24 December 1997
(Dec. 11 digital video conference on NATO enlargement) (5930) Washington -- Jeremy Rosner, special assistant to president and secretary of state for NATO enlargement ratification, was interviewed during a digital video conference (DVC) December 11 by a group of leading newspaper, magazine and television journalists in Warsaw who cover NATO issues. The program was hosted in Warsaw by U.S. Ambassador to Poland Nicholas Andrew Rey, and Rosner participated from a studio in Washington. It took place just a few days before U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright and the other foreign ministers of NATO met in Brussels to sign NATO accession protocols with Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic. Rosner noted that the U.S. Senate, which must ratify the accession, is asking many questions about the costs of NATO enlargement and "whether Poland and the other two states will strengthen the alliance and make a lasting contribution to European security and American security. I think they'll ultimately conclude that the answer is yes, and I think that in the first few months, perhaps as early as March of '98, we may see the Senate vote on this." He said "there is not yet the necessary number of votes" in the Senate -- a two-thirds majority -- but this is due to the fact that "a large number of them still have not declared a position and not examined the question in sufficient detail to have a position." Clinton administration officials and other witnesses testified at nine Senate hearings on NATO enlargement in October and November, which "were crucial to helping answer questions that were on their minds, and I think succeeded in increasing not only Senate understanding but Senate support." The hearings culminated with a letter from Senators Jesse Helms (R-North Carolina) and Senator Joseph Biden (D-Delaware) -- the chairman and ranking minority member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, respectively -- "expressing their very strong support for ratification," Rosner pointed out. He added that "the key to continuing that progress in large part will be events on the ground in Poland and the other two states, and the continuation of the kind of tangible signs of political will that senators are looking for as they evaluate whether Poland and the other two states will strengthen the alliance and make a lasting contribution to European security and American security." Following is a transcript of the DVC: (Note: In the following transcript, "billion" equals 1,000 million.) (Begin transcript) INTERVIEW WITH JEREMY ROSNER SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO PRESIDENT AND SECRETARY OF STATE FOR NATO ENLARGEMENT RATIFICATION Conducted by Journalists in Warsaw, Poland Via Digital Video Conference December 11, 1997 PROCEEDINGS MR. ROSNER: In just five days Secretary of State Albright and the other foreign ministers of NATO will meet in Brussels to sign the protocols of accession that will bring Poland as well as Hungary and the Czech Republic in as full members and allies in NATO. And that is clearly an important milestone. It marks not only the progress of Poland's entry into NATO, but also Poland's progress on the range of issues that have been important for its consideration as a new ally -- its political reforms, its economic modernization, its development of an outward-looking foreign policy. Obviously, membership in NATO is not the only factor in Poland's security or its continued integration into the new Europe, but it is an important factor, and it is something that will make NATO stronger, as well. As you all know, it's a step that requires ratification here in the U.S. and in each of the other NATO states. I think our ratification effort is proceeding well. There is not yet the necessary number of votes -- necessary number of senators in the United States Senate who are publicly committed to voting for this -- but I think we are approaching that goal. The hearings we held in October and November, which were very intensive and included nine different hearings before three different committees over a period of 30 days, were crucial to helping answer questions that were on their minds, and I think succeeded in increasing not only Senate understanding but Senate support. And the hearings culminated, as you may know, with a letter from Senators Helms and Biden expressing their very strong support for ratification. The key to continuing that progress in large part will be events on the ground in Poland and the other two states, and the continuation of the kind of tangible signs of political will that senators are looking for as they evaluate whether Poland and the other two states will strengthen the alliance and make a lasting contribution to European security and American security. I think they'll ultimately conclude that the answer is yes, and I think that in the first few months, perhaps as early as March of '98, we may see the Senate vote on this. I'm pleased to join you and I welcome your questions. A PARTICIPANT: I would like to ask you, how do you think how many (inaudible) the Polish participation being there? MR. ROSNER: I think it's premature to suggest a particular count of Senators, in part because a large number of them still have not declared a position and not examined the question in sufficient detail to have a position. And so when I say that we are short of the necessary number of supporters, I would not want people to think it's because everyone else is opposed to it. It's really because there is a large number of Senators who have not yet focused sufficiently on this to have a position. I think we are moving up on the goal of two-thirds, getting