With the end of the Cold War, there is a need to develop a new security architecture that builds upon and adapts the current security relationships in response to the dramatically changed environment. Fortunately, the United States and its transatlantic allies and friends share common values and objectives, and have inherited from the Cold War era institutions and relationships that facilitate coordination of policies and cooperation. We are now seeking to preserve, adapt, and extend these patterns and institutions to meet the new challenges and priorities of today.
The central security pillar of the new architecture is the North Atlantic Alliance. NATO remains the anchor of American engagement in Europe and the linchpin of transatlantic security. NATO is the most successful and capable political-military alliance in history. NATO is a unified force for stability in a fragmented, unstable world. We and our allies cherish peace and freedom, respect human rights, and thrive on free enterprise.
The Alliance is a guarantor of European democracy and a force for European stability. NATO provides a proven structure for managing transatlantic security. This is why its mission has endured, and why its benefits are so attractive to Europe's new democracies.
President Clinton's comprehensive strategy to develop a new interlocking security architecture builds on the success and enduring value of NATO while also working to strengthen other institutions with a critical role to play in European integration. Its key elements include accelerating NATO's transformation, enhancing the Partnership for Peace, developing a gradual, deliberate, and transparent process of NATO enlargement, enhancing the cooperative relationship between NATO and Russia, supporting European integration as embodied in the European Union (EU), and strengthening the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).
In response to the fall of the Berlin Wall, the Alliance began a historic transformation that continues today. New goals were set forth in NATO's London Summit Declaration of July 1990. NATO declared that it no longer considered Russia an adversary and announced a new program for cooperation open to all the former communist states of the East. Just as importantly, NATO called for a restructuring of its military forces and a reorientation of its strategy. This declaration also led to the establishment of the first formal ties between NATO and the countries of what was then the Warsaw Treaty Organization.
In June 1991 in Copenhagen, NATO continued its evolution by issuing a statement declaring, "We do not wish to isolate any country, nor to see a new division of the Continent. Our objective is to help create a Europe whole and free." This objective has guided NATO's policies ever since. It remains the foundation of NATO's current efforts to extend security throughout Europe.
The work begun at the London Summit came to fruition in the NATO Summit in Rome in November 1991, when the Alliance adopted a new Strategic Concept which committed NATO to a broad approach to stability and security. The new Strategic Concept reaffirmed the continuing importance of collective defense. It also clearly identified the changing European security landscape and sought to encourage the changes that were underway in the East. The strategy stressed dialogue and partnership with the emerging democracies in the former Warsaw Pact. It identified for the first time the importance of addressing security threats beyond the NATO area, establishing the basis for peacekeeping and coalition crisis management operations as important NATO missions. In pursuit of these objectives, the forces and missions of NATO's integrated military commands were radically restructured to better deal with the new security environment in Europe.
Another manifestation of NATO's commitment to an inclusive Europe was its creation of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) at the same Rome Summit. This established a new institutional framework for consultation and cooperation on political and security issues between NATO and the former communist states of the East.
In 1992, NATO took the unprecedented step of declaring its willingness to make its resources and expertise available on a case-by-case basis for peacekeeping activities outside NATO territory under the responsibility of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE, formerly the CSCE) and the United Nations (UN).
The next milestone was the January 1994 NATO Summit in Brussels, where the United States launched three important milestones that markedly accelerated NATO's transformation. These were the Partnership for Peace (PFP), the concept of Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF), and counterproliferation initiatives.
In 1994, the Alliance recognized that it would be necessary to examine ways in which NATO's forces and structures could respond more efficiently and flexibly to new security challenges while providing capabilities for Europeans to address security concerns under their own banner. In so doing, NATO sought ways to make it possible for non-NATO partners to participate in NATO-led contingencies. The resulting concept, known as Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF), will meet that challenge through the provision of "separable but not separate" military structures that will avoid wasteful and expensive duplication of effort and assets in responding to security concerns both inside and outside the scope of NATO collective defense.
