SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER: Good morning. It is a great pleasure to be here again, with the Secretary General, Javier Solana. The Alliance is indeed very fortunate to have a man of his quality and abilities leading NATO at this important moment for the Alliance. Both the Secretary General and I are convinced that NATO has a central role to play in building a stable, democratic and undivided Europe. Certainly, no place is that more apparent, no place is that more important than in connection with Bosnia. IFOR is now fully deployed, achieved a brilliant, quite a stunning success in creating the conditions for peace in Bosnia. IFOR is truly an extraordinary coalition, including, beyond doubt, I think, that the nations of Europe, both East and West, can work together in pursuit of common objectives of peace and security. Just think for a moment of what IFOR has already accomplished in Bosnia. It has successfully implemented not only the cease-fire, but the withdrawal of forces behind established lines and separations, all within the deadlines set out at Dayton. Just days from now, the hand-over of territory mandated by the Dayton accord will be completed, including the reunification of Sarajevo. This is certainly a major milestone that would not have been possible six or eight months ago.
Now that the military requirements are being completed, the stage is set for phase two, the critical challenge of civilian implementation. One week from today the Contact Group's Foreign Ministers will convene in Moscow with the Foreign Ministers of the three Balkan states to accelerate the task of building a stable and democratic Bosnia. On Monday, I will be meeting in Geneva with the leaders of Bosnia and Croatia and Serbia to set the stage for the Moscow meeting. We want to make sure that the efforts on civilian implementation are no less successful than those on the military side.
The Secretary General and I certainly agree that cooperation of the Russian and NATO forces has been one of IFOR's most significant successes and an important model for cooperation in the future between Russia and NATO. Both the Secretary General and I, by coincidence, will be in Moscow next week, not at the same time -- he leaves just as I arrive. NATO and Russia have a mutual interest in building on their work in Bosnia and developing the kind of cooperative structures that are essential for the long term peace and stability in Europe as a whole. NATO is ready to work with Russia both through the mechanism of the Partnership for Peace as well as through the unique relationship that Russia has with NATO. I will be urging my Russian colleagues and I am sure that the Secretary General will, to take full advantage of the extraordinary opportunity that we have, to join together as partners in a joint effort. Building bridges with NATO and the West will also be a central part in my mission when I travel to Kiev and Prague later this week, in addition to the bilateral meetings that I will be having in both Ukraine and the Czech Republic.
In Prague I will hold one of my regular meetings with all the Foreign Ministers of the Central European nations, as well as the Baltic states. At that time, I will also be in Prague making an address on President Clinton's strategy for achieving a stable, democratic and undivided Europe. In our meeting this morning, the Secretary General and I discussed a wide range, a very broad agenda. Over the next several months, we will be talking about strengthening the Partnership for Peace, moving ahead with the steady and gradual process of enlargement, adapting the Alliance in connection with the internal restructuring issues to meet the challenges of the future - all matters that will be discussed at the North Atlantic Council (NAC) meeting to be held, the first ever meeting of this kind, in Berlin. Mr. Secretary General, I want to express my great appreciation to you for your genuinely outstanding work. I look forward to our cooperation and to working closely together in the months ahead.
SECRETARY GENERAL SOLANA: Thank you very much. I have little to add to what the Secretary of State has just said. Let me say that it is always a pleasure to meet with Secretary Christopher and the opportunity of the allies to examine the important challenges we have in front of us. Let me only say, I just returned from the theater. I was yesterday in Bosnia, visiting Tuzla. I had the opportunity of visiting the troops, the American troops, which are deployed there in Tuzla and I also had the opportunity to see the Russian troops which are deployed very close to Tuzla. I had the opportunity also to visit the Northern Brigade, which is a very important example of what IFOR about.
Let me remind you that in the Northern Battalion we have Spanish troops, a country which is a member of the EU and of NATO; a Swedish battalion, which is a country which is member of the EU but not a member of NATO; and the Polish battalion, which is a country which is not part of the EU, but it is part of the Partnership for Peace. So that means, in a practical case, the important role that we are doing in IFOR, getting together countries thanks to the coalition for peace which Secretary Christopher has mentioned. And let me say that, as far as Russia is concerned, I was very happy to see how well they are working together with the other allies. I was very impressed to see that American soldiers and Russian soldiers are patrolling together in the complicated area, very close to the Posavina corridor.
So let me say that, as we approach D+90, which is beginning of this week, I can tell you that the military part of IFOR is still on track and I am very happy to be able to tell you that. And as Secretary Christopher has said, we have talked about some other things, such as Russia, and I will work from now on to the Berlin meeting, that will take place in June and will be without any doubt an important council in their lives. I want once again to thank Secretary Christopher for this opportunity of exchanging views on these important issues. Thank you very much.
