24 April 1998
(April 17: Wide-ranging discussion on NATO enlargement) (5380) Prague -- U.S. Ambassador to NATO Alexander Vershbow says that while there is little doubt the U.S. Senate will ratify NATO enlargement, concerns raised during the debate show how important it is for the three new members "to maintain the momentum of their defense modernization and defense restructuring so that we can dispel the concerns that expansion is somehow going to lead to the weakening of the Alliance." Vershbow, during a question and answer session with the Czech press April 17, said some concerns have surfaced during the Senate debate that "reflect a surprising resurgence of conservative views about the need to preserve NATO as a collective defense organization." He added that the United States and the other Allies "are very impressed by the work that has been initiated, by the swift action on the part of the Czech Armed Forces" to prepare for NATO membership. "It is very important that the Parliamentary support of this week continue to be reflected in the support for the necessary financial resources to support Czech integration." Asked about threats Europe and NATO might face in the coming years, Vershbow said "instability.... And the biggest, biggest risk on the European continent, of course, remains in the former Yugoslavia. While we're optimistic about the situation in Bosnia," he said, "we now see the resurgence of tensions in Kosovo, which continue to bear the seeds of everyone's nightmare scenario of a spill-over into Albania, into Macedonia, possibly igniting another Balkan war." Vershbow said he is "optimistic" about the relationship between NATO and Russia. "We still have problems, of course, in terms of Russian parliamentary perceptions of NATO and NATO enlargement," he conceded. "But I think that these are going to fade over time because there is no objective threat to Russia from NATO or from NATO enlargement." He added that "NATO's development and NATO enlargement will ultimately promote the evolution of a more constructive Russian foreign policy. It may take a while for this psychological transformation to be completed." The ambassador also answered questions from reporters about next year's NATO summit in Washington; the predictability of Russian foreign policy; NATO's open-door policy and possible U.S. Senate resistance to further enlargement; possible U.S. Congressional restrictions on support for new NATO missions; support for NATO military operations in Africa and elsewhere; costs of enlargement; changes in NATO structure or philosophy; and the ability of the three invited new members -- Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic -- to accommodate the military requirements of the Alliance. Following is a transcript of the question and answer session: (Begin text) AMBASSADOR ALEXANDER VERSHBOW U.S. Permanent Representative on the North Atlantic Council Question and Answer Session with the Czech Press on NATO Issues April 17, 1998 American Center Prague, Czech Republic AMBASSADOR VERSHBOW: I won't give a speech; I gave one of those yesterday. I'm here as part of orientation travel. Since I became an ambassador in January, I wanted to visit as a first priority all three of the new member countries. I was in Poland and Hungary over the past ten days, so this is my last stop, and I'm glad I saved this for last, since it was nice to arrive just after the vote by the Czech Parliament. It was particularly nice to see such a strong majority cutting across all of the political parties, except for the communists, but their lack of support doesn't surprise us. I had also hoped that the U.S. Senate would have ratified by this time, but some domestic problems led to a delay in the schedule. I'm quite confident that the Senate will be taking up the issue when they return next week. And we expect that the vote will occur within about two weeks, hopefully by the end of April. And I don't think that there's very much doubt that the vote will be positive, but at the same time there have been some concerns that have surfaced in the debate, which I think are interesting. I don't think it reflects a lack of support for NATO enlargement, but it does reflect a surprising resurgence of conservative views about the need to preserve NATO as a collective defense organization. I think that makes it all the more important -- and this is what I discussed yesterday with Foreign Minister Sedivy and this morning with the Chief of the Defense Staff General Nekvasil and his successor General Sedivy -- important for the Czech Republic and the other two new members to maintain the momentum of their defense modernization and defense restructuring so that we can dispel the concerns that expansion is somehow going to lead to the weakening of the Alliance. The Administration and I think all of the Allies are very impressed by the work that has been initiated, by the swift action on the part of the Czech Armed Forces to reduce the size of the forces and of the senior officer corps, and to put in place a good program that will first focus on NATO interoperability, on training to NATO standards, training more people in the English language skills, ensuring that the command, control and communications are compatible