The concept of the CJTF is designed to allow NATO forces and structures to respond more efficiently and flexibly to new security challenges, while also supporting a strengthened European pillar of the Alliance through the Western European Union (WEU). Under this concept, a CJTF could deploy as a NATO-led force or, on the basis of consultations in the North Atlantic Council, as a WEU-led force supported by the collective assets of the Alliance. In either case, non-NATO members, such as PFP partners, could also participate. The January 1994 NATO Summit endorsed this concept and called upon NATO authorities to develop it further and proceed with its implementation.
Essentially, this concept seeks to adapt NATO's internal structure to meet the challenges of the future. The United States supports the identification of CJTF elements at major NATO commands. Once activated, a CJTF could deploy in various configurations for Article Five contingencies (defense of NATO territory) or for new contingencies, such as crisis management, peacekeeping, and humanitarian missions. Discussions are underway at NATO headquarters to develop the plans and formulate the guidance required to finalize the CJTF concept and to proceed with its implementation. We are seeking to reach agreement on the details of the CJTF concept by the end of this year.
Countering the
Proliferation
The United States has been working with its NATO allies to develop a common approach to countering proliferation. Following President Clinton's emphasis at the January 1994 Summit on the danger to NATO from proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and the initiative launched by allied leaders, the Alliance has made significant progress toward integrating a counterproliferation policy into its new, post-Cold War agenda.
In May 1994, NATO approved two milestone documents: a political framework paper structuring the broad political-military approach of the Alliance to proliferation, and a three-phase work plan for the newly created Senior Defense Group on Proliferation (SDGP) to address the defense implications of proliferation. The Senior Defense Group is co-chaired by the United States and one of the European allies (currently France) on a rotating basis. Having assessed the risks posed by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction to the Alliance, the Senior Defense Group on Proliferation has begun the next phase of its work, in which it is grappling with the operational implications of the use of weapons of mass destruction for the Alliance's military capabilities. In this task NATO is building on the relevant capabilities of the national militaries and the joint work of NATO planning groups. NATO is working to establish a defense policy framework for defense activities related to proliferation and to provide conclusions on the full spectrum of needed Alliance and national capabilities.
The Defense Group's work in assessing proliferation risks to NATO is an important part of NATO's continuing adaptation to the new security environment. While diplomatic efforts to prevent proliferation remain NATO's primary goal, NATO must also ensure that it has the range of capabilities needed to discourage the use of weapons of mass destruction and to counter, if necessary, threats to NATO populations, territory, and forces. Political-military uncertainties and future technological trends related to weapons of mass destruction will inform NATO's decisions today about needed future capabilities. NATO is concerned about the continuing risks of illicit transfers of weapons of mass destruction and related materials, growing proliferation risks on NATO's periphery, and the role of suppliers of WMD-related technology to states on NATO's periphery.
NATO's work clearly shows that the United States is not alone in its concerns for the defense dimension of proliferation. The Alliance remains relevant and forward-looking on military topics central to its core mission of collective defense, and demonstrates the continued interest of the European allies in cooperative transatlantic security with the United States and Canada.
Building a New European Security
Architecture
President Clinton's Partnership for Peace initiative was the centerpiece of the January 1994 NATO Summit. This initiative sought to go beyond the dialogue and cooperation already underway in the NACC and to forge a real partnership with the new Eastern democracies as well as other European states, such as the former neutrals, willing and able to participate. The Partnership will expand and intensify political and military cooperation throughout Europe. Participating states will work within PFP in concrete ways to promote transparency in defense planning, democratic control of the military, and joint planning and training with NATO military forces. Over the long term, a key objective is to develop partner capabilities to operate effectively with NATO forces in such fields as peacekeeping, search and rescue, and humanitarian assistance. Those who participate actively will begin developing the standard operating procedures, the habits of cooperation, and the routines of consultation that are the lifeblood of an effective military relationship.
Within the Partnership each participating state will be encouraged to pursue its relationship with NATO at a pace and scope determined by its own capabilities and interests. To join PFP, the first step is to sign the Framework Document approved at the 1994 Summit. A partner then outlines its interests in PFP and advises NATO of what it plans to contribute. Essentially, while NATO develops an overall Partnership Work Program, each partner "creates" an individual program tailored to its own needs. This is formalized in an agreed Individual Partnership Program which the partner and NATO work out on a bilateral basis. The overall work program and individual programs will then be updated on an annual basis. As this process evolves, we expect that some partners, through a process of self-differentiation, will become fully ready to join the Alliance as effective contributors to NATO's common security.