QUESTION: I have a question for you both: There was new evidence yesterday that the Muslim government is doing little, if anything, to protect the Serbs who were left in the Sarajevo suburbs and as you hail the reunification of Sarajevo how serious a problem is this and what does it say about the Muslim government's commitment to a multi-democratic Bosnia, which, of course, was a cornerstone of Dayton?
SECRETARY GENERAL SOLANA: The question of Sarajevo has been of concern in the last days but as far as IFOR is concerned I think we have done what we could and we have done it in a very good way. I think that Admiral Smith has deployed his troops so that the transition is done as calmly as possible. As we have said so many times, there are always problems that cannot be tackled within our mission but I can guarantee you that, as far as IFOR is concerned, we will do our best so that the transition in the Sarajevo suburbs is done in calm. We have still two or three days until D+90, when the last suburb of Sarajevo will be transferred and the forces are deployed there and, as you know, Admiral Smith has said very clearly that he would do his best with the troops so that no disturbances, no major disturbances, [would occur] there. And as far as the government of Sarajevo, I'm certain that it will be committed to the Dayton Accords and the Dayton Accords talked about a multi-ethnic Sarajevo.
SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER: Carol, the peaceful reunification of Sarajevo is clearly one of the principal goals that we have. At the same time, it is a difficult problem because the reunification is trying to achieve something that has been quite at variance with the situation over the last four years, but it is clearly the right long term solution. It is one of the things I'll be raising with all the parties when I meet with them in Geneva and I'm sure that it will come up in Moscow when we meet this weekend as well. The organization of the international police force needs to be aggressively pushed forward so that they play their proper role and I certainly intend to remind all parties about the importance of achieving a multi-ethnic country. Difficult as that goal is, nevertheless, it's the stated goal of all who are involved and, despite its difficulties, it's something that we need to pursue and work at and we will do so.
QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, (inaudible) from the Middle East Broadcasting Center - Would you please explain the contrast existing today between the United States and the European Union. First, about Iran and, second, the issue of re-armament or giving the Bosnian military forces some level of armament for them to be ready. Paris was absent from Ankara, as you know. Could explain that please?
SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER: What was that the last thing you said?
QUESTION: The differences between the United States and Europe, on Iran and on the possibility of giving the Bosnian armed forces some equipment.
SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER: With respect to Iran, the United States continues to feel that Iran is an international law violator. They are a constant source of international terrorism. They are an open opponent of the peace process. They are trying to acquire weapons of mass destruction and we think they are a very dangerous world actor at the present time. Hence, we are urging all of our European allies and all the countries of the world not to support, not to give support to Iran, not to give Iran the kind of resources that enable them to project this terror around the world. If people had doubts about Iran, I would say, or if people thought that Iran somehow was changing its behavior for the better, I would think they would have had those views pushed out of their minds by the action that Iran, or the comments that Iran has made with respect to the terrorist incidents in Israel. I would think that anybody who felt that Iran was moving in the right direction would be given great pause by those comments and we're going to be redoubling our efforts to try to persuade our European allies that trying to do business with Iran, giving them credits, giving them favorable, various relationships is unwise and is really not consistent with encouraging good international behavior.
Now, with respect to the Bosnian government and its relationship with "arm and train," as we say, the United States takes the position that it is important to create a situation of equilibrium after IFOR departs, that no one of the elements there, either the Federation nor the Serbs, should be so weak as to lack a deterrent capability. We think both entities within Bosnia should have a deterrent capability after IFOR leaves and, hence, we feel that the arms control provisions of the Dayton Agreement are very important and we expect those to play a major role. But we do not think it is likely that the arms control provisions alone will create the kind of equilibrium that is necessary and, hence, the United States feels that some additional training, some additional equipment needs to be provided to the Bosnian government. That is contemplated by the Dayton Accords and it is contemplated by the commitments that we have to the Bosnian government. We're pursuing this. The United States has pledged a hundred million dollars in draw-down equipment for the Bosnian government. We hope that other countries, after they examine the matter more carefully, will follow us in doing so. But the essential point that I want to make is that it is very important to stability in the future for neither of the entities within Bosnia, that is, neither the Federation, nor the Serbska group to be so weak at the end of the IFOR presence that it does not have a deterrent capability. Both countries will have an adequate deterrent capability and that's what we are moving to achieve, both through the arms control provisions as well as through the equipment training provisions.