with NATO, and also trying to reform the personnel system so that good people are attracted to the military and will stay in the military. Over the longer term, obviously, equipment will need to be modernized; but from the NATO point of view, that is not the most urgent priority. It is very important that the Parliamentary support of this week continue to be reflected in the support for the necessary financial resources to support Czech integration. NATO feels the commitment to a one-tenth of one percent real increase in defense spending as a percentage of gross domestic product is a good basis for the future. We hope that the economic difficulties don't lead to any wavering in that commitment, because it is very important -- not only for the credibility of the Czech Republic's participation in the Alliance, but also as an example that will open the way to other countries who seek membership to join the Alliance in the future. So, let me stop there and open up the discussion. Q: You've said that you're impressed by the changes in the Czech Armed Forces, but at the same time those questions or issues like interoperability, English language training, and other things, are the most problematic things in our armed forces, which are in very bad shape. My question is, would you identify any of those issues (inaudible -- as making it hard for the Czech military to contribute?) AMB. VERSHBOW: Well, I didn't come here with a different message than what the Czech Armed Forces have been receiving from NATO as a whole, from the NATO military authorities who have been working actively over the past year, even before the signature of the protocol in December. Yet, there is a lot of work to be done. The overall process is going to take ten years or more, but I think there is agreement between NATO and the Czech authorities that certain basic measures of interoperability have to be achieved, many of them have to be achieved by next April, when the Washington Summit will occur, so that the Czech Republic is a positive contributor from the very first moment. English language training -- it is underway -- has to be perhaps intensified and expanded. We have been doing our part on a bilateral basis to help assist in the English language training, but of course, a lot of that has to be done here at home. So, I don't think there is any difference as to what are the priorities. The key is, as I said, in keeping up the momentum and making sure the resources are there to support the necessary hard work that will have to be done. Q: In January you said that Europe is still a dangerous place, in your speech. Could you describe the threats that Europe and NATO would face in the next years? AMB. VERSHBOW: The big threat to Europe is still instability which can spring from a lot of different sources, from nationalism, from local and regional conflicts between states, from the continued lack of economic progress in some parts, particularly in southeastern Europe, that could breed tensions that could spill over to conflicts between states. And the biggest, biggest risk on the European continent, of course, remains in the former Yugoslavia. While we're optimistic about the situation in Bosnia, we now see the resurgence of tensions in Kosovo, which continue to bear the seeds of everyone's nightmare scenario of a spill-over into Albania, into Macedonia, possibly igniting another Balkan war. So, those are threats on the European continent. There are also threats to Europe from beyond the frontiers of Europe proper: proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, terrorism which could affect the security of European nations. It could also affect the safety of NATO forces, should they have to operate beyond Europe's frontiers. So, a lot of these threats are ones which NATO is increasingly focusing on, and I think that enlarging the Alliance certainly broadens the coalition of states that are united in trying to deal with these threats. At the same time NATO, through its different outreach initiatives -- enlargement, Partnership for Peace, the relationship with Russia, Ukraine -- is trying in a proactive way to shape the security situation so that we can prevent some of these sources of tension from getting out of control. That's a long answer to a short question. Q: I was wondering how is NATO successful in its communication with Russia -- I assume there are still some problems or some heated debate. How do you see it? AMB. VERSHBOW: Well, so far the NATO-Russian relationship has been moving along in a rather constructive way. Since the signing of the Founding Act last May, we've seen desire on the part of the Russian representatives in Brussels to look for concrete areas where NATO and Russia can cooperate, to use the new Permanent Joint Council as a serious forum for discussion and consultation on issues of common concern such as the situation in Bosnia, the conduct of the military operation in Bosnia where the Russians have a significant presence. And they're not, despite the fears of some critics such as Henry Kissinger, using this Permanent Joint Council as a means of trying to obstruct NATO's business or to somehow undermine the work that is going on within the Alliance. So, I'm optimistic about the NATO-Russia