In its first year, PFP has evolved from a promising idea to a bold reality. Important developments include the following:
PFP is already having a significant effect on partner nations. For example, some partners are submitting their Individual Partnership Programs to their parliaments for approval --establishing legislative oversight of military policy for the first time in recent history. Some are also beginning, with bilateral assistance as well as guidance from NATO, to organize most if not all of their armed forces around NATO planning concepts. Perhaps most important, PFP is already succeeding in extending eastward the zone of stability that NATO has helped to establish within the Alliance. A case in point is Hungary and Romania. These two nations, which have long-standing historic grievances, are using their cooperation with NATO to improve their bilateral security relationship.
Successful implementation of PFP's many objectives requires adequate funding. Many partners lack the resources to take full advantage of what NATO is offering. While partners are expected to pay their own way to the maximum extent feasible, we must ensure that adequate funding is available at NATO and in national bilateral channels to maintain the momentum of PFP.
Overall, the United States considers the Partnership an integral and lasting part of the new European security architecture. As the Alliance has made clear from the outset, participation in PFP will not guarantee admission to NATO but is the path to membership for countries wanting to join. For some, PFP will be an essential tool in the demanding task of preparing themselves to meet the responsibilities of full NATO membership. PFP also provides a valuable framework for evaluating the ability of each partner to assume the obligations and commitments of NATO membership -- a testing ground for their capabilities.
PFP will have an equally important role to play for those partners not initially admitted into the Alliance or that do not wish to become NATO members. For them PFP could be their key link to the Alliance for many years to come. A robust and vigorous PFP will provide them with critical reassurance that NATO is concerned with their security as well as providing a structure for increasing close cooperation with NATO -- in itself an important relationship for continued stability and security in Europe. Hence, for the foreseeable future, the dynamic interaction between NATO members and non-members through PFP will be an essential part of our overall efforts to move beyond the competitive alliance systems that have long plagued European history and to extend eastward a "zone of stability" to Europe as a whole.
Another key element of the new European security architecture
will be NATO
enlargement. In the communique of the Alliance Summit in January
1994, NATO
Heads of State and Government stated that they "expect and would
welcome NATO
expansion that would reach to democratic states to our East, as part
of an
evolutionary process, taking into account political and security
developments
in the whole of Europe." This initiative in part responded to the
strong
interest in NATO enlargement by several of the new democracies of
Central
Europe. As President Clinton has said, the question is not whether
enlargement
will happen, but when and how.
This Summit commitment to enlargement was given additional
impetus at the NATO
Foreign Ministers' meeting in December 1994. Specifically, the
Foreign
Ministers accepted a U.S. proposal to launch a study of "how NATO
will enlarge,
the principles to guide this process and the implications of
membership." This
study is scheduled for completion in mid-1995, and the results will
then be
briefed to interested PFP partners. At their December 1995 meeting,
the
Ministers will assess the discussions with partners and decide on the
next
steps.
There is general agreement within the Alliance on several key
points regarding
NATO enlargement. These include the following:
As NATO proceeds with enlargement, the United States will seek to
ensure that
NATO continues to adhere to the principles that have made it the
strongest and
most successful Alliance in history. The first of these is
commitment to
democratic values. Although specific criteria for membership have
not been
determined, certain fundamental precepts reflected in the original
Washington
Treaty remain as valid as they were in 1949. New members must be
democratic,
have market economies, protect freedom and human rights inside their
borders
and be committed to responsible security policies outside their
borders. As
President Clinton has stated, "countries with repressive political
systems,
countries with designs on their neighbors, countries with militaries
unchecked
by civilian control or with closed economic systems need not
apply."
A second key principle is the need to preserve solidarity. NATO,
even with an
enlarged membership, must continue to work by consensus. New NATO
members will
not be expected to agree on everything. But they must be willing to
hammer out
differences on security matters in a spirit of cooperation. For the
maintenance of Alliance unity, a commitment to building consensus is
essential.
