United States Security Strategy for Europe and NATO

LOOKING TO THE FUTURE

For the foreseeable future, most NATO allies -- including the United States -- plan very little growth, if any, in defense expenditures. Political leaders and military commanders fully anticipate that they will be called upon to meet more and varied defense and security challenges with fewer resources than available in the past. Taking a page from private sector management with downsized assets, effective collective security management in the future will place emphasis on innovation, flexibility, and rationalizing (i.e., achieving the fullest utility from) available resources and capacities.

Simply applying textbook solutions to major defense and security challenges will not be enough. True innovation will come by judicious appraisal of security threats; keen analysis of resource requirements; and timely application of workable solutions to produce desired results in the most effective manner. This is the shape of the future of coalition management within and outside of the NATO context. This is also the setting within which Responsibility Sharing will come into its own.

At the same time that we seek increased support from our transatlantic allies, we need also be mindful of our own national obligations -- most notably, support for our military forces stationed throughout Europe, and our financial obligations to the NATO Alliance.

An important aspect of our NATO commitment is U.S. support for the three NATO common budgets -- Military, Civil and the Security Investment Program. With no operating budget of its own, NATO is obliged to seek financial contributions from its constituent members. When pooled, these funds -- apportioned from among its members by cost share -- ensure that NATO can discharge its mission and program requirements in a timely fashion. In recent years, financial trend lines for NATO common accounts have been on a downward slope. In large part, this trend reflects the demise of the Cold War and the diminution of the immediate military threat. Astute financial management and reform of the system have also produced some marginal savings. But there is no substitute for continuing national appropriations to meet mission and program funding requirements. The United States derives significant political, military and financial benefits from its participation in the NATO Alliance. To assure continued benefits in the future, the United States must meet its financial obligations to the three NATO common budgets.

Progress toward a more peaceful and prosperous world must not be impeded by a weakening of the security framework in Europe whose centerpiece is NATO. The top priority must be to strengthen and adapt U.S. partnerships to meet post-Cold War challenges. The alternative -- an erosion of U.S. alliances and trading partnerships -- would lead to widespread instability and diminished U.S. influence over international events and decisions that affect the everyday lives of Americans.

Twice in this century, the United States has paid the great costs of learning too late the lesson that European stability is vital to our own security. Fortunately, after World War II, the founders of the Alliance paid heed to Santayana's warning that those who do not learn the lessons of history are condemned to repeat them. NATO's role in winning the Cold War showed the wisdom of a policy of transatlantic engagement, as opposed to the eventual costs of a strategy of isolationism.

We must now build upon NATO and other institutions to create a new security architecture for Europe. The end of the Cold War and the resultant emergence of new democracies has created an unprecedented opportunity for protecting and advancing our interests in Europe through the successful integration of these new democracies with free markets into the community of nations in the "zone of stability and security."

Our strategy contains a number of interlocking elements which mutually support our efforts to pursue our goals in the region. In view of current uncertainties, our strategy must be flexible enough to respond to a wide variety of contingencies.

NATO must remain at the center of European security. Some European states will push hard to develop a European Security and Defense Identity, but few will increase their capabilities for independent military action. For any major threat -- including nuclear threats -- the Europeans will continue to look to the United States and to NATO as the principal guarantors of their security.
At the same time, we must actively pursue our initiatives to adapt NATO to the new realities of the post-Cold War era. The Partnership for Peace (PFP) was the centerpiece of the 1994 NATO Summit and is a key element of our European security strategy. It provides a creative new vehicle for reaching out to the East and it opens dramatic vistas for a future in which Europe breaks with the destructive past. It also is designed to provide a means to help prevent or deal more effectively with future "Bosnias" and other threats to our common security.
We are also preparing for the enlargement of NATO as new Eastern democracies are added to the Alliance on a case-by-case basis. This process will be gradual, deliberate, and transparent. It will build on the Alliance's success at enhancing stability in Europe and preventing the renationalization of foreign and defense policies and will strengthen the security of the entire region, including nations which are not members.
We must simultaneously continue our engagement and cooperation with Russia to help ensure that it continues to pursue the path of democratic reform. A key element of this effort will be to develop and sustain Russian ties with a range of European security organizations, especially NATO, but also OSCE and others. At the same time, we must be prepared to take effective remedial action in the event of a reversal of Russian reforms.
In addition to our focus on NATO, we are also seeking to develop complementary relationships with other elements of the European security scene, such as the WEU and EU. These relationships will strengthen the "European Pillar" of NATO, and strengthen capabilities for common action.
We are also pursuing a determined effort to strengthen the OSCE both in its historical role as the conscience of the continent and in its new role as a primary instrument for early warning, conflict prevention, and crisis management.
Similarly, our unique bilateral security ties with Canada are an important part of the overall transatlantic security equation. We intend to keep these ties strong by adapting them to new realities, particularly through a renewed and updated North American Aerospace Defense (NORAD) agreement.
Finally, we must continue to maintain close bilateral security relationships with our European allies and to build such relationships with our new Eastern partners.

Maintenance of our leadership position in the transatlantic community is critical to the success of this strategy. America's unique role as the leading security partner of the world's principal democracies and our unparalleled military assets give us great influence, if we wish to use it. To do so effectively, the United States must retain a significant forward presence in Europe and provide adequate funding support for NATO programs, as well as related bilateral efforts such as the President's Warsaw Initiative.

As President Clinton indicated in Brussels, Europe is at a crossroads. We face great uncertainties but also great opportunities. With the successful conclusion of the Cold War, the vision of a Europe united by a commitment to the principles of democracy and market economies appears to be at last within reach. However, such an outcome is by no means certain, as many difficulties and problems lie ahead. Through our initiatives at the Brussels Summit and our ongoing policies of continued commitment to Europe and maintenance of a strong force presence there, we are in a position to advance our long-sought goals. The strategy outlined above provides a blueprint for doing so. The challenge to us now is to implement it.