relationship. We still have problems, of course, in terms of Russian parliamentary perceptions of NATO and NATO enlargement. But I think that these are going to fade over time because there is no objective threat to Russia from NATO or from NATO enlargement. At the end of the day, it will have improved Russian security by strengthening stability to their west, and the Russians -- if they have real security problems, they're to the south and to the east. And so I think that the future for the NATO-Russian relationship is pretty bright. I think it's also important that we stay on course with NATO enlargement with the open door because it's important not to give the Russian hard-liners the impression that if they make enough noise, if they make enough threats, NATO is going to back off and return Central Europe to the status of a buffer zone or a sphere of influence. The Russians have to learn that they have to play by the same rules as the rest of Europe and that they have to treat their neighbors now as sovereign states and not as subjects of intimidation. NATO's development and NATO enlargement will ultimately promote the evolution of a more constructive Russian foreign policy. It may take a while for this psychological transformation to be completed. Q: Do you know if there are any plans about the summit in Washington next year, when the candidates, the new members will be accepted. Is Russia going to be there or do you know about the -- AMB. VERSHBOW: Right now, we just announced the dates of the summit, April 24-25. Right now the scenario is that the first day there would be the summit of the 19 NATO members and then on the second day, there would be some kind of summit-level meeting of all the members of Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council. So it's our hope that Russia would be present in that meeting. As occurred in Madrid, the Russians may choose to be represented at a lower level than President Yeltsin, which would be disappointing, but that's their decision to make. There's no current plan for a summit-level meeting of the NATO-Russian Permanent Joint Council, either in Washington or some other place. But it's always a possibility. I should just add one point for clarification, also, that although the summit will be the occasion to formally welcome the leaders of the three new members into the Alliance, the actual legal admission of the new members may come some months before the summit. It depends when all the NATO parliaments complete ratification and when they and the three new members deposit their instruments of ratification in Washington. When that occurs, everybody is a member, in a legal sense. It doesn't require a summit to actually give you a vote at the NATO table. Q: Do you think that from the perspective(?) (inaudible) the foreign policy of the Russians is more predictable now than two years ago? AMB. VERSHBOW: Well, I'm not sure I'd make any comparison, but it certainly remains somewhat unpredictable. We've seen the Russian politics go through cycles of surge of reform and innovation and then a certain slowing of the momentum and even retrenchment. And I think that we're in one of those phases now where Yeltsin has decided to break some eggs -- to use the old communist metaphor -- by sacking his whole government and trying to put some younger people in charge, who will drive the reform process forward. So, I think that in that sense, we're hopeful that this will lead to an advance that can make the reforms more irreversible, tackle some of the unfinished business that needs to be done in terms of privatization, establishing a stronger legal framework for the market, fighting corruption so that Russia can become more of a normal country, which is what we all hope to see. Q: If all goes as expected, we can think that one stage in NATO expansion or NATO history is now being basically completed and it's necessary to start the next stage. I don't know how far work has progressed on the new strategy. Will there be any options for the size or for which countries would be admitted and when, and what (inaudible) would the different options would make? And do you think that further expansion would encounter much more resistance in the American Senate? AMB. VERSHBOW: There are a couple of questions there. First, I should say that the open door is still a fundamental principle of American policy and NATO policy. The logic, the strategic rationale for admitting the Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary is valid for other countries who meet NATO standards and whom the Allies agree would strengthen the Alliance and strengthen European security. In fact, we want to maintain the momentum of the process because the prospect, the possibility of NATO membership has had a very powerful and positive effect on all countries in the region in terms of taking the tough decisions that are needed for political, economic and military reform, solving problems with their neighbors, and taking a responsible approach in international relations. So, the open door is going to be an integral part of the new strategic concept that is now being discussed in NATO and is supposed to be completed before the Washington Summit. Other aspects of that document we