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U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
95/05/30 Press Conference following NAC Ministerial
Office of the Spokesman



                             U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE 
                             Office of the Spokesman 
 
                            (Noordwijk, The Netherlands) 
 
__________________________________________________________________ 
For Immediate Release                                 May 30, 1995 
 
 
                                PRESS CONFERENCE  
                                     WITH  
                     SECRETARY OF STATE WARREN CHRISTOPHER  
                          FOLLOWING THE NAC MINISTERIAL  
 
 
                                Hotel Boulevard 
                           Noordwijk, The Netherlands 
                                 May 30, 1995 
 
 
SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER:  Good evening.  With your permission I'll stand 
rather than sit. 
 
In January of 1994, President Clinton set forth a comprehensive strategy 
for building an integrated and secure Europe.  At today's North Atlantic 
Council meeting we took important steps to put in place the key elements 
of that strategy. 
 
First, we agreed on strengthening the Partnership for Peace.  In just 
over a year, the Partnership for Peace has become a very important 
security instrument for NATO and, indeed, for the entire world.  In my 
intervention, I laid out an action plan which we believe will make the 
Partnership for Peace an even more effective and efficient instrument, 
and we hope that it will be acted on in the very near future. 
 
Second, at today's meeting, we reviewed the ongoing work on the study 
concerning NATO enlargement.  We affirmed that we are on a steady and 
deliberate course, one we set last December.  We'll complete the study 
sometime in the late summer and present it to the interested Partners in 
time so the results of those first set of meetings can be held at our 
meeting of the NAC ministers in December. 
 
Tomorrow I'll be meeting with the foreign ministers from the Central 
European countries, who will be attending the NACC meeting, to review 
the state of our deliberations on enlargement.  This is a meeting which 
I have held before with the same group of ministers and I look forward 
to doing so again. 
 
Third, today we continued our efforts to adapt NATO's military 
structures to the newest security challenges here in Europe.  We aim to 
aid in helping to build a strong and effective European Security and 
Defense Identity, one that will effectively complement NATO. 
 
Finally, as a result of the agreement reached last March between 
Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin--I'm sorry, it was only a few weeks ago--
Russia is now proceeding with the implementation of its Partnership for 
Peace individual program as well as the agreement on the NATO-Russia 
relationship outside of the Partnership. 
 
When Foreign Minister Kozyrev meets tomorrow with the other NATO 
ministers in the 16-plus-1 meeting, Russia will be crossing a new 
threshold in its relationship with NATO.  By moving forward on these two 
documents, Russia will be moving toward integration with Europe and away 
from isolation.  That's a choice that I feel sure will greatly benefit 
Russia and Europe and the world as a whole. 
 
The dialogue that we'll inaugurate tomorrow with Russia is only the 
beginning of a long process.  We know that there are areas where NATO 
and Russia will lack at least immediate convergence.  Nevertheless, we 
feel that by dealing with these areas with patience and practicality, 
we'll have important dividends from the engagement that we have with 
Russia and they have with NATO. 
 
I believe that the work that we have accomplished here today in 
implementing President Clinton's strategy for European integration will 
make a contribution to efforts to prevent further conflicts of the 
tragic kind now raging in Bosnia.  We discussed that, of course, today.  
Our NATO allies expressed strong support for the understandings that we 
reached last night in the Contact Group and joined in the deep 
condemnation of the actions of the Bosnian Serbs. 
 
Finally, to conclude, on the diplomatic front, I can announce that 
Ambassador Frasure of the United States will be traveling to Belgrade 
tomorrow for further negotiations with President Milosevic, negotiations 
in which we hope to persuade him to recognize Bosnia-Herzegovina and to 
take further action to strengthen the border monitoring between Serbia 
and Bosnia.  At the same time in those meetings Ambassador Frasure has 
emphasized to me that he will be making it crystal clear to Milosevic 
our deep concern over the recent events in Bosnia, particularly the 
taking and detaining of UN troops. 
 
Thank you very much.  Nick? 
 
MR. BURNS:  Ladies and Gentlemen, the Secretary has time to take only a 
few questions.  Please keep them brief. 
 
QUESTION:  Mr. Secretary, on that very thing--the Bosnian mission of Mr. 
Frasure, officials have said he's got about 85 percent of the deal done.  
How tough is that 15 percent?  Can you give Milosevic the prospect of a 
lifting of the sanctions at the end of some suspension period?  Or this 
something you demand of him before you make that promise? 
 
SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER:  Barry, in my experience the last 15 percent is 
always the hardest, so Ambassador Frasure has got his work cut out for 
him.  There are some difficult issues remaining on the table.  We'll be 
talking about, at least initially, no more than a suspension of the 
sanctions.  But looking down the road at the time, hopefully, when there 
is a full engagement by the Bosnian Serbs in the peace process, we hope 
that Milosevic can accomplish this.  If that happens, then there could 
be a lifting of the sanctions.  But that's a ways down the road.  Of 
course, that's the hoped-for result of these negotiations.  What we want 
to do here is to divide Milosevic from Karadzic.  We want to further 
isolate Karadzic.  We think it can work--it perhaps will occur to him 
that it might be a rather lonely world out there, if all of the other 
countries of the former Yugoslavia are now in support of the 
negotiations for a peace plan and Karadzic is in isolation.  At least 
that is an aspect of leverage that we hope to exploit in the 
conversation between Ambassador Frasure and President Milosevic, which 
will reconvene, as I say, starting tomorrow or the next day. 
 
MR. BURNS:  (inaudible) 
 
QUESTION:  Mr. Secretary, could you be more specific about the 
consequences the Bosnian Serbs face if the U.N. hostages are not 
returned? 
 
SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER:  I don't think it's helpful at all to speculate 
in this situation about consequences.  We've made known to the 
leadership of the Bosnian Serbs that we hold them responsible for the 
welfare and well being of those who have been taken and detained by the 
Bosnian Serbs.  It's a barbaric act.  It's uncivilized.  It really is 
not part of any reasonable struggle that might be going on there.  And I 
think that's a point we'll keep making over and over again.  But with 
now over 300 hostages being taken, it really is not useful, I think, to 
speculate on kinds of tactics or the kinds of actions that might be 
taken with respect to them. 
 
QUESTION:  Mr. Secretary, my name is (inaudible) in Amsterdam.  I would 
like to ask you the question whether you consider some realpolitik--
whether you like it or not, or if you don't like the enlargement of 
NATO.  Now you can build a whole legal structure--diplomatic legal 
structure--to--how do you call it--diminish the pain, or to make it more 
attractive, or whatever.  They don't like it.  At the same time, Russia, 
in my opinion, more than any one of the Western--any one of the NATO 
partners, is mental in solving this crisis in Belgrade.  Whether we like 
it or not, it seems to be the case.  Now, is it then good realpolitik to 
at the same time, at the same meeting, stress the point that no droit de 
regard, yes we will prolong with our enlargement since the four Visegrad 
countries would like it so much?  Is this sound policy? 
 
SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER:  Yes, I think we have a sound policy.  We have a 
comprehensive strategy.  We have a strategy which, beginning tomorrow, 
will involve a serious discussion--serious negotiations--between Russia 
and NATO to build a special relationship there, which recognizes 
Russia's size and importance.  I hope that Russia will be effective and 
useful in freeing the hostages.  Their principal leverage, as they will 
tell you, is with Milosevic and there is some question as to the degree 
of Milosevic's leverage.  But we solicit the help of Russia.  But I do 
not think it's in any respect dependent upon the steady, deliberate path 
that NATO has toward enlargement.  There's nothing new about that path.  
It's one we've been steadily on for some time, and it's one, as the 
Secretary General said so firmly, we will remain on.  But that's not in 
any way hostile to Russia.  And we hope that by building in a very 
deliberate way this negotiation between Russia and NATO, we will be able 
to work out a relationship for the future that brings them into Europe, 
that integrates them fully with Europe.  And, as I said in my statement, 
I think they have crossed an important threshold by lodging these two 
documents with NATO and proceeding with these discussions that begin 
tomorrow, which will result in the--bringing closer to NATO the Russian 
government in a way that can be very conducive to harmonious 
relationships between both of them. 
 
MR. BURNS:  Last question, please. 
 
QUESTION:  Yes, Mr. Secretary, could you give us an idea of what sort of 
discussions went on within the NAC today concerning military action or 
regrouping in Bosnia, particularly with an emphasis on any U.S. military 
role? 
 
SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER:  That subject was not extensively discussed in 
NATO today, although it was alluded to.  It was quite extensively 
discussed last night in the Contact Group.  And one thing that I will 
say and will emphasize is, that the United States will be ready to 
assist with equipment and with air lift if requested by our NATO allies 
in connection with a redeployment that might have two purposes, really.  
First, a redeployment that would make the United Nations forces less 
vulnerable; and second, a strengthening of the United Nations forces 
through giving them additional equipment.  These will be decisions, 
basically, for the United Nations and the troop contributing countries.  
But the United States stands ready to assist, as I say, with equipment 
and air lift if that turns out to be useful for our partners.  And there 
was some discussion of that in the meeting last night.  But those 
decisions remain to be taken.  But if you look at last night's 
communique, you will see that the Contact Group members, which includes 
some of the most important troop contributing nations and those with 
numerically the largest number there, have in mind some very significant 
things to consider by way of improving the capacity of UNPROFOR to 
protect themselves, and also to implement the humanitarian purposes, 
which is their underlying purpose. 
 
Thank you very much. 
 
 
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