close to the goal of 67 senators. We are probably at least a handful to a dozen away from that point. A PARTICIPANT: (Inaudible) public television. Except for costs, what have you (inaudible) it should be (inaudible) or could be (inaudible)? MR. ROSNER: I think a number of concerns will be raised and I wouldn't describe them so much as reasons for opposition, as questions that Senators will want answered. They are obviously very interested in the question of the costs to the United States and the degree to which the overall costs will be equitably shared by current and new allies; two, they will be very interested in the impact on relations with Russia; three, they'll be very interested and have a number of questions about the impact on NATO's own effectiveness and strength and its ability to make timely and coherent decisions; four, senators will raise questions about future rounds of enlargement and what the long-term plan and strategy is; five, they will raise questions about the impact on the states that are not being invited into NATO in the first round; and finally, they will raise questions about the three countries that are being invited in. On this final point, I take it as a very encouraging sign that in the hearings that just concluded this fall in the Senate there seems to be a very high level of comfort with the three invited states. And I did not sense a great deal of concern or opposition related to the condition of the economies or political stability or military reforms in Poland and the other two states. And, indeed, I think the feeling went the other way, which was that a range of factors -- including Poland's recent successful elections, its new government, the commitments it had made in the 15-year Defense Modernization Plan, the performance of Poland's economy -- all of these helped increase comfort and support among the senators who took part in the hearings. A PARTICIPANT: (Inaudible) that it's better for the White House that the Congress will ratify the treaty with more than necessary votes. So is it better and why? MR. ROSNER: Oh, yes. I would be delighted if the Senate in its wisdom decides to vote by unanimous acclaim or by any overwhelming margin. I do think this is a very difficult vote for the Senate. It not only costs American taxpayers millions of dollars, but involves very solemn security commitments. And so I wouldn't want anyone to expect a margin of support up at a level substantially above two-thirds. But we are certainly going to try to get as many Senators as possible to support it, and we would be delighted if the margin is very large. I think a large margin, a comfortable margin, can be helpful in several ways. First, in sending a signal to the other states that will need to ratify -- most of which will ratify, I think, after us. Second, in sending a signal to the three invited states of the strength of our commitment. Third, in sending a signal into the years ahead with regard to future rounds of enlargement, because one of the things that will be part of our debate is the commitment President Clinton has made that the first states invited in will not be the last -- and I think the nature and outcome of the debate here in the spring will have implications for future votes on this issue. So for all those reasons we are working very hard not just to get a two-thirds margin and then to stop there, but to talk to really virtually every member of the Senate and to address their concerns and to keep pressing this down to the very end. And this is something that we're pressing. This is something that I see a number of groups in the United States pressing on just this week. The Council of State Governments endorsed this policy of NATO enlargement, [which is] the organization that represents each of the governors and state governments. We've seen our mayors endorse this. We've seen all of our leading veterans organizations, labor organizations, business leaders, human rights groups, religious leaders. I see an increasing wave of support for this and, of course, the embassies of each of the three nations, including Poland's embassy, have been very active and instrumental in pressing this case and have been very effective in doing so. And I think all of these efforts combined suggest that they certainly raise my confidence that we will reach two-thirds and, hopefully, more than two-thirds. A PARTICIPANT: I'm (inaudible). Can you imagine something happening in that short period of time which could prevent the debate? MR. ROSNER: Well, I don't know if I can imagine something that would prevent the debate or result in a negative outcome, but I do think, as your question implies, that we all need to bear in mind that the debate and the outcome will depend very much on events on the ground and that there are things that can happen both in Central Europe and outside of Central Europe that could have a big impact. And Secretary Albright has said, "We do expect that the events in Bosnia and what happens in the mission there, as well as the debate on that question here in the United States, will affect the NATO enlargement debate. As I suggested before, the progress of economic and military and political events in the three countries will affect the debate. I think it's clear that events in Russia have some impact on the debate. I don't expect anything to happen in any of those areas that would result in the debate being substantially delayed or would result in this proposition being defeated. But this is a policy that very much depends on what happens on the ground. And all along in a positive way, as I said earlier, [it] has been moved along precisely because Poland and the other states have made