can talk about, including expanding NATO's potential to act, in dealing with some of the new threats I was talking about -- proliferation terrorism, etcetera. Now, as far as how far can we go in expanding the Alliance, I don't think there'll be discussion of any specific numerical limits on enlargement. Obviously, there is going to be over time some natural limit. NATO can't expand indefinitely and become a universal organization, like the OSCE. It will at some point begin to lose its cohesion and its ability to take decisions, and it will cease to have the coherent, integrated military capabilities which are key to NATO's success in doing all the new missions. But, I think that issue isn't going to arise for the next decade and I think that one could envisage several more stages of the enlargement process and then these will bring countries in that, like the first three, are prepared not only to receive some benefits but also to shoulder burdens and common security. As far as the reaction of the U.S. Senate, I think that it will be more difficult to sell future candidates than the first three for several reasons. There will be continued concern about the "watering-down" of NATO. That puts a tremendous responsibility on the first three to perform well in their military reforms, to stick with the commitments that they've made, to continue to take positive actions such as their contributions in Bosnia, their readiness to support us, as was the case in the Iraq confrontation -- so that they become role models that we can then point to when we discuss this with the Senate. We can say, the first three strengthen NATO unambiguously, so you shouldn't worry about the other ones. Now, of course, domestic constituencies also will be a factor -- there are fewer Slovenian-Americans than Polish-Americans, or even Czech-Americans. Also, some countries have a different image in the United States based on pre-1999 history, so it's going to require more active efforts to familiarize our senators with the achievements of the countries, and how strong democracy that has developed since 1989 really is, when we get to that stage. As to when the next stage will be, we are committed to reviewing the whole process of enlargement at the 1999 summit. That doesn't necessarily mean there'll be another round of invitations. It's a possibility, or there could be a decision to wait a little bit longer. It depends on a number of things, including just how ready the candidates are at that time. Q: So are you afraid that now the Senate might say yes to the new members but at the same time rule out or postpone all other stages of enlargement? AMB. VERSHBOW: The Senator Warner amendment, yes. Well, we're concerned that there is this amendment on the table and that it has generated some support, but we are going to strongly oppose that when it comes to the floor of the Senate, for several reasons. First, because we believe, as I've said, that this open door is a fundamental part of the policy, that it makes sense and has shown its wisdom already, and that we should not send the wrong signal to other candidates that their possibilities of joining NATO when they meet the same standards as the first three are now in doubt, that somehow the United States has lost confidence in its own principles and is revisiting the whole enlargement strategy. But we don't think it's really necessary because we have consulted with the Congress throughout the implementation of the enlargement strategies in 1994. We consulted very closely before making the decision in Madrid to invite only three rather than five, and we'll consult fully before we make any decisions on the American position on round two. And of course, the Senate gets to have its say when ratification comes around for future members. We think it's both unwise and unnecessary, and I'm pretty confident that Senator Warner won't have 51 votes.... Q: (Inaudible)...with the House, with appropriations...could there be any restrictions on new NATO missions? AMB. VERSHBOW: Well, it's in both the House and the Senate that we've seen some sentiment in favor of restricting NATO's new missions. Senator Ashcroft, one of the two members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee who voted against the resolution that was approved -- I think the vote was 16 to 2 -- has been promoting an amendment that would restrict the ability of the United States to engage in NATO operations under Article Four, under so-called out-of-area operations, unless they met a strict test of representing a threat to independence, territorial integrity or security of one of the members of the Alliance. And there is similar sentiment in the House. Peacekeeping is a term that is not very popular in the United States. It's seen as something that causes militaries to lose their backbone, and American forces should only engage in real war-fighting and not in low-intensity missions like peacekeeping. And added to this is the general domestic focus of the new generation of American politicians -- lack of experience in dealing with the outside world and a desire to reduce America's overseas commitments, now that we have a period of relative peace. So this is going to be a challenge to deal with for this administration