Third, NATO must remain committed to an effective collective
defense. New
members must be prepared to defend the Alliance and have the capable,
professional military forces to do it. At the same time, NATO must
be prepared
to come to the defense of any new member. In the U.S. view, an
important
implication is that new members must commit to joining the integrated
military
structure of the Alliance. Participation in that structure is
critical to
preserve the military effectiveness of the Alliance.
A closely related principle is the need to strive toward
interoperability of
military forces. While full interoperability cannot be expected --
and indeed
does not exist even among current NATO members -- the forces of new
members
must be capable of operating with NATO's forces, at least at a
minimal level of
efficiency. This means being open with defense budgets and plans,
having
common defense doctrine and procedures, and commonality on some
equipment,
especially communications equipment.
As previously suggested, the best way to prepare prospective
members to become
effective contributors to NATO is active participation in the
Partnership for
Peace. NATO enlargement and PFP are thus not alternatives to each
other; they
are complementary processes. They are both part of a mutually
supporting,
seamless whole that must work together to achieve our vision of an
expanded
Alliance coupled with a robust partnership.
Cooperation with
Russia
Another key element in the new architecture is strengthening cooperation with Russia. Russia is preeminent by its size, geostrategic importance, and military potential among the states emerging from communist tyranny, and is sure to have a major influence on Europe's security. An active and constructive security relationship with Russia is critical to building a stable European future. If the West is to create an enduring and stable security framework for Europe, it must solve the enduring strategic problem of integrating the former communist states, especially Russia, into a stable European security system.
To this end, the United States and its allies are pursuing strengthened relations with Russia on a bilateral basis, as well as in various multinational fora. Russia is already involved in most aspects of the emerging architecture. It participates actively in the OSCE and worked closely with the United States in upgrading that organization. Russia has signed an ambitious partnership agreement with the EU. It is a candidate for membership in the Council of Europe and the OECD. The United States supports deeper Russian participation in the Group of 7 industrialized nations and is sponsoring Russia's membership in the World Trade Organization, successor to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. For the first time since 1945, Russia is participating, as a member of the Contact Group on Bosnia, in a multinational negotiating team presenting a unified position on a difficult European security issue.
As part of these European ties, the United States and its NATO allies have agreed with Russia to develop relations between the Alliance and Russia, in parallel to NATO expansion, both within PFP and outside it. The need for a special effort toward Russia is inherent in Russia's importance in European security. Indeed, if NATO expansion and PFP are to succeed in their goal of helping to ensure a more stable and secure Europe for all Europeans, a close, enduring, and cooperative relationship between NATO and Russia is absolutely essential. Of course, we face challenges in defining and developing this relationship. Although Russia has joined PFP, many Russians still harbor a negative attitude toward NATO and its policies. This reaction reflects Russian misconceptions concerning NATO's process of enlargement, and historical habits of regarding NATO as Russia's "enemy." Through cooperation with NATO, Russia will see that the Alliance is no enemy, that a stable Central Europe is in Russia's interest, and that the United States and its allies are working to avoid the divisions that existed in the past.
The first steps in building a new NATO- Russia relationship have already been agreed to in principle -- active Russian participation in PFP commensurate with that nation's importance and capabilities, and implementation of the plan for cooperation in a wide range of areas outside PFP. Beyond that, we are considering how we could establish a new longer-term NATO-Russia relationship in time, through some type of formal agreement. The precise nature of such an agreement, as to form and content, remains to be determined. It could well involve substantially enhanced consultation procedures on issues affecting European security. It would also likely involve mutual guarantees of peaceful relations. In the months ahead, we hope the Alliance and Russia can achieve an understanding on the direction in which the NATO-Russian relationship should evolve.
The goal of such an arrangement will be to ensure, without compromising either NATO's or Russia's right of independent decision, that each is fully aware of the other's concerns and that there are no "surprises" on issues of mutual concern. We intend to develop such an arrangement in parallel with progress on NATO enlargement. However, neither Russia nor any other nation outside the Alliance will have a veto over that process. Enlargement and development of the NATO-Russia relationship are complementary yet separate priorities.
