US DEPARTMENT OF STATE DAILY PRESS BRIEFING JUNE 20, 1994 U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE DAILY PRESS BRIEFING I N D E X Monday, June 20, 1994 Briefer: Michael McCurry ............... NORTH KOREA Attempts to Confirm Kim Il-song's Offer .........11-13,16 Bases for Resuming U.S./DPRK Dialogue............11-14 Information from IAEA on Diversion of Material ..13 Status of Sanctions Resolution ..................13-14 Christopher/Kozyrev Discussions on Resolution ...14 MTCR and other Non-Proliferation Concerns........15 Possibility of North/South Summit ...............15 ................. DEPARTMENT OF STATE DAILY PRESS BRIEFING DPC #95 Monday, June 20, 194, 1:25 P.M. (ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED) .................... Q Korea. MR. McCURRY: Korea. I promised -- Q Could you bring us up to date on what you're doing to try to nail down the veracity or sincerity of the North Korea proposal? Are there talks in New York today? MR. McCURRY: I can only tell you that we are going to move to confirm Kim Il-song's offer through diplomatic channels this week. The details on how we will do that, I just don't have available. Q Is the Secretary talking to anybody about this? Have you made any phone calls about this? MR. McCURRY: The Secretary has discussed North Korea with some of his foreign counterparts. I don't believe he has had a discussion following up the matters that were discussed at the White House this weekend. Q Was he there yesterday for that briefing? MR. McCURRY: No, he was not. He was returning from California, I believe, yesterday. Q Michael, what sort of manifestation of this commitment from the North Koreans are you looking for? Is it a piece of paper, a meeting? What exactly is it you want from them? Not what you'd ask for. How do you want them to -- MR. McCURRY: We would like to see a basis for resuming a dialogue with North Korea, and that basis would be restored if North Korea clarified certain things that had been said to indicate that they are freezing major elements of their nuclear program while these prospective talks take place, and that they are not refueling the reactor nor reprocessing any of the spent fuel that has been removed from the reactor; and that they are maintaining continuity of IAEA safeguards at the facility. Q But the reactor issues aside, do you want a piece of paper from them? Do you want a letter? Is their word good enough? What about this -- MR. McCURRY: We want to seek, as you would expect in diplomatic channels, the type of confirmation that would satisfy the United States and senior policy-makers in this government that they are committed to doing exactly those things that I just indicated. Q What would satisfy the -- what is it that would satisfy the U.S. Government. I mean, I understand what -- I hear clearly what you're saying, but what do you want to flow out of this conversation? MR. McCURRY: We want to see some very specific things about some very specific points I just made -- commitments on no reprocessing, no refueling, and an IAEA continuity of safeguards presence that would allow us to be absolutely certain that those things are being met. Q Will the inspectors who are there be able to do those things or confirm these things, the freezing, the non-reprocessing? MR. McCURRY: They should be. I mean, that's a question I really must refer to the IAEA, because they're in the best position to tell you how they can technically verify things that are within IAEA as a safeguards regime. They should be in a position to be able to do those things, I would think. Q So that are we leaving it up to the IAEA, as we have in the past, to decide whether North Korea has lived up to what it has apparently told Carter? MR. McCURRY: No. As I indicated, the United States will be moving through diplomatic channels to seek confirmations from North Korea. Q Is it at all possible that the United States would send an official representative to North Korea? MR. McCURRY: I don't want to speculate about diplomatic channels. I just don't have those details available. I've told you all I can tell you. Q Is that a possibility that you're considering? MR. McCURRY: I don't want to speculate that that will be a possibility or not a possibility. I don't have any details. Q But you're not ruling it out. MR. McCURRY: I didn't say that. I said I have no details that would allow me to speculate on how that diplomatic channel might be pursued. I just don't have any information that I can share with you. Q Do you have any information on whether they mean the same thing -- North Korea means the same thing by freezing as those steps you laid out, or is that the thing you're waiting to get confirmation on? MR. McCURRY: Freezing major elements of their program, which would include assurances that there are no reprocessing and no refueling of the reactor are specific commitments. We can be assured in specific ways that that confirms the substance of what was presented by President Carter based on his discussions with Kim Il- song. Q Does the United States have any independent ways, aside from the IAEA, of determining that? MR. McCURRY: I can't answer that without discussing how. Again, you understand, probably. Q Can you say "yea" or "nay" on whether the United States, short of sending somebody over there to take a look -- MR. McCURRY: The best and, as we have indicated, the proper way is to have an IAEA safeguards presence that can assure continuity of safeguards. Q Let me follow up on this subject just briefly, and then I have another question, Mike. Is the United States Government confident at the present time with the two inspectors and the cameras and whatever else the IAEA has set up and from the reports we're getting from them that no fuel has been diverted from the cooling pond, no rods have been taken out? Are we satisfied about this? MR. McCURRY: It is our understanding, based on what we have heard from the IAEA, that there's been no diversion of