Thank you for that kind introduction. For decades the Atlantic Council has performed an invaluable service promoting greater understanding of America's stake in Europe. I also particularly want to take this opportunity to salute you personally, General Goodpaster, for your own service to our country and your continuing commitment to a strong transatlantic Alliance.
You mentioned my predecessor George Kennan. The hardest part of my job is coming into the office every morning, seeing his picture on the wall, and being constantly reminded of the high standard he set. I try very hard to live up to it. That standard was particularly high on matters of European security, where the extraordinary efforts of Mr. Kennan and General Marshall left a lasting legacy for the United States's own security.
In that spirit, I would like to discuss with you our Administration's recent transatlantic initiatives and how they contribute to advancing President Clinton's goal of a democratic, undivided Europe.
Let me begin by recalling another June day, just seven years ago, when Austrian and Hungarian leaders gathered at their border, snipped the first holes in the Iron Curtain -- and transformed the continent. Over the next months and years -- only a blink of history's eye -- the Berlin Wall fell, the Soviet empire collapsed, new democracies were born, and the sharp, chiseled lines of the Cold War dissolved into a Jackson Pollock painting.
These changes posed both opportunities and challenges for NATO. After all, the Atlantic Alliance was conceived as a bulwark against Soviet expansionism. But NATO has always been more than just a defensive alliance. Even as NATO held the line against the Soviet Army, it drew France and Germany together. It helped integrate Italy and, eventually Spain, into the community of democracies. It gave shattered economies the confidence to recover. And it provided the essential framework for transatlantic cooperation on a wide range of common concerns.
Throughout its history NATO has shown a remarkable ability to adapt to change. It enlarged to take in Greece and Turkey in 1952, Germany in 1955, and Spain in 1982. The Harmel Report of l967, with its parallel strategy of defense and detente, was a creative response to the changing European landscape of the mid- to late l960s, just as NATO's double-track decision on theater nuclear forces was an effective response to the challenges of the late l970s and early l980s.
It was in this spirit that the Alliance quickly began to respond to the tumultuous changes released by the end of the
Cold War. Only eight months after the fall of the Berlin Wall, and seventeen months before the end of the Soviet Union, the Alliance set forth new goals at its London Summit of July l990. NATO declared that it no longer considered Moscow an adversary and announced a new program of cooperation with the states of central and eastern Europe. Just as important, Alliance leaders called for a restructuring of NATO military forces and a reorientation of NATO strategy. One year later, in Copenhagen, NATO foreign ministers declared "we do not wish to isolate any country, nor to see a new division of the Continent." At the Rome Summit of November l99l Alliance leaders approved a new Strategic Concept that dropped containment from the NATO strategy, declared no country to be an opponent or enemy, and made clear that crisis management would become an important mission for the Alliance in addition to its core responsibility for defense of its members. At the same Rome Summit, Alliance leaders created the North Atlantic Cooperation Council -- the NAC/C -- and invited Russia and the other states of the former Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact to join.
These strands of adaptation came together at the Brussels Summit in January l994, when, at President Clinton's urging, Alliance leaders adopted a broad strategy of cooperation with all of Europe, and endorsed a three-point program for Alliance reform. First, they called for adapting NATO's internal structures, including support for greater European visibility and capability within the Alliance and approval of the concept of Combined Joint Task Forces. Second, they launched a strategy for external adaptation, including the Partnership for Peace, a strategy for enlargement, and outreach both to Russia and to Ukraine. Third, they directed an examination of the full spectrum of NATO's roles and missions in the new security environment.
Of course, NATO's adaptation did not proceed in isolation. Since taking office President Clinton has advanced a comprehensive strategy for European security. In addition to a revitalized NATO and robust and permanent Partnership for Peace, it includes support for a broader and deeper European Union and a stronger OSCE. It includes giving Russia the opportunity to integrate into Europe's broad security and economic architecture. None of these is an end in itself, but each is critical to advance the President's overall goal of a peaceful, undivided and democratic Europe. That goal remains within our reach. But the early euphoria that surrounded the collapse of the Soviet Empire has been replaced by a more sober appreciation of the challenges, none more vivid than the tragic conflict in the former Yugoslavia. The Cold War has ended, but more people have died violently in Europe during the past five years than during the previous fifty. As Secretary Christopher said in Prague this spring, "Europe's future will be shaped either by the divisive intolerance that left Bosnia in ruins or the democratic integration to which most nations in this region aspire."
This means that our definition of security must include, but also must go beyond, the military dimension. Security in Europe today is not only a matter of extending guarantees from the top down; it also is a matter of building democracies and market economies from the bottom up. That is why the international community's efforts at civilian implementation of the Dayton peace accords are so important, and why we must continue to give the people of Bosnia a personal stake -- a real interest -- in peace.
Bosnia is also a clear example of NATO's continuing relevance to Europe's new security challenges. One year ago we were trying to end the horrors of war; today we are focused on securing the benefits of peace. IFOR has not only brought hope to the people of Bosnia, but it has also demonstrated the possibilities of cooperation in support of peace and stability. IFOR has brought NATO allies together with 16 non-NATO countries from Europe, North Africa, the Middle East and Asia in an effective and unified coalition for peace. And participation by Russia and the central European nations underscores both the ability of the Alliance to build practical new partnerships and the essential role of these countries in the new security environment in Europe.
Last week in Berlin, the Alliance took important steps to fulfill several key aspects of the 1994 Brussels Summit mandate. The centerpiece of Berlin was NATO's internal adaptation. Here our efforts have been guided by three objectives: to ensure the Alliance's military effectiveness in Europe's changing security environment; to preserve the transatlantic link; and to develop the European Security and Defense Identity within the Alliance.