An expanded European Union will be another important element of the new European security architecture. For more than forty years both Democratic and Republican Administrations have supported peaceful European integration. The EU not only has achieved deeper economic integration, but also has taken significant steps toward strengthening its political and security identity.
The Maastricht Treaty in 1991 provided for a Common Foreign and Security Policy and requested that the WEU elaborate and implement decisions and actions of the Union which have defense implications. The EU has already designated certain areas, such as humanitarian aid for Bosnia and the Middle East peace process for joint action. The EU's intergovernmental conference in 1996 will review Maastricht Treaty provisions and discuss, inter alia, options for developing the WEU's relationship with the EU and institutionalizing issues related to further EU expansion. In January 1995, the EU accepted Austria, Sweden, and Finland as new members.
The West Europeans' desire for a European security and defense identity has led to deeper relations between NATO and the WEU. EU members that are members in NATO form the strong European Pillar of the Alliance. The new CJTF initiative, as discussed above, will allow the use of NATO assets in "Europe-only" WEU contingencies.
Future expansion of the EU and WEU can be integral to strengthening security and stability in Europe, but there is a need for complementarity with the process of NATO enlargement. Divergence in WEU and NATO membership could lead to asymmetries in the security commitments of the two organizations and create "backdoor" security guarantees for non-NATO members.
Security in Europe today means resolving conflicts, many of them centuries old, before they escalate into warfare as Bosnia has. This is why we have strengthened mechanisms formerly associated with the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), renamed the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). We are also making vigorous use of its norms, ensuring full implementation of its commitments, and increasing political and material support for its conflict prevention activities. The OSCE is not only the "Conscience of Europe," it is also the only pan-European security body. This provides it with a special role as a unique forum for addressing issues important to its members.
Under the leadership of the United States, a significant evolution of the OSCE, beyond the adoption of a new name, was started in December 1994 at the Budapest Summit. OSCE members developed a comprehensive framework for the future of conventional arms control, established uniform non-proliferation principles among the 52 member nations, and pledged greater political and material support for the High Commissioner on National Minorities, the preventive diplomacy missions, and the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights. Furthermore, Russia and the OSCE as a whole agreed to merge negotiating efforts on the difficult issue of Nagorno-Karabakh and to provide an OSCE peacekeeping mission there once a political agreement is reached. All of these achievements are important steps on OSCE's path to becoming a more meaningful organization with greater capabilities, operating without regard to old Cold War dividing lines.
These decisions complement our efforts at NATO, and the efforts of the European Union to pursue cooperative, integrated security structures for Europe. The OSCE, NATO, and the EU each have unique, necessary roles. The functions as well as the structures of the OSCE, NATO, and the EU are entirely different, and shall remain so; each will retain its separate authority, even as their roles complement each other. We must also develop new methods to identify and deal with future potential "Bosnias" by addressing at an early stage the causes of conflict. We are bolstering the OSCE so it can prove its worth in this area, as the CSCE did in spreading democratic values and legitimizing human rights.
Maintaining Existing Bilateral
Ties
The United States has a strong interest in maintaining the valuable bilateral relationships we have built over the past fifty years with our NATO allies. As the only other non-European member of NATO, Canada has made important and long-standing contributions to European security: it has been a part of the CSCE/OSCE since its inception in 1973; it is a signatory of the CFE Treaty; and, even though it no longer has forces permanently stationed in Europe, its troops make up a substantial part of UNPROFOR in the former Yugoslavia. We enjoy political, economic, military and cultural connections with this transatlantic region that are not surpassed by those we have with any other nation or area. Furthermore, our common support for democracy, capitalism, human rights, and the rule of law underpins our shared strategic interests. These ties and shared values are the real bedrock of the North Atlantic Alliance.
In addition to being friends and allies, the nations of Western Europe are also vital bilateral partners of the United States. Thus, for example, in keeping with our long-standing "special relationship" with the United Kingdom, we routinely consult the British on a bilateral basis when considering our response to a new or emerging international crisis. Likewise, Germany is a crucial partner of the United States and, since its reunification, has been a key player in bringing the emerging democracies of the East closer to the West. Similarly, by drawing on their own historic and cultural connections, the Nordic countries have taken the lead in supporting the Baltic states of Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia. Norway, Iceland, Denmark, Finland and Sweden are working in concert with the United States, Germany and Great Britain to help the Baltic states develop independent defense forces and a joint Baltic Battalion for participation in international peacekeeping operations.
