -- that is, capable of collective defense, but also able to undertake the full range of crisis response operations. To meet the requirement for these more capable and deployable forces, our leaders approved a Defense Capabilities Initiative (DCI) that commits Allies to build them together. The Kosovo crisis has exposed the huge disparity between U.S. and European capabilities, and we hope that our European allies absorb this lesson by following through on the DCI. For some, this may mean devoting more resources to defense; for all, it will mean spending existing resources more wisely. The Strategic Concept also lays out a positive, pro-active mission for the NATO: promoting and projecting stability through political and military cooperation with other democratic states -- which is the essence of NATO's extraordinarily successful Partnership for Peace. The Strategic Concept emphasizes that non-NATO nations can and will participate in NATO-led operations -- as, for example, has occurred in Bosnia, where Swedish, Finnish, Russian, Ukrainian, and Baltic soldiers, to name only some, participate in peacekeeping alongside Americans, British, Italians, Germans and others from NATO nations. The Summit adopted several initiatives to deepen the operational involvement of Partner nations in future crisis response operations. These show that NATO is more than just an Alliance of the 19, but the core of wider network of democratic states prepared to join forces when their interests demand. It also gives troops from countries who aspire to NATO membership the opportunity to train and even deploy alongside our own. This brings me to the subject of NATO enlargement. Since its establishment, NATO has always been open to nations who share its values, and who would contribute to collective defense. When the fall of the Berlin Wall erased the division between East and West, the countries of Central Europe embarked on the road of democratization, economic liberalization and military reform. They saw joining NATO as an essential part of joining the West, and made clear that they were ready to share the burdens as well as the benefits of membership. Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic officially became Allies on March 12, bringing the total membership to 19. Slovenia, Slovakia, Romania, Bulgaria, Macedonia, Albania, Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia are all on record as hoping to join in the next round. But NATO membership is not automatic. Only qualified countries will be admitted. At the Washington Summit, our leaders committed themselves to helping NATO aspirants make themselves into the best possible candidates for membership, through a Membership Action Plan. At a Summit to be held no later than 2002, Allied Heads of State and Government will review progress and determine if inviting additional aspiring nations to join would enhance the Alliance's overall security. This is not a guarantee that any particular country will get an invitation, but it does signal our commitment to maintaining the momentum of the enlargement process. For several years, NATO has been exploring the possibilities for giving the European members of the Alliance more responsibility in defense and crisis management. This project has been dubbed the development of the European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI). A breakthrough was reached three years ago in Berlin, where NATO Ministers agreed to build ESDI within NATO on the basis of the notion of "separable but not separate" European forces. The idea was to create the mechanisms to permit the European allies to take the lead -- under the banner of the Western European Union (WEU) -- in situations when we judge that NATO does not need to be engaged or that U.S. forces are not required. Prime Minister Blair and President Chirac met last fall in St. Malo to discuss how the European Union could increase its security role under the Amsterdam Treaty -- possibly taking over the role envisaged for the WEU. The situation is complicated because some European Allies -- notably Turkey -- are not members of the EU, and some EU members -- for example, Sweden and Finland -- are not Allies. But the urge to shift defense responsibilities toward an increasingly prosperous EU is shared in Brussels and in Washington. At the NATO Summit we agreed on provisions whereby ESDI would be strengthened through NATO's lending of its assets and capabilities to the WEU and, in the future, to the EU, so that Europe can take greater responsibility for security in its own back yard. U.S. domestic support for NATO will likely be stronger if the Europeans make good on their pledge to back the emerging institutional changes with real military capabilities. It is important, however, that the transatlantic link not be weakened in the process. That means avoiding wasteful duplication of assets or discrimination against non-EU allies who wish to contribute to European operations. We will be assessing the results of today's EU Summit in Cologne with these considerations in mind. One additional Summit initiative is worth mentioning, and that is the decision of Allied leaders to undertake new activities to address the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Among the most unfortunate developments during NATO's first 50 years has been the occasional use of chemical and biological weapons by rogue states and terrorists, and the continued desire of nations to possess and test nuclear weapons. At the Washington Summit, our leaders agreed to establish a center at NATO to address WMD proliferation. Through the center, Allies will share information on WMD threats. They will also undertake exercises and preparations so as to be ready to react to a WMD attack or accident on their territory. Current plans are to enhance our cooperation with Russia on controlling the proliferation of WMD elsewhere -- surely a turn-around from the time when NATO and Russia were on opposite sides of every key military question. So that's a brief prospectus on the 21st century NATO. I hope you agree that, if we were selling shares, the Alliance represents an excellent investment for the future. Indeed, one of the main reasons all of you are here in Europe is the security and stability that NATO has provided over the past 50 years. The reinvention of NATO is aimed at providing that same security and stability to an ever-wider Euro-Atlantic community of democratic nations. You might say that stability in the Euro-Atlantic area is NATO's "bottom line." As long as we continue to deliver on our bottom line, you will be positioned to deliver on yours. (end text)