the kind of strides and commitments that raise confidence here, and because NATO itself in Bosnia and in other settings has shown itself to have the kind of effectiveness that makes it still indispensable after the end of the Cold War. So events on the ground in all those ways will continue to have a very big influence on the debate. People watched, for example, very closely -- here in the United States -- watched very closely such things as the conduct and outcome of Poland's elections as well as the conduct and outcome of Hungary's referendum on NATO enlargement. All of these were watched intensively here. A PARTICIPANT: My name is Maria (inaudible). May I ask you to comment on the fact that (inaudible) were published in the last days proposing (inaudible) NATO concerning Polish, Czech, and Hungarian armed forces, which was very surprising for the Polish (inaudible) because it has very sharp criticism of his forces. Could you comment on that? MR. ROSNER: Yes. The article was, I think, making a great deal out of something which is perhaps old news, which is that all three of the states coming into NATO will need to take a number of steps over the coming years to modernize their militaries and improve their ability to work with the rest of NATO's forces. This is something that we have said for many months, and it's something that NATO's military authorities have known since the beginning of this process. And I didn't see anything in that article that went beyond, really, that notion that there was going to need to be a process over the next decade or so of modernization, integration, investments in interoperability. And certainly, the fact that Poland has designed a 15-year Modernization Plan for its military is a recognition of those very facts and a commitment to do what is necessary to achieve the kind of modernization and interoperability. The whole point of the studies that NATO has just completed was to look at what the military requirements would be of enlargement and to look at what the resource implications would be exactly, because NATO knew that these kind of steps would be needed. And the studies that have just been produced detail the kinds of actions with regard to command and control and air defenses and training and infrastructure improvement that will enable the three states to work fully with NATO to make full contributions to NATO's security missions and to ensure that NATO can honor all of its security commitments from day one. And so, I think, you know, we should not be surprised that we see articles -- not just this one, I'm sure we will see others that raise these kinds of questions -- and it's legitimate for the press and the Congress to ask what the condition of these militaries are. But I think there was a sense of alarm in the article that was out of line with the facts that were being reported. A PARTICIPANT: Mr. Rosner, do you think any of the (inaudible) can be located (inaudible)? MR. ROSNER: Well, as you know, many of the details of the ways in which Poland's military will be integrated into NATO's military structure are still to be worked out, and precise questions of integration into the military commands are yet to be settled, but certainly that's one of the things that will be addressed. A PARTICIPANT: Referring back to the (inaudible) advisors like Boris (Yeltsin?) they told (inaudible) but like to win the second round (inaudible) every sources using even the (inaudible) service to make a big lobby in the number of states against the (inaudible). Especially they mentioned the Turkish government and the (inaudible) Congress. Do you feel some interest of the Russians on the process of ratification of the United States? MR. ROSNER: No. I have not. And as I said earlier, for its own reasons this is a difficult decision for the American Congress because of the costs, because of the nature of the security implications, because of the foreign policy implications. That would be the case even if no one from outside of the United States raised their voices or had any influence. There are enough difficult considerations here that even with no influence from any outside source it would still be a very vigorous debate. And so, in a sense, the question of any influence of that sort is somewhat extraneous for our debate because it will be vigorous no matter what happens. And we have to deal with the arguments that are raised about this on their own merits, and there are many very well-respected voices here in the United States raising concerns or criticisms who are beyond reproach in terms of in any way being influenced from outside the United States. We will need to deal with those voices and those concerns on their own merits. And I think the same can be said of other countries as well, that there are deep, substantive questions here. I'm sure that each of the countries will have to address those. I am confident that we will be able to address those concerns here and that hopefully, after we've done so, other countries will proceed with their ratifications as well -- and we have every expectation that that will occur. A PARTICIPANT: I would like to ask you, (inaudible) the United States has (inaudible)? MR. ROSNER: $200 million a year. Yes. Well, we do believe -- and the estimates that we sent up to our Congress back in February suggested that the annual cost to American taxpayers would be around $150 to $200 million a year over a period of about 10 years. Since that estimate was made -- and obviously, that estimate was made before we knew which states would be invited into the alliance in Madrid -- since that estimate was made, NATO has now had the opportunity to know which countries are coming in and to