Our bilateral relationships with Western Europe are also essential to the pursuit of shared goals outside Europe. France, for example, is in the forefront of nations willing to commit troops and other national resources for international peacekeeping operations -- as demonstrated in the Middle East, Rwanda, and Somalia. Belgium and the Netherlands have also made significant peacekeeping contributions in crises world-wide. Similarly, Italy's decision to allow U.S. forces unlimited use of its military facilities during the Gulf War greatly contributed to our success there, as did Spain's provision of essential logistical support and Portugal's willingness to permit broad access to military facilities at Lajes Air Base in the Azores.
Growing instability in North Africa and our continued interest in the Persian Gulf make our traditional ties to Greece and Turkey all the more important. As the ongoing Operation Provide Comfort II demonstrates, Turkey is a formidable American ally and staunch NATO member in a region that is a crossroads of cultures and continents. The U.S. facilities at Souda Bay in Greece make a substantial contribution to our conduct of naval operations in the eastern Mediterranean, and have been frequently used as a transit point for humanitarian aid.
All in all, it is impossible to consider American strategy toward Europe as a whole without first understanding the extent to which this is shaped by our strong, long-standing and still-vital bilateral relationships with our allies in the region. Through the expenditure of untold numbers of American lives and vast resources, through two world wars and throughout the Cold War, the United States clearly demonstrated its own vital interest in the security and stability of this region. Today the allies and friends who stood with the United States over the past fifty years occupy a well-deserved place of honor and respect in the formulation of American policy. And we look forward to building upon this partnership as together we seek to broaden the zone of democracy, security and prosperity across the entire European continent.
Since the collapse of the Soviet empire, the countries of Central Europe and the former Soviet Union have struggled to free themselves from the habits ingrained by several decades of communist rule. Overcoming the communist legacy within their military establishments has been a particularly difficult task. While the communist system of Party control over the military has been abolished, the channels of civilian control common to the West are as yet very fragile and sometimes uncertain. Under the Clinton Administration, the United States is encouraging military reform in the former communist countries to ensure civilian control of the military, foster greater intraregional cooperation, and "jump start" NATO's Partnership for Peace.
A key bilateral program to assist in reaching PFP goals is the Warsaw Initiative, announced by President Clinton in Poland in July 1994. This program, if funded by the Congress, will provide $100 million to PFP members in FY 1996. At the same time, we are already reaching to the East through programs such as the Bilateral Working Group meetings, the Joint Contact Team Program (JCTP), and the International Military Education and Training program, as well as special initiatives in the areas of regional airspace management and defense resource management.
Twice the crossroads of World War, Central Europe is an area of great strategic interest to the United States. In order to reap the benefits of the end of the Cold War and to ensure lasting stability in Europe, we and our allies must work to help ensure the success of political and market reforms in this crucial region.
Over the past five years, all of the Central European countries have worked to make the transition from totalitarian governments to representative democracies with market-oriented economies. They have also sought to secure their newly found freedom primarily through closer association with the European Union and NATO. More recently, they have begun to pursue limited cooperation with Moscow, at least in part to prove that closer ties to the West should not be viewed by Russia as a threat. The consolidation of democratic governments in the region and U.S. efforts to bring these countries closer to NATO are key elements in preventing a security vacuum in the region. Likewise, Central European efforts to establish cooperative relationships with Russia will be key to the enlargement of NATO in a way which expands the security and stability of all Europe.
The success of the new independent states (NIS) of the former Soviet Union in establishing and maintaining stable and independent democracies is a key to our aim of a secure, undivided Europe. The United States is pursuing pragmatic security partnerships seeking cooperation and promoting favorable reform trends. At the same time, we are also engaging in serious dialogue on our differences and hedging against a possible reversal of reform. In addition to promoting overall regional security and stability, this course seeks the security benefits of reducing the former Soviet nuclear arsenal, improving its security safeguards, and preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and related technology. Recent internal conflicts and political instability within former Soviet states only underscore the importance of this pragmatic approach.