and future administrations. But I think that we have a strong case to make that we still have vital interests in Europe, that American engagement remains indispensable to the security of security of Europe, and that American global leadership is also essential to protect our basic interests including having an open international economic system. So, we'll just have to continue to work on this problem. Certainly, on the issue of NATO's role, we think that it's a great advantage for the United States to be able to act in partnership with Allies and indeed with other countries through the Partnership for Peace when there is an out-of-area challenge. Bosnia is a great example of a broad multinational coalition organized and commanded by NATO that enables United States to reduce the burdens that otherwise might fall upon it. It would be ironic if under an amendment, such as Senator Ashcroft's, it became easier for the United States to act unilaterally than with partners. We obviously have the ability to act unilaterally if necessary, if we can't find partners to do something. But it's certainly better in political, military, and economic terms whenever possible to act through an Alliance. That's why NATO remains so important to the United States. Q: ....do you think that NATO, and especially citizens and lawmakers in large countries, is prepared to support -- and pay for -- an action, a military operation led by NATO, for example, in Africa? Do you think that NATO could change (to be) a new "world cop"? AMB. VERSHBOW: Well, you know Africa way not be the most likely place for NATO to intervene in a future crisis, although NATO members have over the years in different situations been involved, including the United States. Our view is that as we look at NATO's new strategic concept, we shouldn't artificially restrict the possibility of NATO acting in places beyond Europe, if there's a consensus within NATO to do so. That's always the safeguard. If somebody doesn't believe NATO is the right instrument for dealing with the problem outside of Europe, it has the ability to block that -- whether it's Luxembourg or the United States or countries in between in their size. But NATO needs the capabilities to at least have the option to act, whether it's a peacekeeping mission or a peace-enforcement mission near Europe or even farther afield. And that's one of our priorities: to see that the European members of the Alliance develop the capacities for projecting power, protecting military force, so that we at least have the options available to us, and that it's not just the United States that has these capabilities, that there's an unfair burden-sharing in the process. So, again, I don't think that Africa is the most likely place where there would be a NATO consensus, but it shouldn't be excluded either politically or legally from the potential range of scenarios where NATO might act. Q: (Inaudible)...based on the experience of last ten years of NATO enlargement...(inaudible) could be taken at this low level which surprised even (inaudible) last December? AMB. VERSHBOW: We're comfortable with the conclusions of the NATO military planners that this is the right estimate of the collective costs to the Allies of integrating the three new members. It was based on what we considered to be a realistic assessment of the requirements by the military authorities at SHAPE. It was not an understatement of the requirements in order to drive a lower figure. It was an honest assessment. Then we sent people out to survey the actual facilities and infrastructure, and we found that thanks to the highly militarized state of your economy, thanks to the directives of Moscow during the bad old days of the Warsaw Pact, that NATO is inheriting some pretty good facilities. They need some modernization, some adaptation to meet NATO standards, but we discovered that the needs were less than we had predicted. The air fields are good. They may need to have some upgrading of the support facilities so that if NATO troops have to come in to reinforce the Czech Republic, there is better combat support capability on the ground. Communications obviously have to be upgraded so that the systems can talk to each other. But, overall we think that's the right number. It's not the whole cost of NATO enlargement. A lot of the cost has to be borne by the Czech defense budget, the Polish defense budget, the Hungarian defense budget. There too, staying on the course that has been agreed, with the modest increases in real terms, should be enough to meet the targets that NATO has set. And then there is the third piece, which I mentioned in a different context, namely, that the European members of NATO need to upgrade their power projection capabilities, because the same forces that we need to go to the Gulf or to go someplace on the southern shores of the Mediterranean are the forces that are needed to reinforce the new members in a time of crisis. So, we'll continue to put the heat on our European Allies. Q: So do you think it's realistic to think that it could be kept on this level? AMB. VERSHBOW: I think it is. Yes, I think it is. Now, there may be specific areas where the United States may provide bilateral support -- but I'm not here to make