As we have proceeded, we have rejected the false counsel of those who have argued that enhanced European capabilities would necessarily weaken America's engagement with Europe and undermine the effectiveness of the Alliance. I believe that the results in Berlin demonstrate clearly that these three goals are in fact mutually supportive.
Our decisions in Berlin give NATO the means to help provide stability throughout Europe by being able to respond rapidly and effectively to a spectrum of crises that are likely to happen, but the details of which cannot now be foreseen. We established the new Policy Coordination Group to meet the need for closer coordination of political and military issues as NATO embarks on new roles and mission. And we are giving NATO a permanent institutional capacity to plan, train for and deploy complex operations like IFOR through the Combined Joint Task Force concept. By permitting a more flexible and mobile deployment of forces, CJTF will facilitate NATO contingency operations and make it easier for members of the Partnership for Peace to join with NATO forces when the Alliance responds to emergencies.
Our decisions in Berlin will also allow our European allies to strengthen their capabilities within the Alliance. We agreed on a process by which we can make NATO assets available for military operations led by the West European Union, and to develop European command arrangements within the Alliance that preserve NATO's unity and transatlantic foundation.
Though much work remains to be done, we are confident that we can bring these decisions and commitments to life.
Progress in Berlin came in part because of President Chirac's decision to have France participate more closely in the work of NATO, and to pursue ESDI within the Alliance. France has now rejoined the Military Committee, and earlier today its Defense Minister once again participated in a meeting of NATO Defense Ministers for the first time in thirty years. France's soldiers have a critical role under NATO command in Bosnia; and France is playing an indispensable part in our common effort to build a new NATO in a secure and undivided Europe.
Berlin also had important implications for external adaptation. First, we further strengthened the Partnership for Peace. We agreed to apply our experience in IFOR to future Partnership exercises, and in its planning and training activities. We agreed to facilitate Partner participation in CJTF at an early stage. And we agreed to broaden and deepen the Partnership Planning and Review Process. This will advance our common efforts on interoperability, on civil-military relations and defense policy and planning.
Second, by moving forward with internal adaptation, we enhanced our ability to include Partners in NATO activities and how to imporve our ability to implement the internal changes necessary to take in new members.
NATO's progress on internal adaptation is thus a further demonstration that the Alliance is on track to fulfill its decision to take in new members. At present 15 interested Partners are engaged in individual intensified dialogues with the Alliance, continuing the process established at the December l995 NATO Ministerial. These dialogues help both Partners and the Alliance determine what they each must do to prepare for enlargement. Based on the results of these dialogues, the alliance will decide on next steps at the NATO meeting in December.
NATO's external adaptation also means building new partnerships with Russia and Ukraine.
We have a vital interest in integrating Russia into Europe's broad security and economic architecture. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, NATO and the European Union have made progress in expanding cooperation with Russia. Russia has joined and participates actively in the Partnership for Peace. Russia and NATO have held consultations on key arms control issues, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and the safe and secure dismantlement of nuclear weapons. Another positive note came last week with the agreement on equipment levels permitted on the north and south flanks of the CFE region. Cooperation in different fields of NATO activities is ongoing, as for example in the signing of a Memorandum of Understanding on Civil Emergency Planning and Disaster Preparedness.
Our joint efforts in Bosnia demonstrate how important -- and how successful -- cooperation between Russia and NATO can be. Who would have thought that American and Russian soldiers would be patrolling together or that NATO and Russian officials would be planning together in a common mission for peace? Today that unthinkable is a reality.
Now we need to build on our practical experiences in Bosnia to deepen the NATO-Russia relationship in a more formalized, broad-ranging fashion. Together, we should elaborate basic principles for security cooperation and permanent mechanisms for political consultations.
There is much we can do together. But in the end, the choice is Russia's to make -- a choice covering both Russia's internal policies and policies toward its neighbors and the world.
This Sunday the world will be watching as Russia holds its first presidential elections in the post-Soviet era. Far from
fearing the result, we should welcome this important step toward consolidating democracy in Russia, which will benefit not only the people of Russia, but also Europe, America, and the world. Throughout this process, our interests and objectives remain constant: to keep our people safe and to lock in the gains for peace and freedom made possible by the Cold War's end. Ukraine's emergence as a sovereign and prosperous democracy is also critical. That is why we value Ukraine's participation in IFOR and PFP, and why we want NATO and Ukraine to build an enhanced relationship. These efforts are paying off. As we were meeting in Berlin, for example, the U.S., Russia and eight other nations were participating in a joint military exercise in the western part of Ukraine. Thanks to the Trilateral Agreement between the U.S., Russia and Ukraine, the last Soviet-era nuclear warheads left Ukrainian soil just two weeks ago. And President Clinton has galvanized the international community's efforts to support Ukraine's economic reform.
Taken together, these initiatives underscore just how far we have come in our efforts to realize the full promise of the vision charted by such postwar giants as George Marshall and Jean Monnet. We are adapting Western institutions to meet the challenges of a new era. And we are working with Partners to the east to extend the same benefits and obligations of the open economic and security order that has brought peace and prosperity to the West.
For half a century, the Atlantic Community has been the leading force for peace and prosperity -- for ourselves and for the world. But at the threshold of a new century, there is a new world to face -- with challenges no less critical than those faced by our counterparts half a century ago. Without a strong Atlantic Community, the prospects for a safer, more prosperous and freer world in the coming century will fade. The world is too dangerous, and our opportunities are too great, for us to take this partnership for granted. Let me once again thank you for this opportunity to speak, and to encourage you in your own work to advance this important agenda.
(###)