Each of the NIS nations faces its own unique challenges and will receive U.S. support and encouragement for its independence and democratization. Russia occupies a position of particular importance. The United States is pursuing constructive relations with Moscow that will promote Russia's peaceful, democratic evolution, and at the same time, contribute to greater security and stability throughout Europe. An independent and democratic Ukraine is also of great importance to European security, and we are committed to a broad agenda of security cooperation with Ukraine. Our policies will also reflect the importance of regional stability in the Caucasus and Central Asia.
Key Regional
With the end of Communism and the successful conclusion of the Cold War, the threat of major war among the Western European powers is at the lowest level in more than a century. However, these same momentous events have given rise to great uncertainty over the future of the continent:
A key danger to the security of the region is the prospect for ethnic conflict, as we see today not only in Bosnia but also in such areas as trans-Dniester, the Caucasus and Tajikistan. In the Bosnia case, there is clearly a threat of wider conflict in the Balkans.
The end of the Cold War and the dissolution of the Soviet Union created the risk of hostilities among groups with conflicting territorial claims, such as in Nagorno-Karabakh, and concern over the fate of co-ethnics, for example Russians left in the other NIS.
The outcome of Russia's ongoing revolution remains to be seen. We have strongly protested some recent troubling developments, such as the operation in Chechnya. Still, Russia is continuing reforms and policies in a wide-range of other areas which the United States on balance considers positive. However, the threat to this reform is significant, with the possibility of a reversal that, over time, could lead to a resurgent, aggressive Russia.
Another important danger, especially with the breakup of the former Soviet Union, is the increased risk of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems.
In addition, unrest, economic deprivation, and rising Islamic extremism threaten stability on the southern littoral of the Mediterranean, with the attendant risk of massive immigration to Western Europe and growing pressures on Western democratic governments.
Arms Control and Confidence Building
Measures
Nowhere in the world does the level or spectrum of activity in the arms control arena match what is taking place in the transatlantic region. U.S. and allied efforts to comply with the protocols and confidence- and security-building measures of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty, and the Vienna Document 1994 (VDOC 94) set the highest example for the international community on how to responsibly comply with and participate in the cooperative security arrangements.
The INF Treaty, which removed from Europe and eliminated an entire class of nuclear weapons, continues to be implemented in Europe and reduces nuclear tension on the continent. The CFE Treaty represents the most comprehensive conventional arms control treaty since World War II. U.S. forces completed their required equipment reduction and destruction a full two years ahead of schedule. In addition, their direct participation in VDOC 94 confidence-and security-building measures, such as unit inspections, exercise observations, base visits, and military equipment demonstrations, continues to help reduce military tensions and suspicions, and improves confidence and stability in Europe.
In looking towards the future, continuing to reduce strategic nuclear weapons and controlling the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction will remain high priorities in transatlantic security policies. Implementation of START I and the ratification and implementation of START II, will dramatically reduce U.S. and former Soviet nuclear arsenals. These agreements and the recently agreed permanent extension of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) will not only advance our strategic interests in the region, but will also contribute to the stability of the entire international community. Regionally, the United States intends to remain fully engaged and to support other important arms control initiatives, including the just-ratified Certain Conventional Weapons Convention, the Chemical Weapons Convention, and continued implementation of the Open Skies Treaty.
War and Tensions in the Balkans
The breakup of Yugoslavia following the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe generated the first major post-Cold War conflict involving cooperative U.S., UN and NATO military operations. This sometimes awkward overlap has yet to achieve a just and lasting peace settlement among the hostile parties, but it has contained the conflict, kept humanitarian support flowing to needy areas and reduced the level of fighting. These accomplishments are significant given the varying national security interests, force commitments and procedures of the individual nations involved. While the vital interests of the United States and its European partners are not directly threatened by conflict in the former Yugoslavia, the partners understand the importance of the issues and the indirect threats to vital areas and interests.
The potential for Balkan wars to spread is well known. The risk of a wider war is particularly dangerous to sensitive relationships in Southern Europe and cooperation between strategic NATO allies. Moreover, preventing ethnic wars which threaten political, social and economic development in new nations is essential to creating a peaceful environment in post-Cold War Europe.