material subsequent to the defueling of the five megawatt reactor. Q And they are able to certify this? MR. McCURRY: They are able to provide us information consistent with that. Q Do you think President Carter's visit to North Korea has made any difference in U.S. effort to get consensus of the tensions against North Korea at the Security Council? MR. McCURRY: No. There's been no change in our desire to consult with other members of the Security Council and continue our efforts in New York to build an international consensus on a sanctions approach that would work in convincing North Korea that it must live up to its international obligations relating to non- proliferation. Q That's different from a sanctions resolution? MR. McCURRY: No. A sanctions resolution is what is under discussion, and the text of that remains a subject of diplomacy underway by Ambassador Albright today, and I'm sure will be part of the Secretary's meetings on Wednesday with the Russian Foreign Minister. Q Mike, the other day Gallucci said that if the high-level U.S.-North Korean talks were to resume, that would presumably suspend the talks about sanctions. If there were to be a North-South Korean summit, would that also make the sanction resolution moot? MR. McCURRY: I think we'd have to discuss that at the point we actually see such a summit take place. It's not profitable to speculate on what might happen to a draft resolution until such time as a summit of that nature actually took place. The premise for a U.S.-DPRK dialogue is the one that I indicated to you earlier. Q My question originally was on the sanctions issue, and I'll just ask your comment on this -- from the Wall Street Journal today. It says that, "Pyongyang's conciliatory rhetoric as transmitted by Carter has all but derailed for now the U.S. effort to win U.N. Security Council approval of a two-phase sanctions plan against Pyongyang." Is that accurate? MR. McCURRY: There's an interpretative analysis written in the New York Times, and so labeled, I believe, as "news analysis." I can't comment on the -- Q The Wall Street Journal. MR. McCURRY: The Wall Street Journal. Q Today. MR. McCURRY: Another learned publication. I believe they're expressing that as an opinion and not as a fact. I just am not in a position to dissect it. Q Just one other follow-up, if I might. Will Mr. Kozyrev and our Secretary of State be discussing the sanctions dispute in Brussels? MR. McCURRY: I believe they will be discussing the sanctions resolution when they meet in Brussels, yes. Q Can you explain why the Secretary wasn't at the debrief yesterday by former President Carter? MR. McCURRY: He was out of town on a personal trip to California, but he remained in telephone contact, I believe, with all of the principles, and certainly with Ambassador Gallucci who was there. I believe Assistant Secretary Lord was there as well, and he had extensive conversations with them throughout the day. Q Mike, while all this is going on with the IAEA, is the Administration at all concerned about North Korean compliance with the Missile Technology Control Regime? MR. McCURRY: I'm sure we are, and we have MTCR-related concerns in the past -- principally, arms transactions that involve Iran and Syria. We've talked about those here before in the past. That remains a fundamental concern of ours as we discuss the North Korean nuclear program. It's not only the acquisition of a device or the enhancement of a program. It's also the ability to proliferate weapons of mass destruction through their own types of arms sales and transfers. Q Have these MTCR issues been considered in planning for the possibility for asking for sanctions at the U.N.? Or will it solely be a nuclear issue? MR. McCURRY: I'm not sure. Our concern in raising a sanctions resolution, as it relates to North Korea, extends to a range of non- proliferation concerns. I'd say we are seeking sanctions because we expect North Korea to abide by certain non-proliferation norms that go beyond a nuclear program and also get into the proliferation of arms technologies. Q Do you have any (inaudible) comment on the agreement of a summit meeting between South and North Korea? MR. McCURRY: We would welcome the convening of a summit between the Presidents of South and North Korea. It would be a constructive first step to resolve their differences through dialogue. Q I can't remember. Were you asked specifically whether there were any meetings scheduled this week in New York with North Korea? MR. McCURRY: I think I gave the answer that I had to give on that. Q You didn't say one way or the other. MR. McCURRY: I just said we will move to confirm the offer this week through diplomatic channels that I don't have any details on. Q I want to get this straight. You have left open the possibility -- though you didn't say -- that somebody might travel to North Korea. You left them the possibility -- MR. McCURRY: No. I never even opened the possibility. I just said I didn't have enough information to even speculate on such a thing. Q I want to ask you if you are considering -- you said you're not going to answer the question. How would -- MR. McCURRY: We could play the message in a bottle. I told you, I'm not speculating on the way in which we are going to conduct this. I've got no details. Q But you left open -- MR. McCURRY: I've no details for you how we will do this. Don't think that this is not painful for me. (Laughter) Q Considering that the smart people who write those guidance understands how the press thinks, speculation is therefore left to us as to whether the United States might be considering direct contacts with the North Koreans on a higher level than the New York venue. MR. McCURRY: I don't want to speculate on that. I certainly understand you free to speculate on it. When we give answers like this, you speculate even more and maybe that's something people will begin to understand a little. ............. (Press briefing concluded at 2:04 p.m.) (###)