look in detail at their readiness to enter the alliance, to develop more precisely a sense of the military requirement of enlargement. And that has led to the new studies and estimates that NATO has produced. As Secretary Albright and Secretary of Defense Cohen said before the Foreign Relations Committee and our Senate on October 21st, we are now convinced, and the new NATO studies bear this out, that the costs will be substantially below that figure. And it's been reported that the estimates now for all of NATO for common-funded expenses are on the range of $1.5 billion, which means that our share, which has typically been about a quarter of NATO common-funded costs, will be substantially below the $150 to $200 million a year figure. And I think that is being received well in the Senate. There are other expenses, of course, that all the countries must bear through their national military expenditures as well as some bilateral expenses -- for example, our Warsaw initiative, which we have had in progress now for some time and which we expect to continue in the coming year. And those expenses, I'm sure, will be seen as relevant as well by the Congress. But, generally, we think the cost will be below the figure that you cited, and we do think that that will be sufficient for NATO to meet its military obligations; and we think, as well, as all the allies had predicted at Madrid, that the cost, as a result, will be manageable and will be equitably shared by all. And I think that fact was reaffirmed at the Defense Ministerial meeting in Brussels last week. A PARTICIPANT: (Inaudible) calculations concerning the costs there will be huge amounts of the -- more than $100 billion dollars in 10 years. Now this is (inaudible) calculations of the NATO is only $1.5 billion. Who made mistake? MR. ROSNER: There is -- I think in the business of producing estimates at least here in Washington -- and maybe you will find that this rings true in your own experience. Maybe it applies to any government. You know, there's an old law in economics called Gresham's Law which says that bad money chases good money out of circulation. And I think there's sort of a Gresham's Law of estimates as well, where bad estimates tend to chase good estimates out of circulation. And, specifically, with all due respect to the journalistic profession, it is certainly the case here in Washington that journalists jump on whatever the highest figure and the highest estimate is and can't resist the temptation to report it no matter who produces the estimate and no matter what it's based on. We have always felt that some of the estimates that were produced with regard to enlargement were simply not within the range of credible analysis because they were not rooted in the current realities of the security environment of Europe and because they were not rooted in the details of how NATO does business and of what it takes for member states to work together adequately within NATO's military structure. So without pointing a finger of blame at any of the estimates in particular, we have always been extremely confident that the estimates we produced in February were methodologically sound and, if anything, on the high side. And I think that has now been completely borne out by the very detailed estimates that NATO has executed in its recent studies, which go down to the level of detail of specific communications equipment, individual rail lines, particular airports, and all the rest. It's a much higher level of detail than any other study, and I think for that reason should be seen as by far the most credible estimates, at least with regard to the common-funded costs, which was the focus of NATO's study. So I think the estimates that you're talking about have come out over a period of several years. This has been an issue that has had, at least at its start, some uncertainty as to which states would be invited in, as to what the military implications were. And so perhaps with a spirit of charity to the other estimators, I would say that their early estimates did help to enliven the conversation and the debate and examination over this issue. But now we're dealing with known facts. We know what countries will come in. We know what the condition of their military infrastructure is because NATO's military authorities have examined them in great detail. We know what the military requirements will be. We know what the timetable will need to be for integrating the militaries. And so I think we've now moved from a period of guesswork to a period of certainty. The studies that have now been approved at NATO are part of that certainty, not only because they're based on such definite information, but because they now represent a commitment by all 16 allies to the question of what the costs will be and generally how they will be shared. So I think that as a result, we can now start to leave behind some of these earlier estimates that were not based on as much information and certainly did not represent the kind of unified commitment by all the allies. A PARTICIPANT: Mr. Rosner, this is Henry (inaudible). I do have exactly the figures, but (inaudible) government to significantly cut down (inaudible). Do you think this is not rational enough? Do you think it might be (inaudible) future joint NATO policies? MR. ROSNER: Yes. I think one of the things that may surprise some observers in the United States is that there will be reductions in overall force levels in states coming into NATO and that that is fully consistent, or at least it can be fully consistent with the modernization of forces that is necessary in order to integrate into NATO. I think some people have not focused much on this issue here