U.S. policy in the Balkans has four specific goals: (1) contain the conflict and limit its threat to our allies and the fragile democracies of Central Europe until such time as the conflict is ended, (2) support the flow of humanitarian assistance and the protection of innocent civilians, (3) mediate cease-fires and agreements toward the goal of a peaceful settlement consistent with the Contact Group plan, and (4) support NATO responses to UN requests for air strikes or other agreed military support to limit the conflict.
The United States has committed considerable energy and resources to achieve these goals.
NATO is making a number of important contributions to limiting the effects of the fighting. These efforts have reduced the level of violence against the civilian population, protected UN forces, and helped secure the delivery of humanitarian aid. NATO operations include:
The UN, for its part, has dispatched over 38,000 troops from 26 countries to facilitate the work of UN and private relief organizations. UN officials believe their humanitarian mandate means they must maintain strict neutrality. This approach has led to some controversies with NATO, such as over the use of air power, but ways have been found to bridge differences and keep the UN mission in the field.
U.S. policy now is to work through NATO, the UN, and other channels, such as the Contact Group, to resolve the conflict in Bosnia. While acknowledging UNPROFOR's many difficulties, we believe the UN force should remain in Bosnia. The alternative would be a humanitarian disaster. The United States endorses the effort to provide more troops and equipment to make UNPROFOR more effective, and we have made the UN an offer to sell or lease a large amount of U.S. equipment.
Unique Alliance resources and experience in collective action mean there may be other requirements for NATO involvement in the former Yugoslavia in the future.
Ongoing Tensions in the
Aegean
Two key NATO allies, Greece and Turkey, anchor NATO's southeastern region. They have become more important to the United States since the end of the Cold War.
The stability of these two nations is critical to the region, and to broader U.S. and allied interests. Turkey in particular is now at the crossroads of almost every issue of importance to the United States on the Eurasian continent -- including NATO, the Balkans, the Aegean, Iraq sanctions, relations with the NIS, peace in the Middle East, and transit routes for Central Asian oil and gas. Greece, a member of NATO, occupies a strategic location for command of the eastern Mediterranean sea lanes. Our security assistance programs and those of other NATO partners help the alliance respond as necessary to events in Southeastern Europe and the Middle East.
We are deeply concerned about growing tensions between Greece and Turkey. Like the situation in the former Yugoslavia, these tensions pose a threat to broader regional stability and the cohesion of the Alliance. The United States worries that the continuing dispute over air and sea sovereignty in the Aegean and unresolved problems in Cyprus could spark a confrontation that would seriously disrupt the Alliance. NATO's ability to keep the peace among its own members is important for instilling a sense of security in Central Europe and the NIS. Although the problems in the Aegean ultimately must be resolved by the two parties involved, the United States can play an active role in reducing tensions and preventing direct conflict.
Potential Threats Posed By the Rise of Islamic
Extremism
The United States shares the concern of southern Europeans that political turmoil in Algeria could escalate into civil war, and that radical Islamic extremism could spread to other North African countries. Growing instability in North Africa may send a flood of refugees across the Mediterranean and strain the political and social fabric in the recipient countries.
The Alliance has committed itself to a dialogue with five North African and Middle Eastern countries--Egypt, Israel, Morocco, Tunisia, and Mauritania. This dialogue is intended to achieve better understanding and to correct any misinterpretation of Alliance objectives and actions that could lead to a perception of threat. A successful start with these countries could lead to later talks with other states. It is important to deepen contacts with the stable and responsible countries of North Africa and the Middle East. The goals of such efforts are to enhance the security of the nations around the Mediterranean and to improve their relations with one another.
We believe Alliance efforts in the Mediterranean should complement--and not duplicate--initiatives of other fora, such as the EU, the Mediterranean Forum, and the "five plus five" (European countries in the western Mediterranean and the countries of the Arab Union of the Maghreb). The EU, in particular, has a crucial role to play in the region, since the potential for political turmoil is rooted to a large extent in the growing disparity in North-South economic and demographic development.