QUESTION: It's hard to see you in this intimate gathering but if I could just ask a question to both gentlemen. The question is as much about NATO's purpose as it is anything else. As most people agree, the military side of Bosnia is going rather well but the civilian side - you can judge it for yourself. I mean, most people think that it isn't going very well and, obviously, the timetables aren't, right now, very much in parallel. The timetable for NATO withdrawal is approaching. I mean, a year isn't a very long time. The question arises whether it is good for NATO's reputation if, after it withdraws, Bosnia reverts to war. You can say, obviously, that it's up to the Bosnian parties to make peace with themselves but that doesn't affect the way NATO's intervention will judged if, in fact, the end result is a reversion to the war. So the essence of the question is: When is serious talk going to begin, except among the Turks, about extending a period of NATO presence in Bosnia?
SECRETARY GENERAL SOLANA: Let me tell you that I have a much more optimistic approach than you do have. I think that the NATO mission has been a success and don't forget that we are still at D+90. I remind you that means that we have been deployed on the ground for three months -- only three months. And up until now the success is great. If you were to think that, say, six or seven months ago what would have been this three first months of our presence in Bosnia, you would admit that it has been much better than even expected. So let's take an optimistic approach in that sense. It's true that we have problems in Bosnia-Herzegovina which are not related strictly to the military operation. And it's true also that the success of the whole operation is military and it is also political -- the reconstruction, etc. But our commitment as IFOR is concerned is very clear: the separation of the fighters, the cessation of hostilities - first; second, create a climate, an environment of security so that others can do what they have to do. Imagine that we fail this environment of security -- no reconstruction could take place, (inaudible).
So it is absolutely fundamental that NATO is there to create an environment of security and we are to maintain that as the most important task. But I want to say our relationship with the High Representative Mr. Bildt is very good now. Let me remind you that he has been coming to the Council on two or three occasions. You know very well that he has written to me a letter suggesting possibilities of cooperation. We will answer this letter in the coming days in a very positive manner. So we want to maintain, to keep, as close relations and as fluid relations as possible - but within our mission.
With the primary mission that is to keep and to maintain the environment of security. And within that, we are trying to cooperate as much as possible with the international tribunal and Mr. Bildt so that the whole thing, the military and the civilian parts, can come to an end with success. But I want to say once again, we are D+90 and the questions that are related to D+366 - I don't mean that they are very long, time flies -- but we are still, we have to recognize that things are going very well these ninety days and let's hope that it will continue to be so.
QUESTION: (In French) pour M. le Secretaire d'Etat. On a l'impression que vous avez oublie une region importante, Kosovo...
MR. BURNS: En anglais, s'il vous plait. C'est possible en anglais?
QUESTION: C'est pas possible. Vous avez oublie une region importante: Kosovo ou la crise Yugoslave a commence en 1989. Qu'est-ce que vous pensez, est-ce que vous allez vous en occuper ou vous attendez jusqu'a ce qu'il y a une guerre? Vous savez que ca peut couter tres cher pour la region.
SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER: My non-professional translator told me that, heard enough to know that you asked a question about Kosovo and what the future of Kosovo will be. Let me say that we are concerned about Kosovo and concerned that it's future will be one that will give people there more security than they have had in the past. I talked to President Milosevic about that when I was in Belgrade recently. He responded by agreeing that the USIA could establish a mission there. I emphasized to him the importance of meeting with the leaders of Kosovo to try to ensure that they have a greater degree of autonomy within the concept of the country of Serbia. I will be making that same point again when I meet with him hopefully on Monday afternoon in Geneva. We are also maintaining what is called the "outer wall of sanctions" to ensure that Kosovo is treated in a proper way here. I, of course, see a better future for Kosovo in the future as we have an opportunity to encourage President Milosevic to deal with the leaders of Kosovo, to provide them with more autonomy and a more secure, more prosperous life. It is a matter that the people of the United States are concerned about and we intend to not ignore the conditions in Kosovo by any means.
QUESTION: Secretary of State, I have a questions about enlargement. There is a lot of discussion going on between Mr. Primakov and foreign ministers of Central Europe about this thing. What will be your message to them? What will you say in Prague and in Moscow about enlargement?
SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER: Well, I intend to say that the NATO Council and all of the leaders of NATO have taken a consistent position that there should be a steady, open, transparent process of enlargement; that the discussions will go on through 1996 between NATO and the members of the Partnership for Peace that are interested and are being considered for enlargement; that as we move through this year, they will be able to focus on the readiness of various countries to be considered for membership. I'm going to be telling the countries that there has been no change in the NATO position and I don't expect there to be any. We're on this steady course. The proposals that have been put forward I think are not ones that are consistent with the position that NATO has taken. Our view is that all members of the Partnership for Peace are eligible to be considered for membership at the appropriate time. In short, we're on the same course that we have been on before and I want to give reassurance to the foreign ministers of Central Europe and the Baltics that there has been no change in NATO's position, no change in the steady, open, transparent deliberate course towards NATO's expansion that has been marked out by the leaders of NATO for more than a year.
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