or in other places, [and] perhaps imagine it's going to require increases in force levels -- and that's simply not the case in Poland and elsewhere and in our own country. We've seen substantial force reductions even as the capabilities of forces become stronger. I think that as Poland makes its adjustment from the kind of forces and the kind of force structure it had when it was part of the Warsaw Pact, it's a very different kind of structure than NATO's militaries. And Poland clearly has recognized that fact with the kind of planning documents that it has produced in its 15-year plan and the kind of documents it submitted to NATO as part of the (accession?) talks. The determination to make the kind of reforms in personnel structure is very welcomed. These are not easy changes for any country, but they are very necessary changes in order to produce a modern, well-structured military force with the proper kind of ratio of senior officers to enlisted and non-commissioned officers on a par with other Western democracies. I think as the debate goes forward, members of Congress will come to recognize this and will wisely understand that the important variables with regard to Poland's military and the other militaries is not the total number of men in arms, but the ability to work together with the rest of NATO -- things like English language training, ability to work in common operations with NATO, common communications equipment and protocols, and things of that sort. And that quite properly is what Poland has focused on and what the NATO studies focused on. I think that should make sense to members of our Congress. We were just up there yesterday and conducted a briefing for many of the key Senate staff, and this was a briefing that members of the Department of Defense and uniformed officers from our Joint Staff conducted and were stressing many of these same points. I think the sense I got was that this was a point that these Senate staff members understood very well. A PARTICIPANT: What do you think -- which (inaudible) the consequences of the (inaudible) NATO in the future? MR. ROSNER: Well, as you say, France withdrew from the integrated military structure in the 1960s, and as a result is not a part of integrated military structure and not a part of some of the budget categories in NATO's common-funded budgets. At the same time, France has indicated over past years its desire to reintegrate into the military structure. That is a complicated question and we're still not to the point of closure on that, and there have been many discussions over recent months with France over this. We have welcomed the continuation of those discussions and that process. Even without being involved in the integrated military structure, France, of course, remains a key ally involved in a whole range of alliance decisions and actions. I think the fact that we do see not only Poland and the other two new members coming in, but also see Spain integrating into the military structure and France indicating an interest in reintegrating into the military structure is very beneficial for the alliance. In part I think it is an important indicator. The countries throughout Europe see NATO as relevant and effective, and that is also bolstered by the high level of interest by other states that have applied for membership or neutral states who are debating the question of whether to seek membership. And as these states come, in they can make quite a contribution. They can spread the burdens of security. They can make a financial contribution. They can make a military contribution, a geographic contribution. So we welcome the interest and we hope that those efforts continue to proceed. But with France, there are a number of complicated issues that need to be worked through. A PARTICIPANT: Of the translated aggression that is speaking a lot of this (inaudible) and developing the relationship to Russia too much (inaudible) really necessary for us to try to establish a kind of inter opposition in NATO' and can it improve future strength and future power of NATO? MR. ROSNER: Well, I don't know if I would go that far. France fully has supported the efforts to develop a European Security and Defense Identity within NATO, not apart from NATO. The course that NATO, including its European allies, have taken. France fully supported the decisions to invite in the three new members, and, in fact -- I think it's well known -- supported even a broader range of new members, and so fully supports the process of enlargement. France signed on the conclusions of the new studies on the military requirements, but also the resource implications of enlargement and how they will be shared as well as the declaration that came out of the recent Brussels Defense Ministerial which spoke to the sharing of those burdens. And France has completely been supportive of the efforts to build the new relationship with Russia within a NATO context. So, I think France has been very much a part of the same strategy that we've pursued, and I don't see it breaking away or dissenting, or certainly not blocking the kind of policy we've taken, and I think the kind of interest that France has expressed over the years in a strong European voice on security matters has been accommodated within NATO. The development of the Combined Joint Task Force approach, the development of a strong European Security and Defense identity within NATO, the reform of the command structure, which has been quite dramatic, and has in many ways created very strong and meaningful opportunities for European leadership within the NATO command structure. All of these, I think, are very much in line with the interest that France has