any promises in that regard. The budgetary situation is tight. But we have provided limited assistance, particularly in areas like training through the Warsaw initiative, through foreign military financing programs, through the IMET -- International Military Education Training program. And some of that we, I think will continue even after you're a member. So, taken together and given the fact that we don't face the immediate threat of aggression from the Soviet Union or Russia or anybody else, we can take this phased approach over a ten-year period. Q: Do you think there will be some new moves from West European members of NATO, especially France, for instance, to make some changes in NATO structure and the philosophy? AMB. VERSHBOW: We always have challenges coming from Paris when it comes to NATO -- although sometimes these are blown out of proportion. When serious decisions need to be made, whether it was on enlargement, on the NATO-Russia Founding Act, on the whole operation in Bosnia going back over the last three years, the French have been strong supporters of the approach the United States has favored and they have been major contributors to NATO operations. But the French do have a somewhat different view of the future role of the Alliance. I think the French still have an ambivalent attitude because of the strength of the U.S. role and our leadership in NATO. The French are less comfortable with American leadership and would like to promote a stronger European identity in the defense sphere. We think that we've managed to create a framework that has both continued strong American engagement and stronger European responsibility; this is in the so-called European Security Defense Identity within NATO, whereby the Western European Union can be given the lead in some future operations without American combat troops, but draw upon logistic planning, intelligence, and other support from NATO. President Clinton is strongly supportive of the development of this stronger European defense identify, feeling that it's good for the United States to see the Europeans take more responsibility and good for our Congress to see this. So, we hope that in the context of developing the new strategic concept, we can find common ground with the French based on preserving the transatlantic link in American engagement, while at the same time strengthening the European defense identity. And maybe even seeing this lead to what we failed to achieve last year, which is France's re-integration in the NATO military structure, which we think would be a net plus for the strength and cohesion of the Alliance. Q: You spoke about how much it's going to cost to accommodate the new members into NATO structures, but we have seen from historic examples that it is difficult for the armies of new members to accommodate to the requirements, the military requirements of the Alliance. How much time do you give the Czech Army to get to the level of, say, Germany, the Netherlands, (inaudible)?. AMB. VERSHBOW: Well, I think the expectation among the NATO military authorities is that ten years is a realistic period for the full, well, not full but the essential transformation of the Czech armed forces. We've been negotiating with Czech military authorities the so-called target force proposals, which are the equivalent of the force goals that Allies accept each year in the NATO defense planning process. These are spread over several years, and there are some target force proposals that need to be satisfied within the next one to two years. This comes back to the basic requirements for interoperability, compatible communications, modernization of certain essential pieces or infrastructure that would enable NATO to reinforce in time of a crisis. But others of these target force proposals are ones that we expect would take five, six, seven years, depending on the issue. So, having this kind of a phased approach is, we think, good enough; it's sufficient for NATO and compatible with our desire to see the Czech economy is not somehow thrown out of balance by putting excessive emphasis on defense spending. Your long-term stability as a good ally, of course, depends fundamentally on the economic conditions in the country, so we don't want to in any way suggest that the needs of NATO somehow be at the expense of economic development here at home. Q: One small question. You went to Hradec Kralove yesterday. So when will it be decided -- or will there be such a decision on whether there will be some NATO facilities in the three new members? AMB. VERSHBOW: I'm not sure I know the exact timetable. I think the final decisions won't be made until after the formal admission of the now members, whether that's the end of this year or early next year. So I really can't say -- this is being handled by people in a different part of the alliance. These are not issues that we ambassadors directly engage on. But I think that some facilities may be seen as better than others for receiving NATO funds to do the necessary upgrading. But it is still up to the Czech government to decide whether other facilities should be modernized on a national basis without NATO assistance. NATO doesn't dictate what nations do for their own national defense. (End text)