shown over the years for a European voice within NATO and European leadership on security questions. And we don't in any way view that as adverse to us. We've long supported the entire project of European integration. We've long supported the notion of Europe taking responsibility for many new aspects of trans-Atlantic security, and I think that should be intuitive. Our Congress certainly is always pressing us to make sure that Europe is playing its fair part. So I don't think that should be in any way seen as in contradiction to the kind of agenda that we have. A PARTICIPANT: Last time in NATO which is called (inaudible) that last time (inaudible) diluting the essence of the NATO alliance? MR. ROSNER: Absolutely not. I think it's just the opposite. I'm not sure if I would call it a special deal. I think it is a very important accord that creates a better relationship and certainly a new relationship between NATO and Moscow. That, you know, strengthens NATO, it doesn't dilute it, because it strengthens the security of each of its members. If Russia is developing in a positive manner and continues along the path of democratic and economic reforms and security cooperation with its neighbors and with all of the trans-Atlantic community, that obviously makes a very substantial contribution to the security of each of NATO's members and to all of the countries of Central Europe including Poland. The [NATO-Russia] Founding Act we see as contributing to that goal. There is nothing in the Founding Act that compromises NATO's ability to make decisions independently, to act effectively, and to carry out its own policies as it sees fit in order to respond to the security environment. It included no compromises of NATO's policy. The [NATO-Russia] Permanent Joint Council that was created is important and really is a valuable forum for NATO to discuss a range of issues with Russia, and it's really a two-way street. It's not only a place where Russia can raise issues, but it's a place where NATO can raise issues and ask questions of Russia as well. And we've already seen that in the operation of the Permanent Joint Council. But the Permanent Joint Council, as Secretary Albright stressed in the hearings before Senator Helms and his committee on October 7th, in no way compromises the fact that the North Atlantic Council is and will remain the sole and supreme decision-making body at NATO. And as Senator Helms and Senator Biden themselves concluded in their letter to their colleagues, they said that they had become convinced as a result of the exchange with Secretary Albright and the other hearings that the Permanent Joint Council in no way creates any undue influence over NATO, much less that it in any way creates a veto over NATO and its own policies. So I think there's no reason to fear that the Founding Act or the Permanent Joint Council dilutes NATO or hampers NATO's operations or will get NATO to open up areas of decision-making that it should not. The Defense Minister was reported in the press, when conversation wandered into some issues that were not part of the agreed-upon agenda between NATO and Russia, General (Sergeyev?) very politely reminded all concerned that that was the fact and that certain issues were not going to be discussed in that kind of forum. I think that should give reassurance to anybody who thought that this somehow was going to open up parts of NATO policy in a way that they should not be opened up. I think over time we will see, and I think everybody involved will come to recognize, that the Founding Act and the Permanent Joint Council made NATO and the security of each of its members stronger and not weaker, and was really a win-win step for NATO, for its members, and for Russia. A PARTICIPANT: (Inaudible.) MR. ROSNER: Well, the Baltic States have indicated an interest in membership and, as not only we have said but as all of NATO's members said, in the Declaration that was issued from Madrid, we view their interest in membership as fully legitimate. There is nothing about the history or geography of the Baltics or any other European democracy that in any way makes them ineligible or makes their aspirations for membership illegitimate. And clearly, as we go forward and NATO has committed that the door will remain open to future members, NATO's leaders will take another look at that process of adding new members, additional members, [and will look] at the Baltic states in a number of ways because we view their economic performance, their political progress, their security, as important; and obviously, Poland is doing so as well and has taken a number of very important steps in the political conversations that you've had and the joint defense cooperation that have been very beneficial to the Baltics, Lithuania as well as the others. I think it's incumbent on all of NATO's members to keep up those kind of steps, because the goal here that we're all pursuing, after all, is increased security for all of Europe and not just the states that are coming in in this first round. A PARTICIPANT: (Inaudible) plan to build up the common American (inaudible) Corps? MR. ROSNER: Well, I think in terms of those kind of specifics, I would defer to some of my colleagues in the military and I think some of the specifics about how the military requirements of enlargement are to be carried out are still very much under discussion. MR. AMBASSADOR: Jerry, it's a pleasure to see you. MR. ROSNER: Mr. Ambassador, it's my pleasure to join all of you and I look forward to continuing our conversations as we complete our process of ratification here and complete bringing Poland into the alliance. MR. AMBASSADOR: (Inaudible) thank you. (End transcript)